BOOK REVIEWS


The importance of Professor Hall’s book transcends that of the ordinary casebook. A pioneering venture, his collection of readings offers not simply a new set of materials for teaching an existing course, but a new conception of the course in Jurisprudence itself. Though courses have been taught under that title for many years in a considerable number of schools, no course in the curriculum has remained less defined in scope, with the possible exception of Administrative Law. Those who tend to think of Jurisprudence primarily in terms of the school of Austin will find themselves carried into strange fields by this volume, which ranges all the way from an extended discussion of the relative intoxicating effects of beer and whiskey to the lofty abstractions of Stammler, by the side of which Austin’s work itself seems of the earth earthly.

Professor Hall’s book deals at length with two subjects almost wholly neglected in the existing English—the two senses of the adjective coincide in this case—textbooks on jurisprudence: (1) the problem of legal method, and (2) the problem of “right” law, more familiarly and forbiddingly known as Natural Law. I, for one, greet this shift in emphasis, and I only hope that the subsequent development of legal thought in this country will confirm Professor Hall’s judgment as to what is of lasting importance in the field of jurisprudence. There is, I think, a dawning realization of the essential sterility of the positivistic approach, a sterility which inheres in the approach itself and is not affected by the accident that at one time the positivist defines the field of legal research as the Will of the Sovereign, and at another as the behavior patterns of judges and policemen. When the search for the Pure Fact of Law is finally abandoned, the problem of right law and a right juristic method will necessarily come to the fore. When that time arrives Professor Hall’s book will be waiting; it may even help to hasten it.

So far as the work of selection itself is concerned, it may be said that it is a job well done, which reflects the solid scholarship for which the editor has become known in this country. To be sure, Professor Hall has not performed the miracle of selecting and leaving intact at the same time. Everyone will find something to quarrel with in the book, either in the form of omission or undue abridgment. I miss certain names in the list of authors, particularly those of Hume and Gény. It is unfortunate that the book does not make available in English materials hitherto untranslated, for with the exception of ten pages on Duguit the editor has, I believe, taken his selections entirely from existing translations. In some cases the editor seems to me to have carried the process of abridgment to the point where total omission would have been preferable. I think in this connection particularly of two important articles by Llewellyn and Dickinson which have been cut almost to unintelligibility. On the other hand, one is sometimes amazed to see how much of value the editor can crowd into thirty pages, as, for example, in the chapter on Primitive Law.

In general the editor seems to have followed the prevailing practice in compiling “representative passages”, that is to say, he has selected those passages which are deemed to indicate most adequately “what the author stands for”. I wonder if this is always the best basis of selection. Often what an author “stands for” is much less important than how he got to
where he is standing; the negative side of a man’s work, his critique of opposing views, is often—perhaps usually—more important than his affirmations. Among the moderns, this is particularly true of Kelsen. To me the thing valuable in Kelsen is his penetrating criticism of the “sociological” (i.e., descriptive, empirical) approach to law. Despite the fact that Professor Hall’s book contains six selections from Kelsen, the reader will get little insight into this important side of his work. Perhaps the lack of translations is to blame here. Perhaps in any event my criticism runs to the whole system of “selected readings” and not to Professor Hall’s execution of it.

In a book of selected readings the arrangement or sequence of subjects is a matter of secondary importance. The instructor is always at liberty to rearrange the chapters to suit his own tastes and teaching methods. Yet the problem of the proper sequence of subjects is a difficult one, and one welcomes whatever help can be obtained from the editor. I must confess some doubts concerning the teachability of Professor Hall’s arrangement. He begins with the problem of Natural Law. There is much to be said for this. A concern with the problems of justice and right law furnishes the driving force for the whole subject of jurisprudence; it is well in assembling the works to put the mainspring in first. Yet from another viewpoint, bearing in mind the necessity of enticing the student into a forbidding subject, it is an unfortunate beginning. The abstract nature of Professor Hall’s first chapter, together with the paradoxical and dogmatic assertions contained in these pages, may frighten away those not endowed by nature with a yen for the higher and remoter things of law. It is of course true that the views of the Natural Law philosophers are no more bizarre than many contemporary opinions. One will search in vain in Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Burlamaqui for anything as far afield as the assertion of Thurman Arnold that man is, in his essential nature, so altruistic that we shall have to consider imposing legal restraints on his generosity when the progress of a dawning age of enlightenment has relieved him from the artificial taboos which at present keep him respectably selfish. But where contemporary nonsense has a certain stimulating quality, ancient nonsense is apt to be dull, and I am very much afraid that many who might profit from a reading of Professor Hall’s book will bog down, perhaps never to rise again, in his first chapter.

Analytical Jurisprudence, the general heading of Part Two, covering over three hundred pages, seems to me a rubric of doubtful value. In traditional usage, Analytical Jurisprudence connotes two historically related but fairly distinct things: (1) the imperative theory of law; (2) the analysis of legal concepts like right, duty, fact, event, person, etc. Professor Hall makes it include still another thing, legal method. (See, for example, the headings Logic and Law, The Syllogism, Analogy.) The resulting hash seems to me to fall a little below the tolerable limit for good hash.

After deciding to adopt the book for my own course I spent some time in attempting to eliminate the objections just described through a rearrangement of the chapters. The result of this experience was a new insight into the difficulties which confronted Professor Hall and a new sense of modesty before the task of making a book written by more than a hundred con-

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1. “We suggest that the formula of the new social philosophy which is appearing may be the fundamental axiom that man works only for his fellow man; that it is this tendency which must be curbed by law, ethics, and common sense, so that there may be incidental room in the system for the man who works only for personal gain, just as there was incidental room in the old economic creed for the humanitarian.” ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1933) 263.
tributors read like one written by a single author. Nevertheless, I am at present inclined toward a rearrangement along the following lines:

I. Theories of the Fact of Law.  
   (1) The Historical School, 87-122, including Primitive Law, 845-874, and Law and Custom, 875-948.  
   (2) The Imperative School, 395-436.  
   (4) The Vienna School. Scattered passages from Kelsen, supplemented by Kunz, The “Vienna School” and International Law.

II. The Problems of Justice and Right Law. Here I would include not only Natural Law in its various forms, 3-86, 123-164, but also the discussions of utilitarianism, since the principle of utility purports to be a criterion of right law. 165-198.

III. Problems of Legal Method.  
   (1) Scientific Method Generally, 675-766.  
   (2) Legal Method, 539-586, 341-394, 587-642.  
   (3) Analysis of Basic or Recurring Concepts, 437-538.

I realize that this arrangement is vulnerable to some criticisms which cannot touch Professor Hall’s, but the problem in the end is one of compromise, and perhaps the outline given may be of use to others in finding their own line of least resistance through these materials. In any event, Professor Hall has done the labor of selection much too well to justify anyone in rejecting the book simply because he does not find the sequence of subjects to his liking.

Lon L. Fuller.†

2. Under this awkward title I mean to include all the points of view which are concerned primarily with the sources of law rather than its content, with its definition rather than its propriety. I would have preferred the title Varieties of Legal Positivism but for the ambiguity of the term "positivism". As a matter of fact the term "legal positivism" and its various derivatives seem to be used in at least three different senses in discussions of legal philosophy. (1) In the original sense of Austin a "positive law" is something set (cf., positus) by human will. If "positivism" is used to describe this point of view the term becomes practically coextensive with the imperative theory, and, of course, definitely excludes the view of the Historical School that law is something which in the long run is not made but grows. (2) Under the influence of usage in general philosophy, particularly in connection with the philosophy of Comte, the term "legal positivism" is today often used in the sense of an approach to law which excludes metaphysical entities, and deals only with observed and unembroidered facts and phenomena. This is Duguit's usage, and it excludes not only the romantic metaphysics of the German Historical School, but also the more sober metaphysics involved in Austin's concept of sovereignty. (3) The term is, however, most needed and perhaps most commonly used today in a third and broader sense. In this sense it stands in opposition to the view that law is something which cannot be talked about without being altered in the course of being talked about. It asserts a faith in the existence of a raw datum of law which can be sought out, examined, and defined, and it asserts that the quest of this Pure Fact of Law is an undertaking important enough to call for the expenditure or great quantities of human energy. It was in this sense that the term was previously used in this review, and in this sense it is broad enough to embrace all the schools listed above, though in order to include Kelsen it is necessary to make the qualification that with him the Pure Fact of Law is not an external phenomenon, but an internal necessity (or is it merely, convenience?) of thought.

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In the third edition of this book, published originally in 1934, the authors have endeavored to keep abreast of their subject in two ways: (1) by adding additional chapters setting forth phases, not previously considered, of the relation of government to business; and (2) by revision to include laws and Supreme Court decisions almost up to the last minute before the book went to press. The authors have also added two chapters, designated Business and Government, and Theories of Constitutional Protection, which deal, one with the economic approach, the other with the legal. The emphasis throughout the book, however, is factual rather than philosophical, and the two chapters mentioned, which outline the economic and legal approach to the problem, can scarcely be considered adequate preparation for the remaining chapters which, in as great detail as the size of the book permits, describe the exact legislative acts by which the government seeks orderly control of business and the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in regard to many of these as well as to previously existing laws.

While the problem of government relation to business is as old as the science of law or of economics, it is only within the relatively recent past that the problem has been considered a separate one, distinct from either economics or law, and the writers are to be commended for their sincere effort to meet a need for information in this particularized field by giving to inquiring students one book through which they may acquire a working knowledge of the present relations of government to business. The book is, therefore, an exposition of what is; with but little discussion of what might, or perhaps, should be. Thus constituted, it becomes an excellent source book of political science. The style is easy, the facts set forth accurately, the conclusions conservative and well documented, and the decisions of the various courts intelligently and accurately inserted and discussed. While the book is of unusual length, if one considers it as a text, it is difficult to see how it could be cut down without omitting material parts. In fact, the third edition, as compared with previous editions, seems to indicate that the writers have felt they were under a tremendous urge to increase, rather than to restrict, the size by adding new chapters on new developments. If criticism of the book is to be offered, one might question the propriety of adding two additional chapters which purport to give the background of theory. These, because of their necessarily brief survey of a problem which has been in the making at least since the time the philosopher Hobbes published *Leviathan*, or the realist Machiavelli, *The Prince*, cannot be compressed thus easily. The present problem of what is or should be the relation of government to business is not the product of the philosophy of any one political party or of any constitution or frame of government, but is a composite result of many conflicting facts and theories operating through many years of changing economic conditions. The question of what liberty or, perhaps more accurately, liberties, men in process of earning a living may enjoy, if density of population require them to live and work in close association, is not a question which can be authoritatively settled at any time, as the problem is ever a changing and continuing one. A book on the subject of government and business, to be a guide in thought on that subject, would necessarily include a greater analysis of economic

1. (1651).
2. (1513).
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history, legal development and international relations than accorded to those subjects within the book under discussion. However, it is perhaps unfair to the authors to stress that side of the problem which they have chosen not to develop. As written, it is inevitable that new editions must frequently appear in order that the book may maintain its value as a fresh and adequate treatment of the present relations of government to business.

Viewed solely from the standpoint of the work done, the authors have undoubtedly offered a very timely and valuable book for the understanding of the relations of government to business here and now. Whether considered as a text book or a book of digested collateral reading, it is probably the best single book which can now be obtained from which a study of government and business can be made.

Each chapter of the book is followed by a brief but sound bibliography and a list of questions for classroom discussion and reports. A list of some of the headings of the more outstanding chapters will perhaps at once indicate the purpose of the authors and the breadth of the subjects involved: Antitrust Laws, Unfair Trade Practices, Regulation of Securities and Exchanges, Public Utility Holding Company Regulation, Government Competition with Private Enterprise, Railway Regulation, Highway and Air Transport, Government Control of Credit, Government Control of Prices, Government Housing and Farm Tenancy Policies, Social Security.

The book should be of use to business men as well as to students. Justice Holmes once said: "Judges are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need something of Mephistopheles. We too need education in the obvious . . ." If true of judges, whose daily work causes them to view the differences, so frequently economic, that arise among men, how much more true must it be for the business man who, though knowing his own business thoroughly, may know the field of governmental control of business but little. In this book, he may, in a relatively short space, survey what government has done and is doing. Having viewed this field of actually accomplished fact, he is in a better position to pass judgment. Perhaps with this better understanding of the present controls of business by his government, he may pronounce them good or, on the other hand, may feel that these are like the laws of Draco and, now that they are written, must be changed.

Harvey Reeves.


This is a casebook that in many respects is built along lines which have been urged for many years by many law teachers throughout the country. It happens that some of the particular devices used in this new casebook correspond almost exactly with the reviewer's own pet schemes. The great thing is that the procedural side of actions at law and suits in equity are here considered together in a course on procedure. Of course Dean Clark in his pioneer casebooks has combined law and equity procedurally, but his two volume casebook contained so much equity that it perhaps really amounted to a combination of law and equity on the substantive law side as well. It amounted perhaps to an effort in combining

3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1921) 295.
† Professor in the School of Business, Columbia University.
law and equity generally so that the student considered both the legal and the equitable solution of each particular situation, regardless of whether the aspect was significantly procedural or substantive in content. Perhaps Dean Clark would disagree with the accuracy of this statement; in any case, it surely is fair to say that his pioneer work attempted a very sweeping merger and could only be interpreted as solely procedural in character if one were inclined to look at all law very largely from the procedural approach.

The great thing about this new casebook by Professors Scott and Simpson is that they do give the beginning student some historical and critical material on equity procedure as well as legal procedure from the very outset. Substantially now throughout the country, law and equity are merged as a formal concept on the procedural side. Yet in fact the business of getting equitable remedies under the modern codes is strikingly different from securing legal remedies. It is surely honest and good sense to let the student know something of these different methods and the historic significance of the present code provisions. Perhaps one could also add, not unreasonably, that our plan of teaching procedure in most law schools for the past thirty years has been almost incredibly arbitrary. Very little, if any, equity procedure has been given to the student at all, and there has been no sensible synthesis of remedial rights in keeping with the formal unity of law and equity under modern codes.

Let it be confessed at the outset, therefore, that the reviewer is altogether delighted with the particular combination in treatment of legal and equitable remedies found in this casebook. He has always felt that the combining of the treatment of law and equity on the procedural side has arbitrarily lagged behind its merger on the substantive law side. For instance, for some time now we have combined the law and equity sides of Vendor and Purchaser in a single course rather than teaching the equity side and the law side in totally separate courses, perhaps even one course in the junior year on the law side and waiting until the senior year before discussing the equity side of the same factual situation. At last, however, we do consider equity procedure and law procedure in an honest and sensible way in the course on Pleading itself. Furthermore, it seems to the reviewer that just about the right amount of equity content is presented in this casebook in order to show the adjective problem rather than the substantive law problem. Of course this last matter is again one of interpretation or emphasis in assigning a particular phase of equity to procedure rather than substance. But, granting the difficulty, some allocation must be made for practical purposes of dividing the law into convenient hunks for student digestion in law school courses. The reviewer might add that he wishes more of equity on the substantive law side were distributed in other courses than is now apparently the case in the second and third year courses at Harvard. But the further distribution of equity at Harvard will no doubt come fairly easily, as it has already come in large measure in other law schools. The important thing is that this casebook and the scheme of instruction which it signalizes under the new curriculum at Harvard gives a workable merger of the procedural side of law and equity in the introductory course.

The other parts of the book cause more doubt in the reviewer's mind, not with regard to the excellent and scholarly marshalling of materials themselves, but rather with reference to their use in different courses in the law school. How should a teacher use the parts of this new casebook that deal with Code Pleading, Extraordinary Remedies, and the great mass of material that is usually taught in courses on Trial Practice rather than
in courses on Pleading or Civil Procedure? Do the teachers feel that the entire casebook should be covered thoroughly in their freshman courses? Although this course has been increased to five semester hours, it does seem to be asking a good deal to assume that the whole content of Common Law Pleading, Code Pleading, Equity Pleading, Extraordinary Remedies and Trial Practice (as these terms are generally used) can all be covered in this one course. The Harvard curriculum indicates a third year course in Trial Practice, but what proportion of the present book if any, would be covered in that course is not indicated either in the preface or in the excellent article by Professor Simpson on the new scheme of instruction.\(^1\) Presumably, much of the Trial Practice material and perhaps all of the Extraordinary Remedies and some of the Code Pleading would be treated at least more fully, if not entirely, in the third year course.

This will mean inevitably that additional material on these subjects will have to be supplied. For instance, the material on the common garden variety of Code Pleading in most states is not adequate for the average young lawyer who hopes to begin practice with active work in the courts on the basis of his law school training. And in this field again, the part that seems most doubtful is that which deals with motions under the codes as against the general and special demurrers at common law. Very happily, the book does contain considerable material on motions of this kind, while the former casebooks in this field almost ignored this most important subject. The inclusion in a formal perfunctory sense is not enough. It is a great mistake to believe that because the demurrer, though retained in most modern codes, is very rarely found determinative on appeal, that the old game of fighting over the pleadings, and winning if possible on the pleadings when you are very doubtful of winning on the merits, has been discontinued. Much to the horror, no doubt, of the early idealistic codifiers, there is perhaps more fighting over the pleadings now than obtained at common law. It is a question of new names for the old things.

And after all, this should not surprise the lawyer, since we meet this rather childish evasion of unpleasant terms in many phases of modern life. For instance, we no longer declare war in the old crude way; we maintain formal peace and full diplomatic relations at the very time that perhaps a million or more men are invading another “peaceful” country and slaughtering noncombatants, as well as soldiers, far more ruthlessly than generally obtained in the old days of formal wars. And in our general every day thinking, we talk of “recessions” or “improvements”, rather than the old blunt terms of “hard times” and “prosperity”. The poor themselves have taken on nice new clothes that save us from ideologies which might disturb our placid comfort. They are not “poor” any more; they are the underprivileged; they don’t live off the dole or go to the poorhouse; they retire and receive pensions. In pointing out these or other instances of new terminology, the reviewer has not the slightest wish in the world to indicate disapproval of this euphemistic way of speaking so far as words are concerned; he is anxious, however, that the new words should work beneficial results and not injury.

For the most part fighting over pleadings (which, regrettably, is on the increase in modern practice) usually takes the form of motions for a more specific statement or motions to strike, so far as the pleadings are concerned, along with various objections incident to amendment of the pleadings or variance between the pleadings and the proof at the trial. Here

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again, the laudable aspirations of many reformers to get a fair trial on the merits, as economically as possible, have not been realized. Trials are often more prolix and more expensive, so far as procedural pitfalls go, than they were under the common law method, and the instances in which substantial victory or defeat is secured through shrewd bargaining powers and clever use of procedural requirements are more frequent now, in many cases, than at common law. For the young lawyer to defend his client successfully it is correspondingly important that he have a thorough training in code pleading as it is now practiced from the point of view of procedural advantage and effective bargaining power in the wise handling of litigation.

The material on these phases of code pleading in this casebook is perhaps adequate for an introductory course, but in some way that has not yet been indicated, these materials must be considerably amplified before the law student is equipped for active practice in the courts.

Paul Sayre.†


The translation of the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS into French is a monumental undertaking. It has been accomplished in a most creditable manner by two translators under the direction of Professor Niboyet. The RESTATEMENT is presented Section by Section, accompanied with the comments and illustrations as adopted and published by the American Law Institute. A preface by Professor Niboyet and an introduction by the translators explain the RESTATEMENT to French jurists in the light of the underlying differences between Anglo-American common law and French law and practice. Occasional footnotes are added. Thus our own system, primarily unwritten and uncodified, is now presented to French jurists in the form of, if not with the authority of, a code; whereas French law, primarily written, can show only the merest fragment of legislation in the Napoleonic Codes, so far as concerns the Conflict of Laws.

While we are unable in a brief review to make a detailed analysis of the accuracy of the translation, we find it to be generally excellent. We approve the judgment of the translators in employing the original English word wherever there is no parallel French legal concept. This applies to words such as “trust”, “charge”, “equity”, “consideration”, “unilateral” (as applied to contracts), “lien” and others. It is better to continue the English word in the text rather than to give a parallel which may and often would be misleading if a mere linguistic parallel were adopted. An occasional slip is to be noted, such as that on the title page and cover, where the RESTATEMENT is referred to as being “on” instead of “of” the Law of Conflict of Laws.

Arthur K. Kuhn.†

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The past year will probably be remembered by the federal practitioner as the year in which his legal world was turned topsy-turvy. *Erie R. R. v. Tompkins*\(^1\) overruled *Swift v. Tyson*,\(^2\) and the new Rules repealed the Conformity Act.\(^3\) These moves radically changed the sources of both substantive and procedural law for civil cases in the federal courts. Instead of *Swift v. Tyson* and its attempt at uniformity in matters of substantive law, there is now to be conformity to state law. Instead of the Conformity Act and its attempt at conformity in matters of procedure, there is now to be a new code of uniform rules.

*Erie R. R. v. Tompkins* probably calls for a less difficult readjustment by the practitioner than do the new Rules. The *Erie* case just means unlearning a body of federal law and substituting a body of state law with which the practitioner is probably already familiar. The new Rules, on the other hand, mean learning an entirely new code.

Mr. Amram's little book is designed to lighten this burden for the Pennsylvania lawyer. The author has wisely chosen a comparative form of presentation. Rather than treat the unknown in the abstract, he has chosen to relate it to the known. He passes the eighty-six rules in review, compares each with prevailing Pennsylvania practice, and notes similarities and dissimilarities. The result is a brief, lucid explanation, readily comprehensible to those already familiar with Pennsylvania practice.

The work is not exhaustive. It does not pretend to be. Instead, it is designed to fill an emergency need by giving a bird's-eye view of the new code and by telling the Pennsylvania practitioner what obvious changes he must make in the way he tries cases in the federal courts in Pennsylvania. In addition, problematic changes are noted with frequent caveats that this code, too, will need construction.

Mr. Amram has performed an indispensable service to the local bar.

*James H. Chadbourn.†*

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BOOK NOTE


Written by an instructor in Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, Causes of Crime presents a scientific treatment of biological theories of crime causation in the United States during the years 1800-1915. The author explains the diverse theories within their proper categories, names their respective exponents, and offers his own interpretations and conclusions as to the validity of each theory. Setting forth his subject matter in a not too heavy style, the author uncovers a mass of work by American students of criminology. His study is the first complete one of its kind, the only similar works preceding it being those concerned with European thought in this field.

Perhaps the reading would be easier were it not interspersed with innumerable footnotes; yet the latter are invaluable as research sources. Similarly, a comprehensive, indeed exhaustive, bibliography appended to the text refers the reader to all possible aspects of the subject matter treated.

Not only should this book attract the sociologist and psychologist, but it should also be of great interest and value to the practicing lawyer. For, familiarized with this study, the lawyer is better able to understand human behavior—the why and wherefore. It is with no hesitation, therefore, that I recommend Causes of Crime to all those straight thinking persons who are interested in the world they live in, the afflictions of its inhabitants, and a better understanding thereof.

Sylvan M. Cohen.†

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