COMMENTS

THE FIRST AMENDMENT GONE AWRY: CITY OF ERIE V. PAP’S A.M.,AILING ANALYTICAL STRUCTURES, AND THE SUPPRESSION OF PROTECTED EXPRESSION

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INTRODUCTION

"[T]here is an implicit narrative which the viewer is left to complete in his imagination. That is why it is important that the striptease not end in a bathing suit, because a bathing suit is for swimming, not for sex."

There are likely few groups who, while enjoying a vivid academic exchange in the much-celebrated marketplace of ideas, will be interrupted by one member's call to move the debate to a nearby all-nude dance club for additional intellectual perspective. Similarly, while some might be disappointed, it is unlikely that any citizen would be irreparably harmed by the closing of their local "Kandyland" go-go. So now, after years of exhaustive debate and the perpetually prominent role of explicit adult entertainment in the pantheon of First Amendment scholarship, why all the fuss about another nude dancing case? The answer is complex, yet it is instructive as to the degree First Amendment jurisprudence has gone awry. In this Comment, I contend the state of the First Amendment, viewed through the instructive lens of adult entertainment, is far from strong. I argue that, despite the basic First Amendment value that even the most unpopular and perhaps unnecessary expression need be preserved in the face of the suppressive force of a majority, the Supreme Court has taken profoundly disturbing steps in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. toward moving itself from the position of First Amendment rights guarantor and into the position of disinterested spectator of government-imposed majoritarian preferences. Plainly spoken, the plurality's manipulation of

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2 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears."); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 12 (1996) (describing the First Amendment as "a means of protecting the individual speaker from being silenced by the state").
doctrine, precedent, and justifications in *Pap's* has grave implications for the freedom of any expression that challenges societal orthodoxy.

A thorough foray into modern First Amendment doctrine unquestionably must consider the pernicious effect of *Pap's* on underlying free speech values. Indeed, adult expression doctrine is an excellent avenue for examination of the larger state of the First Amendment; explicit adult entertainment occupies a unique place among forms of expression because such a large portion of the populace allegedly disfavors it under many different social, political, and religious rubrics. Constitutional protection of adult entertainment is also an issue of critical import as increasing numbers of municipalities attempt urban renewal initiatives that include regulations designed to relocate or

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6 Some might suggest that adult expression doctrine has been played out over the years in scholarly discussion. Not only has adult expression doctrine taken on a disturbing new life in *Pap's*, but it will continue to shape First Amendment jurisprudence in the near future through further consideration of secondary effects, Internet, and child pornography issues. See, e.g., *City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.*, 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding as a matter of law that ordinances of the City of Los Angeles prohibiting the operation of adult businesses that both sell adult products and contain facilities for the viewing of adult movies or videos were inadequately supported by evidence of adverse impact so as to violate the First Amendment), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-799) (argued Dec. 4, 2001); *ACLU v. Reno*, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (barring enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, which makes it unlawful to make any communication for commercial purposes by means of the World Wide Web that is available to minors and that includes material that is "harmful to minors" on First Amendment grounds because it relies on community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors), cert. granted sub nom. *Ashcroft v. ACLU*, 69 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2001) (No. 00-1293) (argued Nov. 28, 2001); *Free Speech Coalition v. Reno*, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. *Holder v. Free Speech Coalition*, 69 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2001) (No. 00-795) (argued as Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Oct. 30, 2001) (holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which prohibits the shipment, distribution, receipt, reproduction, sale, or possession of any visual depiction that "appears to be[] of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and also contains a similar prohibition concerning any visual depiction that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct" is unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Amy Adler, *Inverting the First Amendment*, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 921 (2001) (asserting child pornography law is the next major First Amendment battleground).

Changes in adult expression doctrine in recent and forthcoming decisions will have great import above and beyond the mere perpetuation of the salacious striptease or publication of the enticing erotic image. To borrow from a more talented source, I would say about explicit adult expression: "You’ve begun to matter more than the things you say." Andrew Lloyd Webber, *Heaven on Their Minds, on Jesus Christ Superstar* (MCA Records 1993).
suppress a growing number of adult-oriented businesses. “As of February 1997, Americans spend more money at strip clubs than at Broadway, off-Broadway, regional, and non-profit theaters; than at the opera, the ballet, and jazz and classical music performances—combined.” As such, the use of zoning and general laws to limit or eliminate adult entertainment establishments is a particularly thorny issue because it inextricably involves conflicts between passionate defenders and equally fervent detractors, as well as difficult questions of morality, government censorship, and legislative motive. Even the most

5 In New York City, for example, the total number of adult bookstores, peepshows, and video stores increased from twenty-nine to eighty-nine between 1984 and 1993; topless and nude bars increased from fifty-four to sixty-eight; and adult video establishments increased from none to sixty-four—overall an increase of more than forty-seven percent. See NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ADULT ENTERTAINMENT STUDY 1, 21 (1994). The New York study also predicted large-scale growth through 2002. Id. I grant that no study has yet reliably determined whether the implied relationship between increased business and increased patronage is one of correlation or causation. More than ever, however, it seems impossible to ignore Foucault’s observation that modern society speaks about sex “ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the secret.” 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 35 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).

6 Although the focus of this Comment is on nude dancing establishments, I will at times use “adult-oriented businesses” or “adult establishments,” which unless specified as “adult theatres” or “nude dancing establishments” may include video and book stores; motels; massage parlors; sex clubs; topless, bottomless, and nude bars; and peepshows. If you desire a frame of reference for nude dancing establishments, view a modern one by using the Internet to visit <www.fantasyshowbar.com>.


8 New York City’s “Quality of Life Initiative” is an excellent example of such a governmental zoning scheme. Launched in 1995, it was accompanied by the city’s Adult Zoning Resolution, which, generally, restricted adult establishments to manufacturing districts and banned adult businesses from most commercial districts. It also prohibited adult establishments from operating within five hundred feet of a church, school, residence, or another adult establishment. For a thorough explanation of the resolution, see Rachel Simon, Note, New York City’s Restrictive Zoning of Adult Businesses: A Constitutional Analysis, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 190-92 (1995), which cites Resolution No. 1322. See also Howard Goldman & Rachel D. Tanur, Zoning for Adult Use: A Delicate Balance: New York City Proposes Tough New Restrictions, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at S1 (describing New York City zoning initiatives from the mid-1970s forward); Vivian S. Toy, Council Approves Package of Curbs on Sex Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at A1 (relating the New York City Council’s approval of the Adult Zoning Resolution).

9 For examples of these types of laws, see infra notes 22 & 100 on the laws considered in Barnes and Pap’s.

principled legal debates on the topic are usually "fraught with some emotionalism.""

Until the early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court did not acknowledge protection for nude dancing; states were free to enact any limitations they desired. Since then, a fierce debate has raged over the level of protection owed to nonobscene adult expression under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Although the Court has consistently held that nude dancing is entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection, over the last thirty years it has developed, adapted, and continually expanded a line of doctrine that has granted broad discretion to local governments to suppress that expression as a means to combat deleterious "secondary effects." Prominent commentators have derided this doctrine as a "gravely erod[ing] the First Amendment's protections" and have decried its "corrosive impact".

purveyors of obscenity and premising a need for regulation thereon).

11 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).


13 See generally Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 611 (1992) (discussing the First Amendment issue presented by topless dancing); Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devolution of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1231 (1993) (noting the debate over the proper meaning and proper regulation of pornographic expression); Tesluk, supra note 10 (arguing for a First Amendment right to expression); Simon, supra note 8 (describing a government scheme to restrict the locations of adult establishments).

14 For a detailed explication of the evolution of nude dancing doctrine through Barnes, see David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms", 37 Washburn L.J. 55, 57-77 (1997); Malmer, supra note 12, at 1275-1305; Michael McBride, Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie: The Wrong Route to the Right Decision, 33 Akron L. Rev. 289, 290-98 (2000); Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1232-54; McDonald, supra note 10, at 341-48; Simon, supra note 8, at 192-201; and infra text accompanying notes 38-122.

15 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 952 (2d ed. 1988); see also id. § 12-18, at 943-44 (noting that if "one parses first amendment doctrine too finely, one may discover that little protection for expression remains").

16 Hudson, supra note 14, at 60; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., "Secondary Effects Doctrine" is Fertile Ground for Abuse, N.J. L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 23 (describing how courts
on First Amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this doctrine has cut an ever-widening swath across First Amendment freedoms.

This doctrinal debate reached an ideological breaking point in the Court's important but hopelessly splintered 1991 decision in *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*, where a battle-worn plurality answered the threshold question of whether nude dancing constituted expressive conduct in the affirmative. A decade of confusion followed as courts tried to cull from *Barnes* a cohesive framework for examining the constitutionality of laws that had the effect of restricting adult expression. In 2000, the Court seized an opportunity to revisit and clarify this clouded doctrine when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned a City of Erie general nudity ordinance on the grounds that it unconstitutionally restricted free expression rights of nude dancing entertainers.

Instead of taking the opportunity to pull back from its heavily criticized prior decisions, in *City of Erie v. Pap's* the Court actually extended the secondary effects doctrine beyond the pale of precedent, with dangerous implications for increased prohibition of protected expression. In doing so, the Court misread existing precedent and misapplied First Amendment analysis both by entrenching a view of nonobscene expression as low-value speech and by adhering to the nonobvious conclusion that general laws that target specific adult expression merit only lower-level scrutiny reserved for content-neutral laws. Furthermore, the Court's decision in *City of Erie v. Pap's* has unleashed a dangerously deferential secondary effects justification that may threaten a wider array of protected speech. In effect, the *Pap's* Court has built, stoked, and released a runaway steam engine in the guise of the secondary effects doctrine and has virtually lashed adult-oriented expression to the tracks a few miles down the line. This Comment argues that the doctrine expounded in *City of Erie v. Pap's* must be both restrained and reevaluated before municipalities use *Pap's* to exert increasing power to further suppress controversial expression.

Part I of this Comment provides background on the 2000 Pennsyl-

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17 *See* 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (showing no five Justice agreement on rationale); *see also* *Young v. Am. Mini Theatres*, 427 U.S. 50 (1986) (same).
18 *See, e.g., Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie*, 719 A.2d 273, 277-79 (Pa. 1998) (attempting to divine a controlling rationale from *Barnes*).
19 *Id.* at 281.
vania Supreme Court *Pap's v. City of Erie* case. Part II provides a detailed explication of the evolution of adult entertainment doctrine. First, I briefly examine the obscene/nonobscene distinction in the aftermath of the landmark 1973 obscenity case of *Miller v. California*. I describe the prevailing content discrimination analysis used to examine laws under the First Amendment. I then provide a thorough description of the application of the content discrimination analytical framework in adult entertainment cases and the development of the secondary effects doctrine through *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.* Part III discusses the application of those precedents and principles by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Pap's* and offers an analysis of the decision's most important points. In Part IV, I offer my analysis of the dangers of the *Pap's* decision. Finally, in Part V, I recommend changes the Court should consider in the application of First Amendment adult expression doctrine. A brief Conclusion follows.

I. SETTING THE SCENE: *PAP'S A.M. V. CITY OF ERIE*

In September of 1994, the Erie, Pennsylvania, City Council enacted City of Erie Ordinance 75-1994, making it a summary offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a state of nudity. To
comply with this ordinance, a female over the age of ten would have to wear at least what are colloquially known as "pastes" and a "G-string."

Pap's A.M. ("Pap's") operated a totally nude dancing establishment in Erie known as "Kandyland." Shortly after the ordinance became effective, Pap's filed a complaint in equity against the City of Erie, the Mayor, and the City Council seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and requesting permanent injunctive relief.23 In January of 1995, the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County struck down the ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad.24 On cross-appeals, the Commonwealth Court—citing Justice Souter's concurrence in Barnes as binding precedent25—reversed the trial court's order on two grounds: that the holding of unconstitutional overbreadth was in error and that the ordinance did not infringe impermissibly on Pap's right to freedom of expression.26

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review on both grounds and held the ordinance violated the free expression rights of Pap's under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.27 At the outset, the court held that nude dancing is expressive conduct and is entitled to "some quantum of protection under the First Amendment.28 The court next examined whether the governmental interest in enacting the ordinance was content-based or content-

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4. The prohibition set forth in subsection 1 (c) shall not apply to:
   a. Any child under ten (10) years of age; or
   b. Any individual exposing a breast in the process of breastfeeding an infant under two (2) years of age.

See also Pap's, 529 U.S. at 283-84 (reprinting ordinance); 719 A.2d 273, 275 n.2 (same).
23 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 284; 719 A.2d at 276.
27 Pap's, 719 A.2d at 281; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ."); id. amend. XIV ("No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."). The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) ("It has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."). For a detailed examination of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Pap's decision, see McBride, supra note 14, at 299-309.
28 Pap's, 719 A.2d at 276 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66); see also U.S. CONST. 529 U.S. at 285 (quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noting that "nude dancing is expressive conduct that is entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment"). See also Barnes, in which eight of the Justices held that nude dancing was expression entitled to Constitutional protection.
neutral. After asserting that no clear precedent arises out of Barnes’ “‘splintered and . . . non-harmonious opinions,’”29 the court conducted an independent examination of the ordinance and concluded that it was content-based and deserving of strict scrutiny.30 Although the court conceded that one of the purposes behind the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, it found an “unmentioned purpose” that was “inextricably bound up with [the] stated purpose”—that of impacting negatively on the erotic message of nude dancing.31 Specifically, the court agreed with Justice White’s dissent in Barnes, noting that “[i]t is only because nude dancing performances may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the spectators that the State seeks to regulate such expressive activity.”32

After applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the ordinance failed the narrow tailoring requirement33 and severed the public nudity provisions after finding them violative of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.34 This holding obviated the need to decide the question of overbreadth. Two justices concurred in the decision but noted that—although they would have sustained the ordinance under the U.S. Constitution because of its similarity to the ordinance upheld in Barnes—they would have invalidated it under the Pennsylvania Constitution.35

29 Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 285 (quoting Pap’s, 719 A.2d at 277).
30 Pap’s, 719 A.2d at 278-80.
31 Id. at 276. The Court drew much of this language from Justice White’s dissent in Barnes. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592-93 (“[T]he emotional or erotic impact of the dance is intensified by the nudity of the performers . . . [and t]he nudity element of nude dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere ‘conduct’ independent of any expressive component of the dance.”).
32 Pap’s, 719 A.2d at 283-84 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592 (White, J., dissenting)); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (“Because the display clause regulates speech due to its potential primary impact, we conclude it must be considered content-based.”).
33 The Court suggested that less restrictive methods such as time, place, or manner restrictions would achieve the government’s interest in preventing harmful secondary effects. Pap’s, 719 A.2d at 280 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594 (White, J., dissenting)); see also McBride, supra note 14, at 308 n.116 (citing Ron Kalyan, Note, Regulation of Nude Dancing in Bring Your Own Bottle Establishments in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Are the Commonwealth’s Municipalities Left to Fend for Themselves?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 169, 181 (1994)) (observing that municipalities can utilize regulations such as control of location of clubs and restrictions on hours of operation to reduce conflicts with residents and reduce crime).
34 Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 286; 719 A.2d at 281.
35 Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 286; 719 A.2d at 281-84 (Castille, J., concurring); McBride, supra note 14, at 302. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 7, which states that “[t]he free communi-
The City of Erie petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case, now captioned City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., on March 29, 2000. The plurality upheld a restrictive general law, applying a secondary effects rationale. I shall return to this decision after setting the doctrinal scene.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF NUDE DANCING DOCTRINE

A. The Limitations of Miller and Nude Dancing as Protected Expressive Conduct

The Supreme Court set forth the modern obscenity test in Miller v. California. Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books. His brochures contained pictures of sexually explicit activities and were mailed to individuals who had not requested them. Miller was convicted of violating California law by knowingly distributing obscene matter. In vacating Miller's conviction, the court should have acknowledged Barnes as binding precedent and decided the case on independent state grounds. Id. at 305. Other courts have chosen this path, see, for example, 7250 Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1990); O'Day v. King County, 749 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1988). Indeed, in his subsequent concurring opinion in Pap's, Justice Souter specifically suggested the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not barred "from choosing simpler routes to disposition of the case" under either a federal overbreadth challenge or a Pennsylvania constitutional challenge. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 317 n.6 (Souter J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Pennsylvania v. Campana, 514 A.2d 854, 855-56 (1974) (holding that after reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court on a federal issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can reaffirm its decision on state constitutional grounds). McBride discusses the precedents for an independent state constitutional ruling at length in his article. McBride, supra note 14, at 305 n.105.

37 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 296, 302 (upholding city ban against public nudity on the basis that the goal of the regulation is the prevention of harmful secondary effects that are unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
39 Miller, 413 U.S. at 16-18. The brochures Miller sent advertised four graphic books entitled Intercourse, Man-Woman, Sex Orgies Illustrated, and An Illustrated History of
tion, the Court developed the three-prong Miller test—whether a work is obscene is determined by:

(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

However, the Court intended for this test to label only graphic, "hard-core" pornography as obscene, as reflected in the Court's reversal of an obscenity conviction for a showing of the film Carnal Knowledge in Jenkins v. Georgia. At the same time, the Court expanded its recognition of First Amendment protections for a variety of forms of entertainment. As a result, only a small portion of pornographic materials could be restricted under Miller's strict reading of obscenity law.

Eventually (if somewhat reluctantly), the Court recognized explicitly that nude dancing was entitled to some level of First Amendment protection. In California v. LaRue, the Court first acknowledged that nude dancing might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. Nine years later the Court suggested in Schad v. Mt. Ephraim that "nude dancing is not without its

__Pornography._ They contained explicit drawings and pictures of groups of two or more people engaging in explicit sexual activities, with genitals often showing. _Id._ at 18.

40 Id. at 24-25.

41 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 ("Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law ... "); Simon, _supra_ note 8, at 193 ("The Court has used the Miller test to deny First Amendment protection only to the most sexually explicit and hard-core pornography.").

42 See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) ("We hold that the film could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that it is therefore not outside the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it is obscene.").


First Amendment protections from official regulation. 45 Finally, in *Barnes*, eight Justices agreed that nude dancing is expressive conduct whose regulation requires First Amendment analysis. 46

**B. Content Discrimination Analysis**

To best understand the evolution of this doctrine and its distortion in *City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.*, it is helpful to be familiar with the content-based/content-neutral distinction, the "primary doctrinal tool employed by the Supreme Court" in First Amendment analysis. 47 The Court most often applies a "motivational" or "government purpose" inquiry to determine whether a law was passed because the government disagreed with a particular message, as well as to gauge what level of scrutiny should be applied to the regulation. 48

Briefly, content-based laws restrict expression based on the specific message conveyed; 49 these can include laws that restrict a specific

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46 See *Barnes v. Glen Theatre*, 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (describing nude dancing as "within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though ... only marginally so"); *id.* at 581 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[W]hen nudity is combined with expressive activity, its stimulative and attractive value certainly can enhance the force of expression... [A]n interest in freely engaging in the nude dancing at issue here is subject to a degree of First Amendment protection."); *id.* at 587-88 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that dancing "[i]nherently... is the communication of emotion or ideas"). Only Justice Scalia argued that nude dancing did not deserve First Amendment protection: "It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a general law regulating conduct pass normal First Amendment scrutiny . . . ." *Id.* at 576.
48 Hudson, supra note 14, at 58-59; see also *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration." (citation omitted)).
49 Hudson, supra note 14, at 58 n.13 ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based.") (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)).
subject matter on their face (e.g., banning the publishing of a magazine on the subject of guns) and laws that narrowly proscribe a particular viewpoint (e.g., banning pro-gun control magazines). Prior to Renton v. Playtime Theatres, content-based statutes always received strict scrutiny, even if they only restricted the time, place, or manner of expression.

In contrast, content-neutral laws are not intended on their face to suppress a message, although they may have inadvertent restrictive effects on expression. The two most common forms of content-neutral laws are time, place, or manner restrictions and incidental regulations of symbolic speech. Importantly, the Supreme Court originally established different tests for these two types of content-neutral regulations.

1. Time, Place, or Manner Regulation Test

A time, place, or manner restriction ("TPM")—which by definition is not a total ban—is content-neutral if it meets three criteria. First, the government must have a substantial interest in the regulation that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas; second, the means must be narrowly tailored to the goal of the regulation; and finally, reasonable alternative avenues of expression must be left open. The tailoring requirement means that the regulation must merely "promote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent regulation"—not that it be the "least restrictive means" available. Furthermore, the TPM test requires that reasonable alternative avenues be made available for expression that is due

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51 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (applying strict scrutiny and striking down an ordinance banning movies containing nudity from outdoor drive-in movie theaters); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny and striking down an ordinance banning picketing near schools).
52 Hudson, supra note 14, at 60.
53 See generally Stone, Content-Neutral, supra note 47; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 47.
54 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217 (holding that the means employed by a city ordinance banning films containing nudity from drive-in theaters are overbroad with respect to the legitimate interests asserted as the goals of the regulation); Williams, supra note 47, at 642 n.118 (collecting cases).
55 Williams, supra note 47, at 643-44 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
some sort of First Amendment protection.

2. Incidental Burden/Symbolic Speech Test

Symbolic speech occurs when the expressive element of communication is conveyed through non-verbal speech (action), and the "speech" and "non-speech" elements are combined in the same expressive action. In order to qualify as speech, the conduct must be intended to be communicative and the message conveyed must be reasonably understood by the viewer. In United States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court created a four-part test for content-neutral laws that create an incidental burden on symbolic speech. In O'Brien, the Court reviewed the conviction of a man for burning his draft card in violation of federal law. An "incidental" restriction is allowed under O'Brien if (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Furthermore, the Court clarified in Grayned v. City of Rockford that, in determining reasonableness under the fourth prong, "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."

3. Collapse of the Two Standards

While the tests may appear similar at first glance, they are distinct in several ways. First, the Court created the O'Brien test in the face of the preexisting TPM test—signaling an intention to create a distinct standard. Second, the TPM test's tailoring requirement is substantially weaker than the parallel requirement in the O'Brien test—it does not require that the restriction be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the governmental] interest." Third, the TPM test requires consideration of "alternative avenues of speech," a prong

56 Id. at 644; Simon, supra note 8, at 196.
60 See Williams, supra note 47, at 648-50 (explaining the different origins of the two doctrinal tests).
61 Id. at 648 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
framework. The Court first faced the question of whether a city may use zoning regulations to single out adult-oriented businesses in Young v. American Mini Theatres.

The regulation at issue in American Mini Theatres required that an adult-oriented business could not be located within one thousand feet of any two other "regulated uses" (ten types of establishments, including adult theaters) or within five hundred feet of any area zoned for residential use. The ordinance itself did not distinguish between establishments presenting "obscene" material and those presenting "non-obscene" pornographic material under Miller. The Supreme Court, in upholding the regulation, admitted that the law—both facially and in its operation—deliberately placed a burden on a type of expression specifically because of its content.

Despite this reality, the Court declined to apply the strict scrutiny normally required for content-based regulations and instead applied the lower standard of scrutiny pegged to content-neutral regulations. The Court accepted the City of Detroit's argument that the goal of the ordinance was not to target any particular subject matter because of the subject matter itself, but rather was to prevent the deterioration of

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67 For a detailed account of such efforts and reaction by the lower federal courts, see id., discussing local governments' uses of TPM restrictions; Simon, supra note 8, at 197-99, discussing the Supreme Court's application of TPM restrictions, particularly the requirement that content neutrality be aimed at negative secondary effects.

68 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For general discussion of this case, see also Malmer, supra note 12, at 1296-97, which generally discusses Young and notes that the Court's holding relied on the fact that the statute was content-neutral and that erotic material, although protected under the First Amendment, receives a lesser degree of protection; Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating Home-Based Voyeur Websites Through Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 929, 958-60 (2001), which discusses Young and its holding that the statute in question was permissible as being viewpoint neutral and that the rights at stake regarding sexual speech were deserving of a lower degree of First Amendment protection; Williams, supra note 47, at 629-32, which generally discusses Young and uses it as an example of the fact that the Supreme Court does not apply the content discrimination principle broadly; McDonald, supra note 10, at 349-46, which discusses the application of TPM restrictions in Young and determines that local governments relying on such restrictions will ultimately have to demonstrate the negative secondary effects adult entertainment has on the community in order to prevail; Simon, supra note 8, at 197-98, which discusses Young and its holding that zoning restrictions are permissible when viewpoint neutral.

69 Here this term encompassed adult bookstores and motion picture theaters.

70 Id. at 52.
71 Id. at 63.
72 Williams, supra note 47, at 629; see Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1238 (noting that Justice Stevens declined to apply strict scrutiny and holding that a lesser scrutiny is appropriate "on the basis of its content as long as it does not violate . . . 'neutrality.'").
completely absent from the *O'Brien* analysis.\(^{62}\)

Despite this segregated development, the Supreme Court has confusingly but effectively collapsed these two tests into a single, lenient test.\(^{63}\) In *Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence*, the Court explicitly stated that there was "little, if any" difference between the TPM test and the *O'Brien* test and sustained an incidental burden regulation under a loose, combined standard.\(^{64}\) The Court saw fit to justify this metamorphosis:

\[
\text{[I]f the time, place, or manner restriction on expressive sleeping ... sufficiently and narrowly serves a substantial enough governmental interest to escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable to invalidate it under *O'Brien* on the ground that the governmental interest is insufficient to warrant the intrusion on First Amendment concerns or that there is an inadequate nexus between the regulation and the interest sought to be served.}\]

Until *Pap's*, no dissenters drew attention to this doctrinal collapse.

C. Application of the Content Discrimination Framework and Development of Secondary Effects Doctrine

1. Doctrinal Shift in *Young v. American Mini Theatres*

Soon after it became clear that the *Miller* test would not support bans of nonobscene adult entertainment, local governments began to use time, place, or manner zoning restrictions\(^{66}\) to restrict adult entertainment establishments, and they sought to justify such laws as content-neutral within the Court’s content discrimination analytical

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\(^{62}\) *Id.*

\(^{63}\) *Id.* at 650-55 (detailing "the collapse of the two lines of doctrine"); see, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-17 (1984) (applying the *O'Brien* standard to a classic TPM regulation); see also David S. Day, *The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause*, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 211-27 (1987) (discussing the hybridization of the two tests and whether or not such a step was warranted).


\(^{65}\) *Id.* at 298 n.8; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-800 (1989) (noting that the Court in *Clark* held *O'Brien* to apply standards no different from those applied to TPM restrictions and reaffirming that holding).

\(^{66}\) For a description of other means that local governments have used to restrict adult-oriented businesses, including alcohol restrictions and licensing, see Malmer, *supra* note 12, at 1281-304 (discussing cases in which local governments have attempted to limit adult entertainment through alcohol restrictions pursuant to regulatory powers conferred by the Twenty-First Amendment, TPM restrictions, and licensing restrictions).
urban neighborhoods caused by the aggregation of adult-oriented businesses.\footnote{American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 54-55.} These "secondary effects,"\footnote{See id. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J.) (noting that the ordinance is intended to avoid secondary effects, such as deterioration and crime, that accompany the establishment of adult theaters).} the Court held, were not related to the suppression of expression.

Scholar David Hudson suggests that the Court neatly "substituted 'viewpoint-neutrality' for 'content-neutrality'"\footnote{Hudson, supra note 14, at 62 (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70).} by concluding that the regulation met constitutional muster "because it [did] not restrict a certain "social, political, or philosophical message' or 'point of view.'"\footnote{Id. at 62 (citing Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)); see also Malmer, supra note 12, at 1296-97 ("The majority also stressed that although the ordinance was not content neutral, it was viewpoint neutral.").} Furthermore, the plurality supported the application of content-neutral analysis by asserting that nonobscene pornographic speech was of low value: "[S]ociety's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . . ."\footnote{American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 84, 87 (Stewart J., dissenting).} In a sharp dissent, Justice Stewart characterized this shift as an "aberration" that was "a drastic departure from established principles of First Amendment law."\footnote{Williams, supra note 47, at 630.}

2. Development of Secondary Effects Doctrine
Through City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres

After holding prevention of harmful secondary effects—"non-communicative effects arising from the speech as a physical event in the world, not from the communicative aspect of the speech"\footnote{See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986) (stating the result was "largely dictated by our decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres"). For a detailed analysis of Renton, see Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1238-41, which discusses Renton generally and notes its reliance on Young in permitting TPM restrictions that are content-neutral, but then changes the analysis of content neutrality to focus on secondary effects; Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1907-12; Ortiz, supra note 68, at 960-61, which discusses Renton and notes its holding that a statute can be permissible as content-neutral if its purpose is to prevent undesirable secondary effects.}—to be a valid government intention, the Court reaffirmed its permissive purposive analysis in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres.\footnote{See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986) (stating the result was "largely dictated by our decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres"). For a detailed analysis of Renton, see Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1238-41, which discusses Renton generally and notes its reliance on Young in permitting TPM restrictions that are content-neutral, but then changes the analysis of content neutrality to focus on secondary effects; Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1907-12; Ortiz, supra note 68, at 960-61, which discusses Renton and notes its holding that a statute can be permissible as content-neutral if its purpose is to prevent undesirable secondary effects.} As Susan Wil-
Williams concludes, "[a]fter Renton, it was clear that the Court had adopted the secondary effects analysis and its underlying purposive theory of content discrimination."\(^8^1\)

The ordinance at issue prohibited any "adult motion picture theaters from locating within [one thousand] feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school," but did not regulate any other types of adult-oriented businesses.\(^8^2\) The American Mini Theatres plurality had concluded that the Detroit ordinance in question was content-based, but nevertheless was entitled to less scrutiny based on the low value of the speech and secondary effects. The Renton Court advanced that proposition two dramatic steps further in holding the Renton ordinance to be constitutional.\(^8^3\)

First, the Court—while admitting the law facially discriminated against adult theaters—held for the first time that such an ordinance was content-neutral: "[T]he Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'"\(^8^4\) As such, the plurality invoked the TPM test and held that the ordinance both satisfied a substantial government interest and did not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.\(^8^5\) The vehicle the Court rode to this destination was the now fully-enunciated secondary effects doctrine. The City of Renton had claimed that its purpose in passing the ordinance was to combat secondary effects and to protect and preserve "the quality of its neigh-

\(^8^1\) Williams, supra note 47, at 632.
\(^8^2\) Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
\(^8^3\) David Hudson notes that Renton has been sharply criticized by legal commentators. See Hudson, supra note 14, at 65-66 (noting that Renton has been criticized as substantially revising First Amendment doctrine and as taking a wholly unprecedented approach to the understanding of content neutrality); see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 15, at \(\S\) 12-19, at 952 ("The Renton view should be quickly renounced. Carried to its logical conclusion, such a doctrine could gravely erode the first amendment's protections."); Rohr, supra note 47, at 452 ("[Renton is] a wholly unprecedented approach to the understanding of content-neutrality"); Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1908 ("Construed expansively to encompass viewpoint-specific resolutions, Renton substantially revises first amendment doctrine."); The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 196 (1986) [hereinafter Leading Cases] ("This reasoning marks a startling break with traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.").
\(^8^4\) See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 ("To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.").
borhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life." For the Renton majority, the ordinance was not aimed at adult theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.

Second, as Gianni Servodidio cogently observes, Renton extended the secondary effects doctrine beyond the scope of American Mini Theatres in several ways. First, the Court ruled that the City of Renton did not have to develop any specific, independent evidentiary basis to support its secondary effects purpose claim. The Court held Renton could simply use evidence already generated by other cities "so long as [it] is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." This profoundly lax standard allowed Renton—a city of 32,000 people that did not even have an adult theater when the ordinance was passed—to use evidence gathered in Seattle and Detroit as evidence of Renton's need to combat secondary effects that did not yet exist. Second, in a departure from American Mini Theatres, the Court demonstrated a willingness to allow the secondary effects rationale to profoundly restrict the availability of alternative avenues of expression. The American Mini Theatres Court had relied in part on the fact that the ordinance left "myriad locations" where theaters could operate without violating the ordinance. The Renton ordinance, in sharp contrast, left only a small area of virtually unusable land open to use for adult theaters—a difference the Court was willing to ignore as mere conditions of the real estate market. The Court was unwilling to consider the imposition of what could be

87 Renton, 475 U.S. at 58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
88 See id. at 47 (approving the district court's characterization of the ordinance as aimed not at the content of the films but at the secondary effects); see also Hudson, supra note 14, at 64-66 (noting that the court, while relying on Young, expanded the doctrine to encompass the secondary effects on which it based its decision); Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1240-42 ("[T]he City Council's actions were not justified on the basis of the content of sexually explicit films but rather on the secondary effects adult theaters would have on the surrounding community.").
89 Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1240-41.
90 Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
91 Id. at 44.
92 See Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1241-42 (noting that Renton, by allowing an ordinance that substantially limited the amount of real estate available, thereby restricted alternate avenues of expression).
94 Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
95 See id. at 54 (stating that "respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees").
termed a "major competitive disadvantage" on adult theater owners as a compelling argument for strict scrutiny. These remarkable secondary effects extensions directly precipitated Barnes.


The U.S. Supreme Court heard *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.* after an en banc Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held an Indiana public indecency statute to be an unconstitutional restriction on express nude dancing. While the ordinances at issue in *American Mini Theatres* and *Renton* were zoning laws (location restrictions imposed on businesses), the Indiana statute at issue in *Barnes* banned all nudity in public and thus involved a direct restriction on nude dancing itself. The law could only be satisfied if dancers wore pasties and a G-string.

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96 Servodidio, *supra* note 13, at 1241; see Simon, *supra* note 8, at 201 ("Despite the Court's refusal to disturb the trial court's finding that other land was available to establish an adult business, it may have in fact created 'a major competitive disadvantage' . . ." (citations omitted)).

97 Laurence Tribe feared this result when, after *Renton*, he suggested that the secondary effects doctrine could "gravely erode the first amendment's protections" and subject "most, if not all" speech to regulation. TRIBE, *supra* note 15, at § 12-19, at 952; see also Leading Cases, *supra* note 83, at 200 ("[Renton] has opened the door to restrictions of all speech on the basis of contrived secondary effects.").

98 See Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Indiana's attempt to ban nude dancing in pursuit of its aforementioned interest is a forbidden interference and restraint because it seeks to withdraw this non-obscene and protected communication from the realm of public discourse."), rev'd, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). For a careful analysis of the vivid dialogue between Judges Posner and Easterbrook in this case, see Blasi, *supra* note 13, at 625-39.

99 See Hudson, *supra* note 14, at 67-68 ("While *American Mini Theatres* and *Renton* involved the concentration or dispersal of adult businesses, 'the essence of zoning,' *Barnes* involved a direct restriction on the nature of exotic dancing . . ." (citation omitted)).

100 The Indiana Code provided in relevant part:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
1. engages in sexual intercourse;
2. engages in deviate sexual conduct;
3. appears in a state of nudity; or
4. fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.

(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernably turgid state.

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (1988) (current version codified with some differences in
Although the Court's decision was fractured and no more than three Justices agreed on any one rationale, eight of the nine Justices answered the threshold question of whether nude dancing constituted expressive conduct in the affirmative. The plurality opinion came to this conclusion reluctantly, admitting it was protected, but "only marginally so." The plurality then proceeded to characterize nude dancing as symbolic speech deserving of analysis under the O'Brien test. This was a marked departure from precedent.

To accomplish this shift, the plurality had to ignore cases such as Schad, American Mini Theatres, and Renton, which recognized the inherent expressive quality of adult entertainment. The plurality declined to apply the TPM analysis requested by Indiana, concluding that it was developed for "evaluating restrictions on expression taking place on public property which had been dedicated as a 'public forum.'" The Court then disposed of the Renton precedent by noting that "although we have on at least one occasion applied it to conduct occurring on private property," the two tests "embody much the same standards" anyway. As commentator Timothy Tesluk shrewdly suggests, "[b]y giving no reason for its departure from settled precedent in the classification of dancing, the Barnes plurality legitimized an exclusive language at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (1998)), quoted in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 n.2 (1991).

101 In fact, two concurring Justices "went out of their way to avoid having to endorse Chief Justice Rehnquist's [plurality opinion]." Blasi, supra note 13, at 639; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572-81 (Scalia, J., concurring) (upholding the regulation not because it survives a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, but because regulating conduct not specifically directed at expression is not generally subject to First Amendment scrutiny); id. at 581-87 (Souter, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality's application of the O'Brien test and noting that the activity in question is subject to some degree of First Amendment protection, but writing separately to express his view that the case should be decided principally on the state's interest in "combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment").

102 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66. For a detailed examination of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 639-44, which examines Rehnquist's enthusiastic approval of the enforcement of morality as a justification for regulating speech.

103 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566-68. But see id. at 596 (White, J., dissenting) ("[The plurality and Justice Scalia] would eviscerate the O'Brien test."). For a detailed discussion of Justice White's dissent, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 655-61, which examines Justice White's skepticism toward legal claims of a symbolic and unspecific character.

104 See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (applying a TPM analysis to an ordinance regulating the zoning of adult theaters).

105 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.

106 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).

107 Id.
focus on conduct, and not communication, in the crucial first step of First Amendment analysis speech classification.\textsuperscript{108} The Court then applied the "legislature-friendly"\textsuperscript{109} O'Brien test, which, importantly, does not require the adequate alternative channels of communication requirement of the TPM test—in effect leaving open the possibility of a total ban on some expressive conduct.

The majority's splintered rationales are reflected keenly in their O'Brien analyses. The plurality concluded that the substantial government interest required by O'Brien was the interest in "protecting societal order and morality,"\textsuperscript{110} buoyed by a lengthy Indiana common law history of prohibiting indecency. In doing so, the plurality relied on several cases unrelated to First Amendment-protected conduct,\textsuperscript{111} and admitted that it was impossible to actually know what the legislature intended because Indiana does not record legislative history.\textsuperscript{112} The plurality then concluded that the law was "unrelated to the suppression of expression" because it was a general law aimed at all nudity.\textsuperscript{113}

Justice Souter's concurrence opened another permissive door to

\textsuperscript{108} Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1111. Tesluk argues that this approach "substitutes assertion for proof and avoids the core question concerning any alleged First Amendment activity: does the activity involve communication?" and suggests that by focusing their argument in this way, the plurality encouraged "courts to 'categorize an apparently limitless variety' of speech as conduct, thereby leading to 'reduced' or non-existent First Amendment protection." Id.; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567 ("[A] sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating non-speech element[s] can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1967))).

\textsuperscript{109} Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1112.

\textsuperscript{110} Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568.

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 569 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).

\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 567-68.

\textsuperscript{113} See id. at 570-71 ("[The law] does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity."). Gianni Servodio argues that "the breaking down of conduct into its component parts" used effectively in O'Brien proves problematic in application to the expression in Barnes. Servodio, supra note 13, at 1250-51. In O'Brien, the case clearly involved speech and nonspeech elements, and O'Brien's conviction was based on the non-communicative aspect of his conduct. In Barnes, however, the conduct in question had been previously held by the Supreme Court to have inherently expressive attributes. See id. at 1250 (discussing the plurality's demonstrated "discomfort with its earlier holding regarding the Constitutionality of nude dance"). But see Barnes, 501 U.S. at 589-90 (White, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the characterization of the Indiana statute as a "general law" since it does not apply to nudity in performances of theatrical productions, plays, ballets, or operas).
local governments.114 Differing from the plurality’s rationale, Justice Souter’s justification for the “substantial government interest” was the deterrence of “pernicious secondary effects” (such as “prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes”) as advanced in Renton.115 Since the law was aimed directly at these secondary effects, and not the suppression of expression, it survived Justice Souter’s O’Brien analysis because he doubted whether there was a causal connection between “the expression inherent in nude dancing” and the evils the State was seeking to prevent.116 Most importantly, Souter determined that a local government need not “await localized proof of those effects” and that Indiana could “reasonably conclude” there was a direct correlation without knowing “what the precise causes of the correlation really are.”117 Therefore, Souter implicitly sanctioned the application of Renton’s secondary effects justification for zoning TPM restrictions to satisfy the potential total suppression of expression as an incidental effect of a general law under O’Brien.118 Finally, Justice Scalia argued against application of O’Brien at all: “It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a

114 For a detailed examination of Justice Souter’s opinion, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 649-55, which examines Souter’s desire to search for limiting principles in the secondary effects doctrine.

115 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring) (relying on Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).

116 Id. at 585-86 (Souter, J., concurring). But see id. at 593 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (“If Justice Souter is correct . . . the State does not have even a rational basis for its absolute prohibition on nude dancing that is admittedly expressive.”); id. at 594 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that if the State’s interest was really in preventing evils like prostitution, the State should adopt restrictions that do not interfere with the expressive nature of nonobscene nude dance instead of “[b]anning an entire category of expressive activity”).

117 Id. at 584-86 (Souter, J., concurring).

118 See Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1119 (“Justice Souter would regard the experiences and findings of any American municipality as presumptively valid in a determination of the non-causal link between a particular expressive activity and negative secondary effects.”). Timothy Tesluk asserts that, under Souter’s analysis, the government must suppress the expressive performances that correlate with negative secondary effects as opposed to being related to the expression (which would fail O’Brien’s third prong)—a rationally questionable distinction. Id. at 1120-21. Given the difficulty in differentiating between the two, Tesluk concludes that Justice Souter effectively gives a free pass on the third prong. Id. at 1121 (“Under Justice Souter’s correlation analysis, states are essentially immune from an attack under the third prong of O’Brien because of the extreme difficulty of determining whether a speech prohibition is related or merely ‘correlated’ to the suppression of free expression.”). Vincent Blasi notes that Justice Souter made no attempt to explain how the pasties and G-string requirement “could be thought, even speculatively, to have any incremental impact on the secondary effects he had posited.” Blasi, supra note 13, at 654.
general law regulating conduct pass normal First Amendment scrutiny, or even . . . that it be justified by an 'important or substantial' government interest."\(^{119}\) The outcome of the Barnes decision was swift and dramatic—it "engendered an assault on the adult entertainment industry."\(^{120}\) Unquestionably, it entrenched a lower level of scrutiny for restrictions on adult entertainment. But it also left courts with no clear guidance as to how best to justify restrictive general laws.\(^{121}\) Aside from advancing three sharply different rationales, Barnes' result is confusing and internally contradictory: while the Court feels constrained by precedent to admit that nude dancing is protected expression, it then "label[s] nudity a noncommunicative component of some undefined whole."\(^{122}\) Nine years later, the Court was asked to articulate a more cohesive decisional framework in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.\(^{123}\)

III. APPLICATION OF NUDE DANCING DOCTRINE IN CITY OF ERIE V. PAP'S A.M.

In upholding the constitutionality of the City of Erie ordinance

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\(^{119}\) Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia based his argument on the fact that the law at issue was a general law not specifically targeted at expressive conduct, and that the "First Amendment explicitly protects 'the freedom of speech [and] of the press'—oral and written speech—not 'expressive conduct.'" Id. at 576. For a detailed examination of Justice Scalia's opinion, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 644-49, which examines Scalia's rejection of the notion that nude dancing enjoys constitutional protection.

\(^{120}\) Hudson, supra note 14, at 73. See, e.g., id. at 77-79 (highlighting twenty-seven widely varied types of secondary effects used to justify restrictions on expression). Barnes also spurred laws not related to adult entertainment. See Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1122 (observing that, in the year following Barnes, only four of the thirteen decisions citing Barnes have involved nude dancing performed as entertainment).

\(^{121}\) See Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1121-22 (suggesting seven ways Barnes weakened and confused the right to free expression).

\(^{122}\) Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1254; see also id. at 1254 n.162 ("Attempts to determine which element 'predominales' will therefore inevitably degenerate into question-begging judgments about whether the activity should be protected." (quoting John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975))). This conclusion is especially confusing given the Court's prior conclusion in Schad that "'nudity alone' does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment." Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)).

\(^{123}\) The Sixth Circuit demonstrated this need when it complained that following Supreme Court precedent in this area was limited to "reading the tea leaves of Barnes." Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994).
outlawing public nudity, the Pap's Court took another dramatic step toward applying low-level scrutiny and allowing municipalities to effectively suppress nude dancing. Critically, however, the Court once again failed to achieve more than an embattled plurality to endorse its revised rationale. Justice Scalia's fifth-vote concurrence displayed overt skepticism toward the plurality's reasoning, while Justice Souter—member of the Barnes majority and original architect of the secondary effects doctrine now adopted by the plurality—questioned a significant portion of his Barnes concurrence in dissent. Despite the Court's continued problems with mustering a convincing majority, the plurality made several substantial strides in its opinion. It emphatically strengthened the content-neutral analysis enunciated in Barnes, while at the same time it adopted the secondary effects justification of Justice Souter's Barnes concurrence as its overriding rationale. Both of these movements significantly altered the landscape of nude dancing First Amendment doctrine.

After disposing of the issue of justiciability, the plurality began by acknowledging precedents that hold nude dancing to be expressive

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124 For the text of the ordinance, see supra note 22.
126 Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer joined the plurality opinion with respect to nude dancing doctrine. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 282.
127 Id. at 302-10 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should have been dismissed as moot and disagreeing with the Court's mode of analysis on the merits).
128 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581-87 (Souter, J., concurring).
129 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 316 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that his "partial dissent rested on a demand for an evidentiary basis" that he failed to make in Barnes). Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice Ginsburg, authored a stinging partial dissent in part that attacked every aspect of the plurality opinion:

Under today's opinion, a State may totally ban speech based on its secondary effects—which are defined as those effects that "happen to be associated" with speech . . . . Because the category of effects that "happen to be associated" with speech includes the narrower subset of effects caused by speech, today's holding has the effect of swallowing whole a most fundamental principle of First Amendment jurisprudence.

Id. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988)).
130 Id. at 289 ("Although the issue is close, we conclude that the case is not moot."). Note that support for the mootness holding came from Justice Souter's partial concurrence in part; Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, sharply disagreed with this aspect of the plurality opinion. Id. at 302 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The case before us here is moot.").
conduct but ignored the scope of those holdings by concluding that nude dancing "falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection." Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor then "clarified" Barnes and held definitively that government restrictions on public nudity should be evaluated under the "less stringent" O'Brien test for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech if the city's purpose was unrelated to the protected expression. The ordinance at issue, the plurality concluded, was fundamentally similar to that in Barnes—a general prohibition that does not target nudity containing an erotic message.

Importantly—and unlike Barnes—the plurality made this determination in the face of evidence directly to the contrary. In the preamble of the ordinance, the Erie City Council explicitly stated its purpose as "limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City." Justice Stevens' reading of the record revealed that a "near obsessive preoccupation" with nude dancing clubs was evident in City Council records. Furthermore, counsel for the City stipulated to the trial court that nudity in theater productions would not be prevented. The ordinance was specifically targeted at nude dancing establishments with regard to both its "applicable scope and the city's enforcement."

The plurality ignored this evidence of content discrimination in favor of another governmental purpose—combating negative secon-

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131 Id. at 289 (relying on Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66, which viewed nude dancing as only marginally "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment").
132 Id.
133 For a detailed explanation of why the Erie ordinance differs from the Indiana law in Barnes, see id. at 325-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens stated: "Several differences between the Erie ordinance and the statute at issue in Barnes belie the Court's assertion that the two laws are 'almost identical.'"
134 See id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[B]oth the text of the ordinance and the reasoning in the Court's opinion make it pellucidly clear that the city of Erie has prohibited nude dancing 'precisely because of its communicative attributes.'" (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment))).
135 Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Justice Stevens) (quoting the preamble to the ordinance).
136 See id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We should not stretch to embrace fanciful explanations when the most natural reading of the ordinance unmistakably identifies its intended target.").
137 See id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A]s stipulated in the record, the city permitted a production of Equus to proceed without prosecution, even after the ordinance was in effect, and despite its awareness of the nudity involved.").
138 Id.
secondary effects. Justice O'Connor classified such evidence—no matter how obvious—to be that of only an "alleged illicit motive" into which the Court chose not to inquire. Rather, the plurality independently designated the suppression of secondary effects as the predominate purpose of the ordinance. Furthermore, while the Court went to great lengths to distinguish between regulations targeting the primary effects of nude dancing—the effect on the audience—and those targeting secondary effects, such as impacts on public health, safety, and welfare, it offered virtually no explanation of why the two purposes are not inherently related. Perhaps recognizing this quandary, Justice O'Connor analogized the Erie ordinance to the factual situations in O'Brien, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, and Ward v. Rock Against Racism—symbolic speech cases where general laws had incidental effects on expression. Justice O'Connor concluded that, although it does have an effect on protected speech, the instant case is similar because it produces only a de minimis effect on the overall expression by requiring the wearing of pasties and G-strings, and that such "de minimis intrusions on expression . . . cannot be sufficient to render an ordinance content based." Justice O'Connor noted further that a city is justified in enacting an ordinance that bans public nudity to combat the secondary effects that may result while simultaneously singling out one specific example of public nudity (e.g., nude dancing) as particularly problematic. As such, the plurality left itself in a confusing position. After concluding that the intent of the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of expression under the secondary effects rationale, the plurality also attempted to justify the ordinance by claiming its suppression of expression was minimal.

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139 Id. at 292 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (noting that the "Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive").

140 Id. at 290-92 ("[T]he ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combating crime and other negative secondary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments . . . and not at suppressing the erotic messages conveyed by this type of nude dancing.").


143 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 294.

144 Id. at 295 ("[T]here is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to ban public nudity . . . and at the same time recognizing that one specific occurrence of public nudity—nude erotic dancing—is particularly problematic because it produces harmful secondary effects.").
In addition, the plurality, for the first time, used the secondary effects doctrine to justify restrictions other than the time, place, or manner of operation of a commercial enterprise—in this case, by upholding a general law that has the effect of a total ban on protected expression. Moreover, Justice O'Connor for the first time coupled a secondary effects justification with the more permissive O'Brien symbolic speech test instead of the TPM test used in American Mini Theatres and Renton. While the plurality advanced a weak argument that the ordinance was not actually a total ban (i.e., there is little difference between fully nude and pasties/G-string), there is no question that it did not object to such a ban where it enthusiastically utilized the O'Brien test, which does not require that any ample alternatives exist. In doing so—in the words of Professor Arnold Loewy—the court "subtly but completely, transmogrifies low value speech into no value speech or nonspeech."
Applying the O'Brien test led the plurality to the rapid conclusion that the Erie ordinance passed constitutional muster in the same manner as the Indiana statute in Barnes did. Justice O'Connor found the first prong—whether the government exercised authority pursuant to the Constitution—was satisfied by Erie’s police power to protect public health and safety. To fulfill the important or substantial governmental interest prong (the second prong), the plurality found that Erie could have “reasonably relied” on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and American Mini Theatres to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood. Justice O'Connor credited the city council members’ “expert judgment,” contained in findings made over the course of a century about the negative effects of “lewd, immoral” activities as sufficient justification of the governmental interest required by O'Brien. Next, the plurality’s analysis of O'Brien’s third prong—whether government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression—grew even more def-

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something is wrong here. If speech is protected, even low value speech, it cannot be precluded because it is immoral.” Id. at 219. He concludes by suggesting that “[l]ow value speech, properly conceived, provides an important detente for utterances that are worthy of some constitutional protection, but are not the functional equivalent of full value political speech. . . . Stripped of its misuses, low value speech should be celebrated as a means to protect both free speech and society.” Id. at 225.

John F. Wirenius exposes the fruitlessness of this type of speech value paradox: “[T]he center needs to be fleshed out, both in terms of its justifications, and in application across the board. This means weeding out the false conflicts—discarding the nonsense about ‘high-’ and ‘low-’ value speech in favor of a functional approach to the First Amendment.” JOHN F. WIRENIUS, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES: VERBAL ACTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 123 (2000); see also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW 219-20 (1990) (arguing a basic thesis that free speech caselaw has become “pathologically complex,” and that the scope of coverage of the Free Speech Clause should be determined by the broadest range of purposes or values that can coherently be thought to underlie the Free Speech Clause).

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150 Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 296-97.
151 Id. at 296.
152 Id. at 297.
153 Justice O’Connor noted:
The preamble to the ordinance states that ‘the Council of the City of Erie has, at various times over more than a century, expressed its findings that certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for profit are highly detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare . . . . The city council members, familiar with commercial downtown Erie, are the individuals who would likely have had firsthand knowledge of what took place at and around nude dancing establishments in Erie, and can make particularized, expert judgments about their resulting secondary effects.

Id. at 297-98.
erential by giving municipalities “sufficient leeway” to combat secondary effects however they see fit, and by deeming empirical data unnecessary since Erie had already shown a substantial government interest and documented its own experience on the issue. Justice O’Connor candidly admitted that “requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly reduce secondary effects,” but asserted that “O’Brien requires only that the regulation further the interest in combating such effects.” Finally, Justice Souter’s concurrence held that the ordinance satisfied O’Brien’s fourth prong—“that the restriction is no greater than essential to the furtherance of the government interest”—by returning to the tenuous argument that the effect of pasties and a G-string is de minimis; the opinion even made the surprising suggestion that other means, such as zoning, would quite possibly be no less of a burden than Erie’s total ban.

Other opinions in the case are notable when contrasted with the plurality’s rationale. Justice Scalia echoed the sentiments of his Barnes concurrence by asserting that it was not the communicative character of nude dancing that provoked the ban and then made the difficult argument that suppressing nude dancing is not the same thing as suppressing what nude dancing communicates. Interestingly, Justice Scalia—who saw no need to apply the secondary effects doctrine at all—saw fit to comment that he is “highly skeptical” that the means chosen by Erie would do anything to further the governmental goal of reducing secondary effects.

Justice Souter also took issue with the plurality’s use of the secondary effects doctrine. In recanting part of his Barnes concurrence,
Justice Souter demanded "some factual justification to connect [secondary effects] with the regulation in issue." Souter argued for an evidentiary basis for both the harm the municipality claims to flow from the expressive activity and the amelioration expected from the restriction imposed. He found no evidence yet established in the record to support either connection. The plurality responded to Justice Souter’s arguments by asserting that Renton was still the controlling precedent on the secondary effects evidentiary standard regardless of the Justice’s change of mind. This sudden fallback on precedent is both ironic and unconvincing given the plurality’s unbiased willingness to ignore far greater precedent belying a total ban on protected adult expression.

IV. DANCING AROUND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE DANGERS OF PAP’S

A. Content Discrimination Analysis and a Potential Total Ban of Protected Expression

Phrased succinctly by Professor Geoffrey Stone, the central concern of traditional content discrimination analysis is whether restrictions, “by limiting the availability of particular means of communication, can significantly impair the ability of individuals to communicate . . . to others.” To the extent that laws impede this end, they “frustrate individual ‘self-fulfillment.’” Professor Cass Sunstein echoed this First Amendment master value when he concluded that “viewpoint restrictions are . . . inconsistent with a central premise of any system of free expression—that the usual remedy for harmful speech is more speech rather than enforced silence.”

Professor Stone argued convincingly in 1983 that the Court’s approach to content-neutral review seemed “a sensible response” to the concern that content-neutral restrictions can diminish the opportuni-

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161 Id. at 311 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 313; see also id. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a titanic surrender to the implausible.”).
163 Id. at 295. But note that Renton employed a TPM analysis, not the more permissive O'Brien test.
164 Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 47, at 193.
165 Id. at 193; see also id. at 193 n.8 (collecting literature on values underlying the First Amendment).
ties for free expression.\textsuperscript{167} That approach allowed the Court to examine carefully restrictions that "seriously threaten" First Amendment rights and to balance them against legitimate governmental interests.\textsuperscript{168} However, even at that early date in the realm of this area of First Amendment jurisprudence, Stone posited that the Court "should be more skeptical of claimed government interests."\textsuperscript{169}

In \textit{Renton}, the Court was willing to characterize a restrictive zoning law as content-neutral because it was justified without reference to the adult content (i.e., based on secondary effects).\textsuperscript{170} However, as a time, place, or manner restriction, the Court applied the more restrictive TPM test—which required ample alternative means of communication—and hinged its decision on the fact that five percent of available zoned land in Renton was still available to adult business owners.\textsuperscript{171} This reasoning dovetails with the primary focus of content discrimination analysis.

The Court's application of content discrimination analysis in \textit{Pap's} has taken the opposite tack. In \textit{Pap's}, the plurality evinced a continued strong desire to view laws that, in effect, restrict adult businesses, as content-neutral. But \textit{Pap's}, like \textit{Barnes}, involved a general law that had the potential to be a total ban on nude adult entertainment. The plurality chose to examine that law under \textit{O'Brien}'s permissive symbolic speech analysis. Viewed in terms of the possibility of a total prohibition, the continued use of the traditional content discrimination analytical framework in such situations is extremely problematic, because it ignores the fundamental concern that \textit{opportunities} for expression be preserved. Even if one were to grant that secondary effects were a legitimate justification for a content-neutral determination under the traditional framework, the \textit{effect} of the law in question undermines the goal of that analysis to the point that it becomes an unten-

\textsuperscript{167}Stone, \textit{Content-Neutral}, supra note 47, at 77.

\textsuperscript{168}\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{169}\textit{Id.} at 79.

\textsuperscript{170}See \textit{City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres}, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school was a valid governmental response to the problems created by adult theaters and satisfied the dictates of the First Amendment, because the ordinance does not bar adult theaters altogether, and therefore was properly analyzed as a form of time, place, or manner regulation).

\textsuperscript{171}\textit{Id.} at 53. The \textit{Renton} Court went so far as to cite a critical passage from \textit{American Mini Theatres} where the Court cautioned against the enactment of regulations that have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." \textit{Id.} at 54 (citing \textit{Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.}, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976)).
able constitutional tool, leading one to doubt whether upholding such a law is the type of "sensible response" of which scholars have previously approved.

One commentator, arguing for a restrictive interpretation of Renton, acknowledged this underlying problem and argued that construing Renton's approval of the secondary effects/content-neutral analysis as limited to only subject-matter restrictions would preserve the central values of the First Amendment. In effect, the Pap's endorsement of the potential total ban of nude dancing by a general nudity law is a type of viewpoint discrimination, not subject-matter discrimination, as in the case of zoning laws that specifically regulate adult businesses. The result of the Pap's general law is that one particular viewpoint (expressive message)—which is communicated by fully nude dancing itself—can be completely suppressed. The Pap's

\[\text{172 See Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1912-17 (arguing that Renton should be construed as limited to only subject-matter-based restrictions on speech, such as time, place, or manner restrictions).}\]

173 Susan Williams offers a concise explanation of the continuum of discrimination in terms of the content category at which a regulation is aimed. She explains how viewpoint discrimination is at the most biased end of the spectrum, while subject-matter restrictions lie in the middle. Williams, supra note 47, at 655-57.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used this rationale when it invalidated an anti-pornography law in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The court of appeals held the law unconstitutional on grounds of viewpoint discrimination because it "established an 'approved' view of women." Id. at 328. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. See Sunstein, supra note 166, at 609 (discussing the court of appeals' rejection of a law that acted as a form of "thought control").

174 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that even if the difference in message between fully nude dancing and dancing with pasties and a G-string is very small, there is still a difference and thus the law restricts a particular viewpoint). The most elegant explanations of the expressive viewpoint of nude dancing over less revealing forms of erotic dance are offered by Judge Richard Posner as part of a concurring opinion in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-104 (7th Cir. 1990). Posner aptly observes that

\[\text{[t]he goal of the striptease—a goal to which the dancing is indispensable—is to enforce the association: to make plain that the performer is not removing her clothes [for other reasons]; to insinuate that she is removing them because she is preparing for, thinking about, and desiring sex. . . . The sequel is left to the viewer's imagination. This is the "tease" in "striptease."}\]

Id. at 1091. Posner expounds on this characterization in Sex and Reason: "[T]here is an implicit narrative which the viewer is left to complete in his imagination. That is why it is important that the striptease not end in a bathing suit, because a bathing suit is for swimming, not for sex. . . . The erotic signal . . . imparts to striptease an unmistakably, and ordinarily a dominant, aphrodisiacal effect." POSNER, supra note 1, at 364 (1992). As Steven Gey appropriately concludes, opponents have "fundamentally misconstrued the nature of pornography and that only by accepting their cropped view of
holding ignores this distinction, and in doing so forgets that "view-
point discrimination poses a more serious threat to [F]irst [A]mendment values: by doing less than it might government some-
times does more than it may."

B. Purposive Theory and Ignorance of Audience Viewpoint

Stemming directly from this first problem is a second danger: that the governmental "purposive" analysis, approved by the Court in Barnes and validated in Pap's, does not devote enough attention to the motive requirement of Renton—that the law be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." By not applying a more reasonable and careful motive analysis, the plurality has aggravated the difficulty in identifying laws that are portrayed as subject-matter restrictions but really are viewpoint restrictions. Professor communication and ideas can their repressive goals be justified." Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1564, 1566 (1988); see also Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd in part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) ("[W]hile the entertain-
tainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who . . . wants some 'entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye."); Judith Lynne Hanna, Dance, Sex and Gender: Signs of Identity, Dominance, Defiance and Desire 22-23 (1988) (discussing the sexuality of dance and its ability to cause vicarious, empathic experiences in its spectators).

176 Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1915. This commentator argues in detail for the vitality of the subject-matter/viewpoint distinction and appropriate, differing levels of scrutiny. See id. at 1913-17; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 83-88 (1978) (examining the Courts' varying approaches to dealing with challenges to content-based restrictions and the distinction between subject matter and viewpoint regulations). But see Sunstein, supra note 166, at 612-13 (arguing that antipornography legislation is aimed at harms, not viewpoint, and that Renton should be read to focus the analysis on content, not viewpoint).


Sunstein (although admittedly arguing against viewing anti-pornography regulations as viewpoint restrictions) suggests that "[w]hether a classification is viewpoint-based thus ultimately turns on the viewpoint of the decisionmaker." If so, the Pap's Court, by refusing to engage in a thorough motive investigation, foreclosed the possibility of an accurate viewpoint restriction determination.

In response, Elena Kagan argues that the content-based/content-neutral distinction implicitly flushes out improper purposes. While that may be true elsewhere, it appears to have failed dramatically in the case of nude dancing, where the Pap's Court made its content-neutral determination in the face of direct evidence of improper motive. In Pap's, there was clear evidence that the Erie City Council not only passed the ordinance for the express purpose of targeting and reducing the number of nude dancing establishments, but that it also intended to enforce the general nudity law solely against such establishments. The Preamble to the Erie ordinance specifically stated that the "Council specifically wishes to adopt the concept of Public Indecency prohibited by the laws of the State of Indiana . . . for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in the nude live entertainment within the City." Furthermore, City of Erie Counsel stipulated that mainstream theater productions involving nudity would be allowed to continue undeterred.

While no such positive evidence existed in Barnes, the Pap's plurality—when directly confronted with it—declined to consider the extrinsic evidence of improper motive. But the plurality glaringly

\[\text{Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1854, 1867-72 (1983) (arguing for an alternative approach).}\]

178 Sunstein, supra note 166, at 615; see also Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance 18-19 (1990) (noting that an "analysis of the first amendment can not be reduced to a concern about government motives").

179 See Kagan, supra note 176, at 451 (contending, in fact, that flushing out improper purpose is a goal of the doctrine).

180 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 327 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 42a, City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (1999) (No. 98-1161)).

181 Id. at 327-29; see also id. at 328 (Stephens, J., dissenting) ("As presented to us, the ordinance is deliberately targeted at Kandyland's type of nude dancing (to the exclusion of plays like Equus), in terms of both its applicable scope and the city's enforcement.").

182 See id. at 292 ("[T]his Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive."). Justice Stevens took issue with what he characterized as an overbroad interpretation of O'Brien. He suggested that what O'Brien actually stated was that a law would not be struck down on the assumption of a wrongful purpose or motive. He also indicated that there was no need to do so in the instant case because the unambiguous statements of the city council members were
failed to acknowledge that in light of such evidence, the law might not have been "otherwise constitutional," since the truth about it would have been revealed: it was really a viewpoint restriction that required strict scrutiny. This blissful ignorance (or deliberate unwillingness to address the issue) is frustrating; it disguises the real question of constitutionality by skipping the spirit of Renton's crucial motive analysis altogether. Narrowly defined, Renton does not permit the circumvention of strict scrutiny adopted by the plurality in Pap's.185

Part and parcel of this problem is the Court's continued refusal to include an analysis of discrimination from the audience viewpoint in nude dancing cases.184 Content-neutral regulations "can have a discriminatory effect on the speech market available to would-be listeners."185 As Susan Williams suggests, "the relevant question concerning discrimination is whether the impact of the regulation falls evenly across the speech marketplace or disproportionately on one part of it."186 From the perspective of the audience, even a regulation that could be justified as "content-neutral" might prohibit some kinds of speech more than others. This question of audience discrimination—a question which should be asked and answered independent of the government's purpose—is especially relevant in nude dancing cases. From the audience perspective, the Pap's law completely eliminates a

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already in the record. Id. at 330 n.16; see also TRIBE, supra note 15, at § 12-5, at 819-20 (suggesting that the Court's interpretation of O'Brien is overbroad).

185 See Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1923 ("Broadly construed, Renton permits circumvention of strict scrutiny.... To avoid this result, courts must conduct more than a cursory motive inquiry.").

184 The special involvement of the audience in this type of entertainment militates strongly in favor of considering audience viewpoint. See supra note 174 (listing and discussing sources dealing with nude dancing and its viewers); see also PORN 101, supra note 12, at 289 ("Plainly the porn viewing experience is more involved than first meets the eye; where the actual imagery is sometimes less significant than the feelings, thoughts, and associations going on inside the viewer's head."). The audience, in words borrowed from Milton, is able to "consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better." ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 543 (1941).

185 Williams, supra note 47, at 658; see also id. at 658-60 (describing views on audience discrimination by content-neutral regulation); Kagan, supra note 176, at 423-27 (examining perspectives on the First Amendment including the "speaker-based" and "audience-based" models); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 764-71 (1986) (arguing that content-neutral regulations have problematic discriminatory effects); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 130-31 (1981) (arguing that content-neutral regulations should not receive less scrutiny than other types of restrictions).

186 Williams, supra note 47, at 658.
particular content category; furthermore, enforcement actions fall disproportionately on that category as a result of the government's social policy choices. The plurality in Pap's, however, declined to even examine this question, focusing its analysis solely on the government's purpose rather than on the law's impact on particular audiences. When justified by secondary effects, that analysis completely forestalled any consideration of audience discrimination.\textsuperscript{187}

To illustrate this concern, Williams offers a hypothetical that highlights the importance of pamphleteering to an audience of poor people, who cannot afford other ways of publicizing their message.\textsuperscript{188} A general law restricting pamphleteering would impact that audience disproportionately, raising a substantial question of content discrimination. Similarly, audience discrimination is particularly problematic in the case of live, nude dancing establishments. Such venues are frequently limited sharply by number and separated by geography; they are often few and far between. Laws such as the Erie Ordinance may foreclose all access to this particular form of entertainment for those without access to transportation and financial means to travel great distances to operating clubs in other localities. Hard-core adult movie theaters and adult video rental stores within the same geographic area are not adequate substitutes, as their messages are decidedly different from live, expressive dance.\textsuperscript{189} Similar to pamphleteering regulations, a general law prohibiting nudity thus impacts the geographically restricted live nude dancing audience disproportionately, raising a real question of content discrimination that will be difficult for the Court to continue to ignore.

\textsuperscript{187} Note that, despite substantial advocacy by commentators, the Supreme Court has yet to exhibit any real approval of audience-discrimination analysis. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 (1984) (noting that solicitude to the concept of audience discrimination has "practical boundaries").

\textsuperscript{188} See Williams, supra note 47, at 658-59 (posing that, from the perspective of the audience deprived of particular points of view, restrictions with a non-communicative purpose can raise serious questions of content discrimination).

\textsuperscript{189} See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) ("There are exceptions to the parity of the live and the canned performance.... [I]t might be possible to distinguish between live and canned nude dancing on the ground that in the former the dancers are accessible to the audience . . . .").
C. Runaway Secondary Effects Doctrine

1. Troubling Expansion

The Pap's plurality dangerously extended the secondary effects doctrine beyond existing precedent. For the first time, the doctrine was used to justify a total prohibition of a form of protected expression.190 Never before had the Court used the secondary effects justification in an adult entertainment case to sustain anything other than a time, place, or manner zoning restriction.191 In both American Mini Theatres and Renton, essential elements of the holdings were that the ordinances be directed only at the places where expression might be presented, and that the regulations did not interfere with content. A critical argument in each of the opinions was that the regulations under consideration did not significantly curtail adult entertainment presentations or the opportunity for a message to reach an audience. However, the Pap's plurality refused to recognize this explicit limitation, maintaining that there was no total ban because only "one particular means" was "limit[ed]."190 Because the plurality could not rely on Renton, it had to fall back upon an analogy to O'Brien, which was not even a secondary effects case.193

This extension of the secondary effects doctrine is dangerous because it undermines what the Renton Court described as "the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about 'content-based'..."
speech regulations: that 'government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.'\textsuperscript{194} Indeed it was only "with this understanding in mind" that the \textit{American Mini Theatres} majority decided that secondary effects-justified regulations be examined under the standards applicable to TPM restrictions, requiring ample alternative avenues of communication to exist.\textsuperscript{195} Likewise, the Renton ordinance only "'circumscribe[d adult establishments'] choice as to location."\textsuperscript{196} In effect, the \textit{Pap's} plurality directly contradicted the Court's prior statement that "the First Amendment requires ... that [the city] refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate ... within the city."\textsuperscript{197} Likewise, the \textit{Pap's} decision is irreconcilable with the Court's holding in \textit{Schad}: "[t]he Court did not imply that a municipality could ban all adult theaters—much less all live entertainment or all nude dancing—from its commercial districts citywide."\textsuperscript{198} The only difference between \textit{Pap's}, on the one hand, and \textit{American Mini Theatres}, \textit{Renton}, and \textit{Schad}, on the other hand, is that Erie disguised its attempt in a general law. Erie's nudity law in effect does exactly what those cases admonished could not be allowed, but the \textit{Pap's} plurality was simply willing to ignore this wolf in sheep's clothing.\textsuperscript{199}

As Justice Stevens observed in his dissent, "[u]nder today's opinion, a State may totally ban speech based on its secondary effects— which are defined as those effects that 'happen to be associated' with speech."\textsuperscript{200} The grave implications of this extension may be felt in all areas of protected speech. \textit{Pap's} reinforces Justice Brennan's original

\textsuperscript{194} City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 404 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).

\textsuperscript{195} Id. at 49.

\textsuperscript{196} Id. at 48 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976)).

\textsuperscript{197} Id. at 54 (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{199} See also \textit{Pap's}, 529 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that this censorship may have a laudable ulterior purpose cannot mean that censorship is not censorship."). Many jurisdictions have applied the secondary effects doctrine to justify nude dancing regulations. See Hudson, \textit{supra} note 14, at 73-74 n.127 (listing post-\textit{Barnes} cases that apply the secondary effects doctrine to regulate nude dancing establishments); see also Clinton P. Hansen, Note, \textit{To Strip or Not to Strip: The Demise of Nude Dancing and Erotic Expression Through Cumulative Regulations}, 35 Val. U. L. Rev. 561, 584-601 (2001) (describing nine different types of regulations that have some potentially successful secondary effects justification and which, when used together, constitute a cumulative adult use ordinance).

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Pap's}, 529 U.S. at 323 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988)).
fear that the secondary effects doctrine "creates a possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can concoct 'secondary' rationalizations for regulating the content of political speech." Already, the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to extend the application of the secondary effects doctrine to time, place, or manner restrictions on "high-value" political speech. In Boos v. Barry, a plurality suggested that a District of Columbia law restricting picket signs within five hundred feet of an embassy could be constitutional if it focused on the secondary effects of picket signs such as "congestion," "interference with ingress or egress," or "visual clutter." Indeed, in the past ten years, the secondary effects doctrine has been used to justify regulation of all kinds of speech, including commercial, noncommercial, and political speech. Instead of reining in this runaway censorship vehicle, the Pap's Court gave its overt approval for total suppression of nude dancing under a general law, thereby leaving open the possibility to develop more complete bans on other types of protected speech beyond mere time, place, or manner restrictions.

2. Evidentiary Basis and the Relationship Between Secondary Effects and Regulations

Pap's raises two major evidentiary concerns regarding the secondary effects doctrine. As Justice Souter reads First Amendment precedent, a regulating government should have to show both real harms it claims flow from an expressive activity and evidence that the regulation in question will alleviate them in a direct and material manner. With regard to the first prong, real harms, the Pap's plurality dangerously reinforced the holding that municipalities need not develop an independent evidentiary basis for the secondary effects they use to justify a regulation of protected speech. Instead, the plurality was willing to trust the city's "expert judgments" and accept its "reasonable belief that the experience of other jurisdictions is relevant

202 Id. at 321; see also Hudson, supra note 14, at 74-77 (detailing the expansion of secondary effects doctrine outside the adult entertainment industry); Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1241-44 (discussing the expanding notion of secondary effects after Boos).
203 See Hudson, supra note 14, at 77-93 (discussing regulations on commercial, noncommercial, and political speech justified by lower federal courts on the basis of secondary effects).
204 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 313-14 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
to the problem it is addressing.\textsuperscript{205}

The plurality continued to allow municipalities to analogize evidence gathered by other cities regardless of whether or not it was obtained by studying a city of the same size, location, demographics, concentration of adult business, or even types of adult businesses. Three commentators recently evaluated the scientific validity of the secondary effects studies most often relied upon by cities by abstracting and analyzing their methods and empirical findings.\textsuperscript{206} Their scientific investigation revealed that, with few exceptions:

[T]he methods most frequently used in these studies are seriously and often fatally flawed. Specifically, these studies do not adhere to professional standards of scientific inquiry and nearly all universally fail to meet the basic assumptions necessary to calculate an error rate—a test of the reliability of findings in science. More importantly, those studies that are scientifically credible demonstrate either no negative secondary effects associated with adult businesses or a reversal of the presumed negative effect.\textsuperscript{207}

In a footnote in \textit{Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.}, the Court observed that, in a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity.\textsuperscript{208} The commentators suggest that the vast majority of secondary effects studies do not meet this requirement because they fail to meet four criteria for insuring a scientifically valid study,\textsuperscript{209} making them little more than "junk science."\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, the ten most often cited\textsuperscript{211} of these fatally

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{205} Id. at 297-98 (citation omitted).
\bibitem{207} Id. at 367.
\bibitem{208} 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).
\bibitem{209} Those criteria consist of the following:
1. A control area equivalent to the area containing the adult entertainment business;
2. A sufficient period of elapsed time prior to and following opening of the adult establishment;
3. A crime rate measured according to the same valid source for all areas considered, with crime information factual and reliable; and
4. Properly conducted survey research.
\bibitem{210} Id. at 370.
\bibitem{211} The ten most cited studies are (with number of citations in parentheses):
1. Indianapolis, IN - 1984 (22)
2. Phoenix, AZ - 1979 (18)
3. Los Angeles, CA - 1977 (13)
\end{thebibliography}
flawed studies continue to be shared, referenced, and cited by more and more cities—continuing the web of reliance upon fundamentally unreliable evidence. The social scientific study aptly concluded:

[T]here is sufficient room for a serious challenge to the assumption made by communities across the United States that past studies of secondary effects show an empirical relationship between adult businesses and negative effects. . . . [T]here is presently no legitimate basis for extending the secondary effects doctrine . . . based on these studies.

In Pap's, the plurality condoned the fact that Erie relied on the same study used by the City of Renton—a Seattle study of the relationship between zoning and secondary effects of adult theaters. While it might have been logical for Renton to use the Seattle study (both zoning, both adult theaters), allowing Erie to use that same study falls far short of the evidentiary basis the Court should have required. The twenty-year old study involved the secondary effects of a different type of entertainment in a much larger, urbanized city and its relationship to a completely different type of regulation. Thus, a Seattle

5. Austin, TX - 1986 (10)
7. Amarillo, TX - 1977 (7)
8. Detroit, MI - 1972 (5)
10. Kent, WA - 1982 (4)

Id. at 369. Cities use combinations of these studies today, often cross-referencing twenty-year-old studies and duplicating reliance on major studies. For example, the City of Erie relied on a Seattle study, which had relied on the 1982 Kent, WA study, which had previously relied on several 1970s studies. Id. The trial of questionable science is unmistakable and continues today.

Id. at 387. For example, the Indianapolis study, which has been relied upon by no fewer than twenty-two communities as evidence of a relationship between adult establishments and negative secondary effects, is terribly flawed and contains serious methodological flaws—"[t]hus, the potential exists that as many as twenty-two zoning ordinances have been founded on a false premise about the substantial government interest in regulating the location of these businesses." Id. at 387-88.

Id. at 391.

See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 296-97 ("And Erie could reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton . . . to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood."). The plurality further suggested that "findings" of the city council over a century of secondary effects flowing from lewd and immoral activities constituted evidence of real harms. Id. at 297-98. Justice Souter aptly countered this point by responding that the city council assumes its own conclusion, and that however much the city councilors believe their conclusions to be true does not decide the evidentiary question. Id. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

adult theater zoning study is not rationally transferable as an evidentiary basis for Erie's general nudity law. Justice Souter noted this inconsistency when he found in the record a “failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied.” Indeed, Souter was so troubled by the lack of evidentiary basis that he lamented the portion of his Barnes concurrence in which he failed to “demand reliance on germane evidentiary demonstrations.”

The acceptance of this most flimsy of proof of real harms is nothing short of a signal to municipalities that even the most transparent, strained suggestion of a “real harm” will satisfy the plurality’s scrutiny. Tellingly, the original proponent of the secondary effects justification in nude dancing cases, Justice Souter, admitted his error in not demanding better evidence. The plurality, however, marched on and suggested that the proof required for a total ban under a general law is no greater than that required for a time, place, or manner restriction that leaves open ample alternatives. After entrenching secondary effects as a means to a total ban, the Pap’s plurality lowers the evidentiary bar for this greater suppression.

Second, the plurality accepts Erie’s secondary effects justification even though it bears no reasonable or rational relationship to the particular means chosen to alleviate those harms. This equally troubling development signals to municipalities that their regulatory means do not even have to pass a minimum rationality (i.e., “laugh”) test to be

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216 See Ortiz, supra note 68, at 963 (“[The Pap’s] plurality . . . seemed to stretch what could be considered reasonable.”).
217 Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 Id. at 315 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 An eyebrow-raising example of this flimsy proof requirement in action can be found in Restaurant Row Associates v. Horry County, 516 S.E.2d 442, 448 (S.C.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1020 (1999), in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a city did not have to make an individualized showing of secondary effects even when the plaintiff adult entertainment establishment produced expert testimony that no negative secondary effects would result.
220 This treatment of secondary effects reasoning does not rectify confusion in the lower courts. Compare Secret Desires Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 470 S.E.2d 879, 880 (Ga. 1996), in which the Georgia Supreme Court struck down an ordinance regulating lingerie modeling studios because the city had failed to consider secondary effects caused by those specific types of businesses, with ILQ Inv., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1417-18 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the Eighth Circuit upheld use of a general secondary effects rationale for a regulation zoning bookstores that sold both adult and mainstream material, despite the fact that the ordinance was tailored based on links to adult businesses generally. See also Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., & Deanne E. Maynard, Playboy and City of Erie: Shift Toward Balancing, COMM. LAW., Fall 2000, at 12, 16 (describing how secondary effects arguments are "inherently destabilizing").
accepted as a legitimate response to specified secondary effects.\textsuperscript{221} Such permissive analysis belies the Court's own prior conclusion. In \textit{Reno v. ACLU}, seven Justices agreed that "the mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was enacted for [an] important purpose ... does not foreclose inquiry into its validity."\textsuperscript{222} That decision, striking down the Communications Decency Act (CDA), further specified that the "inquiry embodies an 'overarching commitment' to make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its purpose 'without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.'\textsuperscript{223} The Court even noted with disapproval the fact that the record contained no evidence as to how effective or ineffective the regulations might prove to be.\textsuperscript{224}

The \textit{Pap}'s plurality cavalierly suggests that "it is evident" that the Erie nudity law will have the required efficacy.\textsuperscript{225} This is perhaps the plurality's most tenuous conclusion, for evidence was neither required nor offered that the wearing of pasties and G-strings by erotic dancers would have any remedial effect on the secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments.\textsuperscript{226} Erie did not point to any study suggesting that the adverse secondary effects of adult-oriented businesses offering erotic dancing depends in any way on the precise costume worn by the performers. Rather, the city "merely assumes it to be so"\textsuperscript{227} and the plurality apparently agrees. Furthermore, the pasties and G-string solution chosen by Erie is \textit{not} the one suggested by the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Williams, \textit{supra} note 47, at 654 ("[T]he requirement ... amounts to little more than the most minimal rational relation review ... .").
\item 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
\item Id. at 876 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996)).
\item See \textit{id.} at 875 n.41 (analogizing the lack of considered judgment as to the effectiveness of CDA regulations to the similarly vacant legislative history of preceding adoption of the unacceptable statute struck down in \textit{Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC}, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
\item \textit{Pap}'s, 529 U.S. at 300-01.
\item See \textit{id.} at 313 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is not apparent to me as a matter of common sense that establishments featuring dancers with pasties and G-strings will differ markedly in their effects on neighborhoods from those whose dancers are nude."); \textit{id.} at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am highly skeptical, to tell the truth, that the addition of pasties and G-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster sexually transmitted disease.").
\item \textit{Id.} at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); \textit{see also} Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 128, 154 (1992) ("Listener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.").
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Seattle study that the city used to arrive at its secondary effects justification in the first place.\(^{228}\) In holding such, the plurality in essence shifts the burden of proof to adult establishments to disprove proactively the effectiveness of a proposed secondary effects-targeted measure.

The \textit{Pap's} plurality thus encourages a two-fold evidentiary failure. First, it does not require any particularized evidence of real harms associated with nude dancing establishments. Second, it does not require a city to tailor its regulation to alleviate those harms (real or otherwise) in an actual manner. In a case involving a total ban under a general law (as opposed to a zoning regulation that is more self-evidently efficacious), a more perceptive reading of precedent suggests that a city should have to make a showing of a causal connection between the regulated speech and the secondary effects as well as a rational explanation of how the regulation will alleviate those harms.\(^{229}\) By not requiring either, the \textit{Pap's} plurality gives municipalities carte blanche to invent secondary effects and then pass expression-suppressive regulations that do not actually remedy them—the ultimate form of approved "improper motive" censorship in disguise.

\subsection*{D. Conflation of Secondary Effects and Symbolic Speech Analytical Frameworks}

In Part II.B.3, I described how the Court has systematically collapsed two doctrines—TPM and symbolic speech/incidental burden—into one by using the \textit{O'Brien} test where the TPM test had been previously employed.\(^{250}\) The \textit{Pap's} plurality embraces this collapse, indicating that general nudity laws should be evaluated as restrictions on symbolic speech under the "less stringent" \textit{O'Brien} test.\(^{231}\) Under the \textit{O'Brien} analysis, the plurality asserts that the Constitution "requires only that the regulation further the interest in combating such effects."\(^{232}\) The plurality acknowledges that the Erie regulation—requiring pasties and G-strings—might not have any real remedial effect on secondary effects,\(^{233}\) but asserts that, by allowing the government to

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\item \(^{228}\) That study recommended dispersal through zoning. \textit{Pap's}, 529 U.S. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
\item \(^{229}\) See \textit{Free Speech Analysis}, supra note 50, at 1923 (indicating that the absence or presence of an objective nexus can be illustrative of true legislative motive).
\item \(^{230}\) \textit{Supra} text accompanying notes 47-65.
\item \(^{231}\) \textit{Pap's}, 529 U.S. at 289.
\item \(^{232}\) \textit{Id.} at 301.
\item \(^{233}\) \textit{Id.}
experiment with that regulation, its interest would somehow be furthered. This assumption requires what Justice Stevens sagely referred to as a "titanic surrender to the implausible." By making this assumption, the plurality dangerously "[ignores] the critical difference between secondary effects caused by speech and the incidental effects on speech that may be caused by a regulation of conduct." Reiterated succinctly:

The incidental burdens doctrine applies when "'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," and the government's interest in regulating the latter justifies incidental burdens on the former. Secondary effects, on the other hand, are indirect consequences of protected speech and may justify regulation of the places where that speech may occur. A municipality may have either of these doctrines as its aim when implementing a regulation, but they are not the same. The plurality, however, ignored the difference and, by devolving the analysis to the O'Brien test, insisted that "both aims are equally unrelated to speech," when they clearly are not.

There were two possible choices as to how Erie could pass a law that could withstand constitutional muster. Erie could have aimed its regulation at something other than speech and then attempted to justify the law under the incidental burdens doctrine, previously discussed. Alternatively, Erie could have justified its law as directly aimed at the secondary effects caused by (and thus directly related to) protected speech. It did the latter. Yet the plurality, by conflating the two doctrines, miraculously arrives at the conclusion that the law is unrelated to speech. As Justice Stevens suggests, they tried to "have their cake and eat it too." The result is a doctrinal

234 Id. ("Even though the dissent questions the wisdom of Erie's chosen remedy... the 'city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.'" (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 52)).
235 Id. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236 Id.
237 For a more thorough explanation, see supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
238 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239 See id. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("One can think of an apple and an orange at the same time; that does not turn them into the same fruit.").
240 Id.
241 See id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot conflate the two with the expectation that Erie's interests aimed at secondary effects will be rendered unrelated to speech by virtue of this doctrinal polyglot.").
242 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see id. at 324-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
maelstrom. The City admitted its law was aimed at secondary effects caused by protected speech and did not defend the law as only having created incidental burdens afterward. The plurality, by way of doctrine conflation, does the City’s work for it. It incorrectly analogizes Erie’s secondary effects claim to the incidental burdens claims in Clark and Ward, and then eliminates the critical “ample alternative avenues” of the TPM test. In addition, the “further the governmental interest” prong of the O’Brien test, as employed by the plurality, is satisfied by what it admits to be only a *de minimis* effect on the neighborhood.

Professor Erwin Chemerinsky recently criticized such a path by describing the treatment of “content-based laws as content-neutral because of a permissible purpose” as one of three major problems with the Court’s application of the principle of content-neutrality. Chemerinsky emphasizes that—despite any attendant secondary effects rationale—if the application of a law depends on the content of the message, then, by definition, the law is content-based. As he suggests, “[t]he court can uphold it by finding that it serves a sufficiently important purpose, but it is still content based. In fact, the Court might even say that it is a category of speech that warrants less than full First Amendment protection . . . .” But, he wisely concludes, “it is simply wrong to say that a facial, content-based distinction is otherwise because it is based on a permissible purpose.”

The Pap’s plurality’s choice to make that mistake is the final link in a chain of extreme deference to the social policy choices of municipalities. First, the Supreme Court made it simple for municipali-

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244 This confusion is revealed when the plurality doubly argues that
[T]here is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to
ban public nudity (even though such a ban may place incidental burdens on
some protected speech) and at the same time recognizing that one specific
occurrence of public nudity—nude erotic dancing—is particularly problem-
atic because it produces harmful secondary effects.
*Id.* at 295. They make this case despite the fact the Erie did not advance an incidental burdens theory.

245 See *id.* at 294 (“This case is, in fact, similar to *O’Brien, Community for Creative Non-Violence,* and *Ward.*”) *But see id.* at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The plurality is also
mistaken in equating our secondary effects cases with the ‘incidental burdens’ doctrine
applied in cases such as *O’Brien*; and it aggravates the error by invoking the latter line
of cases to support its assertion that Erie’s ordinance is unrelated to speech.”).

the Court’s willingness to find clearly content-based laws content-neutral).

247 *Id.* at 61.

248 *Id.*
ties to use a nebulous secondary effects justification without any evidentiary basis or relationship between those effects and the regulation. Then the Court made it clear that it would characterize such regulations as content-neutral despite the fact that they were aimed at the effects of speech long held to be protected. Finally, by conflating doctrines, the Pap's plurality communicates to municipalities that even though they need to use secondary effects to justify their law, the Court will put that justification aside and employ a less stringent analytical framework originally designed for the completely different situation of after-the-fact incidental burdens on symbolic speech.  

The route to a total prohibition ends with a Pap's/O'Brien test that allows a virtually hypothetical furtherance of an assumed governmental interest to satisfy the demands of the First Amendment. Although the Court credits the "O'Brien test," the single standard that has developed "is really just a weak version of the TPM test" that allows restrictions where it did not before. By locking secondary effects and the symbolic speech/incidental burdens test in this dangerous dance, the Pap's plurality moves perilously further away from anything but the most deferential analysis of restrictions on protected nude dancing. As Susan Williams aptly concludes, "[t]hese two lines of parallel doctrinal development, then, have miraculously ended in a single point . . . . As a result, the range of doctrinal tools available to deal with complex first amendment problems has been reduced, and real first amendment protections have been lost."

E. Tension with United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group

Pap's is also at great tension with the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. Playboyn involved a challenge to section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required cable television operators, who provide channels pr-

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249 This conflation poses a danger for all types of protected speech. For example, Timothy Tesluk suggests that "hate speech could easily be recast as involving a 'fighting words' element analogous to conduct, thus triggering the weak symbolic speech test." Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1126.

250 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the plurality opinion concludes that admittedly trivial advancements of a State's interests may provide the basis for censorship.").

251 Williams, supra note 47, at 654.

252 Id. at 653-54.


arily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, to either scramble fully or otherwise block fully those channels or to limit their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing. The section was specifically directed at sexually oriented programming and was enacted to address the phenomena of "signal bleed." Playboy Entertainment Group challenged the law as a content-based regulation violative of the First Amendment. Similar to the nude dancing in Pap's, the content of the sexually oriented channels was admittedly protected by the First Amendment as nonobscene adult entertainment.

Because of the law's specific aim, the majority agreed with the lower court that the law was content-based and found it an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech. One might argue then that a comparison of Pap's to this case is of little value—apples and oranges. I argue, however, that it is the spirit of the two cases that produces conflicting visions of underlying First Amendment values. The effect of the laws in the two cases is markedly similar. In Playboy, the Court highlighted that the effect of section 505 "limited Playboy's market as a penalty for its programming choice, though other channels capable of transmitting like material are altogether exempt." In Pap's, the general nudity law had the very same effect on owners of fully nude dancing establishments—it limited their market simply because those owners chose to offer fully nude dancing as a programming choice, while other clubs were free to present dancers with pasties and G-strings. In fact, the effect of the law upheld in Pap's is much stronger, as it in fact eliminated an entire market across the board. The Pap's plurality used the convenient vehicle of the secondary effects doctrine to remove the Erie law to the realm of content-neutral restrictions, but the essence of the effect of the laws is strik-

255 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806.
256 Id. Signal bleed occurs when, from time to time, discernable pictures appear on the screen and/or audio may be heard through the scrambling. Id.
257 Id. at 807.
258 Id. at 811 ("All parties bring the case to us on the premise that Playboy's programming has First Amendment protection."). But see id. at 829-30 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that at least some of the programming could be prohibited entirely under Miller v. California); id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that section 505 could be justified as regulating the "business of obscenity").
259 Id. at 811-12.
260 Indeed the majority declares its zoning cases (e.g., American Mini Theatres and Renton) to be irrelevant because the secondary effects doctrine requires lower scrutiny than the content-based issue at hand. Id. at 815.
261 Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
ingly similar.

Yet, the result is strikingly different. The *Playboy* Court extols that the general "right of expression prevails," and that we should simply avert our eyes.\(^{262}\) Moreover, in applying strict scrutiny, the *Playboy* Court demanded that *any* less restrictive alternative must be employed.\(^{263}\) But the *Pap's* plurality, again through the vehicle of secondary effects, did not even demand a consideration of less restrictive means—it in fact endorsed what is essentially a total ban.

The *Playboy* Court is careful to stress that its case involves speech alone.\(^{264}\) This determination highlights the mistake of the untenable *Pap's* conclusion that erotic dance contains both speech and non-speech elements that can be independently targeted. The Court, in essence, dictates that televising nude dancers on *Playboy* is speech alone, but having them dance live on a stage is both speech and conduct. Phrased differently, a cablecast of Erie's live dancers would be legal, but the dancing itself would not. This distinction is more than difficult to explain—it is bizarrely without merit.\(^{265}\)

A comparison of *Playboy* and *Pap's* illustrates how the secondary effects doctrine, coupled with an exclusive governmental purposive analysis, has warped the Court's perception of First Amendment protection. By ignoring the effect of the general nudity law on the audience, and allowing a content-neutral distinction based on an assumption of secondary effects, the *Pap's* decision has the same constitutionally offensive effect as section 505 in *Playboy*; yet, the plurality is willing to settle for glaring inconsistency. The decisions make remarkably different content discrimination determinations despite highly analogous expression-suppressive effects. These disparate determinations undercut a primary First Amendment value: "[f]reedom of speech calls for wide and stringent protection for those who speak, or write, or otherwise communicate to the public—protection not just for the words they choose, but also for the means of producing and

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\(^{262}\) *Id.* at 813 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).

\(^{263}\) *Id.*

\(^{264}\) *Id.* at 814.

\(^{265}\) This point was recently explored by commentators who observed that "[t]he same genre of expression was subjected to drastically different judicial treatment." Verrilli & Maynard, *supra* note 220, at 12. Indeed, the authors astutely indicate the irony of the two decisions: "The Court afforded erotic expression the least protection in the setting in which the expression was least likely to be available to minors or to large audiences, live entertainment in adults-only establishments, whereas the Court aggressively protected such expression when transmitted over mass media." *Id.* at 17.
distributing their speech."266

It is unsatisfying to chalk up this result to differences in wording. Justice Kennedy's discussion of the First Amendment's grand protections in Playboy is markedly absent from Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Pap's.267 Several commentators have appropriately decried these discrepancies, questioning how laws that have such a similar effect can receive completely different treatment under the First Amendment.268 By taking the secondary effects doctrine on such a runaway ride, the Court makes its own pronouncements in Playboy sound hollow—conveniently ignored when a good enough excuse (or policy preference) wanders along.269

F. Wrong Turn or True Orthodoxy?

It is worth mentioning a final perspective before concluding this discussion—that of the increasingly popular "new critics," as termed by Nicholas Wolfson.270 New critics—drawing on Plato and John Stuart Mill—attack an absolutist view of the First Amendment by citing the need to order a "good and just society."271 Wolfson uses Willmore Kendall as an example of this counter to the idea that the First Amendment makes society a "debating club." Kendall and others disagreed, arguing that "[s]ocieties...cherish a whole series of goods—among others...the living of the truth they believe themselves to embody already."272 New critics believe that a First Amendment driven society will "descend...into progressive breakdown of those common

266 FISS, supra note 2, at 71-72 (emphasis added). In this collection of essays, Fiss elaborates a theory of the First Amendment as, primarily, an instrument of democratic self-governance.
267 Justice Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in Pap's, making the result even more perplexing. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 282.
268 Verrilli & Maynard, supra note 220, at 12.
269 "[T]he American legal community is like an alcoholic staunchly promising to stay sober, but allowing for one glass—or two, at most—of scotch. After all, all things in moderation—including freedom of speech or thought." WIRENIUS, supra note 149 at 121.
270 In this Section, I rely heavily on Nicholas Wolfson's description of the modern attacks on the traditional, civil rights position on free speech. See NICHOLAS WOLFSON, HATE SPEECH, SEX SPEECH, FREE SPEECH 11-45 (1997).
271 Id. at 27. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC reprinted in THE PORTABLE PLATO 353 (Scott Buchanan ed., 1977) (proclaiming the value of censorship to ensure the achievement of objective goods).
272 WOLFSON, supra note 270, at 26 (citing Willmore Kendall, The "Open Society" and its Fallacies, in ON LIBERTY: ANNOTATED TEST SOURCES AND BACKGROUND CRITICISMS 162 (David Spitz ed., 1975)).
premises upon which alone a society can conduct its affairs by discus-
sion. More specifically, new critics argue that once a consensus
truth is reached by society, it is the responsibility of that society’s
democratic government to “sustain true belief and wipe out false opin-
ion.” Stated differently, there are “true orthodoxies on which courts
can reach closure . . .”

It is tempting (and in fact is regularly suggested by some promi-
nent scholars) to assert that society has simply reached a valid consen-
sus that certain forms of adult expression are of the lowest possible
value. This conclusion carries with it the implication that holdings
such as Pap’s neither misapply existing doctrine nor realize particular
policy preferences; rather, they are realizations that a free speech
“truth-seeking” has occurred, and further, that an ordered govern-
ment should be allowed to implement the resultant true orthodoxy.
Once society determines a particular form of expression is “false,” and
will lead to harm, suppressive Pap’s-like results become much more
acceptable, if not lauded.277

Wolfson posits the best response to the new critics:

[Theirs] is a principle impossible to contain. In the first place, it is im-
possible to achieve infallibility in the judgment that a consensus has
been reached. Since dissent itself is at issue, there will always be those
dissenters who insist that truth has not been ascertained. Second, even if
only one individual in all mankind disagrees on an issue, to use the fa-
mous Mill example, the truth cannot be said to have been infallibly as-
certained. Third and most important, once we grant that society can in-
fallibly pick certain opinions as “noxious,” censorship will quickly extend
to all areas that majorities, or powerful minority interest groups, con-
sider dangerous.278

273 Id. at 26-27.
274 Id. at 30.
275 Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
276 For an objective investigation of the quantifiable harms of adult expression, see
SUSAN M. EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY: REGULATION AND THE RIGHT TO
277 The works of Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin are good examples
of the argument that a particular type of expression, whether it be sexist speech or
pornography itself, is inherently “false” and the bearer of harm. See, e.g., ANDREA
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 201 (3d ed. 1981) (“The fact that
pornography is widely believed to be ‘depictions of the erotic’ means only that the de-
basing of women is held to be the real pleasure of sex.”); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS 9 (1993) (“Protecting pornography means protecting sexual abuse as
speech, at the same time that both pornography and its protection deprives women of
speech, especially speech against sexual abuse.”).
278 WOLFSON, supra note 270, at 30-31.
The First Amendment, Wolfson argues convincingly, "must permit grotesque and nasty speech, because society in the domain of speech cannot be half skeptical and half infallible." In other words, we as a society cannot infallibly choose the subjects that are "legitimately debatable and those that are not." If, as Wolfson suggests, "once we accept that debate and inquiry must end in certain areas, we cannot limit that principle," then it is impossible to consider movement toward true orthodoxies as an acceptable First Amendment value. Governments acceptably regulate harmful conduct. When the government regulates speech on the same grounds—concluding it to be false and thus harmful—it confuses speech with action. The inevitable conclusion, Wolfson posits, is pervasive censorship. This argument illustrates a steep slope of a sort somewhat different from the normatively weak, time-worn fear that courts cannot distinguish between laws that censor completely different types of expression. The new critics' slope is the acceptance of "a fundamental proposition that there are certain orthodoxies that a society and a government must accept and enforce in order to maintain worth and dignity." The subtle difference is that those orthodoxies mandate censorship, rather than suggest its possibility. The conceptual acceptance in Pap's of the orthodoxy that adult expression is, in essence, both speech that is unnecessary in our society and speech that causes direct harms through cognizable secondary effects, takes a dangerous step toward acceptance of the new critics' search for enforceable orthodoxy. This, in turn, moves us back toward "the order of mind that free speech advocacy was designed to overthrow."

V. REEVALUATING FIRST AMENDMENT ADULT EXPRESSION DOCTRINE

Adult expression doctrine has become an unstoppable suppressive force in spite of the free speech guaranties of the First Amendment. Six major problems arise in the wake of the unfortunate plurality

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279 Id. at 31.
280 Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 466 (1990) (suggesting we should be "particularly wary of people who claim to have found the truth and who argue that further inquiry would be futile . . . [A] fallibilist theory of knowledge emphasizes, as preconditions to the growth of . . . knowledge, the continual testing and retesting of accepted 'truths').
281 WOLFSON, supra note 270, at 31.
282 Id. at 132.
283 Id. at 24.
284 Id.
opinion in Pap's. First, the Pap's plurality enshrines the secondary effects doctrine as justification for a general prohibition of protected speech contrary to the intentions of the doctrine as a limited approach to time, place, or manner restrictions. Second, an implausible application of content discrimination analysis by the plurality results in a content-neutral determination that ignores the practical effect of general laws on protected speech. In bending doctrine to get a desired result, the plurality has undermined the basic underlying theoretical framework that justified First Amendment content discrimination analysis in the first instance. Third, the Pap's decision entrenches an analysis that focuses solely on governmental purpose, at the expense of the audience viewpoint so critical and particular to the protected expression of nude dancing. Since this form of entertainment is not popular among the American majority, is not considered to be “high-value” speech, and arguably provides limited stand-alone contributions to American society as a whole, it is only in the very minds of its particular audience that this uniquely erotic expression has its desired effect. As such, the plurality allows a plainly majoritarian attack on unpopular speech to be disguised by jurisprudential smoke and mirrors.

Fourth, the Court has strayed far from the path of a rationally reasonable secondary effects doctrine in two ways. It continues to absolve municipalities of any responsibility to provide an evidentiary basis for their justifications. At the same time, it allows the most irrational remedial means to be coupled with those secondary effects—even if they are both far-fetched and unlikely to have any real impact. In combination, the Court has given municipalities carte blanche to create a secondary effects fiction on both ends of the spectrum—justification and means. Fifth, by conflating what originated as two distinct lines of First Amendment doctrine into one weak standard, the Court effectively sanctions the elimination of alternative avenues of communication, threatening all forms of expression with total prohibition at the hands of the secondary effects fiction. Finally, the Court’s reasoning, rationale, and underlying First Amendment commentary in Pap's is, in effect, strangely and jarringly at odds with other statements by the Court on the underlying priorities of First Amendment doctrine and common understandings of vital First Amendment values.

285 It is also a departure from the entire original purpose of obscenity law in general, which, as a sui generis deviation from First Amendment freedoms, was “undoubtedly far less concerned with the impact of erotic materials on overt behavior than with their impact on internal moral standards.” EMERSON, supra note 38, at 499.
Several adjustments need be considered by the Court to both contain this runaway line of doctrine and to better adapt it to the particularized needs of adult entertainment analysis. Since the avenue to a total ban is now clear, the Court must at the very least consider both the governmental purpose behind a law and the direct discriminatory impact such a law would have on the availability of a particular form of expression to its viewing audience. It should not be enough for the Court to dismiss a law’s effects as merely *de minimis* in the larger scheme of adult entertainment, for such a conclusion defies the very need for a particular remedial action. In addition, if the Court continues to sanction the possibility of totally prohibiting a particular form of expression, it has a positive obligation to consider actively any and all evidence of improper motive as a safeguard against abuse. Proactively probing a law for illicit intentions (especially when plain evidence exists in the record) is necessary in this particular context to preserve the Court’s overall stated commitment to honoring core First Amendment values.

If the Court remains determined to sustain the secondary effects justification, it should take active steps to bring it back from the land of make-believe. The Court should seriously consider splitting the secondary effects test and incidental burdens/symbolic speech tests back into their different selves. Doing so would realize the clear desires of the *American Mini Theatres* and *Renton* Courts to preserve alternative avenues for protected expression while making some concession to majoritarian morality by allowing moderate restrictions on adult entertainment. After parsing the two analytical frameworks in keeping with their original justifications, the Court should then implement a two-prong secondary effects nexus requirement. First, the Court should require a demonstrable factual nexus between the secondary effects claimed and the means proposed to ameliorate them. Second, the Court should also require a rational relationship between the regulation (means) and the actual furtherance of the governmental interests in question. The first prong addresses the need for an underlying factual basis for concluding that a restrictive law is necessary, while the second assures that a law bears directly upon only those demonstrated problems.

Finally, the Court should evaluate whether the path chosen in *Pap’s*—the potential for total prohibition of heretofore protected expression—gels with its larger body First Amendment jurisprudence, or whether the Court’s longstanding sympathy for objection to “immoral” expression finally got the better of it in *Pap’s*. The Court,
frankly, needs to revisit and rediscover its First Amendment first principles and attempt to place \textit{Pap's} within that framework or discard it as an aberration.

CONCLUSION

The plurality has tried to do with its nude dancing doctrine in \textit{Pap's} what it could not do under \textit{Miller v. California}: give municipalities the ability to eliminate what they perceive to be nonobscene but offensive adult entertainment. Unfortunately, the Court has long conceded that such entertainment is entitled to constitutional protection. As a result, the Court has had to contrive an elaborate set of decisional rules to circumvent the First Amendment in order to arrive at the desired suppressive result.

The \textit{Pap's} decision illustrates how implausible, untenable, and dangerous that path has become. It is dangerously close to failing the "laugh test" measuring rationality, and already requires a healthy imagination to even sound plausible. In 1991, commentator Kimberly Smith made a most cogent conclusion about the danger of lowering the hurdles for regulating adult expression:

The perceived danger of sexual speech is not the view it espouses, but the words or symbols themselves. Our emotional reaction to sexual speech, like our reaction to the word "fuck," stems not from the idea it expresses, but from the violation of social taboos; it is a matter of cultural effrontery. There is a risk that this emotional reaction will motivate excessive government censorship of all discussion on the topic, regardless of the viewpoint expressed.\textsuperscript{286}

Such fears are closer to reaching fruition now in many ways; the plurality in \textit{Pap's} allowed an entire medium of expression to fall under the executioner's blade. Surely the Court does not want this limited line of doctrine eventually to swallow whole the master values of First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{287}


\textsuperscript{287} This fear was enunciated shortly prior to \textit{Pap's} by James Weinstein, who described the "potentially significant indirect cost of modifying current doctrine to permit such bans—a general weakening of the constitutional protection afforded debate on matters of public issues." See \textit{JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE} 159-88 (1999) (urging the need to delineate a "confinable principle" to prevent the gutting of core free speech protection); see also Gey, \textit{supra} note 174, at 1565 ("The more significant problem with the pro-suppression position is that it cannot be limited to pornographic expression; it provides a broader rationale for suppressing deviant expression of many sorts.").
The forthcoming consideration of City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.\(^{288}\) indicates a pressing need for heightened recognition of the problems implicit in the Pap's plurality's permissive analytical structure that I have discussed herein. In Alameda Books,\(^{289}\) the Court examines whether a city may ban multiple-use adult businesses based on a secondary effects rationale when it relies on a study that only examined the harmful effects caused by a clustering of many different adult businesses. Below, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit almost altogether avoided discussing Pap’s and, returning to the guiding principles of Renton and American Mini Theatres, determined that Los Angeles did not have a sufficient evidentiary nexus tying multiple-use adult businesses to actual adverse secondary effects on their surrounding areas.\(^{290}\) This case provides a ripe opportunity for the Supreme Court to regain control of a runaway doctrine, and serves as a further call for a return to the fundamental First Amendment values which preceded the under-performing content discrimination framework embraced by the Pap’s plurality.

In Sable Communications, the Court refused to allow the government to “burn the house to roast the pig” through a complete ban of indecent commercial telephone communications.\(^{291}\) In Reno v. ACLU, the Court refused to allow the CDA to “torch a large segment” of the Internet to shield a portion of the population from adult expression.\(^{292}\) In Playboy, the Court reminded us that “[w]hat the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make.”\(^{293}\) In Pap’s, however, the plurality allowed a general law to eliminate an entire form of expression without much regret, forgetting what Justice Frankfurter termed the need to bar legislation “not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal.”\(^{294}\) The Court should heed its own warnings and bring adult expression jurisprudence back


\(^{289}\) Id.

\(^{290}\) See Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 724-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting the operation of adult businesses violated the First Amendment). The Ninth Circuit panel limited its mention of Pap’s to one footnote, noting it is of “little aid.” Id. at 727 n.7.


\(^{294}\) Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
from the perils of *Pap's* by reembracing the First Amendment in a more doctrinally compelling and objectively convincing manner.