A great concern with plea-bargains is that they may induce innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes they have not committed. In this article, we identify schemes that reduce the number of innocent-pleas without affecting guilty individuals' plea-bargain incentives. Large compensations for exonerees reduce expected costs associated with wrongful determinations of guilt in trial and thereby reduce the number of innocent-pleas. Any distortions in guilty individuals' incentives to take plea bargains caused by these compensations can be off-set by a small increase in the discounts offered for pleading guilty. Although there are many statutory reform proposals for increasing exoneration compensations, no one has yet noted this desirable separating effect of exoneree compensations. We argue that such reforms are likely to achieve this result without causing deterrence losses.
Exoneration, Compensation, Wrongful Convictions, Judicial Errors, Deterrence
Journal of Law & Economics
Mungan, Murat C. and Klick, Jonathan, "Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convistions Through Exoneree Compensation" (2016). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law. 1440.