Can Computational Tools Revitalize Antitrust Enforcement?
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-13-2023
Abstract
Pricing algorithms have shown the potential to both help and harm competition. Our new series, Computational Antitrust, explores how algorithms can abet tacit collusion, allowing competitors to set prices at anticompetitive levels without active human assistance. This series will introduce the legal and economic theory behind algorithmic collusion, explore its theoretical and empirical risks for competition, and discuss what regulators can and should do to protect competition and consumers from this rapidly advancing technology. Companies increasingly use sophisticated computational tools to compete, particularly in digital markets. Giovanna Massarotto outlines how antitrust agencies must similarly modernize and adopt advanced technologies to address complex antitrust enforcement challenges effectively and remain relevant.
Publication Title
ProMarket
Repository Citation
Massarotto, Giovanna, "Can Computational Tools Revitalize Antitrust Enforcement?" (2023). All Faculty Scholarship. 3261.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/3261