The past few decades have highlighted the insidious effects of poverty, particularly for poor people who lack access to legal representation. Accordingly, there have been longstanding calls for “Civil Gideon,” which refers to a right to counsel in civil cases that would address issues tied to housing, public benefits, family issues, and various areas of law that poor people are often disadvantaged by due to their lack of attorneys. This civil right to counsel would complement the analogous criminal right that has been constitutionalized. Notwithstanding the persuasive arguments made for and against Civil Gideon, it is less clear why there is such a sharp distinction between civil and criminal legal aid. This Article re-examines longstanding assumptions about the civil-criminal legal aid divide and highlights some underexamined explanations: the legal profession’s historical implication in this division; courts’ unwillingness to use their inherent powers to appoint counsel; and courts’ enduringly narrow understandings of when poor people should be provided with lawyers. These insights prompt alternative reflections on how to best deliver legal services to poor people.
legal aid, legal history, poverty law, social welfare law, criminal justice, right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, civil litigation
Southern California Law Review
Ossei-Owusu, Shaun, "Civil vs. Criminal Legal Aid" (2021). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law. 2833.
Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons
94 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1561 (2021)