Going the Extra Mile: The Cost of Complaint Filing, Accountability, and Law Enforcement Outcomes in Chicago
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-9-2020
Abstract
Elected leaders rely on "fire alarms" to promote good government: in the presenceof bureaucratic malfeasance, citizens can cry foul, so appropriate remedies can be pur-sued. But what happens when bureaucrats tamper with fire alarms? I explore this inthe context of police misconduct, leveraging the sudden relocation of a complaint cen-ter in Chicago to test how changing the cost of "pulling fire alarms" affects the supplyof information on police wrongdoing. Using rare data on complaints against police, Iuse a difference-in-differences design to estimate civilians’ complaint valuation. I findopportunity cost deters civilians from reporting misconduct, especially for those seek-ing help from police. Using a structural model, I show this increased burden woulddecrease the rate of sustained allegations for failure to provide service but increase therate for constitutional violations. These results shed light on the complicated interplaybetween the cost of civilian oversight and government performance.
Recommended Citation
Ba, Bocar A., "Going the Extra Mile: The Cost of Complaint Filing, Accountability, and Law Enforcement Outcomes in Chicago" (2020). Reports. 8.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/qc_reports/8