Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach

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ARTICLE

LITIGATION REFORM: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

STEPHEN B. BURBANK† & SEAN FARHANG††

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INTRODUCTION

This Article is part of an ongoing study of the behavior of American political institutions, including courts, with respect to federal civil litigation. We are particularly interested in litigation that involves statutory private enforcement regimes and other legal provisions that predictably affect incentives and opportunities for access to federal court to enforce federal rights. We believe that, in order to understand the modern history of federal law that affects private enforcement and access to court with respect to federal rights (collectively, “private enforcement”), it is necessary to view the salient events in their institutional context, recognizing that the institutions involved are competing to regulate social and economic life in the United States. As part of our inquiry into how interactions and competition among institutions have produced the contemporary state of federal civil litigation—and in recognition of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—we consider ways in which the federal judiciary has affected private enforcement through control of procedure.

In Part I, we briefly discuss previously published evidence showing that, beginning in the late 1960s, when Democrats controlled Congress, there was a change toward greater reliance on private lawsuits to implement federal regulatory law. We highlight evidence that this transformation was rooted in conflict between Congress and the President over control of the bureaucracy, an alternative or supplementary venue to implement regulatory policy.

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1 We use the phrase “litigation reform” to denote efforts to reduce opportunities and incentives for private lawsuits. Because our concern is the private enforcement of federal rights, tort reform—the most frequent subject of academic attention to litigation reform—is outside the scope of this Article.
In Part II, we show that this program of regulation through private litigation soon met opposition primarily from the Republican Party. During President Reagan’s first year in office, the administration pressed an ambitious litigation reform proposal that would have restricted attorneys’ fees available to private parties seeking to enforce over one hundred federal statutes. Although this Reagan administration proposal failed, it signaled the emergence of a movement.

Using an original data set of litigation reform bills spanning from 1973 to 2010, we show that the ninety-seventh Congress (1981–1982) occasioned the emergence of litigation reform as a Republican issue in Congress. This campaign for litigation reform among congressional Republicans, like the Reagan proposal, largely failed. So long as Democrats controlled at least one chamber of Congress, Republicans’ litigation reform proposals had little chance of success. Even when Republicans secured control of both chambers (and for a time concurrently held the presidency), their litigation reform successes were modest and clustered in a few discrete policy areas. Congress proved inhospitable institutional terrain for the Republicans’ litigation reform agenda.

In Part III, we show that the Supreme Court had greater success in the enterprise of litigation reform than did Republicans in the political branches. With an original data set of Supreme Court decisions on private rights of action, standing, attorneys’ fees, and arbitration, we map the Court’s behavior on private enforcement issues from 1970 to 2013. The data tell a story of transformation: once highly supportive of private enforcement, the Supreme Court, increasingly influenced by ideology and increasingly conservative, has become antagonistic.

We argue that retrenchment through the judiciary achieved important success while failing in Congress because (1) as contrasted with the institutional fragmentation of the legislative process, the Court is governed by a more streamlined decisional process that allows bare majorities to prevail on contentious issues; (2) as contrasted with legislators’ and Presidents’ need to pay attention to democratic accountability through elections, federal judges are insulated from both; and (3) as contrasted with the powerful interest group mobilization that is triggered by the stark alternatives that major legislative reform proposals present, the case-by-case, less visible, more evolutionary process of legal change via court decision is far less likely to activate massive group mobilization seeking to block policy change.

In Part IV, we turn to the impact of procedure on federal civil litigation reform. This is a lawmaking arena in which the judiciary has long been ceded considerable freedom and power—exercised primarily through the
promulgation of prospective, legislation-like rules of court. Starting in 1938
and at least until the 1970s, court rulemaking was a potent means to affect
private enforcement, and prior to the 1980s the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Federal Rules") were litigation-friendly, and hence private
enforcement-friendly.

Federal court rulemaking started to engender serious controversy in the
1970s with the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, and the controversy
spread to the criminal and civil rules. We show that members of Congress,
urged on by individuals and groups with different grievances (some of
which had ideological and partisan valence), were concerned (1) that the
rulemaking process was insufficiently inclusive and transparent; (2) that the
rulemakers were paying inadequate attention to the Rules Enabling Act's
prohibition against abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights;
and (3) that as a result, Congress was devoting too much time to rulemaking
controversies. Chiefly through oversight hearings, these members of
Congress pressured the federal judiciary to open up the process, and some
of the process reforms, including a requirement of open meetings, were
codified in 1988. They have made it more difficult to use the rulemaking
process for major civil litigation reform.

Hence, just as the Supreme Court has been more successful in constricting
private enforcement through decisions than Congress has been through
legislation, so too, we argue, has the Court’s power to make procedural law
constraining private enforcement through decisions—specifically its power
to “interpret” Federal Rules—been more consequential than its power to
promulgate Federal Rules. Two of the most striking examples of this
phenomenon, where the turn to decisional law seems clearly linked to the
constrained state of rulemaking, are the Court’s 2007 and 2009 pleading
decisions.

Finally, just as ideology has had an increasing influence on the Justices’
votes and the Court’s decisions on private rights of action, attorneys’ fees,
standing, and arbitration, so has it had an increasing influence on cases
involving the Federal Rules. Ideology played a comparatively modest
(although statistically significant and substantively important) role in the
Justices’ voting behavior prior to 1994. Now, however, it appears to have a
stronger influence on the Justices in Federal Rules cases—supposedly the
heartland of procedure—than it has in cases presenting issues more
obviously connected to substantive law.2

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2 See infra text accompanying notes 128-259.
I. THE RISE OF THE LITIGATION STATE

In 2013, private parties filed about 170,000 federal lawsuits to enforce federal statutes, spanning the waterfront of federal regulation.\(^3\) Although Congress has relied on private litigation to enforce federal statutes since the rise of the federal regulatory state in the late 1880s, the frequency with which it has done so exploded in the late 1960s. From a rate of 3 lawsuits per 100,000 population in 1967—a rate that had been stable for a quarter century—it increased by about 1000% over the following three decades (reaching 13 by 1976, 21 by 1986, and 29 by 1996).\(^4\) Despite much vitriolic rhetoric (typically focused on tort litigation), serious empirical scholars have not established that there was a “litigation explosion” across American court systems as a whole during this period.\(^5\) There was, however, an unmistakable explosion of private lawsuits to enforce federal statutes.\(^6\) We emphasize two things about this phenomenon: First, it has resulted substantially from self-conscious choices of statutory design by members of Congress seeking to mobilize private enforcers. Second, among the multiple factors that led to these choices,\(^7\) Congress’s growing distrust of bureaucracy under leadership that it regarded as increasingly hostile to its policy goals was particularly important.

It is a legislative choice to rely on private litigation in statutory implementation. In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Congress decided to make the prohibition against job discrimination enforceable in court by including an express private right of action. When Congress chooses to rely on private enforcement, it faces a series of additional statutory design choices that together have profound consequences for how much or little private enforcement litigation is actually mobilized. These choices include who has standing to sue, which parties will bear the costs of litigation, what remedies will be available to prevailing plaintiffs, and whether a judge or jury will make factual determinations and assess damages.

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\(^6\) See, e.g., Farhang, supra note 4, at 118-19.

\(^7\) The literature addressing other factors is discussed in Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 637, 645 (2013).
We refer to this system of rules as a statute’s “private enforcement regime.”\(^8\) In Title VII, as amended in 1991, Congress sought to ensure active use of the private right of action by supplementing attorneys’ fee awards with, in certain cases, compensatory and punitive damages and the right to trial by jury. By design, Title VII is among the most litigated statutory provisions in federal court.\(^9\)

Figure 1: Private Enforcement Regimes, 1933–2004, and Private Statutory Litigation Rates, 1942–2004\(^{10}\)

Figure 1 supports our claim that the growth in private litigation enforcing federal statutes is a function of statutory design. The solid line reflects the cumulative number of fee-shifting provisions and damages enhancements (double, triple, or punitive) attached to private rights of action existing in federal statutory law in each year from 1933 to 2004. The line reflects the structural environment of private enforcement regimes in existence annually. The dashed line is the annual rate, per 100,000 population, of private federal statutory enforcement litigation (it is only possible to distinguish privately

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\(^8\) See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 19–60.
\(^{10}\) Id. at 66.
from governmentally filed actions beginning in 1942). The strikingly close association between these two variables, and particularly the coincident sharp upward shift in both at the end of the 1960s, reinforces the significance of legislatively designed private enforcement regimes in mobilizing private litigants and creating the modern litigation state.\footnote{For a discussion of the data underlying Figure 1, see id. at 3-18, 60-84.}

Congress’s choice of whether and how much to rely on private enforcement of statutory mandates must be understood in an institutional context. The primary alternative is to empower and fund administrative authorities to perform that enforcement function.\footnote{See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982); Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006).} Conflict between Congress and the President over control of the bureaucracy is a perennial feature of the American state, and this creates incentives for Congress, seeking an alternative or supplement to bureaucracy, to provide for enforcement via private litigation. This incentive increases with the degree to which Congress distrusts the President to use the bureaucracy to carry out statutory mandates.\footnote{See F ARHANG, supra note 4, at 36-37; see also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 96-97 (2002); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 93-94 (2001); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 49 (1994); R. Shep Melnick, From Tax and Spend to Mandate and Sue: Liberalism After the Great Society, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 387, 405-06 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005).}

Private enforcement is thus a form of insurance against the President’s failure to use the bureaucracy to carry out Congress’s will.

This reason to choose private enforcement has become much more significant to American public policy since the late 1960s, when divided party control of the legislative and executive branches became the norm and relations between Congress and the President became more antagonistic. In the first sixty-eight years of the twentieth century, the parties divided control of the legislative and executive branches 21% of the time. In the subsequent thirty-two years (from Richard Nixon through George W. Bush), the figure was 81%. Growing ideological polarization between the parties exacerbated the institutional antagonism arising from divided government.\footnote{See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 194 (2006); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarisation in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection, 30 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 3-4 (2003).} Both quantitative and qualitative empirical scholarship have demonstrated that these political–institutional conditions were critically
important in causing the greater congressional reliance on private litigation to enforce federal statutes that is reflected in Figure 1.15

Moreover, it is important to the story we tell that the chief configuration was Democratic Congresses facing Republican Presidents in the years of divided government from Richard Nixon’s assumption of office through the end of George W. Bush’s presidency. Thus, the Democratic Party, with its stronger propensity to undertake social and economic regulation16 and with liberal public interest groups occupying a critical position in the party coalition, predominately controlled Congress.17 This legislative coalition largely faced an executive branch in the hands of the Republican Party, a party more likely to oppose social and economic regulation and for which business groups are a core constituency.18 If antagonism between Congress and the President encourages private enforcement regimes, this will be especially consequential when the more regulation-prone Democratic Party controls Congress and the less regulation-prone Republican Party controls the presidency. The bulk of the foundation for the litigation state was laid under this configuration of divided government.19

Although the genesis and growth of the litigation state have received extensive attention in recent years, we take up the little-studied responses that they have elicited from partisan and ideological adversaries and those seeking to serve different institutional interests. Especially little attention has been paid to the phenomenon that is central in the second half of this Article: how the trans-substantive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have become a site of struggle and contest by interest groups, legislators, rulemakers, and judges who seek to control the procedural playing field on which private enforcement proceeds, thereby influencing its volume and effects.20

15 See generally FARHANG, supra note 4; Sean Farhang, Legislative-Executive Conflict and Private Statutory Litigation in the United States: Evidence from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental Law, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2012).
18 See, e.g., VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES, supra note 17, at 240–42.
20 An exception is Sarah Staszak, Institutions, Rulemaking, and the Politics of Judicial Retrenchment, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 168 (2010), which considers rulemaking among litigation reform responses to the growth of the litigation state.
Surveying these responses requires that we traverse multiple institutional sites of conflict over the scope and trajectory of the litigation state.

II. THE LEGISLATIVE PROJECT OF LITIGATION REFORM

A. The Reagan Administration

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a deregulatory movement was afoot, primarily catalyzed by businesses, trade associations, state and local officials, and newly emergent conservative public interest groups. President Reagan came to power on the wave of this movement. It was clear that regulatory reform was high on the policy agenda from the outset of his administration.21

Leaders of the Reagan administration well understood that private enforcement of federal regulatory statutes had been growing steeply, and they saw it as an obstacle to their regulatory reform agenda. Statutory provisions that forced business and government to pay the attorneys’ fees of plaintiffs who launched invasive, disruptive, and costly lawsuits were a particular target of criticism. Conservative activists and leading business associations also believed that liberal public interest groups used litigation and courts to shape the substantive meaning of the new social regulatory statutes to their liking, thereby making regulatory policy that was injurious to the interests of business and government.22

Conservative activists and business associations mobilized and collaborated in forming a number of public interest law groups to pursue an agenda focused, in part, on limiting the new social regulation.23 Reagan’s close associates, including high-ranking members of his California gubernatorial administration who followed him to the White House, were instrumental in founding this movement.24 Indeed, litigation by liberal public interest groups against the Reagan gubernatorial administration provoked members of his administration to establish the first conservative public interest law

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23 See supra note 22.

24 See Teles, supra note 22, at 60-61; O’Connor & Epstein, supra note 21, at 495; Decker, supra note 21, at 54-76.
group in Sacramento—the Pacific Legal Foundation—which then served as a model for many others. Reagan himself was openly hostile to liberal public interest lawyers, characterizing them in the early to mid-1970s as “a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own thing at the expense of the . . . poor who actually need help” and as “working for left-wing special interest groups at the expense of the public.” Moreover, he appointed numerous leaders and activists from the emergent conservative public interest law movement to important positions in the federal bureaucracy. These individuals had witnessed the rate of private enforcement lawsuits under federal statutes increase by 352% between Nixon’s assumption of office in 1969 and Reagan’s in 1981. Once in power, they sought to retrench private enforcement, in part, through a legislative project of litigation reform.

Attention to litigation reform in the first years of the Reagan administration focused squarely on federal rights, not torts. A 1981 bill capping fees in all federal actions against the government cut across virtually all fields of federal statutory regulation. Also in Reagan’s first term, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy drafted a proposal that would have, among other things, curtailed fee awards for actions under section 1983, which provides for damages suits against state officials for violating federal rights. Discussion of the proposal elicited further suggestions to eliminate punitive damages and introduce a good faith defense. Tort law was not an issue on the Reagan administration’s agenda until 1985, when it made tort reform a policy priority by forming the Tort Policy Working Group. In 1986, the Working Group issued a report calling for a series of

27 Decker, supra note 21, at 74.
28 See id. at 155, 238, 242-45, 250, 255-56.
29 See supra Figure 1.
30 In characterizing anti-litigation reform as retrenchment, we follow Sarah Staszak. Although Staszak focused broadly on retrenchment of judicial power and autonomy, we focus narrowly on retrenchment of private enforcement of federal rights. These are different issues. For Staszak, diminution of judicial power over rulemaking would be retrenchment of judicial power even if its effect was to preserve or enlarge the enforcement of rights. See Staszak, supra note 20, at 169, 173. Our concepts of retrenchment are overlapping but distinct.
31 See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
33 Decker, supra note 21, at 183-84.
reforms, including limits on fees and caps on damages.\textsuperscript{34} Litigation reform with respect to federal rights came first for the Reagan administration, and tort reform followed.

According to Michael Greve, a conservative legal activist and founder of the Center for Individual Rights, the Reagan administration saw federal statutory private rights of action with attorneys’ fee awards as an obstacle to deregulation. Conservative activists pursued proposals to curtail fee awards under federal regulatory statutes and to reduce sources of funding for liberal public interest groups as part of a strategy to “defund the Left.”\textsuperscript{35}

Private enforcement litigation was a “primary obstacle” to Reagan’s deregulatory agenda because, with little prospect of actually being able to repeal or modify legislative mandates, his principal strategy for effectuating the agenda was to demobilize the administrative regulatory enforcement apparatus.\textsuperscript{36} The value of withdrawing administrative enforcement would be weakened if extensive private enforcement continued. Based upon archival research, Jefferson Decker finds that some important members of the Reagan bureaucracy were deeply concerned that private rights of action, coupled with fee shifting in the new social regulatory statutes, were producing “a state-sponsored, private governing apparatus” that was beyond the control of the elected branches.\textsuperscript{37}

Advocates of retrenching private enforcement recognized that the proliferation of fee-shifting provisions in the 1970s had produced a private enforcement infrastructure not just among liberal public interest groups, but also, more significantly, among the for-profit American bar. Our own archival research reveals that this trend became an important concern among advocates of retrenching private enforcement, articulated repeatedly in support of an administration legislative proposal to cap fee awards. Michael Horowitz, general counsel of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), played a leading role in developing the fee-cap proposal. In


\textsuperscript{35} See generally Greve, supra note 22.

\textsuperscript{36} See Farhang, supra note 4, at 172-213; Robert E. Litan & William D. Nordhaus, \textit{Reforming Federal Regulation}, 119-32 (1988); Vogel, \textit{Fluctuating Fortunes}, supra note 17, at 446-65; Farhang, supra note 19; Greve, supra note 22, at 101-04; McGarity, supra note 21, at 260-70.

\textsuperscript{37} See Decker, supra note 21, at 181.
a 1983 memo discussing the problem that the proposal sought to address, Horowitz explained, “Not only the ‘public interest’ movement but, more alarmingly, the entire legal profession is becoming increasingly dependent on fees generated by an open-ended ‘private Attorney General’ role that is authorized under more than 100 statutes,” a large portion of which were enacted in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{38}

Writing to OMB Director David Stockman, Horowitz characterized the fee-cap bill as “designed in part to bar fee awards to entrepreneurial attorneys who now engage in contingency litigation” under federal statutes. “A literal industry of public interest law firms has developed,” he continued, “as a result of the legal fee awards with such groups regarding attorney’s fees as a permanent financing mechanism,” and one central to their commercial viability and business model.\textsuperscript{39}

John Roberts, then working for the Reagan Justice Department, was another active participant in deliberations over the fee-cap bill.\textsuperscript{40} Notwithstanding differences of opinion within the administration about the political wisdom of pursuing the bill, Roberts joined those advocating for it. In explaining why, he stated, “This legislation will, of course, be opposed by the self-styled public interest bar, but the abuses that have arisen in the award of attorney’s fees against the government clearly demand remedial action.”\textsuperscript{41} Antonin Scalia also endorsed the fee bill. Writing as a University of Chicago law professor and editor of the conservative Regulation magazine (just months before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit), he argued that recent D.C. Circuit pro-fee award decisions were a “bad dream” in need of the administration’s legislative remedy and that the bill would surely be opposed by the “private attorney general industry.”\textsuperscript{42} As we shall see, Roberts and Scalia would become among the most anti–private enforcement Justices on the modern Supreme Court.

\textsuperscript{38} Memorandum from Mike Horowitz to Dick Hauser & Bob Kabel (June 16, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
\textsuperscript{39} Memorandum from Michael J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper (July 22, 1982) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
\textsuperscript{40} See generally John G. Roberts, Jr. Papers, Box 5, Folders 1-3 (Attorneys’ Fees); Box 31, Folders 1-3 (Legal Fees Reform Act) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). Reagan Library logs indicating that memoranda written by Roberts are withheld from public view under the deliberative-process privilege further reflect Roberts’ substantive participation in debates over the bill.
\textsuperscript{41} Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. Fielding (Sept. 19, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library); see also Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. Fielding (Nov. 17, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
\textsuperscript{42} See The Private Attorney General Industry: Doing Well by Doing Good, REG., May/June 1982, at 5, 5-7; Memorandum from Michael J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper, supra note 39; id. at exhibit H.
Reagan administration advocates of retrenching private enforcement were surely right. For-profit counsel, not interest groups, prosecute the vast majority of federal statutory private suits. Thus, to the extent that Reagan's sought-after “regulatory relief” involved less aggressive and stringent enforcement of existing statutory mandates, the for-profit bar's response to market incentives was part of the problem.

OMB's fee-cap bill focused on suits against federal and state government defendants. Initially titled “The Limitation of Legal Fees Awards Act of 1981,” the bill proposed amending over one hundred federal statutes allowing recovery of attorneys' fees in successful suits against the government. The bill went through a number of permutations from 1981 to 1984. Some core attributes of the early versions were (1) a fee cap of $53 per hour for private attorneys representing paying clients; (2) a bar on fee awards for public interest organizations with staff attorneys, legal services organizations receiving federal funds, or for-profit attorneys representing plaintiffs on a pro bono basis; and (3) a reduction of the $53 per hour fee award by 25% of any money judgment or to the extent that it was disproportionate to the plaintiff’s actual damages.

Although this proposal's restrictions on fee awards were quite extreme as applied to suits against the government, it did not attempt to restrict fees in suits against the private (business) sector. It appears that key actors in the Reagan administration also wanted a more expansive retrenchment extending to the private sector. If the proposal summarized above had been enacted, it likely would have been the thin end of the retrenchment wedge. This was not to be.

B. Litigation Reform Proposals in Congress

In order to map the legislative movement for litigation reform and its partisan configuration, we identified all bills that sought to amend federal law so as to (1) reduce the availability of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs or increase plaintiffs' liability for defendants' fees, (2) reduce the monetary damages that plaintiffs can recover, (3) reduce opportunities and incentives for class actions, (4) strengthen the operation of sanctions against counsel, and (5) strengthen the operation of offer of judgment rules. These

43 See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 3-18.
45 See Greve, supra note 22, at 92-93; Decker, supra note 21, at 179-88.
provisions fall into two groups. The fees and damages provisions seek to reduce directly the economic recovery available to successful private enforcers. The class action, sanctions, and offer of judgment provisions seek to modify the Federal Rules in ways that disadvantage private enforcers.46

Our search captured 503 bills from 1973 (when the Library of Congress bill database starts) to 2010. Thirty percent of these bills contained more than one litigation reform item, with an average of 1.4 items per bill. The bills had an average of 11 cosponsors, yielding a total of 6063 episodes of legislators sponsoring or cosponsoring a bill with a litigation reform item in it. There were 3620 episodes of legislators supporting a bill with a provision limiting damages, 2835 with an attorneys’ fee provision, and 2257 with procedural provisions. Fifty-nine percent of the members of Congress who served from 1973 to 2010 supported one of our litigation reform provisions at least once.

In order to analyze the relationship between legislators’ ideology and the likelihood that they would support anti-litigation proposals, we constructed the following data set. Separately for each of our items and for each legislator who served in Congress from 1973 to 2010, we calculated the total number of episodes of sponsorship or cosponsorship per Congress. That is, the unit of analysis is a Congress-legislator count of the total number of times that each legislator in each Congress sponsored or cosponsored one of our five items.47 Figure 2 fits a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) curve to the count, per Congress, of the total number of episodes of legislator support for anti-litigation provisions; the aggregation of proposals to reduce damages and fees (monetary recoveries); and the aggregation of proposals to change class action, sanctions, and offer of judgment rules (procedural rules).48

46 We excluded bills that sought to affect incentives for asserting rights in administrative proceedings or for judicial review of administrative action. Our focus is on private lawsuits to enforce federal rights against the objects of statutory regulation.

47 We include both sponsors and cosponsors because we are interested in the degree of legislative support for litigation reform proposals. To neglect cosponsors would be to treat a bill that a legislator introduces only for herself as equivalent to one that dozens of other members of Congress wish to support.

48 We use 80% bandwidth to estimate all LOWESS curves in this Article.
Figure 2: Legislator Support for Anti-Litigation Provisions

Two things stand out in these data. First, support for anti-litigation bills grew strongly in the Reagan years. Because the curve smooths over year-to-year fluctuations, it does not reveal sharp breaks in the data, and thus the raw underlying data are instructive. During the Carter presidency, there was an average of 70 episodes per Congress of legislative support for one of our anti-litigation items. In Reagan’s first term, the figure rose to 257 per Congress, and in his second term it rose to 463 per Congress—a 561% increase over the Carter years. This growth continued and peaked at 1038 in the 104th Congress (1995–1996), when Republicans took control. It has since declined considerably, continuing its downward slope to the present.

Second, in the first half of the 1980s, episodes of support for procedural proposals were negligible in number and flat, while fees and damages proposals exploded. Procedural proposals, however, grew significantly starting in the early 1990s. The raw Congress-level counts again tell the story. In Ronald Reagan’s second term, there were only 18 episodes per Congress of support for anti-litigation procedural proposals. In George H.W. Bush’s term in office, the number rose to 62 per Congress, and in Bill Clinton’s first term the figure grew to 360, more than a 1900% increase over Reagan’s second term. It peaked at 582 in the 105th Congress (1997–1998) and subsequently declined, a trend continuing to the present.
Finally, Figure 3 provides an initial sense of the significance of ideology and party affiliation by presenting separate regression curves for the number of Democratic and Republican sponsors and cosponsors. There was little difference between Democratic and Republican support until the early 1980s, when Reagan took office. The raw data reveal that, in the four Congresses from 1973 to 1980, the number of Democratic supporters actually exceeded the number of Republican supporters, but only marginally. The ninety-seventh Congress (1981–1982) is the first in our data set in which Republican support for anti-litigation measures exceeds Democratic support. From rough parity when Reagan took office, there emerged a partisan gap which grew until it peaked in the 105th Congress (1995–1996), with Republicans supporting anti-litigation proposals at a level about 563% above Democrats. As the level of Republican proposals declined after the 105th Congress, so too did the gap between the two parties.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Note that Figure 3 is based on raw figures of support and does not attempt to make adjustments for the share of seats controlled by each party.
As with the Reagan administration's litigation reform proposals, our bill database shows that proposals in the field of federal rights led the way and tort reform followed. We collected bills containing the same set of five litigation reform items applying to state tort law. From 1973 through 1984 (the end of Reagan's first term), episodes of sponsorship and cosponsorship of bill provisions targeting federal statutory rights outnumbered those targeting tort by a margin of more than three to one. Only in the ninety-ninth Congress (1985–1986), corresponding exactly to Reagan's embrace of tort reform, did episodes of support for tort reform surge in Congress to levels rivaling, and sometimes surpassing, proposals targeting federal rights.

In order to test systematically the relationship between legislator party and legislator support for anti–private enforcement proposals, we use negative binomial count models. We code 0 for Democrats and 1 for Republicans. We employ Congress fixed effects to address the possibility of potential confounding factors, including the political and public salience of the private enforcement issue, the lobbying priorities of business and state governments that may wish to reduce private enforcement pressures, and election cycles. This approach leverages only variation in the relationship between legislators' party and their votes within Congresses to estimate the effects of party.

We suggest in Section II.A that the Reagan administration's fee bill appeared to mark an important juncture in the Republican Party's anti–private enforcement campaign. The congressional session corresponding to Reagan's first two years in office was the first session of Congress in our data set in which Republican support for anti-litigation proposals exceeded Democratic support. In our statistical models, we subset the data by time periods in order to assess the effect of party before and after Reagan's assumption of office.

We estimate separate negative binomial count models for (1) the pooled number of episodes of support for all five types of anti-litigation provisions; (2) the aggregation of proposals to reduce damages and fees (monetary recoveries); and (3) the aggregation of proposals to change class action, sanctions, and offer of judgment rules (procedural rules). We discuss modeling specifications and choices in the Appendix. In Table 1, we estimate the effects of legislator party on support for anti–private enforcement provisions for the period from 1973 to 1980. We find no statistically significant party effect in either the model for pooled episodes or the model for monetary recoveries. We do, however, find a statistically significant effect with respect to procedural provisions. Yet the sign on the
coefficient reflects that *Democrats* were more likely to support such bills. We do not make much of this result because only about 4% of members per Congress sponsored such a bill during this period—procedure had not yet emerged as a locus of significant bill activity. The key point is that prior to Reagan, litigation reform was an area of scarce legislative activity, and to the extent that it was an issue, it was not a Republican issue.

Table 1: Negative Binomial Model of Legislator Support for Anti–Private Enforcement Provisions with Congress Fixed Effects, 1973–1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Bills</th>
<th>Monetary Recoveries</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-.235</td>
<td>-26%</td>
<td>-.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.176)</td>
<td>(.528)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Congress fixed effects not displayed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Bills</th>
<th>Monetary Recoveries</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>2154</td>
<td>2154</td>
<td>2154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. Dev. $R^2$</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**.01; *<.05

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator

In Table 2, we estimate the same model for the 1981–2010 period. Things change greatly. The party variable is statistically significant in the expected direction in all three models: all types of provisions pooled, those reducing monetary recoveries only, and those affecting procedural issues only. In the All Bills model, moving from Democratic to Republican is associated with an increase in legislators’ predicted count by 222%. The figure is 216% in the Monetary Recoveries model and 274% in the Procedure model. Interestingly, the effect of party on the level of support is highest among the procedural provisions.
Table 2: Negative Binomial Model of Legislator Support for Anti–Private Enforcement Provisions with Congress Fixed Effects, 1981–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bills</td>
<td>1.17**</td>
<td>222%</td>
<td>1.15**</td>
<td>216%</td>
<td>1.32**</td>
<td>274%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoveries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Congress fixed effects not displayed)

N= 8093
Adj. Dev. R²= .26 .22 .42

**.01; *.05
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator

Our negative binomial models pool data over about thirty years, raising two obvious questions: First, is the party effect present throughout this period? Second, has its magnitude changed over time? In order to answer these questions, we summarize the results from a series of models over time in Table 3. We aggregated the two Congresses associated with each presidential term from 1981 to 2008 (Ronald Reagan's first term to George W. Bush's second term). The marginal effects column reflects the percent increase in legislators’ predicted count moving from Democratic to Republican. Table 3 shows that, with respect to the fees and damages bills, the party effects are significant within each of the seven presidential terms. The magnitude of the party effect grew over the Reagan-Bush years and peaked in Bill Clinton's first term; it has since declined, though it remains large. In contrast, the effect of party on legislators' support for anti-litigation procedural items took slightly longer to emerge. There was no statistically significant effect with respect to the procedural items in Reagan's first term. By his second term, however, the party effect emerged as durably statistically significant, and by the 2000s, it was actually larger than the effect for monetary recoveries.

50 Our data do not yet extend through President Obama's first administration.
C. The Failure of the Legislative Project of Litigation Reform

The legislative project of litigation reform mounted by the Republican Party was largely a failure. Reagan's fee bill was unable to gain traction, even in the Republican-controlled Senate. Numerous proposals by congressional Republicans fared little better in the ensuing years, even when Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress. Some were trans-substantive bills that would have cut across the whole landscape of the litigation state, including bills requiring federal courts to award attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants in all civil actions or to impose a general loser-pays fee-shifting rule. Another trans-substantive proposal would have capped punitive damages in all civil actions in federal court against small businesses, while increasing the burden of proof for establishing entitlement to such damages.

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Table 3: Negative Binomial Coefficients for Legislator Party in Models of Legislator Support for Anti–Private Enforcement Provisions, with Congress Fixed Effects, by Presidential Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reagan I (1981–1984)</td>
<td>.450**</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>.478**</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan II (1985–1988)</td>
<td>.806**</td>
<td>124%</td>
<td>.799**</td>
<td>122%</td>
<td>.982*</td>
<td>167%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton I (1993–1996)</td>
<td>1.77**</td>
<td>487%</td>
<td>2.0**</td>
<td>639%</td>
<td>1.44**</td>
<td>322%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton II (1999–2000)</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>235%</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>235%</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>239%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Bush I (2001–2004)</td>
<td>1.05**</td>
<td>186%</td>
<td>.821**</td>
<td>127%</td>
<td>1.72**</td>
<td>458%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Bush II (2005–2008)</td>
<td>1.60**</td>
<td>395%</td>
<td>1.50**</td>
<td>348%</td>
<td>2.0**</td>
<td>639%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**.01; *<.05

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Many other Republican proposals targeted particularly active areas of federal civil litigation and sought to reduce economic incentives to bring cases: A 1981 bill proposed full immunity from civil damages suits for police officers who conducted illegal searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A 1982 bill proposed to repeal the attorneys’ fee–shifting provision in the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. A 1987 bill proposed to amend the Clayton Act to reduce the amount recoverable in many private antitrust actions from treble to actual damages. A 1992 bill proposed to eliminate class actions under the Truth in Lending Act.

Although a substantial majority of the Republicans’ procedural proposals would have amended specific statutes, some were trans-substantive. Of 25 trans-substantive procedural bills in our data, 14 were proposals to bolster sanctions under Rule 11, and a substantial majority of these sought to reverse the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 by making sanctions mandatory rather than discretionary. The remaining 11 bills targeted Rule 23, and a substantial majority of those were precursors to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.

Republican successes were few in number. Three are well known: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). We do not diminish the significance of these laws. However, excluding the jurisdictional provisions of CAFA, which themselves do not directly affect federal rights, the three are narrowly focused.

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54 H.R. 4259 proposed to amend titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code to eliminate, and provide an alternative to, the exclusionary rule in Federal criminal proceedings. H.R. 4259, 97th Cong. (1981).
63 CAFA significantly increased the number of state law class actions that were governed by a trans-substantive and ever-more-conservative federal class action jurisprudence. It therefore may have encouraged anti–private enforcement class action jurisprudence that also governs enforcement of federal rights.
Beyond these major laws, only eight more Republican-proposed litigation reform bills in our database passed. More telling than their number is how limited the bills were in substantive scope. They included three antitrust bills limiting multiple damages: one in 1982 applying only to actions by foreign governments,\textsuperscript{64} one in 1984 applying only to narrowly defined “joint research and development venture[s],”\textsuperscript{65} and one in 2004 applying only to antitrust violators who report their own cartel activity to the Justice Department and cooperate in its ensuing investigation.\textsuperscript{66} They also included three bills limiting fee awards to disabled students or their families suing schools: two of these capped only fee awards paid from monies appropriated for the District of Columbia in each of two years, without permanent limits,\textsuperscript{67} and the third limited fee recovery by (or imposed some fee liability on) plaintiffs’ counsel for frivolous or unreasonable litigation behavior.\textsuperscript{68} In 1995, a Republican-proposed bill passed, imposing a five-month moratorium on certain consumer class actions, again with no permanent effects.\textsuperscript{69} In 1996, a Republican proposal passed, foreclosing fee awards in section 1983 actions against judges for actions taken while acting in a judicial capacity.\textsuperscript{70}

In sum, Republican litigation reform successes across the issues in our database, over the three decades from the emergence of the issue on the Republican agenda in 1981 until 2010, nibbled around the edges of the litigation state. They did not challenge it. To understand the substantial failure of the legislative project of litigation reform, it is useful to observe a couple of institutional factors that make retrenchment of rights difficult. An institutionally fragmented American separation of powers system empowers many actors to block legislative reform, making legislative change difficult

on contentious issues and leading to the stickiness of the status quo.\textsuperscript{71} This is especially true when the legal change sought involves divesting groups of existing rights, and even more so when those rights enjoy a broad base of support in the polity.\textsuperscript{72} The phenomenon of “negativity bias” (or an “endowment effect”) means that people are substantially more likely to mobilize to avoid losses of existing rights and interests, as compared to securing new ones. It also leads voters to be more likely to punish politicians who have impaired their interests than to reward politicians who have benefited them, making retrenchment electorally hazardous. Politicians well understand this dynamic.\textsuperscript{73}

These forces make a private enforcement status quo, once constructed, extremely difficult to retrench. A number of high-ranking members of the Reagan administration regarded the political costs of the move to retrench private enforcement as much too high. They foresaw opponents successfully turning the battle into one over the preservation of substantive rights protected by the statutes to be amended—rights to be free of racial and gender discrimination, to be shielded from predatory business practices, to drink clean water, and to breathe clean air. The same forces frustrated the administration’s efforts to build a coalition behind a retrenchment bill.

Attorney General William French Smith observed that striking too severely at attorneys’ fee awards risked “excessive controversy.”\textsuperscript{74} He emphasized that in the public-relations battle, the Administration would be cast as “anti” rights, citing as examples attacks by civil rights and environmental groups.\textsuperscript{75} Opponents of the proposal would be able to beat it back with “the rhetoric of rights and Justice,” as one supporter put it.\textsuperscript{76} Smith also observed that the timing of the bill seemed particularly bad with an election on the horizon.\textsuperscript{77} When the bill was sent to be cleared in


\textsuperscript{73} Pierson, supra note 72, at 39-46; Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 72, at 1560-62. See generally Hacker, supra note 72.

\textsuperscript{74} Memorandum from William French Smith, Att’y Gen., to The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy 5 (June 15, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 2.

\textsuperscript{76} Greve, supra note 22, at 104.

\textsuperscript{77} See Memorandum from William French Smith to The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, supra note 74, at 2.
December 1983, Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, echoed Attorney General Smith’s skepticism and stated that he was “deeply concerned” that it would “open another front in the ongoing battle over our record” concerning the rights of “minorities, the poor, and the aged.”

The political difficulty of retrenching existing rights was also evident in the failure of the administration’s strategy for building a coalition around the bill. Although the administration naturally anticipated opposition from public interest groups and plaintiffs’ lawyers, it expected support from both states and business. With respect to states, it anticipated support because the bill would preserve state and city tax resources against fee awards and reduce incentives for suits against states and cities. However, two of the three groups representing state and city officials, whose support the administration sought, either declined to support the bill or threatened to oppose it publicly. To at least some officials, given the broad popularity of the rights that the fee bill would reach, the prospect of avoiding some of the costs of litigation was not sufficient to warrant the political hazards of supporting it.

Perhaps more surprising, the fee proposal threatened, as one administration strategy memo put it, to provoke the “wrath of the small business community,” which is an important part of the Republican coalition. Ironically, small businesses had themselves developed an interest in fee awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, a law spearheaded by both Republicans and business that provides fee awards for small businesses (among others) that prevail against the federal government in proceedings in which they challenge the legitimacy of federal regulatory actions. When the fee-cap

78 Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Richard G. Darman, Assistant to the President (Dec. 16, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). For additional expressions of this concern, see Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Richard G. Darman, Assistant to the President & Deputy to the Chief of Staff (Sept. 21, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).

79 Farhang, supra note 19, at 26-29; Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, to Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Oct. 27, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library); see, e.g., Memorandum from Mike Horowitz to Lee Verstandig & Rick Neal (Oct. 19, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library); Memorandum from Mike Horowitz to Dick Hauser & Bob Kabel, supra note 38.

80 Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose to Edward C. Schmults, supra note 79; see also Memorandum from Michael J. Horowitz to David A. Stockman & Edwin Harper, supra note 39; Memorandum from William French Smith to The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, supra note 74.

bill became public, small business groups came out strenuously against it, accusing the administration of “break[ing] faith with the small business community.”

In light of the overall political calculus surrounding retrenchment of existing rights, it is not surprising that the fee-capping bill was ultimately unable to attract the support of moderates in Congress, including moderate Republicans. Even if they were inclined to join the administration’s attack on the private enforcement infrastructure, the political and electoral calculus was against it. After the bill’s initial failure, the administration developed a compromise version in an effort to enlarge support. In 1984, a Republican-controlled Senate committee held hearings on the bill. The committee chairman, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, described statutory fee-shifting rules as creating “exorbitant windfalls for lawyers,” leading to an “explosion of litigation” that had “clogged the courts.” Hatch, however, was unable to muster support from even his own Republican-controlled committee, where the bill died.

D. The Alternative Pathway of Courts

Many scholars have observed that the Reagan administration’s law reform objectives were profoundly inhibited by Democratic control of one or both chambers of Congress. One particular strand of work is relevant to the long-run inter-institutional story of litigation reform we tell in this Article. That strand argues, we believe persuasively, that the Reagan administration saw the federal judiciary as an important alternative avenue to effect legal change that could not be accomplished through Congress. As Professor Graber put it, “[t]he Reagan administration sought to achieve its social agenda primarily by staffing the Justice department and judiciary with movement conservatives.” It sought thereby to lay the foundation for law

83 See Decker, supra note 21, at 184; Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose to Edward C. Schmults, supra note 79; Memorandum from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President (Oct. 31, 1983) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
85 See supra note 36.
86 Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 63 (1993); see also Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan 285-358 (1997); Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S.
reform through federal litigation and federal judges—without the aid of legislators. Although this claim has generally focused on the administration's constitutional commitments, we argue that the strategy played out on the issue of litigation reform as well.

Writing to then-Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults expressed both his skepticism that Congress could achieve litigation reform via statutory amendment, and his optimism that the Supreme Court could achieve the underlying goals via statutory interpretation. About the Reagan fee bill, he wrote:

> From a political standpoint, . . . it is probable that a serious fee reform bill would sharply divide Congress . . . [and] like other controversial legislation, it is unlikely that the bill would be enacted into law. . . . As in the past, real progress in curtailing abuses in the award of attorneys' fees is likely to be gained through the Supreme Court, where we have enjoyed considerable success in recent years. . . . An administration fee reform bill will bring to the public eye many of the policies we have been espousing before the courts.\(^8\)

Schmults went on to detail successful efforts by the Justice Department to curtail statutory fee awards in civil rights, employment, and environmental litigation in federal courts, including the Supreme Court. In the next Part, we show that Schmults was correct.

### III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE

#### A. The Existing Literature

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence affecting private litigation has been a frequent topic of attention by scholars, particularly over the last decade. Although some of the literature has focused on civil rights and other areas in which Congress has sought to promote private enforcement of federal law,\(^8\) other articles have broadened the field of inquiry to include court

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\(^8\) Memorandum from Edward C. Schmults to Edwin Meese III, supra note 83, at 3.

\(^8\) See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 185.
access more generally. This literature has usually focused on the recent past, particularly the Rehnquist Court. Much of it asserts or assumes that the phenomenon in question is a manifestation of the ideological preferences of an increasingly conservative Supreme Court. With a few notable exceptions, there has been little attention to other possible influences on the results. None of the work of which we are aware deploys statistical analysis of systematic data.

Perhaps the most comprehensive contribution to this literature is Professor Andrew Siegel’s interesting article arguing that hostility to litigation best explains the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. The author starts by surveying various scholarly attempts to capture the distinctive attributes of the Rehnquist Court (or Courts, as some scholars see two, and a few three, distinct periods during Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice), including federalism, advancement of conservative social and political values, judicial supremacy, and others. He argues that some of those accounts are “under-theorized” and that all of them miss one unifying theme in the Court’s jurisprudence in the Rehnquist years, namely, hostility to litigation—a theme that helps to explain some otherwise inconsistent results.

Although Professor Siegel is generally careful not to exclude the operation of other influences, he does not deal seriously with institutional considerations, such as the role of precedent and attention to the state of the docket of the lower federal courts. Moreover, his references to the

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91 But see Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 823-40 (2011) (exploring a phenomenon the author calls “judicial backlash” and arguing that judicial concerns about overcrowded dockets and inadequate resources may cause the judiciary to seek to thwart congressional private-enforcement regimes through statutory interpretation and judicial control of procedure, particularly if the claims involved are otherwise disfavored); Siegel, supra note 89, at 1145-17.
92 But cf. Epstein et al., supra note 90, at 1448-70 (reporting the authors’ analysis of data to test various claims about the business friendliness of the Roberts Court).
93 See generally Siegel, supra note 89.
94 See generally id.
95 Id. at 1104.
96 See id. at 1112-16.
97 See id. at 1152-53.
98 See id. at 1168.
“pointillist” approach he takes signal realization that his data are not systematic, at least as presented. Indeed, for some of the areas he discusses, the selection seems designed to make his points.

We are particularly interested in Professor Siegel's empirical claims about the role that liberal Justices have played in the phenomenon he describes. Refusing to assume that possible connections between “the Court’s hostility to litigation and the Justices’ instinctual distaste for the modern plaintiffs’ bar . . . stem directly or even principally from partisan politics,” the author adduces the “frequent participation—and occasional leadership—of the Court’s more liberal members in shaping a Court fundamentally hostile to litigation” as evidence of the need for a “more nuanced explanation.” He argues that any “prior ideological commitments” underlying the Court’s hostility to litigation ‘are just as likely to stem from the Justices’ class position or professional and educational experiences as from their partisan political allegiance.” We agree that the Justices’ ideological preferences need not stem from “partisan political allegiance,” although they may do so. But such a strong claim about liberal Justices’ role “in shaping” a hostile Court cries out for systematic evidence. In that regard, we note the author’s conclusion that “the political valence of the Court’s decisions seems sufficiently correlated to the results of the case to demand careful historical consideration.”

B. The Justices’ Votes in Private Enforcement Cases

We endeavored to collect systematic data with which to evaluate the voting behavior of Justices concerning private enforcement (defined to include access to court). We identified issues that have been commonly associated with private enforcement, including in the literature discussed above. For the period from 1970 to 2013, we identified all Supreme Court decisions requiring Justices to vote on (1) the existence or scope of a private right of action, either express or implied; (2) whether a party has standing to sue, under either Article III or prudential analysis; (3) the availability of

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99 Id. at 1097, 1149, 1202.
100 See id. at 1118, 1124-29.
101 Id. at 1116.
102 See Yeazell, supra note 34, at 1788 (“The recently concluded 2012 presidential campaign was the first in decades in which the topic of civil litigation appeared neither in party platforms nor in the candidates’ stump speeches.”).
103 Siegel, supra note 89, at 1200.
104 The data collection occurred before all 2013 cases had become available, and thus our cases for that year only are incomplete.
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff; and (4) whether an arbitration agreement forecloses access to court to enforce a federal right. We regard this body of cases, when pooled, as a strong measure of Justices’ more general treatment of private enforcement.\textsuperscript{106}

Having identified this set of cases, we coded the votes of each Justice as pro–private enforcement (=1), anti–private enforcement (=0), or missing if the Justice did not address the private enforcement issue. We treated votes as pro–private enforcement if they favored recognition of an express or implied private right of action, found that standing requirements were satisfied, took an approach favorable to plaintiffs’ fee awards relative to other options presented by the case, or concluded that a plaintiff should have access to enforce federal rights in court rather than being restricted to arbitration. We treated votes in the opposite direction as anti–private enforcement. At least one of the authors read each majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion in order to assign codes to Justices’ votes.

Our search yielded 241 cases: 80 presented a private right of action issue, 95 a standing issue, 56 a fee issue, and 15 an arbitration issue. Some cases contained multiple discrete private enforcement issues across and within our issue areas. The unit of analysis in our statistical models is the Justice’s vote on the private enforcement issue. The 241 total cases captured by our search contained 266 issues. This rendered a total of 2298 Justice votes on private enforcement issues.

Our primary interest was to model the relationship between Justices’ ideological preferences and their votes on private enforcement issues. For our measure of Justice ideology, we rely upon Martin–Quinn scores. These “ideal point” scores for the Justices are based on the voting behavior and alignments of Justices in non-unanimous decisions.\textsuperscript{107} They are fluid, changing from one term to the next in accordance with changes in Justices’ voting behavior over time. Higher values are associated with more conservative Justices. Use of these scores allows us to assess empirically whether private enforcement belongs in the family of issues associated with the left–right divide, such as civil rights and economic regulation. In an ancillary analysis reported in the Appendix, we obtain substantially similar results to those presented below (in Table 5) when substituting Segal–Cover scores for Martin–Quinn scores. Segal–Cover scores are based on

\textsuperscript{106} We included such cases in our data only to the extent that they involved suits directly against the objects of legal regulation, and thus we excluded judicial review of administrative action. We also excluded cases in which the Court’s analysis applied equally to public and private enforcers.

\textsuperscript{107} See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
pre-confirmation newspaper editorials on the nominations, and thus are independent of Justices’ voting behavior.\textsuperscript{108}

Table 4: Percent Pro–Private Enforcement Votes in Private Right of Action, Standing, Attorneys’ Fees, and Arbitration Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Pro–Private Enforcement Votes (%)</th>
<th>Number of Issues</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Average Martin–Quinn Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alito</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehnquist</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Connor</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burger</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souter</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breyer</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginsburg</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotomayor</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackmun</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagan</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brennan</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 lists the raw proportion of pro–private enforcement votes, relative to total votes, for each Justice who voted in more than five cases in our data. Two things stand out: First, the distribution from lowest to highest pro–private enforcement votes appears straightforwardly to track

\textsuperscript{108} See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).
the conservative–liberal dimension. The four most anti–private enforcement scores are those of Thomas, Alito, Roberts, and Scalia. We note that of the 21 Justices listed, two of the four most anti–private enforcement Justices (Roberts and Scalia) were advocates of the unsuccessful Reagan fee bill. The four most pro–private enforcement scores are those of Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas. White and Stewart are in the center of the Court.

The table also indicates whether a Justice is “conservative” (=1) or “liberal” (=0), dividing them according to whether they are above or below the median of the average annual Martin–Quinn score for Justices in our data. Justices above (more conservative than) the median are Stewart, Harlan, White, Powell, Kennedy, O’Connor, Burger, Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas. Justices below (more liberal than) the median are Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, Blackmun, Sotomayor, and Kagan. This simple division of the Justices above and below the Martin–Quinn median maps to Republican and Democratic appointments, with the exception of Justices widely regarded as having departed from expectations: White is classified as a conservative in this division, and Brennan, Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens are classified as liberals.

Any dichotomous ideology variable is surely a blunt instrument, and we use more granular measures in our statistical models. However, looking at a simple and plausible dichotomous ideology measure is a good first reality check on both the underlying continuous measure and on our data. The Martin–Quinn median divides the Justices into two categories that do an extremely good job of predicting whether a Justice is above or below the median ratio of pro–private enforcement votes. The conservative–liberal dichotomy yielded by the Martin–Quinn scores perfectly divides our ratio of pro–private enforcement votes in the following sense: every “conservative” has a lower pro–private enforcement voting rate than every “liberal.” A second notable feature of the table is the large disparity between conservative and liberal Justices’ voting ratios. The scale ranges from Thomas voting in favor of private enforcement 24% of the time, to Douglas voting in favor of private enforcement 91% of the time, and there is a roughly continuous distribution of Justices between the two poles.
Figure 4 plots a LOWESS line estimating the probability of an outcome in favor of private enforcement, and the separate probabilities of conservative and liberal Justices’ votes in favor of private enforcement. The figure reflects that the estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement outcome has undergone a long decline, from 68% in 1970 to 18% in 2013. This decline has been substantially driven by the votes of conservative Justices, whose estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote declined from 65% to 18% over this period. The probability of a pro–private enforcement vote declined for liberal Justices by a much smaller degree, falling from an estimated 83% in 1970 to 66% in the late 1990s, when it turned back up and grew to 71% by 2013. Thus, over the full period, the conservative decline of 47 percentage points was about quadruple the liberal decline of 12 percentage points. Conservative Justices achieved a five-Justice majority in 1972 and have held it since, with the exception of a six-Justice majority from 1991 to 1993. By 2013, the Court’s private enforcement outcomes converge with the votes of conservative Justices.

Further, the difference, or the ideological distance, between liberal and conservative Justices’ voting in private enforcement cases grew over the period we examine, widening from 18 percentage points in 1970 to 33
percentage points in the early 1980s. That difference remained stable until around 2000, when it began growing again until reaching a 53 percentage point difference by 2013.

It is informative to contrast the patterns displayed in Figure 4 with the same patterns occurring in the full body of the Court’s civil actions asserting federal rights. To do so, we draw upon the Spaeth Supreme Court Database.  

Figure 5: Case Outcomes and Justice Votes in All Civil Federal Rights Cases

Figure 5 depicts the estimated probability of a liberal case outcome in civil actions asserting federal rights, as well as the estimated probability of a liberal vote separately for liberal and conservative Justices. Although there was a long-run 11 percentage point decline in the probability of a liberal outcome from 1970 to 2013, it was markedly smaller than the 50 percentage point decline in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote over the same period. Further, although the difference between liberal and conservative Justices’ voting in federal rights cases gradually widened from 15 to 20 percentage points over the course of the 1970s, it has since grown.  

109 In the Spaeth data, available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/, we used cases with the “law type” variable coded as federal statutory or constitutional, and excluded cases with the “issue area” variable coded criminal.
only an additional 3 percentage points. As compared to this 8 percentage point growth in the difference between liberal and conservative voting in all federal rights cases over the full period, there was a 35 percentage point growth in private enforcement cases.

In our private enforcement cases, as compared to all civil cases asserting federal rights, the difference in voting between liberal and conservative Justices started out at similar levels in 1970, but then grew markedly larger in private enforcement cases by the early 1980s, where it stabilized until the end of the 1990s. It then accelerated sharply, with liberal and conservative Justices’ voting separated by 53 percentage points by 2013—more than double the difference of 23 percentage points we observe in all civil actions asserting federal rights. Thus, the sharp decline in pro–private enforcement outcomes, and the polarization we observe on these issues between liberal and conservative Justices in recent years, do not track rulings in civil litigation of federal rights more generally. These effects are distinctive in private enforcement cases. Below we suggest an explanation for this notable disparity.

Figure 6: Private Enforcement Cases per Term, and Proportion with Dissents

Figure 6 reflects LOWESS estimates of the number of private enforcement cases in our data that were decided each year, and the proportion of them in
which there was a dissent. The estimated number of such cases on the Court's docket grew from the early 1970s and peaked in the 1980s; it then declined until the early 2000s and plateaued until the present time. The percentage of cases with dissents has been relatively stable over the whole period, with predicted values ranging between 58% and 65%. The declining number of private enforcement cases on the docket and the relatively stable dissent rate are notable for purposes of comparison with cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are discussed in Part IV.

We next construct a model using the votes of Justices on the private enforcement issues as our dependent variable and the Justices’ ideology scores as our key independent variable. In addition to the direct incorporation of the ideology measure into our model, we also assess whether ideology had a greater effect on Justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 1994. We do so for several reasons. First, Republicans took Congress in the 1994 elections and have held at least one chamber almost continuously since, materially reducing the probability of legislative override. The logic of this theory is that Justices’ votes may be constrained by the perceived threat of legislative override, and the diminution of that threat after 1994 may have widened their perceived range of policymaking discretion. Certainly, shortly prior to 1994 and in response to many of its civil rights decisions bearing on private enforcement, the Court had experienced a vigorously negative congressional response in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

In addition, there is a plausible case to be made that civil litigation reform grew to be a more salient issue in the Republican party, and the locus of more partisan conflict, at about the same time, playing a notable role in Gingrich’s “Contract with America” in the 1994 campaign, and in the Republican legislative program in 1995. Finally, simply looking at Figure 4 reveals growing distance between liberal and conservative Justices beginning not long after 1995, suggesting the need to address this temporal dimension of the data in our empirical models.

We therefore create a variable that takes the value of 0 from 1970 to 1994, and 1 after 1994, and interact it with the Martin–Quinn ideology

111 See Farhang, supra note 4, at 129–71.
score. This interaction term tests whether ideology had a different effect on Justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 1994.

We use case fixed effects to address the possibility of potential confounding factors ranging from case facts, to the clarity or indeterminacy of precedent, to changing institutional and political conditions. This approach leverages only variation in the relationship between Justices’ ideology and their votes within cases to estimate the effects of ideology.

Although this approach allows us to estimate the effect of ideology most effectively, it comes at the cost that we cannot estimate the effects of variables that take the same value for each vote in the case. Still, the case fixed effects approach absorbs and holds constant any such influence, and in that sense, our estimates of the effects of ideology are net of any case-level or institutional variables that would take the same value for each Justice in a case.

Another limitation of case fixed effects is that it uses only information from cases with variation across Justices’ votes, meaning that it can be used only for cases with a dissent. There are dissents in 60% of our cases, and thus dissents on private enforcement issues are the norm rather than the exception and our fixed effect models use most of our data. Nevertheless, the statistical models we use to estimate the effect of ideology on Justices’ votes are analyzing only cases in which there was at least one dissenter. That said, we emphasize that the LOWESS plots in Figure 4, depicting trends in private enforcement case outcomes and liberal versus conservative Justices’ votes, are based on all of our cases, not just those containing dissents.

**Table 5: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Private Enforcement Cases, with Case Fixed Effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Marginal Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (Martin–Quinn)</td>
<td>-.66**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy</td>
<td>-.51*</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1739
Pseudo R² = .39

**<.01; *<.05

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice
Table 5 reports a logit model with case fixed effects. Further details of modeling specifications and choices are provided in the Appendix. The main effect of the ideology variable is significant. Because of the inclusion of the interaction, this variable reflects the effect of ideology only in the period from 1970 to 1994. The marginal effect for the coefficient is -.09, which means that for each unit increase in a Justice’s Martin–Quinn score (which becomes more conservative as it increases), there is a corresponding reduction of 9% in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. To put this in substantive perspective, the distance between the mean ideology scores of conservative and liberal Justices (as defined above) is approximately 3.53. An increase of this magnitude in the ideology score moving in the conservative direction is associated with a 32% reduction in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote.

The effect of ideology in the 1995 to 2013 period is given by summing the marginal effects of ideology (-.09) and its interaction with the post-1994 dummy variable (-.07), rendering a net marginal effect of -.16. In the period from 1995 to 2013, the reduction in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote associated with moving from a liberal to a conservative Justice is 57%. Relative to the average effect of ideology on Justices’ votes from 1970 to 1994, it is 78% larger in the 1995 to 2013 period. It is evident that the effect of ideology on private enforcement votes became increasingly powerful over the last two decades. We discuss alternative specifications with the Segal–Cover scores substituted for the Martin–Quinn scores in the Appendix, where we observe similar results.

To attribute the Court’s decisions in these areas exclusively to the ideological preferences of the Justices, however, would neglect “the messiness of lived experience,” which teaches that judges—even judges on a court that has the final word on matters of constitutional law—make decisions based on a number of considerations, including the law as they understand it. The many unanimous decisions that the Supreme Court issues every year likely reflect the influence of law, including precedent, and the Justices’ belief in rule of law values, including stability and predictability.115

114 See id. at 47; Frank B. Cross, Law Is Politics, in id. at 92, 100.
In cases implicating the volume and mix of litigation, institutional self-interest is another consideration or influence that may affect a Justice’s vote. Supreme Court Justices are surely aware of the supposed workload of the lower federal courts, some determinants of which are canvassed each year in the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report.\textsuperscript{116} Finding a suitable proxy for what we have termed “the supposed workload of the lower federal courts,” however, is difficult.\textsuperscript{117} This helps to explain our choice of a statistical approach that allows us to control for all variables that take the same value for each Justice in the case (such as caseload in the federal courts), but that permits analysis only of cases in which there is a division of the Justices.

C. Why the Court Succeeded Where Republicans in the Political Branches Failed

The Supreme Court, which became increasingly conservative as a result of appointments by Republican Presidents over the period we study, had greater success in the enterprise of litigation reform than did Republicans in the political branches. Although gauging the actual effects of the Court’s decisions on litigation is complex, difficult, and beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear that the Court was more successful than Republican legislative reformers in \textit{shaping law} in the direction of litigation reform. The Court’s posture toward private enforcement underwent a transformation from highly supportive in the early 1970s to antagonistic today. Why did the Court succeed where Republican reformers in the other branches failed? We believe that four institutional considerations are especially important.

First, as contrasted with the institutional fragmentation of the legislative process, the Court is governed by a more streamlined decisional process and simple voting rules, making a slim majority comparatively more capable of unilateral action on controversial issues.\textsuperscript{118} Four Justices suffice to put an issue on the Court’s agenda, and bare majorities routinely win in decided cases, while they rarely do to enact legislation.\textsuperscript{119} This allows the Court to succeed in achieving policy objectives that are derailed in Congress.

\textsuperscript{116} There is a summary of annual case filing statistics in all such reports for the years 2000 through 2013, which is available online at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx.


\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{Whittington}, supra note 86, at 124-34.

\textsuperscript{119} See generally McNollgast, \textit{The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act}, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Moe, supra note 71.
Second, in contrast to legislators and Presidents who need to pay attention to democratic accountability through elections, federal judges are insulated from both, again allowing the Court to act more decisively on divisive issues. In Part II, we suggest that some Reagan administration leaders and congressional Republicans saw potentially threatening electoral repercussions associated with litigation reform and the attendant charges of retrenching popular rights. Justices are institutionally positioned to weather such charges without threat to their continuation in office. The Court’s electoral insulation and streamlined decisional and voting rules are especially advantageous when advancing a policy agenda as to which elements of a potential legislative coalition are internally divided, such as when Republican proponents of the fee bill were unable to marshal the support of moderate Republicans, small business, and state interests.

Third, although significant legislative reform proposals often present stark alternatives that trigger powerful interest group mobilization, the case-by-case, less visible, more evolutionary process of legal change via court decision is far less likely to trigger group mobilization than a major legislative intervention. It is therefore less likely to be obstructed. A large transformation in private enforcement resulted from a succession of individual Court decisions, none of which may have appeared monumental in isolation.

The last two points are linked in an important way. The claim that the Court is less responsive to democratic pressures does not mean that it is not conscious of them at all. Many scholars have suggested that the Court recognizes that its public standing and legitimacy are important to its


121 See Graber, supra note 86, at 65-68.


123 Scholars have suggested a number of indirect pathways through which interest group mobilization might be pertinent to federal judicial decisionmaking, ranging from Justices’ desire to please elite audiences, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 89-90 (2006), to stimulating legislative attacks on the Court, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. SCI. 369, 376-78 (1992), to affecting the Court’s perception of its public legitimacy, see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
institutional power. Thus, relatively broad public support for many regulatory rights, combined with the phenomenon of negativity bias, likely places some limits on the Court’s perceived discretion to scale back substantive statutory rights by attacking them directly. From the standpoint of public legitimacy, the strategy of focusing on seemingly technical and legalistic issues, such as fee awards, standing, arbitration, and procedural rules, would seem a far better approach. When the Court is engaged in apparently procedural and legalistic decisionmaking, the public perceives it as more objective, neutral, and legitimate. Indeed, the public is less likely to notice such decisions at all. This may explain the great disparity between the Court’s overall decisions on federal rights and its decisions concerning private enforcement of federal rights, with the dramatically harder turn to the right in the latter set of cases.

Focusing on welfare state retrenchment, Jacob Hacker has noted that, because of obstacles to overtly retrenching rights and programs with a substantial base of support, developments toward retrenchment in the welfare state have taken the form of strategically chosen “subterranean,” “covert,” and “hidden” processes that often involve lower-visibility decisions of bureaucrats in the course of administering a statute without formally changing it. Similarly, Paul Pierson suggests the possibility that a process of retrenchment may be “invisible at the surface” while producing “long-term erosion”—like “termites working on a foundation.” The Court’s treatment of opportunities and incentives for access to court to enforce rights over the past four decades has this quality.


IV. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURE IN THE MOBILIZATION OR DEMOBILIZATION OF CIVIL LITIGATION

A. The Federal Rules, 1938–1970: Opening the Courthouse Door

The systematic evidence that we present in Part III supports and refines qualitative accounts of the Court’s hostility to private enforcement over the last three decades, and it supports the view that the Court’s decisions have had an increasingly ideological dimension. Much of the data on which our analysis is based, however, are drawn from cases interpreting federal statutes. If one is interested in the federal judiciary’s ability to influence private enforcement, it would be foolish to neglect the legal domain over which it has long been ceded the first, and for many decades essentially the final, word: federal procedural law.

The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective four years after the successful conclusion of a decades-long campaign to give the Court power to make prospective, legislation-like rules for the conduct of civil actions at law in the lower federal courts, akin to the rulemaking power it had long exercised under statutory delegation for suits in equity. Promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, following more than two years of work by an Advisory Committee appointed by the Court, the Federal Rules merged law and equity procedure, and equity emerged very much the senior partner.

The 1938 Federal Rules were litigation-friendly. To some extent, this was due to the influence of equity procedure, with the circumstances creating equity jurisdiction requiring (or the lack of a jury permitting) tolerance of claim and party joinder and of factual and legal ambiguity. One of those circumstances made discovery, albeit limited in scope, essential, namely, the effect of common law rules categorically excluding relevant evidence on a

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128 See supra Part III.
129 Here, as is usually the case when one posits dichotomies involving “procedure,” numerous qualifications are in order. Some may view one of the case categories in the database for Part III—standing—as “procedural,” and Professor Lemos even treats decisions interpreting statutory attorneys’ fees provisions under that rubric. See Lemos, supra note 91, at 828. Indeed, it was partly to reduce room for argument on that score that we consider in this Part only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and cases interpreting them.
133 See id. at 922.
party’s ability to prove a claim or defense at trial.\textsuperscript{134} In addition, equity’s appetite for ambiguity and complexity served a hunger for justice, something that could hardly be said of the common law system of pleading.

It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the capacity of the 1938 Federal Rules to open the courthouse door primarily to the influence of equity procedure. In that respect, they are better seen as embodying the jurisprudential and social commitments of the individuals who were responsible for drafting them.\textsuperscript{135} In rejecting common law pleading, with its obsessive quest to reach a single issue regardless of the facts, and code pleading, with its insistence on pleading all facts necessary to constitute a cause of action, the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules embraced the insights of legal realism.\textsuperscript{136} Pleadings are an inferior method to find out what actually happened (and if, as in common law procedure, they are often an exercise in fiction, they are useless for that purpose).

Of course, implementing the view that pleading should play but a minor role in litigation required other means to ascertain facts that did not share the inefficiencies of the common law trial. For that, the architects of the 1938 Federal Rules wrote rules that afforded much broader discovery than had been available in equity or in any of the merged systems in the states.\textsuperscript{137} Such broad discovery appealed to the empirical commitments of the Legal Realists. But it also appealed to the commitments of the Progressive movement in American law, of which the chief architect of the Federal Rules on discovery had long been a proponent.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{134} See \textit{Robert Wynn Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective} 204, 207 (1952).

\textsuperscript{135} The most important members for this purpose were Charles E. Clark, the Reporter and Dean of Yale Law School, and Edson R. Sunderland, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School. On Clark, see Subrin, \textit{supra} note 132, at 966-73. On Sunderland, see Stephen B. Burbank, \textit{Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?}, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 591, 596-603 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, \textit{Vanishing Trials}]. For an interesting article arguing that "there is a strong connection between the rise of Legal Realism and the prominence of legal procedure in America," see Paul MacMahon, \textit{Proceduralism, Civil Justice, and American Legal Thought}, 34 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 545, 584 (2013).

\textsuperscript{136} "Clark was impressed with the [realists’] observation that one could not define what was a fact, evidence, or ultimate fact in a scientific way, and that such terms were best seen as a continuum, without logical cutoff points." Subrin, \textit{supra} note 132, at 966.


\textsuperscript{138} See Sunderland, \textit{Appraisal}, supra note 137, at 116 ("The spirit of the times calls for disclosure, not concealment, in every field . . . ."); id. at 136 ("The legal profession alone halts and hesitates. If it is to retain the esteem and confidence of a progressive age it must itself become progressive."); \textit{see also} Burbank, \textit{Vanishing Trials}, \textit{supra} note 135, at 597-98 n.20.
Industrial Revolution through a campaign for what they called “legibility”—we would say transparency. They contended that effective regulation was impossible without access to the facts concerning the regulated enterprise. The system of broad discovery ushered in by the 1938 Federal Rules conferred on private litigants and their attorneys the functional equivalent of administrative subpoena power.

Thus, the architects of the 1938 Federal Rules constructed a broad highway for litigation that was free of some imposing obstacles characteristic of many other systems. The “highway effect” was not, however, evident for many years. More precisely, a small federal judiciary managed to dispose of a relatively small caseload without evident strain for more than twenty years after the Federal Rules went into effect. A fruitful way to home in on what changed—and what may explain the crowded federal litigation highway—is to consider conventional accounts of the so-called American litigation explosion.

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140 See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997); Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997).
141 Of course, those who drafted the original Federal Rules were not free agents. On the non-academic members of the original Advisory Committee, see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1718 & n.184 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Role of Congress].
142 Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts yield the following case data for civil and criminal cases filed in district courts and for cases in the courts of appeals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civil Cases</th>
<th>District Courts</th>
<th>Courts of Appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>Authorized Judgeships</td>
<td>Total Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>34,200</td>
<td>33,221</td>
<td>186, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>52,568</td>
<td>37,437</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28,359 OPA cases)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>54,622</td>
<td>33,739</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>57,521</td>
<td>28,137</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>87,321</td>
<td>38,003</td>
<td>394, 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to those accounts, the tremendous increase in civil cases in the 1970s\textsuperscript{143} was the product of a litigious population, an imperial judiciary, and an entrepreneurial bar.\textsuperscript{144} Whatever one thinks of the empirical basis for such accounts,\textsuperscript{145} within them lies an important clue to the willingness and ability of more and more American individuals and firms to sue in federal court. The American bar did not wake up in 1970 and decide to become more entrepreneurial. Contingent fee arrangements “have a long history in the United States.”\textsuperscript{146} Court decisions in the 1970s did disassemble some restrictive and anti-competitive rules of a self-regulating profession.\textsuperscript{147} Much more important, however, was the fact that Congress provided incentives that made certain types of litigation which had not been financially feasible—or, if feasible, not sufficiently rewarding even on a contingent fee basis—promising opportunities for the investment of lawyers’ time and money.\textsuperscript{148}

Financial incentives, intended to encourage lawyers to represent those Congress endowed with a host of new statutory social and economic rights, were cabined by the substantive reach of the statutes providing them. In 1966, however, the rulemaking process produced amendments to Rule 23 that substantially expanded the scope of a trans-substantive financial incentive. That is because the 1966 amendments enlarged, potentially enormously, the domain of damages class actions, and such actions are subject to a judicially developed exception to the American Rule on fee shifting that permits one who has created a common fund to be reimbursed out of the fund.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{143} See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
\textsuperscript{144} See FARHANG, supra note 4, at 13-14, 69.
\textsuperscript{145} “Notwithstanding a decades-long organized campaign by American business to demonize lawyers and litigation, there is robust empirical evidence supporting [Professor Robert] Kagan’s observation that ‘[m]any, perhaps most, Americans are reluctant to sue . . . .’” Burbank et al., supra note 7, at 646 (quoting KAGAN, supra note 13, at 34).
\textsuperscript{146} See Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 744 (2002).
\textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382, 384 (1977) (striking down Arizona’s ban on lawyer advertising); Burbank et al., supra note 7, at 647.
\textsuperscript{148} See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. For an interesting and valuable account of the development of the plaintiffs’ bar as a business and the rhetorical challenges thereby posed for its champions in responding to anti-lawyer attacks, see Yeazell, supra note 34, at 1755. Professor Yeazell largely neglects, however, the role that statutory private enforcement regimes played in the evolution of the plaintiffs’ bar.
\textsuperscript{149} See Burbank et al., supra note 7, at 654-55.

As we have seen, once the power of statutory private enforcement regimes and of the revised class action rule to stimulate litigation on the broad highway created by the 1938 Federal Rules became apparent, the Reagan administration advocated, and legislative opponents introduced, bills to dismantle or undermine private enforcement regimes. But, the stickiness of the legislative status quo, coupled with “negativity bias” or an “endowment effect,” makes repealing or consequentially amending legislation that confers popular rights more difficult than enacting it in the first place.150

The judiciary is not similarly constrained—although, of course, courts are subject to other constraints151—which helps to explain why, as we demonstrate in Part III, an increasingly conservative Supreme Court had greater success in retrenching private enforcement. Moreover, the judiciary need not wait for cases requiring the interpretation of federal statutes to affect the volume or mix of litigation. Effective control of procedure ensures that means are available for a judiciary that is ideologically distant or driven by institutional self-interest to frustrate legislative preferences by constricting access to court.

1. Retrenchment by Rulemaking: A Brief Experiment

The perception that the institutional interests of the judiciary—in particular, the interest in active judicial management of a burgeoning docket—were no longer in sync with the interests of practicing lawyers, coupled with the desire to control the agenda of litigation reform, likely played an important role in the decision by the Chief Justice of the United States, who appoints all members of rulemaking committees, to change the balance of power on the key committees.152 The original 1930s Advisory Committee did not include even one sitting judge.153 Representation of practitioners declined over time, but even in the 1960s, there were never

150 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
151 See supra note 123.
152 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1714-15, 1720-23. “The risk of a rupture between federal judges and the bar was realized when, in response to a perceived crisis of expense and delay, judges pursued rulemaking strategies that either empowered them at the expense of lawyers and their clients (sanctions and active case management) or that simply disempowered lawyers (discovery reform).” Id. at 1722. For attempts by the federal judiciary to distance itself from the bar in this period, see Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 47 n.71 (2012).
153 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1714 & n.167.
more than three judges, nor less than seven practitioners, on the Advisory Committee. Under Chief Justice Burger, the key committees came to be dominated by judges, who are presumably more likely than lawyers or academics to protect institutional interests, as well as more susceptible to direction from on high. Moreover, Burger’s appointments of judges to the Advisory Committee markedly favored judges appointed by Republican Presidents, reinforcing our judgment that he sought to use appointments to influence the development of civil rules. Burger made no secret of his antipathy toward the “litigation explosion” of the 1970s, a phrase that some credit him with coining. One commentator observed that in the 1970s, “Chief Justice Burger frequently spoke out against what he and many others perceived as excessive litigation,” and that “[s]cholars have characterized the Burger-organized Pound Conference in 1976 as the most important event in the counteroffensive against notice pleading and broad discovery.”

In 1971, two months before he was nominated to the Supreme Court, Lewis Powell wrote a confidential memorandum to the chair of the Education Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, describing a “broad attack” on the “American economic system” and the steps that he recommended in response. Powell observed that “American business and the enterprise system have been affected as much by the courts as by the executive and legislative branches of government” and argued that “especially with an

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154 These data are drawn from a database of the Advisory Committee’s composition from 1960 to the present that we have compiled in connection with our next paper in the ongoing project. During the entire decade, judges constituted on average 18.15% of the Advisory Committee, while practitioners constituted 55.10%. The remaining members were academics (23.16%) and representatives from government serving ex officio (3.59%).


157 Kenneth F. Dunham, The Future of Court-Annexed Dispute Resolution Is Mediation, 5 JONES L. REV. 35, 36 (2001). Although Burger clearly had major concerns with workload pressures, his critique of “litigiousness” also had a normative valence, reflected in his public statement that “mass neurosis . . . leads people to think courts were created to solve all the problems of society.” Chief Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1985, at A21.


activist-minded Supreme Court, the judiciary may be the most important instrument for social, economic and political change.\textsuperscript{160} He further contended that “[o]ther organizations and groups, recognizing this, have been far more astute in exploiting judicial action than American business,” singling out the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and noting that “[l]abor unions, civil rights groups and now the public interest law firms are extremely active in the judicial arena” and that “[t]heir success, often at business’ expense, has not been inconsequential.”\textsuperscript{161} Powell concluded that “[t]his is a vast area of opportunity for the Chamber.”\textsuperscript{162}

In 1980, Justice Powell, joined by two colleagues, dissented from the promulgation of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules on discovery that were designed to address the perceived problems of expense and delay in federal civil litigation, deriding the amendments as “tinkering changes” that would “delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms.”\textsuperscript{163} Thus goaded to propose stronger measures, the rulemakers sought to establish litigation sanctions and case management as the prime weapons with which to attack cost, delay, and perceived excessive litigation. The sanctions proposals, in particular the proposed amendments to Rule 11, lacked empirical or jurisprudential foundation, which helps to explain why they were controversial and elicited widespread opposition from the bar.\textsuperscript{164} Indeed, the opposition to the Rule 11 proposals was so strong that opponents almost succeeded in blocking the 1983 proposed amendments in Congress.\textsuperscript{165} The Democratic-controlled House passed a bill to prevent the proposed amendments from taking effect. In the Republican-controlled Senate, however, although “a bill to delay their effectiveness was sitting in the well of the Senate on the appropriate morning[,] . . . no one hauled it out.”\textsuperscript{166}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Id. at 26.}
\footnote{Id. at 26–27.}
\footnote{Id. at 27.}
\footnote{Since blocking proposed amendments requires legislation, opponents must navigate the separation of powers and checks and balances gauntlet previously discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 71–73.}
\end{footnotesize}
From sanctions and case management, the Civil Rules Committee turned its attention to Rule 68 on offers of judgment, which seeks to promote settlements through financial incentives that are keyed to a comparison of a rejected offer and a subsequent judgment.\(^{167}\) In 1983, the rulemakers proposed amendments that were ostensibly designed to enhance the Rule's effectiveness, the most controversial of which was to add the opponent's attorneys' fees to costs as the price of guessing wrong about whether a judgment would exceed the offer.\(^{168}\) One of the problems with amended Rule 11 was that it could be, and indeed was, used by some lower federal courts effectively to reverse the American Rule by employing attorneys' fees as the sanction for complaints found to violate the Rule.\(^{169}\) The 1983 proposal to amend Rule 68 put at risk both the trans-substantive American Rule and one-way statutory fee-shifting provisions, notably those applicable to civil rights legislation.\(^{170}\)

It is suggestive of the Chief Justice’s influence on federal court rulemaking in the early 1980s that the Advisory Committee, all appointed by Burger, elected to forge ahead. It had barely survived the Rule 11 override effort and had been forcefully and repeatedly alerted to serious problems with its 1983 proposal to amend Rule 68, including by Robert Kastenmeier, the Democratic chair of the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee with jurisdiction over the federal judiciary.\(^{171}\) Encouraged by the Chief Justice,\(^{172}\) the Committee substituted a 1984 proposal that sought to obscure

\(^{167}\) See FED. R. CIV. P. 68.


\(^{171}\) In floor remarks on October 1, 1984, Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier argued that the 1983 proposal “would have crossed the line from procedural to substantive [under the Enabling Act],” and that “Congress conferred a substantive right by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award Act.” 100 CONG. REC. E4104, E4105 n.3 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).

the problems by switching from fee shifting to sanctions and from mandatory to discretionary consequences for failing to beat an offer of judgment.\textsuperscript{173}

Opposition persisted, including from Kastenmeier, who ultimately wrote a letter to the new Chair of the Advisory Committee giving notice that he was "very concerned" about the proposals.\textsuperscript{174} Indeed, as we discuss below, over the course of three hearings in the House from 1983 to 1985, proposals to amend Rule 68 came to occupy center stage in the discussion of changes in the Enabling Act process.\textsuperscript{175}

2. Changes in the Process of Making Procedural Law
by Federal Rule: Lessons in Control Strategy

The controversies over Rule 11 and Rule 68 in the early 1980s came on the heels of a decade in which Congress for the first time blocked proposed Federal Rules—the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence—from becoming effective, and thereafter blocked a number of other proposed amendments, albeit mostly proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.\textsuperscript{176} The 1970s was, moreover, a decade in which a number of thoughtful proposals for rulemaking reform appeared in the academic and professional literature, and in which a number of bills designed to implement reforms were introduced in Congress.\textsuperscript{177} In addition, the rule-specific controversies of the early 1980s came at about the time when (1) the Federal Judicial Center published a study, undertaken at the request of Chief Justice Burger, that comprehensively reviewed the arguments for and against changes in the Enabling Act process,\textsuperscript{178} and (2) the American Bar Association approved a policy that advocated substantial changes in that process.\textsuperscript{179}

Both the controversy concerning the Enabling Act process and controversies arising from specific rulemaking proposals led to a series of oversight hearings in the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives—one each in 1983, 1984, and 1985. The hearings were convened at

\textsuperscript{173} See Burbank, Proposals to Amend, supra note 170, at 426-30. For the text of the 1984 proposal, see \textit{id.} at 428-29 n.20.

\textsuperscript{174} Letter from Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr. (July 31, 1985), quoted in \textit{Burbank, Proposals to Amend}, supra note 170, at 440 n.81. Ultimately, however, the rulemakers did abandon ship. See \textit{Burbank, Proposals to Amend}, supra note 170, at 439-40.

\textsuperscript{175} See infra text accompanying notes 180-82, 200.

\textsuperscript{176} See \textit{Burbank, Rules Enabling Act}, supra note 130, at 1018-20 & n.10.

\textsuperscript{177} See \textit{id.} at 1020.

\textsuperscript{178} See \textit{WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES} (1981); see also \textit{Burbank, Rules Enabling Act}, supra note 130, at 1020-21.

instance of Representative Robert Kastenmeier who, as previously noted, was the Democratic chair of the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee with jurisdiction over the federal judiciary. The first hearing focused on general issues—in particular, on arguments that the Enabling Act process was insufficiently inclusive and insufficiently transparent. Much of the testimony at subsequent hearings addressed proposed legislation to implement comprehensive reforms that Kastenmeier had introduced. Yet attention at those subsequent hearings increasingly turned to the question whether the rulemakers had acted, or were proposing to act, beyond the limits of the Enabling Act, thereby subverting congressional preferences. The proposals to amend Rule 68 assumed greater prominence in the 1984 and 1985 hearings, as did arguments that those proposals put at risk private enforcement regimes that Congress had carefully constructed to vindicate substantive civil rights law.

Although some of the testimony and discussion at the House hearings lacked obvious ideological or partisan valence, it is difficult to so describe most of the testimony and discussion concerning Rule 68. A submission by the Alliance for Justice—an umbrella organization representing a wide range of liberal public interest groups—about the 1983 and 1984 proposals specifically linked them to unsuccessful partisan attempts in Congress on behalf of the Reagan administration to curb fee shifting. There was substantial overlap between the liberal public interest organizations (and their individual representatives) opposing anti–private enforcement moves in the legislative and the rulemaking processes. There was also substantial overlap between the organizations opposing the Rule 68 proposals, who sought to protect statutory private enforcement regimes, and the groups singled out by Powell in his 1971 memorandum as “extremely active in the

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180 See generally 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179.
181 Professor Staszak emphasizes the ideological and partisan motivation in the post-1994 rule reform activity of “Republican legislators and business lobbyists interested in retrenching tort and public interest litigation, primarily through class action reform.” Staszak, supra note 20, at 173; see also id. at 188. We agree, and we stress that there also existed ideological and partisan motivation among some who opposed the Rule 68 proposals and advocated rulemaking reform in the 1980s. Although it grew more intense in the mid-1990s, partisan and ideological conflict over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure emerged in Congress in the early to mid-1980s.
183 Both the ACLU and the Alliance for Justice had publicly attacked the Reagan fee bill. See Barbash, supra note 44, at A15; Mary Thornton, Plaintiffs’ Legal Fees Attacked by OMB, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1982, at A21; see also Memorandum from Jonathan C. Rose to Edward C. Schmults, supra note 79.
judicial arena."  Burt Neuborne, then the National Legal Director of the ACLU, described the story told by the traditional rhetoric of procedure as "a myth" and intimated his willingness to acquiesce in "exempt[ing] . . . procedural rules from the traditional democratic process" only because (and so long as) the rulemakers produced "good rules" from his perspective. Like others testifying at the hearings—most prominently Alan Morrison of Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen Litigation Group—Neuborne had in mind specific communities, in particular the civil rights community, whose views the Enabling Act process—with unrepresentative committees that did not actively seek a broad base of information—had tended to exclude.

These hearings culminated in amendments to the Enabling Act in the 100th Congress (1987–1988), which was the first in which Democrats controlled both chambers since the emergence of the civil rules controversies in the early 1980s. Scholars have disagreed about the extent to which the changes in the Enabling Act process that occurred during the 1980s and the changes that were formally prescribed by statute in 1988 should be attributed to the judiciary or to Congress. The dichotomy is misleading. A dynamic of institutional dialogue in the shadow of possible legislation yielded different results—different winners and losers—on a range of matters that were important to those seeking reform. Spurred by the rulemaking controversies of the 1970s and by the Chief Justice’s apparent willingness to consider reform, the judiciary had experimented with some changes prior to the congressional hearings convened by Representative Kastenmeier, but it was not institutionally committed to any of them until, avowedly in response to those hearings, the rulemakers finally made public a set of rulemaking procedures to which they could be held accountable (to the extent that a failure to follow internally generated procedures would have consequences). Moreover, the judiciary sought to maintain as much power and autonomy as possible. Its representative, Judge Gignoux, thus

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184 See Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., supra note 159, at 26–27; see also supra text accompanying note 156.
185 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 150 (statement of Burt Neuborne, Legal Director, Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)).
186 See id. at 28, 29–30, 35 (statement of Alan Morrison, Director, Pub. Citizens Litig. Grp.); see also id. at 272 (statement of Burt Neuborne).
187 See id. at 147–48 (statement of Burt Neuborne).
188 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1724 n.206 (discussing differing views of Professors Bone and Geyh).
190 See id. at 90 (statement of Judge Gignoux).
continued to resist legislatively prescribed rulemaking procedures, arguing that legislation would lack adequate flexibility and was largely unnecessary given the action taken by the judiciary.\textsuperscript{191} He also continued to resist a requirement of open meetings.\textsuperscript{192}

The rulemaking changes urged upon, and in some cases statutorily required of, the federal judiciary were similar to changes that Congress had imposed on executive branch advisory committees and administrative agencies in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{193} In both domains, concern about abuse of delegated lawmakers power was attended by skepticism about the expertise of those exercising such power or the effective monopoly that deference to the claim of expertise conferred. In the 1988 legislation, Congress required rulemaking committees to hold open meetings preceded by “sufficient notice to enable all interested persons to attend,” to keep and make available to the public minutes of such meetings, and to provide an explanatory note with any proposed rule, as well as a report “including any minority or other separate views.”\textsuperscript{194} It also lengthened the minimum period before proposed Federal Rules promulgated by the Court can become effective from three to seven months.\textsuperscript{195} With these amendments, Congress ensured that interest groups with a perceived stake in the subject of proposed rulemaking could both provide pertinent information to the rulemakers and serve as whistleblowers in the event they thought something was seriously wrong. Congress also effectively increased the evidentiary burden on the Advisory Committee when seeking to change the status quo and increased the window of time for vetoing attempted rule changes.

The goal was not to “control” the rulemaking function by taking it over.\textsuperscript{196} On the contrary, numerous participants in the lawmaking process

\textsuperscript{191} See, e.g., id. at 90, 100, 103 (statement of Judge Gignoux).


\textsuperscript{195} See id.

\textsuperscript{196} Professor Staszak argues that by the 1990s “rulemaking authority had thoroughly shifted . . . to legislative dominance of the rulemaking process.” Staszak, supra note 20, at 183. In contrast, we emphasize that an oft-stated goal of 1980s reformers was to extricate Congress from routine ex post monitoring. In our view, the primary brake on rulemaking since the reforms of the 1980s has not been Congress itself, where blocking a proposed Federal Rule is difficult, but the stickiness of the rulemaking status quo for which the reforms were in part responsible. Cf. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 253-64 (1987) (arguing that notice-and-comment
leading to the 1988 reforms lauded them for reducing the need for congressional action at the end of the process.\textsuperscript{197} Reform was a control strategy designed, at the least, to free Congress from regular active involvement, easing the legislative costs of monitoring the rulemakers ex post. Such a strategy has no intrinsic ideological or partisan valence. However, the convergence of attacks by liberal public interest groups and Democratic members of Congress on specific products of one rulemaking process undertaken by a committee appointed by a Republican Chief Justice, and concurrent advocacy of changes to that process, reflect a more ambitious partisan or ideological agenda than is evident by considering either element in isolation.

A study of the political origins of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) supports the hypothesis that New Deal Democrats changed their position on the APA in 1946 because they feared losing control of Congress and the presidency, and they were comfortable giving federal judges—most of whom had been appointed by President Roosevelt—the power to check the agencies they feared would come under Republican control. The New Deal Democrats’ support represented, in part, a strategic use of statutory process to increase the cost and political difficulty for administrative agencies to change the status quo, in particular the laws and regulations enacted by a series of Democratic Congresses and agencies in the New Deal period.\textsuperscript{198} This legislative strategy deployed formal administrative process in order to, among other things, empower and mobilize interest group monitoring of agency actions, and impose burdens of evidence and justification upon agencies seeking to change the status quo, thereby lessening the necessity of active oversight by Congress.\textsuperscript{199}

The changes to the rulemaking process advocated and promoted by interest groups and members of Congress in the 1980s served similar strategic goals. ACLU National Legal Director Burt Neuborne’s testimony at the 1984 House hearing suggested a goal of using process changes to preserve “good rules” as the civil rights and civil liberties community would

\textsuperscript{197} See, e.g., 1983 and 1984 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 33, 38 (statement of Alan Morrison); id. at 154-55 (introductory remarks of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier); Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier (Jan. 13, 1984), reprinted in id., at 204, 213.

\textsuperscript{198} See McNollgast, supra note 119, at 192.

define them. Under the 1980s reforms, the trans-substantive reach of Federal Rules assures monitoring by a broad swath of interest groups. Such monitoring should make it more difficult for the rulemakers to exceed their charter by providing a credible threat of whistleblowing if the rulemakers proceed with proposals deemed to be ultra vires, unsupported by evidence, or otherwise seriously objectionable.

Unlike the situation under the APA, the courts are not realistically available to preserve the status quo by policing the Federal Rules’ compliance with the terms of the statutory delegation. The inadequacy of the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting the Enabling Act’s limitations was a source of complaint during the House hearings. Yet, even though a goal of the Enabling Act process reforms was to lessen legislative monitoring costs, a “second bite at the apple” is available to “organized interests that seek to preserve the status quo” through the provision requiring proposed Federal Rules to lie before Congress before becoming effective.

After 1988, as before, it is difficult to muster the forces needed to pass legislation that blocks a Federal Rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. Moreover, securing such legislation may be especially difficult because a vote against a proposed trans-substantive Federal Rule may help some constituents or interests while harming others. It is rather the 1980s process changes, combined with other influences promoting institutional self-restraint, that make bold reforms difficult to achieve.

Although Holmes famously observed that “[i]gnorance is the best of law reformers,” he did not mean that it produces the best law reforms. Traditionally, Federal Rules were more often based on limited anecdotal

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200 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., Aron Letter, supra note 173, at 233–34; Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier, supra note 197, at 208–11. Indeed, as we discuss below, the courts have become the major venue for those who seek to change the status quo.
202 McNollgast, supra note 119, at 181. “Perhaps, however, describing the phenomenon as one of redundancy is tendentious. In the absence of effective judicial review of court rules, (the potential for) congressional review becomes the only feasible alternative.” Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1725. For the current version of the “report-and-wait” provision, which gives Congress seven months to block a proposed Federal Rule or amendment, see 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012).
203 Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885 (1975) (discussing the problem of congressional actions that “impose costs on all who use the courts, including various politically effective groups and indeed the beneficiaries of whatever legislation the current legislature has enacted”).
204 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1736–37.
evidence than on systematic empirical data. To some extent, no doubt, their epistemic shallowness reflected the time and money necessary for empirical work. But it also well served a commitment not to let facts get in the way of reforms desired by the rulemakers and those who influenced them, and the rulemakers’ wish to be perceived as neutral, making choices behind a “veil of ignorance.” Empirical study is a threat to ignorance and thus to claims of neutrality.


The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 demonstrated the power of systematic empirical data to discipline improvident rulemaking, albeit ex post, confirming the existence of an empirical vacuum underlying the version of Rule 11 the rulemakers replaced. Unfortunately, however, they were paired with amendments on required disclosures under Rule 26 that reflected the rulemakers’ determination to regain institutional leadership—an impulse that overwhelmed calls to wait for the fruits of experience. The fact that the disclosure proposals elicited a vigorous dissent from Supreme Court Justices and, as with Rule 11 in 1983, only barely escaped legislative override should have encouraged a return to empiricism, as recommended in the judiciary’s 1995 self-study of rulemaking. But bad habits die hard, particularly when they serve institutional or ideological interests.


207 Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogey of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989). But see Burbank, Transformation, supra note 169, at 1940-41 (“A ‘veil of ignorance’ may be an apt metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date. It is not, I contend, an appropriate normative posture for the rulemakers of the future.”).

208 See Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 206, at 845.


210 See 140 Cong. Rec. S7149 (daily ed. June 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (“Both the House and Senate relevant committees concluded that the bar protests should be honored and that the rules should be changed; however, tangles in our own procedures prevented the more objectionable proposals from being deleted and all of the proposed changes went into effect on December 1, 1993.”).

Much of the Advisory Committee’s work during the 1990s was devoted to class action reform and to attempts to reach out to and reflect the concerns of the practicing bar. The latter were largely unsuccessful, as proposed amendments on jury size, which were supported by extensive social science research, and voir dire were squelched by the Judicial Conference and Standing Committee respectively, and the Chair of the Advisory Committee was not reappointed to a second term.

Under new leadership and with Congress under Republican control, the Advisory Committee relied on persistent calls from the organized bar and business community to “calibrate” discovery by restricting its scope, eliminating the right to subject matter discovery and making it available only upon a showing of good cause.

One might draw the inferences from the Advisory Committee’s 2000 note on the scope change that (1) some interest groups count more than others, and (2) those interest groups also count more than empirical evidence, at least if they are persistent.

Methodologically sound empirical data concerning discovery have been remarkably consistent in debunking claims of ubiquitous abuse or excess made by bar organizations and the business community over the last forty

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213 In the last year of his three-year term, shortly before the Advisory Committee returned to discovery, Judge Higginbotham observed:

Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these suits must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.

Higginbotham, supra note 140, at 4-5.

214 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendments; Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520 (1998) (observing that “it is the persistence of complaints and questions about the merit of broad discovery and its expense that, at bottom, has caused the Committee to take another look”). Those inferences also find support in the breathless memorandum that Robert Campbell, the Chair of the American College of Trial Lawyers’ Committee on Federal Civil Procedure, sent to his fellow members in September 1999 to report the “extremely good news” that the Judicial Conference had “approved by a close vote the College proposal (substantially adopted by the Advisory Committee) to amend Rule 26(b)(1) changing the primary scope of discovery from ‘subject matter’ to ‘claims and defenses.’” Memorandum from Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Comm. Chair, to Members, Fed. Civil Procedure Comm., American College of Trial Lawyers 1 (Sept. 16, 1999) (on file with authors).
years. From the perspective of putative abuse, in other words, the discovery landscape did not appear meaningfully different in the run-up to the 2000 amendments than it had in 1980, when Justice Powell dissented from the promulgation of “tinkering changes.” Nor, alas, did the claims of those seeking to curtail discovery. An abiding lack of reliable empirical evidence did not cause them to change their tune, a strategy of blinkered persistence that finally paid off (with a different group of rulemakers).


1. Rulemaking as Democratic Legislation: The Stickiness of the Status Quo

A commitment to reliable empirical data was critical to the abandonment of flawed rulemaking proposals in the decade after 2000, and prominent rulemakers cited that phenomenon as proof that the Enabling Act process works well.

The deeper epistemic foundation that results from an open process and from greater commitment to empirical study also helps to explain why rulemaking largely escaped controversy in that decade. Another important contributing factor was the rulemakers’ commitment to take the Enabling Act’s limitations seriously, whether prompted by the Rule 68 controversies, the Chief Justice’s inaccurate assurance in 1988 that they had always done so, or scholarly literature demonstrating fundamental errors in the


216 See supra text accompanying note 163.


218 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a letter as part of a successful effort to persuade the House not to insist on eliminating the Enabling Act’s supersession clause, pursuant to which valid Federal Rules supersede previously enacted statutes with which they are inconsistent. Inflating the rulemakers’ restraint, the Chief Justice asserted that the rulemakers ‘have always been keenly aware of the special responsibility they have in the rules process and the duty incumbent upon
Supreme Court’s interpretations of those limitations and documenting the effort to change them in the 1988 legislation.219 This additional source of self-restraint also influenced the abandonment of rulemaking proposals and furnished additional evidence for those celebrating the Enabling Act process.220

Opening the process to diverse sources of information, anecdotal and empirical, may have triggered institutional dynamics that were less likely to operate when rulemaking committees were dominated by non-judges and when rulemaking was the product of a “relatively cloistered culture.”221 Smart people operating as part of a group may be perfectly willing to make decisions on the basis of their pooled reflections. Particularly if they can claim expertise or are confident about their power, they may also be willing to recommend bold action that they deem normatively desirable without worrying about empirical support and without any rigorous attempt to assess costs and benefits.

However, when those people are judges, and when reason must be exercised on an evidentiary record more complete than “judicial experience and common sense,”222 they may be reluctant to become involved in controversies in which their decisions can be tarred with a political label. This is especially true when the decisionmakers’ monopoly of expertise is in question, in part because the effect of potential policy choices on substantive rights is plain for all to see. The rulemakers are not courts, and rulemaking under the Enabling Act is not an exercise of judicial power


219 See, e.g., Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 130, at 1023; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1029-36. The latter article discussed the legislative history of the 1988 statutory reforms, which clearly signaled congressional unhappiness with the way in which the Supreme Court had interpreted the Enabling Act’s limitations.

We have, then, a situation in which the body responsible for developing amendments to legislation sought through detailed legislative history to guard against the assumption that similar statutory language should be given the same meaning by the courts, while the expectations of the other body in that regard remain unclear.

Id. at 1035.

220 See Burbank, Role of Congress, supra note 141, at 1737 (discussing abandonment of proposals “to address in Federal Rules problems stemming from duplicative or overlapping class actions”); Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 519-21 (same).


under Article III. It is essentially a legislative activity, not a judicial activity, and federal judges are understandably reluctant to be seen as active participants in a political process. Although Chief Justice Burger did not succeed in extricating the Supreme Court from the Enabling Act process in the 1980s, Justices have been at pains to distance the Court from responsibility for the content of Federal Rules. Finally (and relatedly), we believe that the influence of these institutional dynamics may depend on the qualities of those who lead the rulemaking committees. In that regard, during most of the period since 2000, perhaps the three most influential rulemakers for these purposes all had close ties to academia, which houses an audience likely to notice and reprove rulemaking proposals that lack empirical foundation, test the limits of the Enabling Act, or disproportionately burden identifiable groups of litigants.

Thus, the 1988 reforms assimilated the formal characteristics of the rulemaking process to those of the administrative process, and brought the landscape of rulemaking closer to that of the legislative process more generally. In combination with other influences promoting institutional self-restraint, their effect was to entrench the status quo and to render consequential reform by Federal Rule more difficult than it had been in the era of “undemocratic legislation.”


225 See generally BAUM, supra note 123. The three individuals are Judge Anthony Scirica, Judge Lee Rosenthal, and former Judge (now Dean) David Levi. New leaders are now in place; the rulemakers are again considering proposed amendments to the discovery rules that are intensely controversial, and it is too soon to tell whether recent restraint will endure or was an interlude in an ongoing struggle for power. For comments on the current proposed amendments—an astonishing number of them, exceeding 2350—and transcripts of the public hearings, see Proposed Amendments Published for Public Comment, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed-amendments.aspx (last visited May 12, 2014).

226 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978) (book review). Professor Freer recently criticized the rulemakers for hyperactivity, most of which in his opinion is aimed at trivia. He attributed the dearth of substantial rulemaking to a combination of four influences: uncertainty about the Enabling Act’s limitations, “congressional intermeddling,”
As one example, the rulemakers have recurrently flirted with proposals to tighten up the pleading rules in the years after the Supreme Court’s resounding 1957 defense of notice pleading in *Conley v. Gibson.* Even after two subsequent Supreme Court decisions that could be viewed as inviting rulemaking on the subject, however, they concluded that the game was not worth the candle, probably because any such proposal would generate significant controversy with inescapable political overtones.

As another example, starting in 2006, the rulemakers considered whether they should pursue potentially significant changes to Rule 56 on summary judgment. Conscious of potential Enabling Act objections and assured political controversy, however, they focused on proposals ostensibly designed to improve the process for ruling on summary judgment motions. They abandoned the most prominent of those proposals when testimony and written comments from numerous witnesses, including trial court judges, and empirical data demonstrated that it might not yield the benefits sought and could have a statistically significant adverse effect on plaintiffs in civil rights and employment discrimination litigation. Although cited by rulemakers as an example of the Enabling Act process working, the experience contributed to Gregory Joseph’s description of the rulemakers as having an “instinct for the capillary.”

—Richard D. Freer, *The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking,* 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 450 (2013). We regard this account as historically tone deaf and institutionally naïve. For instance, it ignores the controversies and rulemaking excesses that led to the process reforms of the 1980s, and the Chief Justice’s 1988 letter to Congress. The report-and-wait provision in the Enabling Act has always permitted Congress to “look over the [rulemakers’] shoulder,” id. at 473, and a major goal animating the 1988 reforms was to enable Congress to disengage. In addition, the account’s seeming celebration of closed-door rulemaking is both historically inaccurate and, in 2013, puzzling.

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229 See Burbank, *Transformation,* supra note 169, at 1953-54; Marcus, supra note 217, at 646; see also Stephen B. Burbank, *Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure,* 93 JUDICATURE 109, 117 (2009) [hereinafter Burbank, *Pleading and Dilemmas*] ("[O]nce entrenched . . . [notice pleading] became part of the status quo and thus was highly resistant to change through the lawmaking process that brought it forth . . . . ").
231 See Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 521-24; Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Peter G. McCabe, Sec., Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Jan. 28, 2009) (on file with authors).
232 See Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 524 (concluding that the rulemaking episode resulted from "the robust, transparent, and highly effective process under the Rules Enabling Act").
Finally, by way of example, the rule makers studied possible class action reforms for more than a decade, supported by the empirical research of the Federal Judicial Center. The changes they recommended, which went into effect in 1998 and 2003, avoided the core elements of the rule and were far more restrained than class action opponents advocated.\(^{234}\) One of those changes, however, is of special interest for present purposes because it enabled and highlighted another path to civil litigation reform.


a. The Cases

A 1998 amendment to Rule 23, which permits courts of appeals in their discretion to entertain immediate appeals from class certification decisions,\(^ {235}\) substantially expanded the opportunities for federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to control the course of class action jurisprudence. And control it they have, to the point that the legal mechanism Congress chose to deal with abuses resulting from state courts certifying national classes was to enable most such cases to be brought in or removed to federal courts, where class action opponents had reason to hope that most of them would simply disappear.\(^ {236}\) It was, again, a “procedural” mechanism, this time involving the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Most of this jurisprudence was first developed by the courts of appeals,\(^ {237}\) but in recent years the Supreme Court has focused on class actions. A majority of the Court has appeared to bless court of appeals decisions that made class certification more difficult by assimilating the governing procedures to trial procedures through the imposition of evidentiary requirements and burdens,\(^ {238}\) thereby further ensuring that in most cases, no matter what the certification decision, there would be no trial.

Although most of the changes in class action jurisprudence thus effected can plausibly be grounded in the interpretation of Rule 23, particularly as

\(^{234}\) See Kravitz et al., supra note 217, at 519-20.

\(^{235}\) See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).


amended in 2003, some Justices in the Court’s conservative majority have made little effort to conceal their hostility to class actions and the lawyers who bring them. It is thus no surprise that the concept of interpretation has been stretched to the breaking point, as it was on the question of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) in *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*.

Examples from the domain of pleading provide the most vivid demonstration of both the power of the Supreme Court to reform litigation through supposed interpretation of Federal Rules, and the importance of historical, institutional, and political perspectives on litigation reform. We have seen that the framers of the 1938 Federal Rules rejected both common law and code pleading, criticizing attempts to identify “facts” as opposed to “conclusions,” and preferring discovery to pleading as the means to ascertain what happened. The Court embraced this approach in dictum in *Hickman v. Taylor*, and it embraced it squarely in its 1957 *Conley* decision, which can be seen as approval of the Advisory Committee’s previous rejection of calls for a return to fact pleading through rulemaking. Thereafter, in two cases decided over the ten year period from 1993 to 2002, the Court twice reversed lower court decisions that sought to impose heightened pleading requirements in particular substantive contexts, reasserting the traditional interpretation of the pleading rules and observing that change would have to come from the rulemaking process or from Congress.

239 See, e.g., *In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig.*, 552 F.3d at 320 (relying on 2003 amendments to Rule 23 for the conclusion that a trial court must “consider carefully all relevant evidence and make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met before certifying a class”).

240 See *Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”).


242 See supra text accompanying notes 136-137.


244 See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 90 (2009) [hereinafter Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?] (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Admin. of Justice, Univ. of Pa.).

Yet, as we have also seen, the status quo is difficult to change through legislation and, with respect to important procedural issues since the reforms of the 1980s, the rulemaking process. Indeed, inaction in the face of resurgent calls to move to fact pleading was one of the examples we gave of the stickiness of the status quo in contemporary federal court rulemaking. The Chief Justice not only appoints all members of the rulemaking committees; he meets regularly with the chairs of the key rulemaking committees. It is thus inconceivable that the current Chief Justice was unaware of the Advisory Committee’s decision not to pursue pleading reform. More generally, particularly because Chief Justice Roberts participated in the unsuccessful campaign for a broad fee bill as a member of the Reagan Justice Department,\(^{246}\) it is unlikely that he was unaware of the reality that consequential reform, if it were to occur, would have to come from the courts in the guise of interpreting existing Federal Rules.

Nor can the decisions avoid the charge of judicial lawmaking (here, judicial amendment) by the insight that judicial interpretation and judicial lawmaking shade into each other. The Court itself has provided an objective standard for distinguishing the two when a Federal Rule promulgated under the Enabling Act is in question. Thus, in order to protect the Enabling Act process, that statute’s limitations on rulemaking, and the power it accords Congress to review and, if necessary to block, prospective procedural policy choices, the Court has foreclosed from treatment as mere interpretation (or reinterpretation) the practice of giving meaning to a Federal Rule that is different from the meaning the Court understood “upon its adoption.”\(^{247}\)

The Court’s recent pleading decisions were certainly bold. Particularly when one considers that an effort to overrule them in a Congress controlled by Democrats failed rather miserably, they demonstrate the importance of institutions and institutional dynamics to litigation reform.\(^{248}\) On the basis of information provided in one case, a one-judge majority of the Supreme Court—whose members are unelected, serve for life, and are insulated from individual if not institutional reprisal—can bring about momentous civil litigation reform that would be impossible to secure from the legislature or its delegated procedural lawmakers.\(^{249}\)

\(^{246}\) See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.

\(^{247}\) Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).

\(^{248}\) See generally Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, supra note 244.

\(^{249}\) We agree with Professor Staszak that such decisions are a good example of retrenchment through conversion once “barriers for authoritative change [through amendments to the Federal Rules] rose . . . .” Staszak, supra note 20, at 188. As previously noted, however, we believe that the
Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal are a few recent examples of the Court using its Article III judicial power to achieve results that would have been very difficult or impossible to achieve through the exercise of delegated legislative lawmaking power under the Enabling Act. In addition, in our view, all of the decisions strained any principled distinction between judicial interpretation and judicial amendment. Finally, all of them involved “interpretations” that are inimical to private enforcement, and in most there was a clear divide in the votes of Justices generally thought to be conservative and those generally thought to be liberal.

Having expressed concern in Part III that such accounts of litigation involving private rights of action, standing, attorneys’ fees, and arbitration may not reflect an unbiased (in the statistical sense) view of the Court’s decisions on those issues, we acknowledge the possibility of similar concern as to cases involving the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We therefore turn here, as we did there, to statistical analysis of comprehensive data.

b. The Justices’ Votes in Federal Rules Private Enforcement Cases

We identified all cases from 1970 to 2013 in which the Supreme Court decided an issue that turned on interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, where the result would either widen or narrow opportunities or incentives for private enforcement. The search yielded 50 cases, containing 51 issues and 445 Justice votes. At least one of the authors read each majority, concurring, and dissenting opinion in order to assign codes to primary source of these obstacles is the stickiness of the rulemaking status quo effectuated through the reforms we have traced. See supra note 196.

250 See supra text accompanying note 92.

251 The Federal Rules most frequently interpreted in these cases, in descending order of frequency, were: Rule 23 (class actions) (12 cases), Rule 8 (pleading) (6 cases), Rule 11 (sanctions) (5 cases), Rule 56 (summary judgment) (5 cases), Rule 15(c) (relation back) (3 cases), Rule 50 (judgment as a matter of law) (3 cases), Rule 68 (offers of judgment) (3 cases), Rule 3 (commencement) (2 cases), Rule 23.1 (derivative actions) (2 cases), and Rule 24 (intervention) (2 cases). Rules 4, 16, 19, 37, 54, 59 and 65 were at issue in 1 case each.

252 We excluded from the data set cases that merely cited a Federal Rule, cases in which the decision of an issue did not turn on an interpretation of a Federal Rule, habeas cases, cases not implicating private enforcement, and cases in which the interpretation of a Federal Rule could not fairly be characterized as either pro- or anti-private enforcement. We acknowledge that, as a result, the data on which to base empirical analysis are limited. On the other hand, this is the full universe of cases that actually turn on interpretation of the Federal Rules and that bear directly on private enforcement. Moreover, the trans-substantive nature of the Federal Rules means that such decisions are often considerably more far-reaching than decisions interpreting the private enforcement provisions of individual statutes.
each Justice’s position: anti–private enforcement (=−0), pro–private enforcement (=+1), and missing if the Justice did not take a position on the issue.

Table 6: Percent Pro–Private Enforcement Votes in Federal Rules Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Pro–Private Enforcement Votes (%)</th>
<th>Number of Issues</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Average Martin–Quinn Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Powell</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scalia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehnquist</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alito</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souter</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burger</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Connor</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginsburg</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackmun</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breyer</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brennan</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotomayor</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 lists the raw proportion of pro–private enforcement votes, relative to total votes, for each Justice who voted in more than five cases in our data, along with their conservative versus liberal designation according to the Martin–Quinn median and their Martin–Quinn score. Although the specific ordering changes as compared to our non-Federal Rules private enforcement cases (displayed in Table 4), the distribution from the lowest to highest ratio of pro–private enforcement votes is very similar. Dividing the

\(^{253}\) See supra Section III.B.
Justices into conservatives and liberals in Table 6 demonstrates that it again effectively predicts whether a Justice is above or below the median ratio of pro–private enforcement votes in Federal Rules cases. Only Justice Souter defies expectations. Excluding this one Justice out of twenty, every conservative has a lower pro–private enforcement voting rate in the Federal Rules cases than every liberal.

Figure 7: Case Outcomes and Justice Votes in Federal Rules Private Enforcement Cases

Figure 7 plots a LOWESS curve estimating the probability of an outcome in favor of private enforcement in the Federal Rules cases over time, and the probability of votes in favor of private enforcement separately for conservative and liberal Justices. The figure reflects that the estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement Federal Rules outcome declined from 78% in 1970 to 34% in 2013. This decline occurred first with a 35 percentage point drop in probability from 1970 to the late 1980s; a plateau for roughly two decades; and then an additional 9 percentage point decline in about the past five years. As with the non-Federal Rules private enforcement votes, the decline has been substantially driven by the votes of conservative Justices in the majority, whose estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote declined from 60% to 29% over this period.
The estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote by liberal Justices declined for the first decade of the series, plateaued from about 1980 to 2000, and then increased significantly after about 2000. On net, liberal pro–private enforcement votes actually increased from 82% to 92% over the full period.

What is perhaps most notable about this graph is that from 1970 to the end of the 1990s, the liberal and conservative probabilities of a pro–private enforcement Federal Rules vote moved in rough parallel, with liberals consistently about 20 percentage points more pro–private enforcement on average. After about 2000, however, the distance between the two groups of Justices widened considerably, ending the series separated by 63 percentage points in the estimated probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. By 2013, as was true of the other private enforcement issues we analyze, outcomes on Federal Rules issues approximately converge with the votes of conservative Justices.254

Figure 8: FRCP Private Enforcement Cases per Term, and Proportion with Dissents

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254 As noted in Part III, we acknowledge that there may be variation over time in the frequency of highly salient, large-impact cases.
Figure 8 reflects LOWESS estimates of the number of Federal Rules cases decided each year, and the proportion of them in which there was a dissent. The number of such cases on the Court’s docket grew from the early 1970s into the early 1980s, plateaued for two decades, and then spiked over the past ten years. The likelihood of a dissent follows a similar pattern: it grows from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, plateaus for two decades, and then spikes in the last decade, rising from an estimated 52% likelihood of a dissent in 2001 to an 84% likelihood in 2013. Although the percentage of dissents in the other private enforcement cases we analyzed increased during the same period, the growth was by only 4 (as opposed to 32) percentage points.

Thus, our limited Federal Rules cases suggest significant changes over the past decade. The Court has devoted more attention to these issues on its docket; the decisions are more likely to produce dissents, and liberals and conservatives appear to be increasingly polarized in their voting behavior.255 By contrast, with respect to the non-Federal Rules cases we analyzed, both the number of cases and the dissent rate have been relatively flat during this period, and although conservative and liberal Justices have continued to drift further apart in their voting behavior, the growth in polarization is notably less stark.

255 Scholars have made similar findings concerning the Court’s business decisions, and a similar phenomenon may explain both of these trends: “the increasing conservatism of the Court resulted in the Court’s taking cases in which the conservative position was weaker than previously, leading to more opposition by liberal Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by those Justices in business cases.” Epstein et al., supra note 90, at 1470. An alternative explanation is that it took time for some of the Court’s liberals to realize what was going on. See Burbank, Pleading and Dilemmas, supra note 229, at 114 (describing failure of Justices Souter and Breyer to realize that Twombly could “fundamentally alter the role of litigation in American society” as “understandable but, at least in retrospect, naïve”).
Table 7: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Private Enforcement
Federal Rules Cases, with Case Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Marginal Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (Martin–Quinn)</td>
<td>-30* (.12)</td>
<td>-.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy</td>
<td>-.80** (.25)</td>
<td>-.128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 257
Pseudo R² = .30

***<.001; **<.01; *<.05

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice

Table 7 reports logit models with case fixed effects. The models are parallel to those presented in Table 5 for non-Federal Rules private enforcement cases. The main effect of the ideology variable is significant. Because the interaction is included, this variable reflects the effects of ideology only in the period from 1970 to 1994. The marginal effect for the coefficient is -.048, which means that for each unit increase in a Justice's Martin–Quinn score, there is a corresponding reduction of about 5% in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. Moving from the mean ideology score of a liberal Justice to a conservative Justice (as defined in Part III) is associated with a 17% reduction in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. It is notable that the magnitude of the effect, although substantively significant, is only about half of that observed in the models that pooled our other private enforcement issues. Thus, although there is clearly ideological voting on Federal Rules issues in the period from 1970 to 1994, the cases are characterized by a notably smaller degree of it relative to our other private enforcement cases. Procedure in that period looks different.

In the 1995–2013 period, the net effect of the difference between a liberal and a conservative grew to 62%. Relative to the effect of ideology in the 1970–1994 period (a 17% difference), it grew by 167% in the 1995–2013 period. Thus, the rate of growth in the effect of ideology for Federal Rules cases was much larger than we observed in the other private enforcement

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256 For our previous discussion of the details of the model specifications, see supra Section III.B.
The effect of ideology in Federal Rules cases went from about half the effect in other private enforcement cases in the 1970–1994 period, to about the same in the 1995–2013 period. Indeed, as we discuss in the Appendix, after 2000 ideology had a materially larger effect in the Federal Rules cases. If procedure had once been less ideological, times changed.257

Finally, we again acknowledge the many influences in addition to ideology that may have influenced the Justices’ votes in Federal Rules cases.258 As previously discussed, use of case fixed effects analysis requires some division among the Justices, with the result that unanimous decisions, where we would expect the influence of law and rule of law values to be greatest, cannot be included. Another influence that this approach does not permit us to measure is what we have called institutional self-interest. One of the Court’s Federal Rules decisions where that influence—in the form of an attempt to mitigate the difficulties and costs of seating larger juries, particularly in rural districts—may have played a major role is Colgrove v. Battin, a 1973 civil case in which a five Justice majority upheld a district court rule providing for six-person juries against challenges under the Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act, and federal law requiring local rules to be consistent with the Federal Rules.259

Yet case fixed effects analysis does permit us to measure with confidence the influence of ideology in divided Federal Rules cases implicating private enforcement. The results show just how far we have come from the traditional conception of, and rhetoric about, procedure as technical details or adjective law.

257 As with our other private enforcement cases, we observe similar growth in the effect of ideology by running regressions on subsets of the data for 1970 to 1994, and 1995 to 2013.

258 See supra text accompanying notes 113-117.

259 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973). We agree with those dissenting Justices who argued that the Court distorted the meaning of Federal Rule 48 in order to find no conflict. See id. at 165 (Douglas, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 185-86 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting). Because, however, we do not believe the result can reasonably be deemed either pro- or anti-private enforcement, we did not include Colgrove in our data set. In the 1990s, the institutional interests vindicated in Colgrove were joined by the institutional interest against disrupting courthouse construction plans that assumed smaller juries, and the combination sufficed to defeat an Advisory Committee proposal to return to a norm of twelve-person civil juries. See supra text accompanying note 212.
CONCLUSION

Viewing the modern history of federal law that affects private enforcement in institutional context enables us to see that, in the long campaign for retrenchment that began in the Reagan administration, consequential reform has proved even more difficult to accomplish by statute than have other proposed changes to the status quo, particularly because the object of reform conferred rights with a substantial base of support in American politics. Recognizing that, as Lewis Powell had written in 1971, the courts were fertile and unploughed territory for such a campaign, those seeking to retrench private enforcement turned to that institution and were well rewarded. Litigation seeking to narrow private rights of action, attorneys' fee awards, and standing, and to expand arbitration, achieved growing rates of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, particularly over the past two decades.

An institutional perspective that recognizes interactions and competition for power also enables us to see how the judiciary's control of procedure can be, and has been, central to the campaign to retrench private enforcement, particularly in the last decade. Once a major element of the infrastructure of progressive private enforcement, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became for a brief time the lawmaking territory in which a newly assertive institutional judiciary, intent through its leadership to dictate and control the reform agenda, sought to forge instruments of retrenchment. The ensuing controversies quickly animated interest groups and members of Congress protective of the procedural status quo to press successfully for changes in the Enabling Act process and in the rulemakers' fidelity to the limits of the statutory delegation. Those changes—a product of institutional bargaining in the shadow of proposed legislation and of a promise to Congress by the Chief Justice—moved rulemaking closer to the administrative and legislative processes both formally and functionally, rendering bold reforms of the sort we associate with the era of "undemocratic legislation" in rulemaking difficult to achieve.

Rulemaking is not, however, the only way that an ideologically distant or institutionally self-interested judiciary can frustrate congressional preferences concerning private enforcement. Because Federal Rules are trans-substantive, many of them are written at a relatively high level of indeterminacy and leave substantial interpretative discretion to the federal courts. Even when they are not so indeterminate, however, Federal Rules can be reinterpreted, at least by the Supreme Court, which is at no greater risk of override in doing so than it is when construing a statute. To the
extent that such decisions effectively amend the Federal Rules outside the Enabling Act process, they are today’s “undemocratic legislation.”

Whatever one’s view about cases in which judicial interpretation seems indistinguishable from judicial amendment, data from all of the Court’s Federal Rules decisions confirm that, in this domain as well, the campaign to retrench private enforcement has had its greatest success in the courts. Indeed, it may be that the success experienced in the Supreme Court affected both the content and the zeal of the legislative campaign for civil litigation reform. Thus, although the issue of litigation reform in general—and procedure as a tool of litigation reform in particular—has been declining in Congress since the mid-1990s, it is now more prominent than ever for the Court.

APPENDIX

A. Models of Support for Litigation Reform Bills in Part II

In our bill data models in Part II, the dependent variables are counts of the number of legislators sponsoring or cosponsoring litigation reform bills. Because the distribution of event counts is discrete, not continuous, and is limited to nonnegative values, it is best modeled assuming that the errors follow a Poisson rather than a normal distribution. A negative binomial count model is appropriate for data with this structure in the presence of overdispersion of the dependent variable, which is the case with the data analyzed here. Overdispersion is present where the variance exceeds the mean, violating an assumption of a standard Poisson model.259

We cluster standard errors on legislator because standard regression models (without clustering) treat each legislator’s support for a bill as independent from her support for other bills, but episodes of bill support by the same legislator are not independent from one another. Non-independent observations add less information to regression estimates than independent observations. Clustering standard errors on legislator adjusts standard errors to account for this and thereby avoids standard errors that are too small.260

For the models of the ninety-third to ninety-sixth Congresses (Table 1), and the ninety-seventh to the 111th Congresses (Table 2), we ran alternative

specifications substituting common space NOMINATE scores for party. These scores are continuous measures of legislator ideology based on a spatial model of roll call voting behavior, and thus they are a granular ideology measure as compared to the dichotomous party variable. With this ideology measure substituted for party, we obtained results parallel to those reported in Tables 1 and 2 in terms of statistical significance, direction of effect, and rough magnitude.

In the models of the ninety-third to ninety-sixth Congresses (Table 1), we had in excess of 90% zeros in our dependent variables, suggesting the potential need for zero-inflated models. We replicated the models in Table 1 with zero-inflated negative binomial count models and obtained very similar results: statistical insignificance in the “All Bills” and “Monetary Recovery” models, and a significant negative coefficient of comparable size in the “Procedure” model.

The coefficients of a count model are not directly interpretable. In order to transform them into interpretable forms, an x-unit increase in an independent variable translates into a factor change in the rate of the dependent variable given by exp(xβ). For example, for a coefficient .655, the factor change in the expected count for a one-unit change in the associated independent variable is given by exponentiating \( (1)(.655) \), which equals 1.93. This means that when the independent variable is increased by one unit, holding other variables constant, the expected count increases by a factor 1.93. This is the equivalent of saying that the expected count increases by 93%. This is how the marginal effects in Tables 1 to 3 were computed.

B. Models of Justice Votes in Supreme Court Opinions in Parts III and IV

Because the dependent variable in these models is dichotomous, we use logistic regression, which is designed for dichotomous dependent variables. We cluster standard errors on Justice for the same reason that we did so on legislator in the bill support models. We computed marginal effects for these models with Stata’s “margins, dydx(*)” command.

In the models presented in Tables 5 and 7, we included an interaction with a dummy variable that took the value 0 for the period 1970–1994, and 1 for the period 1995–2013. We explained in the text that this dividing line

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263 CAMERON & TRIVEDI, supra note 260, 139-42.
264 These models were run using Stata’s zinb command.
265 FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2000).
was selected based upon theory and evidence suggesting that the Court had
greater insulation from legislative override, and that litigation reform
became more salient, in the latter period. Considering the distance between
liberal and conservative voting on private enforcement issues in Figures 4
and 7 as a measure of politicization of these issues among Justices, the
distance appears to have begun to widen noticeably in about 2000, after a
period of stability. In alternative specifications, we moved the dividing line
for the dummy variable from 1995 to 2000. The main effects of ideology
remain significant in both models. The marginal effects associated with
moving from a liberal to a conservative Justice for the 1970–1999 period
were essentially the same as for the 1970–1994 period (reported in Tables 5
and 7). However, the marginal effects of ideology for the 2000–2013 period
were somewhat larger than for 1995–2013 period (reported in Tables 5 and
7). The distance between the mean liberal and conservative Justice is
associated with 62 percentage points in the general private enforcement
model, and 92 percentage points in the Federal Rules private enforcement
model. Thus, when we isolate the most recent period we observe a materially
larger ideological effect in the Federal Rules cases as compared to the other
private enforcement cases.

We ran the general private enforcement model (replicating the model in
Table 4), and Federal Rules private enforcement model (replicating the
model in Table 7), substituting Segal–Cover scores for Martin–Quinn
scores. Segal–Cover scores are based upon pre-confirmation media coverage
of Justices’ nominations, and therefore are based upon information
independent of Justices’ voting behavior. Martin–Quinn scores are derived
from Justices’ aggregate voting behavior in non-unanimous cases, and thus
are susceptible to the concern of circularity in that we are using Justice votes
to predict Justice votes. We note in this regard that our 317 private
enforcement issues (combining both the models presented in Tables 4 and
7) comprise a very small fraction of the total non-unanimous votes used to
estimate the Martin–Quinn scores. Moreover, a key part of what we wish to
understand is whether the Court’s private enforcement votes map to the
more general left–right axis on the Court that we associate with the
substantive policy positions that divide it. Still, Segal–Cover scores
provide a useful robustness check.

In Segal–Cover scores higher values are more liberal, but we inverted
their direction to render them consistent with the Martin–Quinn scores.
The results are presented in Table 1-A. Both the main effect and the interaction
are significant in the general private enforcement model (Model 1). For the
main effect, which is the influence of ideology on Justices’ votes in the
1970–1994 period, the marginal effect is -.42. The distance between the mean Segal–Cover ideology score of Justices designated conservative and liberal is about .36. An increase of this magnitude (in the conservative direction) renders a 15% reduction in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote. Summing the marginal effects of the main effect and the interaction indicates that in the 1995–2013 period, there was a 39% reduction in the probability of a pro–private enforcement vote moving from liberal to conservative. Both the main effect and the interaction are also significant in the Federal Rules private enforcement model (Model 2). In the 1970–1994 period, the marginal effect is -.25, rendering a 9% reduction in the probability of a pro-private enforcement vote moving from liberal to conservative. In the 1995–2013 period, there was a 37% reduction.

The overall structure of the results is the same as with the Martin–Quinn scores. There was an ideology effect in both models in the 1970–1994 period, and it increased sharply in the 1995–2013 period. Ideology played a notably smaller role in Federal Rules cases as compared to other private enforcement cases in the 1970–1994 period, but then experienced more growth in the 1995–2013 period, elevating the role of ideology in Federal Rules cases to about the same level as in our other private enforcement cases. The magnitude of the effects with the Segal–Cover scores is less than in models using the Martin–Quinn scores. This is probably explained largely by the fact that, because the Segal–Cover scores are based upon perceptions at the time of appointment but before confirmation, they effectively classify Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, and Souter as moderate–conservatives.
Table A-1: Logit Model of Justice Votes in Private Enforcement and Federal Rules Cases, with Case Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Marginal Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1 (Private Enforcement)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (Segal–Cover)</td>
<td>-2.49**</td>
<td>-.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology*Post-1994 Dummy</td>
<td>-3.98**</td>
<td>-.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N= 1739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²= .28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**<.01; *<.05**

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Justice