BOOK REVIEWS


When the biography of Mr. Justice Brandeis comes to be written, it will be much more than the life of a great man. From the necessities of the case it will be, like Beveridge’s Marshall, a history of America during the long life of its subject. For Brandeis, like Marshall, has acted on and been acted on by the American scene. His biography must picture for us the semi-frontier life in the Ohio Valley just before and after the Civil War. It must describe Boston in the seventies, still basking in the glory shed by its great men, blissfully unconscious that they were to have no successors, busy in its new career of financing the railroads and copper mines of the west. It will show the transformation worked in political as well as in economic life by the building of the railways and the growth of large industry, the depths of corruption reached in our national and local governments, the activities of the muckrakers, the rise of the trusts and the fight against them. It will study with especial care the forces that led to the election of Woodrow Wilson and the tragedy by which Wilson’s domestic program was frustrated by the World War and the events that followed in its train. It will tell us of the economic waste of the twenties, of the miseries of the depression, and of the coming of the New Deal. Through all these phases of American life it will show Brandeis, keenly aware of the deeper currents, sometimes swimming with them and, more often, against them, always informed, thoughtful, deliberate in decision, but resolute and courageous once decision was made. Above all, if it is to be successful, it will convey to us something of the spiritual intensity that has marked off Justice Brandeis from almost all other men of his day.

The writing of such a book will require the best talents of one versed alike in law, in history, in politics and in economics. It will require, as well, a degree of detachment scarcely possible at the present time. We may hope that the writing of this book will be postponed for many a decade. But we must hope also that when the book is written, it will be composed with a degree of scholarship and insight worthy of its subject.

Mr. Lief has not attempted a definitive biography of this sort. His volume is journalistic in tempo and in tone. Limitations of space prevent any serious effort to describe, except in the most general way, the nature of the various problems with which Justice Brandeis has had to deal in his career at the bar and on the bench. The book is almost continuous narrative, broken only by occasional quotations from articles or opinions.

Within these limitations, the book nevertheless was eminently worth writing and is well worth reading. One point of particular interest lies in its demonstration of the deep roots of many of the views for which Justice Brandeis is best known to the present generation. For example, his eloquent plea in the Wiretapping Case1 for “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”, is simply the culmination of a line of thought fully developed as early as 1890 when Brandeis wrote, with his partner Warren, the path-making essay on “The Right to Privacy”.2 His insistence upon “the right to work” and regularity of employment likewise goes back to the nineties, when he successfully applied these principles in working out

2. (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.

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the labor difficulties of clients. His belief that the country’s problems can best be solved by giving free rein to the ability and resourcefulness of its citizens rather than through the imposition of remedies by an all powerful government, is stated at a meeting of the New England Free Trade League in 1897. And the philosophy of “The Curse of Bigness” which has been developed in some of the most profound of his opinions, was already formulated by the time of the New Haven controversy of 1906.

Another interesting aspect of the book lies in its refutation of the prevalent fallacy of Brandeis’ responsibility for the legislative program of the New Deal. Not, of course, that Brandeis can have been lacking in sympathy for the declared end of greater good for the greater number, a purpose for which he had been struggling since the nineties. But many of the means employed to reach this avowed end seem to be antithetical to Brandeis’ philosophy. “This asking for help from the government for everything should be deprecated,” he declared in 1897. Surely this is at the opposite pole from the AAA. “Federal supervision [of corporations] would serve only to centralize still further the power of our government and to increase still further the powers of the corporations,” he said in 1906 concerning proposed federal licensing of insurance companies. One can scarcely suppose that a man who had held such beliefs for thirty years could have looked with favor upon the licensing of all American business attempted by the NIRA. As recently as 1920 we find him writing to The Survey:

“The growth of the future—at least of the immediate future—must be in quality and spiritual value. And that can come only through the concentrated, intensified strivings of smaller groups. The field for special effort should now be the state, the city, the village—and each should be led to excel in something peculiar to it. If ideals are developed locally the national ones will come pretty near taking care of themselves.”

Views such as these are scarcely to be reconciled with the current policy of abandoning all attempts at local control in favor of a colossal bureaucracy at Washington. Such evidence seems to furnish abundant justification for Mr. Lief’s assertion that Brandeis’ “influence on the fashioning of the New Deal and the share of his disciples in its direction were overstated.”

Certain features of the book are peculiarly irritating to the lawyer. It is surprising, for example, to learn that the Clayton Act failed to contain provision “enabling victims to collect damages from monopolies”. We are told that “when the Commerce Court was about to be abolished, Brandeis felt it would be a calamity to lose Judge Julian W. Mack from public service and sought a new post for him. Mack was kept on the Circuit Court.” Actually, of course, all the Commerce Court judges were made Circuit Judges, and this largely because of doubt as to the power of Congress to terminate their tenure. Again, one is

4. P. 63.
5. See, particularly, his dissents in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 403 (1928), and Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541 (1933).
7. P. 63.
8. P. 97.
10. P. 439.
12. P. 299.
puzzled at learning that Brandeis "argued against a motion to remand the case to the Federal Court". Above all, why did Mr. Lief fail to give references to the reports and, in most instances, even the names, of the various opinions discussed?

In spite of defects such as these, the book has peculiar value to lawyers, not so much as a study of Mr. Justice Brandeis as a judge, but for its vivid picture of the extent and nature of the public services which he rendered while still at the bar. Today, when professing "people's lawyers", in and out of the government, are far more numerous than when Justice Brandeis first assumed that role, there is perhaps greater need than ever for services as skilled and as disinterested as those which he rendered in the twenty years preceding his elevation to the bench.

Henry J. Friendly.


This is the fourth and last book of the series by this author, which as a whole represents the most complete work yet published in this country on the important but badly neglected subject of legislation. A glance at the table of contents of this volume will show that it attempts to discuss the more jurisprudential aspects of the field, such as the relation of judges and executives to legislators, administrative law with the corresponding problems of delegation of power, and the problems of the general scope of law making.

The method of development of the book is largely historical. The author draws from his own wide practical experience in the field, and rambles over a multitude of changing materials on legislative systems throughout the world, but his chief sources are in English parliamentary history. The book as a whole offers an excellent picture of the problems in their historical settings, opening a wide panorama for research for one interested in this field. Under the circumstances it is perhaps unfortunate that the author failed to annotate more completely his source materials which are indicated, but often not definitely cited.

The chief interest of the writer seems to be drafting a defense of the status quo in legislative development, and an exposition of the current accepted thought on the problems involved. This he does with that admirable mastery of materials which comes only through long personal experience in the field. The extent to which this effort is carried is indicated by his attempt in Chapter XI to defend the American separation of power as it applies to legislation, against the English Cabinet system. More convincing is the defense in Chapter XII of the so-called Pork Barrel Legislation in which the writer points out that this greatly maligned portion of public expenditures constitutes about three-fourths of one per cent of the total government budget, and ends with an excellent plea for more cooperation in expending funds and improving public works, from which one might draw an implied approval of much of the New Deal legislation.

On the whole the work is non-critical. The best passage where criticism is attempted is found in Chapter XXV: "Another reason why our lawmaking bodies fail to meet the present-day demand is that they are in the control of men who by education and occupation are hostile to the spirit of this demand. Lawyers still preponderate, men by their profession inclined to destructive criticism, worshiping precedent, accustomed to interpret laws but not make them. Now-

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15. For studies of this character, see FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1932).
BOOK REVIEWS

adays the public, or at least the vocal part of the public, calls for constructive, not obstructive nor destructive legislation." If the argument ad hominem can be allowed, the writer's criticism of the law making bodies applies equally well to his book. It adopts chiefly the historical method. Suffering from the same defect as most modern books on political science, too much exposition and not enough theory and analysis, it offers no remedies of any consequence and pro-
pounds no theories. Nevertheless, it is stimulating in that it clears the ground of the historical debris and it should open the way to a critical and scientific study of legislative theory in the light of modern experimental science and statistical method.

The series of works by this learned legislator should be the beginning of a new American science of legislation.

Frederick K. Beutel.†


In 1934 the Legislature of the State of New York passed an act providing for a Law Revision Commission. The Commission consists of five appointees of the Governor, and in addition, the chairmen of the judiciary committees of the Senate and Assembly as members ex-officio. The statute provided that at least two of the appointed members should be members of the law faculties of university law schools within New York, and that four of the appointed members should be members of the New York Bar. Dean Charles Burdick of Cornell University became the Chairman and Dean Young B. Smith of Columbia University was appointed a member of the Commission. In addition, John W. MacDonald, Professor of Law in the Cornell Law School, became the Executive Secretary and Director of Research for the Commission. Thus, it will be observed that the Commission was afflicted with "Brain Trusters". Despite that handicap the work of the Commission for 1935 sets a very high standard and appears to be the type of commission needed in all our states as well as in the national government.

The purpose of the Commission is to examine the common and statutory law of New York in order to discover defects and anachronisms, and then to recommend necessary reforms. The Commission is required to receive suggestions from certain mentioned institutions and officials as well as from the general public. The Report for 1935 is a volume of 721 pages, aside from a table of leading cases and a very elaborate index. Within this volume are studies and recommendations concerning twelve legal subjects, to wit: (1) Definition of value in the personal property law; (2) Negotiability of documents of title; (3) Imputation of negligence to infants; (4) A uniform criminal extradition act; (5) The survival of causes of action for personal injury; (6) Perjury; (7) Six problems in the field of real property, including the doctrine of incorporation by reference as applied to wills; (8) Pre-natal injuries; (9) The New York Correction Law (Section 230); (10) The procedural problem arising under Section 83 of the New York Decedent Estate Law; (11) The Public Enemy Law of New York; (12) Certain proposals by Dr. Strauss for amendment of the code of criminal procedure concerning commissions to examine into the sanity of persons accused of crime and also to amend the mental hygiene law to provide for the certification of qualified psychiatrists.

Ten of these legal topics are presented in the Report. First, there is a terse recommendation to the legislature by the Law Revision Commission as to

† Dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. P. 714.
the legislation which, in the judgment of the Commission, the legislature should enact into law. Then each recommendation is followed by a study which supports the views of the Commission. All of the studies were prepared under the direction of Professor MacDonald, assisted by different individuals who are named in the Report. The writer has not read all of the studies, but he has examined them sufficiently to convince himself that they constitute legal research in the better sense of the word. Some of the studies, or portions thereof, are of particular importance only within the State of New York. Others are of general importance, and the legal scholar as well as the law student will find a great deal of value in these carefully prepared studies. Indeed, it appears that they will rank high in our modern legal literature.

Unless it is too much to expect of our state legislatures that they be sympathetic with carefully and competently considered proposals to reform our law, it would seem that the Law Revision Commission of New York should make a name for itself and should establish a precedent that other states will be glad to follow. However, it must be recognized that it is possible that selfish interests and perverse and reactionary minds may attempt to smear this movement by the same sort of demagogic attack as that made upon the present administration in our national government.

Kenneth C. Sears.†


The copyright is by the Bureau of International Research, Harvard University and Radcliffe College. The work is dedicated to Manley Ottmer Hudson, a member of the committee of the Bureau, to whom the author in his preface expresses particular appreciation for his "unflagging enthusiasm and sympathetic and critical encouragement."

The author throws some little light on the failure of the arbitrations between the United States and Mexico. He indicates numerous adjournments taken by the Commissions because cases were not ready for presentation and because the two governments indulged in delays in the appointment of arbitrators. The so-called Special Commission was called upon to decide but two cases. The so-called General Commission was permitted to hold sessions for a period of only about thirteen months. It disposed through final decisions of one hundred and fifty cases.

A portion of the work consisting of 236 pages is devoted to quotations from opinions written by Commissioners who functioned in arbitrations undertaken a decade ago by Mexico with the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain, and comments are made on the decisions and the opinions.

The last part of the book contains an appendix of 228 pages which is largely a reprint of the several conventions and rules of procedure formulated pursuant to stipulations in those conventions.

On page 44 the author interestingly reveals a fundamental purpose. He states that it is "a great and justified temptation to embark on a discussion of the backgrounds and personalities of the men who sat on the Mexican Claims Commissions." He adds, however, that after "we have seen how the Commissions did their work, it will be possible for us to attempt an appraisal of the influence of the personality of the Commissioners on the results achieved." A brief reference to one or two pages of the book will indicate methods of accomplishing the author’s purpose with respect to an appraisal of personalities of the Commission.

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On page 59 appears the following statement:

"The Memoria of the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations hints at a more serious disagreement: 'As a consequence of an incident provoked (provocado) by the American Commissioner, the ninth session of the Commission was, at first, suspended, and then declared terminated in August 1931. The published sources do not reveal what the character of this 'incident' was.'"

It would be odd for the writer of this review, who was connected with the activities of the arbitration, to ignore this passage. That the American arbitrator never provoked any incident interrupting or marring any session, and that he constantly and successfully exerted himself to eliminate them is equally well known. The writer of the book states that he had access to "unpublished" materials. The writer of this review knows that an abundance of unpublished materials reveals the truth with respect to the remarkable closing events of the arbitration. Either the author did not see those particular unpublished documents or did not desire to make use of them.

On page 315 of the book further appears the following passage:

"It is not easy to apportion the blame for failure or difficulties. From one point of view it might be said that particular Commissioners were responsible. The United States could say, conceivably, that the difficulties of the Special and General Claims Commissions were due to Señores Octavio and Alfaro, while the Mexican government might feel that Mr. Nielsen was more to blame. So the Mexican government might charge Mr. Verzijl with responsibility for the unfortunate history of the French-Mexican Commission."

It is not believed that the author could have referred to any specific official records that would support his conclusion that the Mexican government might properly charge Dr. Verzijl "with responsibility for the unfortunate history of the French-Mexican Commission." And the author of the book has submitted no facts as the basis for his conclusion that it might be considered that the American Commissioner was responsible for failure of the work of the American-Mexican arbitration. These declarations are made concerning an American Commissioner who was named after two-thirds of the period stipulated by the Convention of September 8, 1923, for the work of the arbitration had passed and when only one case had been finally decided; a Commissioner, who acting from time to time under nine Presidential appointments and in other capacities has had a unique, distinguished, honorable record of wider and more varied practical experience in international law and diplomacy than any other living American. The declarations are amazing to those who are able to appraise the value of his opinions, who are informed concerning his activities in tiding over critical situations repeatedly arising from unnecessary friction and controversy, and who are also informed with respect to tributes paid to him by both Mexican and American officials. The object of research worthy of the name is to ascertain, protect and proclaim the truth. It may further be observed that the most prominent inscription on the seal of Harvard University is Veritas.

John W. Connelly, Jr.†

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BOOK NOTES


The authors of Washington Merry-Go-Round present in vivid narrative style their conception of the composition of the Supreme Court. The justices are dissected in order to determine what makes them decide as they do, and as one would expect, the microscopic examination by the authors reveals that men change but little when elevated from the bar to the bench. Typical of the tone of the book is the characterization of Mr. Justice Butler: “The only difference judicial robes have meant [to him] is that as an attorney he pleaded for special privilege and as a judge he creates and sanctifies it.” It is perhaps unfortunate that the authors’ treatment throughout savors of a desire for sensationalism rather than for an impartial appraisal of motives and values. Whether the book is found to be interesting or libelous will depend on the regard one has for our highest Court.


The author has competently covered the subject of how to try a case in court both from a standpoint of observance of the rules of procedure and from the point of view of the most approved technique in practice. Most of the tricks of the trade that lend themselves to book instruction are included. For instance, plaintiffs’ attorneys are warned to exclude ex-policemen, ex-sheriffs, and ex-justices from the jury because they have acquired a dislike for plaintiffs; again, plaintiffs’ attorneys are instructed to favor laborers on the jury because they have a reckless disregard for other people’s money. These instances could be multiplied a thousandfold and it might be noted that many are far more detailed.

There are also included forms for practically all motions, petitions and affidavits; in addition, the author presents unofficial forms as aids in trial preparation—diagrams of a case, memoranda of law, etc.

In his advice on how to prepare the law of a case the author says that law review material should be consulted as a “last resort”.1 Perhaps it was his observance of this principle that caused inaccurate statements in the presentation of modern topics such as lie detectors, blood group tests, etc. For instance, there is no intimation given in the discussion expounding the value of lie detectors that the records thereby obtained are not admissible under the two decisions by appellate courts, which decisions are thoroughly discussed in law reviews.2


Discussion of trade-marks, patents and designs, unfair competition and copyrights forms the substance of this pamphlet. The laws of every important com-

1. Section 97.
mercial country are stated whenever it would seem desirable so to do. Under a separate heading of "Trade Marks Under Foreign Law" there appears in some detail the trade-mark provisions of 63 foreign countries. The appendix states the text of the major Conventions relative to international protection of industrial property.


The two-fold purpose of this book is to give the layman an insight into the factors behind a cross-examination that would not come from ordinary experience in the court room or daily newspaper reading, and to present the lawyer with a guide on how to cross-examine. The book contains chapters on the importance of the cross-examination, the preparation, scope, and method of conducting one, the cross-examination of experts and women, and concludes with a discussion of the psychological factors involved, the function of the re-direct examination, and a group of anecdotes. Anecdotal material, repetitive if one has read biographies of Fallon, Leibowitz, Choate, etc., runs throughout the entire book; unfortunately, only some of the stories are sufficiently good to bear repetition. Although enjoyable reading, the book, because of its nature, will appeal more to laymen than lawyers.
BOOKS RECEIVED


