Abstract
Ex ante regulation of digital markets seems to be an increasing policy focus globally. Competition is but one area of digital regulation. In some cases, digital regulation is warranted. The question of what motivates regulation specific to the competition space is interesting. Antitrust/competition regulation is but one of many policy tools, and yet the focus globally has been on competition regulation. Understanding when to regulate as well as the nature and scope of regulation has significant potential impact on the future of social welfare in a dynamic setting. Regulate wisely in a way that addresses societal concerns and balances such harms against the potential benefits of innovation in fast moving markets, and society is better off. Regulate poorly or devise a regulatory system that is not nimble enough to promote innovation, and society will be worse off.
In this essay we focus on the cost-benefit analysis of what should take place specific to competition regulation. Some of the problems identified by various commentors may have a better regulatory home with other types of regulation. The idea that competition regulation can solve all societal ills is not merely incorrect but creates a rhetoric of expectations that cannot be satisfied. Such unrealistic expectations will only increase mistrust in government and its institutions. Unfortunately, some of the justifications for antitrust regulation are not consistent. Others are misguided as a matter of theory and empirics. Yet other types of regulation make strong sense but for which antitrust is ancillary rather than core to the problem, such as electoral fraud or privacy.
First Page
27
Last Page
56
Recommended Citation
Sokol, D. Daniel and Zhou, Bo
(2024)
"Antitrust Regulation,"
Journal of Law & Innovation: Vol. 7:
Iss.
1, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.58112/jli.7-1.3
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jli/vol7/iss1/4