Abstract
Discussions about government oversight of large information services platforms have raised questions about the appropriate institutional framework for policy implementation. Effective regulation requires a regulatory platform that is well-informed about the commercial phenomena over which it has supervisory duties, agile and adaptable to respond to an often complex and dynamic industry environment, and able to draw upon multiple policy disciplines to formulate good solutions to observed problems. In concept, a regulatory body well suited to perform this role is the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission enjoys the advantages of having a flexible, scalable mandate, a multi-function configuration that combines competition, consumer protection, privacy, and research tools that enable it to gain the knowledge necessary to meet the analytical challenges posed by Big Tech firms. Since its creation in 1914, the Commission often has struggled to realize the full potential inherent in its institutional design. After identifying the ideal characteristics of an information platform regulator, the Article benchmarks the Commission against these traits and examines obstacles that would impede the agency’s ability to bring its nominal strengths to bear in this sector if its regulatory role were to be enhanced. The Article offers suggestions about how the agency can realize in practice the potential inherent in its institutional design.
First Page
106
Last Page
133
Recommended Citation
Kovacic, William E.
(2024)
"Adaptable Platforms for Platform Regulation: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission,"
Journal of Law & Innovation: Vol. 7:
Iss.
1, Article 6.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.58112/jli.7-1.5
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jli/vol7/iss1/6