Forfeiture and Self-Defense
Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
5-1-2016
Abstract
The idea behind someone’s being “liable” to self-defense is that the person has forfeited her rights. This chapter explores how we ought to understand how and why individuals forfeit such rights. Specifically, it claims that forfeiture is a negative normative power, whereby the actor’s voluntary choice to violate another’s rights grounds the loss of his own rights against physical injury. It argues that individuals do not lose “the right to life” but simply claim rights against injury that the defender knows will prevent a culpable rights infringement. It further explores how the self-defense limitations of necessity and proportionality are internal to question of forfeiture itself, rather than being additional limits on the use of force. The chapter further explains why, given the grounding of the forfeiture, the aggressor forfeits only to those who know they must use defensive force. So understood, forfeiture is defeasibly sufficient for all-things-considered permissibility.
Keywords
self-defense, liability, forfeiture, normative power, permissibility
Publication Title
The Ethics of Self-Defense
Repository Citation
Ferzan, Kimberly, "Forfeiture and Self-Defense" (2016). Book Chapters. 19.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_chapters/19
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190206086.003.0012
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190206086.003.0012