Blameworthiness and "Culpability" Are Not Synonymous: A Sympathetic Amendment to Simester
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-21-2024
Abstract
Andrew Simester’s new book, Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Responsibility, Culpability, and Wrongdoing, is a masterful analysis of the doctrines of the general part of the criminal law and the multiple, overlapping functions that those doctrines serve. Along the way, Simester makes explicit what criminal law theorists routinely presuppose—that the ordinary words “blameworthiness” and “culpability” pick out the same moral concept. This essay argues that this assumed equivalence is mistaken: two concepts are in play, not one. Roughly, to be blameworthy is to be justly liable to blaming practices in virtue of being at fault, and to be culpable is to act in a fashion that manifests or issues from insufficient concern for morally weighty interests. Culpability is not identical to blameworthiness, but rather a ground of blameworthiness: to be culpable is one way to be at fault, thus one way to be blameworthy. More importantly, culpability is not the exclusive ground of blameworthiness; an agent can be at fault, hence blameworthy, without being culpable. This essay defends these conceptual claims and draws forth some implications for two theses that Simester advances: that it is morally permissible to punish persons for criminal negligence and that it is unjust to punish persons who don’t deserve it.
Keywords
blameworthiness, culpability, negligence, fault, desert, Simester
Publication Title
Criminal Law and Philosophy
Repository Citation
Berman, Mitchell N., "Blameworthiness and "Culpability" Are Not Synonymous: A Sympathetic Amendment to Simester" (2024). Articles. 438.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_articles/438
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-024-09722-x
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-024-09722-x