In this article, I consider the prospects for and impediments to judicial cooperation with the United States. I do so by describing a personal journey that began more than twenty years ago when I first taught and wrote about international civil litigation. An important part of my journey has involved studying the role that the United States has played, and can usefully play, in fostering judicial cooperation, including through judgment recognition and enforcement. The journey continues but, today, finds me a weary traveler, more worried than ever about the politics and practice of international procedural lawmaking in the United States. Disputes about the proper roles of federal and state law and institutions in the implementation of the Hague Choice of Court Convention suggest that this little corner of American foreign policy is at risk of capture by forces that, manifesting some of the worst characteristics of domestic politics, would have us host a tea party at The Hague.
procedure, litigation, arbitration, private international law, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, transnational contracts, forum selection, choice of court, forum non conveniens, lis pendens, recognition and enforcement of judgments, international judicial cooperation, ULC, NCCUSL
Southwestern Journal of International Law
Burbank, Stephen B., "A Tea Party at The Hague?" (2012). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law. 406.
American Politics Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, Litigation Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Public Policy Commons
18 Sw. J. Int'l Law 101 (2012)