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Provocateurs

Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*

When a provocateur intentionally provokes a deadly affray, the law of self-defense holds that the provocateur may not use deadly force to defend himself. Why is this so?

Provocateurs are often seen as just one example of the problem of actio libera in causa, the causing of the conditions of one’s defense. This article rejects theories that maintain a one-size-fits-all approach to actio libera in causa, and argues that provocateurs need specific rules about why they forfeit their defensive rights. This article further claims that provocateurs need to be distinguished from their cousins, initial aggressors, as initial aggressors engage in conduct that grounds the permissibility of the defender’s behavior whereas the provocateur’s behavior does not justify the respondent’s use of force against him. In addition, this article rejects that the basis of this forfeiture can be found in the doctrines surrounding when and why mitigation for provocation is appropriate for the respondent.

Provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights for the very simple reason that they start the fight. This forfeiture occurs when they behave culpably, meaning that they subjectively appreciate that they are running the risk of causing force to be used against them and they engage in this behavior without justification or excuse. The question of when the provocateur’s behavior is justified is incredibly complex. It requires analysis of when it is that one is justified in increasing the risk of another’s wrongdoing. Any analysis of this justification must take seriously the liberty rights of the potential provocateur to engage in otherwise permissible behavior. Moreover, the determination of whether the provocateur is justified will turn on whether the later acts that he puts into motion are themselves justified. Thus, when Charles Bronson in the movie Death Wish presents himself as a victim so that muggers will attack him, the justifiability of his conduct in appearing as a vulnerable victim will turn on whether he is entitled to engage in this conduct, intending to later defend himself. This article argues that in Death Wish-type cases, the reason that the provocateur is not justified is because he becomes a vigilante, thereby usurping the role of the state and undermining rule of law values.

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Provocateurs often have others do their dirty work, but they still bear responsibility for creating risks of harm. For example, Iago taunts Othello with false claims that Desdemona is unfaithful. As we know, Othello kills Desdemona. But if Iago had the ability to stop Othello, it seems clear that he should harm Othello or harm himself to save Desdemona. Because his actions provoked Othello’s conduct, Iago now not only may, but must, act so as to stop the harm to an innocent.

Things, however, are far more complicated when the provocateur provokes harm to himself. Consider one judge’s hypothetical:

Imagine a funeral ceremony with hundreds of mourners for a widely respected African-American civil rights leader. A white supremacist appears at the church and begins shouting nonthreatening, racial epithets. Enraged mourners rush the person, who pulls out a concealed gun and kills several of them.¹

Unlike Iago, who must act, here, our intuitions seem to support the opposite. The white supremacist is not permitted to kill the enraged mourners. Indeed, even those with potentially more other-regarding motives seem suspect. Consider the movie Death Wish in which Charles Bronson sets himself up to appear as a vulnerable victim so that others will try to harm him and he may act in self-defense. Across jurisdictions, the white supremacist’s and Bronson’s claims of self-defense will likely fail. For example, according to the Model Penal Code: “The use of deadly force is not justifiable if ... the actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter...”² Indeed, most jurisdictions have even broader forfeiture doctrines. They do not require a purpose to cause death or serious bodily harm, but just bodily injury, nor do they limit the provocation to the same encounter.³ Generally, when one intentionally provokes another (a person whom I will call “the respondent”), the provocateur is barred from using deadly force to defend himself from the attack that he provoked. For purposes of this paper, I will focus on deadly force forfeiture, though my thesis will have implications for the resort to lesser degrees of force.

The provocateur is frequently viewed as just one example of actio libera in causa cases. Actio libera in causa is the name given by German theorists to those cases in which the defendant causes the conditions of his own defense.⁴ For example, if Albert wants to kill Betty but is afraid he will not get up the courage to do so, he may take a hallucinogen at t₁ that will render him violent at t₂ when he knows he will be alone with her. It seems clear that Albert has purposefully killed Betty despite the fact that his mental state is temporally disconnected from his actus reus. If Carl recklessly starts a fire at t₁ that

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² Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b).
⁴ See Finkelstein and Katz (2008, p. 480 n.2). It originally applied only to cases in which the defendant rendered himself irresponsible, but has since been generalized to other defenses. Id. at 482.
requires a firebreak at $t_2$, it seems clear that he should purposefully destroy property at $t_2$ to create the firebreak, but he bears some responsibility for so doing.\(^5\)

Criminal statutes that deny the defense in *actio libera in causa* cases do so in problematic and haphazard ways. Consider the following problems Paul Robinson notes with current formulations. **Proportionality:** Some statutes provide that an individual who provokes a fist fight loses the right to employ deadly force when his insult is met with gunfire.\(^6\) **Strict Liability:** In some jurisdictions, the statutory term “provoke” could be interpreted to depend only on the effect on the respondent, such that, to use Robinson’s example, one can provoke one’s neighbor (and thereby lose one’s defensive rights) by painting one’s house a color that incites the neighbor.\(^7\) **Culpability Mismatches:** Some jurisdictions do not take into account the differences in the culpability in causing and the culpability of the later act.\(^8\) We may doubt that a person who negligently starts a fire should be held responsible for purposeful destruction of property when he creates a firebreak.

Fixing statutes, however, requires that we understand the substantive principles at work, and theorists have offered us different accounts of the underlying rationale for the treatment of these cases.\(^9\) It has often been assumed that we can solve all *actio libera in causa* cases the same way. Indeed, Paul Robinson extols the benefit of his approach in offering one unified theory across defenses.\(^10\) The reasoning seems to be that what is good for necessity or intoxication is good for provocateurs. The purpose of this paper is to show that that assumption is wrong.

This paper will focus on provocateurs because they present two particularly interesting problems. The first is to explain how it is that provocateurs can lose their defensive rights without grounding the respondent’s right to react. That is, when the white supremacist provokes the enraged mourners, they still do wrong by attacking him. This is to be contrasted with self-defense where the initial aggressor’s attack simultaneously forfeits the aggressor’s rights and grounds the permissibility of the defender’s response.\(^11\) My aim therefore is to understand what is going on with respect to the moral terrain – how and why do provocateurs lose these rights? Although my argument is largely consistent with existing law, my goal is not to rationalize it but merely to use existing legal standards as some evidence of our reflective judgments about these cases. The white supremacist seems to be a compelling case for why some provocateurs cannot fight back. The goal is to understand why.

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\(^5\) *Actio libera in causa* technically includes only those who purposefully contrive the conditions. *Actio illicita in causa* is the term used when individuals are only aware, but do not intend, to create the conditions. See id. n.3. For our purposes, nothing turns on this.

\(^6\) Robinson (1985, p. 13). Despite the fact that Robinson wrote this paper over three decades ago, little has changed with respect to the problems with statutory formulations.

\(^7\) Id. at 5-6.

\(^8\) Id. at 18.

\(^9\) E.g., Alexander (this issue); DeGirolami (2009); Finkelstein and Katz (2008); Herrmann (1986); Robinson (1985).

\(^10\) Robinson (1985). But see Herrmann (1986) (noting the complexities in German law that Robinson’s unified approach runs roughshod over).

\(^11\) For ease of exposition, I am bypassing the nuances in self-defense. My only aim here is to draw the contrast.
The second puzzle takes us into the depths of *Death Wish* and cases like it. It is not altogether clear how to determine whether the provocateur’s action is culpable, or blameworthy, or impermissible at $t_1$. One may know he is inciting a bully by leaving one’s home. One may know she is encouraging rapists by dressing scantily. But we are free to leave our homes and dress immodestly. Knowledge that one might have to fend off the bully or the rapist does not render this conduct culpable or impermissible. And even with the person who purposefully engages in conduct so as to kill his attacker, why is the question, “Is it permissible to provoke this person so he will attack me so I can kill him?” rather than “Is it permissible to provoke a person so he will attack me so that I may justifiably kill him?” That is, if all we have at $t_2$ is a dead respondent who impermissibly tried to kill the provocateur, then what has the provocateur done wrong?\(^{12}\)

Ultimately, I will claim that the actions of both provocateurs and their cousins, initial aggressors, alter the moral landscape at $t_1$. We have normative powers by which we can change rights and duties; for example we can alter our property rights with gifts, permissions, and abandonment. Provocateurs change the moral relationship with the respondent. By consciously creating the unjustifiable risk of causing the respondent to attack him, the provocateur forfeits his right to defend against such an attack at $t_2$. Necessity and intoxication do not change the rights and duties between two parties. Aggressors and provocateurs do.

As to the second question, I will distinguish some instances of impermissible provocation from others. In some instances, the problem is simply that the provocateur is acting impermissibly, whereas other instances present a problem akin to entrapment. With respect to the latter cases and police entrapment, the problem is not that the provocateur or police behave in a way that exculpates the respondent/defendant. Rather, the problem is that there is something seemingly problematic about significant alterations of another’s circumstantial luck. We worry that there is something unfair about being forced to confront challenges that would otherwise not occur, challenges that bring out the worst in us. I will not answer the boundaries for police conduct. With respect to provocateurs, however, I argue that their efforts to play both God and state render them moral and political vigilantes that destroy rule of law values. With respect to private citizens, any act meant to alter another’s circumstantial luck for the purpose of sitting in judgment upon it is impermissible. Accordingly, at least when there is a reasonably well functioning state, individual citizens are not permitted to provoke impermissible conduct so that they may act as state.

This paper proceeds as follows. Part I will survey three approaches to *actio libera in causa* in the literature, those of Larry Alexander, Paul Robinson, and Marc DeGirolami, all three of which presuppose a single solution to the problem, and I will argue that all three answers are ill-suited to solve the provocateur problem. Part II argues that the reason we cannot use a “one size fits all” approach is because self-defense is not best understood as simply part of a lesser-evils analysis. Rather, what initial aggressors do is to become liable to the force used against them. Part II argues that we need something

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12 Finkelstein and Katz pose this question in the context of comparing *actio libera in causa* to deterrent threats. If one endorses what they dub the *Backward Induction View* that it is impermissible to threaten what it is impermissible to do, then by the same reasoning, the permissibility of self-defense at $t_2$ would justify the provocateur’s action at $t_1$. See Finkelstein and Katz (2008, pp. 500-501).
akin to the liability principle to explain why provocateurs cannot fight back. Part III looks for this forfeiture concept in the doctrines surrounding the provocation mitigation defense, but ultimately concludes that an understanding of provocateurs and actio libera in causa cannot be derived from an understanding of when respondents are entitled to mitigation, even under a partial justification view of provocation. Part IV sets out the positive claim that the reason why provocateurs lose their defensive rights is that they cannot complain about and defend against a risk that they themselves impermissibly created. Part IV also argues that this forfeiture doctrine requires subjective appreciation of this risk, and that the creation of the risk must itself be unjustifiable. Part IV then explores the unjustifiability criterion and concludes by claiming that what is going on in the Bronson-type cases is that some provocateurs, in a way akin to entrapment, impermissibly alter another’s circumstantial luck in order to induce the crime. Because this is something which they lack standing to do, they threaten rule of law values in a way that renders their conduct at \( t_1 \) impermissible.

I. Why Other Approaches to Actio Libera in Causa Don’t Solve the Provocateur Problem

A. Alexander’s Solution to the Non-Problem of Actio Libera in Causa

In accord with Larry Alexander’s contribution to this symposium, I think we can and should, for the most part, analyze actio libera in causa cases in two stages.\(^\text{13}\) The question is when does the actor consciously disregard and unleash a substantial and unjustifiable risk. If at \( t_1 \) Ben sets a fire to kill Joe, but has also risked harm to countless others, then at \( t_1 \) he is responsible for this culpable action.\(^\text{14}\) In addition, by unleashing this risk, Ben is now under a duty to prevent the harm from occurring when possible, and so, he has additional culpability for the duration of his failing to rescue. Indeed, Alexander and I have previously bitten the bullet that if Ben shoots Joe at \( t_1 \), but can save Joe at \( t_2 \), but does not, then Ben is guilty of two crimes—one for the risking and one for the omitting.\(^\text{15}\)

This approach resolves the question of what to do when Iago provokes Othello to kill Desdemona. Iago increases the risk of harm to Desdemona (and for those who care about results, bears responsibility for her death) because he does two things. First, he influences Othello’s reasons. He gives Othello a reason to act that did not exist before. Second, he influences Othello’s rationality. He appeals to Othello’s anger and jealousy.\(^\text{16}\) Iago unleashes the risk at \( t_1 \), and at \( t_2 \), he has a duty to rescue Desdemona if

\(^\text{13}\) Alexander (forthcoming).
\(^\text{14}\) As Alexander and I argue in our book, results do not matter so the offense is complete at the moment the risk is unleashed. Alexander and Ferzan (2009, ch. 5).
\(^\text{15}\) Id. at 242.
\(^\text{16}\) Although because provocateurs “provoke,” we might think they are conceptually limited to those who cause anger, it is important to note that either reason-giving or rationality-influencing behavior may be individually sufficient for blameworthiness. In the first case, someone who solicits a hit man or joins a conspiracy increases the risk of harm to a victim by giving another person reasons to harm her without impairing the other person’s rationality. In the second case, one might, for example, involuntarily intoxicate someone who is about to drive home. Such conduct does not give the driver new reasons for action, but still increases the harm to others and is thus blameworthy.
possible. (There is a rather large puzzle embedded in the deceptively simple claim to which I cannot do justice here, but will also allude to later. This is the question of the degree of responsibility we bear for our increasing the risk that others will do wrong.)

This position then entails that if Iago creates a destructive robot programmed to kill Desdemona, or places hallucinogens in Othello’s cup and feeds him lies, then Iago actually has a duty to rescue Desdemona to prevent the peril that he has created. One may even think that if Othello is about to shoot Desdemona, then Iago ought to throw himself in the bullet’s path.\textsuperscript{17} The criminal law seems to capture this sort of continuing duty in its requirement in both solicitation and conspiracy cases that defendants, to avail themselves of an abandonment defense, must not only abandon their criminal purpose but also thwart the success of others.\textsuperscript{18} Once you light a fuse, it is your responsibility to stomp it out.

All of this is well and good because thus far we have only been dealing with the bullet that the provocateur has to take to prevent harm to others. The more complicated question is how to translate this principle when we are dealing with the relationship between the provocateur and the respondent. If at $t_1$ the provocateur engages in conduct that provokes the respondent to try to harm him, he has curiously made himself both agent and victim. He has unleashed an unjustified risk of harm to himself! Although he typically would be under a duty to stop the harm to others, it seems that the exact opposite is true, which is that he is not permitted to intervene – he may not defend himself.

Alexander simply denies this. He claims that an actor may act at $t_2$; he does have a right to self-defense. The culpability is complete at $t_1$. The analysis would then run that the provocateur is guilty of attempted murder at $t_1$ (which Alexander would punish the same as murder (as would I)), but that at $t_2$, the respondent performs a completely unjustified action because the respondent is using unlawful force against the provocateur and the provocateur is entitled to defend against this. Alexander thus deems the provocateur’s behavior at $t_1$ to be irrelevant to the $t_2$ analysis for these cases.

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Doctrinally, the criminal law, because of its view that voluntary human actors cut causal chains, offers different accounts for these two sorts of behaviors. The first are dealt with through complicity, conspiracy, and other doctrines that do not assume the actor causes the result. The latter are dealt with by assuming that when one acts through an innocent or irrational person, there is no voluntary human action cutting the causal chain. This clear doctrinal split is exactly what gets complicity into trouble when it attempts to deal with Iago, as he both contributes to reasons and rationality. \textit{Cf.} Williams (1961, p. 391)(offering a theoretical account that allows Iago to receive greater punishment than Othello, \textit{contra} the criminal law’s general stance that accessorial liability is derivative of the principal’s).

Of course, if we abandon the idea that humans somehow have contra-causal freedom that cuts causal chains, we can avoid such doctrinal anomalies. For those of us who think that results do not matter, it is as simple as asking whether someone is culpable at $t_1$ for increasing the risk of harm to others by giving reasons or intoxicants. And, even for those who think that results matter, a cleaner analysis is available. For instance, Michael Moore thinks that we do not need a doctrine of accomplice liability, as causing someone to have a reason to act is still causing.


\textsuperscript{17} Tadros (2011, p. 53).

\textsuperscript{18} MPC §§ 5.02; 5.03(6).
Alexander argues that the way we ought to reason about these cases is to look at the $t_2$ culpability of the provocateur and the respondent and figure out the side on which a third party should intervene. Four points on this. First, I reject at least one of Alexander’s substantive conclusions about the relative culpability of the actors. With respect to Desdemona, there is a strong argument that if Othello kills her, then Othello ought only to be guilty of manslaughter, but Iago ought to be guilty of murder. So, why conclude that Iago is less culpable when it is just between Othello and Iago? Second, when deciding between two culpable actors, we might think that there are factors that matter besides the relative culpability. That is, in the way that Alexander advocates a broader inquiry when we are comparing innocents, why would we not also need a broad inquiry to determine which bad guy to choose? This raises a third question. Why think that third parties ought to intervene when both sides are in the wrong? And finally, we might think that there are times when the objective reasons that third parties have to act do not apply to the interpersonal dispute because of the way that the parties have altered their normative relationship.

More generally, this approach, which gives the provocateur a clean slate at $t_2$, ignores the provocateur’s role in orchestrating the entire conflict to begin with. It seems relevant to the question of who may act against whom that the provocateur is the author of the entire controversy. Indeed, given the similarity that provocateurs bear to initial aggressors, it seems quite plausible that the $t_1$ conduct should be morally relevant to the rights held at $t_2$. Moreover, there is some sense that the provocateur gets to have his cake and eat it too, as even though he will be held morally responsible for his $t_1$ act, the $t_2$ act – the very conduct that he culpably concocted – is immunized from interference. Even though to both Alexander and me results don’t matter, it seems somewhat odd that the provocateur gets a free pass to kill the respondent.\footnote{Alexander (1993, p. 61).}

\section*{B. Robinson’s Unified Approach to Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense}

Paul Robinson’s approach fares no better. Robinson proposes a single principle to apply across different defenses.\footnote{Robinson (1985, p. 26).} He argues that

Where the actor is not only culpable as to causing the defense conditions, but also has a culpable state of mind \textit{as to causing himself to engage in conduct constituting the offense}, the state should be [sic] punish him for causing the ultimate justified or excused conduct. His punishment, however, is properly based on his initial conduct of causing the defense conditions...
with his accompanying scheming intention, not on the justified or excused conduct he subsequently performs.22

According to Robinson, we take the provocateur’s culpability at t₁ and link it to the result caused at t₂, but grant the provocateur a justification defense at t₂. This is intelligible (though I don’t endorse the approach) for something like necessity. If Joe starts a fire negligently at t₁, and creates a firebreak at t₂, then the two can be combined such that although there was a purposeful harm at t₂, a crime with a negligence mens rea is that for which Joe will ultimately be held liable.

However, with respect to provocateurs, it seems rather odd to say that purposeful engagement in conduct at t₁ renders one criminally culpable for murder because a dead body is caused at t₂, but one is justified for the act of killing at t₂. Under traditional analysis, it is not clear how Robinson gets to attach the result to the t₁ conduct because the respondent’s behavior should be a voluntary action that cuts the causal chain. So, it isn’t clear why Robinson gets to help himself to the resulting dead body.

If we need the t₁ behavior to have moral relevance for how we view the interaction between the provocateur and the respondent, then is it not far more plausible to claim that the act the provocateur is not permitted to do just is engage in the killing at t₂? However, if provocateurs cause the conditions of their own defense and by that act forfeit the right to defend themselves then we need to understand how or why that happens, and Robinson’s approach to other actio libera in causa cases is not going to get us there.

C. DeGirolami’s Approach to Culpability and Justification

Marc DeGirolami advances a third approach to the puzzle, arguing that “created culpability” alters the later t₂ act in such a way that it is no longer justified.23 DeGirolami’s argument is that when a defendant has a culpable hand at t₁ in creating the situation at t₂, we must reassess whether the t₂ conduct is socially valuable such that it ought to be deemed justified. Unfortunately, I think this approach, while gesturing in the right direction, ultimately fails as both as an approach for necessity and as an answer for provocateurs.

As argued above, I think it is clear that the later action is morally required. To the extent that DeGirolami wishes to reserve the term “justification” for praiseworthy acts, then there is some truth to the matter that those who owe a duty for having created peril are not performing justified actions. That simply depends upon whether one should group the morally right with the morally obligatory. Still, it seems clear that the t₂ act must be done and must be afforded a defense.

With respect to provocateurs, DeGirolami does little to explain why the culpability at t₁ changes the nature of the conduct at t₂. I agree that it does, but we need a fuller account than the one at which DeGirolami gestures. I do not agree that culpability in causing can simply eliminate the justificatory nature of the later act because of something about justifications. Rather, it is how the t₁ act relates to the t₂ act that offers a substantive understanding of the later t₂ act.

22 Id. at 31.
II. The Use of Defensive Force by Provocateurs and Initial Aggressors

As discussed in the introduction, the claim that I am making is that provocateurs forfeit defensive rights, just as initial aggressors do, and that this forfeiture explains why initial aggressors and provocateurs are not permitted to engage in defensive force. In this section, I want to make a few general points about the nature of this claim, and then I want to sharpen our focus by distinguishing between aggressors and provocateurs.

A. Self-Defense is Not (Always) a Lesser Evils Justification

Robinson views one virtue of his approach to be its single approach to the problem across doctrines. I do not think this works. The reason it does not work is because it presupposes that self-defense is a choice of evils defense and therefore that its analysis should follow the same process as necessity. However, it is extraordinarily doubtful that self-defense may be fully explained by a lesser-evils analysis. Consider the problems with this position. First, one must still give an account of why the culpable aggressor’s life is discounted. After all, why isn’t the balance between the aggressor and the defender simply a draw? And indeed, how do we balance these lives if, in all other respects, the culpable aggressor has more value for society (a doctor working on the cure for cancer) than his innocent victim (a criminal law theorist)? Second, the consequentialist view seems to indicate that if many culpable aggressors attacked a lone innocent defender, there would be a point at which the balance would tip in favor of the aggressors. But that simply cannot be right. You get to kill as many bad guys as threaten you.

Moreover, consequentialist accounts are problematic even if we include the value of having a more general rule of self-defense. First, such a rule seems too narrow. If we simply want to deter violence, we might prefer a far broader rule, allowing for retaliation or other “punitive” acts. Second, and more importantly, the approach seems to lose the importance of the relationship between the defender and the aggressor. According to this account, the defender’s act is not justified because the aggressor aims to harm her, but because of some greater societal value. And, this view also leads to the conclusion that a given defender is not justified in a case in which the action would not deter others’ aggression. But, we would think that a culpable aggressor may still be killed in these instances.

To put this point another way, to view self-defense as serving some broader societal goal is to make it contingent. Because the law will not be in a position to calculate in every instance, we will have a

24 When there are innocents on both sides, numbers and balancing matters. Alexander (1993, p. 61) (noting “the most plausible moral theory underlying common intuitions about self-defense is one that would be sensitive to, among other things, (1) number of deaths, (2) relative moral fault, (3) fair allocation of risks and incentives, and (4) nonappropriation of others”).
28 Id.
30 Id. at 883; Wasserman (1987, p. 360).
broad rule prohibiting aggression. However, in any individual case, it may be that that rule is over inclusive and the defender should not have the right to self-defense. However, it seems extraordinarily odd to think that the permission to use self-defensive force is dependent upon the right long-term consequences.

B. Liability Cases of Self-Defense Alter the Normative Relationship Between Aggressor and Defender

Although self-defense is a justification within criminal law, I take some instances of self-defense to ask questions prior to our categorization or understanding of defenses themselves (and certainly prior to the debate over the nature of justification). If Jane takes a computer that is on the table, whether she has even committed an offense depends on whether the laptop was abandoned; or Jane was given permission to use it by Fred, the owner; or Fred gave the laptop to Jane; or Fred had not given Jane permission to use it. That is, to understand when one person has harmed another’s legally protected interest, well, you need to know to whom the interest belongs.

Liability cases of self-defense are similar to these other usages of normative powers. Because liability is an independent ground of permissibility, let me spend a minute defining the scope of the claim about self-defense. Ultimately, because provocateurs alter their rights in a similar manner, examination of liability-based instances of permissible self-defense is the place to start.

In analyzing self-defense, the first question is to figure out what we mean by “self-defense.” As a matter of ordinary language our use of the term is extensive – I kill the Villainous Aggressor who tries to kill me in self-defense; I kill the rabid dog that is about to bite me in self-defense; indeed, I even destroy your television that is flying at me during a tornado in self-defense. Rather than assume that we ought to offer one normative justification for self-defense – one that will necessarily run roughshod over important nuances if it is to offer an account that includes villains and televisions—I think it is best to think of self-defense as a type of defense, where different tokens (or subtypes, at least) may be normatively justified for different reasons.

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32 For a survey of the debate, see Ferzan (2011).
31 Accord Bergelson (2009, p. 110) (“If we were to define the principle of conditionality of rights in Hohfeld’s terms, it would be characterized as the victims’ power to change the balance of rights (in the broad sense) between themselves and the perpetrators.”). Bergelson explains self-defense in terms of this conditionality: “If you try to kill me, you violate your duty to me and thus lose moral parity with me. That loss of moral parity reduces your right to inviolability and allows me to disregard it to the extent necessary to protect my right to life.” Id. at 105.
34 Indeed, in the case of Jimbo on South Park, the claim, “It’s coming right for us!” allowed evasion of all hunting regulations. (South Park, Season 1, Episode 3, Volcano).
35 One reader suggested to me that he would not deem this “self-defense” but rather “self-preservation.” But this only proves my point. Arguing about ordinary language usage and then theorizing from there is not particularly useful. Eugene Volokh uses the term self-defense for the killing of bacteria in one’s own body. Volokh (2007, pp. 1814-1815). I reject the usage. But what does that prove?
36 As suggested by Tadros (2005, p. 117); McMahan (1994, p. 256).
It is thus useful to distinguish between defender-centered theories of permissibility and aggressor liability-centered theories of permissibility.\textsuperscript{37} Within the self-defense literature, theorists struggle with how to explain why it is permissible to kill a culpable aggressor, someone who intends to cause you harm; an innocent aggressor, someone who will engage in a voluntary act that will harm you but lacks a culpable mental state because of mistake, immaturity, insanity, and the like; and an innocent threat, someone whose body will cause you harm but the bodily movement was involuntary such as a push.

In other work, I have argued that liability is its own interesting conceptual and normative path to permissibility, and the reason it is permissible to kill culpable aggressors is because they are liable to defensive force.\textsuperscript{38} (Importantly, I have not maintained that liability is a necessary requirement for permissibility.) The “liability” formulation belongs to Jeff McMahan: “At least part of what it means to say that a person is liable to attack is that he would not be wronged by being attacked, and would have no justified complaint about being attacked.”\textsuperscript{39} McMahan further explains that being liable to attack just is having forfeited one’s right not to be attacked.\textsuperscript{40} Elsewhere, I have argued that a culpable aggressor forfeits his moral complaint against defensive force being used against him.\textsuperscript{41} We can see the trappings of the loss of the right in the following possible implications: the number of aggressors does not matter; the aggressor is not entitled to compensation in tort for harms inflicted; third parties may aid the defender but not the aggressor; and the aggressor may not fight back. On the other hand, I have argued that innocent aggressors and threats do not forfeit their rights. If one kills an innocent aggressor, it is certainly more debatable as to whether numbers do not matter or whether third parties should aid them or you.\textsuperscript{42} Hence, if it is permissible to kill an innocent aggressor, the permissibility is not grounded in the aggressor’s liability, as he has done nothing to forfeit his rights, but rather there is some other reason why you are permitted to infringe his right.\textsuperscript{43} (Similarly, one may turn the familiar runaway trolley but not because the lone individual is liable to be killed. You are just permitted to infringe his right.)\textsuperscript{44}

C. Distinguishing Provocateurs From Aggressors

Although both provocateurs and initial aggressors alter the underlying moral landscape, they do so in different ways. The important contrast to draw then is between the liability inherent in self-defense and

\textsuperscript{37} This suggestion seems to originate in McMahan (1994). McMahan has continually distinguished these concepts in his work. It was made quite explicit by Frowe (2010).

\textsuperscript{38} Ferzan (forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{39} McMahan (2009, pp. 8-9).

\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 10.

\textsuperscript{41} See Ferzan (forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{42} Alexander (1993, p. 62).

\textsuperscript{43} Ferzan (forthcoming); see also Bergelson (2009, p. 76)(distinguishing culpable and innocent aggressors and arguing that the latter’s rights are overridden).

\textsuperscript{44} Dressler rejects a forfeiture theory for self-defense, arguing that it is over and under inclusive. Dressler (1982, p. 454). It is under inclusive, he claims, because it cannot explain innocent aggressors. I agree that this is true, but as noted above, reject that we need one theory for self-defense. Dressler argues that it is over inclusive because it would seem to allow the defender to kill the aggressor even when it is unnecessary. I demur. We alter our rights and duties in fine-grained ways. I can give you permission to use my car only on Tuesdays when it is snowing. When one forfeits one’s right against defensive force, one forfeits one’s right against \textit{defensive} force.
the loss of rights that stems from the provocateur’s act. We can put innocent aggressors and innocent threats to the side because the permissibility of harming them is not grounded in their liability. Rather, if one is permitted to kill innocent aggressors or innocent threats, the rationale will be something akin to an agent-relative permission to prefer one’s life to others. 45

What distinguishes (culpable) aggressors from provocateurs? As a matter of ordinary language, we might start with something as simple as: provocateurs provoke and aggressors aggress. But that is not particularly helpful. Rather, I think the distinction lies in how the normative relationship is affected by the actor (be she a provocateur or aggressor) and the respondent. Namely, what aggressors do, but provocateurs do not, is engage in behavior that renders them liable to defensive force.

When an aggressor attacks her victim, by say, pointing a gun at her and saying, “I am going to kill you,” she forfeits her right against the defender using force aimed at preventing the threatened harm from coming to fruition. When a provocateur says, “I slept with your husband,” the respondent may engage in force – and the wrongfulness of that force is something to be explored below -- but it seems clear even at this point in the discussion that we can say that the force that is used is not intended to be defensive force.

Jurisdictions conflate these actors but they are importantly distinct. 46 Consider State v. Riley, in which the Washington Supreme Court devoted paragraphs (of dicta) to the question of whether “mere words” would be sufficient to constitute provocation such that an “initial aggressor” instruction ought to be given when a defendant claims self-defense. 47 That is, the defendant claimed that his use of words about the victim being only a “wanna be” in his gang did not rise to the level of warranting an initial aggressor instruction (the giving of which the defendant claimed violated his First Amendment rights). 48 Because there was evidence suggesting that the defendant did more than just verbally taunt the victim, the court did not need to decide the mere words issue. Nevertheless, the court stated, “we hold that words alone do not constitute sufficient provocation.” 49 One of the court’s primary arguments for this position was that:

such a rule would effectively permit violence by a “victim” of mere words, contrary to the underpinnings of the initial aggressor doctrine. As noted, the initial aggressor doctrine is based

46 See, e.g., People v. Barnard, 567 N.E.2d 60 (1991) (“mere words may be enough to qualify one as an initial aggressor”). There is even some slippage in discussions, see, e.g., Robinson (1985, p. 6) (“Rather than using the term ‘provoke,’ some jurisdictions deny self-defense if the actor is the ‘initial aggressor.’”).
47 976 P.2d 624 (Wash. 1999)(en banc).
48 Washington’s aggressor instruction is as follows:
No person may, by any intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response, create a necessity to act in self defense and thereupon use, offer or attempt to use force upon or toward another person. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor, and the defendant’s acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not available as a defense.
Id. at 627 (citing II Wash. Pattern Jury Instructions; Crim. 16.04 (2d ed. 1994)). The instruction conflates aggression and provocation -- provocateurs “prove” “belligerent” responses but aggressors “commence” fights.
49 Id. at 628.
upon the principle that the aggressor cannot claim self-defense because the victim of the aggressive act is entitled to respond with lawful force. For the victim’s use of force to be lawful, the victim must reasonably believe he or she was in danger of imminent harm. However, mere words alone do not rise to reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.\(^{50}\)

As should be clear, the problem is that by linking provocateurs to aggressors, the court misses the fact that the reason why a provocateur is not entitled to respond cannot be the same as the reason why the aggressor is not entitled to respond. Indeed, but-for the fact that initial aggressors can regain defensive rights (by withdrawing), there would be no need for an initial aggressor instruction. The aggressor uses unjust force; the defender responds with just force; and therefore, the aggressor is not entitled to respond with force. This is just the upshot of the clear conceptual linkage between aggression and self-defense. Provocateurs are importantly distinct in that their behavior does not—contra the court’s view—justify the violent response. (Even to the extent that provocation is seen as a partial justification, the behavior does not fully justify the respondent’s use of force, which still makes these actors distinct from initial aggressors.)

Notably, Judge Talmadge, writing a concurrence, sees exactly the problem. He rejects the majority’s position that

No matter what one says, no matter how provocative, no matter what the circumstance of the provocation, a speaker may always assert self-defense if attacked by the person the speaker provokes into attacking, and the State is never entitled to an aggressor instruction. The majority’s rule defies human nature.\(^{51}\)

The judge then offers hypothetical cases to prove his point. Here is his hypothetical that I employed in the introduction:

Imagine a funeral ceremony with hundreds of mourners for a widely respected African-American civil rights leader. A white supremacist appears at the church and begins shouting nonthreatening, racial epithets. Enraged mourners rush the person, who pulls out a concealed gun and kills several of them. At his trial for murder, he argues self-defense.\(^{52}\)

Judge Talmadge then notes, “Under the majority’s reasoning, because he used only words to provoke the attack, the white supremacist was not the aggressor and the State is not entitled to an aggressor instruction.”\(^{53}\)

Because aggressors start the fight, their forfeiture of defensive rights naturally flows from how their behavior changes the normative relationship between aggressor and defender.\(^ {54}\) The only necessary

\(^{50}\) Id. at 629.
\(^{51}\) Id. at 630.
\(^{52}\) Id. at 631.
\(^{53}\) Id.
\(^{54}\) Cf. Herrmann (1986, pp. 750-751) (noting the problems with assimilating provocateurs to aggressors, as provocateurs are not guilty of attempts). There are two classes of cases that lie at the provocateur/aggressor border. One group involves Inchoate Aggressors, those whose conduct does constitute an attack but whose
tweaks then come when (1) there is a difference in proportionality between A’s use of nondeadly force and D’s return with deadly force and (2) A has ceased to aggress and the conditions under which he regains his defensive rights must be specified. (I’m not denying that these are complex tweaks, just that they do not affect the central case.) Provocateurs, on the other hand, need more specific rules because their conduct does not ground the permissibility of the respondent to act (he still acts wrongly) and because they are less able to unring the provocative bell. (“I’ve stopped attacking you!” is an easier claim to give normative force to then “Sorry I pissed you off on purpose! Takesy backsies.”) When an aggressor stops an attack, there is no need to defend. When a provocateur incites anger and rage, there is no way to undo the damage.

III. Provocateurs, Provocation, and Provocation Mitigation

 conduct is not sufficient for the defender to respond because of additional requirements for the defender, such as imminence. The other group includes Culpable Apparent Threats. These individuals intend to make the defender believe that they are attacking but lack the actual ability to carry out the threat (for example, robbing a store with an unloaded gun). I would cast both of these actors on the aggressor side, as opposed to deeming them provocateurs. See Ferzan (forthcoming). Specifically, Inchoate Aggressors meet my condition 1(a) and Culpable Apparent Threats meet condition 1(b).

55 To further complicate matters, an actor could be both an aggressor with respect to non-deadly force and a provocateur with respect to deadly force. Interestingly, in many jurisdictions, if one intentionally provokes with the purpose of creating a defense, one cannot recover one’s right to defend by withdrawal; whereas, if one otherwise provokes or aggresses, one can withdraw and recover the right to defend. Kansas’ statute (Ks. Stat. §21-3241) is representative:

The justification described in sections 21-3211, 21-3212, and 21-3213, is not available to a person who:

1. Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony; or

2. Initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, with intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or

3. Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, unless:

   a. He has reasonable ground to believe that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or

   b. In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.

However, there must be a point at which the provocateur regains the rights he has forfeited. After all, it cannot be that a provocative act should render one defenseless in perpetuity. Thus, the Model Penal Code is certainly right to have a “in the same encounter” sort of restriction. I will not further explore this complexity here.
If we agree that the question at issue is rights forfeiture (or specification, or conditionality, depending on one’s view of rights), then there are still questions we need to answer: (1) Does the provocateur forfeit rights and (2) by virtue of what is the rights forfeiture accomplished? If we are trying to understand a principle of rights forfeiture for provocateurs, the natural starting point is with the literature on when the respondent is entitled to mitigation for legally adequate provocation. Ultimately, I will argue that this is a theoretical dead end, but an instructive dead end nevertheless.

A. Provocateurs and Provocation

Who is a provocateur? First, let us make one important distinction. A respondent may be provoked by an act without the person who committed that act being deemed a provocateur. That is, we must distinguish, “provocation” from “provocateur.” An act can incite someone toward violence, even if the person who committed that act was not aware of its inciting properties. For instance, imagine that Ed is sleeping with Sally, but does not know, nor does he have any reason to know, that Sally is married. If Sally’s husband Stan finds the two in bed together and shoots Ed, Ed’s actions certainly provoked Stan’s response. However, Ed, it seems, should not count as a provocateur as he was unaware of the fact that his actions could even have that effect.

Notice that this yields that even if Stan would be entitled to mitigation for provocation, Ed is not a provocateur. At least, given that the question is when do provocateurs forfeit rights, it seems that even though Stan is provoked, we should not consider Ed to have forfeited his defensive rights. I think we would need a positive argument about why strict liability as to inciting a deadly affray should cause one to lose defensive rights. I doubt that one will be forthcoming.

B. Provocateurs and Provocation Mitigation

Indeed, in understanding provocateurs, I think it is also critical to notice that those conditions that render an actor a “provocateur” need not be identical to those conditions that entitle an actor to a provocation defense. A provocateur may provoke an individual into engaging in conduct that the individual is still not permitted to do. Thus, it should not matter whether the provocateur’s conduct partially exculpates the respondent. A defendant is entitled to mitigation from murder to manslaughter when he meets the requirements provocation, including both legally adequate provocation and heat of passion. Early English law set forth the types of conduct that were legally adequate, such as aggravated assault, and it specifically excluded mere words. Although modern case law looks to

56 Following David Rodin, I think nothing turns on how we conceive of rights for these purposes. See Rodin (2002, p. 74).
57 I owe this point to Mike Cahill.
58 A similar hypothetical is employed in Kadish et al. (2007, p. 784).
59 Cf. Robinson (1985, p. 6) (noting that if provoking does not require fault, one could lose one’s self-defensive rights if one’s neighbor is provoked by the color one paints one’s house).
61 Id. at 536.
conduct that would provoke a reasonable person, many jurisdictions still retain the common law rule that “mere words” are never legally adequate provocation.\(^{62}\)

It is important, however, to distinguish between what should partially justify or excuse the respondent and what should constitute behavior sufficient for rights forfeiture by the provocateur. Consider Girouard v. State.\(^{63}\) After a whirlwind courtship, Girouard had known his wife only five months when he overheard her telling a friend she was going to ask for a hardship transfer because her husband no longer loved her. (They were both in the army.) Girouard asked his wife about the conversation, and when she responded that she meant “nothing,” he kicked away her dinner plate and stormed off into the bedroom. Girouard’s wife followed him into the bedroom, stepped onto the bed and onto his back, and pulled his hair, stating, “What are you going to do, hit me?” She then insulted him, claiming she never wanted to marry him, that he was a terrible in bed (in far more colorful language), and that he reminded her of her father (who may have impregnated her when she was fourteen). She then told him that she had filed charges of abuse against him and that he would probably be court martialed. (She had not in fact filed such charges.) When she stopped, the defendant asked if everything said was true, and she affirmed that she had really done these things. He left and got a kitchen knife which he held under a pillow as he returned to the bedroom. At trial, he claimed that he kept waiting for her to say that she was only kidding, but instead, she claimed the marriage was a mistake, that she would claim her brain-damaged sister as a dependent and have her move in, and that she did not love him and wanted a divorce. She then asked him what he was going to do. Enraged, Girouard stabbed his wife nineteen times. (He then tried to kill himself but failed.)

The issue before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether mere words should be sufficient provocation. It held that they should not, noting “We perceive no reason for holding in favor of those who find the easiest way to end a domestic dispute is by killing the offending spouse.”\(^{64}\)

We might ask whether a per se rule against mere words makes sense for the provocation defense. After all, if we are talking about whether to partially excuse the defendant, then he seems to have a valid argument that mere words can make him extraordinarily angry. However, even if we think that there are good reasons for the denial of a provocation defense—and notably, even where a defense exists it only partially mitigates—the question of whether the provocateur should be deemed to have lost rights should not turn on the standard to which we wish to hold the respondent. Even if the respondent is weak or hot-tempered, the provocateur’s responsibility in pushing those buttons should not be disregarded. Just as there is no moral reason to require parity between initial aggressors and provocateurs, there is no reason to require that the basis of the provocateur’s rights forfeiture be co-extensive with the conditions under which an individual is partially excused because of provocation.

That is, imagine that the wife devised the plan to provoke her husband so that he would attack her so that she could kill him. Even if he does wrong by attacking her, she has said these words for the very purpose of creating the affray. The court’s normative goal to set standards of behavior during domestic

\(^{62}\) Id. at 537.
\(^{63}\) 583 A.2d 718 (Md. 1991). Thanks to Jae Lee for suggesting this case.
\(^{64}\) Id. at 723.
disputes simply has no purchase when asking whether individuals who initiate fights should forfeit defensive rights.

At this point, it is important to note where we are in the argument. So far, I have not provided any positive account of when a provocateur forfeits his rights. Thus, I am not claiming that the utterance of insults is itself sufficient to forfeit one’s defensive rights. That question has yet to be answered. My only goal to this point has been to untether the analysis of that question from the question of what constitutes legally adequate provocation.

C. Provocateurs’ Rights and the “Partial Justification” Theory of the Provocation Defense

If our aim is to understand when provocateurs are culpable and when they forfeit rights, we have now eliminated two dead ends. One is that we cannot understand provocateurs simply by analyzing acts that are provoking. Second, we cannot understand provocateurs by analyzing when a respondent is entitled to a provocation defense.

We may ask, however, whether the theoretical understanding of the provocation defense could shed some light on the question of how provocateurs forfeit rights. To this point, I have eschewed the use of justification and excuse, and I have also argued that provocateurs need not act in a way that grounds a provocation defense for the provocateur to lose rights. Yet, in this section, I intend to look specifically at provocation and even the question of whether it is a justification or an excuse. Let me explain.

With self-defense, the reason why a defender is entitled to act is because an aggressor is liable to defensive force. Provocation, a defense which reduces murder to manslaughter, does not look like this because the provocateur is not liable to defensive force. Yet to ask the question whether the provocateur “had it coming” requires further analysis of the provocateur’s rights, and the best analysis of these rights exists within the literature that says that the responder is partially justified in using force against the provocateur. The questions are whether that is true and if so, why it is so. To skip to the conclusion, I will ultimately claim that the partial justification view cannot explain why provocateurs cannot fight back.

The first thing to note is that one need not adopt one rationale for when provocation mitigates. Indeed, Vera Bergelson argues that some instances of provocation are partial excuse and partial justification and other instances are simply partial excuse. So, we might have two different accounts of the mitigation.

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65 Bergelson also notes that the label “provocation” masks different claims, though she carves up the pie differently than I:

[T]he current law of provocation shelters under its roof two conceptually different defenses. The first, “true” provocation, is a mix of partial justification and partial excuse. Its justificatory capacity stems from the responsive character of the perpetrator’s attack on the provoker who was the initial aggressor and violated some important legal rights of the perpetrator....

The other defense, which, for the sake of clarity, may be called the “heat of passion,” is purely excusatory. It applies in the circumstances when the perpetrator does not have a legal right that the victim act in a certain way but has some moral claim or legitimate expectation that the events that caused his loss of control not happen.
Moreover, the goal here is not to rationalize existing doctrine but to get to the heart of the underlying moral questions.

Notably, there seem to be cases in which our intuitions favor killing the provocateur. In the movie *Gladiator*, Commodus tells Maximus about how Maximus’ wife and son were murdered, reporting that his son "squealed like a pig when he was nailed to the cross," and his wife "moaned like a whore when she was ravished again and again and again..." When Maxium kills Commodus, the audience does not think, “Well, there is an instance of legally adequate provocation. His rationality was diminished and he is certainly entitled to a partial excuse.” *The audience applauds*. No one argues that Maximus should go to jail at all. When we cheer for Maximus we do so because Commodus is getting what he deserves, not because of the taunting words but because of Commodus’ role in the commission of the underlying acts. There are two notable features about the case (1) a crime that deserves substantial punishment has been committed and (2) there is a corruption of the legal order such that we cannot expect the law to administer justice.

Indeed, more generally, the argument that provocation is a partial justification must be grounded in the fact that the provocateur deserves at least some of the harm he receives. Although the original grounds for the provocation defense were based upon those acts that threatened a man’s honor, such that he might be said to be “defending” his honor, the “required” retaliation should not be considered any sort of true self-defense. Rather, the man’s actions are meant to demonstrate that he is the sort of individual who views this conduct as a sufficient affront such that retaliation is proper, and he demonstrates his manhood by responding in this way. To update the example a bit, if a mother saw her child brutally murdered in front of her and did not respond with rage and violence, we might question her motherhood status, but this is not to say that the conduct is designed to defend her motherhood status as much as the very act is a demonstration of it. Indeed, as Horder later notes, the aim is not defensive but retributive, and the reason why mitigation and not exculpation was appropriate was because the punishment was too severe.

If part of what grounds the provocation defense is that the provocateur gets what he deserves, and this rationale exists irrespective of the emotional state of the actor, one may question why there is also a requirement that the respondent be in a particular emotional state. Although I need not answer this question (as I am not attempting to justify the provocation defense but rather to see how we are to understand the provocateur’s loss of rights), Berman and Farrell argue that “partial excuse and partial justification are necessary and sufficient conditions for provocation manslaughter.” They reason that although mitigating reasons flow from both excuse and justification reasoning, neither alone is sufficient

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67 Horder (1992, pp. 24-26).
68 Id. at 52.
69 Berman and Farrell (2011, p. 1069).
70 Id. at 1034.
to warrant a departure from murder. More importantly for our purposes here is the fact that sometimes provocateurs act in such a way that they deserve injury, and it is this feature of desert that reduces the wrongfulness of the respondent’s behavior.

Notably, if this desert feature is what renders the respondent’s conduct less wrongful, the questions of when and whether the provocateur forfeits defensive rights are still left unexplained. Except in Gladiator cases—that is cases with clear failures of rule of law and extraordinary desert where we seem to have no problem with vigilantism or the death penalty—what a respondent does is to inflict excessive punishment in violation of rule of law values. So, the desert account cannot fully explain why the provocateur loses defensive rights. Hence, even understanding why provocation is a partial justification cannot explain why the provocateur is not entitled to fight back against the residual unjustified force.

IV. Provocateurs and Actio Libera in Causa

With a better understanding of provocateurs – one that distinguishes them from aggressors and from the provocation’s mitigation provisions— we may now turn directly to provocateurs and what I view as the two actio libera in causa puzzles for provocateurs. The first puzzle is what explains why provocateurs can’t fight back. The second puzzle is whether in determining whatever those conditions are at t₁ that lead the provocateur not to fight back, we are to consider that sometimes the provocateur views himself not simply as killing but rather as killing justifiably. That is, is the provocateur allowed to take into account the later impermissibility of the respondent’s behavior in determining whether he may engage in conduct at t₁?

A. Provocateurs and Rights

Let’s start with cases in which we will assume the provocateur is not justified at t₁ in provoking. (We will reach the question next of how to determine when the provocateur’s action is justified.) How is it that the provocateur alters his rights?

Unfortunately, the literature on this question has been tethered to the question of whether the respondent is entitled to a provocation defense. As discussed above, these are two separate questions. For instance, in analyzing provocation, Bergelson offers the “conditionality of rights” principle, a principle that covers self-defense, provocation, and consent. But this is too broad. Normative powers are likely to be more complex than one test.

Does the provocateur consent to be harmed? Typically, a person who consents to a harm waives a moral complaint. His consent transforms the conduct. However, even if the provocateur wants to

70 Id. at 1065. Berman and Farrell argue that desert gives the respondent a reason to act that renders the respondent’s behavior less wrongful, rather than arguing that the provocateur has lost any rights. Id. at 1088-96. Notably, Berman would be unlikely to construe this as forfeiture in any event. Berman (2008).
71 Cf. Harel (2005, p. 490)(arguing one principle is too broad to be useful); Simons (2005)(noting the complexities and rejecting a single principle of comparative liability).
72 Hurd (1996).
incite the respondent to hit him, the provocateur wants (perhaps he does not succeed, we shall see....) to keep his moral complaint.\textsuperscript{73} That is, he claims the respondent still wrongs him by hitting him and that is why he wants to be able to fight back. Our understanding of consent is also that it is more voluntary than this; that is, when one consents to harm, one acquiesces to the contact that will occur. But this seems far too strong for the provocateur. We don’t think, for example, that Charles Bronson is acquiescing to being mugged.

Along similar lines, another approach would be to claim that the provocateur essentially harms himself because he acts through the respondent.\textsuperscript{74} However, this approach presupposes that causation requires an either/or comparison; in criminal law, it does not. Unlike tort law, where the responsibility pie is limited to the damages the plaintiff suffers and therefore may be divided in proportion to responsibility, criminal law has room to hold more than one person fully accountable for their actions.\textsuperscript{75} Both principal and accomplice can go to jail for the offense. The problem then is why, if the provocateur is “harming himself” and the respondent is “harming the provocateur,” the provocateur still loses standing to defend against the respondent’s action.

The answer actually lies at the surface of the problem. Provocateurs forfeit defensive rights for the very simple reason that provocateurs start the fight. They initiate fights without initiating aggression. They are actually stealth aggressors. Although initial aggressors start fights by throwing first punches, stealth aggressors start fights by inciting the other person to anger or otherwise causing the other person to do violence.

This is just a sense of “asking for it.” What a provocateur does is to taunt someone in a way that he knows creates the risk of a harmful retaliatory reaction. In the same way that one does not poke tigers with sticks or swing at beehives with bats, one likewise cannot act in a way that one knows will provoke and then complain about the reaction. (Admittedly, one may defend against bees and tigers, both because of differences in the underlying normative relations and differences in the comparative value of the person and animal.) Or to put the point another way, as any elementary age child will tell you, the playground rule – “he started it” – has moral traction.

A provocateur creates the risk that another person will harm him by engaging in conduct that he knows may produce a violent response, either because it will anger the respondent or otherwise give him a reason to engage in violent conduct. Having created this risk of harm to himself, he forfeits his moral complaint when this very risk materializes. It is true that this conduct is insufficient to justify the respondent’s behavior, but sometimes, there are just two wrongdoers.

Moreover, to clarify, this forfeiture is a relational concept between the provocateur and the respondent. If Iago can only save Desdemona from Othello by killing Othello, then Iago has a duty to kill Othello. The fact that Iago has forfeited his right to use defensive force against an attack by Othello does not have

\textsuperscript{73} Cf. Herrmann (1986, pp. 749-50) (rejecting the German view that a person who provokes the attack does not intend to defend himself).


\textsuperscript{75} Duff (2010, pp. 210-211).
any implications for Iago’s relationship to Othello. He cannot alter her rights. On the other hand, if a third party rescue Desdemona by killing either Othello or Iago, then there would be complex questions about whom the third party ought to privilege.

B. What the Provocateur Must Do to Forfeit His Defensive Rights

The next question, then, is what is required for this sort of moral forfeiture. With respect to provocateurs, the law typically requires something extraordinarily narrow – purpose to provoke the affray. Like complicity, there seems to be some implicit view within the law that one only identifies with the wrong done by another if one purposefully causes it.

Cases in which the provocateur purposefully provokes the respondent’s attack appear to be rather clear cases for such forfeiture. If Iago tells Othello he has been sleeping with Desdemona, does so knowing that Othello is hot-headed and will attack him, and does so in order to kill Othello, it is difficult to see why Iago should not be held to have started the fight in such a way that he ought to relinquish his defensive rights. His culpability and causal connection to the affray are exceedingly strong.

The question is whether a requirement of purpose is too strong. As Sandy Kadish has notes, there seems to be no reason in principle to limit complicity to purposeful acts; knowledge and recklessness ought to suffice. If Iago tells Othello that Desdemona is unfaithful, intending that Othello will kill her, but also aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that Othello will also lash out against Iago, why should Iago retain defensive rights against the very attack that he precipitated?

Notably, there seem to be good reasons for allowing negligent provocateurs to retain defensive rights. My more general worries about negligence have been vetted elsewhere, but I think we have reason to worry about a forfeiture principle that is not connected to a person knowing he is doing something impermissible. Human relations and human anger are exceedingly complex and the respondent is still engaging in conduct that he ought not to engage in. To take an extreme example, assume someone utters a significant racial slur, completely oblivious to its inflammatory meaning, and this provokes an attack from a member of the racial group. It seems rather extraordinary to think that this act is itself going to be sufficient to warrant a moral principle preventing the negligent provocateur from defending himself against the wrongful attack.

Indeed, a broader provocateur doctrine would likely turn tort law on its head. If Alice negligently drives across the median and Bob has the ability to avert an accident, he is obliged to do so under the last clear chance doctrine. But if Alice is deemed a provocateur, then any injury done by Bob would not wrong Alice and so she would not be entitled to compensation in tort. This seems wrong. Bob, even if he is annoyed by Alice, is not permitted to stand on his rights and hit her car.

76 Kadish (1997).
77 See Alexander and Ferzan (2009, ch. 3).
78 This is under the old contributory negligence regime. Abraham (2002, p. 142). Notably, however, even a comparative negligence principle would not allow Bob simply to hit Alice.
Even if we require a subjective appreciation that one is provoking another toward violence, we would then need to ask the question of whether one loses one’s defensive rights even when the risk is itself justified. We think this would be too broad, as it would hold us hostage to the most despicable but predictable actions of others. We need an account that is not so broad as to forbid defending against rapists who attack the scantily clad but is not so narrow as to require violation of a legal right. We need an account of unjustifiable provocation that respects the liberty interests we have in walking streets, dressing immodestly, and speaking the truth.

Provocateurs also should not be able to forfeit their defensive rights through excused conduct. Consent may be vitiated by force, fraud, and mistake. So, too, a shift of normative powers should not be possible by those whose conduct is not voluntary (broadly construed).

Let me sum up. I have argued that provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights when they consciously disregard the substantial and unjustifiable risk that their words or conduct will cause another person to attack them. This means that it is only when a provocateur is subjectively aware that he is potentially causing another to attack him that the provocateur forfeits his defensive rights. And, to be clear, the provocateur should only forfeit employing the degree of force that he subjectively appreciates. If he only foresees nondeadly force, then he only forfeits his right to use nondeadly force.

C. When Is the Provocateur’s Act Unjustifiable?

This formulation places extraordinary emphasis on the question of unjustifiability. Let me first make some brief observations and then raise two rather complex puzzles embedded within this issue.

First, the question of whether the provocateur’s conduct created an unjustifiable risk does not affect the impermissibility of the respondent’s response. He still is not allowed to attack in any event. We should not forget that nothing about the provocateur’s forfeiture of his defensive right grounds the impermissibility of the respondent’s response. The response remains impermissible. Second, in determining whether such risks are justified, we must take into account how our consequentialist calculus is deontologically side-constrained. For instance, when Leo Katz asks about the gateway sin paradox, where one will cause more good if one commits the “gateway sin,” the answer I would give is that it depends upon whether the gateway sin requires the use of another person as a means. Unlike those who endorse the doctrine of double effect or other formulation of our deontological constraints, Larry Alexander and I have argued that our consequentialist calculus is constrained to the extent that

\[80\text{ Morally, one will only forfeit defensive rights about the kind of reprisals one foresees. Thus, one would still retain defensive rights against unforeseen responses. Statutory drafting would need to get this right.} \]


\[82\text{ With Larry Alexander, I have argued that the substantiality prong is not independent of the unjustifiability prong for recklessness, but nothing turns on this for these purposes. Alexander and Ferzan (2009, ch. 2).} \]

\[83\text{ Katz (1999).} \]
one cannot use another as a mere means. And to me, it is only in context that we can determine whether there was a gateway sin in the first place.

Third, the determination of the justifiability of uttering words is extraordinarily tricky. Words can certainly form the basis of criminal liability, be it uttering “fire” in a crowded theater, issuing a threat, or joining a conspiracy. However, we might first ask whether uttering true, but hurtful, facts should also be justified. If it is true that Desdemona is cheating on Othello, is Iago behaving unjustifiably? This arguably depends upon whether we place such a great premium on truth that it should be set free even when the utterer knows that there is a substantial chance that the husband will kill his wife in response. Another central question will be the role of the First Amendment. Although “fighting words” are not constitutionally protected, picketing outside a funeral under certain conditions is. Given the narrow holding of Snyder v. Phelps, there is certainly room for argument as to how to draw the line between important if unwelcome speech and unjustifiably risky speech. Our moral determination of justifiability may thus be constrained by Constitutional law.

Now, the big(ger) issues. First, the question of whether the provocateur’s conduct is unjustifiable is ultimately part of the puzzle about when we are permitted to engage in actions that may encourage impermissible conduct by another. This is no small puzzle. The criminal law evades this question with doctrines that actually proceed in opposite directions. On the one hand, as noted above, criminal law doctrines on solicitation and complicity (and attempt) require purpose. This means that there is no criminal liability for the actor who provides the address of a known drug dealer or hands a knife to another prison inmate, even when both actors know they are facilitating criminal acts and are providing substantial assistance. The fear here seems to be that we become our brothers’ keepers. However, rather than spending any effort sorting out the question of when we ought to be at liberty not to inquire further and when we ought to be responsible for others’ acts, the criminal law draws a bright line at purpose. On the other hand, criminalization decisions sometimes implicitly rely on the potential wrongdoing of others to justify criminal laws. For instance, if I am a well-trained gun owner who lives alone and is not around children, then a law that restricts my gun ownership is a law the prevents me from doing a justifiable act because others might do wrong (say, by stealing my gun). Similarly, the criminalization of drugs on the basis that some actors will do wrong restricts the liberty of others who will not. Our liberty is thus restricted by the potential wrongdoing of others. But the criminal law’s method of restricting our actions because of others’ potential wrongdoing is opaque to us, as it does not operate through the doctrine of complicity.

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84 See Alexander and Ferzan (2009, ch. 4); Alexander and Ferzan (2012); see also Tadros (2011, ch. 6).
85 I thank Glenn Cohen for raising this question.
86 Larry Alexander and I have argued that if one is aware of justifying facts, one need not act for those facts. Thus, if telling a husband the truth justifies the risk that he will kill his wife, then this utterance is justified even if Iago knows these facts but acts for the purpose of causing Othello to attack her. Alexander and Ferzan (2009, ch. 4).
89 State v. Gladstone, 474 P.2d 274 (Wash. 1980); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985).
Resolving how and when we are responsible for the wrongdoing of others is extraordinarily complex, and I certainly cannot solve that problem now. What is important to note for our purposes is that it is just this solution that we need to fully understand the contours of provocation forfeiture. After all, if Bully threatens Victim that if she leaves her house, he will shoot her, then Victim knows that she is consciously disregarding the substantial risk that she will need to act in self-defense if she leaves. The question then is whether leaving the house is justified, not whether leaving the house is legal. The reason she may leave, even knowing that she will be attacked, is because the initial action is not culpable, even including that it may lead to a later need to kill. Interests need to be fully articulated and debated to understand fully when and why a particular act would lead the provocateur to forfeit her rights.

This brings us to the final puzzle. Is the provocateur entitled to consider that his response will be justified in determining the initial culpability of his conduct? Sometimes at t₁ we act so as to be able to act justifiably later and we are entitled to take this later justifiability into account in determining whether to engage in the conduct at t₁. Carl is entitled to apply for a job as an executioner because he wants to justifiably kill people. Debbie is entitled to drive an ambulance because she wants to justifiably speed through red lights. A police officer is allowed to act undercover and even encourage another to commit a crime so that a gang can be brought down. In these cases, the act at t₁ is causally linked to an act that is justifiable at t₂.

This brings us back to Bronson. Why can’t Charles Bronson say that all he did was cause a bad guy to try to kill him and that allowed him to act in self-defense? More generally, assume a provocateur acts at t₁ in such a way so as to provoke the respondent to try to kill him so that the provocateur can kill him at t₂. Is the correct question, “May one engage in conduct so that one may purposefully kill?” or is the correct question, “May one engage in conduct so that one may purposefully and justifiably kill?” That is, can the provocateur build in the justifiability of his conduct at t₂ in determining whether his culpable and therefore impermissible at t₁?

Finkelstein and Katz present this as a question of whether “we must assess plans—or component parts of plans—in the context of the overall moral character of the entire package.” Certainly, we do. An action at t₁’s justifiability critically depends upon its effects at t₂ and the reasons for causing these t₂ effects. What I reject here, however, is that even taking into account that he would be acting in what is otherwise justifiable self-defense, Bronson’s conduct is justified at t₁. In my view, Bronson cannot act at t₁ because his conduct purposefully aims to usurp the role of the state, and this is an impermissible goal.

Let us parse three cases:

**Dolores Claiborne**: Dolores Claiborne lives with her physically abusive alcoholic husband and her teenage daughter in Maine. Once Dolores discovers that her husband is molesting the daughter and that her husband has stolen all of Dolores’ private savings with which to leave, Dolores plots her husband’s demise. She buys him alcohol and then verbally taunts him, so that he will chase

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90 Raymond (2010).
though the field on their property. Dolores, who has previously almost fallen down a hole in the field, has covered the hole. She jumps over it; he falls in; and she leaves him to die.

**Shane:** In this Western, Jack Palance plays Jack Wilson, a gun slinger hired by antagonist, Rufus Ryker, who is trying to force homesteaders off their land. When one homesteader approaches where Wilson is standing, it is clear that Wilson is to shoot the homesteader but to make it look “right” to witnesses. Wilson therefore proceeds to insult the South and Southerners, which provokes the homesteader to draw his gun. Wilson, quicker on the draw, shoots the homesteader.

**Death Wish:** After muggers kill his wife and rape his daughter, Charles Bronson’s character goes on a vigilante spree. On streets, subways, and parks, he poses as a victim, so that when attacked he can kill his attacker.

Let’s cleanly separate out the various factors. In *Dolores Claiborne*, the husband is molesting the daughter. The audience is led to believe that the wife is in a situation where she will not be able to end the abuse and save her daughter. We are told, by Dolores’ employer, “Sometimes being a bitch is all a woman has to hold on to.” The husband deserves quite a bit of punishment. The state is not going to give it to him. Although from personal conversations I know that there are those who think she did nothing wrong, that seems to go too far. After all, she gets him intoxicated, taunts him so he will attempt to kill her, and leads him on a chase so that he will fall down a hole she has covered up and she herself jumps over. But even if all of that was permissible, she still had a duty to rescue him. It is only because we believe the system will fail her that we don’t condemn her. *Death Wish* likewise raises issues as to law enforcement and the rule of law. We like to know there is justice in the world (or at least at the movies).

In addition, there still seems to be something that distinguishes *Death Wish from Shane*. In *Shane*, Wilson’s intention is to kill the homesteader. He chooses to do this by means of calling it self-defense. In this case, Wilson will fail if he does not kill the homesteader. On the other hand, in *Death Wish*, Bronson would be perfectly happy if the world had no muggers. That is, his intention is to kill bad guys, if and only if such bad guys exist. If there are no bad guys, then Bronson does not fail in his intention.

There is a significant difference between those who create situations so that they can kill, and those who engage in actions that put them in a position to justifiably kill only if necessary. If the actor’s failure to kill constitutes a failure of his plan and action, then his reasons for action are clearly impermissible. This is to be contrasted with why it is permissible for the speed demon to become an ambulance driver and the blood thirsty executioner to kill. Their intentions are only to engage in conduct that is lawful, but they do not engage in conduct in order to create those very circumstances. Therefore, Wilson is culpable in *Shane* because his reason for action is to kill, and he engages in the conduct designed to create those circumstances.

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92 Thanks to Mitch Berman for suggesting to me this parsing of the cases.
This is not to say that Bronson is not also a provocateur, but that the reasons are different. Now, turning to *Death Wish* more directly, what should we say about Bronson’s conduct? Paul Robinson clearly places the protagonist on the culpable side of the divide: “Perhaps the ‘grand schemer’ best known in popular culture is the vigilante character of the 1974 movie, ‘Death Wish,’ who deliberately takes late-night walks and subway rides to place himself in threatening situations where he could kill the muggers who tried to attack him.”  

Recall that what provocateurs do is to affect the respondent’s reasons for action, typically by creating new ones. Iago tells Othello that Desdemona is cheating on him. By his words, Iago aims to influence Othello’s behavior. We might analogize this to the entrapment defense. No one finds it remotely problematic for police to merely leave a wallet out for someone to find. Creating opportunities seems unproblematic. Thus, it is tempting to say here that what one can do, and Bronson does, is to merely create an opportunity, and this is entirely permissible.

As I argue elsewhere, one concern underlying entrapment is about external actors pulling the strings on our circumstantial luck. In many ways, I think that we feel “But for the grace of God go I” and so, we might worry that there are circumstances at which we would meet our price, either by threat or offer. One thus tries to manage one’s life to avoid such situations. What both the provocateur and the entrapping officer do then, is to shift our opportunities in a way that may reveal the worst about us.

The police, it might be thought, are entitled to make slight but not extraordinary shifts in another’s circumstantial luck. So, if a police officer poses as a marijuana dealer, then the buyer cannot complain that she picked the police officer. And importantly, that seems to be partly driven by the fact that if the buyer did not buy from this cop, the buyer would buy from another.

What though to say about the provocateur? Notice that what the provocateur does is to ultimately reveal that under certain conditions the respondent will behave wrongly. May the provocateur play God so as to justifiably rid us of a potential wrongdoer?

The problem Bronson’s conduct is that he is a vigilante. Although he may attempt to flush out the evil tendencies of others, the question is why he should be entitled to play that role. What he aims to do is to give people their just deserts under the guise of preventive force. He aims to replace the state. The problem about making oneself judge, jury, and executioner is that one is, in fact, taking over a role that has been delegated to the state. In the absence of a well-functioning legal order, we might revisit whether Bronson may act as he does. We could still worry about the differences in proportionality between the harm employed as a matter of prevention and the harm deserved as a matter of retributive justice. But then our complaint would be narrower. However, within our legal order, private citizens are not permitted to play both God and government and rid the world of wrongdoers. The

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93 Robinson (1985, p. 31 n.114). When this paper was presented at Penn in December 2011, Robinson seemed to have shifted his view on *Death Wish*.

94 I thank Larry Alexander and Doug Husak for suggesting this analogy and Mike Cahill for urging me to pursue it more than my first draft did. For a general survey of the doctrine, see Allen, et al. (1999).

95 Ferzan, K., Innocence denied (manuscript). See also Squires (2006). Tony Dillof is right to note that in playing God, there is also the problem of selection. Dillof (2004).
unjustifiability of the conduct is thus the extent to which this behavior violates the rule of law values that the criminal justice system serves. This leaves open that sometimes the events at \( t_2 \) will justify the risk at \( t_1 \) – indeed, this must be true for us to lead our lives when we predict the future choices we may face.

To summarize the argument, the question was whether the justifiability of the act at \( t_2 \) affects the justifiability of the act at \( t_1 \). The answer to this is yes. But in some cases, the provocateur will not be justified at \( t_1 \) because his reasons for creating the risk are themselves unjustifiable. In some instances, this is because the provocateur is just a killer, whose aim is to kill – he creates the justifying circumstances merely as a means for doing what he intends to do anyway: kill another. This is impermissible. In other cases, the provocateur may have more protective goals, such as the flushing out of bad guys, to the extent that they exist. But it is not the job of the individual citizen to engage in such behavior, and thus, this conduct, too, is impermissible at \( t_1 \). This conclusion, however, is contingent the existence of a well-functioning state.

**Conclusion**

Criminal law scholarship’s failure to be sufficiently attentive to the way that the normative landscape may be changed by the conduct of the actors renders scholars ill-equipped to articulate why a provocateur cannot fight in her defense. This is not a matter of understanding defenses. Or justifications. It is a matter of understanding how sometimes, you get exactly what you ask for. And at those times, you simply have to take it.

**References**


