Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2007
Abstract
Patent thickets may inefficiently retard cumulative innovation. This paper explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity based regulation through the establishment of a system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold.
Keywords
permits, thickets, license fees, licensing, social costs, infringement, renewal fees, tragedy of the commons, enforcement
Publication Title
Stanford Law Review
Repository Citation
Ayres, Ian and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "Tradable Patent Rights" (2007). All Faculty Scholarship. 177.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/177
Included in
Intellectual Property Law Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, Technology and Innovation Commons
Publication Citation
60 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (2007)