BOOK REVIEWS.


Its authorship is a sufficient guaranty of the value of this book. As the maker of a series of text-books and treatises on various branches of the common law, Sir Frederick Pollock is well known to all American lawyers, and to the greater part of the large student body. These books have from the first been authorities; they are written in a style that is admirably perspicuous, yet not prolix. The matter of this new work is set forth in the same clear manner. It is not intended to lay out a general system of the philosophy of law, nor to give a classified view of the whole contents of any legal system, but is for the student beginning the study of law. Certain legal conceptions and distinctions, which are usually unexplained to the novice, yet are assumed to be familiar to him, are here treated at length; and the reader is soon led to realize the legal point of view and the legal habit of mind.

The volume consists of two parts which are more or less independent of each other, so that either one may be read first, or even alone. The general title of Part I. is, Some General Legal Notions, embracing chapters on The Nature and Meaning of Law; Justice According to Law; The Subject-Matter of Law; Divisions of Law; Persons; Things, Events and Acts; Relation of Persons to Things; Possession and Ownership; Claims of Persons on Persons; Relation of Obligations to Property.

Part II. deals with Legal Authorities and Their Use. The divisions of this part are headed: The Express Forms of Law; The Sources of English Law; Sovereignty in English Law; Custom in English Law; Law Reports; Case Law and Precedents, and Ancient and Modern Statutes.

This is a bridge which may well lead from the studies that make for a liberal education to the more rigid and serious study of the law, so that the student who wishes to start as clearly as possible will possess himself of Pollock’s A First Book of Jurisprudence.

D. P. H.


This book belongs to the Students' Series. It more than sustains the high reputation which that Series has established for itself. It
is difficult to conceive of a more satisfactory treatment of the subject with which the author deals than that which is to be found in the three hundred pages of Professor Harriman's little volume. The lover of scientific analysis and orderly development cannot but take pleasure in the arrangement of the work as exhibited in the Table of Contents. Beginning with an introduction upon "The Nature of Contractual Obligation" and "The History of Contractual Actions," the eleven chapters of the work follow one another in this order: "The Formation of Contract;" "Illegal Contracts;" "Joint and Several Contracts;" "Conditions;" "The Construction of Contracts;" "The Statute of Frauds;" "The Operation of Contract;" "Rescission of Contract;" "The Assignment of Contract;" "The Discharge of Contract;" and "The Enforcement of Contract." As regards the legal theory in accordance with which this arrangement has been determined upon, the author shall speak for himself. "First," he says in his preface; "comes the recognition of the fact that contractual obligation in English law may be due to the act of one party or of two; or to use my own terminology, may be unifactoral or bifactoral. Second, I have carefully separated the facts which are essential to the formation of contract from those which merely affect the validity of contracts when formed. Third, I have treated all voidable contracts under the one head of Rescission. In my treatment of Rescission I have derived great assistance from Mr. Bigelow's treatment of that subject in his work on Fraud. Fourth, I have endeavored to reduce all rules of Offer and Acceptance to rules of Consideration, in accordance with the suggestion made by Mr. Justice Holmes in his work on the Common Law. Fifth, I have treated under the head of the Construction of Contracts certain subjects like Impossibility which are ordinarily treated elsewhere. Sixth, I have tried to shed some additional light on the difficult subject of Conditions. Seventh, I have sought to give an adequate account of the nature and results of the judicial legislation by which, in many States, a stranger to a contract is permitted to sue upon it—a doctrine which is one of the least intelligible and least understood of any in our law of Contracts."

In this book we have a distinct and important addition to the literature of contract law. From the statement cited above, it is evident that the author has brought to his task a discriminating and analytical mind and a clear conception of the importance of reducing his subject to scientific form. This conception has been ever present with him and in his several chapters he has explained with admirable clearness "the rules of positive contract law which are to-day enforced by the Courts of England and the United States, in accordance with the actual historical development of those rules."

Not only has Professor Harriman shown himself to be possessed of the ability requisite for the accomplishment of his purpose, but his whole book shows that he has the industry and capacity for research, without which his task would have been an impossible-
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one. In preparing his history of contractual actions, he has had the wisdom to draw largely from the scholarly "History of Procedure" by Mr. Bigelow, and from the learned articles contributed to the pages of the Harvard Law Review by Professor Thayer and Professor Ames. He has kept in touch with the latest additions to the literature of his subject, and references are numerous to Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law. He has resisted with admirable determination what must have been the constant temptation to dwell longer than was consistent with the symmetry of his treatise upon particular portions of his work. On every page there are fresh evidences of the author's truly remarkable powers of condensation and concise statement. An admirable illustration of this is the opening paragraph of the chapter on the Construction of Contracts. In the paragraphs that follow he has compressed within narrow limits the general rules of construction, and has treated in most satisfactory fashion the difficult subjects of "Impossibility," "Reasonableness," "The Essence of the Contract," "Penalties and Liquidated Damages," and "Notice." The chapter in which the author is seen, perhaps, at his best is Chapter IV. on "Conditions." In this chapter the reader will find good specimens of the author's analytical ability, of his critical faculty and his capacity for clear statement.

The book is intended to be used in connection with a study of cases. In addition, therefore, to the references to the original reports, the author has added references to Langdell and Williston's Cases on Contracts and to Huffcut and Woodruff's American Cases on Contract. With either of these admirable collections of cases in hand and with Professor Harriman's little book to guide him, the student will be able to find his way far more readily than has heretofore been possible through the mazes of our contract law.

G. W. P.


This standard work, as it now appears, is in reality a new contribution to the subject by virtue of the contents of the opening chapters in which the author presents a general doctrine or theory of the law of torts based on what he styles "primary forces or elements of liability," to wit: (1) fraud or malice, as means or motive to conduct; (2) intention, considered without regard to means or motive; (3) negligence. The subject is now considered with reference to this general doctrine, specific torts being classified according to these primary elements of liability.

The author commends the division of duties made by Mr. Harriman in his work on contracts into "consensual or recusable" and "irrecusable or paramount," giving rise in the first instance to the domain of contract and in the second to the domain of torts, and
accordingly considers the subject from the point of view of breach of duty. The work is thus divided into three parts—Breach of Duty to Refrain from Fraud or Malice, Breach of Absolute Duty, Breach of Duty to Refrain from Negligence.

While the treatment of specific wrongs does not differ materially from that of the previous editions, it has been carefully revised and brought up to date. The citations are copious and the typographical work excellent.


It is seldom that the perusal of a legal treatise conveys any considerable amount of satisfaction to our literary senses. The modern law book, under the weight of the rapidly multiplying decisions, very generally assumes the form of a digest, which, though a necessity for the purposes of every day practice, is not an addition to the store of legal literature. Turning the pages of one of our more recent productions, one is confronted with evidences of the high pressure under which work has to be done nowadays, and the carefully condensed headings and columns of innumerable citations speak in no uncertain tone of the rush of mercantile life whose influence has left such apparent traces upon the writings of the law.

It is then with the greatest pleasure that one turns to such a book as Judge Curtis's "Jurisdiction of the United States Courts," written by a master of legal style and combining with a very able discussion of the subject, the highest literary merit.

The origin of the work was a course of lectures delivered before the members of the Harvard Law School in 1872, which lectures were subsequently edited by George T. Curtis and Benjamin R. Curtis, respectively the brother and son of the eminent jurist, Judge Curtis. Owing to the fact that the revised statutes had gone into effect in the interim, considerable additions had to be made in the way of notes, but the original was as closely adhered to as possible.

Though not claiming to be exhaustive of the subject of which it treats, the book is sufficiently so for the ordinary use of the practitioner, and the simplicity of the style and easy flow of the language makes it admirably adapted for the purposes of the student.

Such important changes have taken place in this branch of the law since 1880, that a new edition became absolutely necessary in order to preserve the usefulness of the work, and the present editor, Mr. Henry Childs Merwin, has been eminently successful in bringing the authorities to date, while changing as little as possible the context.

The subject is dealt with in eleven chapters and under the fol-
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lowing heads: The Supreme Court; Appeals from Federal Courts; The Circuit Courts; Removal of Suits; Habeas Corpus; Procedure and Practice; The District Courts; and, finally, Admiralty. There is also a very complete index. The ideas follow each other naturally and logically; each is fully discussed and the authorities thereon cited. Where less important branches are left untouched, there is always a statement to that effect and reference is made to the works in which a treatment of the point may be found.

All lovers of an able and well written law-book should be grateful to Mr. Merwin by whose efforts this work of standard legal and literary value has been given a renewed term of usefulness.


This work is, as the author states, not a treatise on real property generally, but on the law of title to real property, as applied between vendor and purchaser. Matters usually found in the reports, digests, and case-books under the heads of Vendor and Purchaser, Covenants for Title, Specific Performance, Equity Jurisprudence, Deeds, Titles to Real Estate, Real Property, Abstracts of Title, Subrogation, and kindred subjects, have been gathered into a single volume, and so arranged as to make them easily accessible. The system is unusually good. The treatise appears also to be reliable. In reading § 98, however, the question arises whether the author is correct in his statement of the rule of law that where a vendor having the equitable title to land, sells expecting to get in the legal title and to be able to convey at the appointed time, he is liable to damages for the loss of the bargain. The author has cited as the leading case on this point Hopkins v. Grasebrook, 6 B. & C. 31, apparently overlooking the fact that this case was overruled by the House of Lords in Bain v. Fothergill, L. R. 7, H. L. 158, which establishes the rule that with such facts the vendor is liable to nominal damages only. On the whole, however, the book possesses exceptional merit as an accurate, comprehensive, and well-written treatise on a practical branch of the law of real property.


If one desires to obtain a "realizing sense" of the rapid development of various forms of corporate activity, he cannot do better
than turn quickly from Blackstone's single chapter on corporations, in the first book of his Commentaries, to Judge Thompson's six volumes, which have lately issued from the press of the Bancroft-Whitney Company. It will be remembered that Blackstone, in dealing with the "Rights of Persons," treats at last of "these artificial persons . . . called bodies politic, bodies corporate (corpora corporata) or corporations." Of these he remarks that "there is a great variety subsisting, for the advancement of religion, of learning and of commerce; in order to preserve entire and forever those rights and immunities, which, if they were granted only to those individuals of which the body corporate is composed, would upon their death be utterly lost and extinct." This celebrated chapter occupies about eighteen octavo pages and presents a succinct but adequate statement of corporation law as it existed in Blackstone's day. Judge Thompson's six volumes contain nearly seven thousand octavo pages, while the "Table of Cases Cited" (the cases being printed in double column and in exceedingly fine type) occupies no less than one hundred and seventy-nine pages. It is somewhat dangerous to attempt to estimate the number of judicial decisions, which the table represents because of the reduplication which is usual in such tables. A cursory examination, however, leads to the conclusion that each case is indexed only once—instead of being indexed under the name of both parties. If this is true, the number of cases cited must be in the neighborhood of twenty thousand. The contrast is all the more striking if the fact is borne in mind that Judge Thompson treats only of private corporations. "This is an attempt," says the author in his Preface, "to state the law relating to corporations existing in the United States, except those created for governmental purposes." In order to accomplish his purpose, he divides his Commentaries into nineteen separate titles—the titles being in turn broken up into chapters of which the total number is two hundred and one. "Many of these chapters are so large that it has been necessary to subdivide them into subchapters called articles. For example, one of these chapters contains fifteen, another twelve, others seven, and still others lesser numbers of these articles; so that many of the so-called chapters are really extensive titles." But this is not all. "In many cases it has been found necessary for the convenient and accurate grouping of subjects to subdivide these articles into subarticles called subdivisions." Finally, "the whole work is again divided into about eight thousand separate paragraphs called sections. These sections form the units of grouping, of reference and of indexing." The titles are as follows: I. Organization and Internal Government; II. Capital Stock and Subscriptions Thereto; III. Remedies and Procedure to Enforce Share Subscriptions; IV. Shares Considered as Property; V. Liability of Stockholders to Creditors; VI. Directors; VII. Rights and Remedies of Members and Shareholders; VIII. Ministerial Officers and Agents; IX.
Formal Execution of Corporate Contracts; X. Notice, Estoppel, Ratification; XI. Franchises, Privileges and Exemptions; XII. Corporate Powers and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires; XIII. Corporate Bonds and Mortgages; XIV. Torts and Crimes of Corporations; XV. Insolvent Corporations; XVI. Dissolution and Winding Up; XVII. Receivers of Corporations; XVIII. Actions By and Against Corporations; XIX. Foreign Corporations. It is not clear that there is any significance in the sequence of these titles, nor does it appear that they represent an orderly development of the whole subject. This is, perhaps, unfortunate in the case of a commentary, which should lend itself to use not merely as a book of reference, but also as a text-book for consecutive study. Considered merely as a work of reference, the arrangement of titles is satisfactory enough, except that something would have been gained if such a subject as "Insolvent Corporations" had been brought into juxtaposition with the subject of "Liability of Stockholders to Creditors." The same remark may be made of "Corporate Bonds and Mortgages" and "Receivers of Corporations," inasmuch as the most important modern receivership cases are cases growing out of mortgage litigation and the two subjects can best be dealt with in connection with one another.

When the reviewer passes from these general considerations to a more minute criticism of the author's work, he enters upon a task of more than ordinary difficulty. It is not merely because it is a practical impossibility to read the entire work through that the reviewer's task is a hard one, but also because he must constantly temper his disapproval of that which is not to his liking by a recollection of the magnitude of the undertaking upon which the author has entered and the countless difficulties which he must have encountered in his attempt to reduce this shapeless mass of "Corporation Law" to order and to form. It should be remarked at the outset that the whole work bears evidences of careful and laborious preparation. Judge Thompson has stamped his own vigorous personality on almost every page of his six volumes. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to several lawyers for assistance rendered, but we can well believe that the amount of matter which they have contributed "has been inconsiderable in comparison with the whole work." The work having been begun sixteen years ago, it has required much condensation, the author assures us, to bring the text within the limits of six thousand pages. Judge Thompson fully appreciates the difficulty in the way of an orderly treatment of corporation law. He speaks of the "vast, exuberant and intertangled growth of uncodified and unassorted statutes and judicial decisions, the work of near fifty independent sovereignties and jurisdictions which we in America call our law." He has thrown himself boldly into this wilderness, however, and he has been ready to use his axe unsparingly whenever he has met with obstacles in the path of uniformity. He has adopted the name "Commentaries," because it has been his effort to analyze
and classify statutes and decisions and make "such comments upon their respective merits as a long study of the subject seemed to justify him in making." "If these comments," he observes, "have been at times severe, he can only say that they were such in each case as seemed proper to him at the time when the particular topic was under study."

In all his "comments" there is distinguishable a tendency to eliminate the distinction between ethics and jurisprudence. The author's strictures upon the decisions of the courts are never more severe and in none of his passages does he wax more eloquent than when he fancies that a judge has rendered a decision which runs counter to some portion of the moral law. When one is as full of enthusiasm as Judge Thompson, the danger of exaggeration is great, and it sometimes happens that decisions are branded as immoral when they really deserve no such stigma. In an article contributed to a recent number of the *Harvard Law Review*, the present writer has ventured to call attention at length to some of the results of this tendency on the part of the distinguished commentator. No one can fail to recognize, however, that the tendency, when kept under control, is a wholesome one. In such a subject as corporation law no great or useful result can be attained by one who slavishly submits to the utterances of authority, and is too timid to exercise an independent judgment. Chapter CXLVI. on "Preferring Creditors" may be taken as a fair specimen of the author's work. "There are two doctrines upon this subject," he observes "one—and the only one which is deserving of any respect—is, that the assets of a corporation are a trust fund for its creditors; that when the corporation becomes insolvent, or when its affairs reach such a state that its stockholders or directors find themselves obliged to deal with its assets in view of its approaching suspension, they can only deal with them in the character of trustees for its creditors; that this necessarily means that they can only deal with them as trustees for all its creditors, and not for particular creditors whom they may desire to pay in preference to the others—that is, to pay out of money which equitably belongs to the others." Observe that in stating the doctrine the author asserts that the property of a corporation in insolvent or failing circumstances belongs "equitably" to all the creditors. Of the other doctrine, he says that it is frequently met with "in the decisions of courts whose judges, in their opinions, mouth the proposition that the assets of a corporation are a trust fund for its creditors; but it mocks that doctrine—or rather it obliterates it entirely—since it necessarily proceeds upon the proposition that an insolvent corporation, or a corporation whose stockholders or directors anticipate its insolvency, has the same power, in dealing with its assets which an individual, under like circumstances, has." It thus appears that the only doctrine on this subject "deserving of any respect" is inseparably connected with the theory that the assets of a corporation are "a trust fund for its creditors." If we
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turn to the preface (page vii), we find that the author refers to recent decisions which have modified this “American doctrine” to such an extent “that it may now be doubted whether the capital of a corporation is a trust fund for its creditors in any different sense than the sense in which the property of a private person is a trust fund for his creditors.” From this statement in the preface, the reader is referred to § 1665 and following sections in which the author states it to be his purpose to examine “these extraordinary decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States more at length, as the writer believes that, while not professing to do so, they overturn all former rulings of the same court in respect of the rights of the creditors of corporations against the holders of unpaid shares, and totally obliterate the doctrine of that and other American courts that the capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for its creditors.” The “extraordinary decisions” referred to are: Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417; Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 89, and Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118. It is to be regretted that the decision of the Supreme Court, in Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Company, (150 U. S. 371), had not been rendered at the time when these pages were written. With that decision before him Judge Thompson would have found it necessary to modify his expressions of disapproval of courts which refuse their adherence to the so-called “trust fund doctrine”—unless, indeed, he is prepared to say that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are not “deserving of any respect.” So loyal is Judge Thompson, however, to the “American doctrine” that he proceeds to dispose of the reasons advanced in support of the view that a corporation may deal with its property as an individual may do. He condemns the doctrine that a corporation can prefer a stockholder-creditor and criticises as “infamous” the view that a director-creditor may be preferred. “A partnership,” he remarks in § 6498, “cannot distribute its assets to its partners in preference to its creditors; but under this miserable doctrine, if it becomes incorporated, it can do so.” The reader of this chapter is referred to a series of articles in the Northwestern Law Review from the pen of E. A. Harriman in which Professor Harriman takes strong ground against Judge Thompson’s views and points out what are conceived to be the weak points in the author’s argument.

If we turn to title XIII.—“Corporate Bonds and Mortgages”—we find that the author has brought together all the cases upon this important subject and has analyzed and classified them in a satisfactory fashion. It is to be regretted that he has not included in this portion of the work a concise historical statement of the development of the modern corporate mortgage, for if he had done so the conflict and confusion among the cases would not have appeared so hopeless. When a branch of law is developing rapidly, it is difficult to accord to old and new decisions their true relative values unless emphasis is laid upon their difference in date and an effort is made to treat
the subject in perspective. In this chapter we find the light from all judicial decisions both older and more recent thrown, as it were, upon a plane surface, with the result that Judge Thompson's faculty of clear statement is tried to the utmost in his effort to make to the reader a coherent statement of the law. In this effort, in spite of the difficulty of the task, he has succeeded admirably and there are but few questions in this important subject which the reader will not find here intelligently discussed. Corporate bonds are first considered; then coupons, and then the remedies of bondholders. Next, the power of corporations to mortgage their property and franchises is investigated ($§§$ 6131-6165). At § 6171 begins a discussion of the power of directors and officers to execute corporate mortgages. A break in the sequence of section numbers is to be noted here as also at the end of many other chapters and titles. This was doubtless rendered necessary in preparing for the press the separate parts of a book of such great magnitude. Beginning with § 6182 there is a discussion of various incidents of mortgages followed by a full statement of the law relating to foreclosure and the priorities among creditors in foreclosure suits.

Chapter CXXXVII., Civil Liability of Corporations for Torts, presents a good specimen of Judge Thompson's method of dealing with such legal refinements as the older doctrine of the common law that a corporation aggregate could not commit an actionable tort. Again, in chapter CXXXVIII., "Liability for Trespasses and Malicious Injuries," we have in §§ 6299-6301 an instance of the author's faculty of stating rules of law in a fresh and vigorous way and of bringing to bear upon the solution of legal problems a sort of enlightened common sense which characterizes many of his mental processes.

Title XVI., Dissolution and Winding Up, is a valuable monograph upon the subject with which it deals. The manner in which corporations are dissolved is fully dealt with as is also the doctrine that forfeitures can be effected only by the State. The grounds for forfeiting charters are examined and ipso facto forfeitures are discussed. Chapter CLIV. deals with the "Surrender of Franchises and Dissolution," while the three following chapters are concerned with "Winding up at the suit of Stockholders," "Effect of Dissolution" and "Quo Warranto."

Further to chronicle the results of the reviewer's extended examination of this great work would subserve no useful purpose. It would be a continuing record of fresh evidences of industry and research. The discussion of no important cases seems to be omitted, and every subject receives its due share of the author's attention. At a time when so much careless and slipshod legal writing is put upon the market, this commendation means a great deal. It cannot truthfully be said, however, that the work is an epoch-making work, because the mind of the author is not of such a character that he can always give for the faith that is in him a reason which will satisfy the lawyer. He has a strong instinct of
what is just and right, but he does not always succeed in convincing
the reader that the solution of a problem for which he contends is
a solution of universal application. The truth is that the author's
mind is not a subtle one. When he treats of a given doctrine he
impresses the student as having read and studied all the cases on
the subject, but as having done but little in the way of acute think-
ing. He does not always get to the bottom of the matter in hand.
He does not always penetrate the recesses of the common law and
many of the beauties of equity jurisprudence are lost upon him.
He is strong in condemnation. His attacks upon decisions of
which he disapproves are often magnificent, but they are not criti-
cism. His distinguishing faculty is *expostulatory* rather than *critical.*
His righteous indignation blinds him so that he sometimes neglects
the weak points of the decision which he is criticising and impales
himself upon those which cannot be shaken. Upon the whole his
constructive work is better than his destructive work. The industry
and ability with which he has covered the whole field of corporation
law, the anxious care which he has used in sifting and arranging
the mass of decisions, the indefatigable energy which has enabled
him to collate the decisions from so many different jurisdictions and
to set them before the reader in an intelligent scheme—the qualities
in combination have produced a work which will make it easier hereafter
for the student to study and for the practitioner to practice,
if not for the lawyer to think. This is a great deal for one man to
accomplish. It is not as much as Judge Thompson hoped to
accomplish, but he himself must have foreseen that such an ambi-
tion as his could not be fully realized.

It is a delicate matter to criticise literary style. The reader will
doubtless regret that Judge Thompson has made throughout his
work so copious a use of adjectives. Now and then a word appears
which can scarcely be said to be in good use. Sometimes (as in
the dedication) there is a suspicion of "fine writing." Occasionally,
an unfortunate use of words detracts from the dignity of a
worthy thought. An example of this occurs at the end of the
preface, where the author is led by his desire to return thanks
for strength vouchsafed him from above, to tender his most
"grateful acknowledgments" to the Almighty. While these things
are undoubtedly blemishes, the reader will nevertheless find that
Judge Thompson always succeeds in making his meaning clear.
He is never obscure. He is seldom vague or indefinite. No one
who reads his book will fail to be convinced that it is the effort of
a vigorous man who has recorded in vigorous language the work-
ings of a vigorous mind.

Geo. Wharton Pepper.

Philadelphia.