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This Chapter proposes an alternative approach to the IANA transition that migrates the existing core contractual requirements imposed by the US government to the existing IANA functions customers. It also advances modest internal accountability revisions that could be undertaken within ICANN’s existing structure. Specifically, it advocates that the Independent Review Tribunal charged with reviewing certain ICANN board of directors-related decisions be selected by a multi-stakeholder committee rather than being subject to approval by ICANN and expanding the grounds for review to cover all of the rubrics recommended by ICANN’s “Improving Institutional Confidence” process in 2008-2009, including fairness, fidelity to the power, cogency of decision making and addressing the public interest. This new tribunal could be drawn from a standing panel of internationally recognized relevant technical experts, as well as internationally recognized jurists. Members of ICANN’s various stakeholder groups and the public should be able to make comments on the proposed bench before final appointment.


Computer law, Internet, electronic commerce, ICANN, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, IANA, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Independent Review Tribunal, grounds for review, fairness, fidelity to the power, cogency of decision making, public interest, tribunal composition

Publication Citation

In 2 Who Runs the Internet?: The Global Multi-Stakeholder Model of Internet Governance 67 (Centre on International Governance Innovation & Chatham House 2017).