Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2007
Abstract
Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.
Keywords
Courts, Torts, Legal Profession
Publication Title
Journal of Legal Studies
Repository Citation
Helland, Eric and Klick, Jonathan, "The Effect of Judicial Expedience on Attorney Fees in Class Actions" (2007). All Faculty Scholarship. 1122.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1122
Included in
Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Economics Commons, Judges Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Legal Studies Commons, Torts Commons
Publication Citation
36 J. Legal Stud. 171 (2007).