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CYBERBORDERS: EXERCISING STATE SOVEREIGNTY ONLINE

Beth A. Simmons* & Rachel A. Hulvey*

The internet brings challenges that threaten national identities and the foundations of what it means to be a state. Well-known challenges include difficulties maintaining important national values, competition threatening local economic plans, and even the inability to maintain a meaningful informational environment for self-governance. These influences are plausibly understood as challenges to some of the basic functions of a sovereign state. Despite these challenges, we identify the social practice of establishing control over mercurial mediums. States have responded by erecting cyberborders with a collection of laws, practices, and internet architecture designed to filter digital information within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. We contend that new digital bordering methods largely reflect and reproduce the territorial identity of the state. Border allusions, informed by concepts of geography, walls, and territoriality, are rife in states’ official internet rhetoric. In policy and practice, states are not only guided by vertical relations between state and society, but also have horizontal orientations for controlling cross-border flows. We define these preferences as a state’s border orientation or the underlying state preference for preserving national identity by filtering global forces. These preferences explain the rise of legal efforts to control the entry and exit of data and explain national approaches to sovereignty online across regime types.

“Within Chinese territory, the internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. The internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected.”

White Paper, The Internet in China 2010

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INTRODUCTION

Territorial states are increasingly overtaken by a sovereign identity crisis. The integration of markets, the mobility of humans, and the instantaneous transfer of information across borders represent massive opportunities but also challenge states’ abilities to govern territorially. On the one hand, globalization has enabled societies to enjoy a broad range of products and services, interact with different cultures, and share new ideas. On the other hand, the state’s identity is rooted in the provision of collective goods for a people in a specific territorial location. When it appears unable to do so, the territorial state’s raison d’être comes into question.

Are states facing a “sovereign identity crisis” in the digital age? Potentially, yes. We conceive of a state’s identity as comprised of three components: functional, ideational, and spatial. Functionally, states aggregate and coordinate human efforts to achieve collective goods, such as defense, education, public order, or economic development. Ideationally, states cultivate cultural and other socially shared values of their dominant population. They instantiate the social purposes of their citizens. And finally, states’ identities are spatial. They occupy physical territory on earth where their jurisdictional authority is broadly recognized. No other authority in the modern world,

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4. Id.
5. See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881, https://www.hlrn.org/img/documents/Montevideo_Convention.pdf (https://perma.cc/HEX7-9WMP) ("The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.")
whether personal or spiritual, has territoriality as its defining feature. States can be said to experience a sovereign identity crisis when their ability to promote collective effort, protect national cultural values, or govern spatially is seriously challenged.

Territorial sovereignty describes the right of the modern state to regulate activities, people, and ideas according to social purposes on its territory. When they cannot do so effectively, this produces anxiety about sovereign identity which is the focus of this forum. Uncontrollable interdependence across jurisdictions raises questions about why we should consider the territorial state as the locus of sovereign governance. In this sense, neoliberal globalization presents the state with a crisis of governability and undermines the very legitimating mission of the state itself.

Historically, modern states have responded by erecting borders, i.e., “bordering.” In practical terms, this has meant delimiting, enforcing, and hardening the boundary of their territorial jurisdiction. Political entities from city-states to empires have been defining and defending territorial borders for centuries to keep out unwanted people, products, and multifarious threats. The use of territorial bordering technologies are widely viewed as a legitimate exercise of state authority. Wendy Brown has argued persuasively that border hardening can, in fact, be understood as a response to challenges to state sovereignty.

Many early commentaries on the digital age thought that uniquely among the forces of globalization, the digital age would be different. Digital media would be nearly impossible for states to block from view or to contain within the state. In this Essay, we contend on the contrary that a “splinternet” has been engineered by sovereign territorial states to maintain their territorial distinctiveness. Well over a decade ago, Goldsmith and Wu noted that many states had the technological capacity to filter internet traffic according to territory. Building on their prescient insights, we make the more provocative argument that physical and cyberborders are of a piece. Both address anxieties that the sovereign state will be overwhelmed by global forces. Moreover,

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cyberborders and terrestrial borders rest on similar classes of technologies, from law to bureaucracy to architecture, that the state has historically developed to preserve its sovereign identity. We deploy the concept of border orientation, which is a deep-seated, state-cum-society preference for jurisdictional distinctiveness. This slow-moving preference is not directly observable but is evidenced by a broad range of state projects designed to control global influences. Empirical research has shown there is a statistically significant correlation between states’ physical border barriers on land—such as walls, fences, border police, and inspection facilities—and the erection of cyberborders. Both kinds of bordering projects spring from the same preference for protecting the local while filtering the global. Border walls and cyberborders both respond to challenges to the sovereign identity crisis of the modern territorial state.

Section I explores the link between the digital age and crises of sovereign identity and documents the central role that spatial thinking plays in states’ cyber strategy. Section II defines the concept of border orientation and draws out the commonalities between cyberborders and terrestrial border fortifications. Section III discusses how cyberborders are implemented in law and practice. We conclude that states vary significantly in their preferences for jurisdictional distinctiveness, and that cyberbordering represents an effort by territorial states to preserve their identity and authority through the age-old impulse to differentiate through bordering.

1. **The Digital Age and the Sovereign Identity Crisis**

   **A. The Crisis**

   There is nothing new about the challenges extra-territorial forces pose to the territorial state. Integrated markets have complicated states’ ability to control macroeconomic conditions and the distribution of wealth. Highly mobile foreign populations have complicated states’ control over the entry of unwanted persons. Digital flows of transborder information have all affected states’ ability to preserve local values (religious beliefs, cultural cohesion, civility, gender roles, privacy) and to ensure local governance integrity threatened by foreign launched fraud or misinformation. In short, states have repeatedly found it difficult to do what their territorial identity demands: to govern effectively within their territorial borders.

   The digital age provides a host of examples. Citizen data is often stored in foreign data centers controlled by global firms but inaccessible to national industries and law enforcement. In such cases, national privacy protections are largely beyond state control. Data control has obvious commercial implications as well. Control over

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15. *Id.*
commercial data drastically affects economic competition between local firms and global technology companies, which likely explains why India’s telecom secretary Aruna Sundararajan stressed the strategic importance of controlling data: “We don’t want to build walls, but at the same time, we explicitly recognize and appreciate that data is a strategic asset.”18 Such recognition has driven some states to prevent data exportation, citing national strategic interests.

Defining and enforcing rights is a key state function, and the internet challenges a state’s ability to protect these freedoms. Enforcing intellectual property rights is a key example.19 The proliferation of file-sharing tools has spawned copyright violations, and, as early as the 1990s, industries began to demand penalties and sophisticated digital enforcement measures to protect their intellectual property online.20 More generally, an essential purpose of the state is to defend the prevalent social values of its population. Saudi Arabia, for example, systematically blocks internet content, including “provocative attire,” Bahai faith, and content perceived as “insulting to the Islamic religion.”21 Many states attempt to control content that contravenes local social values of decency, such as hate speech, pornography, and defamation.22 Liberal states in Europe control the export of information that risks their citizens’ privacy.23 Unfiltered global information introduces new ideas, some of which are likely to be seen as disgusting, dangerous, or socially dysfunctional in a particular cultural context.

Finally, global information poses new challenges to national security. For some states, the threats of disinformation and misinformation challenge the sanctity of elections and trust in the democratic process. Liberal states have encountered information that endangered the operation of democracy itself: eerily authentic-seeming forms of misinformation that incite political violence or diminish the legitimacy of elections.24 “Deep fakes”—information and images that look authentic but falsely, egregiously, and

20. LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE (Yale Univ. Press 2014); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 12. The Recording Industry of America reported music sales in the United States dropped from $14.6 to $7.7 billion after the advent of Napster, driving lobbying pressure from the bottom up.
often salaciously threaten individuals, national security, and democratic institutions— are an obvious target of concern for any liberal society. States also face significant threats from ransomware and cybercrime. Experts estimate that ransomware attacks will globally occur every eleven seconds, resulting in total damage costs of US$20 billion in 2021.26 Developing countries are among the most vulnerable and most devastated by such attacks. In a matter of seconds, Bangladesh suffered an attack that stole US$81 million from the central bank, an amount that can shatter a state’s development goals.27 Economic damages from cybercrime are predicted to reach more than US$10 trillion annually by 2025, representing what some observers have called “the greatest transfer of economic wealth in history.”28

B. The Response

How have territorial states attempted to govern in the face of such global information forces? They turn to familiar tools for making sense of the world. In particular, they develop means of securing the state territorially. Geography is central to the identity and existence of territorial entities. Their legitimate claim to rule inheres in a physical location where nationality and belonging are carved out by territorial boundaries. The geographic nature of state legitimacy is as true in cyberspace as it is on the ground. While the domain of struggle has changed from the physical to the digital, the first-order characteristic of states remains essentially territorial. To border is to differentiate, whether on terra firma or in cyberspace.

Bordering the internet is the policy response of choice because states think spatially, even when it comes to controlling digital information over the internet. Evidence of territorial thinking pervades states’ strategic rhetoric regarding digital information. They use territorial metaphors to help bridge practices and understandings from offline to online spaces and use these metaphors to guide their thinking when responding to an emerging foreign challenge.29 The very term “cyberspace” creates the imagery of a territory to be conquered.30 “Domain” analogies have had a profound effect, for example, on United States military policy and the setup of a U.S. Cyber Command.31 The idea of China’s “Great Firewall,” first coined over a quarter century ago, has stuck precisely


30. Id. at 41–49.

31. Id. at 50–56.
because of the power of the metaphor to capture the idea of exerting sovereign control over the internet territorially.

Evidence of a worldview grounded in physical and territorial ideas pervades national security documents. Turkey’s National Cybersecurity Strategy contains spatial distinctions between national and international cyberspace, and, in their domestic press, Turkish officials emphasize the need to defend cyberborders in addition to land, sea, and air space. The Philippines’ National Cybersecurity Plan includes a Cyber Geography Program to map national cyberspace infrastructure in a manner reminiscent of early cartographic efforts. China’s concept of cyber sovereignty is highly territorial. China promotes the right of national governments to control the flow of information within national boundaries and regulate data according to the demands of national security. China’s National Strategy for Cyberspace describes cyberspace as a “new territory for national sovereignty,” while their United Nations submissions extol the value of recognizing “all States have extended sovereignty to cyberspace.”

Spatial metaphors are also used to oppose policies of government control. The United States, for instance, has referred to a digital “Berlin Wall” to discourage states from interfering with free transborder flows of information. Many countries remain similarly cautious about the ability to describe cyberspace in sovereign territorial terms.

39. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom at the Newseum (Jan. 21, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rls/2010/01/135519.htm [https://perma.cc/K2MB-WTH6] (“The Berlin Wall symbolized a world divided and it defined an entire era. Today, remnants of that wall sit inside this museum where they belong, and the new iconic infrastructure of our age is the internet. Instead of division, it stands for connection. But even as networks spread to nations around the globe, virtual walls are cropping up in place of visible walls.”).
When discussing threats at the United Nations Open Ended Working Group on Information and Communications Technologies in 2019, Argentina noted, “cyberspace represents an intangible and global space with an infinite flow of data over which no dominion or sovereignty is exercised.”

Love it or hate it, spatial sovereignty is the language of state governance. Through this lens, it is not surprising that states have deployed law, bureaucracy, and engineering techniques to border the internet. What may be more surprising is that a quantitative analysis found that there is a strong correlation between bordering a national territory with fences, walls, police stations, and well-defended border crossing stations and bordering the internet with data takedown requests, website blocking, and data localization requirements. Bordering repertoires shape the policy space from which states draft policies and act.

II. Roots of a Response to the Sovereign Identity Crisis

A. Border Orientation

Analysts have largely interpreted the splintering of the internet in terms of censorship and repression, attributing most of it to authoritarian regimes. Analytical attention has focused largely on China, where internet controls are a tool to repress destabilizing forms of collective action that threaten the government, censor social media, and reinforce official versions of common knowledge. Internet controls have largely been interpreted as a strategy of domestic repression to maintain political power uninhibited by free expression norms. Most scholars assume authoritarian states possess comparative advantages to democratic ones in controlling the internet. They assume that the most important relationship addressed by internet regulation is a vertical one between state and society.

We suggest that the horizontal relationship between states provides even more leverage on why and where states attempt to regulate the internet. We draw on the concept of border orientation, which is a preference for how a society is to be governed in the face of international forces: “It arises from the interplay of societal preferences and
domestic institutions that aggregate and propagate actionable values more generally. As institutions of public order, borders operate as “a means of realizing underlying preferences defined by the demands of societal groups.” In authoritarian regimes, border orientation will largely reflect the preferences of a dictator or “selectorate,” but in more democratic countries, it results from the aggregation of broader state and societal preferences over national distinctiveness. However, this governance theory is distinct from traditional concepts of regime type. While the latter describes state-society (“vertical”) relations, border orientation captures how the state/society governs forces emanating from the rest of the world (“horizontal” relations). As such, it demonstrates a preference for defining and protecting the home environment from the global one.

Border orientation preferences drive spatial policies designed to create national distinctiveness. It has traditionally been used to understand border hardening on the ground. We contend it is useful to alter the aperture of this concept to identify and analyze policies designed to create separation between foreign and national in a borderless medium. Such a national environment may be repressive in some cases, but in many instances, it is merely preferential or even “liberal.” We contend this effort reflects the management of global forces more generally. Virtually and in the physical world, states create boundaries that simultaneously generate national identities and shore up the states’ authority to govern. Governments are motivated to border the physical and virtual spheres to define the polity, regulate commerce, engender respect for local values, and curate ideas that distinguish “us” from “them.” In this sense, bordering the internet is, like all boundary making, an attempt to engineer differences.52

Despite the technological challenges of regulating the internet, governments are “fencing” the internet for very traditional reasons: they want to maintain sovereign control over the information environment in their national territory. We contend that these practices have clear analogies in the physical world. The technologies differ, the bargaining power of states has changed, and the costs and benefits are not identical, but familiar concepts like walls, fences, and even territorial sovereignty continue to be useful. States struggle with sometimes overwhelming “cyber issues,” but they are grounded in—and indeed are constituted by—territorial sovereignty. To understand recent trends toward internet fragmentation, we suggest it is important to think like a state. When we do, it becomes clear that state leaders have fairly traditional ideas and values about maintaining sovereign territorial control.

49. Id. at 855.
51. “Selectorate” is a term referring to the group that selects a leader in a political system without meaningful elections, for example in an autocratic state. The “selectorate” in an autocracy is analogous to the “electorate” in a democracy. Selectorate theory was first developed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson & Alastair Smith, An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 791 (1999).
B. Building Borders, Virtual and Real

To an astonishing degree, states use similar legal strategies of boundary making in cyberspace as they do in constructing their territorial borders. In both cases, bordering requires legal authorization, funding to construct and maintain, and legal definitions, rules, procedures, and permits to function. In most states, land border structures are erected “in a highly legalized fashion according to legal chains of authorizations.”53 Cyber bordering also involves the passage of laws, implementation of policies, and deployment of infrastructural investments designed to drive a wedge between the national information environment and that of the rest of the world. These laws are enforceable because states have the exclusive right to regulate the conditions under which firms, including multinational ones, operate in their territorial jurisdiction.

While it may be technically more difficult to control electronic data than humans or goods, the purposes and commonalities are striking. Figure 1 illustrates the similarities between traditional national borders, aimed at regulating the flow of persons and products between countries, and cyberborders, designed to regulate information flows. The thick vertical line represents a border. Borders filter both outflows (depicted on the left) and inflows (depicted on the right), although the latter seem to be more salient in contemporary policy. The broad purpose of policies on the left is to control strategic assets. Policies on the right are designed to curate jurisdictional distinctiveness.

Figure 1. Creating and maintaining international borders. The goal of bordering is to create and maintain a national environment that is distinct from the rest of the world. Laws, bureaucracies, and structures filter and control the entry and exit of humans, goods, and information.

54. This is not obvious in all cases. Terrain, human motivations, and technical feasibility are all involved in the “success” of filtering cross-border movements.
III. HOW STATES ENACT CYBERBORDERS

At first glance, cyber bordering may appear to be a transnational bordering problem like no other. After all, digital information is nothing like a military tank, narcotics, or a human body. And yet policies to border the internet are strongly correlated with policies to border a state’s territorial jurisdiction. This is not because border walls, fences, and inspection stations “cause” cyberborders. It is because both territorial and cyber borders flow from a state’s/society’s preference, determination, and capacity for bordering generally. This claim has been recently supported with empirical evidence. Data gathered by Simmons and Kenwick documenting gates, official buildings, inspection stations, border walls, border fences, and police stations in border zones provide evidence of hardening land borders around the world. Using this data reveals that “thicker” terrestrial borders positively correlate with at least three cyber bordering practices: data localization laws, website blocking, and data takedown requests.

A. Data Localization

Governments design data localization laws to regulate what types of data can leave national jurisdiction. Data localization laws may prohibit, impound, or conditionally permit the export of certain types of data. These laws are enforceable because states have the exclusive right to regulate the conditions under which firms, including multinational ones, operate in their jurisdiction, i.e., territorially. Even if the medium is complex, laws often place the burden on multinational firms to secure the infrastructure and data centers necessary to comply with national storage requirements. Not all laws ban the same types of exports. Some impound particular types of data, some require security checks before outbound transfers, and some laws prohibit transfers to countries with insufficient privacy protections, for instance.

Laws that restrict data export are clearly a bordering practice. The strictest laws demand exclusive national storage of data and require firms to make investments in data centers to impound data on national soil. For example, China’s 2016 Cybersecurity Law requires firms to store data collected on Chinese citizens exclusively within Chinese borders. In light of this requirement, Apple invested in a data center in Guizhou and also poured millions of dollars into a partnership with the local government to ensure the company would pass state security audits and manage data storage in compliance

56. Simmons & Kenwick, supra note 13.
57. Hulvey & Simmons, supra note 14, at 14.
59. Daskal, Borders and Bits, supra note 23, at 234.
60. Anupam Chander, Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMOBY L.J. 677 (2015).
with national law. National storage requirements also ensure that data is more accessible to the government when law enforcement needs to investigate crimes.

Requirements to impound national information within traditional boundaries are also motivated by industrial development policies. China, again, provides an example. President Xi Jinping has referred to data as a new factor of production. Some laws are designed to encourage domestic industries to successfully use and benefit from national data. For example, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) directed that financial and payment information be exclusively stored and processed within the national jurisdiction of India, to limit the advantages multinational firms’ derive from analyzing digital transactions at centralized global locations. American companies, including Visa and Mastercard, lobbied the RBI to alter the policy as the requirement undercuts their competitive advantages flowing from centralized processing in the United States. The Indian digital payments firm, Paytm, saw such rules as necessary for leveling the playing field to foster “national wealth creation.” Since Indian firms strongly contested “data colonization” by American technology giants, they lauded regulations requiring Indian data to be managed by national firms rather than global corporations.

Other countries eschew demands of full local data storage for more nuanced data localization requirements. In Europe, for example, the Data Retention Directive of 2006 was designed to regulate data retention where data had been generated or...


64. The Srikrishna Committee Report notes benefits will be obtained from localization: “The growth of AI is heavily dependent on harnessing data” and “most of the personal data of Indian citizens, such as the data collected by internet giants such as Facebook and Google are largely stored abroad.” COMM. OF EXPERTS UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF JUSTICE B.N. SRIKRISHNA, A FREE AND FAIR DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROTECTING PRIVACY, EMPOWERING INDIANS 92 (2018), https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_Protection_Committee_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SR8-XWEN].


67. For reports of leveling the playing field, see Vindu Goel, supra note 65. For more on data colonization see Justin Sherman, India’s Data Protection Bill in Geopolitical Context, NEW AMERICA (July 10, 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/c2b/c2b-log/indias-data-protection-bill-geopolitical-context/ [https://perma.cc/S43C-X5WR].

processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks. The Directive required EU states to store information on EU citizens’ telecommunications data. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck down the directive in 2014 and found the objectives were not sufficiently tailored to preserve privacy in the face of increased government surveillance of information. Although the directive satisfied objectives of public interest and national security, the ECJ found it violated privacy protection contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.69

States vary significantly in their data localization laws and controlling the export of data is not the domain of one particular regime type. In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, where Facebook moved and processed citizen data abroad without consent, attention on the standards of outbound jurisdictions has increased.70 One solution is to impose spatial conditions on which locations are permissible for data transfer. The most famous example is the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),71 which requires that firms obtain a data protection adequacy decision from the European Commission before transferring personal data to a third country.72 The GDPR asserts the power of governments to prevent data from crossing borders if privacy protections are deemed inadequate. As European citizens associate being European with a strong level of privacy protection, the GDPR allows the EU to carve out a European vision of privacy and data protection in a borderless sphere.


72. Id. art. 45.
To illustrate the global variance, we have developed an original measurement of data localization laws using a database of legal texts maintained by InCountry, a consulting firm that advises multinational corporations on storing and processing data in countries of operation. Data export restrictions include data localization laws that prevent firms from storing certain types of data abroad, such as health or financial data, as well as conditional transfer laws that restrict the movement of data to jurisdictions without stringent privacy protections. Figure 2 illustrates the global variation in the intensity of such laws.

Figure 2. Data localization laws by country. Darker shades indicate more restrictive laws. Gray indicates missing data.

We find that the total intensity of data restriction laws worldwide positively correlates with Simmons and Kenwick’s measure of terrestrial border structures. The correlation suggests states and their societies desire to maintain jurisdictional distinctiveness by restricting outbound data flows. Sometimes this trend is motivated by a preference for maintaining privacy, typically reflected in conditional data transfer laws. At other times, data localization laws reflect a desire to increase the state’s capacity for surveillance to access data that would otherwise be stored on foreign servers. In either case, the desire to filter and exclude traditional forms of cross-border

74. Hulvey & Simmons, supra note 14, at 39 tbl.5.
76. See, e.g., COMM. OF EXPERTS UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF JUSTICE B.N. SIKHRISHNA, supra note 64, at 3–4.
movement is associated with a horizontal impulse to manage and separate the foreign from the domestic and to control national information.

**B. Takedown Requests**

States have a range of social and political motivations for attempting to reconfigure social media channels to maintain distinctions between domestic and foreign content. Many states work through multinational technology firms, such as Google or Facebook, altering the types of information displayed within national boundaries by issuing takedown requests. Requests for removing certain kinds of foreign information from national view are usually based on national regulations for permissible forms of expression. For example, when Thailand demanded that YouTube filter videos of the king—which is illegal in Thailand but permissible in other jurisdictions—Google removed videos from their platform only within the geographic boundaries of Thailand, creating differences in the content to which users are exposed in different nations. National security concerns motivate other requests to alter or elide digital information. South Korea has demanded that Google blur or hide sensitive locations such as power plants and military installations. Some governments have even sought to reinforce their territorial claims on digital maps. Google received a request from Vietnam to “correct” the boundaries of a Vietnamese providence near China and the firm adapted the details on Google Maps visible in Vietnam.

Many states enforce the boundaries of permissible content through intermediary liability laws. Such laws require firms to respect distinctions in national culture and values and adapt platforms accordingly. Some legal models offer firms a safe harbor from liability in exchange for hiding infringing content once firms receive notice of content violating domestic rules, such as copyright protections. In the United States,

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77. Note takedown requests are different from the requests users submit or the self-regulatory policies of platform companies, including terms of service elegantly addressed by Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).

78. See id. at 1623.


the Digital Millennium Copyright Act largely outsources handling disputes about intellectual property violations to platform companies that must then remove infringing content from their platforms once notified. These laws reinforce the ability of the state to protect intellectual property by requiring social media platforms to adapt global platforms when notified of violations. Intermediary liability laws also connect to many states’ goals of maintaining a domestic environment free from incivility or violence.

Other intermediary liability models incentivize proactive policing by threatening to fine firms for illegal content transmitted or posted on the social network. Germany’s NetzDG law responded to heightened levels of online hate speech to mitigate the risk that online rhetoric will mobilize offline hate crimes. The law allows individuals to submit concerns directly to firms to remove any violative speech within Germany’s borders. Google’s Transparency Reports reveal that individuals and businesses have requested a large number of takedowns for hate speech and violence viewable within their jurisdiction, suggesting strong societal interest in online civility. Australia created laws to prevent the rapid dissemination of terrorist content on social media, in response to the Christchurch, New Zealand massacre the gunman had live streamed. Australia’s law requires multinational technology firms to police internet traffic for violent content and remove abhorrent material.

Some laws direct content erasure rather than removal and reflect a concerted state response to protect cultural values. The European Union codified the “right to erasure” in the 2018 GDPR. The “right to be forgotten” derives from a long history of the “right to oblivion” that arose as a means of protecting the dignity and privacy of individuals. Under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, individuals are protected from inappropriate communications that threaten to degrade, humiliate, or mortify them. As search engines increasingly become the means of finding people online, what information appears on the first page of a search query can significantly impact someone’s personal and professional life. Information found in the results shapes a stranger’s estimations of that individual—creating the potential for humiliation or, in the extreme, the forfeiture of jobs or personal relationships. Intervention by the state

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84. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz] [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 30, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT TEIL I [BGBL. I] (Ger.) [https://perma.cc/L3FEY2F3].
85. Id. at § 3(1).
89. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 71, art. 17.
91. Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 982 (2018). This longstanding concept at stake is referred to as “dignitary privacy.” Id.
draws a boundary around search engine results, so privacy-infringing content is not available within the European Union.

Figure 3 displays how intensively states around the world have used content removal and takedown requests to filter global information that would otherwise be visible domestically. For each country in the world, we used Google’s Transparency Reports⁹² to document the frequency of content removal requests made to Google between 2011 and 2021. Each request represents a demand to distinguish the content that social media and search engines offer nationally versus globally by removing content visible within the state’s jurisdiction. States work through multinational firms to border the world wide web in an effort to maintain a distinct domestic informational environment. Recent research has found that the intensity of takedown requests states make is correlated with the intensity of states’ physical border architecture in place around the world.⁹³

![Figure 3. Google content removal requests. The number of requests states have made to Google to remove content from their platform, total, 2011–2021. Gray indicates missing data. Russia is by far the most frequent content removal requestor. Even democracies such as the United States, Australia, and France have made a significant number of takedown requests. China, which blocks Google wholesale, has also made ad hoc requests.](image)

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⁹³. Hulvey & Simmons, supra note 14, at 29, tbl.2.
C. Foreign Website Blocking

Takedown requests described above are a “retail” approach to cyber bordering; states issue individual requests to private firms to remove illegal or unwanted content on a case-by-case basis. Website blocking is a “wholesale” approach. States wall off their territory from global information by blocking foreign websites rather than requesting the removal of specific content. Blocking foreign websites reflects an even more intense desire of the state to control how and where citizens are exposed to foreign ideas, products, and transactions. Many authoritarian states blocked foreign social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, in the wake of the Arab Spring protests that had been organized on such channels. During its invasion of Ukraine, Russia blocked American and Ukrainian websites to sever the domestic information space from global news critical of Russia’s attack. Others report on the construction of digital walls during the pandemic and governments’ desires to control how global news about the virus was consumed by domestic populations. China blocked global news on the COVID-19 pandemic from crossing China’s borders. Democracies block and shut down websites that violate intellectual property protections in a similar manner to the seizure of drugs or other illegal substances.

Erecting digital walls by blocking the visibility of specific websites requires state investments in infrastructure. State-created infrastructure includes engineering code that redirects internet traffic through deep packet inspection technology looking for illegal content and malicious intent. Firewalls require sophisticated routers to redirect internet traffic data at a number of limited “gateway” protocol points, similar to gates at land ports of entry. Would-be entrants are denied access, effectively walling off parts of the global internet for users within territorial boundaries.

Website blocking is not a matter of engineering alone. Law is at the center of strategies to control how domestic internet users interact with foreign content. Russia’s Sovereign Internet Law, for example, targets internet exchange points (IXPs) where...

Governments often work with ISPs by providing a list of URLs or categories of websites that should be blocked within the state’s jurisdiction. One example is India’s 2009 Information Technology Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules.\footnote{Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, G.S.R 78 E. (India), https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Information%20Technology%20%20Procedure%20and%20Safeguards%20for%20Blocking%20for%20Access%20by%20Public%20Rules%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3Y-9YK2].} These rules empower the central government to direct any agency or intermediary to block access to information when satisfied that it is “necessary or expedient” for the “sovereignty,” “integrity,” or “[d]efence,” of India, “[s]ecurity of the State,” “[f]riendly relations with Foreign States,” “public order” or “[f]or preventing incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence relating to above.”\footnote{Id.}

The incidence of website blocking varies significantly around the world. To demonstrate this, we collected data on blocking incidents from the world’s top 500 websites (by traffic).\footnote{Data are from SimilarWeb. See \textit{Top Websites Ranking}, \textit{SIMILARWEB} https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/ [https://perma.cc/XYV3-ZS3E] (last updated July, 2022). For details, see Hulvey & Simmons, \textit{supra} note 14, and associated appendices.} We then collected evidence gathered by the Censored Planet Project on traffic disruptions to these major sites.\footnote{\textit{CENSORED PLANET}, https://censoredplanet.org/ [https://perma.cc/9V4U-LGWJ] (“An Internet-wide Longitudinal Censorship Observatory”); see Hulvey & Simmons, \textit{supra} note 14, and associated appendices for details.} Finally, we used SimilarWeb’s categorization of each website’s content to draw inferences about the motivations for blocking. The results are displayed in Figure 4. Some countries, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, block foreign websites in almost every category displayed. But even liberal western democracies, such as Canada, Australia, and Norway, block certain
websites, especially those that facilitate file sharing—and thus potential property rights violations—and certain social media sites. Research demonstrates that blocking social media, file transfer, news media, commerce, and culture/streaming websites are all positively correlated with physical border architecture more generally.  

109. Hulvey & Simmons, supra note 14, at 35 tbl.4.
Figure 4. Intensity of blocking major foreign websites. Major websites (by traffic) are ranked by SimilarWeb: https://www.similarweb.com. Data on incidence of blocking is from Censored Planet Project: https://censoredplanet.org/.
D. Discussion: Cyberborders and Terrestrial Borders

Over a decade ago, Goldsmith and Wu observed that it was indeed possible for states to exert their territorial authority to border the internet. Not only is this possible, but it is a reenactment of states’ ongoing struggle to maintain a sovereign identity in the face of global forces. Moreover, the concept of border orientation captures the underlying preference to engineer distinctiveness. Figure 5 summarizes the remarkably strong relationship between cyberborders on the one hand and border orientation on the other. To measure cyberborders, we created an additive index for each country from the three cyberborder policies described above (data localization, takedown requests, and website blocking). These values are denoted on the vertical axis. Border orientation is along the horizontal axis. It is a latent variable developed from physical bordering responses (walls, fences, border inspection stations, and police stations in border zones) that represents a state’s commitment to controlling the penetration of its national border. The relationship is positive (correlation = 0.27) and extremely tight (p=.0018). The results suggest cyberborders spring from the same horizontal preference for jurisdictional distinctiveness and spatial control. States that have highly controlling border orientations toward the movement of goods and people also tend to erect more cyberborders that control the movement of data. This summary figure underscores the limitations of claims of cyber exceptionalism. It also suggests that the states have fought to preserve their sovereign identity and have indeed attempted to do so in the digital age as well.

Figure 5. The correlation between cyberborders and border orientation. The cyberborder index is comprised of data localization laws, take-down requests, and website blocking. The border orientation score is a latent variable developed from border crossing structures, border walls and fences, and police stations in border zones to represent a state’s commitment to the public, authoritative, and spatial display of
controlling cross border movement. The correlation between these two indexes is 0.27 (p=.0018).

CONCLUSION

Sovereignty in cyberspace has often been characterized as a unique concern. This Essay has reviewed cyber exceptionalism—paralleling other debates about the nature of state sovereignty in the face of globalization. We argue instead for a broader understanding of states’ sovereign identity crises. States have been grappling with the limits of their own territorial control for decades. They have dealt with trade, human mobility, transnational crime and violence, and the challenges such cross-border movements pose for governability. Variance in sensitivities to jurisdictional distinctiveness in the face of these challenges can be captured by the concept of border orientation. To varying degrees, states respond to information flows by bordering. Such a move is not unique. Indeed, many bordering routines are a reprise of policies to shore up states’ capacity to filter many kinds of transactions at their national borders.

Despite the anxieties produced by the information age and the attendant sovereign identity crisis, we suggest that states can and do border the internet in ways that are mirrored at their geographic borders in the physical world. We enumerated the various ways that states engage in highly territorial practices and rhetoric to maintain national distinctiveness and drive a wedge between foreign and domestic. Governments will continue to rely on geographic concepts to guide and direct policy in unfamiliar territories. Although the anxiety over managing mercurial flows, such as the internet, may vary by country and vacillate over time, we demonstrate that the states that have already taken strong stands to carve out jurisdictional distinctiveness are the same countries that take the strongest stands when emerging forms of globalization arise. Our research suggests that the sovereign identity crisis can be understood through the familiar concept and practice of bordering.

Policy implications abound from widening the analytical aperture from censorship to the lens of cyberborders. Practices to limit the movement of information are not isolated to only the most repressive jurisdictions. Democracies also have motivations to remove content, and sometimes for liberal reasons. Our study suggests the need to consider the diverse motivations across regime types for controlling cross-border information flows.

Internationally, our research speaks to robust global debates over the implications of internet fragmentation.110 The phenomenon has been described as digitally bordered

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“national Internets,”\textsuperscript{111} the “balkanized Internet,”\textsuperscript{112} and “splinternets”\textsuperscript{113} to represent the same outcome: distinctive zones of digital content that arise through government actions. We explain the societal forces driving fragmentation that motivate the construction of online and offline walls: controlling foreign flows and, thereby, protecting jurisdictional distinctiveness. Since fragmentation comes at a price—connectivity—policymakers should continue to deliberate the meaning and appropriate responses to the construction of digital walls. Our research provides the tools to identify where and when these changes occur to motivate further work on the implications and appropriate policy responses to online borders.


\textsuperscript{113} See Grothaus, supra note 10.