Promotion Incentives, Career Decisions, and Police Performance
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-28-2022
Abstract
In the public sector, using incentives as a motivational tool is more constrained than in the private sector, and a lack of promotion incentives may dampen morale, performance, and talent retention. I study how bureaucrats' on-the-job performance and career decisions respond to changes in promotion incentives. I use a unique setting in the Chicago Police Department (CPD), where strict eligibility criteria in the promotion opportunities suddenly reduced the promotion chances of some officers relative to an otherwise similar group of officers. The deterioration of promotion outlook actually induced the ineligible officers to sharply raise arrest performance by 30% as they pursued an alternative career path in high-productivity tactical teams that provided intrinsic rewards. In a large frontline bureaucracy, intrinsic career incentives are a powerful determinant of organizational performance and can compensate for inadequate external incentives.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Taeho, "Promotion Incentives, Career Decisions, and Police Performance" (2022). Reports. 10.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/qc_reports/10