Rational choice theory is the dominant paradigm through which scholars of international law and international relations approach treaty design. In this Article, I suggest a different approach using a combination of empirical observations of state behavior and theoretical insights from behavioral economics. I focus on one aspect of multilateral treaty design: namely, treaty reservations and associated legal mechanisms which allow states to vary the degree of their formal commitments to treaties. I call these mechanisms “treaty options.” I argue that the framing of treaty options matters powerfully — and does so in ways inconsistent with rational choice theory, but consistent with insights from behavioral economics. This finding has important implications for the theory, law, and practice of treaty-making and for our understandings of state behavior more generally.
Virginia Journal of International Law
Galbraith, Jean, "Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design" (2013). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law. 1455.
Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Legal History Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons
53 Va. J. Int'l L. 309 (2013)