Human Freedom And Two Friedmen: Musings On The Implications Of Globalization For The Effective Regulation Of Corporate Behavior

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Human Freedom And Two Friedmen: Musings On The Implications Of Globalization For The Effective Regulation Of Corporate Behavior

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(Vice Chancellor Strine reserves the right to deviate from this text.)

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Thank you, Dean Moran, for that gracious introduction. I find it daunting to be here, a lowly colonial invited to the seat of cultural empire, intimidated that he is on the home soil of Mitchell, Young, McLachlan, Atwood, Shields, Bellow, Arcade Fire, and, of course, Ackroyd. But to get through what I knew would be a nerve-wracking and humbling experience, I wrote a note to myself in the text of the speech that says — “just think of Celine Dion.” And I now have, and suddenly I don’t feel so inadequate . . . . But something I feared would happen has happened, I’ve thought of Pamela Anderson and the feelings of utter, “I’m not worthy” inadequacy have washed over me again.

Now that the cheap schtick is out of the way, I’ll actually begin discussing the corporate law subject I’ve chosen as the basis for my address to you this evening. And, quite coincidentally, the topic underlying my strained efforts at humor — the discomfort Americans feel abroad — actually pervades my speech.

For those of you who came to hear me speak about deal protection measures, the proper way to go about considering a leveraged buyout in which management will participate, the backdating of stock options, the benefits and costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, or Conrad Black, now would be a good time to exit. Of course, I’ll be happy to take questions about those subjects later — well, all but one of them. But those issues are not my focus. And for those of you who actually thought I was going to talk about the connection between hockey TV ratings and the growth of private equity, you either take your favorite sport way too seriously or played it in the era before helmets were mandated.
Rather, I am going to devote the precious moments I have with you to a subject of importance to both Canadians and Americans — the effects of globalization on corporate behavior and accountability. Somewhat whimsically, I’ve entitled this address: “Human Freedom And Two Friedmen: Musings On The Implications Of Globalization For The Effective Regulation Of Corporate Behavior.” But the title has some pedagogical utility.

Let’s start with the human freedom part of the equation. Much of what makes up the most worthy of what can be called the “Western Tradition” rests in an evolving intellectual and moral struggle that involves, in very simplified terms, the following related elements. Crucially, the struggle begins with an effort to define what constitutes a human life well and fulfillingly lived, a good and happy life in the deepest sense. The effort then turns to the articulation of the type of polity that is most conducive to that good life — the just society, if you will.

A great deal of what is appalling about human history, but what is also most inspiring, involves the debate over eligibility to live the good life, or put in plainer terms, the question of who is fully human and who is something lesser. For example, Aristotle would have deemed it intolerable for himself — a philosopher by nature — to have been enslaved and treated as the property of another. But he rationalized that there were people naturally fitted for slavery. He struggled over the question of how to shape a society in which those persons possessing what he regarded as higher-order virtues and talents could be given the freedom and authority that was their natural entitlement, when
it was possible that by happenstance of birth they could end up as slaves to dullards, in a cruel reversal of what nature had fitted them for.²

Aristotle was, of course, hardly alone in grappling over the eligibility issue. Many of those who we justly regard as important soldiers in the cause of human freedom did likewise. Could a woman live the good life? Could a man without property? Could a person of a different religion? Could a person of a different ethnic background? Could a person from a different racial group? The shrinking of the “other” in the West over the last 250 years has been one of the major achievements of human existence.³ That it took so long and that the struggle continues remains a source of enduring shame.

Along with the question of who constituted those eligible for the good life came the vexing issue of what a fully realized vision of human freedom conducive to the good life meant. Did it mean leaving humans as close to the state of nature as possible? And what was the state of nature anyway, given that wealth and security flowed as much from the social position into which a person was born as from any native ability.⁴ Over time, it

³ The United States experience is illustrative. In the early days of our Republic, the franchise was increasingly extended to all white males. See generally SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005). The Civil War constitutional amendments purportedly extended full citizenship to black males, U.S. CONST. amends. XIV & XV, but as a practical matter, that task was not accomplished until 1965, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Voting rights for women were not secured nationally until 1920, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, and protection against employment discrimination until 1964, Title XII to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Now, the United States is grappling with the questions of whether and to what extent to ban discrimination based on sexual orientation. Those questions are far from settled.
⁴ “In fact, the government is ‘implicated’ in everything people own. If rich people have a great deal of wealth, it is because the government furnishes a system in which they are entitled to have and to keep that wealth. . . . People work very hard for what they earn. But without government,
became a subject of almost universal agreement that governments are to freedom, as one NBA star once said women were to men, “Cans’t leave with em, cans’t live without em.”

Initially, government was viewed as necessary simply to ensure that one man’s liberty did not result in another’s senseless murder and that society didn’t descend into brutal discord. For example, the oft-maligned Thomas Hobbes appears in a very different light when read in view of the current situation in Iraq. In a society when crossing the street to go to work or buy food is a life-risking adventure and when one’s mere religious identity marks one as an enemy to others of different faiths, freedom is a hollow concept. Put simply, anarchy is not freeing, it is enslaving, and relegates human life to the most basic of purposes, mere survival.

Of course, at the same time, it was recognized that government was itself an historic threat to human freedom. Therefore, carving out the personal space upon which government could not intrude at all, or only with strong justification and due process, has deservedly been a preoccupation of many enlightened thinkers, and a dominant theme of people would face a free-for-all, a kind of test of strength. Who knows what would emerge from that test? The people who most loudly object to ‘government intervention’ depend on it every day of every year; they have the most to lose if government really got ‘off their backs.’” Cass R. Sunstein, Economic Security: A Human Right: Reclaiming Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights, AM. PROSPECT 24 (October 2004) available at http://www.law.chicago.edu/news/sunstein-economicsecurity.html.

5 My recollection is that these were the words of the inimitable, backboard-breaking Darryl Dawkins, also known as “Chocolate Thunder.”

6 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Chapter XIII, (1651) (famously describing life in a state of nature without a strong state as involving “no account of time, no arts, no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short”).
the school of thought that may be denominated as liberal.\textsuperscript{7} Freedom of speech, religion, association, and the right to own property and to labor for personal gain and fulfillment, have therefore been central objects of protection from unwarranted government intrusion.

Much of what has been interesting in this discussion over the last 250 years or so has involved the tension between constricting government’s power to trample on the freedom of citizens to do certain things, whether it be to speak, worship, or engage in certain activities, on the one hand, and expanding government’s role in ensuring that social conditions do not, as a matter of fact, if not of legal mandate, restrict the ability of large swaths of the community to live the good life. As capitalism emerged as the Western mode of economic development, it was increasingly recognized that the legal abolition of slavery did not in fact mean that the operations of markets freighted with historical baggage did not continue to subjugate many. After all, slavery and related conditions such as indentured servitude endured not only because the state legitimated the concept that a human being could be the legal property of another, but because economic necessity often created irresistible incentives for communities and even parents to sell their children. Sadly, in too many places in the world, what can only be regarded as actual slavery still persists, and employment arrangements resembling indentured servitude are even more common.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7} E.g., \textsc{John Locke}, \textsc{The Second Treatise of Government} (1689); \textsc{The Declaration of Independence} (U.S. 1776); \textsc{U.S. Const. amend. I-X}; \textit{see also} \textsc{Universal Declaration of Human Rights}, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (hereinafter “Universal Declaration”).

\textsuperscript{8} \textsc{U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report} 8 (June 2007), \textit{available at} http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/ (citing UN figures that estimate there to be “12.3
In the West writ large — the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, etc. — just how completely to prevent de facto economic slavery remains an ongoing subject of debate. But what we can confidently say is that a general consensus exists in the West that humans cannot live a good life without an active role for government in ensuring their freedom from, among other things, working a 70 hour work week, being employed as a child, laboring under unsafe conditions, breathing air and drinking water polluted by manufacturing concerns, suffering injuries from unsafe products, and providing for themselves in their golden years without any societal help.\footnote{For example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes protections on the topics of maximum working hours, child labor, workplace safety, environmental concerns, consumer protection, social security and social assistance. \textit{Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union} arts. 31-32, 34-38, 2000/C 364/01, 364/8 (Dec. 18, 2000). Canada, having acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has a framework of federal, provincial, and territorial laws addressing social policy issues, employment, poverty, homelessness, health care, disability issues, early childhood development and child care, and family violence. \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Dept. of Canadian Heritage, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Fifth Report of Canada} (2005), \textit{available at} http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/CH37-4-6-2005E.pdf (collecting the 1999 to 2004 changes in Canadian law that advance Canada’s implementation of the ICESCR).}

Put simply, it is now widely accepted that the precious freedoms upon which government could not intrude are of little or no utility to those, who by the necessity to eat and find shelter, are forced to spend their lives in ceaseless, bone-grinding, dangerous, and life-shortening toil, leaving them little time for family life, study, prayer, relaxation, or hedonic pleasure.

As we all know, there were a wide range of views regarding what government should do about the rise of capitalism. There was, of course, that guy named Karl Marx
and his later followers Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. They had a rather thoroughgoing program to address capitalist excess, one which ultimately involved something far worse.

Although putatively anti-communist, there was also the fascist tradition, which involved the xenophobic and nightmarish apotheosis of a mercantilism directed to serve a sick vision of national glory and historical destiny. On the other side of the debate were those who viewed virtually any governmental involvement in the economy as an unjustified inhibition on liberty and nature itself, believing that if a millworker was not legally compelled to labor 70 hours a week, it was no business of government to prevent her from doing so, and conflating the issues of who had what wealth with who had talent and virtue.10

10 E.g., HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Caxton ed. 1940) (opposing government interference in the lives of individuals based on natural rights philosophy and social Darwinism). In the infamous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a New York State statute limiting bakers from working in excess of 60 hours in a week or 10 in a day. In so ruling, the Court stated:

“[t]he act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts.”

198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (declaring unconstitutional Congressional statute prohibiting interstate trafficking of goods manufactured or mined by children under the age of 14 or by children between the ages of 14 and 16 who work more than 8 hours per day, 6 days per week); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional minimum wage law for women and children in the District of Columbia).

In fairness, some of the later adherents of this school of thought were also powerfully influenced by their horror at the actual experience of communism and fascism and their fear that any major role for the state risked totalitarianism. E.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); see also Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 n.6 (1962) (“Hayek] ha[s] more than a theoretical attachment to laissez-faire. [He]
Emerging as the most successful and enlightened approach to balancing the human need for freedom to pursue happiness without undue government restraint, and the human need for freedom from economic oppression, was a far less doctrinaire and far messier philosophy, that which we in the United States associate with Franklin Roosevelt and regard as the current standard-bearer for the tradition known as liberalism. In Europe, this strain of thought is often termed “social democracy.”

For present purposes, it is useful to concentrate on my own nation’s experience for a moment. When the Great Depression hit, Americans suffered, and an opening existed for the temptations presented by communism and fascism. Too many of us in the United States today are ignorant of the reality that these more extreme remedies for market failure were appealing to many Americans in the 1930s.

saw the nazi government reduce Germany to an autocracy partly through control of the economic processes of the country.”); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7 (1962).

11 There is an historical fork in the liberal road, of course. Some, for example, Milton Friedman, described themselves as liberals because they were advocates of free markets and private enterprise. In the United States, liberalism is now associated with that school of thought which champions generally free markets whose participants, as producers and consumers, play the primary role in capital investment and spending decisions, but which also believes there is a need for a strong regulatory state that checks capitalist externalities, economic inequality, and economic downturns, while also vigorously protecting civil and human rights. The so-called laissez-faire philosophy, which involves allowing companies (based on pre-existing ownership interests established by prior legal arrangements) to proceed with economic activity and practices virtually without interference from the state in any respect is now more associated with folks who would call themselves conservatives, or perhaps libertarian. The predominant conservative party in the United States does not advocate laissez-faire and indeed may have closer to a mercantilist bent than a laissez-faire, 19th century liberal one.

12 For a provocative historical imagining of what might have happened had the United States embraced the fascist sympathizer, Charles Lindbergh, as an alternative to Roosevelt, see PHILIP ROTH, THE PLOT AGAINST AMERICA (2004).
The New Deal, in very simplified terms, represented the liberal answer to capitalist market failure.\textsuperscript{13} That answer was multi-faceted. One important element was charging the government with the task of helping to ameliorate unemployment and poverty, particularly when the economic cycle was on the downturn. Related was the recognition that government could help smooth economic cycles, through fiscal and regulatory policies that tempered booms and busts.\textsuperscript{14} As important was the enactment of federal legal requirements protecting workers from being coerced into unfair conditions of employment. Maximum work weeks and minimum wage laws were federally mandated.\textsuperscript{15} Workers were given the right to join unions and bargain collectively for wages.\textsuperscript{16} Worker safety protections were eventually implemented.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} There was, of course, a rich nuance to the New Dealers’ views regarding the appropriate shape of the regulatory structures required to address corporate excesses and capital market failures. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, (draft 2007) (focusing on Adolf Berle’s precise place in these debates). But it is fair to say that virtually all called for a strong regulatory state that would constrain various aspects of corporate and capitalist behavior that they thought were a danger to the public interest.

\textsuperscript{14} This recognition was, of course, inspired in large measure by the work of Lord Maynard Keynes.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{E.g.}, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, \textit{et seq.} (establishing maximum hours and minimum wages for employees).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{E.g.}, National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) (guaranteeing the right to collective bargaining); National Labor Relations Act (1935) (strengthening the NIRA protections for collective bargaining).

There is a geographic component to these protections that is important and that bears highlighting. Many of the New Deal enactments — such as maximum hours legislation — had been the subject of legislation in some, but not all, American states.\textsuperscript{18} The New Deal represented in some ways a new founding for the United States, in which our national government was charged with primary regulation over economic policy for the first time.\textsuperscript{19} It took a crisis like the Depression to overcome an ingrained strain in the United States, a nation in which many viewed themselves more as citizens of a particular state — i.e., as a South Carolinian or Texan — rather than as an American. The credo of “states rights” hadn’t been killed in the Civil War, it had just been prevented from entirely destroying the national union.

But the New Dealers convinced the nation that if the economy were national in scope, it was necessary that the regulations that protected citizens from market failure and excesses be national in scope, too. If, for example, there was a societal consensus that employers should be restricted from hiring children or making workers labor for 70 hours a week, that consensus would be undermined without the establishment of a national floor. Otherwise, hungry capitalists would simply migrate to states that tolerated such practices, putting pressure on workers needing jobs to follow and generally undermining the overall clout of workers to extract better conditions of employment.

\textsuperscript{18} As noted, these local measures also faced judicial invalidation at the hands of federal jurists believing that market regulations of this kind were unconstitutional. See note 10, supra.

\textsuperscript{19} See, e.g., 2 Bruce Ackerman, \textit{We the People: Transformations} (1998) (describing the New Deal’s role in transforming the United States from a states-centered governmental system to an activist national regulatory state).
In this geographical calculus, the corporation’s emergence as the dominant instrument of capital was central. Through the corporate form, powerful aggregations of capital had been amassed, increasingly under the control of managers who were themselves little constrained by even stockholders, who were thought to be dispersed, rationally apathetic, and poorly positioned to take collective action. Corporate law scholars obsessed with the protection of the economic interests of stockholders from corporate managers tend to forget that the classic treatise of American corporate law, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means,\(^\text{20}\) was as focused on the broad range of dangers that unconstrained corporate power posed to the citizenry, as it was on the victimization of stockholders by faithless managers.\(^\text{21}\) Berle and Means feared that large corporations had outgrown the capacity of existing governmental structures to constrain them.\(^\text{22}\) The weakness of disaggregated

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  \item \textbf{20} \textit{ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE} (1932).
  \item \textbf{22} As an incisive new article points out, Justice Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court echoed their sentiments:

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Justice Brandeis, in 1933, built on the empirical case they set out, deriding acceptance of ‘the evils attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism’ following the advent of general incorporation statutes, ‘as if these evils were the inescapable price of civilized life and, hence, to be borne with resignation.’ In his view, availability of the corporate form for general business purposes had been restricted for centuries ‘because of fear.’ Brandeis detected in the history ‘a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations,’ and interpreted the advent of general incorporation as a rejection of ‘favoritism’ rather than an indication ‘that the apprehension of corporate domination had been overcome.’ Observing the size to which corporations had grown, as well
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stockholders, combined with the weakness of government regulatory structures, threatened the creation of a dangerous managerial class, governing huge and powerful entities and accountable to no one.\(^2\)

In particular, Berle and Means and others of their viewpoint realized that corporations that conducted business throughout the United States could not effectively as their social and economic significance—and citing to Berle and Means’ work—Brandeis argued that the separation of ownership and control had ‘removed many of the checks which formerly operated to curb the misuse of wealth and power.’

. . . .

Such descriptions of the modern public corporation reflect deep misgivings about the corporate form not unlike those identified in Coke’s and Blackstone’s writings. References to ‘absentee owners,’ ‘absentee stockholders,’ ‘absentee landlords,’ and the like often appeared in arguments that corporations were not sufficiently answerable to the public, over which they held enormous sway—be it as consumers, employees, or communities—and that stockholders were effectively enabling their activities by financing them, without accepting responsibility to monitor how, and to what ends, their money was being used.”


\(^2\) Some scholars have recently questioned whether U.S. stock ownership ever really reflected as great a separation of ownership of stock from managerial control as Berle and Means and their many adherents assume. Clifford G. Holderness, *The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States*, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991363. Regardless if that is so, the arguably larger question would remain whether corporations, even if more influenced by stockholders than previously assumed, would present dangers to the social good, if left unregulated. In fact, one can argue that the greater the influence of profit-seeking stockholders, the more pressure managers would feel to externalize corporate costs so as to deliver a return pleasing to their employers, the stockholders. Stephen M. Bainbridge, *The Politics of Corporate Governance*, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 703 (1995) (“Reforms that make management more directly accountable to shareholders increase the pressure on management to promote shareholder wealth at the expense of employees and other social responsibility concerns.”).
be regulated by individual American states. Imagine if an individual American state — say Michigan across the river — had decided to regulate all the key aspects of corporate behavior in isolation — treatment of labor, the environment, and consumers. As a mere matter of institutional capacity, its state government would have faced the problem of regulating institutions often larger and wealthier than it was. More importantly, unless a national floor was set that corporations could not escape, corporations could have engaged in a form of regulatory arbitrage to shift their operations from Michigan to states that, by dint of poverty or a corrupt political culture, would tolerate conditions of employment that were inconsistent with enlightened thought. Therefore, if corporate power was to be channeled in a positive direction consistent with society’s interest, a strong national regulatory regime was required.

Unavoidably, the enactment of such standards involved a governmental restriction on economic liberty. The argument was made, for example, that national minimum wage and maximum hour laws prevented employment opportunities for persons in poverty who

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24 “The growing weight of publicly traded companies raised an alarm for Berle and Means. They argued that the modern corporation ‘has brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state.’ The potential social damage that could be done by the new institution was sharply highlighted by the collapse of the capital markets in 1929. For these New Deal intellectuals this triggered the need for a ‘constitutional’ approach to the governance of the corporation that would re-generate legitimacy to the decision-making processes of what was to them as much a socio-political institution as an economic one.” Stephen F. Diamond, Beyond The Berle and Means Paradigm: Private Equity and the New Capitalist Order, Dissent 6 (Winter 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004234.

25 I slight for today’s purposes, the legal constraints flowing from Supreme Court jurisprudence hostile to state regulation protecting workers from onerous terms or unsafe conditions of employment. See note 10, supra.
were willing to work for less than the minimum wage for 80 hours a week.\textsuperscript{26} But the vast majority of our citizens came to view that sort of restriction on liberty to be more than justified, given that this form of liberty was more a matter of theory espoused by moneyed interests, than one actually desired by the working poor. What was deemed preferable was to temper the excesses of capitalism by establishing national standards ensuring that workers received a minimally decent wage, had work hours that left them time to enjoy life, and labored in safe environments.

Beginning during the New Deal and accelerating in the post-war era, the federal government also took steps to ensure greater economic equality and to alleviate poverty.\textsuperscript{27} Large federal programs were created to increase access to health care,\textsuperscript{28} provide housing and food for the working poor,\textsuperscript{29} and deliver transitional assistance for

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\textsuperscript{26} Press Comment on Wages and Hours Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1938, at 4 (mentioning the prediction of Alfred P. Sloan Jr., chairman of General Motors, “that enactment of the [Wages and Hours Bill] will lead to further unemployment and will penalize the very group that it is supposed to help”).

\textsuperscript{27} Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 547 (2003) (“FDR signed the Social Security Act into law with the aim of enhancing macroeconomic stability. The Act provided unemployment insurance, pensions for retired workers, aid to dependent children, and other social insurance programs.”).


\end{footnotesize}
the unemployed.\textsuperscript{30} Consistent with the political strength and popularity of private enterprise in the United States, many of these measures — particularly in the area of health care, unemployment insurance, and pensions — were designed so that benefits would be delivered to recipients as an emolument of their employment by a particular corporation. Although these programs were far from perfect in design or scope, when combined with a robust post-war economy, they were successful in creating much greater economic equality and in reducing poverty in the United States.

The expansion of the federal government’s role in regulating corporate conduct went beyond protecting workers and curbing poverty and economic inequality. Recognition that the profit motives of corporations gave them incentives to pollute and to produce unsafe products led to federal regimes protecting the environment and consumers.\textsuperscript{31} The environmental legislation again emphasized the recognition that national standards were needed because poorer states would tolerate environmentally egregious behavior as a cost of securing job-creating facilities in their borders. Like the programs addressed to poverty and inequality, those federal measures were hardly ideal,


but they inarguably improved the safety of products and the quality of our nation’s air and drinking water.

At the same time as the United States was putting in place a full regime of regulation for corporate behavior, Europe was essentially doing the same thing, albeit in a necessarily somewhat less uniform way. For today’s purposes, though, it is sufficient to note that the evolution of the European Union can in many ways been seen as Europe’s New Deal. To enjoy the full benefits of EU membership, nation states are expected to comply with a host of minimum standards in a range of areas thought important to the maintenance of just societies in which the many, and not the few, could live the good life. These standards set a floor beneath which nations could not allow corporate behavior to sink.

For a while, the West writ large seemed capable of having it all. We could maintain economic dynamism and promote economic equality. We could make profits while improving product safety and reducing environmental degradation.

At this point, it might be helpful to observe something you likely already know about how the United States regulates corporations. In the United States, so-called corporate law is a narrow domain, almost entirely focused on the internal affairs of the

32 In the latest accession round to the European Union, the ten new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe were required to meet three broad criteria for admission. Needed reforms were categorized into political reforms, economic reforms, and a final criteria relating to social criteria and infrastructure, which included regulation “in the fields of agriculture, environmental, transport, social policy,” and other related reforms. Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.J. 15, 29-30 (2005); see Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen (June 21, 1993), at 12-16 (listing the Copenhagen Council Criteria); see also CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 9.
corporation.\textsuperscript{33} Corporate law enforcement is largely a function of the American state that charters a corporation. Its role is to ensure that the managers of the corporation honor the corporation’s charter and bylaws, and that they fulfill their equitable fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders. State law enforcement of corporate law interacts closely with federal regulation of the national securities markets, regulation that subjects a public company to a regime of federally mandated disclosure and financial accounting standards. The Securities and Exchange Commission is the primary federal agency responsible for this function and was a creation of Roosevelt’s New Deal.\textsuperscript{34} Notably, the role of state corporate law and the SEC largely center on the question of protecting investors in their capacity as investors. Unlike in some European nations, so-called “company law” in the U.S. does not include other important bodies of law regulating corporate behavior. The regulation of corporate conduct that threatens the interests of workers, consumers, or the environment are governed by other laws, which are not thought of as corporate law.

This legal context is critical to grasp in approaching a debate that pervades American corporate law. That debate is over the basic question of whether for-profit corporations are to be governed solely for the benefit of stockholders or whether

\textsuperscript{33} For a succinct discussion of the standard American approach to corporation law, see generally, Leo E. Strine, Jr., \textit{The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the Challenges We (and Europe) Face}, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 674-79 (2005). For the reader interested in an authoritative take on America’s historical approach to corporation law, see ROBERT C. CLARK, \textit{CORPORATE LAW} (1986).

corporate managers may give equal weight to the interests of other constituencies, such as the corporation’s workers.\textsuperscript{35} As one might expect, the long-standing corporate law debate in the United States regarding whether directors could consider other constituencies was always influenced — but not necessarily as much as it should have been — by the reality that our corporate law only gave stockholders any ability to sue the directors for breaching duties to the corporation. Likewise, under American corporate law, stockholders were the only constituency granted the right to vote for directors and on other corporate matters.

For this reason, before the New Deal, commentators who believed that directors, in an ideal world, should take into account the public interest, were worried that giving directors the ability to justify their actions in reference to other constituencies would leave them accountable to no one. Indeed, Adolf Berle himself, a key New Dealer, famously made this case at the time when President Hoover was still in office, believing that disaggregated stockholders were too weak and poorly incentivized to constrain managerial misbehavior and that the existing governmental institutions were inadequate to ensure that managers would act consistently with the social good.\textsuperscript{36} Berle’s academic debating partner, Harvard Professor E. Merrick Dodd, countered with the more optimistic view that empowering managers to pursue ends other than profit maximization would speed progress toward a more just society. Capitalism would better serve everyone, if


managers could manage corporations not simply to increase the wealth of the stockholders, but in order to pursue broader ends consistent with the public interest, such as full employment and higher living standards for workers.37 Dodd therefore contended that corporate resources could be devoted to endeavors that, while not profit-maximizing, were consistent with the national interest, as understood by corporate managers. Berle was more skeptical of managerial good faith. Better for corporate law to at least hold directors accountable for advancing stockholder interests, Berle said, than to let directors justify their action in reference to so many interests that they effectively could do whatever they wished, regardless of whether it was injurious to the investors’ interests.38

Once the United States had successfully weathered the Great Depression and World War II, and the New Deal regulatory regime was finally in place, Berle and others grew more comfortable with allowing corporate managers to consider other interests, because they believed that the new regulatory state, and not simply corporate law, now cabined the room managers had to abuse the power they wielded.39 In an economic era in

37 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
38 “When the fiduciary obligations of the corporate management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.” Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). He continued that “you can not abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.” Id.
39 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444-45 (1962) (“For the present, the system as a whole functions successfully; the public consensus moves in fairly rapidly when trouble becomes apparent; the government supervisory system does reasonably well at making situations apparent, and there seems to be no cause for alarm. But, in the name of
which all American interest groups seemed to be thriving and in which a strong social consensus supported the New Deal structures and reforms, it seemed less of a threat to stockholders that directors could consider other interests. As a matter of formalism, the most important corporate law, that of Delaware, gave rhetorical emphasis to the primacy of stockholder interests. But the business judgment rule gave directors wide leeway to consider other corporate constituencies, when such consideration could be justified as being in the long-term interests of stockholders.40 Given prosperous times, then prevailing political norms, and the weakness of disaggregated stockholders still facing pre-Internet era barriers to collective action, as a practical matter, management had a good deal of room to balance the interests of all corporate constituencies, without tilting heavily in the direction of the stockholders.

And, in their own words, American CEOs in the post-war era embraced Dodd’s side of his debate with Berle, articulating their own role as one involving service to the various interests affected by the corporation, interests that included stockholders, to be

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40 Einer Elhauge, *Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest*, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 739 (2005) (“The very reason for the business judgment rule is precisely that courts cannot reliably figure out what maximizes profits—that is, that a legal duty to maximize profits is too hard to monitor. And the profit-sacrificing discretion created by business judgment deference suffices to cover the lions’ share of profit-sacrificing discretion that exists.”).

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sure, but which also included the nation itself, the corporation’s home communities, its workers, and the consumers of its products and services.\textsuperscript{41}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{41} Herman E. Kross, Executive Opinion: What Business Leaders Said and Thought on Economic Issues, 1920s-1960s, at 50-53 (1970) (“[T]he old concept that the owner of a business had a right to use his property as he pleased to maximize profits, has evolved into the belief that ownership carries certain binding social obligations.”); Robert A. Wright, Beyond the Profits: Business Reaches for a Social Role, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1966, at 59 (quoting George S. Moore, President of First National City Bank, stating a business organization’s “social responsibility is, instead, inseparable from its response to the kind of world in which we live. For today’s institutions—banking, public or private—cannot exist in modern society without reacting constructively to (1) the goals of society, and (2) the economic, technological, social and political forces that mold society.”); Robert A. Wright, Steel Producers Are Optimistic, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1966, at 69 (noting that Edmund F. Martin, Chairman of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, “urged businessmen to take an active role in developing an effective partnership with Government and the use of managerial skills and advanced technology in the solution of social problems”); American Capitalism Today, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1952, at 26 (summarizing the three speakers at the National Association of Manufacturers Congress of American Industry as calling “for ‘industrial statesmanship’ which would operate our economic machine with a sense of social responsibility and for the benefit not only of stockholders but also of customers and employees both here and elsewhere in the free world”); Management Seen Facing Challenges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1949, at F8 (quoting Harold B. Maynard, President of Methods Engineering Council, stating “[t]he trend is definitely toward greater emphasis on social matters and the manager of 1949 must bring a greater sense of social responsibility to his work if he is to be successful”). See also C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Perspective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 77, 99-101, 111 (2002) (“By the mid-1960s, it was conventional wisdom that public corporations owed some responsibility to society beyond making profits.”).

This philosophy has continued to be given rhetorical lip service. Adi Ignatius, Meet the Google Guys, TIME, Feb. 20, 2006, at 40 (quoting Google CEO Eric Schmidt as stating “[t]he company isn’t run for the long-term value of our shareholders but for the long-term value of our end users”); John Mackey, Putting Customers Ahead of Investors, in Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, REASON, Oct. 1, 2005, at 28 (“At Whole Foods, we measure our success by how much value we can create for all six of our most important stakeholders: customers, team members (employees), investors, vendors, communities, and the environment.”). Interestingly, both these companies have taken actions to maximize profits that can be seen as involving socially irresponsible conduct, in the case of Google, aiding the Chinese government in preventing free speech, Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (And China’s Google Problem), N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2006, at 64, and in the case of Whole Foods, using a fake identity to cast doubt on a competitor’s prospects. Janet Whitman, Whole Foods Probes Wacky Mackey, N.Y. Post, July 18, 2007, at 33.

Although the Business Roundtable now squarely adopts stockholder wealth maximization as the primary corporate objective, it tries to soften that emphasis by stressing the common interests of
In 1970, the Nobel-winning economist Milton Friedman said all this high-falutin, high-minded talk was hooey.\textsuperscript{42} The value that society received from for-profit corporations was the creation of wealth for stockholders. If the corporation generated such a surplus, it was likely that workers and communities would benefit incidentally, of course. But Friedman believed that managers were not well-positioned either as a matter of competence or legitimacy to pursue ends other than corporate profit.\textsuperscript{43} If they did so, they risked undermining the most obvious utility of the corporate form — its capacity to

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\textsuperscript{42} Milton Friedman, \textit{The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits}, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine).

\textsuperscript{43} Friedman argued that corporate managers spending funds on social purposes were, in effect, taxing them. \textit{Id.} To force or expect corporate fiduciaries to decide where to spend public funds was an impermissible manner of circumventing the political process, and transformed them into civil servants. \textit{Id.} “On the level of political principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are governmental functions,” he wrote, arguing that it was “intolerable” that managers presumably selected for their ability to operate businesses profitably, rather than their policy wisdom and sense of justice, would make morally and ethically-freighted about the allocation of scarce resources to advance the public interest.). \textit{Id.}

\textit{See also} Adolf A. Berle, \textit{Modern Functions of the Corporate System}, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444 (1962) (“If we assume, as I think we must, that elections of directors by stockholders has become, in large corporations, a ritual rather than a reality, its legitimacy-bestowing function becomes extremely weak.”).
increase social wealth — and perverting the democratic process by having corporate managers use other people’s money (in Friedman’s conception) for social purposes of their own choosing. Far better, Friedman believed, for these managers — who were hardly representative of the general populace — to stick to their knitting. If they ran profitable operations, the wealth that was created could be, if government chose, redistributed to temper economic inequality. But it was not the job of corporate managers to be agents for their idiosyncratic visions of the overall social good. Rather, they were to vigorously pursue profits for stockholders, tempered only by the requirement to comply with laws and generally accepted business norms.

Friedman’s views were controversial at the time. Moreover, his normative arguments seemed to be largely aspirational, as many thought that the positive facts regarding the behavior of corporate managers were more consistent with the proposition that the corporation could be managed with the objective of serving various corporate constituencies in a balanced way.44 Certainly, public opinion in the United States was soundly against Friedman, with most Americans believing that for-profit corporations

44 For example, Martin Lipton argued the “system of corporate governance places the directors at the center of corporate decisionmaking and has expanded the corporation’s responsibilities to safeguard interests broader than those of shareholders alone.” Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW 101, 106 (1979). Lipton believed that it was “well-settled” by 1979 that “corporations must protect the environment, must protect the health and safety of employees, must protect the pensions of employees, must produce safe products and replace products found to have defects, may make charitable contributions from corporate funds, may spend corporate funds, or assign employees to engage in activities, for the betterment of communities in which the corporation operates.” Id.; see also id. at 119 (“After five decades of continuous efforts both to raise the consciousness of directors with respect to issues of national policy, and to impose on corporations and their directors obligations to employees, customers and communities, it is impossible to contemplate a [legal] rule” that would require a board to accept a takeover simply to profit stockholders if that threatened harm to these other constituencies).
only could, but should, give heavy weight to the interests of their workers and consumers, even when that came at a cost to stockholders.\(^{45}\)

But over time, Milton Friedman’s vision of the appropriate focus of corporate management has won out where it really counts, in the marketplace. The reason for Milton’s victory brings me to the other Friedman, Thomas Friedman. Thomas Friedman is a prominent opinion columnist for the New York Times. More recently, his provocative book “The World Is Flat” has sold millions of copies and helped educate Americans about the transformation the globalization of commerce will have on the U.S. and its Western allies.\(^{46}\) As Friedman pointed out, predictions that capitalism would break down national barriers and create a global marketplace are hardly new. As he notes, Karl Marx — the least humorous of the Marx brothers — argued something

\(^{45}\) This is illustrated by the fact that a majority of American states have adopted so-called “constituency” statutes authorizing corporate directors to resist a takeover if the takeover threatens the interests of non-stockholder constituencies such as the corporation’s workers. See Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 173 (1997) (noting that constituency statutes have been enacted more than half of American states); see, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2007); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1715-1716 (2007). Although in my view, stockholder wealth maximization is now clearly the emphasis of corporate management, the continuing public appeal of the idea that corporations should protect their other constituencies has resulted in corporate communications emphasizing corporate social responsibility. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 691-92 (2006) (“In recent years stakeholder rhetoric has permeated official corporate documents. . . . Since 2000, corporate discourse reflects a shift from the traditional shareholder rubric to an embrace of rhetoric focused on stakeholders.”).

similar in the 19th Century. 47 Although Marx may have been ahead of his time in that regard, Thomas Friedman stresses that information and transportation systems have now reached the stage where the key barriers to constant, speedy, and frictionless international commerce have effectively been torn down. 48 Not only that, these systems facilitated the performance for Western corporations of high-end product design and research work by well-educated, but extremely low-cost, workers in developing nations, putting under pressure the notion that only the unskilled faced competitive threats from the developing world.

Discomfort with globalization is widespread in the United States. Discomfort, I think, is the right word. We’re not shutting the borders anytime soon but unease is widespread, across the political spectrum. There is a sense that we are losing control of our own destiny and the ability to provide economic security and stability to our citizens, but we seem to lack the political vocabulary and maturity to discuss what is facing us in any but the crudest of terms. Thus, cartoonish debates between strawman concepts like free trade versus protectionism, and closed versus open borders, abound, with simplistic nostrums substituting for hard thought.

47 Citing Michael J. Sandel, a noted Harvard political theorist, Thomas Friedman wrote that “[w]hile the shrinking and flattening of the world that we are seeing today constitute a difference of degree from what Marx saw happening in his day . . . it is nevertheless part of the same historical trend Marx highlighted in his writings on capitalism—the inexorable march of technology and capital to remove all barriers, boundaries, frictions, and restraints to global commerce.” Id. at 202.

To someone from Delaware steeped in the evolution of corporate behavior during the last forty years, what is interesting about the current hooha in the U.S. regarding globalization is how quaint it seems. The reality is that the pressures of international competition have, within the domain of what constitutes corporate law in the United States, rendered the historical debate regarding the purpose of the for-profit corporation increasingly irrelevant. Milton Friedman’s view regarding the obligation of corporate management — i.e., to maximize profits for stockholders — has won a sweeping victory.

There is a complex history beyond this triumph, to be sure. But the simple outlines of the story go like this. When the U.S. faced stagflation in the 1970s, and the threat posed by that decade’s China — that would be Japan — American industry faced strong pressure to rationalize and become more efficient. A President, Jimmy Carter, who seemed constitutionally unable to make decisions in the face of daunting circumstances, was followed by a bold and confident leader, Ronald Reagan, who, although capable of adroit compromise, rhetorically embraced a vision of markets comparable to that of Milton Friedman.

49 For a fuller, but still general, telling of this story, see William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1383 (2005).
A wave of takeovers swept the U.S. in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{50} There was, of course, a political pushback. Consistent with the public’s view that corporations should benefit all their constituencies, not just stockholders, a majority of American states passed statutes permitting corporate boards to resist a takeover if it would impair the interests of a non-stockholder constituency.\textsuperscript{51} States as politically diverse as Massachusetts and Georgia passed other statutes giving corporate boards power to resist takeovers.\textsuperscript{52} Although Delaware did not go to these extremes, our case law did give corporate directors broad authority to make their own decisions about whether a takeover was good for stockholders and to resist it if the board believed in good faith that the stockholders

\textsuperscript{50} “In the 1980s, about 30 percent of America’s Fortune 500 companies received takeover bids. This is an extraordinary number, indicating that shareholder power via takeover bids had to be on the minds of all large firm managers. The 1980s were also, consistent with the thesis here, arguably one of the periods of strongest product market competition. Not only were American manufacturing markets workably competitive, but international competition was, for essentially the first time, pounding every manufacturer that could not perform. Hostile takeovers were, and despite the rise of the poison pill still are, an engine of shareholder wealth maximization. . . . Only recently, as European governments have been moving to the right economically and product markets have become more competitive, have hostile offers appeared; historically they occurred in continental Europe at a rate far lower than that prevailing in the United States.” Mark J. Roe, \textit{The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization}, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2074-75 (2001) (comparing U.S. merger activity with historically lower merger activity in continental Europe due to concern for other corporate constituencies).

\textsuperscript{51} See note 45, supra.

would be better off if the bid were thwarted. But what was critically different about Delaware — a state in which a majority of major American corporations are domiciled — is that Delaware law was clear that directors were charged with managing the corporation for the benefit of stockholders, with any consideration of other constituencies required to be incidental to the end of maximizing stockholder wealth.

Although many corporate law scholars continue to obsess over the few cases where corporate boards were able to keep their stockholders from accepting premium acquisition bids, the realities of the marketplace and the pressure that case law put on directors to act faithfully toward stockholders led to a huge increase in mergers and acquisitions activity. As a practical matter, corporate decisions did not turn on whether a deal or management move was good for a particular community or for the corporation’s workers. A race to take steps that would increase corporate stock prices ensued. Plant closings, downsizing, outsourcing, and wage and benefits cuts became common. CEOs knew that they had to stay ahead of the curve, lest they find their corporations the object of unwanted attention from hungry bidders or dissatisfied institutional investors. CEOs realized that independent directors would cashier them if push came to shove, and

56 See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, *Push Comes to Reform*, BUS. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 26. See, e.g., Robert H. Malott, *Directors: Step up to Your Responsibilities*, 16 DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 1992, at 72 (“CEOs are becoming more sensitive to shareholder’s interests and concerns. Managers are focusing on shareholder value, and those who aren't are losing their jobs to successors who will.”).
stockholder unrest became commonplace. Therefore, rhetoric about focusing sharply on “stockholder value” became standard for CEOs, who obsessed over ensuring that the financial markets were happy with their performance. With these waves of corporate mergers came shrinkage in the number of corporate headquarters, hollowing out the civic leadership in many communities, by converting business leaders from the CEOs of independent locally-run corporations into branch managers for national organizations with no particular interest in the cities where they made acquisitions.

Speeding the changes worked by international pressures was the emergence of activist institutional investors as powerful influences on corporate behavior. In a perverse irony, the rise of these institutions was attributable in no small measure to funds they received from American workers. As corporations stripped their employees of access to guaranteed pensions, employees were increasingly forced to provide for their own retirement through investments in the stock market. Most employees were not

57 See, e.g., J.P. Donlon, CEOs on the block; CEO Turnover; The CEO in Transition, CHIEF EXEC., April 1993, at 22.
58 E.g., John A. Byrne, The Making of a Corporate Tough Guy, BUS. Wk., Jan. 31, 1996, 61 (“Dunlap bristles at the notion that a business should be run for such stakeholders as employees and communities. ‘Stakeholders are total rubbish,’ he says. ‘It’s the shareholders who own the company. Not enough American executives care about the shareholders.’”); Robert Moran & Ira Sager, Keen Edge, Dull Vision—IBM CEO Gerstner’s Massive Cuts Please Wall Street but Do Nothing to Appease Customers, INFO. Wk., Aug. 2, 1993, at 10 (“The last thing IBM needs is a vision . . . IBM needs a series of very tough-minded, highly effective strategies that deliver performance in the marketplace and shareholder value. If you are going to have a vision for the company, the first frame of that vision better be that you are making money.”); Alison L. Sprout, America’s Most Admired Corporations, TIME, Feb. 11, 1991, at 52 (“Says Coca-Cola CEO Roberto Goizueta: ‘Increasing shareholder value over time is the bottom line of every move we make.’”).
59 E.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 469-71 (2004) (discussing the shift in the dominant paradigm for the provision of retirement income
given the choice to, nor could they rationally, invest in particular companies. Instead, they gave their money to mutual funds and other investment funds, which made the decisions about what shares to buy and how to vote those shares.

For obvious reasons, these institutions were primarily focused on generating impressive current returns. They fixated on eliminating barriers to takeovers and turbo-charging managerial incentives to pump up stock prices as their corporate governance agenda. They sought to populate boards with super-majorities of independent directors who would be more responsive to their demands for measures that would increase stock prices.

As the 20th Century ended, institutional investors controlled well over half of the stock in American corporations, and the percentage is continuing to rise.60 This separation of “ownership from ownership” made the triumph of Milton Friedman’s vision even more complete. As a matter of fiduciary duty, these institutions have a clear responsibility to take steps to increase the value of the funds they manage.61 Thus, they


61 E.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000) (requiring ERISA fiduciaries to discharge their duties “for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries”); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policy or Guidelines, 29 CFR § 2509.94-2 (2007) (“The fiduciary duties described at ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A) and (B), require that, in voting proxies, the responsible fiduciary consider those factors that may affect the value of the plan's
can rightly be expected to use their influence as stockholders to pursue an increase in stockholder wealth. Although one can question whether their agenda for achieving that goal has been or is well-designed for that purpose, one cannot quibble with the basic proposition that an investment fund should seek to maximize the long-run return for its investors.

But this separation has also extended the legitimacy problem that Milton Friedman identified as plaguing corporate managers who sought to use corporate funds to pursue ends other than stockholder wealth. Unless he is managing an investment fund that is explicitly premised on some vision of social responsibility, what is the moral entitlement of a fund manager to use the fund’s shares to encourage more benevolent corporate behavior toward its workers or the environment, or to encourage greater corporate giving to charity? Who chose him to make such decisions? What about his training at the Wharton School or HBS or the Rotman School of Management prepared him to opine investment and not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives.”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1046 (1998) (“The managers of pension funds or other institutional investors, for example, have a fiduciary duty to maximize their own beneficiary or shareholder value.”).

Interestingly, we are now at a time when it is demonstrably possible for equity investors to shrink the gap between ownership and control, and to exercise more direct control over managerial behavior. See Stephen F. Diamond, Beyond The Berle and Means Paradigm: Private Equity and the New Capitalist Order, Dissent 9 (Winter 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004234 (expressing an optimistic view about the potential utility of this phenomenon). Such corporations may well protect their investors better. But precisely because they are investor-dominated and non-public, it is difficult to see how they will be less, rather than more, susceptible to the temptation to generate externalities in order to increase profits.

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on these issues? An individual who owns stock in Exxon-Mobil might vote his conscience over his pocketbook, but how can an investment manager do that?

Although more Americans than ever are invested in equities, most of them hold through intermediaries and are therefore entirely disconnected from decisions about which operating company’s shares to buy or how to vote those shares. The ordinary investor, I daresay, does not view her retirement investment portfolio as a reflection of her moral and ethical values. Which Vanguard or Fidelity mutual funds should hold her 401(k) dollars is simply a confusing economic choice she has to make.

Of course, there are a number of investment funds affiliated with labor unions or religious institutions that regularly make non-binding proposals to corporations about issues of social responsibility. But they are the exception that proves the rule. The bulk of the institutional money is run by money managers whose investors have not charged them with having a social conscience. These money managers control most of the vote and they are focused on profits. That focus leads them regularly to support activist investors who pressure corporations to reduce operating costs, increase leverage, or accept takeover bids. Put bluntly and summarily, the agenda of the institutional investor community is to make and hold management accountable for increasing stockholder wealth. In particular, the institutional investor community has sought to put itself in a


65 According to a recent article, only 9% of professionally managed assets were in so-called “socially responsible” investments. Henry Blodget, The Conscientious Investor, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2007, at 82. To be fair, many workers are given only a limited choice of investment funds into which to place their retirement savings. As a result, they may not have the option to choose a socially responsible investment fund.
position to direct the determination of corporate policy, by improving its capability to replace the board if the board does not take action favored by the stockholders. Having illustrated its muscle to replace corporate management when it is unhappy, the institutional investor community has made corporate managers even more focused on stockholder value.66

As a practical matter, the American corporate law question of the corporation’s purpose has been settled in favor of stockholders. The fight that goes on is really about the appropriate form of agency to achieve maximal returns for investors. Would stockholders be better off if directors and managers were given some insulation from stockholder influence and therefore better able to pursue capital-intensive strategies designed to generate long-term returns? Or would they be better served by a system that

66 “If investors are insulated from the consequences of corporate production in public corporations in which they own stock directly, then one might reasonably expect those same individuals to be even more insulated from what is going on in companies the stock of which they own only indirectly through mutual funds, pension funds, and the like. As Elhauge has observed, ‘they are [now] twice removed from knowledge and responsibility. . . .

* * *

The structure of the public corporation ‘insulates . . . shareholders from social and moral sanctions and processes,’ both by rendering them ‘largely anonymous’ to the public, as well as by virtue of their ‘relative lack of information about how corporate operations may impact the public interest.’ Consequently, [Elhauge] argues, shareholders could push all that much harder for profit maximization ‘untempered by social consequences,’ and a management team focused on their interests would indeed render the corporation ‘soulless’ for lack of the ‘social and moral processes’ that constrain individuals acting on their own.”

Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law 8 & 47 (Aug. 9, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005729 (citing Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 733, 814 (2005)); see also Blodget, supra note 41, at 86 (noting that 80% of investors in so-called socially responsible funds say they would not buy them unless they produced returns equal to or greater than conventional funds, and noting that these investors “may be delusional” because “finance theory” suggests that investors are unlikely to “get the best of both worlds — responsible practices and superior returns”).
enables them to easily replace management if management is not following current stockholder sentiment regarding the company’s policies? This debate is not one over the object of corporate activity, but the best way to get there.\footnote{The recent debate between two professors who both believe for-profit corporations should be managed to maximize stockholder wealth, Professors Bebchuck and Bainbridge, in the Harvard Law Review is a good example of a debate about Means, between contestants who believe in the same end. Lucian A. Bebchuk, \textit{Letting Shareholders Set the Rules}, 119 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 1784 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, \textit{Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment}, 119 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 1735 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, \textit{The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power}, 118 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 833 (2005).}

Even this narrower debate is of questionable relevance. With the ease of information flow facilitated by the Internet, the huge voting positions held by institutional investors, and the desire of institutional investors to lock in short-term gains from premium-generating transactions, stockholders are finding it easier than ever to directly influence corporate decisionmaking. The capital markets are driving managers, not the other way around.\footnote{Independent directors are best seen, in my view, as an instrument of market forces, rather than as a genuinely independent power center. In other words, their self-interested dependence upon and sensitivity to stockholder sentiment makes them prone to following market whims, rather than acting as Burkean leaders. An excellent historical piece can be read as supporting this intuition about independent director behavior. \textit{See generally} Jeffrey N. Gordon, \textit{The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices}, 59 \textit{Stan. L. Rev.} 1465 (2007).}

The amoral content of the current conversation between managers and institutional investors should not surprise anyone steeped in history. A dialogue between top executives (one capitalist instrumentality) and money managers (another) is not likely to include the serious and high-minded consideration of issues like economic equality or environmental responsibility.
As the investor class itself globalizes in search of higher returns, this dialogue is likely to be even more focused solely on issues of stockholder return. With cross-border merger activity, more and more corporations are losing any national identity. Just as domestic merger activity has converted many former headquarters into mere shrunken outposts that can be closed in short order, so too is cross-border activity rendering the concept of an American, Canadian, French, or British corporation quaint. The pressures for performance compel these corporations to move operations and focus where the most gain can be made, even if that requires diminishing beneficial activity in the corporation’s traditional “home.”

Within the foreseeable future, corporate stockholder bases could also lose a clear national identity. This will put pressure on an old foundational element of the arguments made by the Milton Friedman school, which is that increases in stockholder wealth will increase national wealth for the good of the citizenry as a whole. \(^6^9\) Already, there is the problematic data indicating that what has been good for stockholders during the last 40 years has not necessarily benefited the average worker. Returns to equity have been more lucrative than those to labor, \(^7^0\) as reflected in very slow growth in the median

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As the investor class globalizes, we face the reality that increases in returns to equity will increasingly flow, not to domestic investors, but to investors abroad. If those returns result from corporate operations mostly conducted abroad, a so-called American corporation could mostly be American in name only, deriving most of its profits from international operations and paying out most of those profits to foreign investors.

The ability of any nation, even mine, to address these emerging circumstances in isolation is, in my view, minimal. In the long run, capital’s ability to move freely across borders will swamp domestic regulation’s effectiveness. Ironically, it can be argued that the comparative strengths of the London and New York Stock Exchanges reflects this reality. As you know, the United States recently faced scandals that arose entirely from frauds premised on exploiting institutional investors’ ardent for short-term returns. The

instrument of the frauds was the publication of financial statements showing paper profits based on hokum. In response, our Congress hastily adopted Sarbanes-Oxley. An admixture of reality and exaggeration about the burdens of compliance with that Act has, it has been argued, led to a decline in initial public offerings on the NYSE, and a concomitant increase in offerings on other exchanges, particularly the London Exchange. Whether the posited causal relation is correct or not, what is indisputable is that there is nothing so special about an American listing that gives American policymakers the ability to set regulations that cannot be effectively side-stepped.

Instead, we are at the beginning of an era in which regulatory arbitrage will be a regular corporate tactic. Credible hints that corporations will move operations or even the corporation’s legal domicile to another jurisdiction that lacks burdensome regulation

\[72\] See Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming 2007); Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings 32 (Jan. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987 (“The average probability of a firm listing its shares on a U.S. exchange (versus a U.K. exchange) is significantly lower in the post Act period after controlling for firm, industry, country, and exchange-specific factors that would influence listing decisions.”); Leonce Bargeron, Kenneth Lehn, & Chad Zutter, Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking 4-5 (2007), available at www.aei.org/docLib/20070615_LehnSOX.pdf (studying over 9,000 initial public offerings conducted from 1990 to 2006 and finding that “the probability that an IPO was conducted in the U.K. as opposed to the U.S. increased sharply after SOX”); INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION at x, 47 (Nov. 30, 2006) (arguing the difference in the US listing premium in public markets after SOX increased either because the degree of SOX regulation is “particularly harmful” or “beneficial but too costly”); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1857, 1857 (2007) (finding empirical results “that investors expected SOX to have greater costs than benefits” for foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S.”). But see Nomi Prins, Paulson’s Deregulatory Mission, AM. PROSPECT 11 (April 2007) (arguing that the relative decline of the U.S. capital-raising activities is not due to SOX compliance, but instead a weak dollar and national debt); John Coffee, It's the Litigation, Stupid, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 23, 2007, at 9 (“[T]o say the whole story is a ‘Sox story’ is misleading. . . . [T]he American share of IPOs fell to 8% from 60% between 1996 and 2001, a year when Ken Lay was still viewed as a national hero.”).
will weaken the leverage individual nation-states have over corporations. Corporations will play nations off against each other, and put their less than edifying behavior (think of huge American software concerns helping the Chinese track down dissidents)\textsuperscript{73} down to business necessity.

Admittedly, if one were Milton Friedman himself, this development could be thought of as a welcome one. If one is of the view that the unregulated pursuit of profit by corporations is likely to grant the greatest number access to the good life, the downward pressure that globalizing capital and product markets is exerting on the ability of governments to regulate corporate behavior is a welcome development.

But for those who believe that history teaches a different and more complex lesson, that social welfare is optimized by ensuring that corporations compete vigorously but within boundaries requiring the exercise of responsibility toward workers, the environment, and consumers, this prospect is less enthralling. As much that is of durable value seems to be threatened as good is promised. Magnifying the worry is the very scale of human activity. There are many more of us now than there were in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century.\textsuperscript{74} Only the most stubborn or foolish can fail to harbor doubts whether Earth or humanity

\begin{footnotes}
\item[73] See, e.g., Miguel Helft, \textit{Chinese Political Prisoner Sues in U.S. Court, Saying Yahoo Helped Identify Dissidents The New York}, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2007, at C-1 (reporting a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victims Protection Act in which a Chinese prisoner accuses Yahoo of “abetting the commission of torture by helping Chinese authorities identify political dissidents who were later beaten and imprisoned.”).
\end{footnotes}
can weather without irreparable injury a lengthy period of comparable irresponsibility toward the environment and labor, given the greater impact that will flow from the behavior of billions and billions of people using modern machines and consuming precious resources.\textsuperscript{75}

In other words, just as individual American states in the 1930s could not temper the excesses of corporations acting on a national scale, the globalization of capital and product markets is eviscerating the strength of even the United States to effectively regulate corporate behavior and promote economic equity.

The problems Adolf Berle put on the table in the 1930’s regarding the need to regulate corporate conduct have not gone away, they’ve gone global. To address this need in isolation risks job and capital flight. The political maturity of Americans regarding these realities has suffered because we have not had a candid discussion about the following unavoidable truth: once you have decided on a world of generally free capital flows and trade, you have already made a decision about the effectiveness of domestic regulation, whether you wish to admit it or not.

In my view, the traditional ambivalence of Americans toward the world partly explains our reluctance to speak about these issues more frankly. The stereotype of the cocky, swaggering America, believing itself to know better and having the capacity to have its way whenever it wants, is, like most stereotypes, rooted in some truth. But so

\textsuperscript{75} E.g. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE, ch. 12 (1998) (making the point that human populations have such substantial impact that they threaten earth’s survival and that “[t]o raise the whole world to the U.S. level with existing technology would require two more planet Earths.”).
too does an older American stereotype, which portrays Americans as a tad frightened of
the world and desiring nothing more than to retreat within our own borders, and to shape
our own destiny, untainted by influence or contact from the outside world. Our friends
might say these images actually consist with each other, in that our insularity reflects
itself even in our international endeavors, interacting externally mainly out of self-interest
and mostly by attempting to impose our own solutions and values on others, without
expressing any reciprocal willingness to be subject to international norms. Certainly
there is some truth in that.

But there is also a more idealistic streak that runs through the United States’s
international relations, which is premised on the notion that there are in fact certain rights
that are of universal appeal, which all humans desire and to which all humans are
entitled. Although I recognize that there is a basis for cynicism about America’s motives,
I believe that a genuine desire to extend the blessings of freedom to others has inspired
many of my nation’s foreign policy initiatives.76

But the purpose of my address today is not to win over those of you who harbor
doubts about the good faith and wisdom of your southern neighbors. Rather, it is
highlight the economic realities that should motivate self-interested Americans in seeking
closer relations with your nation and other of its Western allies.

The body of law that I apply every day — American corporation law — has no
answer to the challenges facing Americans as a result of globalization. American

76 For an accessible piece taking this more optimistic view and relating an important American
Foreign aid initiative, the Marshall Plan, to current circumstances, see Nicolaus Mills, A
Globalism for Our Time, AM. PROSPECT 35 (July & August, 2007).
corporation law will continue its important, but very discrete role, in ensuring that
corporate managers are faithful to the legal and fiduciary duties they owe to their
corporation’s stockholders. That law will no doubt continue to protect the ability of
directors — during their term of office — to undertake corporate strategies even if those
strategies are not favored by the stockholders. But that law will do little, if anything, to
give managers the ability to give consideration to the interests of other corporate
constituencies that rivals that of the stockholders. That is a naïve and unrealistic hope.

Rather, the realities of the marketplace and the power of institutional investors will
guarantee that corporations are governed for the primary purpose of increasing returns to
equity. Indeed, the controversies over executive compensation are in large measure a
direct result of the increasing focus on stock price returns, as CEOs seek rents to
compensate them for the increased riskiness of their tenures and the callousness of the
cost-cutting measures they are regularly asked to undertake, and for what they perceive as
their rightful share of the equity value they’ve created for stockholders. Indeed, if it were
not a serious subject, the sight of institutional investors complaining about levels of
executive compensation their own policy proposals have fueled would be amusing.77

The internecine battles among the haves of corporate governance — that is, CEOs,
independent directors, institutional investors, and those who make up the emergent

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77 Between 1980 and 2003, inflation-adjusted CEO pay for Fortune 500 companies increased
sixfold and tracked a similar sixfold increase in stock prices. Robert B. Reich, *Don’t Count on
Shareholders*, AM. PROSPECT 52 (April 2007). Over that same period, CEOs of companies took
home an increasing multiple of the pay earned by their median worker. *Id.* In 1980, CEO pay
was 40 times a median worker’s salary, a ratio that increased to 100 times in 1990, and again to
approximately 300 times in 2006. *Id.*
corporate governance industry itself—do not focus on the economic questions most relevant to ordinary people. Will the economy continue to produce well-paying, decent jobs in the face of international competition? Is there consistent and affordable access to health care? Can the nation afford to honor the promises made to retirees as the percentage of the population that is elderly markedly increases? How can citizens of Western nations maintain their current lifestyles while reducing their disproportionate consumption of the Earth’s natural resources? Without being too bold, I think I can safely venture that it is simply silly to believe that questions like these will be fairly and justly considered within the corporate polity itself, in which the only constituency with a vote is capital and in which the only other constituency with real power are the directors and top managers.78 Capital will not protect labor, that is not its purpose. Capital will not protect the environment, that is not its purpose. Capital will not protect consumers, that is not its purpose. Capital’s purpose is the ruthless one of increasing its own

78 Precisely because capital has the only real power in the corporate polity, I have long been dubious about the realism of expecting corporate boards to be an effective force for ensuring so-called “corporate social responsibility, in the absence of a legal structure prohibiting corporate misbehavior and protecting the interests of other constituencies.” See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 673, 691-92 (2005) (“Without appropriate regulation by the citizenry's duly elected representatives, the least ethical of businessmen will trash the environment, exploit workers, and steal from investors — thereby creating inexorable pressures for others to follow suit in order to survive.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1169, 1186 (2002) (“In the end, . . . institutions whose governing bodies are elected solely by the stockholders will, when conflicts become unavoidable, tend to act in ways that put the interests of those with the most clout at the forefront. This means that the interests of stockholders and high-level managers will come first.”). A respected economic commentator and former U.S. Labor Secretary, Robert Reich, has now come to essentially the same conclusion. ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2007).
wealth.\textsuperscript{79} And the idea that top corporate managers, who owe their tenure to capital, are a bulwark against capital’s tendency for overreaching is equally ludicrous.\textsuperscript{80}

Being somewhat bolder, I will go into more adventurous territory and reiterate my view that no single nation, not even the United States, can address economic and social questions like these in isolation.\textsuperscript{81} And, as in prior periods, questions of this kind bear importantly on the capacity of our citizens to live the good life as we now conceive it. Nations like Canada, the United States, France, Germany, and Japan have all come to the conclusion that unregulated corporate power will generate poor answers to questions like these. We have all therefore sought to temper the freedom-impairing tendency of profit-seeking corporations, a step that necessarily involved the impingement on the economic liberty of corporations (and yes, even workers) in order to ensure that workers were free

\textsuperscript{79} This is illustrated by the relative lack of success of corporate social responsibility shareholder proposals. During the 2007 proxy season, less than one quarter of the shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues received more than 15\% of the shares voted, with only 2 of the 174 proposals winning majority support. Meg Voorhees and Carolyn Mathiasen, \textit{2007 Review: Social Proposals}, \textit{Risk & Governance Wkly.} (Risk Metrics Group), Sept. 14, 2007, \textit{available at} http://www.riskmetrics.com/governance_weekly/2007/118.html. In contrast, 2007 shareholder proposals for traditional corporate governance issues received significantly greater support — 73\% for proposals to eliminate supermajority voting requirements, 69\% for proposals to repeal a classified board structure, and 46\% for proposals to redeem or vote on a poison pill. \textit{Support for Pay Proposals Marks 2007 Proxy Season}, \textit{Corp. Governance Bull.} (Institutional Shareholder Services), June 2007, at 3.

\textsuperscript{80} In being skeptical that managers with an incentive system tilted toward stockholders are likely to be good at protecting other corporate constituencies, I echo Adolf Berle himself. See Adolf Berle, \textit{For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note}, 45 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 1365 (1932); Bratton & Wachter, \textit{supra} note 13, at 32 (describing Berle as holding the view that the “idea that managers could be trusted to use discretionary power for the welfare of others as the naïve and out-of-touch thinking of an ivory tower academic”).

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Cf. Overweight but Underpowered; Charlemagne}, \textit{Economist} 56 (Sept. 8, 2007) (arguing that even a more unified European Union is likely to have diminishing influence over global economic and energy issues).
from unreasonable conditions of employment, that the environment was free from
despoilment, and the consumers were free from dangerous products.

The United States and its Western allies now face an historically familiar moment.
As discussed, during the New Deal, citizens of particular American states, by necessity,
risked a society in which a national government, over which they definitionally had less
influence, rather than their own state government, over which they wielded
comparatively greater clout, would regulate the most important aspects of corporate
behavior. But they gave up a form of local power that was increasingly more powerful in
name, than in reality, so as to gain the protective benefits of an effective national
government. They did so in order to create a form of capitalism worth saving, in the
sense that it served well the many, rather than just the few. Similarly, the emergence of
the European Union and its establishment of European-wide standards for corporate
behavior and the fair treatment of workers represented a similar kind of moment, in
which it was recognized that the advance of human freedom, in its broadest sense,
required citizens of particular nation-states to risk giving important aspects of their
nation’s sovereignty over to something larger.

The concept of the United States joining together with its Western allies to
globalize enforceable standards of responsible corporate behavior is a difficult one for
Americans to fathom. Such an endeavor would require the United States to subject itself
more fully and diversely to enforceable international standards, standards that would
therefore not exactly match America’s own preferences. But we must give in order to
receive. Figuring out how to build on the imperfect international institutions that now
exist and to use them as a means for progress toward the globalization of an enlightened capitalism will be a daunting and patience-challenging endeavor.

But anyone committed to the progress of human freedom knows that we have little choice but to try, and to do so with much greater urgency. Such an endeavor will admittedly involve a concerted effort to globalize Western values and standards, notions like decent minimum wages, maximum work weeks, the right to unionize, and proper regard for the environment and consumers. But having already decided to allow our corporations to globalize their operations, and therefore to globalize the Western tradition of private, for-profit enterprise, it hardly seems a logical moral dividing line to pull back from globalizing the regulatory framework Western nations have developed to ensure that corporate behavior advances social welfare. Indeed, I can think of few beliefs more immoral than assuming that our brethren in the developing world desire to work for, and live in communities dominated by, capital, but under the conditions that prevailed in the West in the 19th century, rather than in the prosperous and more decent post-war era.

There is nothing natural about the scope of product and capital markets. If such markets have been, as I consider them to have been, effectively extended beyond the control of any nation state, then corporate behavior will only be effectively regulated if the regulatory sphere is coextensive with those markets. And the only way to build effective regulatory structures of this kind is to begin with international cooperation among nations sharing similar values and traditions.

Whether we are comfortable with it or not, we are already economic citizens of the globe. Capital is taking good care of itself, have no doubt, as Milton Friedman would
have it. But, contrary to what Milton Friedman might desire, the very fact that corporations are now being governed obsessively for profit provides a strong justification for the strengthening of governmental institutions regulating corporate behavior affecting workers, the environment, and consumers. The global scale of corporate operations logically requires the formulation, adoption, and enforcement by international institutions of minimum labor, environmental, and consumer protection standards that are also global. The rights of capital seem well secure, but what of the rights of men and women?

In 1944, Franklin Roosevelt essentially called for a New Deal for the Globe in his State of the Union address, which amplified his earlier 1941 Four Freedoms speech. Roosevelt believed that we had “come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.” He articulated various aspects of this form of freedom — which he deemed more generally “freedom from want” — and made clear that these rights should not be the preserve of only Americans, but of all citizens of the Earth. Notably, many of these rights required for their fulfillment that the conduct of corporations be subjected to effective regulation.

82 “The best interests of each nation, large and small, demand that all freedom-loving nations join together in a just and durable system of peace. . . . And an equally basic essential to peace—permanent peace—is a decent standard of living for all individual men and women and children in all nations.” President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944) available at http://fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html.

83 Id.

84 As a provocative new historical paper points out, Adolf Berle played a key role in convincing Roosevelt to premise his presidency in large measure on the protection of the economic rights of individuals, but rights in a new sense, including the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation by corporations and market externalities. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, at 12-14 (draft 2007) (describing the role of Berle in drafting Roosevelt’s important
Roosevelt’s speech soon found resonance in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which echoes and extends his conception of freedom of want. To those of us in the West whose societies have largely implemented this vision of the good and who now find it under pressure, Roosevelt’s words should be even more relevant now. Having globalized the world’s economy, we now face more directly a challenge akin to that Roosevelt articulated in the 1940’s, implementing “economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peace time life for its inhabitants — everywhere in the world.” Although Roosevelt’s emphasis was then on the what — what was freedom from want — the arguably more urgent challenge now are the how’s of globalizing the

“New Individualism” speech from September 1932, a speech that presaged Roosevelt’s later articulation of the freedom from want; Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The New Individualism, Address Before the Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932) available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=447 (“[T]he exercise of property rights might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism, but to protect it. . . . [T]he responsible heads of finance and industry . . . must, where necessary, sacrifice this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. It is here that formal government . . . comes in. Whenever in the pursuit of this objective the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reckless promoter . . . declines to join in achieving an end recognized as being for the public welfare, and threatens to drag the industry back to a state of anarchy, the government may properly be asked to apply restraint.”).


86 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 6, 1941) available at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Text/wwt0047.
regulatory structures necessary, one, to address the externalities resulting from corporate profit-seeking behavior and, two, to protect the economic and social rights the West has long recognized as vital to human freedom. In other words, the polity — in some effective manner — must expand to the global scope of markets in which corporate power is influential, in order to protect the freedom of its citizens, all of humanity.

In my judgment, history demonstrates that there is little doubt whether action of that kind will ultimately be required to protect the ability of humans to live the good life, to enjoy freedom in its fullest sense. A mature reflection of human experience might also suggest that the wisest answer to the question of when to begin would have been some time ago, but is presently a very clear and certain, right now.

\[87\] Id.