COMMENT

ALL ALONE IN ARBITRATION: AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION AND THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS

FRANK BLECHSCHMIDT†

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 542
I. A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ............... 546
   A. The Text and History of the FAA ............................. 546
   B. Case Law Interpreting the FAA .............................. 549
II. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS ............................................ 554
   A. Unconscionability in the Lower Courts .................. 555
   B. Pre-Concepcion Commentary and the Procedure/Substance Divide ........................................ 559
III. AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION: THE FAA AND THE CALIFORNIA COURTS COLLIDE ................................................................. 561
   A. Background of the Case ...................................... 562
   B. The Concepcion Opinions ..................................... 565
   C. An Initial Critique of the Reasoning in Concepcion ...... 567
IV. CLASS ACTION POLICY IN THE WAKE OF CONCEPCION AND SHADY GROVE ................................................................. 570
   A. Shady Grove and the “Incidental Effects” on Substantive Rights .......................................................... 571
   B. Reconciling Shady Grove with the FAA Cases . . . or Not ................................................................. 574
V. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PATH TO REFORM ....... 577
   A. The Evolving Scope of the Concepcion Opinion ....... 578

† J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., B.A., 2009, The Ohio State University. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Burbank, Professor Tobias Wolff, and Lindsey Freeman for comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank my parents for their continued support.
INTRODUCTION

On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court announced its decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, one of the most closely watched cases of the 2010 Term. In Concepcion, the Court considered whether states may condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class-wide arbitration proceedings. While the subject of class arbitration is rarely viewed as a headline-grabbing legal topic, Concepcion attracted the attention of many consumer advocates, corporate counsel, and procedural scholars because of its far-reaching implications for consumer and employment contracts and class action policy. Ultimately, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts states from invalidating class action waivers in arbitration agreements because these invalidations stand as an obstacle to the purposes behind the FAA.

Was this result surprising? Not in the least. Indeed, given the increasingly predictable road the Court had taken in previous FAA cases, a contrary ruling exhibiting deference to a state’s views on arbitration would have represented an abrupt tug on the FAA steering wheel. But leaving the Court’s track record aside, was the Court’s decision to limit the role of states in shaping class action policy a legally sound and principled conclusion? In this Comment, I argue that it was not. Because class actions are so intimately linked to the vindication of substantive rights, the Court should not have unilaterally made a policy decision as to when the use of class proceedings is appropriate.

Though class action policy discussions typically focus on the efficacy of class action litigation or the inner workings of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Concepcion did not directly involve
2012] All Alone in Arbitration 543

either of these topics. Instead, Concepcion centered on the class action’s close cousin, class arbitration—a proceedings involving similarly situated litigants that occur before an arbitrator, rather than before a judge or jury in court. While the development of class arbitration was still in its embryonic stages, several judges and businesses adopted the view that this method of dispute resolution was antithetical to the whole point of arbitrating in the first place, which is to provide a speedy and efficient alternative to litigation. Eventually, with the addition of more claimants and in light of the uncertainty surrounding this new form of aggregate procedure, class arbitration became what was described as “a lose-lose proposition” to which “no rational business [would] agree.”

As a solution, defendant businesses turned to their contracts for protection. By inserting class action waivers into their arbitration agreements—agreements that were themselves part of larger contracts with consumers, employees, and other actors in the marketplace—businesses attempted to narrowly circumscribe the procedures available to their adversaries. In essence, once an opposing party agreed to arbitrate any future claims and also to waive his right to bring proceedings as a class, the only remaining option was bilateral arbitration: arbitration between two individual parties.

It was only matter of time before this solution was attacked in court. In particular, consumers pleaded that class action waivers were exculpatory provisions in the small claims setting because the inclusion of these waivers in arbitration agreements effectively relieved

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8 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
10 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (describing one of the FAA’s goals as the “encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution”).
11 Brief for Petitioner at 22, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3017755, at *22.
12 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 437 (2010) (“[T]he received wisdom [is] that some businesses’ use of consumer arbitration clauses is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to reduce their exposure to class actions.”); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005) (“In the late 1990s, trade-journal articles first appeared encouraging corporate counsel to consider redrafting contracts to include provisions requiring consumers and others to waive the right to participate in class actions or even group arbitrations.”).
businesses from liability. Without class proceedings, no individual consumer in the small claims setting had an incentive to file a claim. In some states, such arguments were initially met with favorable responses. For example, an early opinion on the matter in California held that such class action waivers supplied defendants with a “get out of jail free card.” These waivers were also considered troublesome because they were almost always found in contracts of adhesion, or on a “take it or leave it” basis.

But the businesses in these suits were not without a strong defense. Virtually all of the arbitration agreements in dispute were governed by the FAA, a federal statute that the Supreme Court has consistently held to proclaim a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Thus, the common argument defendants raised in motions to compel arbitration was that the FAA required courts to enforce the arbitration agreements, and with them, the class action waivers. Under this theory, the FAA, by way of the Supremacy Clause, would preempt state rules relating to arbitration. On this point, however, state and circuit courts divided. For example, some states and circuits ruled that the class action waiver was enforceable on its face or that the FAA preempted state policies to the contrary. But other decisions—including the California Supreme Court’s leading opinion in Discover

16 See Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007 (noting that Washington customers had brought no individual claims against the cell phone provider over a six-year period).
17 Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002).
18 Id. at 867.
19 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). The Act provides that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of . . . a contract, transaction, or refusal [involving commerce], shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. § 2.
21 See, e.g., Scott, 161 P.3d at 1008 (introducing the defendant’s argument that its cell phone contract was covered by the FAA).
22 See, e.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (enforcing a waiver based on its explicit language); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D., 693 N.W.2d 918, 927 (N.D. 2005) (same); see also Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing a district court’s conclusion that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and compelling arbitration pursuant to the FAA).
Bank v. Superior Court—held that § 2 of the FAA, known as the savings clause, enabled states to strike down class action waivers in the small claims setting on unconscionability grounds. Further complicating the analysis in some cases were additional clauses that ostensibly altered the cost equation for litigants, such as clauses providing for the reimbursement of arbitration costs or the payment of attorneys’ fees.

Concepcion took the Discover Bank rule head on, with the majority ultimately siding in favor of preemption. In doing so, the Court limited states’ latitude to strike down class action waivers and effectively forced upon the states its own views regarding the pros and cons of certain aggregation policies (i.e., policies relating to the aggregation of claimants in a class action or collective action). It is here, I will argue, that the Court erred. Aggregation policies should not be a topic solely for our nation’s highest court. As several commentators have recently argued, the availability of class proceedings is often deeply rooted in substantive regulatory policies, including state policies on the resolution of consumer disputes.

In light of this inseparable connection to substantive law, it should be the state’s prerogative to determine whether the availability of class proceedings in arbitration would help further its substantive policies. In support of this argument, I will highlight the inconsistencies within the Concepcion opinion, as well as the doctrinal confusion between the Court’s treatment of one aggregation mechanism, class arbitration, in Concepcion and the treatment of another aggregation mechanism, the class action, in a

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21 See, e.g., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (finding that “under some circumstances . . . class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are unenforceable” and that the FAA did not preempt California law on this issue), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 988-93 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable under state law and thus not preempted by the FAA); Scott, 161 P.3d at 1009 (same).

22 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (describing the cost-shifting provisions in AT&T’s arbitration agreement).

23 Id. at 1753.

24 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21 (2010) (arguing that Rule 23 does not set aggregation policy, but rather is “merely the mechanism for carrying an aggregate proceeding into effect when the underlying law supports that result”); cf. David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 716 (2011) (suggesting that the authors of Rule 25(b)(2) considered class treatment as “essential to the vindication of substantive rights”).

In Part I of this Comment, I will analyze both the history of the FAA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this statute in relation to class arbitration. Part II will briefly discuss lower courts’ use of unconscionability as a bulwark against class action waivers, while Part III will analyze the *Concepcion* case itself. Part IV will juxtapose the FAA decisions with *Shady Grove*. In Part V, I will examine several questions that remain unanswered after *Concepcion* and discuss avenues for reform. These avenues include a potential amendment to the FAA, administrative regulations that could target class action waivers, and most importantly, a change in the way the Court approaches class actions in future cases, which should involve a greater appreciation for the role class actions play in the enforcement of substantive law.

I. A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

The question of whether states may mandate that class proceedings be available in arbitration, notwithstanding an express contractual agreement to the contrary, ultimately turns on courts’ interpretation of the FAA. Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA broadly and has in turn exhibited a considerable amount of deference to the black-and-white terms of the arbitration agreements at issue. But much of the FAA jurisprudence is constructed upon a foundation of assumptions about the intent of the FAA’s framers—assumptions that are still being questioned today. This Part will briefly analyze the history and text of the FAA and describe the FAA case law leading up to *Concepcion*.

A. The Text and History of the FAA

The key language of the FAA appears in § 2, which states in pertinent part that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for

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25 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion). The Court in *Shady Grove* held that Rule 23 superseded a New York state law that prohibited certain class actions. *Id.* at 1437-38.

26 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, *The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law*, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1422 (2008) (noting that the Court “has interpreted the FAA expansively, nullifying most of the state laws and public policies that formerly excluded many types of transactions, such as consumer and employment transactions, from arbitration”).
the revocation of any contract.”27 This latter clause, which provides courts with room to invalidate arbitration agreements on generally applicable contract defenses, is commonly referred to as the FAA’s “savings clause.”28

An idea that has persisted throughout the FAA line of cases is that Congress enacted this language in 1925 in response to hostility from the state courts toward the use of arbitration.29 The thought goes that the Act endeavored to put arbitration agreements on an “equal footing with other contracts.”30 In Concepcion, both the majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion subscribe to this view, albeit to varying degrees. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion takes a more expansive view, suggesting that the FAA’s goal of achieving streamlined proceedings is of roughly equal importance to the FAA’s corresponding goal of enforcing private agreements to arbitrate.31 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, cautions against viewing the efficiency objective as a primary goal of the statute.32 Moreover, Justice Breyer submits that when Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, the statute’s scope was intended to cover agreements between merchants possessing “roughly equivalent bargaining power.”33 Scalia explicitly rejects this point, proposing that “[s]uch a limitation appears nowhere in the text” and that recent cases involving unequal bargaining partners have declined to apply the statute in this manner.34

While Justice Breyer leaves much to be desired in his explanation of the FAA’s legislative history,35 his account more closely aligns with scholarly research on the issue. For example, in a detailed historical

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28 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007).
31 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2010) (describing the dissent’s view that the expeditious resolution of claims is not the overriding goal of the FAA as “greatly misleading”).
32 Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 1759.
34 Id. at 1749 n.5 (majority opinion) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)).
35 Justice Breyer cites several congressional reports but gives little explanation as to how such reports reflect his account of congressional intent regarding the scope of the FAA. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
account of the statute, Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen write that the FAA was “not necessarily the product of hostility to arbitration.”\footnote{Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 339.} Rather, the movement behind the passage of the FAA centered mostly on promoting interstate commerce and “mak[ing] the benefits of arbitration generally available to the business world.”\footnote{Id. at 341 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).} To be sure, it is likely that at least some state judges were miffed by the idea of having their cases pulled from their dockets because of a binding arbitration clause, and that by passing the FAA, Congress could ensure that these judges would refrain from acting territorially.\footnote{See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that some courts “refus[ed] to order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate”).} But hostility, according to Carrington and Haagen, was not the main concern. In fact, although state courts and legislatures were worried that binding arbitration clauses could become a “trap for the unwary” and could be used “as a potential means of economic oppression,”\footnote{Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 340, 343.} many courts favored arbitration as a general matter.\footnote{See id. at 339 (explaining that “arbitration was widely favored in America”); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 19 (1992) (“Contrary to modern folklore..., the premodern statutory law of arbitration was largely supportive of that institution, as was the common law.”).}

Moreover, Carrington and Haagen suggest that Congress intended the FAA to apply to sophisticated businesses and not to stifle Progressive-era concerns for the weak and vulnerable.\footnote{Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 344.} Indeed, the FAA excluded employment contracts of certain transportation workers from its scope.\footnote{Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1431.} While the FAA’s true purpose may prove to be evasive, legislators are currently attempting to resolve the debate. As Part V will discuss in more detail, congressional lawmakers, acting in response to the Court’s ruling in \textit{Concepcion}, have introduced a bill—the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011\footnote{S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).}—that would amend the FAA. Among the bill’s findings is a provision stating that the FAA “was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.”\footnote{Id. § 2(1).} Certainly, \textit{Concepcion}’s supporters will likely view this statement as a blatant example of revisionist history. But at a minimum, this statement, along with research
such as Carrington and Haagen’s, demonstrates the considerable disagreement over the majority opinion’s historical account of the FAA.

Finally, one important feature of the historical period during which Congress enacted the FAA is that federal courts were still operating under the *Swift v. Tyson* regime, which applied general federal common law to the types of commercial contracts that included arbitration provisions.\(^{45}\) It would be another thirteen years before the Court would require that state law be applied in federal-diversity contract disputes.\(^{46}\) With this in mind, any attempt to recreate Congress’s intent with respect to the savings clause in diversity suits takes a bit of creativity.\(^{47}\) As I discuss below, much of the debate surrounding the savings clause focuses on how much latitude it affords the states in invalidating arbitration agreements. But given that Congress may have not had state contract law in mind at the time of enactment,\(^{48}\) a determination of Congress’s intent regarding the statute’s deference to that law may be a Sisyphean task.

### B. Case Law Interpreting the FAA

In the decades since the FAA’s enactment, the Supreme Court has heard numerous challenges to its applicability.\(^{49}\) And in response to these challenges, the Court has ruled in favor of the party requesting

\(^{45}\) 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842). The *Swift* court held that the interpretation and effect of “contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature . . . are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.” *Id.* at 19. For a discussion of the expansion and eventual displacement of the *Swift* doctrine, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechslers’s *The Federal Courts and the Federal System* 550-64 (6th ed. 2009).

\(^{46}\) See *Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”).

\(^{47}\) Cf. Hiro N. Aragaki, *Arbitration’s Suspect Status*, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1233, 1238 (2011) (“[T]he language of the FAA is simply too indeterminate, and the congressional record leading to its enactment too sparse, to draw any firm conclusions about its original meaning.”).


\(^{49}\) Much of the FAA jurisprudence has focused on the arbitrability of particular statutory claims, see, e.g., *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), and the appropriate procedural interplay between the courts and the arbitrator, see, e.g., *Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
arbitration virtually every time,\textsuperscript{50} displaying in some cases a \textit{Lochner}-esque approach to the freedom of contract.\textsuperscript{51} While an extended discussion of the FAA jurisprudence exceeds the scope of this Comment, this Section will discuss several early decisions that helped shape the Court’s reasoning in \textit{Concepcion}, as well as the Court’s previous encounters with class arbitration in the FAA context.

The modern Court’s policy toward the enforcement of arbitration clauses has its roots in two key decisions from the Burger Court. In \textit{Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.}, Justice Brennan set the standard for future FAA cases: “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”\textsuperscript{52} A year later, in \textit{Southland Corp. v. Keating}, a majority of the Court held that in creating a federal substantive law of arbitrability, Congress intended for the FAA to apply not only in federal courts, but also in state courts.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, the Court explained that the policy from \textit{Moses H. Cone} aimed to “foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”\textsuperscript{54} Thus, when the Court applied this policy to a California statute that required judicial consideration of claims arising from a franchise agreement, it held that the FAA preempted the statute, notwithstanding the fact that the appeal came from the California Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{55}

Yet the majority’s view that the FAA applies to state courts was met with considerable resistance, and ironically, the debate over \textit{Southland}
may still be affecting the Court’s modern-day certiorari decisions, such as its decision to hear Conception. In Southland, Justice O’Connor penned a vigorous dissent, arguing that the legislative history of the FAA demonstrated Congress’s unambiguous intention for the statute to apply only in federal court. 56  The academic literature on the history of the FAA tends to support her view. 57  Her argument, moreover, has received subsequent support from conservative justices. Justice Scalia has written that he “stand[s] ready to join four other Justices in overruling [Southland],” 58  and Justice Thomas has subscribed to this view as recently as 2008. 59  If Conception had been an appeal from a state court, then it is uncertain whether the FAA would have applied at all, because the Court, particularly Justices Scalia and Thomas, might have felt obliged to reconsider the majority’s view in Southland. 60  But it is perhaps no coincidence that the Court consistently rejected certiorari petitions involving unconscionability rulings in state courts, and instead waited to grant certiorari to Conception, a Ninth Circuit case interpreting California law. 61  As one commentator has put it, the Court’s current certiorari process enables it to “wait for the right vehicles in which to make law,” and a federal case, like Conception, was an ideal vehicle through which the Court could advance its FAA agenda. 62

56 Id. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor opined in Southland, “One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts.” Id.

57 In a detailed account of the FAA’s history, Ian Macneil verifies O’Connor’s opinion, writing that Southland “is an Orwellian object lesson in the potential and often actual unreliability of the legislative history of judges rationalizing results in cases.” MACNEIL, supra note 40, at 144; see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 380 (describing the majority’s opinion in Southland as “an extraordinarily disingenuous manipulation of the history of the 1925 Act”).


59 See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing his previous dissenting opinions in which he argues that the FAA does not apply to arbitration clauses being analyzed in state courts).

60 See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T v. Concepcion and Adherence to Minority Views, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/atts-long-game-on-arbitration.html (exploring a range of possible outcomes the Court might have reached regarding FAA preemption had Conception originated in state court).

61 See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T’s Long Game on Unconscionability, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/atts-long-game-on-unconscionability.html (“[C]ompanies trying to enforce the clauses filed plenty of petitions . . . asking the Supreme Court to slam the door on unconscionability challenges. They were all denied.”).

62 Id.
Following Southland, the savings clause itself received much closer scrutiny. In Perry v. Thomas, the Court again addressed the validity of a California statute that authorized judicial determinations “without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.” Given the holding in Southland, the Court had no reservations about preempting the state statute. Yet the Court’s dicta in Perry provided an important explanation of the savings clause, an explanation that would later factor prominently in the Court’s treatment of the Discover Bank rule in Concepcion. In a footnote, the Perry Court emphasized that when litigants use traditional state law defenses to revoke a contract, those principles—such as duress, fraud, or unconscionability—must be applied uniformly to “any contract.” In other words, if a state court’s unconscionability doctrine is applied differently to arbitration agreements than it is to other contracts, then the Supremacy Clause requires that the FAA preempt the state court’s attempt to regulate the law of arbitrability.

Although the subject of class arbitration made fleeting appearances in these early cases, the Court did not confront a question specifically involving class procedures in arbitration until 2003 in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle. Unfortunately, the Bazzle ruling yielded no majority opinion and left several key questions unanswered. In Bazzle, the defendant argued that class arbitration was impermissible in a proceeding that left it liable for over $20 million in statutory damages. Prior to the Court’s review, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that class arbitration was permissible because the contracts were silent on that subject. On appeal, instead of deciding whether class arbitration could occur when contracts were silent, and rather than discussing the practical consequences of class arbitration, the Court simply ruled that

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64 See id. at 491 (“[C]lear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California’s § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute must give way.”).
65 Id. at 492 n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
66 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
67 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9 & n.4 (1984) (highlighting the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that imposing a class action structure on the arbitration was acceptable, but refusing to determine whether such a conclusion would be contrary to the FAA because the state supreme court had not reached this latter question).
69 Id. at 449.
70 Id. at 450.
the arbitrator, and not the court, should decide whether the parties intended to permit class proceedings. Moreover, only a plurality of Justices joined the *Bazzle* holding, with four Justices dissenting and Justice Stevens concurring on alternate grounds.

During the 2009 Term, the Court finally took up the issue of class arbitration in *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.* Picking up where *Bazzle* left off, the Court took up the question of whether class arbitration can be imposed on parties when the “arbitration clause [is] ‘silent’ on that issue.” Here, the Court decided it could not.

The arbitration agreement in *Stolt-Nielsen* was part of a contract, originally drafted in 1950, between several businesses and a group of shipping companies. The agreement said nothing about class proceedings. In the arbitration literature, scholars have referred to such an agreement as a “first-generation arbitration clause[]” because it included neither a class action waiver (as would a “second-generation clause[]”) nor contractual provisions intended to make the arbitration agreement seem more consumer-friendly (as would a “third-generation clause[]”). Despite this silence, an arbitration panel in *Stolt-Nielsen* had previously decided that class proceedings in arbitration would be appropriate.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the panel, holding that an arbitrator could decide “procedural questions which grow out of the dispute,” but that class arbitration was not such a question.

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71 *Id.* at 452-53. Bruhl has characterized this decision as an example of “the ultimate trump card in the unconscionability game” because it allowed the Court both to avoid ruling on a difficult question of state contract law and to avoid creating a federal common law of contracts. Bruhl, *supra* note 26, at 1470, 1475-77.

72 539 U.S. at 447.

73 *Id.* at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); *id.* at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

74 *Id.* at 454-56 (Stevens, J., concurring).

75 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).

76 *Id.* at 1764.

77 *Id.* at 1776-77.

78 *Id.* at 1764-65.

79 *Id.* at 1766.

80 Nagareda, *supra* note 50, at 1106.

81 130 S. Ct. at 1766.

82 *Id.* at 1775 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)). It is uncertain whether *Stolt-Nielsen* overrules *Bazzle*. The majority in *Stolt-Nielsen* noted that *Bazzle* only retained a plurality, *id.* at 1771-72, and—while it might be a moot point after *Concepcion—Stolt-Nielsen* seems to open the door to future challenges regarding whether courts or arbitrators should determine the parties’ intent in allowing class arbitration. See John Elwood, *After Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*: *Deciding
Justice Alito’s majority opinion, the Court stressed that a “basic precept” of the FAA is that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” The Court then concluded that the arbitration agreement did not exhibit any explicit or implied intent by the parties to consent to class arbitration proceedings. On the issue of implied consent, the Court stated that “class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it.” Additionally, the Court explained that class proceedings would invite several “fundamental changes” to the arbitration by adjudicating the rights of absent parties and transforming the dispute into a high-stakes showdown with limited judicial review.

As I will discuss in Part IV, this language from *Stolt-Nielsen*, which *Concepcion* subsequently adopted, is difficult to reconcile with other recent decisions involving aggregate proceedings. But while *Stolt-Nielsen*’s statements controlled agreements that were silent on class arbitration, the holding did not address whether the doctrine of unconscionability could be used to invalidate class action waivers found in second- and third-generation arbitration agreements. The next Part will discuss several of the unconscionability cases that were brewing in the lower courts and that eventually prompted the Court to grant certiorari in *Concepcion*.

## II. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

Although the Supreme Court had established in *Southland* and later cases that attempts by state legislatures to undercut the FAA would be preempted, plaintiffs seeking to avoid the enforcement of their arbitration agreements still had a shield to use against defendants who moved to compel arbitration. State courts were free to provide relief based on the explicit terms of the savings clause. The savings clause permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of


84 Id. at 1775.

85 Id.

86 Id. at 1776.
generally applicable contract defenses. Recognizing this fact, plaintiffs argued that class action waivers were unconscionable because their use in contracts of adhesion increased the chances that businesses would avoid liability for consumer fraud or employment discrimination in the small claims setting. Ultimately, state and circuit courts divided on the unconscionability issue, with the courts of up to twenty states constructing barriers against businesses’ use of these waivers.

A. Unconscionability in the Lower Courts

Unconscionability, a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” is a common law principle that differs from state to state. As with any common law contract doctrine, it requires a fact-specific inquiry. Therefore, the disparities among courts on the issue of class action waivers are not surprising. Nevertheless, almost all courts subscribe to several common principles of unconscionability. For example, the defending party usually must prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability—with the procedural aspect relating to defects in the bargaining and the substantive aspect relating to harsh or one-sided terms. Also, courts often apply a sliding scale approach, meaning that the more procedurally unconscionable a contractual provision is, the less substantively unconscionable it must be, and vice versa. In light of these common principles, as we will see, varying attitudes toward class actions, not differing approaches to unconscionability, best explain the disparate results across states and circuits.

California pioneered the use of unconscionability to protect individuals from class action waivers. One of the earliest invalidations of a

87 See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 65.
88 See supra note 13.
89 Brief for Respondents at 1, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292, at *1; see also id. app. at 1a-5a (listing the twenty states and corresponding decisions that have invalidated class action waivers).
91 One reason courts have not applied the doctrine uniformly is that they have struggled to develop an exact definition for unconscionability. One commentator has noted, “That the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness.” 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 581 (3d ed. 2004). Unconscionability, however, is commonly defined as “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unconscionably favorable to the other party.” Id. at 582 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Id. at 582-88.
93 Id. at 585.
class action waiver occurred in *Szetela v. Discover Bank*.\(^94\) In *Szetela*, the California Court of Appeals found that the class action waiver at issue was procedurally unconscionable because it was offered on a “take it or leave it” basis.\(^95\) Furthermore, the *Szetela* court held that “[t]he manifest one-sidedness . . . [was] blindingly obvious” because the class action waiver would certainly not harm the defendant, Discover Bank.\(^96\) Not only was the provision unconscionable, but it was also against public policy because it granted Discover Bank “a ‘get out of jail free’ card while compromising important consumer rights.”\(^97\) In other words, the inclusion of the waiver undermined a consumer’s right to have his deceptive business practices claim adjudicated. Notably, the appeals court did not face an FAA preemption challenge in the case.

Three years later, the California Supreme Court decided the seminal case on the issue of unconscionability and laid down the three-part test that the Ninth Circuit subsequently used in *Concepcion*. In *Discover Bank v. Superior Court*, the court held that, in at least some instances, class action waivers are unconscionable.\(^98\) Specifically, the court acknowledged that “[c]lass action and arbitration waivers are not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses,” that is clauses that would relieve the defendants from liability.\(^99\) The *Discover Bank* court nevertheless concluded that, in practice, these waivers are “indisputably one-sided.”\(^100\) The court then laid out its three-part test, holding that class action waivers are unconscionable under California law if (1) “the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion”; (2) the setting “predictably involve[s] small damages”; and (3) “it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has [attempted] to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”\(^101\) Under these conditions, the Court reasoned, the agree-

\(^94\) 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002).  
\(^95\) Id. at 867.  
\(^96\) Id.  
\(^97\) Id. at 868.  
\(^98\) 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).  The dispute in *Discover Bank* involved claims by credit cardholders who had been charged late fees.  
\(^99\) Id. at 1103.  Although the cardholders made payments on the specified day, they did not make them by a certain unspecified time—a time which the credit card company used to assess fees.  
\(^100\) Id. at 1108.  
\(^101\) Id. at 1109.  
\(^102\) Id. at 1110.  The court explained that the waiver, by satisfying these three criteria, violated the state’s prohibition against “contract clauses that are contrary to public policy.”  
\(^103\) Id. at 1108; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2009) (“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether
ment violated the state’s statutory provisions against unconscionable and exculpatory contracts, noting additionally that “class actions and arbitrations are . . . inextricably linked to the vindication of substantive rights.”

In *Discover Bank*, the California Supreme Court also reversed the appeals court’s conclusion that the FAA preempted California’s policy regarding class action waivers. The court explained that “the principle that class action waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable . . . does not specifically apply to arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally.” For support, the court cited its decision in *America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court*, which also found a class action waiver unenforceable, though outside the arbitration context. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its explanation of the savings clause in *Perry*, warned against discriminatory applications of general contract principles to arbitration agreements. But because the *America Online* case showed that California’s unconscionability test was not limited to the arbitration context, the admonition in *Perry* would presumably not apply. Thus, under this interpretation, the unconscionability test in *Discover Bank* would fall squarely into the acceptable parameters of the savings clause.

Finally, the *Discover Bank* court commented on the use of class arbitration. Although class arbitration is not an optimal form of dispute resolution, the court said it “must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its alternatives.” In other words, while class arbitration may have its flaws, if the alternative is to foreclose consumer rights, then courts must consider compelling class arbitration.

Although several other state courts had invalidated similar class action waivers before *Discover Bank*, many courts adopted the California
Supreme Court’s reasoning after the ruling. Some state courts have gone to even greater lengths to show that they will find a class action waiver unconscionable only if it is indeed exculpatory. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a class action waiver involving small claims on the same day it enforced a provision involving no small claims. This is not to say that state and federal courts have uniformly invalidated class action waivers, however. Numerous states and circuits have enforced the waivers pursuant to the explicit terms of the arbitration agreement without regard to the size of the claim.

In addition to the decisions that view class action waivers “through the prism of state unconscionability law,” several circuit courts have utilized a somewhat different analysis, albeit one that produces essentially the same result. Rather than apply state contract law principles, these circuits have analyzed the friction between class action waivers and statutes that rely primarily on private enforcement and class actions to achieve public policy goals, such as the Sherman Act. While several circuits have found that class action waivers do not conflict with the statutory schemes at issue, both the First and Second Cir-

\[\text{\footnotesize 110 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying Discover Bank’s three-part test to Cingular’s class arbitration waiver and finding it “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable”); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (finding that the “class action is often the only effective way to halt and redress . . . exploitation” of consumers by companies (quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1105)).}

\[\text{\footnotesize 111 Compare Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99-101 (N.J. 2006) (invalidating the waiver at issue where each plaintiff’s claim was so small that it was unlikely that individuals would bring suit), with Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. 2006) (upholding a waiver in a suit for over $100,000 in damages in which the plaintiff had “adequate incentive” to bring an individual suit).}

\[\text{\footnotesize 112 See supra note 20; see also, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the right to bring a class action can be contractually waived); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 143-45 (Me. 2005) (enforcing a class action ban under Texas law and determining that the “one-sided aspects of the arbitration provision [do not] render it unconscionable”); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 750-51 (Md. 2005) (upholding a class action ban under Maryland law and noting the “strong policy, made clear in both federal and Maryland law, that favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements”).}

\[\text{\footnotesize 113 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006).}

\[\text{\footnotesize 114 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 196-98 (2d Cir. 2011) (highlighting the importance of class actions for plaintiffs vindicating their rights under antitrust statutes).}

\[\text{\footnotesize 115 See, e.g., Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004) (enforcing a class action waiver in a dispute involving claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the waiver ‘deprived[them] of substantial rights guaranteed by [that Act]’); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 651, 658-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (enforcing a waiver in a dispute involving}
cuits have invalidated class action waivers using a “statutory rights analysis.”

Under this analysis, courts refuse to enforce class action waivers if the foreseeable result is plaintiffs’ inability to vindicate their statutory rights in arbitration. For instance, in an antitrust suit, if class proceedings are not available, then a plaintiff’s claim could be cost-prohibitive because of the great expense of hiring an economist as an expert witness. On these facts, the Second Circuit declared a class action waiver unenforceable. As Part V will explain, cases relying on a statutory rights analysis appear to survive the Concepcion decision.

B. Pre-Concepcion Commentary and the Procedure/Substance Divide

Before the Court granted certiorari in Concepcion, courts striking down class action waivers had been the subject of critical reviews in the arbitration literature. Nevertheless, these early criticisms began to shed light on how courts were incorporating state aggregation policies—policies relating to the aggregation of claimants in a class action or collective action—into their rulings.

Despite the California Supreme Court’s assertion that its rule against unconscionable class action waivers applied generally to all contracts and not just arbitration agreements, several commentators claim that the California courts were not actually practicing what they preached. For example, Michael McGuinness and Adam Karr contend that the California courts were applying a “heightened standard of unconscionability in the arbitration context” and that they “ha[d] taken the FAA’s ‘savings clause’ where no court ha[d] gone before.”

Truth in Lending Act claims and finding “no limitations upon the substantive remedies available to [the plaintiff] in arbitration”).

116 See, e.g., In re Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 197-99 (invalidating a class action waiver as inconsistent with the Sherman and Clayton Acts because it “preclude[d] plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights”); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59, 61 (invalidating a class action waiver on the basis that Comcast would be “essentially shielded from private consumer antitrust enforcement liability” if the agreement were upheld).

117 See In re Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 197-98 (“[T]he cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”).

118 See, e.g., Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. Disp. Resol. 61, 78 (arguing that California courts were “accomplish[ing] what the FAA commands cannot be done . . . all under the guise of a ‘generally applicable contract defense’” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996))).

119 Id. at 81.

120 Id. at 62.
the authors limited their analysis primarily to employment disputes, they concluded that the California courts were demonstrating an antiquated form of hostility toward arbitration agreements.\footnote{See id. at 61 ("[T]he same judicial hostility ostensibly thwarted eighty years ago continues today, albeit in a more subtle—but equally hostile—form.").}

Such arguments may also have empirical support. Stephen Broome’s analysis of California Courts of Appeal cases from 1982 to 2006 found that unconscionability challenges to provisions in arbitration agreements were about five times more successful than unconscionability challenges in the nonarbitration context.\footnote{Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 44-48 (2006). Broome’s research showed that “unconscionability challenges succeeded in about fifty-eight percent of cases in the arbitration context,” whereas such challenges in the nonarbitration context “succeeded only eleven percent of the time.” Id. at 47-48.} He argues that during this time, the California courts strayed from their traditional “shock[s] the conscience” analysis.\footnote{Id. at 53 (quoting Hicks v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 714 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).} However, Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl countered such evidence by arguing that this aggregate data may indicate that the arbitration agreements at issue were indeed much more one-sided than other agreements.\footnote{See Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1457 (“The fact that arbitration agreements were more often held unconscionable may simply reflect the fact that during the relevant period they really were, on average, more unfair than other types of challenged agreements . . . .”).}

Although these studies do not delve into great detail about aggregation policies, they suggest that courts are intertwining policy decisions regarding class actions with these unconscionability analyses. The intermingling of substantive and procedural policy discussions by the courts is not necessarily undesirable. Rather, perhaps it is scholars’ dismay with this intermingling that should cause concern. For instance, Broome writes, “The California courts presume that the procedural limitation will have substantive consequences.”\footnote{Broome, supra note 122, at 57. Some judges have also voiced skepticism about the effect of class action waivers on substantive rights. See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D., 693 N.W.2d 918, 927 (N.D. 2005) (reasoning that these waivers are not unconscionable because the plaintiff “retains all substantive remedies he would otherwise have without the ‘no class action’ provision”).} Likewise, Professor Richard Nagareda argues that although “nominally cast in terms of unconscionability, the court’s analysis [in Discover Bank] ulti-
mately speaks to the distortion that a foreclosure of aggregation might work . . . upon underlying substantive law."\textsuperscript{126}

But, as I will explain in more detail in Part IV, this is exactly what state courts should be authorized to do.\textsuperscript{127} Because class action decisions are often deeply rooted in substantive regulatory policies, neither the contract nor the FAA should limit a state in furthering its regulation of arbitration agreements in the small claims setting. In \textit{Concepcion}, the Court finally had the opportunity both to resolve the class action waiver debate and to provide a candid discussion about the practical effect that class actions have on substantive rights and liabilities. The Court, however, failed to produce.

\section*{III. AT\&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION: THE FAA AND THE CALIFORNIA COURTS COLLIDE}

For the past decade, scholars have speculated as to how our nation’s highest court would eventually resolve the class action waiver debate.\textsuperscript{128} The Court’s decision to intervene was a foregone conclusion—after all, lower courts’ unconscionability rulings and their heavy reliance on the FAA’s savings clause seemed to deviate starkly from the Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration. But as one scholar had noted, the “pro-arbitration Supreme Court [found] itself in the position of having picked most of the low-hanging anti-arbitration fruit.”\textsuperscript{129} In \textit{Southland}, for example, once the Court decided that the FAA should apply in state courts, its invalidation of the state legislature’s blatant attempt to flout the FAA was a fairly simple task.\textsuperscript{130} Judicial circumventions of the FAA, on the other hand, are harder to identify. Surely, the Court did not want to appear as if it was second-guessing state contract law principles. This hesitation may explain why the

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\footnotesize\textsuperscript{127} Certainly, there is a further question about the appropriate allocation of policy discussions between state courts and state legislatures. However, state-level separations-of-powers concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{128} See, e.g., Bruhl, \textit{supra} note 26, at 1464-88 (proposing several strategies that the Supreme Court could use were it to grant certiorari to a lower court’s unconscionability ruling); Wilson, \textit{supra} note 48, at 791-92 (providing four hypothetical holdings for a case like \textit{Concepcion}).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{129} Bruhl, \textit{supra} note 26, at 1467.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{130} See id. (explaining that the \textit{Southland} decision “involved relatively clear questions of federal law”).
\end{footnotesize}
Court, over the last decade, has rejected dozens of certiorari petitions challenging lower court unconscionability rulings.\(^\text{131}\)

Then along came the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in *Concepcion*, and with it, an ideal set of facts for the Court to continue its predictable path in FAA cases. This Part will briefly summarize the facts underlying the *Concepcion* dispute and then discuss the Court’s views regarding the enforceability of AT&T’s class action waiver. As I will explain, the Court, in siding with AT&T—a company that prompts its customers to “rethink possible”\(^\text{132}\)—first considered, and then severely limited, the possibilities open to states that want to incorporate class proceedings into their regulatory policies.

A. Background of the Case

The underlying dispute in *Concepcion* centers on a cellular phone contract between Vincent and Liza Concepcion and AT&T Mobility. The Concepcions purchased cell phone service from AT&T and received two new cell phones as part of the agreement.\(^\text{133}\) Though the Concepcions did not have to pay for the phones themselves, AT&T charged them $30.22 in sales tax for the new devices.\(^\text{134}\) In response, the Concepcions brought a claim in the Southern District of California and asserted that AT&T’s advertisements for “free” phones were fraudulent.\(^\text{135}\) The case was later consolidated with a putative class action against AT&T involving the same issues.\(^\text{136}\) AT&T then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the parties.\(^\text{137}\)

At its core, the arbitration agreement between the Concepcions and AT&T was similar to the agreements at issue in previous California cases, such as *Szetela* and *Discover Bank*. The cell phone contract’s arbitration clause and class action waiver read as follows: “You and AT&T agree that each may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any

\(^{131}\) See id. at 1466 (“Since 2000, there have been dozens of petitions . . . yet the court let them pass by . . . .”).


\(^{133}\) AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).

\(^{134}\) Id.

\(^{135}\) Id.

\(^{136}\) Id.

\(^{137}\) Id. at 1744-45.
purported class or representative proceeding.”138 Unlike the first-

generation arbitration clause in *Stolt-Nielsen*, this agreement explicitly

referenced class proceedings and could at first blush be referred to as a second-generation arbitration clause.139

Yet the arbitration clause in *Concepcion* is more accurately categor-

ized as a third-generation arbitration clause, because it “attempt[s] to respond in various ways to the lower-court invalidations of second-

generation clauses,”140 What was this attempted response? AT&T in-

cluded “consumer-friendly”141 provisions that supposedly altered the cost calculation for plaintiffs. These additional provisions included, but were not limited to, a $7500 payment if the arbitration award ex-

ceeded the last written settlement offer AT&T made prior to selecting an arbitrator; cost-free arbitration for nonfrivolous claims; double at-

torneys’ fees if the arbitrator awarded the customer more than AT&T’s last settlement offer; and the option of conducting the arbi-

tration in person, over the phone, or solely on the filed papers.142

Although AT&T claimed that the addition of “consumer-friendly” provisions would help consumers bring low-value claims to arbitration,143 the clauses were almost certainly a strategic move by AT&T to avoid state unconscionability ru lings and to strengthen its position on appeal. In fact, when AT&T’s codefendants petitioned for the Court to grant certiorari in *T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster*, a 2007 case involving a second-generation provision, AT&T filed an amicus brief requesting that the Court deny its codefendants’ petition.144 The amicus brief ex-

plained that AT&T had developed a new arbitration clause and that *Laster* was “a less than ideal vehicle for addressing whether States may refuse to enforce class waivers.”145 Thus, as one commentator has noted, AT&T’s long-term litigation strategy enabled it to return to the Court in 2010 with a “much less messy case” based on “the right set of facts.”146

138 Brief for Respondents, *supra* note 89, at 3.

139 See *supra* text accompanying note 80.

140 Nagareda, *supra* note 50, at 1106.

141 Brief for Petitioner, *supra* note 11, at 1 (quoting Makarowski v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 09-1590, 2009 WL 1765661, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009)).

142 Id. at 5-7.

143 Id. at 5.


145 Id. at 21.

146 Bruhl, *supra* note 61.
Both the district and circuit courts held that AT&T’s third-generation class action waiver was unenforceable. Although the district court initially found that the provisions in the arbitration agreement were an “adequate substitute” for consumers seeking class arbitration, it ultimately concluded that it had to invalidate the waiver because of deterrence considerations. Applying the *Discover Bank* test, the district court reasoned that some putative class members might be unaware of any attempt to defraud consumers and that, without class proceedings, an adequate deterrent effect was lacking. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In particular, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the potential for a $7500 premium payment actually altered the cost equation for plaintiffs. On this issue, the court reasoned that “the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.” Realistically, AT&T would simply pay the face value of a claim rather than proceed to arbitration and face the likelihood of a $7500 liability. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that preemption was not warranted because the *Discover Bank* rule was “simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.”

With this record in front of the Court, the Justices had several options. For instance, the Court could have deferred to California’s decision to incorporate the availability of class proceedings into its regulatory policy. More generally, the Justices could have decided that this issue required them to wade too far into the intricacies of California’s contract law and its unconscionability doctrine. Relying on federalism principles would presumably have been appealing to Justice Scalia. After all, it was he who wrote in a case involving a state’s choice-of-law rules that the Court should leave such rules to the states, given that there was “no compass to guide [the Court] beyond [its] own perceptions of what seems desirable.” But the Court balked at both of

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148 Id. at *12-13.
149 *Laster*, 584 F.3d at 852.
150 *Id.* at 855-56.
151 *Id.* at 856.
152 *Id.*
153 *Id.* at 857 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)).
these options and instead intruded on the states’ prerogative to formulate class action policies.

B. The Concepcion Opinions

Like other recent FAA cases, Concepcion was a 5-4 decision. Not surprisingly, the votes divided along traditional ideological lines, with the Justices volleying arguments about the FAA and the state’s role in shaping arbitration procedures.

In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia frames his analysis by reiterating the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” He then discusses the Court’s historical interpretation of the savings clause, focusing specifically on Perry’s prohibition of discriminatory applications of state contract defenses such as unconscionability, and warning that “the act cannot be held to destroy itself.” With these standards in place, Scalia reasons that even if the Discover Bank rule applied to “any” contract—and not just arbitration agreements—“the rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.” As support, Justice Scalia references Broome’s article on unconscionability statistics in California, albeit with the disclaimer that the statistics are “not definitive.” Justice Scalia’s opinion also suggests that if the Court were to allow states to condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class proceedings, then it would be obliged to allow states to demand other procedures in arbitration, such as judicially monitored discovery.

After critiquing the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia moves to a discussion of class arbitration, picking up where Justice Alito left off in Stolt-Nielsen. Here, Justice Scalia reiterates that the shift from individual to class proceedings introduces changes that are “fundamental,” including the introduction of absent parties, different procedures, and higher stakes. He then explains that class arbitration would

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155 Both Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), and 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), were 5-4 decisions.
157 Id. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-228 (1998)).
158 Id. at 1747.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1750 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“greatly increase[] risks to defendants” and reasons that this risk will force defendants to accept “in terrorem” settlements of questionable claims.\textsuperscript{162} Finally, the majority opinion concludes with a brief discussion of the claim-disabling effect of class action waivers in the small claims setting. But on this point, Justice Scalia gives short shrift to the Concepcions’ argument, stating that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”\textsuperscript{163}

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which he relies more closely on the text of the FAA than does Justice Scalia. According to Justice Thomas, Congress’s use of the word “revocation” in the savings clause and its “conspicuous omission of ‘invalidation’ and ‘nonenforcement,’” indicate that the savings clause carves out an exception for some, but not all, state contract defenses.\textsuperscript{164} Because the Discover Bank rule was more akin to a rule prohibiting contracts against public policy, and not one that dealt with the making of the arbitration agreement, Justice Thomas concludes that the savings clause does not protect that rule.\textsuperscript{165} Thus, under his interpretation, the Discover Bank rule warrants preemption.

In dissent, Justice Breyer attacks several of Justice Scalia’s propositions. On the facts, he asserts that the Discover Bank rule is not necessarily discriminatory toward class action waivers and cites various cases in which courts have upheld class action waivers under California law, despite unconscionability challenges.\textsuperscript{166} On the FAA more generally, Justice Breyer also questions Justice Scalia’s assumption that a “fundamental attribute” of arbitration is its individualized, not class, nature.\textsuperscript{167} Nothing in the FAA’s history, Justice Breyer contends, supports this conclusion.

Furthermore, Justice Breyer provides a defense of the Ninth Circuit’s view of the incentives to file suit in the small claims setting. Invoking Judge Richard Posner’s famous quote that “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30,” Justice Breyer explains that class proceedings can provide countervailing advantages to the parties, particularly

\textsuperscript{162} Id. at 1752.
\textsuperscript{163} Id. at 1753.
\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{165} Id. at 1756.
\textsuperscript{166} Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Walnut Producers of Cal. v. Diamond Foods, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 459-62 (Ct. App. 2010)).
\textsuperscript{167} Id. at 1759.
plaintiffs. Justice Breyer, however, only briefly addresses the role of
states in formulating aggregation policies by asking the majority,
“[w]hy is this kind of decision—weighing the pros and cons of all class
proceedings alike—not California’s to make?” Ultimately, with an
uncharacteristic recitation of federalist principles, Justice Breyer con-
cludes that the majority has run afoul of the federalism goals con-
tained in the FAA’s savings clause.

C. An Initial Critique of the Reasoning in Concepcion

By and large, the initial response to Concepcion among policymak-
ers, media outlets, and the legal community was negative. Several
commentators, for example, lambasted the Court for its “devastating
blow to consumer rights,” and Justice Scalia, in particular, for the “se-
lective nature of his brand of originalism.” In contrast, some com-
mentators welcomed the opinion, claiming that Concepcion was a step
in the right direction in a world in which plaintiffs’ attorneys have ex-
loited the claims of class members with injustices such as coupon set-
tlements. This Section will offer a brief critique of several of the
opinion’s key points before explaining the larger doctrinal problems
with the Court’s views of class actions in Part IV.

The Court’s “Contract” Approach. On the surface, the majority’s ap-
proach constitutes an emphatic promotion of contract autonomy. In-
deed, the thrust of the Court’s class arbitration criticisms is based on
the idea that the defendants would not have willingly agreed to arbi-

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169 Id. at 1761 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1762.
172 Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26; see also Erwin
at A11, available at 2011 WLNR 9250480 (contending that, after Concepcion, it is “in-
creasingly a myth that an injured person can suc”).
173 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Schonbrun, Supreme Court Ruling Is Not Bad News for Con-
sumers, the Class Action System Is the Real Culprit, HUFFPOST POLITICS (May 19, 2011, 2:42
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-w-schonbrun/supreme-court-ruling-is-
not-bad-news-for-consumers-class-action-system-is-the-real-culprit_n_b_862491.html (“Consumers
need real protection from nefarious corporate behavior, not the class action runaround that only
benefits the lawyers.”). The term “coupon settlement” refers to class action settlements that
award class members worthless coupons, which are rarely redeemed, and that award class counsel
generous attorneys’ fees. For a discussion of the social legitimacy problems emerging from these
settlements and the resulting political pressures for Congress, see David Marcus, Response,
Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 150 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
trate if they knew they could be subject to the disadvantages of class proceedings.\textsuperscript{174} But contract autonomy is a two-way street. Practically speaking, the Court’s enforcement of AT&T’s class action waiver can hardly be construed as promoting autonomy because, like most class action waivers, it was contained in a contract of adhesion. In fact, in explaining the scope of the \textit{Discover Bank} rule, Justice Scalia states that “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”\textsuperscript{175} This concession is rather puzzling in light of the FAA’s contract-promoting goals.\textsuperscript{176} Furthermore, even if the autonomy of both parties is enhanced, \textit{Concepcion} steers the Court closer to its \textit{Lochner}-era jurisprudence, in which the Court often prioritized economic liberty over sensible and socially desirable regulation.\textsuperscript{177} Class actions can help further such regulation. But after \textit{Concepcion}, states have limited power to incorporate class proceedings into their regulatory structures.

\textit{The Scope of the FAA’s Savings Clause.} There is no question that an overly expansive reading of the savings clause could threaten to “destroy [the Act] itself.”\textsuperscript{178} The problem, though, is that the majority uses this admonition to justify its broad-sweeping and overinclusive FAA principles. As one scholar explained before the \textit{Concepcion} decision, a “remarkable aspect of the [Court’s FAA jurisprudence] is its formalism: it does not matter why a state . . . singles out arbitration, just that it does so.”\textsuperscript{179} Perhaps the Court’s FAA approach could yield better results if it examined whether the state rule “rest[s] on generalizations about arbitration’s inadequacy as a dispute resolution process.”\textsuperscript{180} Unfortunately, the current approach is more of an

\textsuperscript{174} See \textit{Concepcion}, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (“We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{175} Id. at 1750.

\textsuperscript{176} See Lawrence A. Cunningham, \textit{Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts} 40 (George Wash. Univ. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 547, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1809005 (“[T]he Court [in \textit{Concepcion}] commits contradictions that manifest a lack of understanding of contract law and even life. Most strikingly: on one page Justice Scalia observes that consumer contracts are totally ‘adhesive’ today yet on the very next page strikes the California law because the aggregate actions it ordains are not ‘consensual.’” (quoting \textit{Concepcion}, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51)).


\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Concepcion}, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998)); see also \textit{supra} note 157 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{179} Aragaki, \textit{supra} note 47, at 1248.

\textsuperscript{180} Id. at 1297.
“on/off” switch\(^{181}\)—the mere fact that the state rule can be interpreted as “singl[ing] out” arbitration is enough for the Court to preempt.\(^{182}\) Concepcion exemplifies this approach. Thus, in light of the Court’s invalidation of the Discover Bank rule, it is now of seemingly no consequence that a state, New Jersey in this instance, invalidated a class action waiver on the same day it upheld another outside the small claims setting.\(^{183}\) Unfortunately, the Court completely disregarded whether the invalidation of the waiver may have been “desirable for unrelated reasons,”\(^{184}\) such as the avoidance of a class action waiver’s claim-disabling effect.

*Fixing Problems in the Class Action System.* Admittedly, supporters of class action waivers like that in Concepcion correctly note that the class action system is far from perfect.\(^{185}\) “Entrepreneurial plaintiff’s attorney[s]”\(^{186}\) have been criticized—perhaps justifiably—for their abuses of the system, including their attempts to maximize attorneys’ fees at the expense of the class.\(^{187}\) But is the Court’s enforcement of a class action waiver, which effectively strips consumers of an aggregate remedy, really a good solution to these problems? Certainly not. Legislative reform, such as Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),\(^{188}\) can help cure some of class action’s ills. Furthermore, scholars have considered tweaks to the current fee regime that could per-

\(^{181}\) *Id.* at 1245.

\(^{182}\) *Id.* at 1247.

\(^{183}\) *See supra* note 111 and accompanying text (summarizing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning in these two cases).

\(^{184}\) AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).

\(^{185}\) For example, class action reform could help enhance judicial economy and fairness to the litigants. *See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?*, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 75, 102 (“Academics as well as corporate interests have pointed to ethical and efficiency issues and have urged that class actions be limited or reformed, if not eliminated.”).


\(^{187}\) *See id.* at 882-96 (detailing the divergent incentives that motivate plaintiffs’ attorneys and plaintiffs in class action litigation). *But see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers*, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103-05 (2006) (arguing, in opposition to Coffee, that class action opponents improperly focus on fairness considerations, such as whether “plaintiffs’ lawyers are being overcompensated,” instead of on the more important issue of whether class action litigation deters undesirable behavior by defendants).

haps effectuate better results. While none of these reforms is fool-proof, each is certainly a better way of handling problems within the class action system than removing the availability of class proceedings altogether.

**State Preferences for Other Procedures in Arbitration.** As noted earlier, the majority in *Concepcion* was concerned that if it allowed states to require the availability of class arbitration, then it would be obliged to allow states to require other procedures, such as judicially monitored discovery. This is a fair point—one that the Concepcions had difficulty refuting. Nevertheless, discovery procedures do not exhibit the same claim-enabling effects as class actions. Surely, the costs of discovery procedures influence the parties and, in extreme situations, can factor into a party’s decision to either go forward with or settle a claim. But as the *Discover Bank* court recognized—and as I will explain in more detail in Part IV—class actions are “inextricably linked” to substantive regulatory policies. In some cases, this holds true from the policy’s inception. That the Concepcions could not distinguish how class proceedings differ from procedures like judicially monitored discovery only underscores how important it is for the Court to provide a candid discussion about the practical effects of class proceedings.

**IV. CLASS ACTION POLICY IN THE WAKE OF CONCEPCION AND SHADY GROVE**

*Concepcion* was indeed a crossroads for the class action. Policies relating to this form of aggregate proceeding had come a long way since the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, which revolutionized the modern class action. But during the 2009 Term, the Court created some

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189 See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, *Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?*, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2043, 2047 (2010) (proposing that class action lawyers in small-stakes actions should receive one-hundred percent of the class’s recovery so as to “fully incentiviz[e] class action lawyers to bring as many cost-justified actions as possible”); *see also* Marcus, *supra* note 173, at 163-66 (challenging Fitzpatrick’s utilitarian proposal and suggesting that it may overlook legitimacy benefits that emerge from a smaller attorney fee reward).

190 See *supra* text accompanying note 160.

191 See *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (questioning the Concepcions’ contention that cases involving other procedures would be a “far cry” from the instant case involving class arbitration).

192 See *supra* text accompanying note 102.

193 *For an example, see infra text accompanying note 233.*

doctrinal confusion in two cases analyzing class proceedings. In *Shady Grove*, the Court held that Rule 23 preempted a state’s attempt to limit aggregate remedies in court, and in so doing, wrote that class actions only have “incidental effect[s]” on substantive rights. Four weeks later, in *Stolt-Nielsen*, the Court seemed to change its view toward class actions—at least in the arbitration context—by holding that an arbitration panel’s decision to allow aggregate remedies in arbitration would “fundamentally change” proceedings “to such a degree” that the consent of the two parties could not be presumed.

With *Concepcion*, another class arbitration case, on the docket last Term, the Court had the opportunity to resolve this confusion by either distinguishing the two lines of reasoning or revisiting its flawed analysis in *Shady Grove*. But the majority failed to seize the opportunity; instead, it blindly followed the language in *Stolt-Nielsen* and perhaps only added to the confusion by treating the rights of plaintiffs and defendants differently within the same opinion. This Part will discuss this troubling development within class action policy. It will also offer a critique of one scholar’s attempt to reconcile these two lines of reasoning by showing that such a reconciliation requires a strained reading of *Stolt-Nielsen* and a reliance on *Shady Grove*’s shortcomings. Ultimately, clarity from the Court is needed in order to explain the class action’s unique role as both a procedural mechanism and a vindicator of substantive rights.

A. *Shady Grove* and the “Incidental Effects” on Substantive Rights

Lest there be confusion about the implications of a case like *Shady Grove*, it is important to begin by clarifying how these three cases differ. *Shady Grove* did not involve the FAA; rather, it implicated a Rules Enabling Act (REA) challenge and is perhaps the most important decision addressing the *Erie* doctrine since *Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.* In contrast, neither *Concepcion* nor *Stolt-Nielsen* involved an REA challenge, but instead considered the preemptive force of the

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198 *Gasperini*, the Supreme Court held that the lower court should have applied New York’s standard governing excessive jury verdicts in a federal diversity case, as doing so would not have violated the Seventh Amendment. *Id.* at 419.
FCAA. Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis in *Shady Grove* was the source of an important point of disagreement between the parties in *Conception* because of a single unifying fiber—the class action.

*Shady Grove* involved a class action against Allstate Insurance in the Eastern District of New York for Allstate’s alleged failure to pay a statutory penalty on late benefits payments that were due to health care providers. The named plaintiff, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, claimed that it had received late payments for orthopedic services covered under one of Allstate’s auto insurance policies, but that it had not received a statutorily prescribed two percent monthly interest fee from the insurer. In response, Allstate pointed the court’s attention to section 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, which provided that “an action to recover a penalty . . . may not be maintained as a class action” unless the statute creating the penalty includes an express authorization. The New York insurance statute that prescribed the two percent fee included no such authorization.

Because this class action was a diversity suit in federal court, the New York court rule would not automatically resolve the issue unless the rule was considered substantive, rather than procedural, in nature. Thus, the Court was faced with the following *Erie* question: whether, in a federal diversity suit, Rule 23 should supersede a state law that appeared to set policy on the availability of aggregate remedies. Although section 901(b) seemed to be a calculated attempt by the New York legislature to limit the substantive liabilities of defendants in statutory penalty suits, its insertion into a collection of civil procedural rules no doubt muddled the issue.

Intertwined with this question was an ancillary inquiry into the validity of Rule 23 itself. In order for Rule 23 to be found valid under the REA, the rule would have to “really regulate[] procedure” and overcome the REA’s prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge

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199 *Shady Grove*, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37.
200 Id. at 1436.
201 N.Y. C.P.L.R., 901(b) (McKinney 2010).
202 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2010).
203 *Shady Grove*, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
204 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 69-70 (“[T]his limitation on aggregate liability in New York ‘was the result of a compromise among competing interests’ that arose from concerns among prodefendant groups that the aggregation of penalties would lead to gross and destructive overenforcement.” (quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007))).
205 *Shady Grove*, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
or modify any substantive right." Although the invalidation of Rule 23—a rule that has allowed an enormous number of plaintiffs to bring collective actions in federal court—seems unfathomable, the argument for invalidation maintains some legitimacy. Previously, on the topic of class actions and substantive rights, Professor Stephen Burbank has suggested that “[i]t is difficult to conclude, other than through a wooden analysis . . . that the advent of the small claims (negative value) class action did not ‘alter substantive law.’” Rule 23 might still be valid, but the Court’s analysis would have to be sophisticated enough both to preserve Rule 23 and still leave room for state class action policy decisions. Instead, in Shady Grove, the Court served up a “wooden” analysis of Rule 23. Ultimately, a plurality of the Court concluded that, under a Hanna analysis, Rule 23 is valid and supersedes section 901(b) in federal court, leaving the defendant potentially liable for the statutory penalties.

The most contentious portion of the plurality’s analysis explained that class proceedings are simply a matter of procedure, and nothing more:

A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.

... The likelihood that some (even many) plaintiffs will be induced to sue by the availability of a class action is just the sort of “incidental effect[s]” we have long held does not violate § 2072(b) [of the REA].

Yet this reasoning seems to be at odds with Stolt-Nielsen’s and Concepcion’s language about the fundamental changes that class proceedings introduce. As Professor Richard Nagareda points out, “The formida-
ble claim-enabling effect of class treatment that the Shady Grove Court deems incidental in litigation becomes a fundamental difference in Stolt-Nielsen . . . .”

Viewed together, these two cases exhibit a bit of doctrinal confusion regarding the correct treatment of aggregate proceedings and cannot be reconciled without ignoring the practical realities of class proceedings.

B. Reconciling Shady Grove with the FAA Cases . . . or Not

An analysis of the reasoning underlying these opposing views on aggregate proceedings illustrates why Concepcion is critically flawed. Facially, the two lines of decisions do involve different mechanisms—class litigation on the one hand, which has been refined through countless iterations in the courts, and class arbitration on the other hand, which is far from a tested formula. The doctrinal problems exceed this distinction, however, because the Court’s concern for the defendant’s increased liability in Concepcion is simply absent from Shady Grove.

In his attempt to resolve the cases’ apparent discrepancies, Professor Nagareda argues that the FAA’s international dimension should be viewed as the distinguishing factor. He contends that class actions are a standard method of adjudicating domestic business disputes, and that for the Hanna analysis in Shady Grove, the effect of class actions can be treated as truly “incidental.” But in cases such as Stolt-Nielsen and others implicating the FAA, the international dimension of the FAA is overlooked. Because class actions are not nearly as common in the transnational setting as they are in the domestic setting, Professor Nagareda argues that imposing class arbitration would, in fact, be a “fundamental change” for many international parties. And, with-

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212 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1090; see also id. at 1074 (“Across the two cases, the Court maintains an almost studied avoidance of any explanation for the difference of view as to class treatment.”). During the 2010 Term, Justice Scalia continued to subscribe to his Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen views. Compare Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1952 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating his stance in Shady Grove that “the sole purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims that are individually viable” and that, as such, class actions do not alter the substantive rights of parties), with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (invoking his reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen that “the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” leads to “changes” that are “fundamental,” and exploring these changes in greater depth (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

213 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1101-02.

214 See id. at 1090-99 (arguing that international commerce disputes have informed the Court’s FAA jurisprudence).

215 Id. at 1101-03.
out a relative degree of certainty in arbitration, international business could return to being a “legal no-man’s-land.” Finally, tying together this explanation of the Concepcion dispute, he argues that because Shady Grove was correct vis-à-vis class action litigation, the lower courts in Concepcion were wrong in holding that the class action waiver in AT&T’s contract was unconscionable. In his view, this is especially true because AT&T’s waiver is not exculpatory.

While insightful, Professor Nagareda’s analysis misses the mark in a few key ways. First, although his argument may shed some light on the differences between Shady Grove and the FAA cases, it deviates substantially from the actual language in Stolt-Nielsen to come up with a distinguishing factor. Concerns for international relations, no doubt, play a role in some FAA cases. With this in mind, the Court is arguably fashioning federal common law in an appropriate manner. But this point should not fundamentally alter the aggregation analysis as Professor Nagareda argues it does.

Second, the plurality’s reasoning in Shady Grove, with which Nagareda agrees, is questionable to say the least. As Professors Stephen Burbank and Tobias Wolff contend, the Court’s categorization of an aggregation mechanism’s “expansion of liability exposure [as] merely an ‘incidental effect’ does not describe reality, and we should not pretend otherwise.” Such a categorization ignores the practical realities of Rule 23 and its monumental “impact on the regulation of economic and social activity.” This categorization, of course, fails to acknowledge that under the modern formulation of the rule, negative-value claims can be converted into headline-grabbing, bet-the-company cases.

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216 Id. at 1097-98.
217 Id. at 1119-20.
218 Id. at 1126.
219 See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 358 (noting that some federal courts have properly treated prior FAA cases as subject to federal common law). I say “arguably” because, as Carrington and Haagen point out, the federal common law of international relations generally does not involve matters of “slight political consequence,” id., such as Stolt-Nielsen’s rule that class arbitration is a matter of consent.
220 For a similar critique of Professor Nagareda’s inconsistent approach toward class proceedings in arbitration and in the courts, see Burbank, supra note 208, at 1935-37.
221 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 65.
222 Id. at 25.
223 See id. at 19 (“Certification can transform unenforceable negative-value claims into an industry-changing event . . . .”).
So if Shady Grove is wrong, does that mean that Concepcion was correct when it highlighted the increased risks to defendants in class arbitration? To a large extent, yes. Surely those risks are real. But what Concepcion failed to do was consider the flip-side of the equation—the risk of creating a claim-disabling effect through the removal of class proceedings. Rather, with respect to the plaintiffs, the Court seemed to follow Shady Grove’s erroneous reasoning. In the same vein, by ignoring the risk to plaintiffs, the Court failed to realize that states should be able to weigh the risks posed to both plaintiffs and defendants.

An extrapolation of the arguments in Professors Burbank and Wolff’s critique of the Shady Grove decision helps synthesize these arguments. Both section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in Shady Grove and the California statute that enabled the unconscionability rule in Discover Bank attempted to set liability policy. In both cases, the availability or nonavailability of the class action device was the determining factor in the regulatory decision. Therefore, the class action is not simply a procedural mechanism with an “incidental effect” but rather a deeply rooted means for advancing regulatory choices. States certainly may come to different conclusions on a waiver’s unconscionability depending on the individual’s incentives to file suit, as is evidenced by New Jersey’s unconscionability analyses. Congress could also enact its own liability policies that would trump the state’s regulatory decisions. But viewed in isolation, the state’s decision should not be preempted by a federal statute, like the FAA, that does not endeavor to affect liability policies.

Several lower courts have adopted this line of reasoning. As noted earlier, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank proclaimed that “class actions . . . are . . . inextricably linked to the vindication of substantive rights.” The Maryland Court of Appeals has similarly noted

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224 In its brief, AT&T claimed that if the availability of a class action under Rule 23 did not alter the defendant’s aggregate liability in Shady Grove, then the Court could not deem the class action waiver “exculpatory” because the withholding of class proceedings would not change a defendant’s liability. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 44-45. Although the Court in Concepcion never actually cited Shady Grove, it effectively came to the same conclusion when it ignored the ruling’s effect on future plaintiffs.

225 See supra text accompanying note 111.


that rather than being a mere matter of procedure, the class action has a “penumbral remedial aspect” because of its claim-enabling effect.\footnote{Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464 (Md. 1997). The court explained that this “penumbral remedial aspect” of class actions helps overcome “procedural or economic impediments that might hinder a normal action [and] make relief that otherwise might be only potentially available to a plaintiff actually available.” Id.} While Justice Breyer’s recognition of the state’s role in weighing the pros and cons of class proceedings is a good first step, the Court should come to appreciate this “penumbral remedial aspect” in future class action cases rather than rely on the sort of flawed reasoning found in \textit{Shady Grove}. Otherwise, the Court will fail to acknowledge the practical realities of class action waivers. Without class actions, the concern is not simply that plaintiffs will be alone in arbitration (the title of this Comment is, indeed, somewhat of a misnomer). Instead, the likely consequence of removing class proceedings is that plaintiffs will either have no incentive to go to arbitration, or they may not even know that their rights have been infringed at all.

\textbf{V. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PATH TO REFORM}

With \textit{Concepcion} now in the rearview mirror, commentators have speculated as to whether the entire class action system as we know it will soon be behind us as well.\footnote{See, e.g., Ashby Jones, \textit{After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class Actions?}, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions (noting Professor Brian Fitzpatrick’s prediction that a victory for AT&T could lead to “the end of class action litigation”).} To some extent, this is true; the frequency of class arbitrations will almost assuredly decrease. Fortunately, though, post-\textit{Concepcion} developments suggest that class action litigation will not be flatlining anytime soon. In the months following the release of the \textit{Concepcion} opinion, lower courts have found various ways to distinguish the case, based both on the unique facts of AT&T’s class action waiver and the unresolved questions stemming from the opinion.\footnote{Although this section focuses on how courts have distinguished \textit{Concepcion}, some courts have faithfully followed the opinion. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the FAA preempts a Florida law requiring class-wide proceedings in arbitration); see also Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 10-5663, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (following \textit{Concepcion} but noting that the \textit{Concepcion} opinion had “regrettably” rejected the plaintiff’s argument that individual arbitration made it cost prohibitive for a single plaintiff to bring suit).} Moreover, reform efforts have commenced, with Congress already considering a bill that would amend the FAA and with admin-
istrative agencies considering additional remedies. This Part will begin by briefly analyzing the post-\textit{Concepcion} landscape. It will then explain that, though efforts to change \textit{Concepcion}'s effect at the legislative and administrative level are a step in the right direction, tweaks in the judicial treatment of the class action device could provide immediate protection both for consumers and for states that want to factor aggregation policies into their regulatory regimes.

A. The Evolving Scope of the \textit{Concepcion} Opinion

The first noteworthy development regarding \textit{Concepcion}'s scope concerns its interaction with the “statutory rights analysis” used by some lower courts. As Part II mentioned, some courts that invalidated class action waivers over the past decade used a “statutory rights analysis” rather than the doctrine of unconscionability.\footnote{See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.} Using this analysis, courts have invalidated class action waivers where the foreseeable result is that plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights in arbitration.

The analysis seems particularly applicable in situations where Congress has embedded procedural devices, such as the class action, into a statute to further public policy goals.\footnote{See Marcus, supra note 173, at 162 (“Governments regularly use procedural devices to fine-tune the regulatory force of the substantive law.”).} For example, when Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991, it expanded the statute’s damages provisions, and in doing so, provided plaintiffs with an incentive to bring class claims.\footnote{Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 102, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981a (2006)); see also Nancy Levit, \textit{Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform}, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 367 (2008) (explaining that the Act expanded compensatory and punitive damage relief).} Furthermore, statistics since 1991 show that the number of employment discrimination class actions have increased as a result of the amendments, thus improving private enforcement of the federal statute.\footnote{Id. at 367, 374-75.} Therefore, a waiver of class proceedings for a civil rights claim, for instance, would seem to be at odds with the statutory structure.

To date, the statutory rights analysis has been used to circumvent both \textit{Stolt-Nielsen} and \textit{Concepcion}. Prior to \textit{Stolt-Nielsen}, the Second Circuit invalidated a class action waiver in an antitrust case against American Express because the retention of multiple expert witnesses—which is par for the course in antitrust cases—was prohibitively expensive for
individual plaintiffs and would have effectively stripped the plaintiffs of their statutory rights. On reconsideration, however, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its previous ruling, concluding that the Court’s contract approach in *Stolt-Nielsen* did not control its fact-specific approach centered on the plaintiffs’ statutory rights. The Second Circuit also found support in earlier FAA cases for its conclusion that a statutory rights analysis can be invoked, notwithstanding the Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration. Although the Second Circuit conceded that *Stolt-Nielsen* prevented it from ordering class arbitration, it ruled that *Stolt-Nielsen* did not prevent class action litigation from moving forward. Notably, the Southern District of New York, in accordance with this opinion—and apparently sticking its tongue out toward Washington, D.C.—invalidated a class action waiver the day after the Supreme Court released *Concepcion*.

If circuit courts continue to follow a statutory rights analysis, then the Supreme Court will likely grant certiorari at some point to clarify whether this line of reasoning can act as an exception to the standard FAA rule favoring arbitration. As an initial matter, the extent to which these cases can circumvent *Concepcion* is not entirely clear. Given that a lawsuit must involve a right protected by federal statute, the statutory rights analysis is narrower than unconscionability rules like *Discover Bank’s*. But what is clear is that the statutory rights analysis provides an example of how the Court could consider the class action’s role within substantive law. To her credit, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent in *Stolt-Nielsen*, intimates that she would take this approach. She notes that “class proceedings may be ‘the thing’” in the small claims context because “without them, potential claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.”

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236 *Am. Express Co.,* 130 S. Ct. at 2401.

237 See *In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig.*, 634 F.3d 187, 193-94, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (highlighting the narrow reach of *Stolt-Nielsen* and stressing that “each case which presents a question of the enforceability of a class action waiver . . . must be considered on its own merits”).

238 *Id.* at 197 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).

239 *Id.* at 200.

240 See *Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.*, 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (invalidating a class action waiver without a single reference to *Concepcion*).

persuade four Justices to join her will certainly be difficult considering the Court’s recent track record in FAA cases.

A second development regarding Concepcion’s scope—one that is much narrower than the first but similar in that it involves a federal statute that may conflict with the Court’s interpretation of the FAA—concerns whether the decision conflicts with certain contracts governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).242 Just a few months before Concepcion was released, an administrative law judge for the National Labor Relations Board concluded that a class action waiver in an employer’s arbitration agreement violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA because employees could have reasonably believed that they were precluded from filing charges with the Board.243 Following Concepcion, the full Board invited interested parties to submit amicus briefs explaining whether the Board should enforce the waiver.244 Admittedly, the Board’s decision will be limited to employment contracts under the NLRA, and employers could presumably cure this problem simply by being more explicit about their workers’ rights in future contracts. Nevertheless, this case may prove significant, as the Board might temporarily be able to sidestep Concepcion in the NLRA context.

A third development regarding Concepcion concerns whether lower courts might take the old-fashioned route and distinguish Concepcion on its facts. One interpretation of the case is that it only singles out state rules that make class action waivers “per se unenforceable.”245 Such a reading does not mean that all class action waivers are “per se enforceable.”246 Within this gap, unconscionability challenges could presumably continue.247 Indeed, despite Concepcion, one Northern District of California judge has taken this approach, ruling that California unconscionability law can still be used to invalidate an employ-

245 John Murray, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Decision on Unconscionability, the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, and Banning Class Arbitration: Dr. John E. Murray, Jr. on AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, May 18, 2011, available at LEXIS, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5659 (italics omitted).
246 Id. (italics omitted).
247 See id. (noting that the AT&T contract has “created a new model draft of arbitration clauses in such consumer contracts”).
er’s class action waiver. In addition, a New Jersey appellate court recently invalidated a class action waiver that it found to be “too confusing, too vague, and too inconsistent to be enforced,” despite its conclusion that Concepcion controlled.

In the same vein, while AT&T’s “consumer-friendly” provisions perhaps provided an ideal vehicle through which the Court could further its FAA policies, their uniqueness also makes the case easily distinguishable. For instance, if the agreement is merely a second-generation clause that lacks additional provisions, then a court could perhaps distinguish Concepcion on its unique facts. Albeit a welcome development for consumers, this approach would unfortunately do little to clarify current problems with class action policy.

Finally, a fourth development regarding Concepcion’s scope involves its effect, or lack thereof, on suits brought under state private attorney general statutes. In the months after Concepcion, a California appellate court considered whether to enforce a waiver in an employer’s arbitration agreement that prohibited suits by employees under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Specifically, the PAGA allows employees to bring representative actions against their employers for violations of the state’s Labor Code. These actions are not class actions and are thus not subject to the same requirements, such as certification or notice requirements. These suits, however, can have some of the same deterrence effects of class actions. Ultimately, the court held that the waiver of PAGA suits was unenforceable and that FAA preemption would effectively nullify the benefits of these actions to the public. The court also distinguished Concepcion quite gracefully by noting that a representative

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248 See Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, No. 11-0892, 2011 WL 2940690, at *6-7, *12-13 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (concluding that the waiver was unconscionable but granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration because the plaintiff had waived this argument).  
250 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.  
252 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a).  
253 Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-63.  
254 Id.  
255 Id. at 863-65.
action in arbitration would not have the same attributes as class arbitration, which so concerned the majority in Concepcion.\textsuperscript{256}

While a discussion of the pros and cons of these private attorney general statutes, such as “day in court” considerations, is beyond the scope of this Comment, this fourth development underscores that Concepcion has not completely eliminated the deterrence effect of court proceedings. Some wrongdoing will still be held in check, even without the class action. Nevertheless, barring a significant upswing in the enactment and usage of these types of statutes, other reform efforts are needed to cure the problems resulting from Concepcion.

B. Reform Efforts

Thus far, this Comment has advocated reform efforts solely at the judicial level, and in particular, for a change in the way the Court views the class action mechanism in FAA cases. A more flexible approach to the FAA, rather than the Court’s current rigid approach, would enable the Court to appreciate the role that class actions play in substantive law.\textsuperscript{257} Such a reform does have its disadvantages, however. For example, a case-by-case approach that analyzes how the class action device either fits into a state’s unconscionability paradigm or into a federal statutory scheme does require a greater share of courts’ time and resources. Furthermore, there is not always a clear line distinguishing claims that are prohibitively expensive from those that are economically viable. Even so, a more flexible approach to the FAA would certainly yield better outcomes than the Court’s current approach, which effectively prohibits plaintiffs from vindicating substantive rights.

There are, however, steps at both the legislative and administrative levels that could be taken to facilitate a new approach at the judicial level. Most prominently, after Concepcion was handed down, a group of lawmakers reintroduced a bill in Congress that would amend the FAA. The bill, the Arbitration Fairness Act, was originally proposed in

\textsuperscript{256}Id. at 863.

\textsuperscript{257} Other scholars have also advocated a more flexible approach to the FAA, although one that does not necessarily account for the current problems regarding class action policy. See Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1283 (proposing a functional test for determining when state law singles out arbitration); Diana M. Link & Richard A. Bales, Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International, 11 P EPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275, 276 (2011) (advocating a “totality of the circumstances” approach); Wilson, supra note 48, at 792 (concluding that states should be permitted to invalidate waivers based on unconscionability principles as long as those principles are “applied in an objectively reasonable manner”).
2009 and excludes employment contracts and consumer agreements from the FAA’s scope. As I noted earlier, commentators have labeled it as an attempt to restore Congress’s original intent of only applying the FAA to parties with relatively equal bargaining power. The bill, however, will undoubtedly face intense lobbying attacks, and it has been criticized as taking a “meat cleaver . . . to an issue that requires a scalpel” because not all employees, consumers, and franchisees are unsophisticated bargainers. Nevertheless, the introduction of the bill is a welcome development to those who are dismayed by the Court’s current FAA jurisprudence.

Also at the legislative level, it will be interesting to see whether states begin enacting more private attorney general statutes like California’s PAGA statute. State lawmakers who want to increase deterrence efforts aimed at harmful business practices should consider enacting these statutes because presumably they would have a greater chance of withstanding an FAA preemption challenge. Additionally, even supporters of limited government intervention may react favorably to this method of reform because it would leave the enforcement of substantive law up to the courts, rather than politicized public agencies.

Finally, at the administrative level, the recently established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is in a position to help guarantee the availability of class remedies through future regulations. However, the CFPB, which emerged as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, is only beginning to take shape, and Republican lawmakers have adamantly opposed the Bureau’s organizational plans. Thus, a considerable amount of time

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260 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
261 See supra note 47, at 1273 (quoting Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4, 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).
262 See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
263 Cf. Burbank, supra note 208, at 1931 (noting that private enforcement actions, such as class actions, can be “critically important to the vindication of substantive law norms in a society that distrusts, and is therefore unwilling to commit adequate resources to, centralized government enforcement”).
265 Republicans have opposed plans proposed by the CFPB chief architect, Elizabeth Warren, and are expected to block President Obama’s appointee for the CFPB director position, Richard Cordray. Tamara Keith, New Consumer Protection Agency Faces Opposition, NPR (July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138550502/new-consumer-protection-agency-faces-opposition. At the time of writing, Cordray had been approved
may pass before the agency implements any reform efforts. But aside from these obstacles, once the CPFB is up and running, it should immediately consider reforming the use of class action waivers to help cure the injustices the Concepcion opinion created.

CONCLUSION

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion was a crossroads for the future of class action policy, the protection of consumer rights, and the use of class arbitration as a technique for dispute resolution. This Comment has demonstrated why an appreciation for the “penumbral remedial aspect” of the class action and for states’ roles in formulating aggregation policy should have been factored into the Court’s analysis. While subsequent developments may limit or reform Concepcion’s scope, the Court should nevertheless reconsider its views on class action policy in future cases.