SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES AND THE FAIR GOVERNANCE OF SCHOOLS

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INTRODUCTION

No Supreme Court decision is better known than Brown v. Board of Education1 [Brown I], and none has had a more conflicting legacy. On one hand, Brown I's declaration that intentional racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional now commands overwhelming popular acceptance.2 In this respect, Brown I may be the Court's proudest demonstration of the judiciary's capacity to catalyze social progress. On the other hand, Brown v. Board of Education- [Brown II], the follow-up decision rendered a year later, was the progenitor of an unabating controversy concerning the proper remedies for unlawful racial segregation in the public schools. The debate has focused on busing,4 the most widely publicized judicial tool against unlawful segregation, and has spawned vigorous congressional attempts to withdraw the power of fed-

2 According to a February-April 1982 poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, 91% of white Americans polled and 95% of black Americans polled believe that black and white students should attend the same schools. Opinion Roundup, PUB. OPINION, Oct.-Nov. 1982, at 28. The trend in public opinion polls towards increasing public support for integration and decreasing support for affirmative desegregation remedies is reviewed in G. ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS? 108-18 (1978).
4 The familiar use of the short-hand term "busing" to refer to racial balance remedies involving student reassignment is misleading in two respects. First, student reassignments for purposes of racial balance need not involve, in every case, additional requirements for public transportation. See infra note 65. Further, although a majority of school children in the United States use some form of public transportation to attend school, only three to five percent of the nation's school children are involved in desegregation-related busing. W. HAWLEY, R. CRAIN, C. ROSELL, M. SMYLIE, R. FERNÁNDEZ, J. SCHOFIELD, R. TOMPKINS, W. TRENT & M. ZLOTNIK, STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DESSEGREGATION 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited as W. HAWLEY].

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eral courts and administrative agencies to impose that remedy.\(^5\) Far from evoking public consensus on the Court’s position, \emph{Brown II} and its remedial progeny have embroiled the Court in a profound battle over the legitimacy of the federal courts’ equitable powers.

The debate over the Supreme Court’s endorsement of extensive busing remedies has encompassed a variety of complex issues, including the constitutional authority of courts to mandate the restructuring of public school systems,\(^6\) judicial competence to implement sensible busing remedies,\(^7\) the efficacy of busing to accomplish effective desegregation,\(^8\) and the degree of support within the minority community itself for remedies focused on busing, rather than on educational quality per se.\(^9\) Despite the breadth of this debate, the writings of supporters and critics of the Supreme Court’s approach to remedies exhibit two complementary shortcomings. Supporters of busing often downplay the degree to which busing imposes significant burdens on the minority students for whose benefit it is implemented.\(^10\) For example, to the extent that mandatory busing accelerates white flight from formerly segregated school systems,\(^11\) busing in such cases may only increase logistical burdens on minority students, without providing the benefits of genuinely integrated schooling. Conversely, critics of busing underplay the injury that minority students suffer from intentionally segregated public schools. For example, a conception of school desegregation remedies that focuses only on particularized aspects of educational quality for

\(^5\) In the 97th Congress, the Senate approved one antibusing jurisdictional proposal, S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 128 CONG. REC. S1336-37 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1982), but the bill died in House committee.


\(^7\) On the unsuccessful efforts in 1982 to restrict the use of appropriations by the Department of Justice for bringing legal action to compel busing, see 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 385-86 (1982).

\(^8\) The criticisms of judicial competence are reviewed briefly in M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPirical STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 11-15 (1982).


\(^11\) On the relevance of remedial costs to the design of school desegregation decrees, see Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 194, 195-97.
black students, such as the dollar value of resources expended for their schooling, fails to take account of the intangible harms of segregated schooling.

Whether these weaknesses in the public debate over busing are attributable to the rhetoric of the Supreme Court's opinions is a question that defies satisfactory answer.\textsuperscript{12} There is, however, little in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence to counteract either tendency. The Court has never stated precisely the benefits that busing or other remedies are supposed to yield in school desegregation cases or the harms that desegregation remedies are intended to relieve.\textsuperscript{13} For supporters of busing, the cases articulate no general standard for remedial success against which the relative costs and benefits of remedies other than busing can be assessed. For critics of busing, there is no explicit statement of remedial purpose as a reminder that institutionally modest remedies may be insufficient to implement the insight into racial inequality embodied in the holding of \textit{Brown I}.

The central purpose of this Article is to fill this vacuum in the Supreme Court's remedial jurisprudence by fashioning a remedial theory against which the utility and legitimacy of busing, and of school desegregation remedies generally, can be assessed. The essential thesis may be stated as follows: Whatever the Supreme Court's original rationale, the Court's conclusion in \textit{Brown I}—that racially separate schooling is inherently unequal—is correct because segregation imposes a system of unfair governance on minority students and parents. By "unfair governance," this Article refers to the systematic vulnerability of minority students in segregated school districts to discriminatory treatment by public school authorities. Where minority students are systematically vulnerable to hostile or insensitive treatment, the racial separation of schools effectively subjugates minority students in the competition for educational resources and deprives them of any basis for reasonable confidence in the evenhanded administration of their schools. Recognition of unfair governance as among the evils prohibited by the Constitution justifies both the Supreme Court's broad imposition of liability for remediying racial segregation in the public schools and its approval of institutionally burdensome remedies when such liability has been imposed.

\textsuperscript{12} Professor Yudof emphatically faults the Court for inadequacies in public dialogue over racial justice in the schools. See Yudof, \textit{Nondiscrimination and Beyond: The Search for Principle in Supreme Court Desegregation Decisions}, in \textsc{School Desegregation} 97, 115 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980).

\textsuperscript{13} The ambiguity in the theory of right and remedy underlying the school desegregation cases has not gone unnoticed. For a brief critical review of attempts to re-explain the cases, see generally Yudof, \textit{supra} note 12.
Explicit recognition of the harm of unfair governance highlights, however, the Supreme Court's recurring ambivalence in weighing educational equality against state and local autonomy in political decision-making. Actual integration is so preferable a remedial goal under a fair governance conception of the harms of segregated schooling that it justifies busing across school district lines. The Supreme Court's disapproval of interdistrict desegregation remedies in *Milliken v. Bradley*[^1] even when such a remedy was necessary to achieve actual integration, is thus at odds with the fair governance theory. Assuming *Milliken I* will not be repudiated, a critical judicial task is to fashion intradistrict desegregation remedies that respond to the harm of unfair governance as effectively as does the remedy of integration. The penultimate section of this Article considers what such remedies might be.

At this point in the history of public school desegregation, an inquiry into the justification for school desegregation remedies is likely to be motivated by something more than a desire to understand the debate over remedies more fully in the abstract. Further debate may yield consensus that busing is educationally or politically inappropriate, or Congress may, in any event, prohibit courts from ordering busing. Some choice will then need to be made among other remedial approaches unless judicial attempts to end racial segregation in the public schools are to be abandoned altogether. The fair governance conception of school desegregation offers such an underlying remedial theory upon which more fully reasoned court decisions may be fashioned.

I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PUZZLING REMEDIAL JURISPRUDENCE

A theory of remedial design should identify the harms that a judicial remedy is to rectify. Yet Supreme Court school desegregation opinions rarely discuss the harms of segregated schooling and almost never relate remedies the Court has approved to specific harms. Before articulating, in part II, a conception of the harms of segregated schooling not explicit in the cases, it is helpful to explore the limits of the Court's identification of the harms of segregated schooling.

A. The Ambiguity of the Supreme Court's General Remedial Strategy

The choice among conceivable school desegregation remedies should depend upon what such remedies are intended to accomplish. Familiar broad goals for legal remedies include retribution, compensa-
tion, and deterrence. That is, the primary thrust of a particular remedy may be to punish a wrongdoer, to make the victim whole, or to prevent future wrongdoing by the particular wrongdoer (specific deterrence) or by potential wrongdoers in general (general deterrence). Although such goals are by no means mutually exclusive, the choice among them will certainly influence the remedial tools employed, both in kind and degree.

By negative implication, the Court eschewed punishment as a central remedial goal in Brown II, and school boards since have never labored under the threat of punitive damages for intentional segregative acts. Avoiding a punitive approach was appropriate for several reasons: the dubiousness of obtaining jury verdicts for punitive damages, the nonpunitive nature of the remedies sanctioned by the Court in Brown II is implicit in three elements of that decision. First, the Court approved equitable remedies, which ordinarily are not retributive in nature. See id. at 300. Second, the measure of the appropriate remedy articulated in Brown II is not a generalized social interest, but a “personal interest” of the plaintiffs in nondiscriminatory admission to public schools. Id. Finally, the Court instructed lower courts initially to rely on the good faith efforts of the school boards for the implementation of desegregation remedies. See id. at 299. Leaving school boards that had been adjudged guilty of purposeful discrimination with the “primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving” the problems of accomplishing school desegregation effectively, id., is not a policy choice easily reconciled with any notion of punishing those authorities.

Of course, certain punitive tools, such as the enactment of criminal statutes, would have been beyond the Court’s power in any event. Others may simply not have been requested by any plaintiff. The remedial aim of the plaintiffs in the cases consolidated in the first Brown decision, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was not damages, but securing the admission of black children to formerly all-white schools, see generally R. Kluger, Simple Justice (1976), and the questions assigned for reargument in Brown II involved the pace and logistics of such a remedy. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298 n.2.

The availability of damage actions against government officials in their individual capacity for violating the constitutional rights of individuals was not clear until Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

If the preferred remedy for unlawful segregation had been damages, implementation would have depended on jury verdicts because the Constitution guarantees a jury trial in federal suits for damages amounting to more than $20. U.S. Const. amend. VII. Although, in theory, southern juries in federal courts might have responded to the Supreme Court’s lead more willingly than other southern institutions, the history subsequent to Brown II of tenacious public and private resistance to desegregation demonstrates the wisdom implicit in the 1955 decision not to rely on juries to put teeth into the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
Court's past approval of segregated schooling, and the greater resistance punitive remedies might have precipitated to implementation of the Brown I holding.

Beyond avoiding retribution as a remedial goal, however, the Supreme Court's direction has been ambiguous. It opted for equitable relief, rather than compensatory damages, undoubtedly for the same

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Even assuming cooperative juries, however, punitive damages could have posed intractable problems concerning the number of potential claimants and defendants. The magnitude of liability that might have been imposed on behalf of all minority children enrolled in public schools in the South in 1954 alone—putting aside, for the moment, potential suits by all then-living black graduates of such schools who could, with equal justice, have filed damages claims—would have been staggering and staggeringly difficult to manage. If states attempted to indemnify defendant school officials, for example, one can imagine the justifiable damages claims of minority students exhausting many state treasuries.

Additionally, if the Court had approved punitive remedies in school desegregation cases, the universe of potential offenders, that is, public school authorities and other government officials who had contributed to the establishment and maintenance of such systems, would have been vast. Indeed, we may be thankful that the Court did not endorse punitive damages because the specter of individual liability in school desegregation cases might have prompted the Court to be less vigorous in finding various forms of segregated schooling unlawful in the first place. The doctrinal extension of the first Brown decision, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to the schools of the North and West might have been more problematic if such an extension had resulted in drastic remedies against particular school officials in their individual capacities.


practical reasons it avoided the endorsement of punitive damages. The Court has not clearly indicated, however, the aims of such relief. Only in recent years has the Court articulated a broad restorative purpose for school desegregation remedies: to restore the victims of discrimination to the position they would otherwise have enjoyed but for the occurrence of discrimination. This formulation fails to identify, however, the harms such remedies are intended to rectify.

To understand better the nature of the problem faced by courts deciding school cases, one might consider an example more trivial than school desegregation. Imagine two friends, one of whom breaks a treasured heirloom of the other's family. Imagine that an arbitrator of the victim's grievance determines that the remedy should be one that restores the victim to the position she would otherwise have enjoyed but for the breakage. Under one approach, the arbitrator may consider as the only relevant loss the destruction of the physical object. Restoration may thus be limited to the repair or replacement of the object or payment in compensatory damages. This would be the most narrow remedial approach because it would focus only on the loss most obviously embodied in an "objective" phenomenon, the breaking of a solid thing.

From the victim's perspective, however, such a remedy would not restore the victim to the position she would have occupied but for the accident. The victim's family has suffered grief, for which only an apology may be adequate relief. The victim may also have suffered mental distress, for which psychological counseling would provide a remedy. A remedy recognizing these additional factors would be restorative in that it aims chiefly to restore the victim's status quo ante. Such a remedy would be expansive, however, because of the wider scope of legally cognizable injuries it addresses.

Thus, in any given situation, a court's identification of losses or injuries might logically proceed along dramatically divergent lines with equally divergent implications for the proper design of remedies.

20 Beyond the problems of manageability and enforceability discussed above with reference to punitive damages, compensatory damages would have presented the additional troublesome problem of measuring the losses inflicted by segregation on individual black plaintiffs.


22 Priceless heirlooms often provide useful illustrations of more broadly applicable legal points. For a telling use of the priceless heirloom example to demonstrate the disutility of foreseeability as a standard to establish the scope of a tortfeasor's liability in damages for particular harms, see Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401, 1405-09 (1961).

23 Professor Paul Gewirtz has recently elaborated a distinction between "Rights Maximizing" and "Interest Balancing" approaches to the evaluation of remedies that largely corresponds to the distinction drawn in this Article. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 588-89, 591, 598-99 (1983). For a critical review of
the face of Supreme Court silence as to whether a narrow or expansive restorative approach is appropriate in desegregation cases, lower courts are unlikely to produce consistent remedial opinions.

The treasured heirloom example illustrates three critical ways in which the decisionmaker's conception of the cognizable harms will affect remedial design. First, the expansive approach is likely to include a greater variety of remedial tools. Some harms, for example, can be rectified through monetary compensation. Others are less amenable to compensation and require more imaginative relief.

Second, the narrow approach is less likely to reflect the victim's subjective perception of the harms suffered. It is more likely to relieve only those harms that are the most objectively measurable. This might be either because of the decisionmaker's lesser sensitivity to the less measurable, subjective harms the victim has suffered or because of institutional concerns (such as difficulties of proof) that the decisionmaker weighs more heavily than the victim's losses.

Third, a broader perspective on harms is likely to lead the decisionmaker to take a more expansive view of the role of deterrence in remedial design. Taking the heirloom incident again as an example, the arbitrator might award a memorial rather than a mere apology as relief if the aim is not only to restore the victim's immediate sense of well-being, but to assure a sense of well-being that will extend into the future. That the victim's status quo ante included no precisely equivalent honor would be less significant in the choice of remedies once the arbitrator's priority shifts to protecting the victim against a future recurrence of the sense of loss.

The Supreme Court's remedial formula says nothing specific about the importance of deterrence in school desegregation cases. This silence may reflect the Court's determination that deterrence is not a primary remedial goal in these cases. Alternatively, the Court may be assuming implicitly that deterrence is a primary aim, but one that is accomplished by restorative relief. For example, the Court may contemplate that, even if deterrence of future discrimination is a primary remedial goal, an injunction ending proven racially discriminatory practices in the public schools will be a sufficient deterrent.

Because the Court's remedial formula gives no clear direction on deterrence, the question arises whether lower courts should limit prospective injunctions to prohibiting only those discriminatory practices

modern developments in antidiscrimination law that plumbs the possible ideological significance of choosing a "victim perspective" or "perpetrator perspective" in legal disputes, see Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
for which the plaintiffs have proved school authorities culpable. As the heirloom example illustrates, to the extent the Court's perspective moves closer to the victim's perspective on the appropriate protection of her interests in the future, such limited remedies will become less likely.

The critical ambiguity in the Supreme Court's decisions on school desegregation remedies is whether its remedial rationale is intended to be narrow or expansive in its recognition of and protection against the harms inflicted on minority students by segregated schooling. The Court briefly discusses these harms only in *Brown I,* but this discussion does not link a theory of harms to specific guidance for remedial design. Several aspects of the Court's remedial decisions subsequent to *Brown II* imply that the harm to be rectified in school desegregation cases is only the state-wrought distortion in the intradistrict attendance pattern of formerly segregated schools. These aspects of the Court's remedial doctrine, however, are inconsistent with the expansive results of the post-*Brown II* cases. The Supreme Court has produced a body of cases that sanction substantial judicial interference in the policymaking of local school districts but which do not explicitly attempt to justify such broad intervention.

**B. Brown I and Ambiguities in the Supreme Court's Conception of the Harms of Segregated Schooling**

The ambiguity in the Supreme Court's conception of the harms to be remedied in school desegregation cases is rooted in *Brown I* itself, which contains the only extended Supreme Court discussion of the harms of racially segregated schooling. The decision did not discuss remedies but reached only the threshold conclusion that state-required or state-authorized racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and results in liability for some form of relief. *Brown I* is still the logical starting point for identifying the harms of segregated schooling that school desegregation remedies should attempt to rectify; the harms to be targeted by those remedies should be the harms that justify the conviction that segregated schooling is a violation of constitutional rights in the first place. Otherwise, it would be hard to justify as a legal matter the judicial imposition of those burdens that desegregation remedies create for defendants and, indeed, for plaintiffs as well.

The uncertainties of *Brown I* have been discussed at length else-

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24 347 U.S. at 493-94.
25 *Cf.* Fiss, *supra* note 10, at 194 (remedial orders should be based on determinations that discriminatory practices are sufficiently harmful to justify costs of remedies).
where, in numerous attempts to identify and assess the various propositions for which Brown I can stand. My interest in tracing out here the various conceptions of harm that have been frequently associated with Brown I will be limited to two points. First, none of these conceptions correlates very comfortably with the remedial strategies the Supreme Court has endorsed since the Brown decisions. Second, and more important, none of these conceptions entirely explains the central factual assertion of Brown I: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."26 I will argue that this assertion is true. The conceptions of harm typically associated with Brown I do not satisfactorily explain the assertion, in part because the conceptions are incomplete and in part because, over the thirty years since Brown I, our perceptions of the nature and significance of the harms of segregated schools have changed. A current remedial theory would have to regard the catalogue of harms cited in Brown I only as a starting point for analysis and take account also of subsequent research into the nature of racial inequality.27

The harms often attributed to racially segregated schooling that are typically regarded as explicit or implicit in the Brown I decision include (1) interference with minority students' freedom of association, (2) the impact of segregated schooling on minority students' academic performance, (3) the impact of segregated schooling on the subsequent adult status and income of black students, (4) the harm of racial isolation, (5) the damaging psychological effect of segregation on black chil-

26 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
27 Brown I could not, in any event, be expected to be as definitive or precise a statement of the harms rendering segregated schooling unequal as the search for sound remedial theory currently requires. First, it is a reasonable surmise that the harms of segregated schooling at issue in Brown I were so egregious and notorious that a mincing analysis in 1954 of what exactly made segregated schooling unequal might well have seemed superfluous and belittling of the enormous injury the Court finally saw fit to redress. Professor Black has persuasively written that the discriminatory purpose and impact of segregation in the southern regional culture were "matters of common notoriety, matters not so much for judicial notice as for the background knowledge of educated men who live in the world." Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960).

Further, Brown I was a political document. The Court was commanding a restructuring of social institutions more dramatic than had ever before been ordered by the courts. As author of the opinion, Chief Justice Warren was deeply concerned with articulating the Court's judgment in such terms and in such a tone as to win his colleagues' unanimous endorsement. See R. Kluger, SIMPLE JUSTICE 679-99 (1976). It thus should not be surprising if, today, a comprehensive explanation of the constitutional rule in Brown I requires resort to certain factors not made explicit in the opinion. The sensitivity of the Court's decision may have counseled something less than a candid statement of the evils of segregation that led the Court to its constitutional judgment.

For a similar analysis of Brown II, see Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 611-12, 615.
dren, and (6) the objective insult to blacks that segregation represents. These harms are distinguishable from such "tangible" harms of resource inequality as may be present in individual cases, but on which the Supreme Court did not rest in reaching its Brown I judgment.28

There is little doubt that the Supreme Court regarded the interference of segregated schooling with minority students' freedom of association as a significant harm. This is evident in a passage in Brown I referring to the value to black students of contact with white students29 and is perhaps also implicit in the reference in Brown II to the necessity of guaranteeing the "admission [of black children] to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."30 It is clear, however, first, that the Court's post-Brown II endorsement of busing goes beyond rectifying this particular harm and second, that this harm is not a complete explanation for the "inherent inequality" of segregated schooling.

That the Supreme Court has gone beyond enabling blacks to attend schools of their choosing is evident in the Court's rejection, in Green v. County School Board,31 of so-called "freedom-of-choice" plans as adequate school desegregation remedies. Under such plans, school children were typically assigned to the schools they had previously attended, but they could transfer at will. The usual result was that a few black students in a formerly segregated district opted to attend previously all-white schools, but no white students opted to attend previously all-black schools.32 Although laws requiring or authorizing separate white and black schools were eliminated, public schools remained iden-

28 The Court in Brown I, in explaining the unconstitutionality of segregation, did not rely on any inequality in the tangible resources that white public school authorities might afford to black and white schools. The Court articulated the issue before it as turning on "intangible" inequalities: "We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.

Any resource inequality that might be present in an individual case would be a fact readily susceptible to particularized adjudication and would not explain the Court's conclusion in Brown I that separate educational facilities are "inherently" unequal. It is just as unlikely that case-by-case resource inequalities would persuasively justify the Court's expansive post-Brown II remedial results, given that such inequalities could seemingly be remedied through narrowly tailored injunctions requiring the equalization of specific resources.

29 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
30 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
It may be that social circumstances partly resulting from past segregation prevented blacks under freedom-of-choice plans from freely choosing to attend the schools they most preferred. Mandatory student reassignment might then have been necessary to guarantee the right of black students to a genuinely free choice. The Supreme Court in Green, however, refused to adopt or reject findings of fact that would have supported this possibility. In at least one lower court case, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Board of Education, black parents have been unsuccessful in asserting their children’s right to attend neighborhood schools of choice in the face of an integration plan that school authorities voluntarily adopted and that required the busing of black children out of their neighborhood. The district court and court of appeals in that case correctly interpreted Supreme Court desegregation decisions as vindicating something other than free choice per se.

Aside from the inadequacy of a freedom-of-choice conception to explain the Supreme Court’s post-Brown II decisions, the impact of segregation on blacks’ freedom of association is not, when viewed in isolation, the most compelling possible explanation of the inherent inequality of racially separate schooling. As Herbert Wechsler has pointed out, it is difficult in the abstract to identify a constitutional principle for choosing between a claim to free association by those who would have it and a claim to deny free association by those who would wish to avoid it. The choice is difficult, that is, unless that fact of exclusion is assessed in a specific cultural setting that renders exclusion harmful for reasons beyond the fact of nonassociation itself. If racial exclusion is unconstitutional, however, because of the particular impact of exclusion in a racist society, then there must be additional harms associated with racial exclusion that segregation imposes in such a society. These harms, in addition to exclusion per se, are then part of what renders segregated schooling inherently unequal.

In explaining its opinion in Brown I, the Court identified, at least

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33 391 U.S. at 440 n.5.
36 See Norwalk CORE, 423 F.2d at 124.
38 Id. at 34.
implicitly, several harms beyond the impact on free association that segregated schooling inflicts on black children. These harms are the detrimental impact of segregated schooling on the academic performance and subsequent adult status and income of black students, the harm of racial isolation, and the damaging psychological effect of segregation on black children.

The extent to which these harms may be traced directly to segregated schooling has been much debated since Brown I was decided. It is unlikely, however, that racially segregated schooling has not affected significant numbers of black children in these particular ways. Notwithstanding the social science controversies, public perception and disapproval of such injuries to minority students undoubtedly accounts for much of the consensus behind Brown I. For purposes of our analysis, however, it is important again to make two points. First, a remedial

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40 The Court stated in Brown I that public education "is a principal instrument in preparing [children] for later professional training . . . In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if . . . denied the opportunity of an education." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.

41 In addition to asserting a relationship between public education and adult professional success, the Court cited the importance of public education in acclimating students to the mainstream culture. According to the Court, education "is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, . . . and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. The Court went on to cite its opinions in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), holding segregation unlawful in public higher education in part because students in higher education, in order to have a full education, must "engage in discussions and exchange views with other students." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641). These observations imply that, apart from its impact on future income or social status, racial isolation in public schools so depreciates the schooling experience as to render such isolation unconstitutional.

42 "To separate [minority students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court based this finding on the "modern authority" of a number of social science articles, see id. at 494 n.11, that have since been subjected to scholarly challenge. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.

It is important to sort out two notions of what "stigma" might mean in the school desegregation context: first, the "subjective" internalization of insult; that is, the kind of psychological harm to which Brown I refers explicitly; second, the "objective" insult that intentional segregation represents irrespective of its psychological impact on the victim. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60. The opinion in Brown I articulates only the former conception.

43 See supra note 2. Professor Dworkin has argued, however, that, even if such injuries to black students are prevalent, such a theory would not fully explain the constitutional command to desegregate because individual students should still be able to prove under a "harm theory" that segregated education provides them, in particular, with a more effective educational opportunity. See Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of Uncertainty, in Education, Social Science, and the Judicial Process 20, 26 (R. Rist & R. Anson eds. 1977).
theory based exclusively on any of these harms does not fit comfortably with the Supreme Court's post-*Brown II* doctrine. Second, none of these harms captures the full force of the assertion that segregated schooling is inherently unequal.

Doctrinally, the threshold difficulty with reconciling a remedial theory based on this list of harms with later Supreme Court decisions is that such a theory would not account for the Court's adherence to the de jure/de facto distinction as a key element in its constitutional analysis. One reason for this difficulty may be that the Court, although dealing with intentionally segregated schools in *Brown I*, did not consider whether the intentionality of racial segregation was of constitutional significance. The opinion condemned "separate educational facilities" without reference to the causes of the racial separation. Nevertheless, the *Brown I* opinion implicitly confirms at least that the Court was not thinking about the application of its holding in de facto settings, and more recently, the Court explicitly has stressed intent as the touchstone of legal liability. Despite the urgings of Justices Douglas and Powell and scholarly invitations to abandon the distinction, the Court retains the doctrine that intentional segregation is unlawful but that adventitious racial separation in public schools is not.

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44 *Id.* at 25-26.
45 The facts of the cases consolidated for decision in *Brown I* made resolution of this point unnecessary. Fiss, *School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law*, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3-4 (1974). A footnote to the Court's opinion implies, however, that an 1855 Massachusetts act outlawing segregated schooling in the state accomplished for segregated Boston what *Brown I* was intended a century later to accomplish for the South. The footnote suggests that the Court was thinking of *Brown I* as dealing with de jure segregation only. *See Brown I*, 347 U.S. at 491 n.6. 
47 The abandonment has been urged not only because racial imbalance may be equally harmful in all settings, *see* Carter, *De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented*, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 502, 503-12 (1965), but also, it is argued, because responsibility for the fact of imbalance can justly be attributed to the government in every case, *id.* at 512-15; Fiss, *Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts*, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 583-88 (1965); Comment, *School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility*, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 440-47 (1972). Professor Fiss notes, however, that such an attribution involves a "nonaccusatory theory," which, unlike the Court's current rhetoric, does not attempt to predicate liability on the "wrongfulness" of the state's acts. *See* Fiss, *supra* note 45, at 29-31.
48 The de facto/de jure distinction is not compelled by the constitutional interpretation that limits the reach of the fourteenth amendment to "state action." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Justice Douglas has argued that a state's control and support of its system of public education brings that system wholly within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. *See* Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 758-59, 761 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Implementation of the distinction does, however, advance one of the goals that the state action doctrine serves, namely, preserving a realm
Putting aside the social science debate concerning whether racially separate schooling has a significant adverse impact on the academic performance of black students or on their adult income and status, it is unlikely that these detrimental impacts of segregated schooling would depend upon the intentionality of the segregation. Likewise, whatever harm is wrought by racial separateness per se would not seem to depend in any degree on the purposefulness of segregation. If racial isolation injures black students by depriving them of contact with the majority culture or of the opportunity to interact with people of a different racial background, such injuries occur whatever the cause of their isolation.

It may be that intentional segregation works a more detrimental harm than does de facto segregation in terms of damaging the personality development of black children because purposeful segregation is a more powerful and therefore more readily internalized white statement of black inferiority. Even if the statutory enactment of segregation in the South could simply be assumed to have had a greater psychological effect on black children than de facto segregation, however, it is not plausible to suggest that the tacit, subtle manipulation of attendance patterns that the Court has condemned in cases outside the South inflicts damage on the personalities of minority children that de facto racial segregation does not. If internalized psychological harm were truly the crux of the Court’s conclusions, it would be difficult to understand the Court’s continued adherence to the de jure/de facto distinction in school desegregation cases.49

A remedial theory addressing only these putative injuries not only fails to account for the de jure/de facto distinction, but like the freedom-of-choice conception, it inadequately explains the inherent ine-
quality of racially separate schooling. There exist both empirical uncertainties regarding the harmful effects of racially separate schooling in each of these respects and normative problems raised by asserting that single-race schools are harmful per se.

As an empirical matter, for example, no consensus exists as to a correlation between segregated schooling and student achievement or adult "life chances." There is only inconclusive support for theories that desegregation improves minority children's cognitive skills or those noncognitive work characteristics valuable in adult life. The weakness

Most of the research on the effects of desegregation has focused on the impact of desegregation on the academic achievement of minority students as measured by performance on standardized tests. It has been estimated that, as of 1978, there were already as many as 200 such studies "[e]ven after the inadequate studies and those that duplicate other reports are eliminated." Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1978, at 17, 23.

Although the substantive and methodological issues raised by these studies defy easy summary, it is helpful to note the general conclusions reached by some major reviewers of the literature. Nancy St. John reviewed 68 studies on academic achievement and found a relatively small number of studies of sufficient methodological soundness to warrant serious consideration. She also concluded that the results of the well-designed studies were so mixed that there was insufficient evidence from which to draw any reliable conclusions about the effects of desegregation on minority students' academic achievement. See St. John, The Effects of School Desegregation on Children: A New Look at the Research Evidence, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 84, 87-88 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981); see also Edmonds, Effective Education For Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confirmed?, in SHADES OF Brown: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESSEGREGATION 109 (D. Bell ed. 1980) (arguing, in light of the same conclusion St. John reaches, that desegregation planners should focus not on racial balance per se, but on establishing those school characteristics that have been proven effective in improving all pupil performance).

Others have drawn a different picture based on the same material. Weinberg, after a review of essentially the same studies as those analyzed by St. John, concluded that, even though a significant number of studies found no effect or a mixed effect of desegregation on minority student achievement, "overall, desegregation does indeed have a positive effect on minority achievement levels." See Weinberg, The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1975, at 241, 268. Weinberg qualified his conclusion, however, by noting reservations about methodological problems inherent in many of the studies, and concedes that some of the studies' results may be attributable to factors other than racial desegregation, such as the students' socioeconomic backgrounds, which may affect academic achievement. Id. at 243, 268.

Crain and Mahard reviewed 93 studies of the effect of desegregation on minority achievement and concluded, "Desegregation is indeed beneficial, although it must begin in the earliest grades." Crain & Mahard, Minority Achievement: Policy Implications of Research, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESSEGREGATION 55, 76 (W. Hawley ed. 1981). Despite serious methodological problems that the authors recognized in much of the research, Crain and Mahard concluded that the "methodologically strongest" studies, especially those made of students "desegregated at either kindergarten or first grade," showed consistent positive results. See id. at 63. Crain and Mahard would not assert, however, that the available evidence supports the conclusion that desegregation beyond "the early primary grades" has positive effects on achievement. Id. at 76.

Even more controversial than the relationship between desegregation and minority

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50 Most of the research on the effects of desegregation has focused on the impact of desegregation on the academic achievement of minority students as measured by performance on standardized tests. It has been estimated that, as of 1978, there were already as many as 200 such studies "[e]ven after the inadequate studies and those that duplicate other reports are eliminated." Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1978, at 17, 23.
in the data may, of course, reflect the limitations of social science, rather than the actual relationship between segregated schooling and adult income or status. If the aspiration of our inquiry, however, is to identify a firm basis for the result in Brown I and for a consequent remedial theory, reliance on an educational performance or "life chance" hypothesis cannot fulfill this aspiration. Similarly, the data on the impact of segregation on personality are inconclusive. Such data test scores is the assertion of any significant relationship between improvement in test scores and the "adult life chances" of minority students. It appears that the effect test scores have upon a person's eventual income and occupational attainments is nominal at best. See Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of Social Science Evidence, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1975, at 217, 227-29. Levin's review of the studies of the relationship between test scores and income and occupational attainments indicates that "at most only about 10 per cent of the differences in income can be explained by test scores, leaving 90 per cent or more to be explained by other factors," and test scores explain at most "about 25 per cent of the variance" in occupational status. See id. at 229.

There are a variety of possible explanations for the lack of relationship between test performance and adult success. First, notwithstanding that studies of cognitive development tend to focus on standardized tests, there are "serious questions about whether the standardized achievement test is the correct measure of cognitive outcomes." Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement, supra, at 25. Levin further surmises that "noncognitive educational outcomes" such as "dependability, subordination to authority, respect for rules, and internalization of work norms" may have more of an influence on adult success than cognitive outcomes of schooling. Levin, supra, at 229-30. There is virtually no research, however, on the impact of desegregation on such noncognitive characteristics.

A key reason why no sufficient evidence exists from which reliable conclusions may be drawn concerning the relationship of desegregation to the life chances of minority students is the paucity of research on the long-term impacts of desegregation. Id. at 218-21; McPartland, Desegregation and Equity in Higher Education and Employment: Is Progress Related to the Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools?, 42 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1978, at 108, 109. McPartland states that the studies of such long-term consequences that do exist are generally "derived either from very small . . . or unrepresentative samples, or from data that are out of date," and concludes that "major new data collections will probably be needed to make real progress" on this issue. See id. at 132; see also McPartland & Braddock, Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in Effective School Desegregation 141, 152 (W. Hawley ed. 1981).

In Brown I, the Court attributes its finding as to the impact of segregated schooling on personality to seven books and articles, see Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11, all but one of which were brought to the Court's attention by the appendix to the black appellants' briefs filed in Brown I and reprinted in The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 427 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Effects] (reprint of appendix to appellant's briefs to Brown I). The additional source, a chapter of a report edited by Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making ch. VI (H. Witmer & R. Kotinsky eds. 1952), is, according to Dr. Kenneth Clark, largely a summary of Clark's White House Conference manuscript on the personality effects of prejudice and discrimination, to which the appellants' appendix referred. See Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 224, 227 (1959-60).

Although Dr. Clark, among others, has vigorously defended the potential role of social scientists in school desegregation cases against criticisms based on Brown I, see
afford only a weak justification for regarding segregated schooling as inherently unequal. Moreover, it is doubtful that racial isolation deprives black students of sufficient knowledge of the majority culture to acquire healthy notions of citizenship, proper moral development, normal environmental adjustment, or adequate preparation for adulthood, even in a racially mixed society. Even on the prejudiced assumption that exposure to majority values is somehow necessary to achieve these ends, there is no reason to suppose that minority students educated in segregated schools are not educated in majority values. Indeed, it might

_id., apparently no social scientist now argues that the studies cited in Brown I provide an adequate empirical basis for an assessment of the impact of segregated schooling on personality development. Indeed, the White House Conference report published by Witmer and Kotinsky stated in 1950 that there did not then exist “thoroughly satisfactory methods of determining the effects of prejudice and discrimination [generally] on health of personality.” PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING, supra, at 139.

The studies cited in Brown I have been challenged both for inadequacy in experimental design, e.g., Gregor, The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 621, 622-23, 626 (1963), and for a failure even to attempt to isolate segregated schooling as the causal factor for any personality developments identified. “The main theme of that evidence was that Negro children, from a very young age, are sensitive to and strongly affected by prejudice and discrimination generally. None of the empirical studies brought to the Court’s attention . . . even purported to isolate the effects of public school segregation per se . . .” Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 279 (1972).

The research since the early 1960’s concerning the effects of desegregation on personality development is also inadequate in determining the impact of segregated schooling on personality health. One reviewer of the literature concludes, “[I]t is virtually impossible to determine with certainty whether or not desegregation has short-term or long-term beneficial or harmful effects on minority students’ self-esteem, aspirations, or motivation.” Epps, Minority Children: Desegregation, Self-Evaluation, and Achievement Orientation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 85, 95 (W. Hawley ed. 1981). See also Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 420, 423-26 (1979); St. John, supra note 50, at 90-92; Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 217, 226-28 (1978).

In any event, the relative emphasis on stigma in Brown I may well reflect something other than the Court’s determination that psychological harm really was the wrong at issue in Brown I. An obvious aspect of the rhetoric in Brown I is the Court’s attempt formally to cast that decision as comfortably as possible in the doctrinal mold of earlier cases. The Court does not, for example, overrule the separate but equal rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), but finds instead, in the context of public schooling, that separate education is inherently unequal. To cast its argument in this mold, however, the Court had to deal with the Plessy Court’s rejection of the argument that segregated train transportation was unequal because of the stigma imposed on black passengers. The relevant passage from Plessy (163 U.S. at 551-52) is among the most ignominious in the Court’s history; but rather than dismissing it, the Court chose instead to deal with Plessy by explaining that “psychological knowledge” as to stigma had changed since the 1890’s. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. How critical this response to Plessy was to the result in Brown I may, however, be doubted, especially given the weakness of the data cited in Brown I. See Goodman, supra, at 278-83.
be supposed that segregated schooling was implemented in part precisely to inculcate black students with majority cultural values hostile to them. Finally, there is no strong support for the hypothesis that desegregation produces racial interactions that promote adult friendship or reduce adult racial conflict; thus, the absence of such contacts in childhood may not be firmly regarded as harmful on these bases. In short, the proposition that racial isolation is inherently harmful is very much unproven by empirical evidence.

There are also philosophical objections to the proposition that all-black schools are inherently harmful. Black educators and political leaders have voiced opposition to the implications of the suggestion that black children will be better off if integrated with white students in school. Several predominantly black schools have been noted for

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52 The paucity of useful research on the relationship between desegregation and race relations is widely noted. "Reading this literature leaves one impressed with how little is known and how much additional research . . . is needed." McConahay, The Effects of School Desegregation Upon Students' Racial Attitudes and Behavior: A Critical Review of the Literature and a Prolegomenon to Future Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1978, at 77, 100. See also Cohen, The Effects of Desegregation on Race Relations, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1975, at 271, 297-98; Cook, supra note 51, at 430-31; St. John, supra note 50, at 93. In addition, the reviewers of the literature in this area decry the methodological weaknesses in the research that is available. E.g., McConahay, Reducing Racial Prejudice in Desegregated Schools, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 35, 36 (W. Hawley ed. 1981) ("[T]he literature is a methodological cesspool.").

Some authors have offered broad—and conflicting—generalizations on the issue. See, e.g., McConahay, supra, at 36 ("[W]hile desegregation [has] not produced a situation in which race is irrelevant, there [are] more amicable interracial contacts and friendships than one could have expected under segregation."); Stephen, supra note 51, at 217 ("[D]esegregation generally does not reduce the prejudices of whites toward blacks” and “desegregation leads to increases in black prejudice toward whites about as frequently as it leads to decreases."). Despite such statements, the general consensus among the reviewers is that it is "impossible to draw any firm conclusions" from the available research. Id. at 224. In addition, it is apparent that there are simply no reliable studies of the long-term impact of desegregation on racial attitudes and behaviors, so even the tentative conclusions drawn by some of the authors “apply, at best, to the short-term effects of desegregation.” Id. at 234.

One author’s statement, made in 1975, about the state of the available evidence is still true today:

In some instances desegregation of the schools appears to have improved the self-images of racial minorities and racial attitudes of both majority and minority students; in other cases there seem to have been no effects, or even negative ones. One of the basic problems that pervades this research is the questionable reliability and stability of any measure of human attitudes.


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achieving exceptional student performance. At least one commentator asserts that the sense of self-esteem and confidence that may proceed from an ethnocentric public education, under black community control will facilitate successful interracial contacts in adult life and prepare students to assume roles of power in their own communities. The assertion that racial isolation is "bad," therefore, erroneously implies that black political autonomy has no positive value.

In sum, segregated schooling may well be harmful to personality development and adult life chances, and it may be harmful in terms of racial isolation per se. Empirical and, in one respect, normative doubts about the scope of these harms, however, in addition to the difficulty of reconciling a theory of Brown I based on these harms with the de jure/de facto distinction in later cases, prompt further inquiry toward a more compelling conception of the inherent harms of segregated schooling.

In part because it is difficult to maintain a theory of current desegregation remedies based on any causal hypothesis linking segregation to a measurable harm, it might be suggested that Brown I rests on an abstract conception of stigmatic harm distinct from any observable impact on black students. Such a view rests not on a correlation of segregation and harm, but on shared understandings of the meaning of segregation in contemporary American society; that is, on an "objective" conception of stigma. According to the objective stigma theory of harm, an intentionally segregative act might result in an unjustified inequality because the act imposes solely on the minority race a label of inferiority or undesirability that is objectively insulting and degrading to the minority group.


Maynard, Black Nationalism and Community Schools, in COMMUNITY CONTROL OF SCHOOLS 100 (H. Levin ed. 1970).


The use of the word objective, derived from its common use in tort law, to describe this theory of harm may seem problematic. The identified harm is intangible and is not associated with a verifiable impact on any victim. The injury, as a consequence, is a matter of normative, not sensory perceptions. This notion of stigma is objective, however, in the sense that it relies on the legitimacy, in contemporary American society, of law imputing to the "reasonable person" the normative view that labels of racial inferiority are wrong. As a consequence, courts may regard segregation as universally injurious without regard to the views of particular individuals whose normative perceptions actually differ from the view that the law treats as shared by all.

That the Court's condemnation of segregation represents an interpretive judgment that segregation is unjustifiable, rather than a causal judgment relating the phenomenon of segregation to particularized injuries to blacks, is suggested by the Court's use of
The objective stigma theory is compatible with the doctrine of Brown I and the accompanying opinion, Bolling v. Sharpe, which overturned segregation in District of Columbia schools. The objective insult arises from state misfeasance, not from state acquiescence in de facto segregation, presumably because meanings other than official endorsement of the undesirability of interracial contact can reasonably be attributed to state inattention to de facto segregation. The theory also explains why separate educational facilities are inherently unequal; the insult is directed only at blacks. Because the label of racial inferiority is untenable, this inequality can never be justified.

Grounding a remedial theory in so noninstrumental a conception of the harms of segregation is problematic, however, because it imputes a harm from segregation independent of any objectifiable injury to the victim class; it is thus difficult to link it nonarbitrarily with any particular remedial prescription. If intentional segregation imposes no inherent harm other than the dissemination of an official statement that blacks are inferior or that interracial contact is undesirable, the only impact of the statement that needs to be redressed by a remedy is the statement itself. Retraction of the insult, for example, by repeal of a statute requiring segregation or the cessation of intentionally segregative administrative practices, might be fully sufficient. As will be seen,

per curiam orders to invalidate segregation in a variety of public facilities other than schools. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, aff'd 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, aff'd 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, rev'd 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, aff'd 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (beaches).

347 U.S. 497 (1954). When Brown I and Bolling were decided, the Court had not yet settled on the now-familiar two-step constitutional inquiry into justification for explicitly discriminatory government acts—an inquiry first into the level of justification public authorities must proffer for such discrimination, and a second inquiry whether such justification appears in the particular case. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982). In Bolling, however, the Court made its position on justification clear: "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective . . . ." 347 U.S. at 500. Thus, just as Brown I forecloses case-by-case adjudications whether proven intentional segregation results in inequality, Bolling forecloses relitigation of the question whether such inequality is ever justified under the strict scrutiny the Court employs for explicit racial classifications.

See Fiss, supra note 10, at 194-95.

Reflecting this approach, a federal district court, in 1955, interpreted Brown I as follows: "The Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C.), on remand from Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The great majority of southern school boards undertaking any voluntary desegregation relied on such reasoning to avoid affirmative integration prior to the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Under so-called "freedom-of-choice" plans, such school boards purported to comply with Brown II simply by permitting those minority students who chose to transfer to move from all-black schools to majority-white
however, the Supreme Court’s post-

Brown II decisions cannot be re-

conciled with so modest a remedial approach.61

An understanding of the harms of segregation on which a remedial

theory can be based must identify some harm caused by intentional se-

gregation that provides a useful measure of the scope of appropriate

remedies. If the harm at the heart of segregation is only the departure

of state authorities from a constitutionally prescribed normative position

without any necessarily corresponding tangible effects, it becomes diffi-

cult to justify any affirmative relief as reflecting more than the Court’s

ex cathedra judgment as to what constitutes natural justice. To accept

objective stigma alone as the crux of Brown I would render any attempt

to ground a remedial theory in the harms of segregation merely an ex-

ercise in mystifying the arbitrary value judgment that remedial design

entails.

This discussion does not deny that segregation imposes harms,

which, although not providing a useful gauge for appropriate remedies,

nevertheless exist. The degradation of all races and wasted human en-

ergy and talent are among those harms resulting from racism. Recogn-

izing such harms, which do not suggest particular remedial strategies,

underscores the importance of identifying remedial approaches that will

address those harms of segregation the law is capable of relieving.

C. Narrow Conception of Harm and Expansive Results in

Post-Brown II Remedial Cases

None of the Supreme Court’s decisions after Brown I deals with

the problems just catalogued of relating a particular conception of the

harms of segregated schooling to the Court’s insight into the inherent

inequality that segregation imposes. Brown II did not relate remedy to

harm because it did not, in fact, specify the preferred form of remedy.

Instead, it left the process of remedial design to lower courts and to be

governed by “equitable principles.”62 The Supreme Court returned to

61 The “objective stigma” conception of the harm of segregation is limited in its

usefulness largely because of its abstract, isolated character. The richer and more useful

understanding, proffered in this Article, of this harm is not, however, entirely dissimilar

to an “objective stigma” approach.

62 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
the problem of remedial design only after a lapse of thirteen years, to reject, in Green, a freedom-of-choice plan that failed to undo the racial identifiability of schools in a formerly segregated district.\(^{63}\)

Since Green, the overriding issue in the Supreme Court's major decisions has been the appropriate impact of a school desegregation remedy on the racial composition of the schools in such a district. The issue, in other words, is how much racial balance is required to undo segregation. This concern with the racial composition of the schools is best justified as a proxy for other concerns; that is, the Court, albeit tacitly, has deemed an alteration in the racial composition of the schools to be a remedy for ills other than the distortion per se in racial attendance patterns that intentional segregation creates.

These cases, however, emit conflicting signals in this respect. They leave unclear whether the process of remediation should be broadly or narrowly conceived. The rhetoric of several of the Court's decisions and the result in Milliken v. Bradley\(^ {64}\) [Milliken I], the Detroit metropolitan desegregation case, imply that the harm to be relieved by school desegregation remedies is only the distortion of intradistrict attendance patterns. Although we cannot know what would have been the "natural" pattern of school attendance without discrimination, the Court has spoken in these cases as if the remedial goal is to restore blacks to an ascertainable attendance pattern they would have enjoyed but for the fact of intentional segregation. On the other hand, the actual results of all the post-Brown II cases are compatible with, and often only with, a far less mechanical theory of remedial strategy.

It would be strange in principle to regard distortion in school attendance patterns as the constitutional evil of intentional segregation. Even more than legal exclusion, racial imbalance, when viewed in isolation from other phenomena we associate historically with racially segregated school systems, seems to be of uncertain significance. The goal of racial balance does not seem worth the burdens entailed by desegregation orders unless we can attach some value to it other than the creation of an attendance pattern that would have existed but for a history of educational discrimination. Once we recognize some additional value to racial balance, however, we are implicitly identifying some harm other than the distortion of natural attendance patterns that we associate with racial separation. Such additional harm must be regarded as part of what our remedy is trying to relieve.

Although the rhetoric of the Court's Green decision in 1968 was

\(^{63}\) Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42.
\(^{64}\) 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
expansive in describing the aims of desegregation, the implications of the case for permissible remedies were unclear because of the unusual facts of the case. The Supreme Court's formulations of the proper

65 In Green, the Supreme Court's first major opinion on school desegregation remedies after Brown II, the Court overturned a so-called "freedom of choice" desegregation plan that a small rural school district in New Kent County, Virginia, had adopted 11 years after Brown I to avoid losing federal financial aid eligibility. See Green, 391 U.S. at 433. Under "freedom-of-choice," first and eighth graders were to choose their preferred schools and all other students would be assigned to the schools they had previously attended, unless the students requested otherwise. The district, however, comprised only two schools for all grades, which, notwithstanding Brown II, were operated as separate black and white schools until 1965. Despite "freedom-of-choice," by 1967 the black school was still entirely black, and only 15% of the black school children had elected to attend the formerly all-white school. Likewise, the complete segregation of black and white faculty continued to attest to the racial identity of the two schools.

The Court in Green concluded that the "freedom-of-choice" plan provided an "intolerable" lack of "meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of [the] dual [school] system." Id. at 438. The Court used the phrase "dual system" to refer to a school system segregated under state compulsion in which racial segregation and other forms of discrimination had not been eradicated. In contrast, the Court characterized as a "unitary, nonracial system," id. at 436, one "in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch," id. at 438. Having evaded its responsibility for 11 years after Brown I to effect any transition whatsoever from a dual to a unitary system, the school board in New Kent County was required "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at 439.

The language of Green suggested a broad conception of desegregation remedies. Securing the nondiscriminatory admission of black students to formerly all-white schools, as commanded in Brown II, was characterized as "only the first step" in the remedy. "[T]he ultimate end to be brought about" was the "transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education." Id. at 436. Brown II, the Court stated, "clearly charged" school boards operating dual systems "with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added). Toward this end, federal courts were declared to have "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Id. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)). The Court approvingly cited the formulation of one court of appeals judge, who described the "constitutionally required end" of school desegregation to be "the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects." Green, 391 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring)). This meant that school authorities must "convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Green, 391 U.S. at 442. Although each of these formulations can be read to require no more, with respect to students, than the restoration of a pattern of attendance that intentional segregation had disrupted, the Court's rhetoric does not, in its tone or phrasing, invite so crabbed a view.

Confined to its facts, however, Green could be reconciled with the narrow conception of remedial compensation later articulated by Justice Rehnquist in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). New Kent County was a residentially integrated rural school district in which racial segregation had been maintainable only through the actions of the school authorities in busing black and white children to racially designated schools. In this context, the judicial command of total integration—the elimination of "racial discrimination root and branch"—thus required no
objectives of school desegregation remedies were vague in *Green* and continued to be vague\(^6\) prior to the Court's first opinion in the Dayton school desegregation case, *Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman*\(^6\) [*Dayton I*], rendered in 1977. Not until *Dayton I* did the Court focus expressly on the incremental distortion of the intradistrict pattern of student attendance as the measure of harm to which desegregation remedies should be tailored.

The Burger Court's first major school desegregation decision, its unanimous 1971 opinion in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*,\(^6\) seemed to augur a broad conception of school desegregation remedies. In *Swann*, following a complex series of lower court proceedings, the Court approved the district court's imposition of a desegregation plan that required extensive busing in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system. Under the approved plan, all of the city's junior and senior high schools were desegregated, chiefly through zoning and consequent student reassignments, and the district's elementary schools were desegregated through "zoning, pairing, and grouping techniques.\(^8\) The lower court imposed the plan, notwithstanding the school board's objections and its submission of an alternative plan promising significant improvement in racial balance but omitting a number of the district's schools from substantial involvement in the desegregation order.\(^7\)

The lower court plan, which the Supreme Court approved, clearly did more than restore the pattern of school attendance that would have prevailed but for the school authorities' racially segregative acts. In 1968-1969, Charlotte-Mecklenburg was the forty-third largest school district in the country, with 107 schools spread over 550 square miles.\(^7\) Although the school board's school site location decisions undoubtedly

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\(^6\) The remedy should eliminate racial discrimination in schooling "root and branch," *Green*, 391 U.S. at 438; the ultimate end of a remedy is "[t]he transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education," *id.* at 436; "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy," *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.*, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Although the Burger Court gave these formulations a narrower cast than had the Warren Court, each of these guidelines, in context, might be given a relatively narrow or expansive interpretation.


\(^8\) 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

\(^9\) *Id.* at 6-11.

\(^7\) *See id.* at 8-10.

\(^7\) *Id.* at 6.
exacerbated the perpetuation of racial imbalance in the public schools after 1954, Charlotte-Mecklenburg was an urban school district with significant residential segregation that neither the district court nor the court of appeals attributed entirely to school board action. Although the precise contribution of state-required segregation to the pattern of school attendance in 1971 might have been impossible to prove, it is unlikely that the schools would all have been racially balanced, even without official segregation.

Nor did Chief Justice Burger's opinion state that the precise restoration of an attendance pattern that would have existed but for the state's segregative acts was the sole remedial goal in *Swann*. Lower courts, he declared, have sufficiently broad authority "to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." Remedial assignment plans should "counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation," and district judges and school authorities "should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." Today, these formulations might be interpreted narrowly in light of *Dayton I*, but in 1971, the Court's evident concern in *Swann* was not just with the physical restoration of a natural attendance pattern, but with the maximum possible disestablishment of a pattern of segregated schooling that had been approved by state law.

Between 1971 and 1977, however, aspects of three Supreme Court decisions indicated that the goal of school desegregation remedies was to be more narrowly conceived. In 1973, in *Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo.*, the Court's first opinion focusing on a segregated school district outside the South, the Court equated the question whether a desegregation remedy should encompass each school in the district with the question whether petitioners could demonstrate that the attendance pattern of a substantial portion of the district schools had been affected by intentional segregation. Although the evidentiary

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72 Id. at 7.
73 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 28.
75 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
76 See infra text accompanying note 83.
77 Chief Justice Burger did, however, characterize the judicial role in desegregation cases as a limited one: "We are concerned . . . with the elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not with myriad factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds." *Swann*, 402 U.S. at 22. "[J]udicial powers," he reminded, "may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation," and in a school case, "[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." *Id.* at 16.
79 Id. at 203-04. The Court noted that the district court finding of intentional segregation with respect to 37.69% of Denver's total black school population was not
rules the Court developed were extremely generous to the petitioners, it is striking that so mechanical a measure of a school's involvement in a plan of intentional segregation was adopted to justify the inclusion of every school in the district's remedial obligation.

In 1974, the Supreme Court, in *Milliken v. Bradley*[^80^] [Milliken I], reversed a lower court decision to involve suburban school districts in the desegregation of the Detroit public schools. The Court reasoned that the Detroit plaintiffs had not shown any constitutional violation in the suburban school districts that had produced a "significant segregative effect" in Detroit.[^81^] The plaintiffs argued, without avail, that no intradistrict remedy in Detroit could accomplish any significant integration: that inclusion of additional districts in the remedy was equitable because state authorities had contributed to the segregation of Detroit and that school district lines were no more than artifacts of state law. The Court majority, however, viewed the minority students' remedial entitlement narrowly: "The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district."[^82^]

The 1977 Dayton case was the third case of the decade to indicate that school desegregation remedies were to be narrowly construed. Writing for eight of the nine Justices in a unanimous opinion, Justice Rehnquist articulated a remedial methodology in specific and narrow terms. After explaining the insufficiency of the factfinding used by the district court to justify the systemwide remedy it had imposed on the Dayton Board of Education, Rehnquist wrote that, if intentional racial discrimination is found on remand,

> the District Court in the first instance, subject to review by the Court of Appeals, must determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy.[^83^]

Thus, Justice Rehnquist finally formulated a narrow conception of the

[^81^]: Id. at 744-45.
[^82^]: Id. at 746.
[^83^]: Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420.
Court’s remedial rationale: remedies should restore minority students to the racial pattern of school attendance within the school district’s confines that would have existed but for the school authorities’ intentionally segregative acts.

Yet, the important point is that, while the doctrinal developments just described pointed in the direction of a narrow, restorative conception of school desegregation remedies, the actual results of the post-1971 cases other than Milliken I and Dayton I pointed toward an expansive view of these remedies, equally compatible with Green and more compatible with the result in Swann.

The Court’s decision in Keyes, despite its formal equation between the permissible scope of remedies and the number of schools in which actual taint by segregation could be proved, in fact requires integration more broadly. Justice Brennan’s opinion for five members of the Court attempted to fit the remedial holding of Keyes into a narrow doctrinal rendition of the holdings of prior cases. Separate concurring opinions, reflecting very different policy perspectives, by Justices Douglas and Powell, however, indicated that the doctrinal mold was breaking. While agreeing with Justice Brennan that a basis existed for a remand to determine whether Denver school authorities were liable for the imposition of a systemwide school desegregation remedy, Douglas and Powell argued that the case put an end to the legal distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. In Powell’s view, the case required a reconception of the constitutional right at stake in school desegregation cases.

The issue in Keyes was whether the principles of the Brown decisions had been correctly applied in a suit brought by black parents against the Denver school system. The Court held that, contrary to the different analyses of the lower courts, districtwide desegregation might be the appropriate remedy in Denver given the record presented.


85 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 313 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Colo. 1970), modified, 445 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
Though the plaintiffs could not prove that intentional segregation existed throughout Denver, they had proved that intentional segregation affected a "substantial portion" of the school district, called Park Hill. That being so, the Court said, the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that intentional segregation affected the entire school district—a case that the school board shouldered the burden to rebut.

Through this shift in the burden of proof, Justice Brennan purported to cast the Keyes facts into the Brown I mold. If evidence from Park Hill gave rise to an unrebutted inference that no segregation in

413 U.S. 921 (1973). The latter demand was based on allegations that the school board had manipulated student attendance zones and located new schools so as to insure that the general student population would in fact be segregated by race.

The federal district court in Denver held that the school board's rescission of the desegregation resolutions constituted an intentional act of segregation within the meaning of Brown I. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 303 F. Supp. 279, 286-88 (D. Colo. 1969) (preliminary injunction); Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 64-69 (permanent injunction). On that basis the court ordered the desegregation of the Park Hill zone. As for other schools in Denver, the court did not find intentional segregation. See Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 73, 77.

The school board had, since World War II, made various zoning and school site location decisions that had led to increased public school segregation. The court found, however, that educational considerations lay behind some of the decisions. See id. at 75-76. In addition, the black population in Denver had been small when the decisions were made and was of relatively little concern to the school board at those times. Id. at 75. So little attention had been paid to the problems of racial separation before the civil rights movement of the 1960's that the district court found itself unable to conclude that the Denver school board had intended to segregate schools outside Park Hill. See id. at 73, 77. It concluded that the segregation that had resulted from the school board's policies prior to 1960 proceeded from the segregation of housing in Denver, which had developed slowly and without the intervention of school authorities over a period of decades. See id. at 75.

The court's findings as to intent, however, did not end the question of relief. The court found that Denver's predominantly black schools outside Park Hill were inferior to white schools in the quality of educational experience they offered. See id. at 77-83. The court held that such inequality violated the separate but equal rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which Brown I had not overruled in this respect. See Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 83. In order to remedy such inequality, the district court concluded that both material improvements in the schools' programs and some degree of desegregation throughout the city were required in relief. See id. at 97-99. The court said that the establishment of educational equality in Denver necessitated the implementation of "compensatory education in an integrated environment." Id. at 96.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of relief with respect to Park Hill but reversed both the educational improvement and desegregation measures ordered with respect to the rest of Denver. See Keyes, 445 F.2d at 1007. The court of appeals held that the district court's finding of no intentional segregation beyond Park Hill should have ended the judicial inquiry. See id. at 1005.

88 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201.
89 Id. at 211, 213-14.
90 Id. at 208-09. Rhetorically, the Court may have wanted to exert the same moral pressure to desegregate in Keyes as is now commonly associated with the Brown I-type case. See Fiss, supra note 45, at 37-38.
Denver was "adventitious," then the results of intentional segregation might be viewed as being as extensive in Denver as they were in any southern school district. Because the school board's intended segregation would thus reach the entire district, the obligation of districtwide racial balance would follow in Keyes even under a narrow conception of the remedial command of Brown II, Green, and Swann. That is, school authorities who practice intentional segregation must cease their segregative practices and undo the segregation they created. Under the evidentiary rules of Keyes, such segregation would be deemed to have pervaded the Denver school system.

The Supreme Court's use of a presumption of intentional segregation to draw the analogy between the facts of Keyes and of Brown I would have been unremarkable except that, if accuracy in factfinding was the Court's sole concern, the findings of the two courts below belied the fairness of the presumption. The Supreme Court reasoned that, if a school board intentionally segregates a "substantial portion" of a district, it may be causing the segregation of other schools in the district by virtue of a spillover effect. Thus, the Court said, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the intentional segregation of one portion of a school system that is racially imbalanced might make the entire district a "dual system."

The Supreme Court's analysis ignored, however, that a pattern of racial imbalance may occur over time. The district court found, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, that the pattern of segregation in schools beyond Park Hill antedated by at least ten years the purposeful segregation of Park Hill itself. On such a record, and in light of the pattern of racial segregation that characterized housing in Denver, the school board had proved that the segregation of Park Hill did not cre-

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91 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
92 Id. at 213-14.
94 Fiss, supra note 10, at 207, says,

[In order to make the issues [of past racial assignment and its relationship to current segregation] triable or capable of ever producing relief, the Supreme Court had to create a set of presumptions in favor of the existence of these linkages and those presumptions, especially when viewed as a set, do not seem supported by natural probabilities.

95 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201-04.
96 Id. at 259-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
ate the pattern of segregation in the "core city." Although some black enrollment in the core city may have represented Park Hill spillover, the spillover effect of eight Park Hill schools on the 111 other Denver schools was likely to be small.

The effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to school authorities to demonstrate that the racial segregation in other schools is not the result of intentional segregative acts by the school board is likely in every case to render an urban school board liable for more segregation than it caused in any mechanical sense.\textsuperscript{98} If a school board such as Denver's could never show precisely which schools were tainted by the spillover effects of the board's segregative actions in a distinct portion of a city,\textsuperscript{99} it follows that a district court might impose a districtwide remedy on that board even in the face of evidence that the school board did not independently generate all, or even most, of the segregation found to exist. This renders suspect any implication from the \textit{Keyes} opinion suggesting that the remedy in a \textit{Keyes}-type case ought to seek to achieve a pattern of attendance that would have existed but for the school board's segregative acts.\textsuperscript{100} The \textit{Keyes} opinion allows courts to require school boards to do more than undo only the segregation they themselves create or actively promote.

This view of \textit{Keyes} is confirmed by the 1979 decision in \textit{Columbus Board of Education v. Penick}\textsuperscript{101} and the subsequent history of \textit{Dayton I}. In \textit{Columbus}, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court judgment imposing a systemwide remedy in Columbus, Ohio because (1) the Columbus public schools were "openly and intentionally" segregated on the basis of race in 1954, and (2) after \textit{Brown I}, the Columbus Board

\textsuperscript{98} This is not to say that there is no legal conception of cause under which responsibility for segregation could reasonably be linked to school board action. Even if a school board uses only geographic criteria to assign students to schools, its assignments may facilitate or encourage housing segregation, with the result that racially neutral school assignments lead to racial imbalance. The school board may thus be a joint tortfeasor with other public and private agencies, whose collective action causes the pattern of racial imbalance. \textit{See} Fiss, \textit{supra} note 47, at 583-88; Fiss, \textit{The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case—Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation}, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 705-07 (1971). The observation in the text about the \textit{Keyes} presumption challenges only the implication that the Court was imposing liability on the Denver school board based on the kind of immediate causation between racial assignment and segregated schools that existed in \textit{Brown I}. \textit{See} Fiss, \textit{supra} note 45, at 26.

\textsuperscript{99} The likelihood of any defendant's overcoming the \textit{Keyes} presumption is further reduced by the Court's description of the stringent showing necessary for the defendant to prevail. \textit{See} \textit{Keyes}, 413 U.S. at 213-14.

\textsuperscript{100} Professor Fiss asserts that the Court's methodology entails institutional costs: "The use of presumptions involves the court in fictionalizing and thereby impairing its credibility." Fiss, \textit{Groups and the Equal Protection Clause}, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 145 (1976).

\textsuperscript{101} 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
of Education "never actively set out to dismantle this dual system." The lower courts reached the first conclusion after applying the Keyes presumption to the finding that, in 1954, the school board had maintained "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus." The segregation found to exist in 1954 was deemed to have a current systemwide impact because Brown II imposed on Columbus a constitutional duty to desegregate, which the Columbus Board never performed. Therefore, each instance of racial imbalance in 1979 could be treated as the unlawfully neglected artifact of systemwide desegregation existing twenty-five years earlier, thus justifying current systemwide desegregation relief.

The Supreme Court, by endorsing the "affirmative duty" theory, took a major step forward in expanding school board liability for the desegregation of schools. Its approval of the Sixth Circuit's approach meant that a school board's post-Brown II policies in a school desegregation case could now be viewed in an unanticipated light. As expressed in the accompanying decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman [Dayton II], "[T]he measure of the post-Brown I conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system" is now to be "the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system." That is, if intentional segregation sufficient to trigger the Keyes shift in burden of proof ever occurred in a particular school district, local authorities are responsible for desegregating the entire district unless, after 1955, the school board's policies had the effect of undoing the results of the intentional segregation.

However justifiable the results of this shift in focus from the purpose to the effects of a school board's post-1955 policies may be, the Court's statement is remarkable. Although the Court, in Columbus and Dayton II, dramatically increased the number of school boards against


\[102\] Id. at 452 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)).


\[107\] Id. at 538 (citations omitted). The Court's reference in Dayton II to "the post-Brown I conduct of a school board" betrays some carelessness since, as explained in Columbus, the "affirmative duty" to disestablish dual school systems arose after Brown II, a year later than Brown I. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-59.
which successful desegregation suits may be brought, it again neglected to explain the harms at stake in desegregation cases that would justify such an expansion of potential liability. Even assuming that what is at stake in desegregation cases is attendance patterns, the reach of the *Columbus-Dayton II* rule is extraordinary given the obvious uncertainties attending any attempt to repair distortions of attendance patterns occurring more than three decades ago.

Indeed, the facts of *Columbus* show, as compellingly as those of *Keyes*, that the defendant board of education was being held liable for a greater degree of racial separation than could have been closely linked to school board action alone. *Dayton II*, however, illustrates this con-

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108 It may be that school districts otherwise vulnerable to liability under *Columbus* and *Dayton II* can shield themselves by invoking principles of collateral estoppel based on pre-*Columbus* judgments favorable to the school authorities. See Bronson v. Board of Educ., 687 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982) (Cincinnati); Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982) (Akron).

109 The Court's statement is also remarkable because no one reading any Supreme Court decision prior to *Green*, decided 13 years after *Brown II*, could have discovered that *Brown II* imposed on school boards the "affirmative duty" to which *Columbus* and *Dayton II* refer. See *Columbus*, 443 U.S. at 494-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

110 The Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding of intentional systemwide segregation based on the school board's pre-1954 use of gerrymandering, *Columbus*, 443 U.S. at 506, to preserve an enclave of five black schools in the predominantly black near east side of Columbus, *id.* at 467, 505-06. This act of intentional segregation in a "meaningful" portion of the district shifted the burden to the school board, under *Keyes*, to show that racial imbalance elsewhere in the district was not the product of intentional segregation. The lower courts held this burden had not been met, although the Columbus school system, at the time suit was filed, included 172 schools, *id.* at 452, the racial imbalance of most of which could not be traced entirely to the pre-1954 gerrymandering.

The lower courts did identify various post-1954 acts demonstrating the Board's abdication of its legal duty to dismantle the dual system existing in 1954 and, in a more limited way, its continuing intention actually to segregate the schools. The post-1954 acts that were intentionally segregative, however, may have affected even fewer students relative to the whole system than the pre-1954 gerrymandering. For example, the school board created "optional attendance zones" to allow whites living close to an all-black school to attend a white school instead. See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 243-47 (S.D. Ohio 1977), *aff'd*, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), *aff'd*, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). The district court reported specific data on the number of students affected for only one of these zones; this optional zone, in 1972, apparently included 27 public school students. *Id.* at 245. Similarly, in the 1960's, the school board transported 70 students past an allegedly overcrowded black school to a predominantly white school farther away. *Id.* at 247.

Although several other examples of actions preserving predominantly black or white schools are cited in *Columbus*, see 443 U.S. at 461-62 & nn.8-11, 515-18, the lower courts apparently made no specific findings as to their continuing segregative effects. Thus, however justified systemwide relief in Columbus may have been, it cannot reasonably be supposed that the degree of racial imbalance proved as of 1976 was attributable to the spillover effect of the proven intentional segregation. About 70% of Columbus's public school students attended schools in 1976 that were at least 80% black or 80% white, and half of the schools in Columbus were over 90% black or 90% white, *id.* at 452. The court of appeals recognized that, even under *Keyes*, the post-1954
clusion even more dramatically. On remand and after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint because, under *Dayton I*, the plaintiffs "failed to prove that acts of intentional segregation over twenty years old had any current incremental segregative effects." The Sixth Circuit reversed, declaring some of the trial court's findings of fact clearly erroneous and reinterpreting the record under its new theory of affirmative duty.

The Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit and distinguished *Dayton I*:

On the facts found by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at the time *Dayton* first came before us, there were only isolated instances of intentional segregation, which were insufficient to give rise to an inference of systemwide institutional purpose and which did not add up to a facially substantial systemwide impact.

It may be that a Supreme Court majority viewed the records in *Dayton I* and *Dayton II* as significantly different. The instances of segregation on which the court of appeals relied, however, in imposing liability in *Dayton II* amounted to little more than the "isolated instances of intentional segregation" held by the Supreme Court in *Dayton I* to be an insufficient basis for systemwide liability. The factual record had not "isolated" segregative acts alone could not have supported systemwide relief. *Id.* at 502 n.11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

*Dayton I*, 443 U.S. at 532.

*Dayton II*, 443 U.S. at 534-35.


*Columbus*, 443 U.S. at 458 n.7.

*Dayton I*, the Supreme Court regarded the three factual findings on which the lower court imposed systemwide relief as insufficient. These were, first, the school board's 1972 rescission of school board resolutions passed earlier, which "acknowledged a role played by the Board in the creation of segregative racial patterns and had called for various types of remedial measures"; second, the pervasiveness of racial imbalance in the school system; and third, the use of "optional attendance zones" to increase racial separation. *Dayton I*, 433 U.S. at 412-13. By contrast, the Court in *Dayton II* approved the Sixth Circuit's conclusion as to districtwide liability based on the earlier record and four additional factual considerations identified by the Supreme Court in its opinion: the creation and maintenance of Dunbar High School as an all-black school, the establishment of the Garfield school as an all-black elementary school, the intentional districtwide segregation of faculty, and the use of enrollment and transfer policies to maintain two all-black elementary schools beginning in the 1930's. *Dayton II*, 443 U.S. at 534-35.

The district court in *Dayton I*, however, had already recited the facts regarding Dunbar High School, the Garfield School, and faculty segregation. See Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1254-55 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (appendix A, findings of fact and memorandum of law reprinting the district court's *Dayton I* opinion). The district court failed only to base its legal conclusions expressly on those facts. Thus, of the four "new" factors that the Supreme Court stressed in *Dayton II*, the only ones discussed by...
significantly changed; only the Court’s liability rules were in flux. Assuming the unanimous Court was correct in *Dayton I* that the record in the case could not justify a systemwide remedy under a narrow conception of the remedial goal, the change in liability rules in *Dayton II* necessarily sanctioned a conception of school desegregation remedies broader than the mechanical restoration of a natural attendance pattern that *Dayton I* had approved.

The results in *Keyes*, *Dayton II*, and *Columbus* thus point to a remedial theory that, although never clearly articulated, is broader than the narrow conception expressed in *Dayton I* and implied by some of the rhetoric of *Keyes* and by *Milliken I*. Implicitly, plaintiffs in school cases are being granted relief for the protection of interests other than an attendance pattern untainted by intentional segregation and its consequences.

The Sixth Circuit opinion upheld in *Dayton II* fails to recite significant facts not before the Supreme Court in *Dayton I* but re-explains, under the Sixth Circuit’s “affirmative duty” theory, the legal significance of facts found earlier. Such was the district court’s conclusion on remand, albeit with a result different from the judgment finally approved by the Supreme Court in *Dayton I*. See *Brinkman v. Gilligan*, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1253 (S.D. Ohio 1977).

Further buttressing the implication that its conception of school desegregation remedies should not be too narrowly understood was the Supreme Court’s decision affirming the judgment on remand in the Detroit desegregation case, *Milliken v. Bradley*, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [*Milliken II*]. After the Court in *Milliken I* disapproved the metropolitan integration remedy that the district court had imposed and the Sixth Circuit had affirmed, the district court designed an intradistrict racial balance remedy combined with a variety of “educational components,” including remedial education requirements, curricular changes, in-service training requirements, provisions for new guidance and counseling programs, and revisions in Detroit’s testing procedures. *Id.* at 272 & n.5. The Supreme Court, in *Milliken II*, approved the implementation of four of these measures, which were challenged on certiorari by the state defendants.

In describing the remedial purposes that underlay the educational components of the revised order below, the Court adopted a rationale going beyond the repair of attendance patterns, but which nonetheless has uncertain implications for remedial design. The district court had concluded, and the Sixth Circuit had agreed, that the educational components were necessary to assure the success of desegregation and to remove all vestigial effects of past segregation. *Bradley v. Milliken*, 540 F.2d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 1976), *aff’d*, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The latter purpose, as implied by the required educational components, facially encompassed more than the vestigial attendance distortion resulting from past segregation. The Supreme Court expressly approved this rationale. *Milliken II*, 433 U.S. at 282.
It could be argued that the apparent tension in the cases has been overstated. Perhaps the narrow conception articulated in *Dayton I* is the Court’s actual conception of proper remedial design, and the other decisions, to the extent they sanction broader remedies, do so only because of the difficulties involved in implementing precisely the pattern of attendance that would have existed but for the history of intentional segregation. Equity may simply require that the Court indulge a certain remedial expansiveness to assure, given the difficulties of proving which schools in an urban district are tainted by intentional segregation, that all such tainted schools are actually desegregated. Such practicality on the Court’s part does not necessarily belie the Court’s underlying conception of proper remedies, which is no more than the narrow conception of restoring a natural pattern of school attendance.

Such an argument, however, provides only weak justification for the Supreme Court’s school decisions for two reasons. First, characterizing the breadth of the remedy in *Keyes, Dayton II,* or *Columbus* as a prophylactic measure to insure that the few schools actually tainted by intentional segregation are mandatorily desegregated trivializes the extent of the “prophylaxis.” Given the relatively small spillover effect that the proven segregation in Denver, Dayton, and Columbus could possibly have caused in fact, the expansiveness of the remedies sanctioned by the Court undermines any argument that the crux of the remedy is the vindication of an historically based pattern of student assignments.

Second, the Court’s rhetorical appeal to a mechanical conception of remedies to justify costly systemwide relief leaves the district courts that render such decrees vulnerable to a public perception that the courts are unrealistic in their goals and unjustifiably interventionist in

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*Milliken II,* on its face, however, did not offer a strong indication of how much should be made of its seeming remedial expansiveness. First, although the educational components addressed problems other than attendance, the Court described the educational components in narrow, historically based terms: “These . . . remedies . . . were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education” had they been able to attend a nondiscriminatory school system free of de jure segregation. *Id.* Second, nearly all the educational components were suggested by the defendant school district, and the only truly contested issue on appeal was the appropriateness of the lower court’s requirement that the state defendants fund these components. *Id.* at 293 (Powell, J., concurring). Because the interests of the plaintiffs and the school board were aligned, *Milliken II* could be regarded as a weak precedent for sanctioning broad remedies unrelated to racial balance in cases in which those remedies are opposed by the defendant school authorities and represent an incursion into their ordinary policymaking discretion.

It should be noted that *Milliken II* is consistent with the expansive fair governance remedial theory explained below insofar as its approval of remedies other than those aimed at racial balance has important precedential significance.
local school systems. If we consider that the lower courts are the local agencies charged by the Supreme Court with implementing the constitutional mandate of desegregation, the Supreme Court serves these agencies poorly by articulating only a weak, and seemingly artificial, rationale for the kind of intervention in local school systems that the Court has required.\(^{120}\) The Supreme Court has failed to provide the lower courts with a firm and specific statement of remedial principle with which to resolve in a justifiable way the competing interests of the parties before them.

In sum, it is possible to understand the Supreme Court's remedial results as compatible with a narrow demographic conception of the harm that school desegregation remedies should relieve only if one ignores the absence of factual support for treating the degree of racial balance ordered in these cases as having an historical demographic basis. The fact is that culpable school authorities in all successful urban school desegregation cases have been required to do more than "fix" the "broken" pattern of school attendance. It is at best an unhelpful fiction to regard the pattern of attendance resulting from an urban school desegregation decree as "redressing" no more than "the incremental segregative effect" of constitutional violations, calculated by comparing the school district's current attendance pattern with the distribution of students that would have occurred "in the absence of such constitutional violations."\(^{121}\) This realization does not mean that the results of the school cases are unjustified, only that the Supreme Court's proffered justification, to the extent it is explicit at all, is very weak when compared to the massive remedial undertaking that the cases entail. This weakness, like the ambiguities of \textit{Brown I}, turns our attention again to the problem of identifying more cogently those harms that school desegregation remedies should address.

II. \textbf{FAIR GOVERNANCE AS THE PROTECTED INTEREST IN SCHOOL DESSEGREGATION CASES}

A. \textit{Segregated Schooling and the Harm of Unfair Governance}

Surveying those harms of segregated schooling to which the Supreme Court's opinions are most often thought to refer has not yielded a conception of harm that is both a compelling explanation for the inherent inequality of segregated schooling and a useful guide to remedial

\(^{120}\) The political process may exercise an analogous effect on administrative agencies that are granted broad, standardless authority by Congress. See Jaffe, \textit{The Illusion of the Ideal Administration}, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1188-91 (1973).

\(^{121}\) Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420.
design. The perspective of the analysis thus far, however, has been limited. We have evaluated various harms as isolated, discrete phenomena, attempting to determine whether each is objectively hurtful in the abstract or whether empirical evidence exists that clearly links the particular harm to segregated schooling. This approach has not made any particular effort to reflect the experience of segregation as perceived by its victims, rather than by a detached decisionmaker.

Although the impact of exclusion may be indeterminate in the abstract, blacks do not experience segregation in the abstract. Exclusion derives its meaning for its victims from its historical association with a hostile white power structure, unequal opportunities in every realm of social activity, and schooling for black children that ordinarily was inferior, and markedly so, to the schooling reserved for whites. Although social science may not have proved that segregated schooling inexorably injures black children in specified, measurable ways, neither has it disproved such harm. Any risk that segregation does hurt educational achievement, adult life chances, or personality adjustment falls solely on black children, and there is no evidence that white school authorities are unwilling to have black children shoulder that risk.122

An extended conception of the injury from intentionally segregated schooling may be inferred when the aforementioned harms are considered as a totality, rather than separately. It derives from a recognition that the intentional racial segregation of public school students renders minority children systematically and continuously vulnerable to a variety of harms that may be inflicted solely on them by hostile public authorities. For example, there can be no doubt that racial segregation in public schools in the South was established and maintained primarily for the purpose of perpetuating an inferior educational system for blacks. This was but a part of a deeply rooted cultural system that was hostile to black dignity and advancement.123 Likewise, although the role of segregated schooling in a system intent on gross discrimination against blacks was not broadcast as blatantly by the laws of the North and West, it is reasonable to infer from the history and sociology of blacks in those states that intentional segregation outside the South was

122 Notwithstanding the degree of controversy concerning the effects of desegregation on minority academic achievement, see supra note 50, it is widely accepted that desegregation has no adverse impact on the academic achievement of whites. Crain & Mahard, How Desegregation Orders May Improve Minority Academic Achievement, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 693, 696 (1982). Thus, whatever the aspirations of segregationists, segregation apparently does not secure for white students higher absolute levels of academic achievement.

123 See Black, supra note 27, at 424-28.
just as pervasive and invidious.\(^{124}\)

This systematic vulnerability of black children to discriminatory treatment in public schools has an additional, objectifiable impact on black students and parents that contributes to the inherent inequality of segregated education.\(^{125}\) For black students and parents, intentional segregation justifiably creates a lack of confidence that invidious racial discrimination does not or will not operate as a factor in public school administration. This justifiable lack of confidence in school authorities reflects the infringement of a constitutional entitlement to fair educational governance.

There is no Supreme Court decision that rests equal protection doctrine on this theory of injury or that establishes fair governance as

\(^{124}\) See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders chs. 4-9 (1968) (report of commission formed by President Johnson to investigate the Summer 1967 racial riots in Newark and Detroit).

\(^{125}\) In a brief essay written in 1977, Professor Ronald Dworkin suggests a conception of the minority interest at stake in the school desegregation cases, which, except for one facet, is very close to the fair governance conception. See Dworkin, supra note 43. The difference lies in Professor Dworkin’s contention that a proper identification of the harm of segregated schooling does not rest essentially on a “causal judgment” asserting a relationship between “independent and specifiable phenomena,” id. at 21-22, presumably, between segregation and harm. Rather, it rests on an “interpretive judgment” that nonempirically specifies the meaning of segregation “within the society in which it occurs,” id. Thus, Professor Dworkin states,

> We know that *de jure* segregation is an insult, rather than the product of equal concern [for blacks and whites], in the same way we know that a rain dance is religious and not technological, although we [would] have more confidence in the former than in the latter judgment, because the community it judges is our own.

*Id.* at 29.

Contrary to Professor Dworkin’s implication, however, society’s judgment that segregation is wrong is justified in part by “causal judgments” based on the observable correlations between segregated schooling and a variety of adverse impacts on black students and parents, including the objectively reasonable adverse impact of segregation on their confidence in impartial school administration. Even if such judgments do not rely on a precise mechanical model linking segregation to its various harms, relational judgments linking segregation to harm must play a role in remedial efforts in order to minimize the arbitrariness in judicial intervention to protect constitutional rights. Neither the informality nor the incompleteness of the Court’s empirical inquiries into the relationship between segregation and harm renders this inquiry essentially intuitive or unusual in the law. See Fiss, supra note 47, at 595-96.

Notwithstanding this point of difference, this Article shares Professor Dworkin’s essential perception of the kind of government decisionmaking that produces segregated schools. Dworkin argues that segregated schooling violates the equal protection clause because of the "high antecedent probability" that a "political judgment" to segregate schools does not "fairly reflect the kind of preferences that rightly make up the general welfare, but . . . [gives] influential expression to preferences based on prejudice." Dworkin, supra note 43, at 29. Such a decision represents a "corruption" of the political process, *id.*, because the Constitution requires that government, when it makes political decisions, "must treat each individual, as an individual, with equal concern and respect." *Id.* at 28. See infra note 128.
the core concern of equal protection. There is thus no single opinion to
demonstrate the authoritativeness of the fair governance theory. In the
one post-\textit{Brown} opinion to attempt an express reconceptualization of
the purposes of school desegregation remedies, however, Justice Powell
isolated a justifiable lack of confidence in nondiscriminatory decision-
making as the basis for a redefinition of the right at stake in school
desegregation cases in both de jure and de facto settings:

\begin{quote}
I would now define [the right derived from \textit{Brown I}] as the
right, derived from the Equal Protection Clause, to expect
that once the State has assumed responsibility for education,
local school boards will operate \textit{integrated school systems}
within their respective districts. . . .

\ldots

[In] an \textit{integrated school system} . . . all citizens and
pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination
is neither practiced nor tolerated.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

Powell's use of the term "integrated school system" to describe a system
that is reliably nondiscriminatory is confusing because it does not neces-
sarily rest on any requirement for a particular pattern of student at-
tendance, which is part of what the word "integration" typically im-
plies.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, although the following discussion rests on a conceptual
approach similar to Justice Powell's, it uses the phrase "unfair govern-
ance" to describe the harm caused when the administration of a school
system is such as to instill in the minority a reasonable lack of confi-
dence in the public authorities' commitment to nondiscrimination and
"fair governance" to describe the condition to be restored in a system
where unfair governance has prevailed.

Beyond Justice Powell's discussion, the implication that the equal
protection clause guarantees citizens a form of governance sufficiently
sensitive to all persons' interests to justify reasonable confidence in non-
discriminatory decisionmaking resonates in the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional equal protection jurisprudence generally.\textsuperscript{128} It is implicit both

\textsuperscript{126} Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 225-26 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
\textsuperscript{127} Indeed, notwithstanding his recommended abandonment of the de facto/de jure
distinction, Justice Powell has strongly criticized the degree to which the Court has
permitted the value of racial balance to interfere with local policies of neighborhood
schooling. \textit{See id.} at 242-53; Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444
\textsuperscript{128} Justice Stone's well-known footnote number four in \textit{United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co.}, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), is the seminal suggestion in fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence that heightened judicial scrutiny should be undertaken when ordinary
political processes may not be relied upon to protect minorities. On the footnote's impli-
in the notion of guardianship that the words "equal protection" evoke and in equal protection doctrine as elaborated by the Court. That doctrine not only requires government to proffer reasons for distributing goods differently to different constituencies, but requires substantial or even compelling reasons to justify discrimination against historically victimized groups. The judicial demand for such justifications is a safeguard on behalf of disadvantaged groups to ensure that they are not being handicapped by majoritarian prejudice and exclusion.

The elaboration of overarching constitutional philosophy is, of course, not the Court's traditional task. Given the Court's historic reserve in deciding constitutional questions, there is no single opinion setting forth a comprehensive philosophy of equal protection. This may be why the fair governance conception of equal protection is most fully articulated in dicta in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, a pre-Brown I case involving statutory interpretation. Steele held that, under the Railway Labor Act, a railroad union charged with the representation of black non-union railroad employees may not discrimi-

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128 See generally Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982). One noted commentator has argued that the legitimate role of judicial review under the equal protection clause is solely to police the mechanisms of representation, and not to impose on state governments any substantive conception of equality. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980).

A more substantive version of a representation-reinforcing conception of equal protection, which is more closely akin to the theory of this Article, suggests that the equal protection clause prohibits governmental resource and opportunity allocations that are based on prejudice. Dworkin, supra note 43, at 28-31. Governmental decisions tainted by prejudice are "unprincipled" because they cannot be defended on the basis of validly determined "public values." Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 128.

It is hoped that this Article offers fruitful lines of thought for broad inquiries (my own and others') into the nature of the equal protection guarantee, see infra note 267, and the role of fairness in governance generally. It should be noted, however, that this Article does not attempt to address these broad inquiries systematically, in large part because the utility of the fair governance approach to desegregation does not depend on their outcome.

Bolstering the effectiveness of representation in our republican form of government is not a goal that is confined to equal protection cases or to cases decided under clauses of the Constitution explicitly regulating governmental procedures. On "representation enforcement" in dormant commerce clause cases and in cases decided under the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, see generally, Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982).

129 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting forth seven categories of cases in which the Court has had jurisdiction but has avoided passing on constitutional questions).

130 323 U.S. 192 (1944).


nate against the black workers in collective bargaining. The terms in which the Court describes the statutory bargaining obligation of union representatives to minority workers express the notion of fair governance as described above:

[T]he [union] representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights.

... ...

[I]t is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed.

We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents, but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them.

The Court went on to say that fair union representation does not require that all union decisions favor all workers equally all the time. Any given decision may advance the common good, even though not advancing each individual’s interest. The union’s duty rather is “to represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”

Steele imposes a statutory duty of fair governance that should be constitutionally required of legislatures. Using power derived from the consent of the governed, and acting as the exclusive providers of public

133 Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
134 Id. at 198, 202-03 (citation omitted).
135 See id. at 203.
136 Id. at 204.
education, state authorities should be deemed to have fiduciary responsibilities to parents and students. Given such a duty, it is possible to characterize the violation involved in *Brown I* as the failure to represent minority students "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." The remedy, in turn, should instill fair governance as a means of protecting the minority's expectation interest in a system of government that will administer the schools nondiscriminatory and that thus reasonably deserves the minority's confidence.

By "hostile discrimination," it should be understood that the Court is condemning an unfair form of decisionmaking whether or not based on actual animus. The collective bargaining agreement challenged in *Steele* disadvantaged black railroad firemen explicitly, but the Supreme Court did not indicate that it regarded the agreement as evidence of subjective hostility or proof of such motivation as relevant. From the victims' perspective, it is critical that hostile discrimination be interpreted to encompass not only discrimination deriving from animus, but also discrimination based on the systematic insensitivity of power holders to the victims' needs and preferences. Such an interpretation reflects the famous insight of John Stuart Mill:

> We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class, that class will knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other classes to themselves: it suffices that, in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns.\(^{187}\)

Focusing on the harm of unfair governance fully justifies the statement in *Brown I* that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,\(^{188}\) even though not all separate educational facilities stand as insults to racial minorities. Blacks and other minorities have, indeed, experimented with minority-only education programs designed to respond to particular cultural traditions.\(^{189}\) Such experiments are not

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\(^{188}\) *Brown I*, 347 U.S. at 495.


Recognizing that the cultural value of black institutions results from black participation in their inception and management raises a central issue regarding the fair governance approach to school desegregation remedies: Is judicial intervention intended to create reasonable minority confidence in fair governance as legitimate once black voters succeed through the political process in securing black participation on school boards
stigmatizing because the institutions were created by minorities, even though the existence of such institutions may testify to a past history of racial discrimination. They were established, designed, and maintained to serve minority needs and to foster minority progress.

The value of these institutions for those they serve stems from participation in their inception and maintenance. Indeed, it seems apparent that minority participation in such institutions is the key to their value. By contrast, the heart of the injury in state-compelled racially segregated schooling is the element of involuntariness or powerlessness in the subjection of blacks to a discriminatory school system over which they have no effective influence and that expresses a racial hierarchy.

If unfair governance is recognized as the key to inequality in Brown I, other elements of the Court's broad discussion take on additional meaning. Blacks suffer not from separation from the majority culture per se, but from a forced and degrading estrangement from it. Black students are taught their inferior status not only through racial separateness or the application to blacks of a label of inferiority, but also through the state's active intervention to create artificial separation. Segregation is an insult not so much because black children would be better off going to school with whites; the objective insult lies largely in the minority's powerlessness to partake of an educational program that is not hostile to the minority.

Closely connected to the pervasive element of involuntariness in the establishment of segregation is the majority's use of racial separate-

and in state legislatures? In the near term, the answer is affirmative. Even if, in some cities, blacks control the school board or mayor's office, black-dominated political agencies are still subject to the control of white-dominated political agencies at the state and national level and to the influence of extrapoltical powers, such as banks and industry, which make it impossible to translate numerical power immediately into substantive political changes. Fiss, supra note 100, at 152-53. The Supreme Court has thus been unwilling to limit judicial solicitude for the protection of minority rights even when the "governing majority" in a particular jurisdiction consists of members of the "minority" group. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1977).

Over time, of course, one hopes that an ongoing history of government that is routinely sensitive to black interests will allow relaxed judicial scrutiny of political decisions that affect blacks adversely. At that time, the scope of a school board's legal obligations may change to reflect the new egalitarian society.

140 The claim that separateness is forced on a particular group is central to the debate over the "inherent inequality" of separateness in other contexts as well. Compare Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 ILL. L. REV. 1 (low status and pay imposed on "women's work" renders sex-segregated work "inherently unequal") with Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1050-54 (1981) (defending federal support of Indian reservation development as contributing to Native American autonomy in part because the residential segregation of Native Americans is not compulsory).
ness to facilitate the disparate treatment of blacks. The institutional separation of whites and blacks not only instills in blacks a knowledge of the majority’s belief in their inferiority, it also enables white authorities more easily to provide black students with less qualified teachers, poorer facilities, insufficient transportation, and inadequate programs. Such material inequality in schooling may, in turn, help to legitimate inequality in all aspects of life, thus extending the harm of unfair governance beyond the specific context of education. Blacks also suffer under segregated schooling from a sustained subjugation to political decisionmaking processes intent on ensuring that their resources remain inferior. Thus, their powerlessness is a double burden: it both transforms racial separateness into an insult and attests to the continuing vulnerability of the segregated minority to government discrimination facilitated by separateness.

Although the lack of fair governance is a profound harm in itself, judicial concentration on remedying the harm of unfair governance is likely to provide remedies for other harms of segregated schooling as well. After all, the crucial measure of the utility of any possible fair governance remedy will be its probable effectiveness in promoting official sensitivity to the educational interests of all persons in the community. In choosing among possible procedural or structural norms for fair governance, courts should therefore focus on measures that appear most likely to avoid any of the substantive harms that are suspected to result from segregated schooling. It is the supposed connection between norms of fair process or structure and the achievement of substantive fairness that makes fair governance an appropriate remedy for the lack of black confidence in educational decisionmaking by school authorities in segregated districts.

Recognizing that fair governance may achieve other desirable goals does not mean that courts, instead of striving for fair governance, should shift their remedial focus to more substantively defined goals, such as equal educational achievement or equal resource “inputs.” It is difficult to articulate specific substantive criteria for equality in formerly segregated school systems that both command broad support and are capable of implementation through mechanisms more direct than a fair governance approach. Unlike the elaboration of substantive cri-

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141 On the design of fair governance remedies, see infra sections IIC and IIIA-IIID.

142 It is sometimes urged that courts enforce a substantive right to equal education for minorities, either as the proper implementation of Brown I, see Bell, Civil Rights Commitment and the Challenge of Changing Conditions in Urban School Cases, in Race and Schooling in the City 194, 201 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981) (urging remedial stress on effective school leadership, close paren-
riteria for equality, however, it is a manageable task for courts to specify procedural and structural norms for the governance of school systems that would facilitate policy decisions untainted by prejudice and, thus, would be generally acceptable to blacks in the long run on substantive grounds as well.

Focusing on unfair governance as the inherent harm of segregated schooling may seem akin to explaining *Brown I* in terms of the objective stigma of intentional segregation. Conceptualizing the inherent harm of intentional segregation as unfair governance rather than as objective stigma, however, may yield two significant advantages for the elaboration of a remedial theory.

First, recognizing the harm as unfair governance may better direct attention to the problem that needs redress in the school cases: the continuing vulnerability of minority children to policymaking that is hostile or otherwise insensitive to minority interests. Although no single remedy suggests itself as the one logically compelled means of correcting unfair governance, the goal of fair governance may provide more guidance for determining the appropriate scope of a remedy than does the goal of "counteracting insult."

Second, to understand a desegregation remedy as an attempt to
instill fair governance and, thereby, to redress black students’ and parents’ reasonable lack of confidence in nondiscriminatory school administration is to conceive of that remedy as an attempt to redress an objectifiable adverse impact on the injured parties. This is likely to invite a more narrowly channeled and, therefore, more acceptable judicial role than is an attempt to decree arbitrarily the measure of official endorsement for racial integration that adequately counteracts what the court construes as the insult inherent in an intentionally segregative act.

Spelling out the implications of fair governance as the interest to be protected in school desegregation cases sheds new light on the justifiability of the Supreme Court’s decisions and may help explain the Court’s rhetoric. The theory does more, however, than illuminate the possible logic of results that the Supreme Court has justified with other rationales. The fair governance theory provides a basis for exposing deficiencies in the Court’s guidance on remedial design. It provides, in particular, a basis for criticizing the Court’s treatment of metropolitan desegregation, and it suggests legitimate desegregation remedies that are not yet employed. To put these points in proper perspective, I will pursue the implications of the fair governance theory for five major issues in school desegregation litigation: (1) the requirement of proof of some intentional segregation before the imposition of liability; (2) the rules for proving the existence of a dual system; (3) the role of actual integration as a desegregation remedy; (4) the appropriate geographic scope of desegregation remedies; and (5) the choice of desegregation tools in cases where intradistrict integration is impracticable and interdistrict remedies are legally barred.

B. Fair Governance and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction

I have urged that a minority group’s expectation interest in the fair governance of schools is the interest to be protected through desegregation decrees, and the measure of appropriate protection is the reasonable restoration of minority confidence in nondiscriminatory school administration. Should relief then be limited to cases in which acts of intentional segregation can be proven, or should the de facto/de jure distinction be abandoned as irrelevant to the issue of fair governance? Would the difficulty in reconciling a theory of remedial design based on the harms cited in Brown I with the de facto/de jure distinction pose an equal doctrinal obstacle to the Supreme Court’s acceptance of fair governance as the interest to be protected in school desegregation cases? To answer these questions, it is necessary to decide whose perspective will be used to determine whether a violation of constitutional right has occurred. Assuming that the Court has several relevant perspectives
before it, it becomes critical to decide the manner in which these viewpoints are to be reconciled.

If the Court were to adjudicate rights entirely according to the victims' perspective, the right to fair governance in schooling would imply more than a right to be free from intentional segregation. At the extreme, one could imagine victims of discrimination advocating a rule of law that any person is entitled to some judicial relief if that person demonstrates a sincere lack of confidence in the fairness of educational decisionmaking. It is easy to see, however, that such a rule of law would soon undermine the presumed authority of elected officials to make educational policy. Because every government act can be viewed as disadvantaging some persons, every such act may prompt someone's sincere lack of confidence in government. Allowing one person's sincere lack of confidence to trigger judicial relief against any government decision would impede stable decisionmaking.

A less extreme rule, however, would be to grant judicial relief to any person who could point to a particular event as justifying a reasonable lack of confidence, not only on the plaintiff's part, but on the part of all members of an identifiable protected class. Courts would not grant relief solely upon demonstrations of personal distress, but would grant relief based on the proof of events that are widely known to have a high probability of manifesting unfair governmental decisionmaking. Once an event, such as intentionally created segregated schooling, was regarded as having such a high probability of taint, subsequent plaintiffs would not need to reprove that probability, but would only need to show the existence of the suspicious event in each case.

The Supreme Court's current doctrine embodies just such a rule. From the victim's perspective, however, the requirement that intentional segregation be proved as the event manifesting likely government unfairness erects an unjustified barrier to relief. Justice Powell argued in *Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo.* for the abandonment of the requirement of proof of intentional segregation because difficulties of proof might lead to inconsistent results in different regions of the country, which would not be justified given the uniform interests of minority plaintiffs. It could be urged even more directly that black plaintiffs can reasonably doubt the fair governance of schools as an historical matter based on indicia far easier to prove than intentional segregation. Given this country's racial history, black parents might reasonably doubt the fairness of educational administration in any racially

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imbalanced school system that is or ever was under predominantly white control. If reasonable confidence in fair governance is to be the measure of appropriate desegregation relief and if that measure is to be gauged solely from the perspective of the victims of segregation, it should be enough to establish liability that the attendance pattern in a school district is racially imbalanced and that the school system was subject to white control at some point during the existence of such imbalance.

Reasons exist, however, why the Court is unlikely to adopt this perspective as the governing perspective from which the scope of constitutional rights is to be determined in school desegregation cases. Aside from factors of personal ideology and political climate that would make such a result unlikely, this victims' perspective fundamentally challenges the model of intentional tort litigation most familiar to the Justices. The rhetoric of the Court's desegregation opinions may be interpreted as attempting to confine an expansive view of victims' rights within a tort framework involving particular injured parties, charging certain named wrongdoers with particularized injuries that are attributable to those wrongdoers through a discernible causal chain. Each aspect of this familiar framework may now have only an attenuated relationship to the form and substance of most current desegregation cases. The points of attenuation, however, may have been less clear to the Court when it first adopted the tort model, and, in any event, a full-fledged victims' perspective would not fit easily within any other traditional model of litigation.

Even if the victims' perspective did fit more comfortably within familiar forms of litigation, there may be reasons why it should not be the sole perspective from which the measure of constitutional rights should be gauged. Under our constitutional system, it is impossible to ignore the presumptive authority of democratically elected officials in government decisionmaking. One means for respecting majoritarianism

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144 See generally Freeman, supra note 23.
145 See Fiss, supra note 45, at 35.
147 This point originated with Professor Martha Minow. Tort law has, of course, developed strict liability as a model for litigation that escapes problems of correlating particular injuries with particular blameworthy wrongdoers. The strict liability goal of spreading losses to those most able to bear them, however, seems inapposite to the desegregation context, in which the victims bear much of the remedial burden. A thoughtful attempt to reconceptualize public law litigation that takes account of the implicit departures of the desegregation cases from the traditional model of civil litigation is Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
without unduly compromising constitutional values of equality is to make the threshold for liability either a particularized showing of majority unfairness or the existence of some event that a majority recognizes as manifesting a high probability of unfairness. Intentional segregation, although not racial imbalance per se, is now understood by an overwhelming majority of Americans as manifesting virtually a certainty of antecedent prejudice, and proof of such segregation is therefore a defensible requirement for the imposition of liability in school desegregation cases.

Adhering to the de facto/de jure distinction increases, however, the risk that some unfair governance of schools will not be remedied. Cases of unfair governance may exist in which no intentional segregation can be proved, and the Court has not yet approved any alternative standard for proving prima facie unfairness. For this reason, the fair governance theory might seem to require us to reject the de facto/de jure distinction. The difficulties are much the same as with theories of remedy based on harms to black children's educational achievements, adult life chances, and personality development. Under any of these theories, proof of government inaction in the face of a high degree of even adventitious segregation might seem a more appropriate factual trigger for government liability.

The possibility that the de facto/de jure distinction may erect too high a barrier to government liability prompts two comments about the utility of the fair governance theory, even if the distinction survives. The first pertains to the theory's usefulness in shaping the rhetoric of judicial decisions in school desegregation cases. For those who criticize the de facto/de jure distinction, judicial acceptance of the fair governance theory might shift the doctrinal debate to more fruitful territory for analysis. Under the fair governance theory, judicial observance of the de facto/de jure distinction would be given a specific, and therefore debatable, justification; namely, that intentional segregation is an appropriate signal that government conduct has been tainted by prejudice. Supreme Court adoption of the fair governance theory would invite continuing judicial attention to the question whether other phenomena are equally demonstrative of government unfairness. In contrast, the conception of the remedial process manifested in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman [Dayton I] submerges the question of what harm is to be remedied in school desegregation cases and thus obscures the

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148 It is also conceivable, though it seems far less likely, that cases exist of past segregation in school districts that, without judicial intervention, are now administered with the utmost sensitivity to black students.

question whether the Court's liability rules are justified.

The second point relates to the practical significance of the de facto/de jure distinction, which depends on the rules for proving intentional segregation. The applicable evidentiary rules could either make the right to fair governance extremely easy or else virtually impossible to enforce. One way to characterize the developments from Keyes through Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman\textsuperscript{160} [Dayton II] is to view the evolving doctrine as a preservation of the de facto/de jure distinction that is nonetheless sensitive to the dangers of leaving government unfairness unremedied because of difficulties of proof. The fair governance theory is helpful in reconciling the Brown I liability doctrine with the remedial consequences of the Court's post-Brown II\textsuperscript{161} decisions by providing a more persuasive justification for the rules of Keyes and Dayton II than the narrow Dayton I conception of school desegregation remedies based on incremental distortions in patterns of attendance.

When intentional segregation occurs, it may be regarded generally as probative of a lack of fair governance. Specifically, it implies official intent to use racial separation, even adventitious racial separation, to facilitate the disparate treatment of black students.\textsuperscript{162} Given our nation's racial history, any significant intentional racial segregation is a reasonable ground for losing confidence in nondiscriminatory policymaking by school authorities. Indeed, given our historical experience, it is difficult to understand why white school authorities would try to create racial separation at all if the officials' objective were truly to provide equal educational opportunity for black students.

It is, therefore, a reasonable inference that, whenever school authorities intentionally segregate a substantial portion of a school district, all racially separate schools in that district reinforce the condition of unfair governance. If school authorities act intentionally to create racially separate schools to facilitate disparate treatment, the minority community can reasonably expect the authorities to rely on even adventitious racial imbalance to accomplish the same discriminatory purposes. Absent compelling proof that racial imbalance in some schools is neither the product nor the instrument of unfair discrimination, it is justifiable when some significant intentional segregation is proven to

\textsuperscript{160} 433 U.S. 526 (1979).


\textsuperscript{162} On remand in Keyes, the district court stated, "The affirmative evidence is... that defendants' actions in Park Hill are reflective of its attitude toward the school system generally." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Colo. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
include all of a district’s racially imbalanced schools in a Keyes-type remedy. Only by removing the condition that the authorities have indicated they will use to effect discrimination can a system of fair governance be achieved.

Correspondingly, our historical experience may be such that, once significant intentional segregation occurs, black students and parents can legitimately doubt the good faith of school authorities until those authorities affirmatively undo the system by which black students have been made vulnerable to discriminatory treatment. That is, the skepticism of minority parents about the uses of racial separation in any district that has ever been subject to significant intentional segregation may be so justified that school authorities should now be liable to provide a fair governance remedy even if the most significant segregative acts antedated Brown I.

These justifications for the results in Keyes and Columbus Board of Education v. Penick are not beyond debate, but at least the debate they might raise would focus on what truly is at stake in those cases—the implementation of public school governance that reasonably deserves the confidence of all persons subject to it. Unlike the narrow conception of remedies articulated in Dayton I, the fair governance approach should not appear artificial or inattentive to the facts or competing interests that those cases present.

C. Fair Governance and the Remedial Importance of Integration

Although the fair governance theory can be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decisions on the scope of school board liability for desegregation relief, the theory goes beyond the Court’s decisions in terms of the remedial tools it suggests. Most important, a strong case can be made that, under the fair governance theory, integration should be the remedial tool of first resort for redressing systematic discrimination against black students.

For purposes of clarity in explaining this point, it is necessary to provide definitions for two recurring terms—“racial balance” and “integration”—that may misleadingly be regarded as interchangeable. “Racial balance,” the Supreme Court’s preferred remedial strategy, means the reassignment of students throughout a public school district to prevent, to whatever degree possible, the concentration of minority students residing within the district in racially identifiable schools. Thus, if a district is seventy percent white and thirty percent black, the

goal of racial balance would be the rough approximation of that ratio in as many schools as possible. It is critical to note, however, that racial balance need not imply significant interracial education unless the racial composition within the district could permit it. That is, if a school district is ninety percent black, racial balance cannot afford most black pupils the opportunity for interracial education.154 "Integration," in the following discussion, means something different from mere racial balance; it means the assignment of majority and minority pupils in such a way as to assure substantial interracial contact in each school. Therefore, for example, the lower courts' rationale for the necessity of a metropolitan remedy in Milliken v. Bradley155 [Milliken I] can be rephrased as follows: racial balance in Detroit would not produce integration in Detroit because Detroit had become a nearly all-black school district.

Integration fosters the goal of fair governance both as a form of restoration and as a deterrent. As a restorative measure, integration is designed to undo much of the intended discrimination that went hand-in-hand with the establishment of segregation. To the extent intentional segregation instilled in blacks feelings of inferiority, integration restores the dignity of the minority. To the extent intentional segregation prevented blacks from associating with white students, integration vindicates freedom of association. To the extent intentional and de facto segregation facilitated inequalities in the availability of material resources, integration prevents white school authorities from distributing resources to different races in a conspicuously unequal manner.

Integration, however, has an equally critical prophylactic aspect. First, by dispersing white students throughout a school system, it offers some guarantee of improved official treatment for blacks. If blacks and

154 Precisely how many districts would face difficulty generating substantial interracial enrollments throughout their schools apparently is not known. For the 1974-75 school year, the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare identified 19 large school districts in which metropolitan desegregation would be needed to place all minority children in predominantly white schools. G. Orfield, Must We Bus? 68-69 (1978). Assuming relative demographic stability, however, intradistrict integration might still be a realistic goal in a number of these "majority minority" communities because schools need not be predominantly white to be substantially integrated. A major source of concern, however, is that demographic trends point to an increasing concentration of minority public school enrollment in central cities. Rossell & Hawley, Understanding White Flight and Doing Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 157, 157-63 (W. Hawley ed. 1981). As of 1980, 57.2% of all blacks in the United States lived in central cities as compared to 24.6% of all whites. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at 21 (103d ed. 1982). This concentration may indicate increasing difficulty in affording substantial integration in some urban school districts.

whites attend the same schools, there is a structural incentive for school authorities intent on benefitting white students to afford distributional equality to all students attending each school.\(^\text{186}\) Second, by creating a minority presence in each school, integration restructures a school system so as to help assure that blacks have some decisionmaking influence throughout the formerly segregated district and generates increased confidence that official decisions will take minority interests into account.

A significant analytical advantage of the fair governance approach over the Rehnquist approach in *Dayton* \(^\text{187}\) is that it clarifies the need for prophylactic relief to protect plaintiffs' expectations of educational fairness. The fair governance theory recognizes the pervasiveness of the constitutional evil to be redressed, but it also admits the impossibility of recreating the precise school system that would have been but for the unlawful discriminatory acts of school authorities. It follows that the most appropriate means for achieving reasonable confidence in nondiscriminatory school administration is to fashion a system of governance in which discrimination will be substantially deterred. Thus, under a fair governance conception of remedies, the goals of restoration and prophylaxis merge. The remedial goal of a fair governance decree is primarily restorative in that the remedy aims to encourage conditions that would reasonably justify the confidence of minorities in nondiscriminatory school administration. The remedial tools used, however, are intended to foster fair governance now and in the future.

The merger of a restorative remedial rationale with prophylactic remedial tools is especially justified in a school desegregation case. Given the history and pervasiveness of racial discrimination in the United States, minority communities cannot reasonably be expected to have faith in school authorities ordered to do nothing more than mechanically undo particular acts of past injustice. To a large degree, the opportunity to atone for the past losses suffered by students and parents has long passed. To compensate the current minority community, the historical slate must, in a more emphatic way, be wiped clean. Formerly segregated communities should seek a structure of school governance that promises a new pattern of educational decisionmaking.\(^\text{188}\)


\(^{187}\) See *supra* text accompanying note 83.

\(^{188}\) One might object that such an approach would go beyond Supreme Court pre-
These justifications for integration as a fair governance tool highlight the critical distinction between integration and the conventional goal of racial balance that may appear in particular cases. If racial balance does not entail integration, then the restorative and prophylactic purposes of the desegregation remedy under a fair governance theory will be largely undermined. That is, because the remedial goal of fair governance is not merely the repair of an artificially distorted pattern of school attendance, it is not a sufficient remedial strategy to redistribute temporarily a small percentage of white students in a school district throughout the system. To assure fair governance, integration must proffer some hope of sustained interracial education throughout the school system. Hence, integration will be a sufficient remedy only if there is substantial representation of both white and black student groups in each school and if the pattern of integrated attendance has some chance of lasting.\textsuperscript{169}

cedent in affording the right of minority students to particular results in education, rather than to an undoing of a particular history of unconstitutional conduct. It could be argued that the purpose of the de facto/de jure distinction is precisely to confine the conception of rights in school desegregation cases to an historically-based principle. See generally Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 673-79 (1982) (noting the Court's reluctance to choose between historical and end-result principles for determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred).

Such an objection, however, would misconstrue the utility of the distinction between "historical principles" and "end-result principles," R. Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-55 (1974), in analyzing desegregation remedies. Because only the unconstitutional conduct of public school authorities triggers the prospect of the kind of fair governance decree being considered here, the fair governance approach is historically based. To reach the question of remedial design, however, it is necessary to depart from the historical focus of the suit to recognize the impracticality of establishing fair governance by attempting to refashion a school system merely by undoing certain historical acts of discrimination. The resulting remedial emphasis on deterrence need not, however, undermine the historical basis of the remedy. Even if the fair governance approach requires courts to assess the adequacy of remedies according to their likely success in achieving a broadly conceived "end-result" of fair educational governance in the future, the degree of protection against discrimination may still be determined according to the school authorities' past performance. See infra text accompanying notes 212-19. That is, the more frequent and pervasive the proven acts of discrimination in a given school system, the more a court will be justified in intervening to prevent future unfair governance. Thus, the fair governance approach to remedial design is reconcilable with the historical focus of the post-\textit{Brown I} cases.

\textsuperscript{169} Cf. Gewirtz, \textit{supra} note 23, at 641 & n.145. This Article refers recurrently to problems of black students and parents and relies chiefly on this country’s history of race relations to justify its emphasis on fair governance. As the Supreme Court recognized in \textit{Keyes}, however, Hispanics are also an identifiable class for purposes of equal protection analysis, and the history of educational inequity common to both blacks and Hispanics justifies \textit{Keyes}-type relief for segregated Hispanics as well. See \textit{Keyes}, 413 U.S. at 197-98. Concentration on the experience of blacks to justify the fair governance theory in this Article should not be read to imply that the approach is less useful when other groups are victims of intentional segregation.
Integration should be the remedy of first resort not only because of its utility, but also because of its legitimacy in principle. A remedy is both a response to particular parties' injuries and also a judicial instrument imposed on public school authorities and on a complex social institution—the public school system. For this reason, there are considerations of institutional legitimacy with which remedial design must also be concerned. The problem of legitimacy is implicated in the remedial process, for example, because any judicial desegregation decree represents the intervention of an unelected and nonexpert agency into the policymaking realm of persons normally vested with educational decisionmaking power on behalf of a particular community.

From this perspective, however, integration becomes especially attractive as a principled compromise among the various viewpoints on legitimacy that are most likely to surface in a desegregation case. In order to accommodate the value of majoritarianism, integration eschews direct and detailed interference into the substance of educational decisionmaking by defendant school boards. Given the remedy's ambitious task, this represents a profound concession to local autonomy. Although integration appeared to be a radical form of intervention in the South in the 1950's and 1960's, it most directly alters only the structure of governance. In terms of dictating particular educational policy outcomes, it is a highly restrained measure.

On the other hand, integration forcefully accommodates what is likely to be the victim class's prime criterion for legitimacy: the guarantee of a fair educational process for minority students. If it were possible to specify with precision and to implement any prevailing substantive standard for what equal education should mean for each student, the remedial focus on government process might seem too modest. Absent such a standard, however, integration vindicates minority educational interests in powerful ways. It erects a pattern of school attendance that does not reflect an antecedent pattern of prejudice, deprives school authorities of a primary mechanism for dealing with minority students in bad faith, helps assure that black students will benefit from distributional decisions that benefit white students, and eliminates other risks of harm inherent in racial imbalance per se. In sum, integration vindicates legitimate concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants.

Given the apparent legitimacy of integration, it is not surprising that at least racial balance, typically implemented through busing, has been the federal courts' remedy of first resort. Indeed, the Supreme Court's desegregation opinions in Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton II can

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160 See supra note 142.
be reinterpreted as relying on racial balance as a two-edged approach to relieve state-imposed segregation. On one hand, the Court implicitly makes an effort to undo discriminatory systems of school governance in which blacks were subjected to school authorities intent on treating them unequally. On the other hand, the Court's choice of racial balance as a remedial technique indicates a desire to inculcate new norms of institutional behavior in school systems without seeming to take over the governance of formerly segregated schools.

There are two differences, then, between the fair governance orientation and the Supreme Court's approach to busing. First, the fair governance theory offers a different and more persuasive explanation for the utility and legitimacy of student reassignment remedies. Second, if student reassignment is to be the primary remedy in a particular case, the fair governance theory stresses the importance of establishing integration, not merely racial balance.


The importance of integration as a remedial tool to achieve fair governance supports the use of interdistrict integration to remedy segregation in a district in which intradistrict integration is not possible. The desirability of that remedy, in turn, raises what the Court has treated as a key problem of remedial legitimacy: the conflict between judicial intervention in public school systems so as to protect constitutional rights and the legitimate autonomy of local school boards to govern their own school systems.¹⁶¹

In the Detroit desegregation litigation the conflicting values of fair governance and deference to local authority collided. An assessment of the consequences of Milliken I for the implementation of fair governance standards in school districts outside the South, and in large cities generally, requires a review of the facts of the case.

On April 7, 1970, the Detroit Board of Education voluntarily adopted a racial balance plan for twelve of the twenty-one high schools in Detroit. Under the plan, the high schools would have been desegregated grade-by-grade over a three-year period.¹⁶² At that time, De-

¹⁶¹ Stephen B. Kanner has argued that the Court's very articulation of a narrowly compensatory or restorative purpose for school desegregation remedies represents an appropriate compromise between competing values of remedial efficacy and local autonomy. See Kanner, From Denver to Dayton: The Development of a Theory of Equal Protection Remedies, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 382, 385 (1977).

Detroit's public school enrollment overall was 63.6% black. On July 7, 1970, however, Michigan's governor, William G. Milliken, signed into law legislation that blocked implementation of all local attendance provisions adopted by boards of education for the 1970-71 school year, pending the advent of new "first class school district" boards of education. A first class school district was defined as a district with over 100,000 students. Detroit was the only such district in the state.

Before the new school year, a recall election removed from Detroit's Board of Education the four-member majority that had adopted the racial balance plan. Governor Milliken appointed four replacements who, together with the incumbents, rescinded the plan. In August 1970, the Detroit NAACP, together with individual parents and students, filed a class action to declare the 1970 act unconstitutional and to secure desegregation under the terms of the board's plan. Litigation began and interlocutory questions went before the court of appeals. In late September 1971, the district court found that the Detroit schools were unconstitutionally segregated under policies adopted and implemented by state and local officials.

Hearings on appropriate relief were conducted from March 28 through April 14 of 1972. On June 14, 1972, the district court appointed a panel to design an integration plan for Detroit and for fifty-three of its neighboring school districts on the ground that intradistrict busing would not accomplish effective desegregation. The court of appeals affirmed on June 12, 1973, over three years after the Detroit Board of Education had originally voted to adopt racial balance in the high schools voluntarily.

In July 1974, the Supreme Court voted five to four to overturn the court of appeals decision and to remand for the design of intradistrict relief only. The Court held that the neighboring districts could not be incorporated into the plan absent a finding that each district had perpetrated a constitutional violation that produced "a significant segre-

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165 Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1970).
166 Id. at 900.
169 Id. at 733-35.
gative effect” in Detroit. In doing so, the Court, in its desire to re-
spect the integrity of local authority and governmental structure, fully
overcame any value that earlier cases had implicitly placed on the ideal
of fair governance.

The starting point of the majority’s analysis was the uncontested
fact that no suburban school district was guilty of any proven wrongdo-
ing. The Court then deduced that the only reason for joining the
suburban districts in the remedy was the lower courts’ aim to “produce
the racial balance which they perceived as desirable.” This aim, the
majority said, misconstrued the nature of the plaintiffs’ right, which
“does not require any particular racial balance in each ‘school, grade or
classroom.’” The plaintiffs’ right, the majority said, was to attend a
“unitary school system” within the school district in which they re-
sided. Consequently, the initial premise—that no wrongdoing was
proved against any other district—along with the fact that no proven
intentional discrimination underlay the initial drawing of the district
lines, led the Court to its conclusion: no district other than Detroit
could be joined to vindicate the rights of plaintiffs living in Detroit.

The majority’s analysis appears to be syllogistic, but its first de-
duction from its factual premise is fundamentally wrong. The analysis
rests on the deduction that the inclusion of the suburban districts could
be justified only by positing that plaintiffs have a right to a particular
racial balance in the school they attend. The existence of such a right
need not have been assumed by the plaintiffs, by the district court, or
by the court of appeals, in order to justify interdistrict relief. A suffi-
cient assumption is that plaintiffs have the right to a racial balance
remedy that includes a sufficient degree of racial integration to guaran-
tee that black children will, in the future, be treated as well as white
children by the governing state and local school authorities. Unless ra-
cial balance accomplishes substantial integration, black children are
likely to remain as isolated and as susceptible to discrimination as
before.

Nondiscrimination, not a particular ratio of whites and blacks,
was, in fact, the district court’s overriding goal. Although the Su-

171 Id. at 744-46.
172 Id. at 745.
173 Id. at 740.
174 Id. at 740-41 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (1972)).
175 Id. at 746.
176 [I]nsofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system of public
schooling in every state must be operated in a racially non-discriminatory,
unified fashion; until that objective is met, the very system of public
schooling constitutes an invidious racial classification. The adoption of an
The Supreme Court in *Milliken I* said, "The target of the *Brown* holding was . . . the elimination of state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems,"177 it again failed to consider the constitutional rationale for the abolition of those systems. If the rationale is deemed to be the vindication of the plaintiffs’ right to fair or nondiscriminatory governance, that rationale supplies convincing justification for the lower courts’ approach.

The justification for including suburban school districts in a remedy for Detroit is twofold. First, as explained above, racial balance must entail sufficient racial integration to assure fair governance by school authorities. The steady egress of white students from the Detroit public schools to the suburbs indicated to the lower courts that any student reassignment plan confined to Detroit would produce only a small improvement in the degree of racial mixture in Detroit schools and classrooms. Consequently, to achieve effective integration, the district court broadened its remedy.178

Second, and just as important, convincing evidence persuaded both lower courts that state discrimination also required relief.179 The July 1970 legislation, which accomplished nothing more than the prevention of the voluntary desegregation of Detroit’s public schools, evidenced the state’s desire to maintain separation between whites and blacks. The maintenance of segregation was surreptitious but certainly probative of the state’s intent to use racial separation to facilitate the disparate treatment of blacks—an inference that justifies the expansive liability approved in *Keyes*.180 The inference of discriminatory intent was but-

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177 *Milliken I*, 418 U.S. at 737.

178 Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973), rev’d 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court could have justified state liability for metropolitan desegregation in *Milliken I* on the same basis as it imposed districtwide liability in *Keyes* on school boards responsible for intentional segregation in a significant portion of a school district. See *Keyes*, 413 U.S. at 207-11. That is, since local authorities, whose power derives from the state, have been found liable for intentional intradistrict segregation, the burden should shift to the state to show that interdistrict racial imbalance is neither the product nor the instrument of unfair discrimination. The evidentiary gap linking past state discriminatory practices to interdistrict racial imbalance can be handled through a presumption no less easily than the evidentiary gap handled by a presumption in *Keyes*. See Fiss, *supra* note 45, at 29 n.25.

180 See *supra* notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court could have justified state liability for metropolitan desegregation in *Milliken I* on the same basis as it imposed districtwide liability in *Keyes* on school boards responsible for intentional segregation in a significant portion of a school district. See *Keyes*, 413 U.S. at 207-11. That is, since local authorities, whose power derives from the state, have been found liable for intentional intradistrict segregation, the burden should shift to the state to show that interdistrict racial imbalance is neither the product nor the instrument of unfair discrimination. The evidentiary gap linking past state discriminatory practices to interdistrict racial imbalance can be handled through a presumption no less easily than the evidentiary gap handled by a presumption in *Keyes*. See Fiss, *supra* note 45, at 29 n.25.

The second *Milliken* opinion, *Milliken v. Bradley*, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), suggests that the Court might be more willing to impute such remedial responsibility to the state where the remedies do not entail interdistrict transportation. See *id.* at 287-90; *supra*
tressed by evidence that educational resources in predominantly white suburban districts throughout Michigan were superior to those available in the predominantly black city district.\textsuperscript{181} Thus, including suburban districts in a remedy for Detroit could be justified on the ground that interdistrict racial integration was needed to guarantee local non-discrimination and on the complementary ground that metropolitan integration was needed to discourage racial discrimination by the state of Michigan.

The Supreme Court made only passing mention of the state's influence in derailing voluntary desegregation in Detroit. The Court's observation that the plan it sidetracked "had no causal connection with the distribution of pupils by race between Detroit" and the suburban school districts\textsuperscript{182} was true, but, in the light of the fair governance analysis, inapposite.

The \textit{Milliken I} opinion suggests two countervailing rationales for the Court's devaluation of the remedial importance of integration. The first is deference to local autonomy—the traditional practice in many states of giving local communities extensive decisionmaking power over schools within a limited geographical area.\textsuperscript{183} The tradition of local autonomy may reflect both a state's desire to maximize parental input in school governance and the desire of parents to have children attend schools close to home. The second rationale appears to be deference to state-imposed structures of school administration. The Court's concern in \textit{Milliken I} was that metropolitan relief might impose administrative changes on Michigan that would, in turn, "disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan."\textsuperscript{184}

Neither of the localist values described above finds any more support in the Constitution than do specific prescriptions for school desegregation relief. \textit{Milliken II} describes \textit{Milliken I} as articulating only "appropriate limits of federal equitable authority,"\textsuperscript{185} not as implementing a specific constitutional mandate. Subsequent commentary has identified such guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion in the design of traditional equitable relief as "extra-constitutional" or "sub-

\textsuperscript{181} For example, Michigan excluded Detroit from state funding for intradistrict student transportation, which the state provided to nonurban Michigan school districts. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 238 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Id.} at 741-42.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Id.} at 742-43.
constitutional" rules. Whatever the sources of these guidelines, however, it may be that the Court's reliance on either or both of them will be crucial in determining whether desegregation relief in the future will vindicate the right of fair governance implicit in the pre-Milliken I and post-Dayton I cases.

If the Court relies on the first rationale, espousing popular traditions of local autonomy, a possibility still exists that courts faced with racial discrimination and unable to secure actual integration within a local school district might yet design a wide range of intradistrict remedies to effectuate the right to fair governance. If the Court relies, however, on values implicit in deference to state-imposed administrative structures, implementation of the right of fair governance may be much more difficult where integration is not feasible. Lower courts may be forbidden both to attempt integration through interdistrict desegregation and to interfere in other significant ways with the governance structures of local school systems to secure reasonable confidence in nondiscrimination.

The argument that Milliken I is concerned chiefly with local autonomy springs from the greater support in case law for the relevance of such a value. Justice Powell, who voted with the majority in Milliken I, wrote the Court's opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, cited in Milliken I as support for judicial deference to local control of schools. Powell's separate concurrence in Keyes, in which he argues for a conception of plaintiffs' rights in school desegregation cases broader than that made explicit in Brown I, dis-

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180 On the impact of "subconstitutional values"—the traditional "equitable principles" referred to in Brown II—on values expressed in constitutional norms, see Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HArv. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1975). Monaghan argues that the development of a body of "subconstitutional" law in connection with the general guarantees of due process and equal protection would lead to the judicial creation of liberties without "constitutional reference points." Id. at 45. It is equally possible, as in Milliken I, that "subconstitutional rules" will be used to circumscribe the enforcement of equal protection. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976) (referring to Milliken I as implementing "fundamental," but textually unstated, "limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities"). But cf. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 973 (1976) (upholding the metropolitan desegregation of Wilmington, Del., as consistent with Milliken I).
188 418 U.S. at 742.
190 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 217-53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
cusses at length the danger of geographically expansive remedies that disrupt values of home, family, and neighborhood that he believes are deeply ingrained in our national tradition.\footnote{Id. at 237-52.}

On the other hand, the facts of \textit{Milliken I} imply that the Court opposes more specifically any judicially imposed structural change to accomplish desegregation.\footnote{The Court's implicit solicitude in \textit{Milliken I} for the structural inviolability of local governmental entities was articulated in dicta in \textit{Milliken II}. See 433 U.S. at 291 (Court orders should "not jeopardize the integrity of the structure or functions of state and local government").} If attaining a nondiscriminatory system of local administration is the proper goal, then Michigan's involvement in stymying voluntary desegregation in Detroit appears to have been a valid basis for ordering interdistrict relief.\footnote{See \textit{Gewirtz, supra} note 23, at 648; \textit{cf.} Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296-300 (1976) (relief against HUD for its unlawful financial support of racially discriminatory activities of the Chicago Housing Authority, which affected public housing options in Chicago, appropriately extended beyond Chicago city limits to include the entire metropolitan housing market).} One would have thought that the state's blockage of even modest voluntary desegregation in Detroit would have made \textit{Milliken I} the paradigmatic case in which the value of fair governance would outweigh deference to the state's choice of administrative structure.

If \textit{Milliken I} rests on a theory of the inviolable integrity of state administrative structures, the prospects for implementing the fair governance standard appear dimmer in districts where intradistrict racial balance will not secure sufficient integration to produce a system responsive to minority interests. Lower courts seeking to accomplish fair governance by imposing even intradistrict remedies that require changes in administrative structure will find little direct case support for such relief. \textit{Milliken I} may restrain such lower courts completely, forbidding them either to reach beyond district lines to secure integration or to tamper with state administrative structures within district lines.

If \textit{Milliken I} rests, however, on community concern for local control over schooling, the prospects for implementation of the fair governance standard are greater. Though the desegregation cases do not discuss the prospect of structural changes within districts to secure fair governance, they can, if this Article proves persuasive, be read to imply that fair governance is the proper remedial goal. Therefore, courts seeking guidance in the design of remedies to secure fair governance may look beyond racial balance cases to those school cases that have considered structural changes and to other equal protection cases in
which structural remedies have been imposed.\textsuperscript{194}

If courts are not innovative in shaping remedies, the achievement of racial balance, where it cannot secure integration, will not provide fully satisfactory relief. It offers little promise in such circumstances of securing an affirmative right to fair governance and, as discussed below, presents a significant likelihood in many districts of reimposing the same harms it was designed to relieve. As for Detroit, the court of appeals opinion on remand rings with frustration at the court's inability to provide genuine relief through racial balance.\textsuperscript{195}

III. INTRADISTRICT REMEDIES IN PURSUIT OF FAIR GOVERNANCE

Part II of this Article considered some of the general problems that any theory of school desegregation remedies will have to address. This part concerns the more specific characteristics of desegregation decrees that are framed in accordance with the fair governance theory. First, the overall structure of such decrees is reviewed; second, specific steps

\textsuperscript{194} See infra part III, especially sections C and D.

\textsuperscript{195} By 1975, when the district court entered its remedial judgment on remand, the school system had become over 75% black, as compared to 63.6% five years earlier. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The court of appeals, in affirming the district court, wrote,

> When this school desegregation case was filed in August 1970, Ronald Bradley, one of the black plaintiffs, had been assigned to enter the kindergarten of a Detroit school whose enrollment was 97 per cent black.

> In September 1976 Ronald Bradley is scheduled to enter the sixth grade of the Clinton School, which now is more than 99 per cent black. The decisions of the District Court which we now review do nothing to correct the racial composition of the Clinton School. They grant no relief to Ronald Bradley nor to the majority of the class of black students he represents.

> Nevertheless, this court finds itself in the frustrating position of having to leave standing the results reached by the District Judge on the issue of assignment of students, although we disagree with parts of his opinions and orders. Our affirmance is found to be necessary for the simple reason that reversal would be an exercise in futility under the situation now existing in the Detroit school system and the law of this case as established by the Supreme Court in \textit{Milliken v. Bradley}.

\textit{Id.} at 232 (footnote omitted).

The Court-imposed limitation on remedies decreed in \textit{Milliken I} is unfortunate, not only because it may perpetuate racially imbalanced school systems, but because \textit{Milliken I} insulates suburban school districts from the social burden of integration and may actually cause more logistically burdensome intradistrict remedies in some districts. \textit{See Fiss, supra} note 45, at 33-34. For vigorous statements in support of creating metropolitan school districts to achieve educational equality generally, see Chemerinsky, \textit{Ending the Dual System of American Public Education: The Urgent Need for Legislative Action}, 32 \textit{De Paul L. Rev.} 77 (1983); Pettigrew, \textit{The Case for Metropolitan Approaches to Public-School Desegregation}, in \textit{Race and Schooling in the City} 163 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981).
that directly address the governance structure of a school district are examined.

A. The General Structure of a Fair Governance Remedy

What remedial tools are appropriate in pursuing fair governance? Where Milliken v. Bradley[^106] does not permit interdistrict integration, what form is a fair governance decree to take in a district where meaningful intradistrict integration is impracticable?

No general prescription, of course, can precisely answer the myriad remedial questions that a given case will pose. As familiar a scholarly sidestep as it may be, only case-by-case development can yield a detailed system of remedial guidelines for courts to follow. It is possible, however, to outline at least a preliminary approach to the design of fair governance remedies. For this purpose, the fair governance theory is useful in two ways. First, it sheds new light on the utility of, and justifications for, racial balance and ancillary remedies now implemented under conventional court orders. Second, it suggests desegregation remedies that are not now employed but that would be justified responses to the problem of unfair governance.

One foreseeable policy objection to a fair governance orientation may be addressed immediately. Each of the remedial steps explored below is based on some supposition of which administrative practices may generate confidence in the nondiscriminatory administration of public schools. Each step entails either a change in procedure or structure designed to facilitate fair educational administration or a change in substantive educational policy aimed at advancing more effectively the interests of minority students. None of these measures provides an absolute guarantee of fair governance; each is at best a significant step toward that guarantee. One might thus protest that a fair governance approach is less effective than a conventional racial balance remedy because its goal is open-ended and its remedial tools are but gross proxies for the ultimate remedial aim.

In responding, it is not denied that the fit between the remedial tools suggested below and any detailed conception of fair governance will be imperfect. The point, however, is that the remedial approach takes aim at the pervasive inequalities of racially separate schools.^[197]

[^197]: The impossibility of vindicating a right of fair governance perfectly does not invalidate fair governance as a conception of right. The expression of a constitutional right is, in part, the expression of a constitutional ideal, and “it is meaningful . . . to preserve [a right] as an aspiration that may be vindicated” not only by courts, but by political processes as well. Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 606; see also id. at 672-73.
The narrower aim of achieving an historically natural attendance pattern, which seems to underlie the conventional racial balance approach, is more metaphorical than actual. More important, the racial balance approach fails to target the pervasive harm that segregated schooling inflicts.

The apparent open-endedness of the fair governance remedy might also raise questions as to the theory's manageability. Three such concerns include the amenability of the proffered standard to orderly and principled implementation, the competence of courts to make the pol-

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198 See Kanner, supra note 161, at 393-94 & n.53.


200 Under a fair governance approach, judicial discretion as to which remedial tools to use, and to what degree to use them, will be less bounded than under a conventional racial balance theory. Implementing remedies under a fair governance ideal, however, involves no more judicial inventiveness or breadth of discretion than judicial implementation of institutional remedies in other contexts involving broad constitutional standards. Besides schools, the public institutions most frequently subject to "structural injunction"-type litigation are legislatures involved in reapportionment, see, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983), and cases cited therein; prisons, under the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, see cases cited in Fletcher, supra note 158, at 684 n.152; and mental institutions, under a due process-based "right to treatment" theory, id. at 688-91. But cf. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981) (reserving the issue whether the fourteenth amendment creates a "right to treatment" for the "involuntarily . . . , much less the voluntarily committed"). In assessing the legitimacy of judicial latitude in remedial design in such cases, one must weigh against the cost of discretion the cost of denying effective constitutional relief through overinsistence on inflexible rules of decision. See Fiss, supra note 10, at 215-16.

As with all institutional remedies, the fair governance elaboration of general guidelines as to how much of what kind of remedy is appropriate, so that similar cases may be dealt with similarly, will depend on case-by-case judicial experience. In this respect, the open-endedness of the fair governance approach should not be overstated. This Article does not recommend that courts implement remedies and then try to measure, in some empirical way, whether fair governance prevails; that would be a more complex inquiry than whether racial balance exists. Instead, this Article sets forth a variety of measures—such as student reassignment, changes in the structure of school governance, affirmative action, and the implementation of fair educational policies—which, as a matter of law, may be regarded as appropriate measures for achieving the fair governance goal. Once the appropriateness of these measures is assumed, a court need only determine the proper mix in an individual case; once implementation is ordered, the court need not then inquire empirically whether reasonable confidence in fair governance has been created. It can more simply determine whether the measures ordered have actually been implemented. These inquiries are no more problematic as an empirical matter than is the verification of the existence of racial balance.
icy decisions necessary to implement the remedy, and the ability of courts to recognize when the remedy has been effected such that jurisdiction over the case may cease. Even if fair governance remedies achieve their goals only imperfectly, they are, nevertheless, compelling goals for which to strive.

The remedial steps a fair governance decree comprises may be categorized in five complementary components. Two of these components should be identical to measures taken under any conception of appro-

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201 The charge that courts are unsuited to make the kinds of factual or policy judgments that fair governance “judicial activism” requires is subject to challenge. See Fiss, supra note 10, at 209, 211-16. A recent study by Michael Rebell and Arthur Block on judicial intervention in educational policymaking “largely rebut[s] the criticism that the judiciary lacks the resources, expertise, or comprehensive perspective needed to implement educational reform successfully,” M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 7, at 210. In particular, Rebell and Block find little reason to conclude that courts are inferior to legislative or executive decisionmakers in terms of anticipating implementation problems. See id. at 211.

Rebell and Block state that the suits they investigated were generally less confrontational than desegregation cases, in that the parties involved were not as deeply committed to antagonistic moral and legal positions. See id. at 212-13. Perhaps because of institutional problems resulting from the confrontational character of desegregation suits, researchers have had doubts as to the remedial competence of courts deciding such cases. A fair governance approach to school desegregation cases may, however, actually bolster judicial competence in such cases by mitigating the degree of the opposing parties’ antagonistic commitment to deeply held policy views.

This possibility has three sources. First, the fair governance approach is grounded in values embodied in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), about which consensus is more likely. Second, and of more concrete importance, the fair governance approach sanctions a wider variety of remedies than does the racial balance approach. Therefore, the possibility of judicial reconciliation of competing interests is greater. Third, by counseling nonintervention into the substantive authority of school boards undertaking leadership roles in the implementation of integration, the fair governance approach may promote the kind of cooperation under which judicial competence appears greatest.

202 The racial balance approach ensures against excessive judicial intervention by forbidding courts from requiring school authorities to revise their remedial plans as population shifts or other conditions undermine the effectiveness of the remedies initially ordered. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Thus, for example, once a school board implements a racially neutral attendance pattern under a racial balance order, it will be deemed to have fulfilled its obligation under conventional remedial principles.

It should not be significantly more difficult for courts under a fair governance approach to identify the appropriate point at which to terminate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction would exist as long as necessary to implement fully the variety of remedial measures that fair governance requires, including, for example, integration, affirmative action hiring, or raising academic standards in minority schools. Presumably, the court will adopt a schedule for remedial implementation. If, during implementation, problems arise that significantly undermine that strategy, courts may employ other remedial options and continue to exercise jurisdiction as long as necessary to assure implementation. Once the district court, however, has “fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy,” id. at 437, jurisdiction may cease. Cf., e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 559 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (tri-ethnic committee disbanded once designated roles no longer needed or adequately performed by others).
appropriate school desegregation relief. First, any reasonable school desegregation decree must contain a *prescriptive antidiscrimination component*, that is, an injunction against future racial discrimination generally and against those kinds of racial discrimination particularly identified in the individual case. Second, any reasonable decree must contain an *historically-based affirmative action component*, aimed specifically at the undoing of particular unconstitutional acts. Thus, if school authorities have discriminated in the hiring and assignment of teachers and other staff, affirmative action will be required to redress such discrimination. If school authorities have discriminated in neighborhood school siting decisions, they will be required to give special consideration to under-served neighborhoods in any subsequent school construction or closing decisions. Such particularized measures should help to foster confidence in the restoration of nondiscriminatory educational administration. Such a remedial decree, however, narrowly tailored to individualized acts of discrimination, would insufficiently redress persistent and systematic discrimination.

It remains to be considered what affirmative remedial measures are sufficient for the establishment of fair educational governance in a formerly segregated school system. Because of the advantages that integration offers in terms of utility and legitimacy, the remedy must contain an *integration component*, the scope of which will depend upon the prospects for its effective implementation. If integration is not possible, the remaining avenues for reform entail judicial intervention more directly into the structure of governance or into the substance of educational policymaking. Thus, the remaining categories of a fair governance decree will be a *structural nondiscrimination component* and an *educational policy component*.

**B. Implementing Integration**

The critical issue posed under a fair governance theory after *Milliken I* is how to pursue integration within the confines of a single school district. Few major urban school districts are at the point where substantial representation of more than one racial or ethnic group in each school is unattainable, although, as the Detroit case indicates, the

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203 These two components were contained, for example, in the Fifth Circuit's first model desegregation decree that bound all district courts in the deep South. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 896-900 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
204 See supra part II.C.
205 See supra note 154.
206 See supra note 195.
possibility exists that demographics alone will make an effective intradistrict remedy impossible. A more troubling issue in relying on intradistrict integration alone is whether such integration can be expected to endure.

Prospects for successful and enduring integration depend on four factors: the availability of integration options, the availability of resistance options, the leadership role of the responsible school authorities, and the existence of incentives for desegregation.

Integration Options. The first index of likely success in the integration of a given school district is the extensiveness of the measures that would have to be taken to attain this goal. In some districts, progress may be achieved through the cessation of the school board’s current segregative acts and through voluntary integration measures. That is, courts may find that schools are segregated solely because local authorities transport students past schools close to their homes in order that they may attend racially identifiable schools perhaps even farther away. The termination of such practices would entail no added logistical burdens for students or parents and might thus encounter little resistance. Similarly, the creation of “magnet schools” or other voluntary programs that would successfully attract integrated participation from a variety of neighborhoods might help to yield a stable integrated system and perhaps would even attract whites back from suburban schools.

For most big city districts, however, this combination of measures will not be sufficient to yield systemwide integration. This is partly because school siting decisions by local school boards are likely to have reinforced racial patterns produced by residential segregation. It will thus become necessary to determine how integration can be accomplished through measures that, although inconvenient, are least burdensome for students and parents. Resistance may be somewhat diminished if options are available that involve little added transportation time for most students and afford the opportunity of attending schools whose programs are especially attractive. Where such options are available, enduring integration is a realistic goal.

Resistance Options. Any judicial assessment of the likely stability


209 See W. Hawley, supra note 4, at 27-34.
of an integration plan must include a consideration of the available avenues for avoiding the plan. That is, the success of a given integration plan will largely depend upon the costs involved in leaving the school district. If there are parochial schools or nearby suburban public school systems available to white students, it will be easier for them to resist participating in an integrated system. If integrated schooling is available more conveniently and more cheaply than nonintegrated schooling, integrated schooling may be an attractive option even to persons predisposed to resist integration.

Courts trying to decide the degree to which they can rely on integration as the centerpiece of a remedial decree should thus be expected to make a threshold judgment as to integration's likely durability. If there exist attractive integration options and little incentive or opportunity for resistance, the courts may rely with greater confidence on integration as the basis for a fair governance decree. If integration options are nonexistent, or if the options co-exist with possibilities for resistance that may be attractive to white parents, a court's judgment must be guided by additional factors. It may be possible, as discussed below, to build into the decree other support for integration that would justify relying on it as the core remedy, even in the face of genuine resistance possibilities. Alternatively, a court may conclude that the likelihood of resistance or the demographic impossibility of integration make additional tools necessary to effect fair governance.

Leadership of School Authorities. In any school system where the durability of integration is problematic, a key factor for judicial consideration will be the degree of cooperation and leadership the court can

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210 Parental resort to parochial schools, even if animated by resistance to integration, is a constitutionally protected educational choice. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

211 The degree to which desegregation accelerates white flight from urban school districts is a hotly debated issue, particularly since sociologist James Coleman delivered a paper in 1975 concluding that school desegregation in some cases was a significant cause of declining white public school enrollments (J. Coleman, S. Kelly & J. More, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73 (1975)).

secure from defendant school authorities. Studies of desegregated communities show that actual integration occurs through racial balance more easily when school and community officials, through enthusiastic and cooperative leadership, assure the white community that integration will proceed smoothly and will improve the overall quality of schooling. Correspondingly, black students and parents can reasonably be expected to have greater confidence in the educational administration of such school authorities. Thus, if school authorities willingly proffer a "leadership plan" for encouraging popular support for integration, a court may rely more confidently on integration as the central school desegregation remedy, even where exit options exist for white parents.

Boston is perhaps the most dramatic northern example in which the absence of positive leadership might have counseled the court to intervene more emphatically at the earliest remedial stages in order to effectuate fair governance. For ten years prior to the first Boston

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212 The necessity of invoking judicial intervention to secure local desegregation does not itself invariably indicate that local authorities will prove uncooperative in implementing a remedy. As Millican v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), illustrates, cases may arise in which a local school board will resist desegregation, partly in the hope that an eventual lawsuit will result in the state sharing the obligation to fund the desegregative effort.

213 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATING THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A CRISIS IN CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY 1-7 (1975); Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 652 n.183.

214 The judicial preference for implementing desegregation plans devised by defendants reflects, in part, the supposition that defendant school authorities will support such plans more vigorously, thus helping to insure more effective implementation. See, e.g., Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 541 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (M.D. La. 1982).

decision, the school committee had steadfastly opposed all state and federal efforts to secure any school integration in Boston, even challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act.\(^{216}\)

After the committee's liability for desegregation was determined, the committee still took no initiative—either in assisting the court or in implementing relief—and refused to take steps beyond adherence to the literal meaning of even the most modest court order.\(^{217}\) For example, the committee's resistance included a refusal to submit voluntarily a timely proposal for the final grant of relief.\(^{218}\) The committee's public opposition to integration before and during the lawsuit was truculent and unremitting.\(^{219}\) Members and former members, after the court's first decision, helped to organize mass rallies in opposition to integration and to lobby Congress to prohibit busing through a constitutional amendment.

Using the nature of school leadership as an indicator of prospective white resistance affords at best an imperfect index of the viability

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\(^{216}\) See School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). The Racial Imbalance Act required school committees to take affirmative action to eliminate "racial imbalance" in schools where nonwhites constituted more than 50% of the student population. \textit{Id.}


\(^{218}\) Morgan v. Kerrigan, 389 F.2d 618, 619-20 (1st Cir. 1975).

of integration as a desegregation remedy. It is a sensible indicator, however, because school authorities have significant access to parents through public media and private channels. A school board's capacity to set the tone of public response to integration is likely to be great. School authorities may also be able to mobilize other community agencies—businesses, civic groups, and parent organizations—to encourage white participation in an integrated school system.

Further, under a fair governance approach, the use of an index of official cooperation to help measure the need for relief makes sense given the school authorities' incentives to cooperate. Enthusiasm in administering integration may justifiably be deemed probative of the kind of governance that will prevail in an integrated system without further court intervention. More drastic intervention, to the extent of curtailing the powers of the school board, may be justified where racial balance alone will not assure integration and fair governance. If school authorities are aware of the possibility of losing governance powers, even reluctant school boards may be induced to cooperate in the implementation of integration. Any resistance of school authorities in the face of possible reprisals might indicate the likely reaction of other members of the community who perceive their interests to be threatened by integration. Such resistance would justify a more interventionist intradistrict role for a court trying to secure nondiscriminatory schooling for minority plaintiffs.

Incentives for Desegregation. In deciding how much to rely on the prospect of stable integration as a remedy, a court should also consider what additional strategies might be implemented to enhance the success of an integration plan. One promising suggestion, for example, concerns the establishment of incentives for housing desegregation. The more integrated housing is, the easier it becomes to establish integrated schooling without burdensome transportation requirements. If desegregation plans exempt residentially integrated neighborhoods from cross-district busing, while providing that reassignments will be ordered if schools in those neighborhoods become segregated, courts can provide incentives for integrated neighborhoods to remain integrated and for segregated neighborhoods to integrate. Such incentives are preferable to integration-maintenance plans, employed by some communities, that maintain racial balance in housing by limiting black entry into integrated neighborhoods at a certain "tipping point."
A second range of possibilities for enhancing the desirability of desegregation involves improvements in the schools that would respond to parental interests in stable, disciplined, and educationally effective school environments. Some parents may now resist integration not because of hostility towards blacks but because of apprehension that a desegregation effort will absorb resources that would otherwise go towards instruction or generate discipline problems that would detract from teaching and learning.\(^2\) To forestall such resistance, courts may order measures to help bolster the educational effectiveness of all integrated schools. These could include not only instructional enhancement measures but also orders to involve black and white parents and students in cooperative efforts to develop codes of acceptable school behavior and understandings regarding fair and effective discipline.\(^3\)

After evaluating these four factors, a court should be able to make a threshold judgment as to the amount of integration possible and its likely durability. If reasonable promise exists for obtaining substantial and stable representation of both majority and minority student groups in each school, then the court can confidently pursue integration as the key to its fair governance remedy. Its selection of remedial tools from the other categories of affirmative orders outlined below should be based only on the need to buttress the success of integration.

If, however, integration is demographically impossible or stable integration cannot reasonably be expected, then the court should exercise its discretion to implement other affirmative remedial tools that intervene more substantially in educational administration than would integration. Such remedies would be necessary to assure reasonable confidence in the nondiscriminatory administration of the schools.

Another important difference between the fair governance orientation to integration and the conventional racial balance approach becomes clear at this point. As stated above, courts following a fair governance orientation would find it legitimate to invoke non-racial balance remedies if stable integration is unlikely because of community resistance; under the conventional approach, many courts have acted as

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891. On the general undesirability of racial ceilings in desegregation decrees, see Gewirtz, \textit{supra} note 23, at 643-44, 659-65. Some of the potential harms Professor Gewirtz identifies with regard to school desegregation remedies that leave some one-race schools intact, \textit{id.} at 668-70, may be ameliorated by those nonintegration remedies associated with fair governance that would enhance the power of the racial minority in an imperfectly integrated district. \textit{See infra} part III, sections C and D.

\(^2\) Interview with Hon. Alvin B. Rubin, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Iowa City, Iowa (Nov. 3, 1983).

if only the demographic impossibility of actual desegregation could legitimately sanction the use of alternative remedies.\textsuperscript{224} This is because, under the conventional approach, judicial willingness to calculate the possibility of white flight in designing an appropriate remedy might seem to reward resistance to the restoration of a nondiscriminatory attendance pattern.\textsuperscript{225} It would thus be viewed as illegitimate per se and discounted in order to avoid perpetuating the segregated pattern of schooling it is the court's aim to undo.\textsuperscript{226}

The problem with the conventional analysis, which may be based on \textit{Cooper v. Aaron},\textsuperscript{227} is that failing to account for the prospect of

\textsuperscript{224} See Levin, \textit{School Desegregation Remedies and the Role of Social Science Research}, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 1, 9-15, and cases cited therein. A few instances do exist in which courts have considered evidence of white flight in the remedial design process. \textit{Id.} at 15-21.

For an elaborate defense of the necessary legal relevance of white flight, see Gewirtz, \textit{supra} note 23, at 635-43.

\textsuperscript{225} In Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), \textit{aff'd}, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), the federal district court in Boston analyzed the problem as follows:

\begin{quote}
Some of the parties have urged that the court limit the extent of actual desegregation lest children from middle class white families leave the public school system and to prevent racial turmoil and violence in Boston's schools and communities. . . . These prophecies of "white flight" and racial turmoil, like opposition itself, are not "practicalities" that can be weighed against the rights of the plaintiffs. . . . Expression of that opposition constitutes a problem, of course, which the desegregation plan must confront in its implementation. But it does not constitute one of the "practicalities" to which the plan itself properly can make an accommodation.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} at 233-34 (citations omitted). One might argue that desegregation should not accommodate the prospect of white flight because predictions of white flight cannot be verified and that any "accommodation" would be a sacrifice of relief for only speculative purposes. It is important to note, however, that this is not the argument that the district court makes. The court does not rest on the unpredictability of white flight, but rather on what accommodation to prospective white flight represents, namely "to trade away the constitutional rights of children to receive a desegregated education . . . . The rule of law must prevail." \textit{Id.} at 234. As the court puts it, a deliberate failure to acknowledge prospective white flight in planning racial balance is a matter of principle, not practicality.

\textsuperscript{226} But cf. Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983) (White flight and subsequent resegregation can be taken into account in devising alternative plans to promote integration. The school board was allowed to create four virtually all-black schools as long as all white children attended integrated schools and substantial measures were taken to improve education in the all-black schools.); Levin, \textit{supra} note 224, at 19-21 (discussing California's consideration of the effects of white flight in its devising of alternative desegregation plans in response to the affirmative duty placed on school officials to correct de facto racial imbalance as well as de jure segregation).

\textsuperscript{227} 358 U.S. 1 (1958). \textit{Cooper} is, on its facts, not directly apposite to cases involving problems of accommodating local white resistance to desegregation relief. In \textit{Cooper}, local school authorities cooperated in implementing the federal decree, and the local citizenry "reluctantly accepted" the desegregation plan. Official resistance in Little Rock manifested itself through the intervention of the state governor. \textit{Id.} at 7-11; see Farber, \textit{The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited}, 1982 U.
white flight in remedial design threatens even the narrow remedial conception on which the conventional racial balance order is based. If the remedial objective in a desegregation case is to achieve the restoration of a natural pattern of attendance, it must be relevant whether white exit from the public school system in response to a desegregation plan will make such a pattern unattainable.

More practically, the conventional attitude is insensitive to the reality that white flight tends to isolate black students in the desegregated system, to shift the tax base to the suburbs, and to reimpose the harms initially associated with segregated schooling. Black students may remain isolated, stigmatized, and vulnerable to systematic discrimination against minority interests, albeit by state-level school authorities who may favor all-white suburban districts over predominantly black urban school systems.\textsuperscript{228} Ironically, if a court order produces such results, the consequent injuries may continue to appear to blacks as the artifacts of an affirmative government policy, thereby perpetuating their lack of confidence in fair governance.

In sum, if the conception of school desegregation remedies expressed in \textit{Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman}\textsuperscript{229} \textit{[Dayton I]} is the sole remedial principle on which lower courts may rely, these courts are caught in a dilemma. They cannot secure the proper remedial objective—a genuinely desegregated pattern of attendance—unless they bus. At the same time, their very reliance on busing may accelerate white flight, thus eliminating the possibility of creating the desired attendance pattern. In contrast, the fair governance orientation would legitimate—and, indeed, mandate—the greater use of nonbusing remedies whenever stable integration is genuinely unlikely.

One issue such an approach will pose for courts will be the grounds on which they can legitimately predict the impracticability of

\textsuperscript{228} Disenchantment with such continuing harms, even under court-ordered desegregation, prompted a group of black parents in Boston, in February 1982, to advocate replacing the court plan with a student assignment plan based on parental choice and increased black staffing of predominantly black schools. As in Detroit, the progress of effective intradistrict desegregation may have been hampered after the initial decree by a statewide political initiative, a 1980 property tax cap measure that resulted in a $30 million reduction in Boston's annual school appropriations over a three-year period. \textit{School Assignments in Boston: Black Parents Want Control}, CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUC. NEWSNOTES 6-7 (Aug.-Sept. 1982).

\textsuperscript{229} 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
integration. For reasons of manageability and legitimacy, a court would likely be uncomfortable imposing remedies on local school authorities that do not presume their good faith in the implementation of the remedial order.\textsuperscript{230} The point, however, is that extreme cases may well exist in which the grounds for presuming the impracticability of integration counsel against reliance on busing as an effective remedy. Indeed, there may be cases in which the minority plaintiffs and defendant school authorities agree that other remedies will be more effective in vindicating minority interests without compromising interests the local system is trying to protect, such as neighborhood schooling.\textsuperscript{231} If the remedial possibilities are viewed as a range of tools, each of which can be used to secure the overall goal of a fairly governed educational system, courts will have at least a framework within which to respond to the competing interests at stake in school desegregation suits.

C. \textit{Fair Governance and Nonintegration Remedies}

There are only two categories of options other than integration for restoring what should be a minority community's reasonable confidence in the fair administration of schools. The first involves structural reforms that hold reasonable promise of deterring discrimination and promoting fair representation of minority interests. The second entails court-ordered measures to improve the educational effectiveness of the schools that minority children attend. Rather than focusing on process or structural norms of fair governance directly, these latter measures aim at inducing those substantive policy changes that a fair decision-making process might yield. Although it may be more difficult to implement substantive educational policy measures rather than structural changes, courts may, in some cases, prefer to focus directly on altering the educational policies of the school district in order to make the system more effective for minority students. Such courts may doubt whether structural remedies other than integration will produce fair

\textsuperscript{230} Aside from any independent principled justifications for such a presumption of good faith, a fair governance approach to remedies might well buttress the reasonableness of such a presumption. The threat of judges imposing alternatives to busing that would more drastically undercut the authority of local officials over their school system could encourage the official support of integration that courts would wish to presume.

educational administration unless they are combined with requirements for substantive policy change as well. One element of an “educational policy component” of a desegregation decree might require that predominantly minority schools be at least as well funded as are those schools serving predominantly nonminority students.232 Such a decree might also contain measures calculated to bring the academic standards in such schools up to the level achieved in predominantly white schools.233

In Milliken v. Bradley234 [Milliken II], the Supreme Court has already sanctioned a variety of particularized educational remedies as tools “to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education” had educational services “been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial segregation.”235 The Court is comfortable with such remedies, in part because such programs do not represent an attempt “to restructure local governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing.”236

The main difference between Milliken II and the fair governance rationale for desegregation relief, therefore, lies in the justification the latter proffers for educational remedies. Under the fair governance approach, educational remedies are legitimate even absent a showing that the resulting educational program would restore minority students to the educational position they would have enjoyed absent discrimination.237 Indeed, the district court’s rationale for the educational remedies ordered in Detroit involved not only remedying effects of past segregation but also “assur[ing] a successful desegregative effort and . . .

228 See Bell, supra note 53, at 130.
233 Id. But cf. supra note 142 (providing sources discussing the feasibility of attempting to provide substantive educational equality).
235 Id. at 282. On the particular remedies approved, see supra note 119.
236 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 291.
237 What the educational status of minority students in a segregated district would have been but for the history of race discrimination is at least as immeasurable and unknowable as is the pattern of racial attendance that a history of nondiscriminatory assignments would have yielded. It may be that the school authorities in a formerly segregated district, had they never segregated the schools or discriminated against minority students, would have appropriated the same number of dollars for the district but distributed those dollars more fairly. A nondiscriminatory school board might have thus provided an education of lesser quality for all students rather than bringing the quality of minority education up to the level of that afforded to nonminority students in the segregated system. It would thus not be entirely persuasive for courts to order that minority schooling quality be raised to the level of that now afforded white students based entirely on a narrowly restorative remedial conception. The point of such remedies should be to provide minority students with an education commensurate with the education provided current to nonminority students.
minimiz[ing] the possibility of resegregation."\textsuperscript{238} This rationale is clearly more expansive than a narrow restorative view of desegregation relief.

The aim of structural remedies other than integration is to enhance the effectiveness of the minority voice in reaching educational decisions. Integration, by itself, does not change the cast of persons in authority; rather, it hampers the ability of persons in authority to treat minority students differently. The alternative reforms suggested below as parts of a "structural nondiscrimination component" of a desegregation order attempt to increase representation of minority interests by providing minorities with some direct authority to govern the school system.

Under conventional remedial rationales, courts have implemented three structural remedies. As to these three remedies, the essential contribution of a fair governance theory is the insight it offers into their utility and legitimacy.

The most obvious means of increasing minority input into educational decisionmaking is to guarantee the hiring and placement of a significant number of minority administrators in a school system.\textsuperscript{239} Such a measure may be useful to buttress integration even if it proves less than adequate as a complete alternative to integration.\textsuperscript{240} Whether or not evidence of past employment discrimination exists, increasing the number of minority educators in positions of authority can be justified as a means of bolstering the system's administrative sensitivity to minority interests.

The second technique for increasing minority power in school governance, which may or may not involve changes in the command structure within a school system, is to establish community boards, on either a neighborhood or school basis, to oversee the progress of desegregation.\textsuperscript{241} If integration is the core of the desegregation order, such boards may be confined to overseeing, advising, and disseminating information. On the other hand, if community review is employed, in some measure, as a substitute for integration, the boards should be given actual policymaking functions or veto powers over existing school authorities.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{239} On the adoption of such a plan for Atlanta, see \textit{supra} note 231.
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{See supra} note 139.
\textsuperscript{241} A variety of such mechanisms are discussed in W. Hawley, \textit{supra} note 4, at 73-88, and sources cited therein.
\textsuperscript{242} Under the latter scheme, a school committee might be required to negotiate with each community panel an initial agenda for school reform that would then have to be approved by the school board itself. Additional procedures might be ordered under
A third way of dealing with school authorities who are antagonistic or insensitive to minority interests is to place all or part of the school system in receivership.\textsuperscript{243} The receiver might be the court or, in appropriate cases, state authorities likely to be more responsive than local authorities to minority interests.\textsuperscript{244} This technique, however, has obvious disadvantages. It assures nondiscriminatory schooling only so long as a court is willing to administer the schools, and it has the potential for straining federal-local relations to a great degree. State receivership may also be an unsatisfactory alternative because of justified local objections that statewide authorities cannot be as sensitive to legitimate local interests as would be locally elected authorities or even the local federal court.

A compromise position would invoke judicial receivership until such change in local leadership as would promise greater responsiveness to minority interests; in such an event, the court might appoint a local official, from within or without the school system, to be the receiver.\textsuperscript{245} The court would thus remain as a lever for increased minority input into educational decisionmaking but could extricate itself from the details of day-to-day educational administration.

D. Restructuring the Governance of Formerly Segregated Districts

In addition to justifying the three structural remedies that have been employed under different rationales, the fair governance theory suggests a fourth major structural approach to remedies not yet taken which the community panels would retain effective influence over future decisions affecting local schools. It should be noted that such panels could pose problems by requiring courts to determine the respective roles to be played by the panels and the already constituted school authorities. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 559 F. Supp. 9, 10-12 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (difficulties in defining role for tri-ethnic committee led to committee's relative inactivity and disbandment). Without clearly defined powers, review committees must depend more on their members' individual resourcefulness and on recourse to the courts to be effective checks on the exercise of an existing institution's power. Cf. Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1353-64 (1975) (analyzing role of Human Rights Committee in overseeing the implementation of injunctive relief against a state hospital for the mentally impaired in Alabama).


\textsuperscript{244} Cf. Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635-39 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (Alabama prison case in which, after over six years of litigation, the district court appointed a new governor as receiver for the prison system).

\textsuperscript{245} In Boston, for example, the district court appointed the school superintendent as receiver on the recommendation of special experts. R. DENTLER \& M. SCOTT, supra note 199, at 178.
in school desegregation cases—the complete political restructuring of a district’s governance system. While political restructuring has not been employed as a school desegregation remedy, it has been litigated in the context of voting rights. Because both issues concern the effectiveness of the minority voice in governance decisions, however, political restructuring seems as reasonable a remedy for desegregation as for voting rights, even if justified only in cases of extreme official intransigence.

One form of political restructuring would involve the dismantling of a centrally-elected school board and replacing it with a school board elected by different wards within the school district. A second form would divide the district itself into subdistricts, each under the power of a local board, which might be subject to some central coordinating agency. The central agency under the latter plan might be a separately elected board, a board elected from the local boards, or some executive officer or agency connected to the office of the mayor.

The premise of either plan is that the closer the school board is to its constituents, the more responsible it will be to those constituents. Because integration is most problematic in residentially segregated school districts, blacks in such districts would be assured under these plans of either some representation on the central school board or control of a local board catering to minority interests.

Each plan suffers from some disadvantages. Under the first plan,


in which the creation of a minority district would assure minority membership on a central board, such minority presence might not adequately deter discriminatory policies if the majority of the electorate is always antagonistic to minority interests. On the other hand, one cost of the latter plan is the increased logistical problem of coordinating citywide programs and establishing citywide standards of equality in a decentralized district.

Minority parents in a growing number of cities have been seeking such remedies, often unsuccessfully, as relief for voting dilution.249 Plaintiffs in such cases have sought to overturn centrally elected school boards on the ground that such governance systems were adopted or are operated for the purpose of furthering racial discrimination. Such particularized showings of intent, however, are extremely difficult to prove.

Even if a case of purposeful voting dilution cannot be established, however, the Boston litigation indicates that attempts to overturn at-large elections of school boards may make good sense as desegregation remedies. Black voters in Boston were denied the relief they sought in part because they could not show that the choice of a centrally elected school committee was made for the purpose of disempowering black students and parents in educational decisionmaking.250 Such a showing could not be made, however, because the system had been adopted through state legislation in 1905 for the purpose of limiting Democratic and working-class Catholic influence in school politics.251 That blacks fell victim to the system only as black migration to Boston became demographically significant does not lessen the role that the school committee structure has played in subordinating minority interests to the interests of the white majority. Had the court thought genuine integration impracticable, it would have been rational to conclude that, in Boston,

249 See supra note 246. Notwithstanding the increasing concentration of minority students in urban school systems, blacks typically do not constitute a majority of the voting population in such districts. For example, although black students represented 45.8% of the Boston public school enrollment in 1979-80, R. DENTLER & M. SCOTT, supra note 199, at 12, the black population of Boston is 22% of the total population and accounted for only 18% of the vote in 1982. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1983, § 1, at 30, cols. 1, 4.

250 See Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165, 192 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977). The district court also found that, under the standards set forth in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1971) and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Boston at-large system did not have an impermissible effect of denying black voters access to the political process. 421 F. Supp. at 189-92. The First Circuit upheld this finding tentatively: "We cannot quite say on the present record that plaintiffs have demonstrated . . . an exclusionary effect. But our decision is close . . . ." 565 F.2d at 7.

the implementation of community control or a ward-elected school committee should be part of an effective alternative to busing.\textsuperscript{252} The court, indeed, would not have had to choose an alternative structure itself but could have permitted the city to conduct a referendum on all alternatives supported by enough signatures to get an initiative on the ballot in a Boston election.\textsuperscript{253}

In sum, a fair governance decree, in addition to prohibiting future discrimination and redressing particularized showings of past discrimination, should seek to establish a system of school governance that reasonably guarantees nondiscriminatory educational administration in the future. The preferable remedy is actual integration coupled with such other structural or substantive educational changes as are needed to ensure the stability of integration. If integration is impracticable or impossible, courts should resort to alternative structural forms and substantive educational changes necessary to accomplish fair governance.

E. The Efficacy of Fair Governance Remedies

One concern in evaluating the fair governance orientation towards remedies is whether such remedies would effectively protect the relevant interests of minority students and redress the harms imposed by unlawful segregation. Doubts as to the efficacy of fair governance remedies in this respect may be articulated from different points of view.\textsuperscript{254} It may be argued that sanctioning alternatives to integration where integration is even hypothetically possible is to give up on the promise of actual desegregation, "caving in," as it were, to unjustified white resis-

\textsuperscript{252} Indeed, the First Circuit stated, "Court control of the schools [as undertaken in the Boston desegregation case] is a more drastic remedy than taking whatever steps, if any, may be proper to ensure full and equal participation in the political process by all groups," Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1977).

\textsuperscript{253} In June 1974, a variety of reform plans to restructure the school system and incorporate some element of community control were defeated in a citywide referendum. Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165, 183-84 (D. Mass. 1976), affd, 565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977).

\textsuperscript{254} One weak argument, perhaps implicit in the dicta of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971), is that the fair governance theory promises more than can be achieved, while racial balance remedies focus on more realistic goals. It is true that the less ambitious a set of remedial goals, the more effective a remedial order can be expected to be in meeting them. The relevant issue, however, is what set of harms a school desegregation remedy ought to redress. If the pervasive evils of segregation include the systematic subordination of minority interests by school authorities hostile towards those interests, the effectiveness of a conventional racial balance remedy in adjusting student attendance patterns is not a meaningful objection to setting the court's sights higher. If unfair governance is an evil that causes our legal system to regard racial segregation as unconstitutional in the first place, courts can legitimately view themselves as duty-bound to try, however imperfectly, to relieve minority students of unfair racial domination in the governance of schools.
tance to integration. Alternatively, it can be argued by even critics of the conventional racial balance approach that the goal of school desegregation remedies should be the educational effectiveness of minority schools rather than fair governance; that is, minority plaintiffs should view desegregation suits as levers for improving education, not for more elusive goals of fair representation.

The appropriate response to the first concern is three-fold. First, the fair governance theory gives remedial priority to integration where reasonably practicable. Second, proponents of any form of desegregation must be concerned about remedies that substantially reimpose the harms on black children that desegregation is supposed to relieve. Busing that promises only questionable gains for minority pupils is not a sensible policy, especially because alternatives exist.

Finally, the development of alternative legal strategies to achieve equal protection cannot justly be blamed for forestalling otherwise unachievable integration. Under the fair governance approach, local school boards would have incentives to accept integration as the minimum level of interference necessary to effect constitutional standards of fair governance. Where officials forego those incentives and entrench themselves against change, no court order can secure integrated schooling. Boston and Detroit are two painful examples; others may exist. Where community leaders are dedicated to maintaining a segregated system, only a reallocation of political power can begin to set the stage for integration. Moreover, it is likely that one would find as much integrated classroom experience in the long run in a public school system administered under a fair governance order as in an antagonistic, residually segregated community subject to a conventional racial balance decree. The results in cities like Boston suggest that, in some cases, blacks would be giving up little in actual integration under a fair governance decree while receiving increased leverage over the operation of the schools their children attend.

255 See supra note 228.

256 The tradeoff between integration and local control is implicated in a related question that litigants may face—whether, if intradistrict integration is not possible, to pursue a fair governance intradistrict decree or a metropolitan decree to achieve integration. Notwithstanding the reasons argued above for favoring integration as the desegregation remedy of first resort, see supra section II C, from the perspective of the black community there are two possible objections to metropolitan desegregation. First, metropolitanization may place the overwhelming burden of integration on blacks, decreasing the value of whatever integrated classroom experience does occur. Second, the dispersion of black students may dissipate the political influence of blacks within their school system.

These objections to metropolitan remedies raise issues that can probably be resolved only within the context of a particular case. The desirability of metropolitan integration will depend on at least two factors: first, on the support among metropolitan
An alternative concern for the effectiveness of fair governance remedies comes from the opposite direction, challenging not the theory's doubts about conventional pursuits of racial balance but the emphasis still placed on integration as a remedy of first resort. Dean Derrick Bell is perhaps the best known current advocate for concentrating on educational effectiveness and not racial balance as the judicial goal for minority education. He argues,

[B]lack parents are increasingly disenchanted with remedies that have increased their educational burden without improving the quality of schooling provided their children. Alternative remedies [should] seek to translate the desire of black parents for educationally effective schools into school policies that can gain judicial approval. They [can] provide a vehicle for continuing the Supreme Court's and the country's commitment to the equal educational opportunity mandate of Brown.257

Unlike the writings of critics that argue that busing be abandoned and that remedies be targeted at particularized educational interests of black students,268 Dean Bell's theoretical critique of the principles underlying conventional racial balance incorporates an expansive view of the harms of segregation. In a case in which a court regards integration as impossible or impracticable, the fair governance orientation is, in fact, likely to lead to a remedial mix perhaps identical to Dean Bell's prescription for making minority schools more effective and giving black parents more political power in school systems.259

257 Bell, supra note 53, at 138-39.


259 Bell, supra note 53, at 128-33.
The significant difference between the fair governance theory and the Bell approach to remedies is that implicit in Dean Bell's writings is a warning against devoting any judicial energy to "futile adherence to racial balance remedies that are increasingly hard to obtain." So persuaded is Dean Bell of the counterproductivity of pursuing racial balance that he challenges the propriety of giving any priority to integration as a remedial tool for segregated schooling. This difference between Dean Bell's perspective and the fair governance theory may thus depend more on political judgment than on overriding principle. The Bell thesis is less a challenge to the importance of integration than to predictions of its achievability.

Because of the importance of integration, it is essential, however, for substantial districtwide interracial education to remain the remedy of first resort. The only long-term hope of maintaining an official commitment to effective minority education is to change the system of schooling in a way that requires official sensitivity to the educational concerns of the minority community. This is not to say that quality education cannot be obtained in predominantly black schools; it can. The point is that meaningful educational equality for all racial and ethnic groups cannot be expected if such groups attend separate educational institutions governed by school authorities representing the racial or ethnic majority. Although one may hope that a demonstration of the educational effectiveness of minority schools will encourage integration, it may be more realistic to hope that stable integration will encourage a long-term public commitment to equal educational opportunity.

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260 Id. at 138.
261 Dean Bell bases his pessimism for the achievability of integration remedies on what he identifies as an increasingly powerful conviction among whites that integration is not in the interest of whites. See Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation 91 (D. Bell ed. 1980).
262 Several examples are noted in Bell, supra note 53, at 126-27.
263 See supra note 139.
264 Proponents of more effective public education for minority students must recognize also the importance of social integration to maintenance of any long-term social commitment to any form of public education. In American society, public schooling may be regarded not only as a good to be distributed fairly, but also as a form of coercion, depriving parents of the opportunity and, in large part, the resources to educate their children in more individualized ways. But cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (State may not "standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."). It is true, of course, that the government's incursion into child raising may be justified by a host of beneficial services that public schools render. As one scans the list of such services, however, the most compelling reason for permitting government to require children to spend large parts of their early lives in predominantly government-run institutions may be the critical importance of
Whether or not fair governance decrees prove as effective in promoting fair governance as racial balance orders are at guaranteeing student reassignment, the goals of fair governance decrees are broader and more critical than are those of racial balance and are therefore worth pursuing. In addition, by focusing judicial attention on actual integration as the remedy of first resort, the fair governance theory offers hope of accomplishing integration wherever possible without sacrificing minority interests quixotically in districts in which only alternative remedies can hope to protect those interests effectively.

CONCLUSION

The unfair governance of intentionally segregated school districts renders racially separate schools in those districts inherently unequal. School desegregation remedies should attack what was the systematic and continuous vulnerability of minority children in those districts to a variety of harms inflicted upon them by hostile public school authorities. That vulnerability, which deprives minority students and their parents of objectively reasonable confidence in the nondiscriminatory educational administration to which they are entitled, is the crux of unfair governance.

Focusing on fair governance as a central issue in the school desegregation cases has three major advantages over the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman265 [Dayton I], which articulates only a narrow remedial conception aimed at achieving some natural pattern of racially balanced student assignment as the key desegregative aim. First, the fair governance focus provides a standard against which to assess the utility of busing as a remedial tool and against which it is possible to suggest and assess alternatives to busing in school districts in which busing cannot and will not promote actual integration. Second, it justifies the Court's imposition of stringent liability rules on culpable school authorities. Third, the fair governance focus helps reconcile the Court's allegiance schooling to social integration. See Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state cannot demonstrate that its interest in compulsory schooling until age 16 is compromised by exempting 14- and 15-year-old Amish children, in light of evidence that Amish are effectively socializing their children in a separate agrarian community based on religious faith, which has proven economically self-sufficient and politically and socially responsible). If schools admittedly give up on that function, it is a reasonable prediction that long-term support for any high-quality public education would be eroded in favor of private forms of schooling that might serve minority interests even less well. This is surely a result to be avoided.

to a de jure/de facto distinction in the school cases, with its unwillingness to permit case-by-case litigation of the question whether racially separate schooling is equal or ever justified.

In terms of remedial design, the fair governance orientation to remedies differs from the conventional racial balance approach in that:

1. The success of busing under a fair governance approach depends on the likelihood of achieving significant actual and stable integration in all schools;

2. Alternatives to busing are permissible under the fair governance approach even if the impracticability of integration results from community resistance rather than demographic impossibility;

3. The fair governance approach would regard as legitimate, in extreme cases, the restructuring of educational agencies to accomplish fair governance; and

4. The fair governance approach would permit improving the educational effectiveness of minority schools even if no showing could be made that the current educational deficiencies of those schools are directly traceable to particular instances of past discrimination.

The fair governance theory of the school desegregation cases cannot, however, be fully squared with *Milliken v. Bradley*\[266\] [Milliken I]. The Court's preference in that decision for the value of local autonomy over the value of actual integration reflects a balancing of competing interests that either tacitly incorporates a narrower conception of the minority interests at stake than the fair governance theory suggests, or weighs those interests far less heavily. *Milliken I* does not, however, necessarily proscribe a fair governance approach to intradistrict remedies. Of key importance in this respect is the degree to which the Court, notwithstanding *Milliken I*, would tolerate judicial requirements for structural and policy changes within school districts, so long as the integrity of school district boundaries is respected. There is reason to expect that, if adopted, such intradistrict remedies would be manageable and effective. Such remedies would also have the distinct advantage over conventional orders of explicitly targeting the pervasive evils at issue in the school desegregation cases, thus warranting the expenditure of resources they require.

The fair governance theory, despite its invitation to courts to focus on the process of educational administration, is fully compatible with a substantive view of the equal protection clause, which regards that clause as protecting a normative view of equal educational opportu-
nity. Even under a substantive view of equal protection, however, the central problem for school desegregation remedial design is securing a long-term commitment from public authorities to provide minority children with education as effective as that received by white children. In part because any substantive view of equality may be hard to prescribe in specific terms, it seems reasonable to give priority to securing for minority students a structure of governance in which school authorities cannot succeed in being administratively insensitive to their interests while working to serve effectively the interests of nonminority students.

Although some sacrifice of local autonomy would be a reasonable price to pay for meaningful school desegregation, the enforcement of the fair governance norm need not require extensive intervention into the command structure and substantive policymaking of a public school system. Integration, if it can actually be accomplished, is a desirable compromise between the egalitarian and majoritarian values at stake in the desegregation cases. When those values conflict, however, inequality should not prevail.


For present purposes, recognizing these scholarly disputes prompts only the observation that the legitimacy of a fair governance theory of school desegregation remedies does not depend on their resolution. The focus of the fair governance theory makes it obviously compatible with a process-oriented conception of equal protection. As the text elaborates, however, fair governance may also be part of the substantive ideals of equal educational opportunity and distributional fairness.