Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-1-2015
Abstract
Among the explanations for state ratification of human rights treaties, few are more common and widely accepted than the conjecture that states are rewarded for ratification by other states. These rewards are expected to come in the form of tangible benefits—foreign aid, trade, and investment—and intangible benefits such as praise, acceptance, and legitimacy. Surprisingly, these explanations for ratification have never been tested empirically. We summarize and clarify the theoretical underpinnings of “reward-for-ratification” theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased international aid, economic agreements, and public praise and recognition following ratification of four prominent human rights treaties. We find almost no evidence that states can expect increased tangible or intangible rewards after ratification. Given the lack of empirical support, alternative explanations seem more appealing for understanding human rights treaty ratification.
Keywords
International law, human rights, treaty ratification, motivations for ratification, tangible rewards, intangible rewards, empirical research
Publication Title
International Studies Quarterly
Repository Citation
Neilsen, Richard and Simmons, Beth A., "Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?" (2015). All Faculty Scholarship. 1687.
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12142
Publication Citation
Published as: Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?, 59 Int'l Stud. Q. 197 (2015).