Whither the Regulatory “War on Coal”? Scapegoats, Saviors, and Stock Market Reactions

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Whither the Regulatory “War on Coal”?
Scapegoats, Saviors, and Stock
Market Reactions

Cary Coglianese* and Daniel E. Walters**

Complaints about excessive economic burdens associated with regulation abound in contemporary political and legal rhetoric. In recent years, perhaps nowhere have these complaints been heard as loudly as in the context of U.S. regulations targeting the use of coal to supply power to the nation’s electricity system, as production levels in the coal industry dropped by nearly half between 2008 and 2016. The coal industry and its political supporters, including the president of the United States, have argued that a suite of air pollution regulations imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during the Obama administration seriously undermined coal companies’ bottom lines, presenting an existential threat to the industry. Under the Trump administration, industry players have lobbied hard for (and sometimes received) financial subsidies and regulatory changes, with the president seemingly all too happy to play the role of the industry’s savior.

Stepping back, we consider the extent to which regulations have really led to the decline in demand for coal and how much the coal industry can actually expect to gain from the deregulatory policies of the current administration. To illuminate these questions, we statistically analyze stock market reactions to important events in what critics called the regulatory “war on coal” during the

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Obama administration. Using an event-study framework that measures abnormal market activity in the immediate wake of these events, we are able to isolate any potential impact of regulatory developments above and beyond market factors, such as secular trends in natural gas prices and market performance as a whole. Surprisingly, we find no systemic evidence consistent with a “war on coal” based on investor assessments of the industry’s financial prospects in the wake of new regulatory developments, even though our methods do find evidence of stock market reactions to other events, such as bankruptcies of other companies. Coal firms’ investors—the very actors with financial stakes in understanding the impact of regulation on the industry—appear to have behaved as if they never actually bought into the regulatory “war on coal” narrative.

Our findings are consistent both with broader evidence about the effects of regulation and with an underlying political economy of regulatory scapegoating, according to which actors in a declining industry prefer to blame regulation rather than competitive factors for their businesses’ decline. By calling attention to the pervasive incentives for scapegoating and cheap talk by politicians seeking to be saviors, we offer an account that can explain the mismatch between our findings and the rhetoric of the “war on coal.” Along the way, our account reinforces how important it is for courts, elected officials, and the public to demand that government agencies base their regulatory decisions on evidence instead of relying on political rhetoric.
INTRODUCTION

Regulation can improve society by correcting market failures. But in doing so, it can also impose costs on industry. As a result, businesses often have an incentive to mobilize against the imposition of new regulatory obligations and seek the alleviation of existing ones. Corporate managers frequently emphasize the negative ramifications of regulations, claiming that regulations kill jobs and place an inordinate drag on the economy. Such claims about excessive regulatory costs have permeated political discourse, and they hold high strategic value for the business leaders who make them. Even when specific regulations have little or no perceptible impact on firms’ bottom lines, managers still have incentives to overstate a regulation’s negative consequences. Exaggerating small or nonexistent effects of regulation might be useful in staving off other, more stringent or comprehensive regulations that would be truly onerous. Exaggeration may also help industry leaders build the case for subsidies, tax relief, or forms of tariff protection that would benefit their firms. Blaming regulations also can divert attention from business leaders’ own failings and their inability to maintain profitability during periods of heightened economic competition.

Perhaps nowhere has the rhetoric of excessive regulatory costs emerged as prominently on the political agenda in recent years as it has with environmental regulations imposed on electric utility plants that rely on coal as their source of

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1. See, e.g., Jack L. Walker, Jr., Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements 98 (1991) (noting that “[o]ne of the chief reasons that business firms join trade associations, for example, is their desire to secure sympathetic public policies or to mount effective defenses against government regulation”).


During the Obama administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a suite of rules designed to curb power plants’ emissions of mercury and other toxic chemicals, prevent air pollution from power plants from drifting across state lines, and limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants in an effort to combat global climate change. Industry claimed that these rules constituted a veritable regulatory “war on coal.” According to executives and lobbyists in the coal mining industry, these environmental regulations made coal a more costly energy source for electric utilities, prompting a wave of coal-fired plant retirements that decreased overall demand for coal. Coal production has, in fact, declined dramatically over the last decade: dropping 38 percent between 2008 and 2016. At the same time, the coal industry apparently invested millions of dollars in a “strategy . . . that urge[d] coal-mining families to join the coal and electric power industry in fighting back against the federal government’s so-called ‘war on coal.’”

Coal industry executive Robert Murray accused the Obama administration of creating a “regulatory rampage” aimed at “appeas[ing] his radical environmentalist, liberal elitist . . . constituents” who seek to “destroy” the coal industry.

Sympathetic politicians have echoed the coal industry’s claims that air pollution regulations have undermined the coal industry. After the Obama

5. For a concise history of this rhetoric with respect to coal-powered utility plants, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” 1–2, 16–19 (2016).

6. See id. at 1–2 (identifying the mercury rule, cross-state transport rule, and the CPP as the “primary evidence” of the regulatory battle against the coal industry); see also id. at 22–23.

7. See Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 695, 773 (2016); Richard L. Gordon, An EPA War on Coal?, 36 REGULATION 16, 16 (2013); Michael Grunwald, Inside the War on Coal, POLITICO (May 26, 2015, 11:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/inside-war-on-coal-000002. Coal companies have filed hundreds of official regulatory comments with environmental and natural resources agencies as well as annual financial reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission claiming that environmental regulations have had significant effects on the economic viability and competitiveness of their industry. See id.


administration announced a plan in 2013 to put in place new climate-related rules, then-Speaker of the House John Boehner criticized the proposed policy initiative as “essentially a national energy tax and a continuation of the war on coal [that will only make matters worse,] putting thousands and thousands of Americans out of work.”

Then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell criticized President Obama for waging a “war on coal,” charging that new EPA rules were just a “back door attempt by President Obama to . . . shut down our nation’s coal mines.” As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump railed against “unnecessary regulations” and repeatedly pledged to “end the war on coal.” Such assertions have not been limited to Republican political leaders either, as “Democrats from coal mining and processing states have opposed EPA regulatory requirements that the politicians claimed would disadvantage U.S. industry.”

Just as industry actors have strategic reasons to exaggerate the negative consequences of regulation, so too do certain politicians have an incentive to exaggerate how much their efforts to reduce regulatory burdens will promote industrial activity and job growth. As a candidate and as president, Donald Trump has regularly portrayed himself as the coal industry’s savior. In addition to his general populist appeals during the campaign—such as his claim that “I alone can fix it,” when referring to a governmental system “rigged against our citizens”—Trump also specifically made saving the coal industry one of his most prominent campaign promises. “I’m coal’s last shot,” he would come to say. And his message of salvation resonated with voters in certain key coal states. In West Virginia and Wyoming, Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a margin of roughly three to one in the 2016 presidential election.

17. See, e.g., John H. Cushman Jr. & Zahra Hirji, Trump: America First on Fossil Fuels, Last on Climate Change, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 27, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27052016/donald-trump-republican-party-election-fossil-fuels-coal-oil-gas-fracking-climate-change-paris (quoting candidate Donald Trump as saying that “[w]e are going to save the coal industry, believe me, we are going to save it”).
19. In 2016, Trump bested Clinton by 2.6 times as many votes in West Virginia and by 3.1 times as many votes in Wyoming. West Virginia Results, N.Y. TIMES (last updated June 15, 2018 11:40 AM).
victory produced considerable initial optimism in coal states. As a retired miner in Gillette, Wyoming stated, “You saw right after the election . . . people with smiles on their faces. They finally felt like the albatross was gone . . . .”20 In the years to follow, the President and his administration took steps aimed at reducing regulatory burdens on coal-powered electricity, including repealing EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP).21 On announcing the initial steps in that repeal, President Trump’s first EPA administrator even declared that “[t]he war on coal is over.”22

The rhetoric of a regulatory “war on coal” has proven itself politically resonant in part because it accords with a certain economic logic. If regulation raises the costs of using a product, then that should make the product less attractive in the marketplace. Yet regulation is not the only reason that an industry such as coal mining could struggle. During the eight years of the Obama administration, coal faced other economic challenges, including increased competition from natural gas.23 Perhaps much, if not most, of the coal industry’s decline derived from these other factors. If so, political rhetoric about a regulatory war on the coal industry might merely amount to symbolic speech that serves the self-interest of industry leaders and politicians.24 Industry lobbyists and leaders would presumably prefer to make regulators in Washington, D.C., the scapegoat of what ails their industry rather than take the blame for failing to ensure that their line of business remains economically competitive.25 Politicians


seeking votes from workers and their families also benefit if they can make themselves appear to be saviors who can simply roll back regulatory burdens and thereby revitalize a struggling industry or economy.

In this Article, we report findings from empirical analysis, seeking to shed light on the credibility of the “war on coal” narrative about the role of regulation in the decline of the coal industry in the United States. Were environmental regulations imposed on the utility sector really instrumental to that decline, as the narrative has suggested? Or was regulation essentially just a scapegoat for business leaders and a symbol for self-declared political saviors? Some economic analysis already indicates that the decline in coal production in fact had much more to do with competition from natural gas than from regulation. Still, other scholars and analysts continue to suggest that environmental regulation poses an “existential” threat to the coal industry.

This empirical study seeks insight from the signals provided by private investors in publicly traded coal firms—those with real money at stake—to see what their investment behavior reveals about their expectations of the likely impact of environmental regulations on coal firms’ bottom lines. We specifically analyze the stock prices of publicly traded coal companies to see how they may have responded to news of the relevant regulatory events predominantly associated with the “war on coal.” By analyzing investor responses to discrete events associated with the development and implementation of key environmental regulations, we seek to factor out more secular confounding contributors to coal’s decline, such as falling natural gas prices, and then to assess what the market itself might say about the impact, if any, of environmental regulation.

As we detail in the Parts that follow, our statistical analysis shows that the stock prices for coal firms responded to certain nonregulatory events, but it
reveals no comparable changes in response to news of environmental regulatory events in a manner consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. We find no clear evidence that investors saw key developments in the regulatory “war on coal” as having meaningful implications for profitability in the coal industry. Overall, it would seem as if investors in the stock market perceived something that company executives and certain politicians would not have wanted workers or voters to understand—namely, that environmental regulation of electric utilities has not significantly contributed to the decline of the coal industry. Our research not only sheds additional light on the question of regulation’s role in the decline of the coal industry in the United States, but it also provides an opportunity for a broader reflection on the political economy of regulatory scapegoating, and it provides reason to question the extent to which dying industries can be reinvigorated through environmental regulatory reforms.

This Article begins, in Part I, with a descriptive account of the coal industry, including its recent decline. We review existing research on the causes of the decline, including other studies that, using other data and methods, have raised questions about whether regulation explains much of the decreased demand for coal as a source of energy. What has remained unexamined in the existing literature, though, has been whether regulation affects the expectations of investors in the coal industry—and, by extension, what private investors’ behavior might imply about the true financial implications of environmental regulations on the coal industry in recent years.

In Part II, we explain our focus on firm-level financial data and outline our methods of analyzing these data—an event-study approach supplemented with a difference-in-differences analysis of coal’s fortunes vis-à-vis its main competitor, natural gas. We explain how we used these widely accepted methods to assess the impact of news of regulatory events on the stock market’s perceptions about the coal industry’s bottom line.

In Part III, we report the results obtained from our analysis of stock price responses to the EPA regulations underlying claims of a regulatory “war on coal.” We also analyze the impacts of other related Obama-era policy initiatives, including the Paris Agreement, and we look for possible effects on stock prices from decisions in major litigation concerning EPA air pollution regulations. On the whole, our analysis suggests that news of environmental regulations and policies had no more than highly inconsistent effects on coal companies’ value to investors—with no overall discernible pattern supportive of claims of a regulatory “war” on the industry.

In Part IV, we test the robustness of our methods by considering other types of events, such as more direct operational rules on coal production, bankruptcies within the industry, and the outcomes of presidential elections. We find some of these other events associated with statistically significant changes in coal share prices. The highly discernible stock price reactions we observe in response to news of bankruptcies by other coal firms, for example, show that coal stock prices do react to negative events—a finding that both reinforces the appropriateness of our
empirical methods and makes the overall nonresponse to news of key events in the regulatory “war on coal” narrative all the more noteworthy.

Finally, in Part V, we address implications for regulatory law of the disconnect we find between political rhetoric and market behavior. We offer plausible explanations for the seemingly blasé market reaction to news of what would have seemed, judging from the political rhetoric, to be an existential regulatory threat. Although our analysis of market reactions in this single industry cannot be taken to imply that regulation never has any negative effects on industry competitiveness or stock market valuation in other contexts, the absence of significant market reactions consistent with claims of a regulatory “war on coal” does shine light on the strategic incentives that business and political leaders have to exaggerate the negative effects of regulation. It is relatively easy for the managers of private firms to make regulation a scapegoat for their own inability to keep their industry competitive, just as it is relatively easy for politicians to make themselves appear to be saviors to struggling workers and their families by offering quick fixes in the form of regulatory rollbacks. Given the gulf we observe between the heated rhetorical claims and the apparent market realities in this highly salient context of energy-related regulation, we urge a degree of caution before accepting claims in other contexts about supposedly dire effects of regulation.

I. AN INDUSTRY IN DECLINE, BUT WHY?

Coal literally fueled the original launch of the U.S. system of electricity generation and distribution.\(^\text{28}\) For most of the last century, coal has been abundant and cheap compared to its major competitor fuels, including natural gas and renewable energy.\(^\text{29}\) Although coal combustion requires a relatively high level of fixed and capital costs relative to its main competitor, natural gas,\(^\text{30}\) analysts continued to project considerable growth for the coal industry as recently as the early 2010s.\(^\text{31}\) The CEO of a major coal company told the Wall Street Journal in 2011 that he thought “the next decade for coal is going to be one of the best decades we’ve ever had.”\(^\text{32}\)

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Between 2008 and 2017, however, the market for coal took an unexpected turn. As Figure 1 shows, actual coal production began to tumble from almost 1.2 billion short tons in 2008 to 728 million short tons in 2016. Although coal had been steadily losing ground to natural gas and renewables in the market for electricity generation since the late 2000s, Figure 1 shows that in 2016, natural gas actually eclipsed coal as America’s primary fuel for electricity, driven by a plentiful supply of cheaper natural gas made possible by the hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) revolution. Policymakers began to view natural gas as a potential bridge fuel to shift from coal-fired electricity generation to an eventual system based on renewable sources of energy. By mid-2019, the volume

Figure 1: Changing Fortunes in the Coal Industry

Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA)

33. John Coglianese et al., The Effects of Fuel Prices, Regulations, and Other Factors on U.S. Coal Production, 2008-2016, 41 ENERGY J. 55 (2020); Devashree Saha, Trends and Market Forces Shaping the Future of U.S. Coal Industry, COUNCIL STATE GOV'TS 2 (Sept. 11, 2017), https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/CR_coal.pdf. It appears that the pivotal drop off in coal production occurred after 2011. Houser et al., supra note 31, at 12 (pointing out that, after 2011, “the bottom fell out” in coal production, leading to “the biggest 5-year decline in postwar US history”); see also id. at 7 (describing the decline in demand for coal as “one of the most spectacular market collapses in history”).

34. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Competition Between Coal and Natural Gas Affects Power Markets (June 16, 2017), available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31672 (“In 2016, natural gas provided 34% of total electricity generation, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source.”)


36. See Alexander Q. Gilbert & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Benchmarking Natural Gas and Coal-Fired Electricity Generation in the United States, 134 ENERGY 622 (2017); Roger Lueken et al., The Climate and Health Effects of a USA Switch from Coal to Gas Electricity Generation, 109 ENERGY 1160 (2016).
of electricity provided by renewable energy sources had reached a point that rivaled, and in some months exceeded, the volume provided by coal.\textsuperscript{37}

Around 2008, utilities began increasing the rate of coal-fired power plant retirements, and construction of new coal plants virtually ceased even as utilities added capacity.\textsuperscript{38} In many cases, older coal-fired generation units were running at a loss and were “over-ripe” for retirement even before the imposition of any additional pollution controls.\textsuperscript{39} With the changing market trends, coal producers found themselves with an oversupply problem, “crippling” debt, and a variety of other liabilities.\textsuperscript{40} Reflecting the hard times, three of the biggest and most established coal producers—Peabody, Arch, and Alpha—filed for bankruptcy in 2015 and 2016.\textsuperscript{41}

Although some of these market dynamics pre-dated the Obama administration, a steeper decline in coal output coincided with President Obama’s term in office. As Figure 1 suggests, as late as 2007, the coal market looked relatively stable. Prior to mid-decade, few foresaw just how fundamentally different the coal industry—and the larger energy sector—would look by the end of the Obama administration.

### A. Explaining Coal’s Decline

Several research studies have sought to explain coal’s slide. Simplifying greatly, at least six general factors have been examined for their possible role in coal’s decline since 2008:

- Declining productivity in mining operations, which in turn affects the price of coal and its competitiveness with natural gas;\textsuperscript{42}

- Declining coal exports due to a reduction in Chinese demand;\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{41} Houser et al., supra note 31, at 7.

\textsuperscript{42} Sanya Carley et al., \textit{Adaptation, Culture, and the Energy Transition in American Coal Country}, 37 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 133 (2018).

\textsuperscript{43} Houser et al., supra note 31.
• Unexpectedly low demand for electricity in several recent winters, compounded or caused by the Great Recession;\textsuperscript{44}

• Rapidly falling natural gas prices, spurred by the development of shale gas through hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”;\textsuperscript{45}

• Growing consumer demand for clean energy, driving utilities to increase natural gas and renewable generation capacity;\textsuperscript{46} and

• Environmental regulations that raised the cost of coal and drove utilities to shift generation capacity to cheaper inputs.\textsuperscript{47}

Among these various factors, existing research provides ample support for falling natural gas prices (due to innovation in shale gas extraction) as the primary factor leading to the decline in demand for coal.\textsuperscript{48}

The relationship between the coal industry’s stock prices and natural gas energy prices is strong, as shown in Figure 2. In a widely cited study, energy analysts Trevor Houser, Jason Bordoff, and Peter Marsters estimated that displacement by “natural gas is responsible for 48.9 percent of the decline in coal production nationwide, [with] renewables (including hydro and biomass) . . . responsible for 17.8 percent, and nuclear . . . responsible for 7.7 percent.”\textsuperscript{49} In another study, economists John Coglianese, Todd Gerarden, and Jim Stock found a strong relationship between natural gas prices and declining coal production, with more than 90 percent of coal production’s decline attributable to cheaper natural gas.\textsuperscript{50} These findings accord with more general research modeling the relationship between natural gas prices and coal generation.\textsuperscript{51}

Unlike prior studies, our purpose in this paper is not to test for all of the possible causes of the coal industry’s decline. Instead, our purpose here is to use market behavior to assess the plausibility of a more straightforward but widely

\textsuperscript{44} Coglianese et al., \textit{supra} note 33; Houser et al., \textit{supra} note 31; Catherine Hausman & Ryan Kelley, \textit{Welfare and Distributional Implications of Shale Gas} 3, 31 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21115, 2015).

\textsuperscript{45} Coglianese et al., \textit{supra} note 33; Houser et al., \textit{supra} note 31; Hausman & Kelley, \textit{supra} note 44.

\textsuperscript{46} Saha, \textit{supra} note 33; Houser et al., \textit{supra} note 31.

\textsuperscript{47} Coglianese et al., \textit{supra} note 33; Houser et al., \textit{supra} note 31.

\textsuperscript{48} Coglianese et al., \textit{supra} note 33, at 56-57.

\textsuperscript{49} Houser et al., \textit{supra} note 31, at 19. The remaining 25.6 percent drop in demand for coal-powered energy derived simply from overall reductions in demand for electricity. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{50} Coglianese et al., \textit{supra} note 33.

held claim that is central to “war on coal” rhetoric—namely, that environmental regulations had substantial negative effects on coal companies’ profitability.  

B. The Regulatory “War on Coal”

Political rhetoric about the regulatory “war on coal” has generally centered on federal environmental regulation and specifically on three EPA rules: the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), and the CPP. Unlike other earlier environmental regulations, these three rules are thought to have disproportionately affected the demand for coal because they were explicitly designed to address pollution from old utility plants.  

52. See Gordon, supra note 7. The claim persists to the present as analysts continue to attribute the decline of coal at least in part to environmental regulations imposed on electric utilities. See, e.g., Taylor Kuykendall, U.S. Coal Sector Remains in Rough Shape Heading into 2020s After Decade of Decline, S&P GLOBAL (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/tyh7jm_k_PMJ1i_C2yAOC5w2 (stating that “[i]nstead of a coal construction boom in the country, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency began enforcing new rules restricting power plant emissions of mercury, a regulatory move that contributed to 2015 setting a high watermark for annual coal power plant retirements . . . .”).  

plants—largely coal-fired plants—that had been “grandfathered” under the original Clean Air Act.\textsuperscript{54} Although \textit{new} coal-fired power plants have been subject to environmental regulations since passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the statutory grandfathering of existing coal-fired power plants meant that these old plants were shielded from the brunt of regulatory limitations so long as utility companies were able to find innovative ways to keep them operating.\textsuperscript{55} By 2012, over 75 percent of coal-fired power plants had been operating for over thirty years, and 20 percent had been operating for over fifty years.\textsuperscript{56} This “distortion of retirement decisions” created what some scholars have called the “old plant effect”—that is, the operation of power plants longer than their originally anticipated lifespan.\textsuperscript{57} For decades, administrations from both parties had sought to address this distorting, environmentally undesirable effect.\textsuperscript{58}

Although the CSAPR, MATS, and CPP rules were in some ways building on previous attempts to address the old plant effect,\textsuperscript{59} these three regulations are said to have been the most pointed efforts to bring the largely unregulated, existing coal plants under some kind of emissions control regime.\textsuperscript{60} Richard Revesz, law professor and former dean at New York University Law School, and his coauthor Jack Lienke note that industry’s “narrative of ‘Obama’s war on coal’” focused on “three major ‘fronts’ in the President’s supposed war—the Transport Rule [CSAPR], the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard, and the Clean Power Plan.”\textsuperscript{61} In fact, these three rules were part of a concerted “Climate Action

\textsuperscript{54} REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 35–49.
\textsuperscript{55} See Gordon, supra note 7; REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 35–49.
\textsuperscript{56} REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 32.
\textsuperscript{57} See id.
\textsuperscript{58} See id.
\textsuperscript{59} One of the previous efforts was the attempt during the George W. Bush administration to ratchet down New Source Review in order to make it easier to construct new coal-fired power plants. This approach to the old plant effect has typically been strongly supported by the coal industry and utilities. REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5.
\textsuperscript{60} For example, in asserting that EPA “has declared a war on coal,” the editor of industry magazine \textit{Coal Age} cited “[t]wo major rules [that] will affect the future of U.S. power generation: the proposed Maximum Achievable Control Technology Rule (the Utility MACT Rule) and the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (the Transport Rule).” \textit{Will the EPA Acknowledge the True Cost of Its War on Coal?}, \textit{COAL AGE} (Aug. 25, 2011), https://www.coalage.com/from-the-editor/will-the-epa-acknowledge-the-true-cost-of-its-war-on-coal/. A coal industry lawyer characterized the MATS rule as “a key element of an illegal and devastating war on coal.” Cody Nett, Assistant General Counsel for Murray Energy Corp., Public Hearing Comments on “Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review for Coal- and Oil-Fired Utility Steam Generating Units” (Nov. 2017). Robert Murray, the CEO of Murray Energy Corp., declared that “[t]he CPP was the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s ‘War on Coal.’” Robert Murray, Chairman, President and CEO, Murray Energy Corp., Comments on “State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units” (Nov. 2017); see generally REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 1–2 (noting that “[a]s the primary evidence of this undeclared war on coal, its opponents point to three regulations issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act that aim to reduce pollution from the nation’s aging power plants”: namely, CSAPR, MATS, and CPP); see also infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{61} REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 2. As Revesz and Lienke have elsewhere explained:

[T]he most commonly cited evidence of “war” are three EPA restrictions on pollution from power plants: the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, commonly known as the Transport Rule, which prevents plants in upwind states from exporting dangerous soot- and smog-forming pollution to their downwind neighbors; the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which restrict
“Plan” (CAP) announced by President Obama in 2013, acknowledging the role of an aging coal-fired power plant fleet in preventing realization of carbon dioxide emission reduction goals. Together, the three rules essentially forced electric utilities to factor new, and potentially steep, compliance costs into their decisions about whether to continue relying on an aging fleet of coal-fired plants or to shift generation to newer plants that could use other types of fuel, such as natural gas.

We provide additional details about each of these three key rules in Part III, where we analyze the stock market’s reactions to each. For now, we note that these three rules have received outsized blame, on both the campaign trail and in political debate, for the coal industry’s changing fortunes. Such distinctive attention appears to have had meaningful policy consequences because implicit in assigning blame to these regulations has been the assumption that weakening or removing them could reverse the trends that the coal industry had experienced. As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump promised to rescind the Obama-era climate regulations in an effort to augur a return to greatness for the coal industry. As president, one of his earliest actions was to direct EPA to consider repealing the CPP—declaring that “[p]erhaps no single regulation threatens our miners, energy workers, and companies more than this crushing attack on American industry.” His EPA has since rescinded the CPP, and it is well underway toward making a substantial rollback of the MATS.

Despite the attention paid to climate regulation as the source of the coal industry’s decline, researchers who have sought to investigate the substantive


effects of these regulations have failed to find much support. One study estimated that EPA regulations may have been associated with about a 3.9 percent decline in domestic coal production (about 10 percent of the total decline from 2011 to 2016) and a 5 percent decline in coal-fired generation (about 17 percent of the total decline in generation from 2011 to 2016).\footnote{69} Another study estimated that environmental regulations, and primarily just the MATS rule, accounted for no more than about 6 percent of the decline in demand for domestic coal.\footnote{70} As these studies indicate, existing research has focused on demand for coal and industry production levels. Although some have speculated about how investors might react to changing dynamics in the energy market and in energy regulation, the financial market’s assessment of the so-called regulatory “war on coal” has remained unexamined.\footnote{71} In the next two Parts of this Article, we describe our empirical research to fill that gap.

II. INVESTIGATING THE MARKET EFFECTS OF THE “WAR ON COAL”

Our point of departure from previous research into regulation’s effect on coal comes from our use of financial data—namely, the daily share prices of publicly traded securities issued by coal firms. The main data we use come from the U.S. Stock Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Stock prices are widely considered an important measure of the health and profitability of businesses, and we exploit this measure to analyze the impact of regulation on market evaluations of coal firms. We analyze these financial data using two approaches: event studies and difference-in-differences analyses.\footnote{72}

A. Event-Study Analysis

Event-study analysis is a common statistical strategy used to capture the impact of an event on a company’s stock price by estimating a normal model of a stock’s performance and measuring the departure from that normal model in the immediate wake of news of a decision or event.\footnote{73} Event studies rely on a “semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis,” which posits that stock

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{69} Houser et al., supra note 31, at 22.
\item \footnote{70} Coglianese et al., supra note 33, at 56-57.
\item \footnote{71} See Nico Bauer et al., Divestment Prevails Over the Green Paradox When Anticipating Strong Future Climate Policies, 8 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 130 (2018).
\item \footnote{72} We conducted our event-study analysis using the software Eventus made available through the Wharton School’s research data services. This software requires the researcher to select the event date, the sample firms, and other parameters and then automatically extracts data from the Center for Research in Security Prices and computes abnormal returns and statistical significance tests. For our difference-in-differences analysis, we worked directly with raw daily return data using the statistical analysis software Stata.
\end{itemize}
prices are reflective of the information that is publicly available to investors and that these prices respond quickly to the introduction of new information to the market.\textsuperscript{74} Under this widely accepted assumption, any abnormal return in the short “event window” after the introduction of information about an intervening event can essentially be understood as the market’s valuation of the impact of the news associated with that event.\textsuperscript{75}

Event-study analysis has been used widely to interpret the impact of financial events, such as mergers or earnings announcements.\textsuperscript{76} The approach has also been used to investigate the market impact of laws and regulations imposed on business.\textsuperscript{77} Other studies have found that investors can react negatively to developments in the regulatory or legislative process. For example, events leading up to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley financial accounting reform legislation in 2002 reportedly led to a one-time overall loss in stock market value as high as $1.4 trillion, due to changes in market expectations occurring around those legislative events.\textsuperscript{78} When the Food and Drug Administration announced its regulation of cigarettes in the 1990s, the stock prices of the major tobacco companies experienced a statistically significant loss.\textsuperscript{79} On occasion, when regulation serves


\textsuperscript{75} Although stock prices respond to many factors, only one of which may be regulation, in the short run it is likely that any anomalous performance of the stock immediately following news of a salient regulatory event will in fact be a response by investors to the perceived impacts of regulation on business.\textsuperscript{76} See Paul Asquith, \textit{Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns}, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51 (1983); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, \textit{Empirical Studies of Corporate Law}, in \textit{HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS} 945 (2007); John J. Binder, \textit{Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data}, 16 RAND J. ECON. 167 (1985).


\textsuperscript{78} Ivy Xiying Zhang, \textit{Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002}, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 75 (2007); see also Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, \textit{Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?}, 30 REGULATION 48, 51 (Winter 2008) (“One study by Ivy Zhang estimated that the U.S. stock market lost $1.4 trillion in value, which is over 10 percent of annual U.S. GDP, as a result of the legislative events leading up to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.”).

to create barriers to entry for competition, event studies have shown that stock prices can respond positively to news of regulatory developments, as one study found in connection with the development of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s cotton dust standard and EPA’s prevention of significant deterioration rules.80

Event-study methods have also been used to evaluate the impact of court decisions on stock prices. One study of over 200 Supreme Court cases showed statistically detectable abnormal returns for affected firms in about 37 percent of cases.81 Studies specifically about court decisions in regulatory cases have found such decisions to be associated with abnormal returns. When a district court upheld the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of cigarettes, for example, major tobacco company stocks experienced statistically significant losses.82 In contrast, a study of the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proxy access rule found that firms that would have been most affected by the rule lost stock value in the wake of the court’s rejection of the rule, implying that the market placed positive value on the regulation of proxy access.83

For each of the three EPA rules at the center of the regulatory “war on coal” narrative (CSAPR, MATS, and CPP), our analysis focuses on two major regulatory events: the public release of the proposed rule and the public release of the final rule. We also analyze subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning each of these rules. Although prospects for the development of each regulation will likely have been known to the market in advance, the issuance of a proposed rule will be the first time that the public (including investors) will be able to see concretely what the agency plans to do. Similarly, although the prospect of a final rule will also obviously be known—because the agency has, after all, issued a proposal—the final release brings new information to the market. Not only does it bring certainty, as some proposed rules never result in a final rule, but it also provides the market with information about exactly what that regulation will say. Not infrequently, a final rule will differ from a proposed rule. In addition, at the same time EPA releases its rule language—whether proposed or final—it also releases a separate regulatory “preamble” that contains additional information about each regulatory action, including the results of the agency’s benefit-cost analysis of the proposed or final rule.84 In using event-study analysis, we seek to assess the extent to which these key events in EPA’s rulemaking processes, and the information they bring to the market, affect investors’ expectations about the coal industry’s future

82. See Lax & McCubbins, supra note 79.
84. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are to “incorporate in . . . rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose”—known as a preamble. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
profitability. In light of the highly salient claims about a regulatory “war on coal” narrative, our expectation is that the market will respond negatively to these pivotal events in the development of the three “war on coal” regulations.  

We do much the same for Supreme Court decisions related to each rulemaking. As we explain further below, the Supreme Court issued some surprising and significant decisions with respect to the “war on coal” regulations. In the case of CSAPR, the Supreme Court upheld EPA’s rule, while in the case of MATS, the Court invalidated it. We thus expect the market to have responded negatively to the news of the Court’s decision with respect to CSAPR but positively to the MATS decision. The Supreme Court never passed final judgment on the CPP, but it did take an even more shocking step by keeping the rule from taking effect pending the resolution of litigation in the lower courts. Never before had the Court acted to block an agency rule in this way, making the occurrence of this event a complete surprise to everyone, even the lawyers involved. By staying the CPP, the Court not only bought industry more time, but it also signaled clearly to everyone that a majority of the Justices had legal concerns about EPA’s regulation. For this reason, we expect investors in the coal industry to have responded positively to the news of the Supreme Court’s stay.

We forgo here a detailed account of the econometric methods involved in undertaking event studies, as others have provided a sufficient account of these established techniques. For present purposes, we simply highlight the essential steps that any event-study analysis undertakes:

1. identify one or more appropriate event dates;
2. calculate the stock’s return on each event date;

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85. As a general matter, our expectation of negative results would be strongest for the proposed rule event for each regulation, as this is the first time that the market has clear information about what EPA plans to do. Of course, especially with respect to the final rule, positive reactions from the market are also conceivable, such as if the final rule turns out to be less onerous to the industry than the proposed rule. In either case, the magnitude and the volume associated with the “war on coal” rhetoric—our main interest—would lead us to expect some statistically perceptible market reaction to these pivotal regulatory developments.
86. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 496 (2014) (upholding CSAPR as based on a permissible construction of the Clean Air Act’s good neighbor provision); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (striking MATS due to EPA’s failure to consider costs when making its determination of whether regulation was “appropriate and necessary”).
87. Although our principal analyses center on the Supreme Court decisions passing on the legality of both of these rulemakings, we also report in footnotes in the relevant sections below the results of event-study analyses of the lower court decisions and the Supreme Court’s grants of certiorari agreeing to hear an appeal.
88. Bob Sussman, The Supreme Court’s Clean Power Plan Missteps, BROOKINGS (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2016/02/12/the-supreme-courts-clean-power-plan-missteps/ (discussing the stay and noting that the “immediate effect of the stay will be to halt enforcement of the CPP while the courts conduct a full review of its validity under the Clean Air Act”).
90. See, e.g., John J. Binder, The Event-Study Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 111 (1998); Corrado, supra note 73; Khotari & Warner, supra note 73; MacKinlay, supra note 73.
(3) determine the stock’s expected return for each event date by estimating a model of normal performance;

(4) subtract the actual return from the expected return (based on the model of normal performance) to compute the excess or abnormal return for each event date; and

(5) evaluate whether the resulting excess or abnormal return is statistically significant.91

Figure 3 illustrates how these steps come together to yield the results we will report from our statistical analyses.

The vertical axis in Figure 3 represents the coal firms’ share prices, while the horizontal axis represents the passage of time. At some point along the horizontal axis, an event occurs—for example, the Supreme Court hands down its decision to stay the CPP.92 We undertake first to compute the path or trend that average coal stock prices were taking in the period leading up to the event—the period called the “estimation window.” We next extrapolate that trend past the event for an increment of time called the “event window.” We then can compare actual share prices at the end of the event window with where they would have been had the trend prior to the event continued to hold—the latter counterfactual estimate being called the “normal returns.”93

In Figure 3, we illustrate the direction that coal company stocks would be expected to respond in the wake of news of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP if that EPA regulation had constituted part of a “war on coal.” The Court’s surprising decision to halt the CPP would be expected to constitute good news for the coal industry, lifting stock prices higher than they would have otherwise been expected to be based on the pre-stay trend. If statistically significant, this positive difference in actual share price at the end of the event window, compared with what the price would have been based on the preexisting trend prior to the stay, is called an excess or abnormal return.94

In the example of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP, we would expect a positive abnormal return, precisely as illustrated in Figure 3. Indeed, positive

91. Fisch et al., supra note 73, at 20.
92. Following the convention of those who conduct event studies, in reporting our results in the next Part of this Article, we denote the day of any given event day as “0.” Pre-event time is thus indicated in negative days and post-event days in positive days. The event day is often denoted as “(0,0),” with the first number indicating the beginning date of the event study and the second number indicating its ending date. This notation becomes useful when referring to different windows of time examined in an event study—or “event windows.” For instance, the event window of interest might be one day long, starting at the beginning of the event day, so that abnormal returns would only be estimated for the window (0,0). But if the researcher is interested in a longer event window—say, three days—the event window could run from (0,2), indicating that the event window covered the day of the event, the day after the event (day one) and the day after the day after the event (day two).
93. Figure 3 is a simplification for illustrative purposes. In calculating both pre-event trends, post-event extrapolations of that trend, and the actual post-event returns, we are both averaging across all the coal companies in the sample and controlling for other variables, such as overall stock prices (based on the S&P average).
94. These daily abnormal returns can be summed across the event window to provide a measure of cumulative abnormal returns, with a separate test of the statistical significance of these cumulative impacts.
abnormal returns would be expected to result whenever the courts act to halt or remand any “war on coal” regulation. On the other hand, such returns would be expected to be negative in the wake of events leading to the imposition of new regulatory burdens on coal-powered utility plants, such as announcements of the issuance of proposed or final rules. In other words, rather than expecting to see coal stock prices increase relative to the normal baseline in the wake of the new regulatory event, the “war on coal” narrative would imply that share prices would drop—resulting in negative abnormal returns—in response to events associated with the imposition of regulatory burdens on coal-powered utility plants.

As long as another confounding event does not occur at the same time as the event of interest, the excess or abnormal return in the event window, if statistically significant, can be taken as the market’s short-term response to the information conveyed by or with the event under study. Researchers typically use varying estimation and event windows to assess the market reaction to events of interest. Following convention, we report separate statistical analyses using event windows of one- and three-day durations (as well as individual-day windows for each of the first three days). As a general rule, reactions observed in the smaller windows will merit greater confidence because less time has elapsed during which other factors or events could influence observed changes in stock prices.

In addition to our main event-study analyses of each of the “war on coal” regulations and their associated Supreme Court decisions, we report in Part III the results of a variety of additional related events, including the adoption of the Paris Agreement and President Trump’s announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement. In Part IV, we also report results from a variety of additional event-study analyses of other events for comparison purposes.
B. Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Although the event-study approach constitutes our principal empirical strategy, we also adapt a difference-in-differences technique to compare stock market reactions between coal firms and natural gas firms. Whereas an event-study approach seeks to measure the impact of an event by comparing a single firm’s stock performance immediately after the event to its own normal performance as measured before the event, a difference-in-differences approach considers an event to be a form of what in other contexts would be called the treatment or intervention. Difference-in-differences analysis has frequently been used to study the effects of regulatory interventions. Here, we use this method of analysis to compare the post-event outcomes for one group (or panel) thought to be affected by the event to the post-event outcomes for another group (or panel) not thought to be affected. This allows for estimation of the difference between the former “treated” firms’ outcomes and those of the counterfactual with no “treatment.”

The difference-in-differences approach we use here does not compare coal firms that might have been affected by regulations to other coal firms that were thought not to be affected by regulations, since the EPA regulations at the center of our analysis were national in scope and presumably affected the demand for coal from all coal firms. Instead, we use the difference-in-differences approach to compare the stock prices of coal firms to the stock prices of their most serious competition: natural gas firms. This effectively controls for any unobserved variables that might equally affect both coal and gas firms.

Difference-in-differences analysis works here much like our event-study analysis; however, instead of benchmarking coal firms’ post-event stock prices to an extrapolation of the same coal firms’ pre-event stock prices, we are using an extrapolation based on differences in price trends benchmarked against the stock performance of natural gas firms. As with our event-study analysis, we undertake first to compute the path or trend in stock prices before the event—but we make separate computations for coal firms and for natural gas firms. We also compute post-event price trends for each group. We used the trends in stock prices before and after the event in both groups to compute the predicted level where prices of coal stocks would have been vis-à-vis natural gas stocks absent the event. We then test whether the difference is statistically significant.


97. ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 96.
Much like with the event study, we would expect the Supreme Court’s decision to stay the CPP to amount to particularly good news for the coal industry relative to natural gas firms, so coal stocks would be expected to increase in value relative to the expected trend benchmarked to natural gas firms. By contrast, the “war on coal” narrative would imply that other events announcing regulatory obligations on coal-powered utilities would be expected to yield a decrease in coal stock prices relative to those for natural gas firms.

We use difference-in-differences analysis here as an additional test to see whether stock market behavior supports the political claims that environmental regulations disadvantaged the coal industry. This separate analysis serves as an important robustness check of our event-study analysis. Our difference-in-differences strategy might even be thought to be more likely than the event-study approach to find an effect on share prices following key regulatory events that disadvantage one sector but not the other, given that a regulatory event that disadvantages coal firms would be expected, by extension, to advantage natural gas firms that are in direct competition.

C. Data and Sample

With our unit of analysis being daily stock price, we focus on publicly traded coal firms.86 During the period under study, ten U.S. publicly traded coal companies existed that, taken together, constituted nearly two-thirds of the total coal market. Table 1, drawn from a ranking of major U.S. coal producers in the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Coal Report 2016, shows available data for U.S. market share in coal production for the publicly traded companies in our sample (bolded) along with other major private coal producers. In 2016, our sample firms comprised 63.2 percent of the total U.S. coal production. Within the sample, however, there was wide variation in market share. Peabody was the dominant player in the industry, with Arch and Cloud Peak typically having vied for second place. A number of our sample firms clustered together in a second tier ranging from 1.7 percent to 5.0 percent of production. As a general matter, it appears that publicly traded firms had greater market share than private firms. Only Murray Energy, Contura Energy, and, to some extent, Vistra Energy were major competitors to the bulk of the publicly traded firms in our sample. Overall, Table 1 reveals a long tail on the low end of the distribution—with many firms in the coal mining industry that had an extremely small slice of the pie (and with most of these small firms being privately owned and operated). Focusing on the ten publicly traded firms, as we do, captures the bulk of production and hence the bulk of exposure to any competitive effects from regulation. One important note about our sample: For

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86 Privately owned coal companies, such as Murray Energy and Contura Energy, are obviously not included in our analysis.
Table 1: Top Producing Coal Mining Firms as of 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Production (thousand short tons)</th>
<th>Percent of Total U.S. Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peabody Energy</td>
<td>143,024</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arch Coal</td>
<td>96,483</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloud Peak Energy</td>
<td>58,370</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray Energy</td>
<td>46,033</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contura Energy</td>
<td>44,231</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacco Industries</td>
<td>36,373</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Resource Partners</td>
<td>35,243</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmoreland Coal</td>
<td>29,594</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consol Energy</td>
<td>24,666</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vistra Energy</td>
<td>24,247</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foresight Energy</td>
<td>19,040</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Natural Resources</td>
<td>12,396</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiewit Peter Sons’</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackhawk Mining</td>
<td>11,842</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowie Resources Partners</td>
<td>10,853</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coronado Coal</td>
<td>7,175</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Fuels Association</td>
<td>6,141</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallador (aka Sunrise)</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie State Energy</td>
<td>5,913</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armstrong Energy</td>
<td>5,889</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Mining Group</td>
<td>5,609</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>87,099</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Bolded entries are publicly traded and included in the sample used for our analysis. Non-bolded entries are private companies and partnerships for which no securities market data exist.

some events in our analysis, data for some firms were unavailable. As discussed above, the event-study methodology extrapolates a “normal” trend through an event window based on stock price data from before the event. In our case, we use an estimation window of 250 days. If a firm did not have publicly traded stocks on the market for any reason during that period (for instance, because of a bankruptcy at that firm or because that firm’s stock offering had not yet occurred), then the firm is not included in that particular analysis. Thus, in some of our results, the industry-wide estimates are based on a subset of our sample of ten publicly traded firms. Arch, in particular, was sometimes absent in our results because it was in bankruptcy proceedings during a critical stretch of time overlapping with our events and estimation windows. Likewise, when we estimate single-firm event studies below, we omit analyses when there were no usable data for the particular firm-event combination. Any missing estimate is not due to a choice on our part, but rather due to the fact that the firms in our

sample sometimes were in and out of the category of publicly traded firms due to factors outside our control (namely, bankruptcy), making analysis of stock prices impossible for those firms at particular times.

III. STOCK MARKET REACTIONS AND THE REGULATORY “WAR ON COAL”

As previously mentioned, our main analysis focuses on the three environmental regulations most often singled out in the “war on coal” narrative: CSAPR, MATS, and CPP. We also analyze other, more general policies designed to address climate change as well as direct environmental effects of coal mining operations. But we begin with the three principal environmental regulations that have figured centrally in the narrative of a regulatory “war on coal.” Taking each in turn, we apply event-study and difference-in-differences methods to critical events in each regulation’s development, promulgation, and post-promulgation histories.

A. The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)

CSAPR is EPA’s latest attempt under the authority of the Clean Air Act’s so-called good neighbor provision to deal with the wafting of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides across state lines. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides can “react in the atmosphere and contribute to the formation of fine particle (soot) pollution” and to “ground-level ozone (smog) formation.”

100 For decades, utilities in the Rust Belt built increasingly taller smokestacks that dispersed these pollutants into the atmosphere where they drifted into northeastern states and caused soot and smog to form, preventing these downwind states from coming into compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards.

101 The CSAPR project began in 2008 after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated a George W. Bush-era effort to deal with this problem, thereby sending EPA to work on a replacement.

102 The resulting rule—CSAPR—provided for an emissions trading program with allowances distributed to states according to the degree to which they were capable of reducing emissions that were traveling across state lines.

103 The rule was proposed on July 100. EPA, Overview of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), https://www.epa.gov/csapr/overview-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-csapr (last visited May 30, 2020). Sometimes this rule has been referred to as the Air Transport Rule or even just the Transport Rule. See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5.

101. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997); REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 85–86.


6, 2010\textsuperscript{104} and finalized exactly one year later on July 6, 2011.\textsuperscript{105} The announcements of the proposed rule and the final rule marked the first time the full detailed regulatory language had been released, along with additional information about how the agency understands and interprets the regulatory language.

As not infrequently happens with major EPA rules,\textsuperscript{106} the finalized CSAPR was challenged in federal court by a coalition of utilities and upwind states. In 2012, the D.C. Circuit vacated CSAPR, citing concerns about the methods used to determine state allowances and the bypassing of the normal state implementation planning process.\textsuperscript{107} However, on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding in \textit{EPA v. EME Homer Generation} that EPA’s approach to a “thorny causation problem” was a reasonable exercise of its authority under the Clean Air Act by considering states’ ability to pay for emissions reductions in addition to their “physically proportionate responsibility.”\textsuperscript{108} With the victory in the Supreme Court, EPA was poised to move forward with the first substantial regulation of the interstate pollution created by existing coal-fired power plants.

Did stock prices in the coal industry decline in the wake of the Court’s decision or the release of the new information associated with any of the regulatory events leading up to that decision? Table 2 presents the results of our event-study analysis of several of the key developments.\textsuperscript{109} The minus signs in parentheses in the left-most column indicate the direction that we expected share prices to take if they followed the “war on coal” narrative: negative here because the narrative views CSAPR as harmful to the coal industry, and each event either moved this regulation forward toward taking legal effect or sustained it on judicial review.

The results in Table 2 fail to show CSAPR events as having any meaningful effect on coal share prices—certainly nothing as might have been expected, given

\textsuperscript{104} See Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,210 (Aug. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97). The date of publication in the \textit{Federal Register} always follows the date that a proposed or final rule is signed and announced publicly. We use the latter date for our event analysis, as the earlier date is when the stock market received the news and copy of the agency’s decision.

\textsuperscript{105} See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97). The publishing of the final rule was delayed one month but was signed on July 6.


\textsuperscript{107} EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2012).


\textsuperscript{109} In the upper row, the numbers in parentheses separated by commas under each column heading refer to the range of days included in each event window. With “0” representing the day of the event, a range of zero to zero (that is, “0,0”) represents the abnormal return on the day of the event, whereas “1,1” represents the abnormal return on the day after the event and “0,2” represents a cumulative abnormal return of the day of the event and the two days following the event. As also noted in Table 2, we report two-tailed tests for statistical significance. We do this for all of the event-study analyses in this Article. Separately, we performed each analysis using a one-tailed test as well. Although not reported here, the results were substantially the same.
the “war on coal” rhetoric. The direction of the market response to the proposed CSAPR rule signing was opposite of that expected on day one; although it was consistent on the second day, neither of the results were statistically significant. The release of the final rule saw a day-one change in the direction expected under a “war on coal”—but it was not statistically significant either. Furthermore, the final rule was followed by a statistically significant and positive day-two response, precisely the opposite of expectations. The Supreme Court’s decision was also followed by a statistically significant abnormal positive return on day one.

Our difference-in-differences analysis also failed to produce results consistent with expectations. As noted above, our difference-in-differences approach tests for any divergence between natural gas companies’ share prices and coal companies’ share prices in the wake of each event, rather than just coal stocks’ prices compared with those same companies’ pre-event prices. Here, the key variable in Table 3 is “DiD,” which is an interaction of the dependent variable (the average difference in daily returns) between two dummy variables: one for whether the observation occurred after the event, the other for whether the firm was in the coal industry versus the natural gas industry. Simply put, a positive coefficient would mean that the stock price changes in the coal industry were comparatively more positive than similar changes in the natural gas industry. Yet none of the coefficients meet the normal test of statistical significance, and the signs on the coefficients for half of the models run in the opposite direction of that implied by the rhetoric of a regulatory “war on coal.” The only nearly statistically significant result for the difference-in-differences estimator was a 1.81 percent outperformance of coal compared to natural gas on the day after the Supreme Court’s decision—which is precisely the opposite of what the “war on coal” rhetoric would imply.\footnote{By “marginally” significant, we simply mean that it is significant at the 10 percent level rather than at the standard 5 percent level of significance, even though we also report significance at the 10 percent level when it occurs. In adhering to the 5 percent level as the test of significance, we follow the}
Overall, our results for CSAPR are hard to square with expectations of a resounding “war on coal.” For most of the event windows, we fail to find any basis for rejecting our null hypotheses. For the two event windows with statistically significant results, the direction of the effect is opposite what we expected. Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s approval of EPA’s first real foray into uncharted territory—the regulation of existing coal-fired power plants—not only did not appear to lead investors to value coal stocks less, but it seemed to lead them to value them more. Moreover, none of the results from the difference-in-differences analysis are significant; if anything, they might suggest that the Supreme Court’s decision resulted in more of a negative effect on natural gas stock prices than on such prices for coal. Commentators have suggested that industry had been revising its expected compliance costs downward with CSAPR over the course of the litigation, so perhaps the absence of expected market responses to the Supreme Court’s decision simply indicates an increasing recognition of the limited impact of this regulation on the future profitability of coal mining firms.

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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Results for the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day One (0,0)</th>
<th>Three Day (0,2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR Sign</td>
<td>FR Sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiD (Post Event)</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EventXCoal</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Event</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.38^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Firm</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.4377</td>
<td>.3588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates are from a generalized linear model with random effects at the firm level and robust standard errors clustered on the firm. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed t-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=.^.

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111. See Carson & Davis, supra note 103.

112. We also checked two other litigation-related events using event-study analysis, which yielded mixed results. First, even though we would have expected the vacatur of the rule by the D.C. Circuit to be a positive development for coal companies, the abnormal returns were negative and statistically significant, with a loss of 2.88 percent across the three-day event window. We also checked the Supreme Court’s grant of the petition for certiorari—an event that we expected would be negative for the coal
B. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS)

Few observers dispute the economic significance of EPA’s regulation of mercury emissions from coal-powered utility plants. When Congress revisited the Clean Air Act in 1990, it greatly bolstered EPA’s authority to regulate “hazardous air pollutants” (HAPs). Unlike with so-called criteria pollutants, for which regulations generally only apply to new sources, standards for HAPs can be applied to existing sources through technology-based emissions control requirements. EPA has used this authority approximately ninety times since 1990. With MATS, it took direct aim at existing coal-fired power plants, which emit mercury and certain heavy metals at a higher rate than combined-cycle natural gas plants. When EPA issued the final MATS rule on December 21, 2011, the agency estimated annual compliance costs would amount to $9.6 billion (with $37 to $90 billion in benefits to the public). With this kind of money at stake, it is little surprise that industry challenged MATS, just as it did CSAPR. Initially, the challengers did not prevail at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals; however, on June 29, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Michigan v. EPA that the agency had acted unlawfully by failing to consider compliance costs as part of a threshold inquiry into whether the regulation was “appropriate and necessary” under the Clean Air Act. The regulatory “war on coal” narrative would imply that the Supreme Court’s decision should have had a positive effect on coal companies’ share prices, as it sent the rule back to EPA and limited EPA’s ability to impose a future costly regulation on the industry.

The evidence, though, is not closely aligned with the expectations generated by the “war on coal” narrative. The event-study results in Table 4 show that in the days after each event (rule promulgation, finalization, and litigation), coal stocks swung in both directions, sometimes in unexpected ways. For instance, the stock market’s reaction following the proposed rule’s unveiling was actually quite positive in the day-one window—contrary to expectations. But then it was nonexistent in the day-two window and only statistically significant and consistent with expectations on the third day. When it came to the signing of the rule, given the decision of the lower court to vacate the rule—and these results were consistent with expectations, with a loss of 5.22 percent across the three-day event window. This is the only result for CSAPR consistent with expectations.

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117. See MATS, supra note 53, at 9,304, 9,306. This is the same rule as was finalized in December 2011, but the publication of the final rule lagged by a little more than a month after the actual signing of the final rule, as noted in the immediately preceding footnote.
The market results were positive but not statistically significant. As with the proposed rule, only on the third day after the final rule appeared were results significant and consistent with expectations. And when it came to the Supreme Court’s surprising decision in *Michigan v. EPA*, although the market reaction did appear to deliver an expected boost to the coal market in the day-one results, the gains were more than offset by significant negative abnormal returns over the next two days, leaving a three-day cumulative result that was negative but nonsignificant.\(^{119}\)

Taken together, the results from the three events are difficult to interpret in a way that would lend much support to the “war on coal” narrative. The initial market response to the proposed rule produced some statistically significant abnormal returns in the first day—but in the direction opposite of what the “war on coal” narrative would lead one to expect. Only the day-three results were significant in the direction expected, as was the case with the final rule. Yet for the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the final rule, it was the initial, day-one reaction that was consistent with expectations, while the second and third days showed significant reactions opposite of expectations. For all three events, if one looks at the market reaction across the entire three-day period, in no instance are the results significant and consistent with expectations. In fact, only for the proposed rule does the three-day window show a statistically significant result—and that is in the direction opposite of expectations.

\(^{119}\) As with CSAPR, we also checked two other litigation-related events for MATS: the lower court decision, and the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. With the D.C. Circuit decision to uphold the rule, we expected to find negative returns. Although the sign was uniformly negative in every window we checked, none of the results registered as statistically significant. We also checked the Supreme Court’s grant of the petition for certiorari, which we expected would lead to positive abnormal returns for the coal firms, given the industry loss below and the likelihood that a grant of certiorari would lead to a reversal. In fact, though, the results suggest that the market perceived the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari as a negative event for the coal industry. The day-one returns were down 2.39 percent (statistically significant at the .001 level) and the cumulative three-day returns were down 4.12 percent (also statistically significant at the .001 level).
Our difference-in-differences analysis yielded only one statistically significant result. As shown in Table 5, neither the proposed nor the final rules seemed to yield any diverging price reactions between the coal and natural gas industries. Both rule promulgation events seemed to be generally positive for the natural gas and coal stocks together, as suggested by the generally statistically significant and positive results on the post-event variable and the lack of statistically significant results for the difference variable. With respect to the Supreme Court decision, the difference-in-differences analysis appears consistent with the results from the event study, in that the immediate impact of the Supreme Court’s decision appears to have been associated with a sharp divergence between coal and natural gas in the expected direction, but this effect was short lived, as the three-day results show no difference in the performance of natural gas and coal returns.

Some complicating factors in interpreting the results for the Supreme Court’s decision in *Michigan v. EPA* should be noted—even though it is not entirely clear which way they cut. One factor is that, by the time the Supreme Court handed down its decision, many utilities apparently had already complied with the rule, and many of the anticipated coal-powered utility plant retirements had already taken place. Perhaps that is why the initial positive reaction to the

Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Results for the Mercury and Air Toxics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day One (0,0)</th>
<th>Three Day (0,2)</th>
<th>S Ct Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR Sign</td>
<td>FR Sign</td>
<td>PR Sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DdD (Post Event)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.96</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event X Coal</td>
<td>(.79)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DdD (Post Event)</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Firm</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.95***</td>
<td>1.57***</td>
<td>.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates are from a generalized linear model with random effects at the firm level and robust standard errors clustered on the firm. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed t-test, is denoted as follows: p<.01=****, p<.05=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=×.

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120. See Gavin Bade, *What the Supreme Court MATS Ruling Means for Utilities and the EPA Clean Power Plan*, UTILITY DIVE (July 2, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-supreme-court-mats-ruling-means-for-utilities-and-the-epa-clean-p/401707/; Susan E. Dudley, *Supreme Court to EPA: Fool Me Once*, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2016/02/10/supreme-court-to-epa-fool-me-onece/; EIA Annual Outlook 2012, supra note 31. Although the event-study analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision might not have reflected the negative effects on the firms because they already incurred the costs, this would obviously not have been the case at the time the proposed and final rules were announced—and we find that the earlier of the significant reactions to the proposed and final rules ran in the direction opposite of expectations.
Supreme Court’s decision dissipated quickly, as market actors realized that even the Court’s decision would not have spared the coal industry any diminution in demand for coal from utilities. But another factor may also be important: The Supreme Court specifically declined to vacate the rule, instead remanding the case to the D.C. Circuit and allowing that lower court to make a decision about whether EPA needed to start from scratch with cost considerations in mind. Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit left EPA’s rule in place and did not halt any compliance deadlines, and the Supreme Court declined to review this subsequent decision by the lower court. As a result, what initially looked like a legal victory for the coal industry when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in *Michigan v. EPA*—and which we have assumed it to be in outlining expectations in our analysis above—in fact never turned out to be any real victory at all.

**C. The Clean Power Plan (CPP)**

Although MATS and CSAPR made important strides in regulating the emissions of conventional pollutants from existing coal-fired power plants, from the standpoint of climate change they did not address the elephant in the room: carbon emissions from burning coal. As of 2016, coal-fired power plants emitted about 68 percent of the total carbon dioxide from the electric power sector, or about 1241 million metric tons. In adopting the CPP, EPA for the first time set direct carbon dioxide emissions guidelines for existing power plants and set up a process of state planning to come into compliance with these guidelines. Altogether, the CPP was projected to lower carbon dioxide emissions by 32 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and deliver net public benefits between $26 and $45 billion. Yet due to unprecedented action by the Supreme Court, the CPP never took effect.

The CPP was challenged in court by industry and several states on the same day it was made final, and the challengers, as is relatively common, sought a judicial stay of the rule’s legal effect pending litigation. The D.C. Circuit denied the challengers’ motion for a stay, a decision which the challengers

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appealed to the Supreme Court (also not uncommon). But what was entirely uncommon was the Court’s subsequent decision to grant the stay when the lower court had denied such a request. The Supreme Court had never done this before—ever. When the Court granted the challengers’ request, it not only handed down one of the most surprising decisions in the history of regulatory challenges, it also effectively added years to the timeline for regulating carbon dioxide emissions, giving a major and clear victory to utilities and the coal mining industry. It also signaled that a majority of the Supreme Court did not hold a favorable view of EPA’s regulation and that the agency was unlikely to prevail when the merits of the challenge would eventually reach the Court.

In the so-called regulatory war, the coal industry secured a seemingly pivotal and unprecedented battlefield victory. Yet the CPP’s effects on the coal industry would almost seem to have been something of an afterthought for investors. The unveiling of the proposed CPP was associated with no significant differences in either the event-study analysis (Table 6) or the difference-in-differences analysis (Table 7). And even though the final rule’s signing corresponded with significant negative abnormal returns over the following two days, we cannot be at all assured that these differences in returns were associated with the CPP. The same day that EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy signed the CPP, one of the largest coal players—Alpha Natural Resources—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after posting losses of $875 million in 2014.

We discuss bankruptcies and how they affected returns in greater

128. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html (stating that “[t]he 5-to-4 vote [to grant the stay], with the court’s four liberal members dissenting, was unprecedented—the Supreme Court had never before granted a request to halt a regulation before review by a federal appeals court”); Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 425 (2016) (noting that “[i]n staying EPA’s Clean-Power Plan, the Supreme Court for the first time stopped a nationally applicable agency regulation prior to an initial decision on the merits of the rule in a lower court”); see also EPA: PROPOSAL: AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY (ACE) RULE, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule (last visited June 1, 2020).
129. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue et al., Supreme Court Blocks Obama Climate Change Rules, CNN (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/09/politics/supreme-court-obama-epa-climate-change (quoting Bruce Huber as saying that “[t]he Supreme Court’s order signals serious misgivings among some of the justices about the legality of the plan”); Lawrence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Supreme Court Blocks Obama’s Clean Power Plan, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016, 6:31 PM) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s action casts doubt on the long-term future of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s rule because it increases the chances that the conservative-leaning Supreme Court would take the case after a lower court issues a decision on the legality of the regulations and ultimately would strike it down”).
detail in Section IV, but for now we simply note that there is much stronger evidence that bankruptcies in the industry affect coal companies’ share prices more than regulations do. It seems highly plausible that the market reactions on August 3, 2015 and August 4, 2015 are attributable to the Alpha Natural Resources’ bankruptcy.

This reading is strengthened by the lack of positive returns for coal firms in the wake of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP just months later, in February 2016. In this highly surprising decision to stay the CPP pending further litigation, five Justices prevented the rule from taking legal effect, handing the coal industry
a huge break.\textsuperscript{131} Although litigation surrounding important federal regulations is not uncommon,\textsuperscript{132} the Court’s decision to stay the CPP was widely considered “stunning”\textsuperscript{133} because apparently never before had the Supreme Court stayed a regulation that had yet to be reviewed by a federal appeals court.\textsuperscript{134} Even lawyers for the entities challenging the CPP were reportedly surprised to have the Court grant their petition.\textsuperscript{135} The decision to stay the rule in such circumstances almost certainly indicated that, when the Supreme Court would inevitably hear an appeal of the lower court litigation, it would either uphold an appellate court’s decision to strike the rule down or would reverse an appellate decision upholding the rule.

Given this surprising turn of events, one might expect the Supreme Court’s stay decision to have had an immediate effect on the market capitalization of publicly traded coal firms, boosting the fortunes of a beleaguered industry engaged in a supposedly existential fight with regulators. From the standpoint of event-study methodology, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant a stay of the CPP in 2016 stands as a true exemplar of exactly the kind of surprising and clear event that should provide a strong test of what market actors’ think in its immediate aftermath. Yet investors’ reactions did not match expectations. Figure 4 displays the daily share price returns at closing (percentage change from the previous trading day) around the Supreme Court’s decision for the stocks of the seven publicly traded coal mining firms in operation at the time. Because the Supreme Court’s decision on February 9 came after the end of trading hours, the vertical dashed line at February 10 marks the end of the first day that investors could react to the news. Contrary to expectations, none of the firms reacted strongly that day. Only one firm—Peabody Energy Corporation (dashed line)—responded on February 11, and that firm’s returns were severely negative, wholly opposite of what the regulatory “war on coal” narrative would imply.

The event studies in Table 6 show that, for the first two days after the decision, coal stocks lost ground (although these results were not significant). It was only on the third day that stocks rebounded, leaving the industry with a three-day cumulative return that was normal by statistical standards (albeit still negative).\textsuperscript{136} Given the relative simplicity of the ruling—an unprecedented stay of the rule—


\textsuperscript{132} See Coglianese, supra note 106; see generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2009) (arguing that American policy processes tend to be adversarial and litigation prone).

\textsuperscript{133} Liptak & Davenport, supra note 128(quoting Jody Freeman).

\textsuperscript{134} See id.

\textsuperscript{135} As one news report explained: “The stay order was unexpected. Jeff Holmstead, an industry attorney at Bracewell whose clients are challenging the regulation, called the high court’s move ‘remarkable.’ It’s ‘the first time that the Supreme Court has ever stepped in at this stage to put a rule on hold,’ he said.” Amanda Reilly & Robin Bravender, Is Obama’s Signature Climate Rule Doomed?, E&E DAILY (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032134.

\textsuperscript{136} As indicated in Table 6, we use February 10 as the event date for our analysis. We do so because the Court’s ruling came out after markets had closed on February 9. Nothing of consequence hinges on this choice, as the same analysis using February 9 as the event date produces no clearer effects.
Figure 4: Daily Coal Stock Returns Surrounding the Supreme Court’s 2016 Stay of the Clean Power Plan

and the lack of a market response on the first two days of trading immediately following the ruling, we do not believe that the day-three positive result could have had much to do with the decision. We also note that, in this case, the first day of analysis was actually the first day after the Court’s decision, which was announced after trading hours on February 9, 2016. The market had time by the first day in our analysis to understand the Court’s ruling and factor that into stock prices—but, based on the empirical results, it appears the ruling made no difference to investors.\footnote{137}

If one were to surmise that the CPP’s finalization had a negative effect on coal stocks (independent of the Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy that occurred on the same day), then one presumably would expect that the stay of the rule by the Supreme Court would have been a positive event. Yet in neither the event study nor the difference-in-differences analysis did coal stocks do as well after the Supreme Court’s stay as they did before, nor as well as natural gas share prices did in response to the stay. Indeed, we even looked at intraday trading to see if stocks were down in the minutes after the market opened on February 10, 2016, before any other negative news could contaminate the effect of the previous night’s stay. Even in the short-run, coal stocks were steeply down.\footnote{138}

Of all the events we analyzed, the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP is the clearest one to test the extent of the effect of environmental regulations on the

\footnote{137.} For much the same reason, three-day window results effectively become four-day window results, another reason why we are skeptical of attributing the reaction at that point to the Court’s decision.\footnote{138.} We were unable to locate any data on after-hours trading that could be used to investigate any effects prior to the opening minutes of February 10, 2016.
market’s assessment of the coal industry’s profitability. The CPP has played a central—if not the central—role in the narrative of the regulatory “war on coal.”

Moreover, the Court’s stay of the rule was, by all accounts, a shocking development that won great praise within the coal industry. And yet, coal stocks never responded in a way consistent with expectations. If anything, stock prices declined further in the immediate response to the stay. Our results here would seem to draw into serious question the notion that environmental regulation was perceived as a serious threat to the coal industry’s financial viability. That is not to say that the industry’s viability was strong, just to say that investors in the industry—those with a real stake in understanding the relationship between regulation and the industry’s financial prospects—did not apparently see the CPP as making any meaningful additional difference, all things considered.

D. Other Climate Policies

As noted, the CPP was the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s climate policy. Along with CSAPR and MATS, it has figured prominently in accounts of the federal government’s regulatory approach toward climate change and the coal industry. Yet the CPP was just one part of a larger “Climate Action Plan” (CAP) announced in 2013, which articulated a range of policy actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—not just by reducing emissions from electric utilities but also by promoting greater fuel economy in transportation and energy efficiency in buildings and appliances. Furthermore, at the same time that U.S. regulators were busy developing their domestic regulatory responses to climate change, world leaders were pursuing international negotiations over a global agreement with potential ramifications for coal. In December 2015, the international community reached agreement on the Paris Agreement, under which countries made commitments to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions—albeit commitments that were not in any fashion


141. See, e.g., REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5.

142. See supra note 62; see generally Meredith Fowlie et al., An Economic Perspective on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 346 SCI. 815, 816 (2014) (providing an overview of the economics of the CPP).
binding or enforceable under international law. The Paris Agreement signaled a more aggressive policy posture toward the threat of global climate change, which in turn was predicted to lead to a mass “divestment effect” in long-term investment in coal. The United States committed under the Paris Agreement to making a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2025: 26-28 percent below 2005 levels. Of course, within his first year in office, President Trump delivered what would seem to have been a major win for the coal industry by announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement—an announcement preceded by a palpable level of “suspense” leading up to its actual delivery.

Table 8 reports the results of an event-study analysis of the CAP announcement, the signing of the Paris Agreement, and President Trump’s announcement that the United States would be withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. The results for the CAP and the announcement of the signing of the Paris Agreement are more indicative of the expected market reaction to climate policies’ effects on the coal industry than were the domestic regulations typically associated with the regulatory “war on coal.” Both the CAP and the Paris Agreement showed statistically significant and negative effects on coal firms in either the day-one or day-two windows—strong enough that they also appear as statistically significant negative effects in the cumulative three-day window. The announcement of the United States withdrawal from the

| Table 8: Event-Study Results for Other Climate Change Policies |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                  | Date (0)        | Day One (0.0)   | Day Two (1.1)   | Day Three (2.2) | All Event (0.2) | Pre-Event (-5,-1) |
| CAP (-)          | 25-Jun-13       | -0.67           | -2.79***        | -0.14           | -3.61***        | -0.01           |
| Paris Agmt (-)   | 14-Dec-15       | -4.52***        | -0.10           | 0.01            | -4.62***        | -2.31           |
| Paris WD (+)     | 1-Jun-17        | -0.34           | -1.75           | -0.20           | -2.29           | -4.73**         |

Note: Positive (+) and negative (-) symbols in the first column indicate the expected sign of the reported abnormal returns as would be suggested by the “war on coal” narrative. Estimates are precision-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns for each window. The results are from a market model using value-weighted returns for the constituent firms. The estimation window (-305,55) was separated from the event window (-5,10) by fifty trading days. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed standardized cross-sectional z-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=±.


144. See Bauer et al., supra note 71.

145. On the suspense leading up to the announcement, see, e.g., Trump Announcing Decision on Paris Climate Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 31, 2017), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/trump-expected-pull-us-paris-climate-deal-1008919 (“Building suspense about America’s role in the world . . . Trump himself said Wednesday [the day before the announcement] that he was still listening to ‘a lot of people both ways’”). On the announcement itself, see, e.g., Yeo, supra note 143.
Paris Agreement, though, did not appear to lead to any concomitant gains for coal. The abnormal returns across the window were, contrary to expectations, consistently negative, albeit not statistically significant.

At the same time that the event-study results suggest that some of the global or broader commitments to addressing climate change might have had some negative effects on stock prices for the coal industry, the difference-in-differences results reported in Table 9 appear to suggest that these effects may have applied more generally to the nonrenewable energy sector. Only in the day-one estimation for the Paris Agreement signing is there any evidence of a diversion between natural gas and coal firms, and even that result is not statistically significant at the conventional level. This lack of a divergence is striking, given that, at the time of these developments, natural gas was still seen as a key, if not even favored, energy source. In the CAP, for example, the White House noted that “[b]urning natural gas is about one-half as carbon-intensive as coal, which can make it a critical ‘bridge fuel’ for many countries as the world transitions to even cleaner sources of energy.” The plan made clear that the administration preferred natural gas. In its discussion of what was then EPA’s proposed CPP, the White House said that the proposal “reflects and reinforces the ongoing trend towards cleaner technologies, with natural gas increasing its share of electricity generation in recent years.” The plan also outlined a series of explicit steps the administration planned to take to support natural gas develop-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Difference-in-Differences Results for Other Climate Policies</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DiD (Post)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EventXCoal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates are from a generalized linear model with random effects at the firm level and robust standard errors clustered on the firm. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed t-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=.  

147. See CAP, supra note 62, at 19.  
148. Id. at 6.
ment, noting that “[g]oing forward, we will promote fuel-switching from coal to gas for electricity production and encourage the development of a global market for gas.”149 Yet judging from the analysis shown in Table 9, it appears that the market either did not believe the administration’s stated support of natural gas over coal, or it did not view these policy differences as financially meaningful.

IV. ASSESSING ROBUSTNESS: MARKET RESPONSES AND OTHER EVENTS

The lack of any strong and consistent reactions of the stock market to the key regulatory events in the supposed “war on coal” would appear to come as a surprise, given the pervasive claims that environmental regulation has been a key factor in burning out the coal business. In stark contrast with the kinds of claims made by industry leaders and politicians, as reported at the outset of this paper, we find no clear evidence that the financial market took regulatory developments to be a substantial threat to coal companies’ future profitability.

During the time period of our study—the period of the so-called regulatory “war on coal”—other economic factors impinged on the coal industry, especially growing competition from the natural gas sector.150 Perhaps one might imagine that these larger, long-term forces effectively drowned out any impact that climate change regulation may have had on the financial market performance of coal companies. That may be so, but the event-study methodology we have employed should not be affected by these longer-term trends. By focusing on extremely short windows of time, the event-study methodology factors out the secular trends that could otherwise threaten to confound longitudinal analysis. If there were in fact major economic effects on the coal industry from new environmental regulations (or their halting in the courts), and if investors were attentive to the financial effects of these regulatory events (as they clearly have an incentive to be), then their trading decisions in a short window of time after important regulatory events should show consistently negative abnormal returns. But they do not. Despite a modest effect here and there, our overall analysis indicates that the stock market really did not care much about the regulations that industry actors and politicians bemoaned so vocally.

The results of our analysis of the effects of environmental regulation are all the more striking in light of other analyses we conducted that show what the stock market did care about with respect to coal firms in the time period we

149. Id. at 19.

150. See, e.g., Kolstad, supra note 26 (noting that “[i]n the first decade of the new millennium, productivity gains — this time in natural gas — generated a fundamental shift in which coal was no longer clearly the cheapest fossil fuel”); Houser et al., supra note 31 (indicating that “[a] surge in US natural gas production due to the shale revolution has driven down prices and made coal increasingly uncompetitive in US electricity markets”); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Fuel Competition in Power Generation and Elasticities of Substitution 3 (June 2012), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/fuelelasticities/pdf/eia-fuelelasticities.pdf (noting that, “[b]eginning in 2005, natural gas production from domestic shale gas formations began to rapidly increase, which has led to a relatively sustained period of low natural gas prices”).
studied. As a means of testing the robustness of our event-study methodology in this context, we studied other, nonregulatory events that might have affected the stock prices of coal companies, including elections and bankruptcies. We also looked at other, non-climate-related regulatory events and, separately, conducted firm-level analyses of the same climate change regulations examined in Part III. Together, these robustness checks reveal that the failure to find stock market reactions to events in the supposed regulatory “war on coal” is no artifact of our event-study methodology. That same methodology has not only been used by others to show stock market reactions outside the environmental policy context, as we noted in Subpart II.A, but it also finds that coal stocks sometimes responded significantly to other events during the same time period as the regulatory “war on coal”—most especially bankruptcies in the industry. The juxtaposition of the findings we report in this Part with the findings in Part III underscores how the stock market reveals the emptiness of the political rhetoric about a regulatory “war on coal.”

A. Coal Industry Bankruptcies

Previous research indicates that bankruptcies affect share prices for other firms in the same industry.\textsuperscript{151} A bankruptcy declaration can sometimes be destabilizing, but other times it can be a boon to surviving competitors, perhaps because they see an opportunity to gain market share or to buy up liquidated assets. Toward the end of the Obama administration, a number of coal companies filed for bankruptcy, including some of the biggest players such as Peabody, Arch, and Alpha Natural Resources. It is reinforcing of the efficacy of our event-study methodology that stock prices for competitor firms do react to bankruptcies by other firms in the coal industry. In fact, as Table 10 shows, the share prices

| Table 10: Event-Study Results for Coal Firm Bankruptcies |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|            | Date    | Day One | Day Two | Day Three | All Event | Pre-Event |
|            |         | (0.0)   | (1.1)   | (2.2)    | (0.2)    | (-5,1)    |
| Peabody    | 13-Apr-2016 | 1.93 | -0.86  | -0.50  | -1.27  | 7.08** |
| Arch       | 11-Jan-2016 | -6.42**| -2.97  | -0.87  | -10.26**| 2.17 |
| Alpha      | 3-Aug-2015  | -4.72**| -2.32* | -0.99  | -8.03**| -0.87 |
| Patriot    | 12-May-2015 | 0.32  | -1.34<  | 0.63   | -0.39  | -0.21 |
| Walter     | 15-July-2015 | -2.42***| -2.35**| -3.06**| -7.54***| -2.59 |

Note: Estimates are precision-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns for each window. The results are from a market model using value-weighted returns for the constituent firms. The estimation window (-305,-55) was separated from the event window (-5,10) by fifty trading days. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed standardized cross-sectional z-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=. For a detailed view, see the original document.\textsuperscript{151}

for surviving coal firms indeed tended to react quite strongly to certain bankruptcy events. Three out of the five bankruptcies we analyzed—Arch, Alpha Natural Resources, and Walter—elicited statistically significant abnormal returns on day one. All of these responses were negative, as would be expected, and the negative direction persisted across all event windows. The magnitude of the abnormal returns was notable, with cumulative abnormal returns across all event windows showing a drop of about 8-10 percent. (Sufficient data were only available to permit us to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of the Peabody and Arch bankruptcies, but the results in those cases were consistent with the event-study results in Table 10.)

The key takeaway from these findings for present purposes lies simply in their contrast with the general absence of a market response to the regulatory events central to the “war on coal” narrative. These results indicate that our findings for regulation were not the product of a methodology that is somehow inherently insensitive to changes in the market for coal stocks. They also reveal what kind of market reaction was strikingly missing in the wake of the regulatory events analyzed in Part III. If the regulations imposed on the utility sector actually had amounted to a “war on coal,” then it is surprising that investors did not react in a manner consistent with these regulatory events being viewed as harbingers of bankruptcy, as the narrative would imply.

B. Presidential Elections

Numerous event studies in the broader social science literature have found that significant changes to corporations’ share prices occur in the aftermath of national elections.152 In much the same spirit as those other studies, we analyzed coal firms’ fortunes after each of the previous three presidential elections. As Figure 5 shows graphically, coal industry stock returns responded in the wake of each presidential election day.

After the 2008 national election, coal stocks began a nose-dive: Coal firms saw a -11.64 percent deviation from normal returns in the three days after the election (Table 11). Although the graphic depiction in Figure 5 suggests a similar decline after the 2012 election, the three-day cumulative average abnormal return that year was actually statistically insignificant, as shown in Table 11. By contrast, coal stocks jumped upwards in the immediate aftermath of President Trump’s election in 2016. The day after the election, November 9, 2016, (which was the first time any trading could have incorporated information about Trump’s victory), coal stocks exhibited a highly statistically significant 9.22 percent abnormal return and a three-day gain of 9.99 percent (Table 11). Perhaps

Figure 5: Cumulative Returns Surrounding Three Presidential Elections

Table 11: Event-Study Results for Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day One</th>
<th>Day Two</th>
<th>Day Three</th>
<th>All Event</th>
<th>Pre-Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,0)</td>
<td>(1,1)</td>
<td>(2,2)</td>
<td>(0,2)</td>
<td>(-5,-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama 2008 (-)</td>
<td>5-Nov-08</td>
<td>-3.68**</td>
<td>-7.54***</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-11.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama 2012 (-)</td>
<td>7-Nov-12</td>
<td>-3.12***</td>
<td>1.71*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trump 2016 (+)</td>
<td>9-Nov-16</td>
<td>9.22***</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>9.99***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Positive (+) and negative (-) symbols in the first column indicate the expected sign of the reported abnormal returns as would be suggested by the “war on coal” narrative. Estimates are precision-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns for each window. The results are from a market model using value-weighted returns for the constituent firms. The estimation window (-305,-55) was separated from the event window (-5,10) by fifty trading days. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed standardized cross-sectional z-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=^.

even more notably, the difference-in-differences estimators in Table 12 show that the coal industry performed significantly worse after the Obama elections and better after the Trump election in both the one-day and three-day windows in the aftermath of these elections.

The most important thing to note about these results is that they are much more robust than any of the findings from Part III. The only remotely comparable event-study finding from Part III was that for the final rule signing for the CPP—which, recall, occurred on the same day as a major bankruptcy in the industry—and even then, the difference-in-differences analysis did not suggest that there was any divergence between coal and natural gas in the aftermath of the event. With elections, all of the signs indicate a major effect. Of course, this should not be surprising. Prior to the 2008 election, candidate Barack Obama noted publicly that, under his preferred approach to climate policy, “If somebody wants to build a coal-powered plant, they can; it’s just that it will bankrupt them because they’re
going to be charged a huge sum for all that greenhouse gas that’s being emitted.”

The rapid decline in coal production, particularly in the Appalachian region, that followed Obama’s inauguration certainly could give the impression immediately after his reelection in 2012 that things would not be looking up for the coal industry. In the 2016 election, not only did candidate Trump position himself as a potential savior to the coal industry, he was running against an opponent, Hillary Clinton, who had in the campaign predicted that “[w]e’re going to put a lot of coal miners and coal companies out of business.” With statements such as these, the future business climate for the coal industry could be reasonably assumed to be better under Trump and worse under Obama and Clinton.

One question that might be asked is whether these elections were just a proxy for perceived future changes to the regulatory environment for coal. Of course, if that were the case, it would be all the more striking that the regulatory events themselves that preceded the 2016 election never yielded clear changes to the price of coal stocks consistent with the direction of these electoral effects. The market’s nonresponsiveness to the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP would

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Table 12: Difference-in-Differences Results for Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day One (0,0)</th>
<th>Three Day (0,2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DiD (Post)</td>
<td>3.60***</td>
<td>2.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EventXCoal</td>
<td>(2.10)</td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Event</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>1.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
<td>-0.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.6801</td>
<td>0.2738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates are from a generalized linear model with random effects at the firm level and robust standard errors clustered on the firm. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed t-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p>-.10=.

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154.  Cicala, *supra* note 23 (describing it as an “easy sell”—but a misleading one—to blame Obama for the decline in coal after he took office).

155.  See Trump, *supra* note 64.

156.  Lauren Carroll, *In Context: Hillary Clinton’s Comments About Coal Jobs*, POLITIFACT (May 10, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/may/10/context-hillary-clintons-comments-about-coal-jobs/. Clinton later stated that this was the campaign statement of hers that she regretted most. See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 263 (2017) (stating that “it is the [comment] I regret most”).
be particularly surprising, as that could not have been predicted by the market at the time of any election. It seems more plausible that elections simply reflect a general gestalt reaction of optimism or pessimism, rather than a consideration of specific policies. To the extent that the election response does reflect some specific forecast about policy, it may be that, instead of seeing elections as a proxy for regulatory policy, investors saw potential implications for tax benefits, subsidies, and other policies that would more directly and immediately affect coal firms’ bottom lines. The coal industry, after all, has long enjoyed substantial tax advantages, pension guarantees, leases to federal lands, and other financial benefits from the government which might be either threatened or expanded depending on who occupies the White House.157

Under President Trump, expectations that his administration would favor the coal industry with such direct financial benefits seem to have been borne out.158 His Department of Energy took the unusual step to propose that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) offer additional subsidies to the coal industry.159 Although FERC has not yet approved subsidized rate proposals, the overall supportive posture for coal subsidies under President Trump—not to mention at times even active lobbying by one of his senior political advisors—helped provide fertile ground for subsidies and tax breaks that have been granted

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157. See, e.g., Carl Pope, The Secret Coal Bail-out: Bigger Than GM, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-secret-coal-bail-out_b_9577878 (arguing that federal policies on pensions, reclamation liability, and bonding amount to an estimated government “bailout” of the coal industry that is twice as large as the financial package given to General Motors in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis); David Roberts, Friendly Policies Keep U.S. Oil and Coal Afloat Far More Than We Thought, VOX (July 26, 2018, 7:54 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-coal-oil-subsidies (describing an estimated $14.7 billion of federal subsidies given to coal companies every year). As an indication of the kind of advantages that coal industry leaders contemplated the Trump administration delivering, consider that in 2017 the CEOs of both Murray Energy and Peabody Energy, respectively the largest privately held and publicly traded coal companies, reportedly called for the administration to invoke a provision in federal law that would impose a two-year ban on the closure of any coal-powered electricity generating plant. Jeff Horwitz et al., A Coal Country Dispute Over an Alleged Trump Promise Unmet, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://apnews.com/bac7510776874d6f88c255e73de00e6c/A-coal-country-dispute-over-an-alleged-Trump-promise-unmet.

158. For discussion of the range of recent policies and proposals aimed at helping the coal industry that go well beyond repealing “war on coal” regulations, see Howard Gruenspecht, The U.S. Coal Sector: Recent and Continuing Challenges, BROOKINGS 6–10 (Jan. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/H.Gruenspecht_U.S.-Coal-Sector_Final_Jan_20191.pdf (noting that, beyond regulatory change, coal-friendly policies proposed in recent years have included pricing “decisions by federal and state electricity regulators,” “options to mandate coal plant use,” and “[s]ubsidies for coal production or use”).

at the state level. His Department of the Interior also lifted the Obama administration’s moratorium on federal coal leases and approved new coal mining projects on federal lands. The financial impacts that these kinds of actions deliver are likely to be much more direct, tangible, and immediate to the coal industry than any that might have derived from changes to air pollution regulations on the electric utility industry, with their indirect, and perhaps at best marginal, effects on the demand for coal.

C. Direct Regulation of Coal Mining

One way to assess whether markets respond differently to policies with direct financial effects on the coal industry is to look for effects from a different kind of regulation. After all, the major environmental regulations we studied in Part III—CSAPR, MATS, and CPP—share a common feature: They only indirectly affected coal production rather than directly regulated coal extraction operations. Each of these “war on coal” rules targeted air pollution from electricity generation by utility companies, some of which use coal as their energy source. They increased utilities’ costs for using coal as an energy source and, as such, could be expected to decrease demand for coal and increase demand for natural gas—which is much less carbon intensive than coal. The fact that utilities have been closing their coal-fired plants and avoiding building new ones has lent surface-level plausibility to the regulatory “war on coal” narrative, even if, as we have seen, the stock-market evidence is not consistent with such a narrative. Thus, it is not surprising that complaints about the “war on coal” most commonly centered on these three air pollution regulations that primarily affected the end users of coal in the utility sector. Indeed, the earliest


162. See supra Part III.

163. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
references to a “war on coal” appearing on Google Trends emerged in response to the proposed Waxman-Markey climate cap-and-trade bill in 2009 because of its expected effect on the use of coal by electricity utilities. But in the wake of the failure to pass that proposed climate legislation, the supposed “war” became synonymous with efforts within the Obama administration’s EPA—namely, the CSAPR, MATS, and CPP regulations. Industry has frequently cited these rules as the driving force behind a decreased demand for coal—even though we can find no systematic evidence that investors took these claims seriously.

But the lack of any systematic market evidence for utility-sector environmental regulation’s indirect effects on the coal industry does not necessarily mean that coal stock prices did not respond to other types of regulation. Specifically, it does not address whether later regulation of extraction-level operations—rules that post-dated the fervor over EPA’s air pollution rules—might have had a real impact on coal firms’ bottom lines. To test for the possibility that share prices might have responded differently to

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165. See Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, How Obama Went From Coal’s Top Cheerleader to its No. 1 Enemy, GRIST (Feb. 15, 2016), https://grist.org/energy/how-obama-went-from-coals-top-cheerleader-to-its-no-1-enemy/ (reporting that, “with the failed cap-and-trade bill a distant political memory, the most commonly cited evidence of ‘war’ are three EPA restrictions on pollution from power plants: the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, commonly known as the Transport Rule, which prevents plants in upwind states from exporting dangerous soot- and smog-forming pollution to their downwind neighbors; the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which restrict plants’ emissions of mercury and other toxic pollutants; and the Clean Power Plan, which will limit plants’ emissions of climate change-driving carbon dioxide.”); Cicala, supra note 23 (“Mining output from this region has fallen by nearly one third since inauguration. This drop has coincided with new regulations that have raised the cost of operating coal-fired power plants going forward, such as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard, the Cross State Air Pollution Rule, and the Clean Power Plan. Indeed, many on the political left are as eager to take credit for these reductions as those on the right are to assign blame. The result is a belief that these developments are due to actions taken in Washington DC, and therefore can be undone if only a politician favorable to eastern coal were in office.”); Gordon, supra note 7 (placing blame for the “war on coal” on the MATS, CSAPR, and CPP regulations).

166. See, e.g., Reid Frazier, Federal Air Rules Force Coal Plants to Clean Up or Shut Down, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:57 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2015/09/15/federal-air-rules-force-coal-plants-to-clean-up-or-shut-down/ (highlighting the cited concerns of the Homer Generation Facility in Pennsylvania). Typical is a coal industry comment submitted to EPA that referred to the “first war on coal [as having been] largely fought through battles over sulfur dioxide and acid gas emission regulations through the New Source Review program and the [MATS] rule,” and that any “second war on coal” in a future administration would also be fought under the Clean Air Act. Martin T. Booher et al., Baker & Hostetler LLP, Counsel for the National Bituminous Coal Group, Comments on “Affordable Clean Energy Rule Proposal” (Nov. 2018); see also supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.

167. In particular, the Obama administration’s signature regulation of coal mining operations was not even proposed until July 2015, about a month before the finalization of the CPP—the last of the three “war on coal” regulations. See Stream Protection Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,436 (July 27, 2015) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, 827). This rule was finalized just weeks before President Trump’s inauguration. See Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, 827). We further discuss the stream protection rule infra at notes 167–68. As should be evident from its timing, the stream protection rule never held a central place in the overall “war on coal” narrative.
regulations that directly applied to the extraction of coal, we separately analyzed potential stock market reactions from several other environmental regulatory actions adopted during the Obama administration—specifically, those that directly regulated coal mining operations.

One such Obama-era rule sought to strengthen protection from the environmental harms associated with a type of coal extraction method known as mountaintop mining removal. This increasingly prevalent method involves coal companies using explosives to crumble the tops of Appalachian Mountains and then removing the “spoil” to reveal the coal underneath. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act gives the Secretary of the Interior the authority to regulate mining activity, and the Clean Water Act gives EPA the authority to regulate the disposal of the spoil material, which is often dumped in nearby streams and valleys and can cause serious environmental harms. In 2009, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers developed an interagency plan (IAP) for “enhanced coordination procedures” that in effect made it more difficult for coal companies to obtain permits to dump spoil. This plan was challenged and eventually struck down in a district court. Then, in 2010, EPA issued controversial interim guidance aiming to “force the industry to adopt a practice of minimal or zero filling of valleys with mountain debris.” This policy, too, was challenged and struck down by a district court. Then, in 2014, a court of appeals reversed the district court decisions and reinstated both policies, in part on the basis that they were too informal to be reviewable as final agency action.

Meanwhile, in 2015, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) in the U.S. Department of the Interior began a more formalized, notice-and-comment rulemaking effort that resulted in what came to be known as the “stream protection rule.” This rule, published in 2016 at the
tail end of the Obama administration, required coal mining firms to ensure that their new mines would not disrupt the “hydrological balance” of nearby streams and rivers. The rule never went into effect, however. After the administrative transition, the new Republican Congress in 2017 issued a resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), which vacated the rule and barred any similar rule in the future.

Table 13 reports the difference-in-differences estimators for coal versus natural gas in the aftermath of relevant events in the development of mountaintop mining regulations, both by EPA and OSMRE. (Event-study results are similar, but simply for economy of presentation, we report here the results from our difference-in-differences analysis.) Whereas significant results were hard to find with respect to regulations that indirectly affected coal mining—such as CSAPR, MATS, and CPP, as well as the CAP and the Paris Agreement—there is somewhat greater evidence that investors reacted to developments in the direct regulation of the coal industry. For each event listed in Table 13, we have indicated in parentheses the expected direction of the sign of the variable, depending on whether the event supported more stringent direct regulation of the coal industry (negative sign) or rejected or repealed such regulation (positive sign).

These more direct regulatory efforts were associated with some statistically significant effects on coal firms’ stock value in seven out of the nine events, with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Days from Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IAP Signed (-)</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance Signed (-)</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP Vacated (+)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance Vacated (+)</td>
<td>1.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>App. Ct Reverses in Part (+/-)</td>
<td>2.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stream Protection PR (-)</td>
<td>-3.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stream Protection FR (-)</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA Resolution Introduced (+)</td>
<td>2.66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trump Signs CRA (+)</td>
<td>3.34*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Positive (+) and negative (-) symbols in the first column indicate the expected sign of the reported coefficients as would be suggested by the “war on coal” narrative. Estimates are from a generalized linear model with random effects at the firm level and robust standard errors clustered on the firm. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed t-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=:.
five events showing a statistically significant result within the one-day window. The district court’s decision striking down the 2010 guidance shows the clearest association: statistically significant returns in the expected direction in every event window analyzed. Moreover, the signs on the returns in each analysis yielding statistical significance all run in the direction expected if investors consider additional regulation to be bad for business. The introduction and signing of the CRA resolution of disapproval were immediately viewed as positive events by the stock market.

One possible exception worth noting is the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s decision striking down the 2010 guidance. That decision is associated with a statistically significant positive result, even though it reinstated both the IAP and the guidance. At first blush, this sign seems counterintuitive, given that (1) the imposition of the guidance in the first place resulted in returns with a consistently negative sign (and significantly negative at five days out), and (2) the vacating of the guidance was positive and statistically significant at each of the event windows. Yet perhaps this positive sign should not be so surprising. As policy analyst Claudia Copeland argues, even as it reinstated the IAP and the guidance, the appeals court clarified that neither of these policy statements were formally binding, thus effectively giving at least a partial win to coal companies.179 From industry’s vantage point, the effect of the ruling was to reinstate the policies but essentially make compliance with them optional. This understanding fits the positive returns associated with the court of appeals event.

Our analysis of mountaintop mining regulations reveals both that regulation can be associated with perceptible effects on stock prices and that our statistical methods do work to ferret out such associations. That has been our principal reason for conducting these analyses of a different set of regulations. As to why we find evidence that these direct forms of regulation of coal mining seem associated with stock price changes in the manner expected, when no such clear, significant statistical associations exist for the major but indirect regulations that were the principal focus of industry’s ire and politicians’ rhetoric about a “war on coal,” we can only speculate here. Perhaps the economic consequences of direct regulation of coal mining operations were more readily capable of estimation or more certain for investors to take into account. Or perhaps other, more significant factors affect the demand for coal by utility plants, making the increased regulatory costs to utilities largely superfluous. Many coal-powered plants were already well past their retirement age and, with the advent of cheaper energy from the hydraulic fracturing of natural gas, investors may have known that demand for coal in the medium-to-long term was already in decline irrespective of any indirect regulations, such as reflected in CSAPR, MATS, and CPP. Or perhaps utility companies could be expected to raise their rates or otherwise absorb any cost increases without much spillover effect on the demand for coal. Whatever the reason, the key for our purposes here—namely,

179. See COPELAND, supra note 168.
investigating claims of a “war on coal”—is to see that the primary regulations underlying those claims did not result in anything close to the same kinds of effects on coal stock prices that direct regulations, bankruptcies, or election returns did.

D. Market Responses by Individual Firms

As a final robustness test of our event-study analysis of the “war on coal” regulations’ market effects, we disaggregated our event analyses of the CSAPR, MATS, and CPP for the individual firms in our sample. Despite the ten firms in our study being “coal companies,” they do each have fairly different business models and profiles. Some of the firms, such as Alliance Resources Partners and Cloud Peak, are “thermal coal focused miners,” meaning they mostly produce coal that will be used for electricity generation, while others, such as Peabody and Arch, are more diversified. In particular, Peabody and Arch have substantial metallurgical and coking coal production, which typically is used in industrial processes, such as steel manufacturing. Likewise, there is substantial variation in the location of these companies’ mines. Eastern coal from the Appalachian region is higher in overall sulfur content, and early Clean Air Act regulations made this fact irrelevant by requiring scrubbers on all smoke stacks. However, despite the protection of eastern coal afforded by environmental regulation, production of lower sulfur content coal in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming—much of it by Peabody Energy Company—has caught up in recent years, possibly destabilizing Appalachian production and the companies that primarily mine there, such as Alpha Natural Resources and Consol Energy. This variation across firms only underscores the complexity of this industry, and presumably the heterogeneity of these firms should itself provide reason for skepticism about the “war on coal” narrative, insofar as it claims that environmental regulations have a one-size-fits-all effect on coal firms.

To begin our firm-level analysis, we focus on how stock prices for individual firms responded to bankruptcy declarations in the industry. As Table 14 shows, bankruptcies in the coal mining sector have led to palpable investor responses for some of the surviving firms. As we explained earlier, the missing

estimates in Table 14 are due to bankruptcies, both at the firm whose bankruptcy is the event in question (for example, there would be no Peabody data for the Peabody bankruptcy) and previous bankruptcies (for example, Arch’s bankruptcy overlapped with Peabody’s declaration of bankruptcy). The results in Table 14 suggest that bankruptcies in the coal industry matter to investors in a way that regulation of coal-powered electric utilities does not. In the wake of the Peabody bankruptcy, one company experienced positive abnormal returns. However, the stock for this company and three others suffered statistically significant negative effects following the Arch bankruptcy, and three other companies saw a statistically significant drop in share prices following the Walter bankruptcy filing. It is worth noting, moreover, the sheer magnitude of the abnormal returns for these events and comparing them to the magnitude of even the relatively few statistically significant results from the analysis of regulatory events. Judging from the magnitude of the returns shown in Tables 10 and 14, bankruptcies appear to be much more important to investors than any other type of event.

Applying this same firm-level approach to environmental regulatory events, we report results in Table 15 for the three-day cumulative responses by individual firms. Surprisingly, few statistically significant changes in share prices are observed. Putting the finalization of the CPP to the side for a moment (as the Alpha bankruptcy occurred on that same day), only eight out of sixty-four other results are statistically significant. Of these, only two have a sign in a direction consistent with expectations that would follow from the regulatory “war on coal” narrative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peabody Declares</th>
<th>Arch Declares</th>
<th>Walter Declares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peabody</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-38.94***</td>
<td>-20.88***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloud Peak</td>
<td>-4.09</td>
<td>-18.27*</td>
<td>-14.85**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACO</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>-2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>-4.57</td>
<td>-1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmoreland</td>
<td>-3.22</td>
<td>-4.24</td>
<td>-6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consol</td>
<td>-6.18</td>
<td>-17.80**</td>
<td>-14.85***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foresight</td>
<td>35.18***</td>
<td>-23.53***</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-7.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallador</td>
<td>9.14^</td>
<td>-8.86^</td>
<td>-6.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates are precision-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns for each window. The results are from a market model using value-weighted returns for the constituent firms. The estimation window (-305,-55) was separated from the event window (-5,10) by fifty trading days. Statistical significance, as determined by a two-tailed standardized cross-sectional z-test, is denoted as follows: p<.001=***, p<.01=**, p<.05=*, p<.10=^.
### Table 15: Three-Day Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Individual Firms Following the "War on Coal" Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>MKT</th>
<th>PSM</th>
<th>CPR</th>
<th>CSAPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>9.97</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreshield</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamsland</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACO</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloud Peak</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notably, several coal firms—Cloud Peak, Westmoreland, and Consol—did see double digit abnormal declines around the finalization of the CPP. Hallador also saw a statistically significant decline. It might seem, then, that the CPP—but by and large not either of the other two regulations—could have negatively affected just a small handful of publicly traded firms. At the most, then, these firm-level results might suggest that any negative effects of the “war on coal” regulations on firms in the coal sector were heterogeneous, with some firms affected to some degree even though the industry saw no systemic effect overall. In this sense, the effects of climate regulation on the coal industry may be little different than the effects of regulation more generally.\footnote{Other research indicates, for example, that individual environmental regulations may lead to employment effects at some individual firms while not having much of any aggregate effect on overall employment. See Cary Coglianese & Christopher Carrigan, The Jobs and Regulation Debate, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 6–11 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2013).} Still, even this finding of heterogeneous effects across different firms would be itself noteworthy because it contrasts with the fervent political rhetoric claiming an industry-wide regulatory “war on coal”—not on some individual coal firms. Rather than any systemic assault, a few air pollution regulations imposed on the utility sector may have, at most, affected the stock prices of only a few individual coal firms.

But in fact, even such a limited conclusion cannot be drawn because the coal industry saw one of its largest bankruptcies (Alpha Natural Resources) occur on the same day that the CPP was signed. Moreover, no statistically significant abnormal returns for any company are observed in connection with the proposed CPP rule. We thus cannot say with any confidence that any of the effects in Table 15 for the four firms showing statistically significant, negative abnormal returns can be attributed to the signing of the CPP rather than the Alpha bankruptcy. Based on the market reactions to bankruptcies as reported above, the overall effect—in its size, direction, and number of firms—looks more consistent with a reaction to the Alpha bankruptcy than to the CPP. This conclusion is only reinforced by the firm-level share reactions to the unprecedented Supreme Court stay of the CPP, as the only two firms with statistically significant changes in their share prices saw those prices decrease—not increase as one would have expected based on the “war on coal” rhetoric.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM

In the previous Parts of this Article, we report the findings from our efforts to look carefully, through a variety of empirical lenses, for what investors thought about the key regulatory developments that figured prominently in the narrative of a “war on coal” from new regulations on existing coal-power utility plants. Yet we could not find any clear, systematic indication that investors thought much at all of the main regulatory characters in the “war on coal” story:
CSAPR, MATS, and CPP. It is true, of course, that the coal industry as a whole experienced a substantial secular decline in production levels over the last decade, along with a loss of jobs, numerous facility closings, and several bankruptcies. But the results presented in this paper are consistent with the view that this decline has stemmed mostly—if not entirely—from secular causes, such as the rise of less expensive natural gas (and, increasingly, sources of renewable energy), rather than acute regulatory events. We find no evidence that would allow us to conclude that key Obama-era environmental regulations targeting coal-fired electricity generation led to changes in the investment in the coal industry consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. At the same time, the same measures and methods of analysis did reveal significant responses in coal company stock prices from other events, such as bankruptcies and elections, suggesting that the lack of consistent responses to the “war on coal” regulations is not merely an artifact of our data or empirical methods.

In this final Part, we recap our principal findings, putting them into further context and drawing out their implications for regulatory law and policy more generally. The lack of any consistent, systematic evidence that would allow us to dismiss the null hypothesis for the events pivotal to the regulations targeted by the “war on coal’s” proponents is certainly striking. After all, under standard economic theory, forcing utility companies to internalize their negative externalities from burning coal should increase the private costs of using coal and lead utilities to look to alternative sources of energy. The stock market should thus respond negatively to news of events leading to new regulations and positively to those events blocking or reversing those regulations. These same expectations also follow from the repeated political rhetoric alleging a regulatory “war on coal.” Yet news of the key events in the development of “war on coal” regulations, as well as their subsequent litigation, shows at best only fleeting and inconsistent associations with coal stock prices. As we explain in this final Part, the absence of evidence sufficient to support the expectations that follow from the “war on coal” narrative may prove less surprising when one takes a step back and considers the results of our analyses in light of other research on the coal industry specifically and regulation more generally. We take our research findings to support a cautionary lesson about basing regulatory policy decisions on complaints about the costs of regulation put forward by self-interested actors who have reason to look for scapegoats or set themselves up as regulatory reform saviors.

185. See supra notes 61–62, 67, 166–67 (discussing how the “war on coal” narrative consistently centered on these three regulations).
186. See supra notes 46, 49-50 and infra notes 212-217 and accompanying text.
A. Situating the Stock Market’s Nonresponse to the “War on Coal”

As explained in Part II of this Article, we have relied on standard empirical methods in our effort to isolate the reactions of stock market investors to key regulatory events that we thought may have affected coal companies’ financial performance. If the dire predictions underlying the narrative of the regulatory “war on coal” had merit, then it is surprising not to see investors in coal companies responding in clear, perceptible ways to the announcement of key battles in this regulatory “war.” The event-study technique we have principally relied on here has been widely used by other researchers to find market reactions to new developments, including government regulations.\(^{188}\) It works to identify how the market processes new information that comes forward publicly, as occurs with the release of the text of a proposed or final rule and the accompanying information from the agency’s regulatory impact analysis. In the face of this new information, it holds constant and controls for the overall trends in stock prices and looks at what change occurs within a short time after the release of news of the event under examination. As noted earlier, a statistically significant change in stock prices that occurs immediately after the public release of news of an event provides confidence that investors saw the event as having a meaningful impact on the future financial performance of the companies included in the analysis. When such an immediate change is sustained over another day or two, this implies, generally speaking, a stronger and more-than-fleeting effect.

For each of the three principal regulations associated with the “war on coal” narrative, we used one- to three-day event windows to analyze three key events in their development: the announcement of each proposed rule, the announcement of each final rule, and the relevant Supreme Court decision for each. The vast majority of these event-window combinations yielded no statistically significant changes in stock prices in response to the regulatory events. If we look at the results that might be said in principle to provide the strongest support for a market response to these regulatory developments, we find that only four events across the three regulations yielded any statistically significant result on day one—and in all of these instances, there exists reason to question how meaningfully these results can support the regulatory “war on coal” narrative. With CSAPR, the only event showing a statistically significant day-one abnormal return was the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the rule—but coal stocks gained, rather than lost, as would have been expected from claims of a “war on coal.”\(^{189}\) With MATS, the announcement of the Supreme Court decision faulting the way EPA had justified its rule did yield a statistically significant positive abnormal return on day one—but it was followed on both days two and three with statistically significant negative abnormal returns.\(^{190}\)

The proposed MATS rule also showed statistically significant returns on the first

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188. See supra Subpart II.A.
189. See supra Table 2.
190. See supra Table 4.
day following its release, but these returns were positive—again, opposite what would be expected from claims about a “war on coal.” Now, the release of the final CPP did yield statistically significant negative returns on both days one and two; however, these results cannot be taken to imply anything about the market’s reaction to CPP because a major coal firm bankruptcy occurred on the very same day the final rule was announced.\textsuperscript{191}

When these seemingly “best-case” responses to regulatory events are compared with the market responses to bankruptcies in the coal industry, it becomes still clearer what is lacking in the observed market reactions to the “war on coal” rules. Out of the five bankruptcies analyzed, three resulted in immediate day-one statistically significant negative returns.\textsuperscript{192} (A fourth yielded marginally significant negative returns within the first two days.)\textsuperscript{193} Over the entire three-day event window, the returns were negative for each of the five bankruptcies, and three of these five were statistically significant.\textsuperscript{194} By contrast, only two of the nine regulatory events resulted in a statistically significant abnormal return across the entire three-day event window—and, perhaps tellingly, one of these ran in the direction opposite of expectations (MATS proposed rule), and the other occurred on the same day as the Alpha bankruptcy (CPP final rule).\textsuperscript{195}

The fact that we find much clearer and more consistent reactions in response to bankruptcies provides a degree of assurance that our lack of comparable findings with respect to the “war on coal” regulations is not merely an artifact of our empirical methods. Nevertheless, we did use a second statistical method in a further effort to ferret out market effects that might have been consistent with the regulatory “war on coal.” That second method—a difference-in-differences analysis—compared changes in coal stock prices to changes in natural gas stock prices, with the idea that what is bad for the coal industry would probably be good for the natural gas industry, and vice versa. By benchmarking coal stock prices not just against their own trends but also against trends in natural gas prices, we may well even have found a measure that would be biased in favor of finding effects consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. After all, changes in the coal industry might be more likely to be significant when compared with changes in the natural gas industry, which should move in the opposite direction. Despite this potential bias in favor of the “war on coal” account, only one out of the eighteen difference-in-differences analyses we conducted on the “war on coal” regulations yielded a statistically significant result.\textsuperscript{196} By comparison, every one of our six difference-in-differences results for national elections was statistically significant and in alignment with expectations.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{191} See supra Table 6; see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{192} See supra Table 10.
\textsuperscript{193} See id.
\textsuperscript{194} See id.
\textsuperscript{195} See supra Table 2; supra Table 4; supra Table 6.
\textsuperscript{196} See supra Table 3; supra Table 5; supra Table 7.
\textsuperscript{197} See supra Table 12.
At this point, it might be asked whether our failure to find any comparable results supportive of the rhetoric of the “war on coal” could stem from factors other than market disinterest in the key regulatory events. For example, perhaps the financial effects of the applicable regulations were somehow factored into coal firms’ stock prices long before the regulatory events in our study were even announced. In light of the statistically significant day-two returns after the release of the CAP in 2013, for example, it might be wondered whether that earlier event was the moment when the market priced in the negative effects from the CPP, even though the latter would not be proposed for another year.\textsuperscript{198} Perhaps in other similar ways the news of impending CSAPR and MATS rules leaked to the market earlier, and thus the effects of these rules on the coal industry were already factored into stock prices by the time they were proposed. For three principal reasons, we do not find such alternative speculations provide a convincing explanation for the results of our analysis.

First, even though stock markets can and do take the possibility of future events into account, the occurrence of an event still can provide new information that affects stock prices further. For example, every time an election is held, the markets already know in advance, come election day, that one of two candidates will win—and yet the declaration of a winner still brings with it something new, namely certainty, which can affect stock prices. The same can be said of regulations. Even following the release of CAP, the CPP was far from certain until it was released. Moreover, the release of a proposed or final rule gives markets new information in terms of the actual regulatory language contained in these documents. The regulatory events that we studied—announcements of proposed and final rules—were each accompanied by the release of new information about the specific details of the regulatory proposal or decision.

Second, we have no reason to think that regulatory impacts would have been pre-factored by the market only for the “war on coal” regulations but not for other regulations. As we noted in Part II, other researchers have found abnormal returns in similar event studies of different regulations.\textsuperscript{199} We even found significant abnormal returns with coal stocks in the immediate aftermath of the proposed stream protection rule and related regulatory events that directly affected coal mining operations, even though these regulations never played any meaningful role in the “war on coal” narrative.\textsuperscript{200} We generally just failed to find clear and consistent significant results associated with the clean air rules that were the real bogeyman in the rhetoric of a regulatory “war on coal.”\textsuperscript{201}

Finally, and most importantly, the market had absolutely no reason in advance to factor in the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP. It is simply implausible to think that the market had factored in an entirely unprecedented event that

\textsuperscript{198} See \textit{supra} Table 8. Of course, CAP showed no effect in difference-in-differences analyses. \textit{See supra} Table 9.

\textsuperscript{199} See \textit{supra} note 83 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{200} See \textit{supra} Table 13.

\textsuperscript{201} For discussion of the three bogeymen rules, \textit{see supra} notes 61–62, 66, 166–67 and accompanying text.
surprised even lawyers involved in the case. Moreover, if one assumes arguendo that negative financial effects from the proposed CPP rule had already been factored into coal stock prices due to CAP, that would only provide greater reason to expect positive returns from the Supreme Court’s stay. If the effects of a regulation were already built into and depressing the value of coal company share prices, then a totally surprising decision halting that regulation from taking effect, as well as signaling its likely demise, should have positively affected share prices for coal firms. Overall, if the regulatory “war on coal” were the existential threat to the industry that critics claimed, then the Court’s shocking stay should have clearly and immediately boosted coal company stock prices—but it did not.

Perhaps the most plausible explanation for our results stems from the overwhelming effects of lower natural gas prices on the demand for coal. The “war on coal” regulations, recall, did not directly regulate the coal industry; they regulated the electric utility industry, thereby increasing the costs to operate old coal-powered electricity plants and thus decreasing the likelihood that utilities would keep these plants running or replace them with new coal-powered electricity plants. Yet we fail to see evidence from the reactions of the stock market that would be consistent with the expected effects of an indirect reduction in the demand for coal induced by these regulations. What we do see around the same time are dramatically decreasing natural gas prices that were already driving coal company decisions to close down aging coal-powered plants and replace them with natural gas.

Given the strong preexisting and ongoing competitive pressures from natural gas driving down the demand for coal, perhaps whatever additional effects on coal demand coming from regulations imposed on electric utilities were viewed as de minimis. In other words, if there was any proverbial war going on, the mortal wound may have already been inflicted by the natural gas industry, such that any additional (regulatory) wound did not make much, if any, difference to investors.

But then one might ask: What accounts for the negative market reaction to the Paris Agreement? By December 2015, when the agreement was announced, stock market investors fully recognized the substantial decline in

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202. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

203. See supra Table 6. Perhaps much the same could be said for the announcement of the planned U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, as it was not entirely clear up until the day of the announcement what decision, if any, that President Trump had decided to announce. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.

204. Moreover, coal’s share prices correlate highly with the market price for natural gas. See supra Figure 2.

205. The use of death as a metaphor to describe the coal industry is far from unique to us. See, e.g., Roman Mendelevitch et al., The Death Spiral of Coal in the U.S.: Will Changes in U.S. Policy Turn the Tide?, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 1310 (2019); Frederick Hewett, Coal Mining is a Dying Industry. So Why Does It Play an Outsized Role in Our Energy Policy?, WBUR (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2018/08/22/trump-epa-coal-pollution-fred-hewett. Of course, in using such a metaphor to characterize an entire industry, we do not mean to overlook or trivialize the fact that the same industry, through its operational risks as well as the combustion of its product, leads to some literal loss of human life.

206. See supra Table 8.
demand for coal in the face of cheaper alternative sources of energy. If a “second-wound” hypothesis were plausible, why did the market respond to the adoption of the Paris Agreement? In fact, that market response was also one of the stronger ones we observed: a statistically significant decline in coal share prices immediately followed the accord’s announcement and a marginally significant decline in the difference-in-differences analysis. This decline seems all the more curious in light of the absence of any statistically significant positive returns eighteen months later in the wake of President Trump’s announcement of his intended withdrawal from the agreement.207 Yet, rather than a curiosity, these results may actually be consistent with the “second-wound” hypothesis. With domestic market demand from coal already rapidly in decline due to low natural gas prices, policy actions affecting only domestic markets—such as EPA regulations and the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement—would be expected to have little incremental effect on demand for coal. An industry dying from a decline in domestic demand, though, may at least have one lifeline available to it in the form of exports to foreign markets. By some accounts, that appears to be what coal firms and their investors had been banking on for the future of the industry.208 The signing of the Paris Agreement, however, signaled that the demand for coal by other countries around the world would also be on the decline. In the end, the divergent market responses to the signing of the Paris Agreement and the announced U.S. withdrawal could be quite consistent with investors viewing regulation as largely irrelevant to domestic demand while still at one time possessing optimism over a future with coal exports.

Our purpose here, of course, has not been to develop and test a theory of stock market reactions to regulation as much as to investigate the plausibility of the “war on coal” narrative. Without a doubt, the U.S. coal industry suffered a dramatic decline during the Obama administration. Coinciding with coal’s demise was both the establishment of new environmental regulations and a dramatic decrease in natural gas prices. In our empirical analysis, we sought to isolate the effects of the key regulations that industry and its allies often blamed for the industry’s demise209 but we found no convincing evidence that investors saw systematic effects from regulation consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. Granted, it is always possible that further analysis might yield other

207. The returns were actually negative, but not statistically significant. See id.
insights. We also recognize, of course, that any study of stock prices necessarily cannot speak to effects on privately held firms. Yet on the basis of all we have been able to analyze, it would appear that, rather than seeing regulators as inflicting substantial harm on the coal industry, the stock market treated the key regulatory events essentially as irrelevancies. With a serious economic war taking place between the coal industry and its market competitors, EPA’s regulatory agenda appears to have constituted at most a minor skirmish.

B. The “War on Coal” and the Overstatement of Regulatory Impacts

A conclusion that investors did not see air pollution regulations to be a major financial concern will seem surprising, especially given the vociferous complaints leveled in the political sphere by opponents of these regulations. Yet on reflection, such a conclusion probably is not entirely surprising after all. Other research actually shows that environmental regulation has had only small effects on coal production and, more generally, that such regulation has not played a major role in terms of industrial competitiveness or levels of employment across the economy.

As noted in Part I, other empirical studies have used different methods and data to discern how much, if at all, air pollution regulations imposed on coal-power electricity plants explain the overall falloff in demand for coal. In one study, a team of economists based at Harvard University conducted both (1) a longitudinal analysis of state-level data on the share of electricity generated by coal based on the presence of cross-state air pollution rules, such as CSAPR and the MATS rule, and (2) a separate event study of plant closures in response to MATS. Using the results of these analyses, they decomposed the overall changes in coal production from 2008–2016, estimating that only 6 percent of coal’s decline could be attributed to air pollution regulations. What, then, “predominately” drove the coal industry’s decline? The “major driver of the decline”—which explained 92 percent of the decline in coal production—was the decreased price of natural gas.

In a second study, Columbia University researchers assumed for sake of analysis that all closures of coal plants in the years between 2011 and 2016 stemmed from regulatory burdens, but they still concluded that, even under such

210. For discussion of the complaints against these air pollution rules, see supra notes 61–62, 67, 166–67 and accompanying text.
211. In addition to the studies of the coal industry discussed in the text, another major study found that in the 2000-2015 period environmental regulation had little financial impact on electricity-generating plants powered with coal. Joshua Linn & Kristen McCormack, The Roles of Energy Markets and Environmental Regulation in Reducing Coal-Fired Plant Profits and Electricity Sector Emissions, 50 RAND J. ECON. 733, 736 (2019) (finding that “factors other than environmental regulation explain most of the decline in the profits of coal-fired plants and the resulting retirements”).
212. Coglianese et al., supra note 33, at 64–74.
213. Id. at 56–57.
214. Id. at 57.
215. Id. at 56–57.
a strong assumption, no more than 3.9 percent of the drop in coal production during that period could have been attributable to regulation. They also used a version of a model developed by EIA to forecast the likely effects of a rollback of the CPP and a range of other environmental policies; however, they found that these changes, even if all of them were adopted and even if natural gas prices increased at rates higher than current government forecasts predict, would never bring coal production back to anywhere close to its peak levels prior to the Obama administration. From their analysis, “[t]he bottom line is that for the next few years, natural gas prices and, to a lesser extent, renewable energy costs will play a far greater role in determining U.S. coal consumption than President Trump’s deregulatory agenda.”

It may well be that, at the time that new air pollution regulations were in development during the Obama administration, sophisticated investors already understood what researchers have since documented: The effects of decreasing prices of natural gas overwhelm any effects of the regulations. For an industry already mortally wounded by its economic competition, any second wound inflicted by regulation may have amounted to little more than a cut on the finger.

More broadly, the results of our analysis fit within a larger pattern of overstated claims about the negative economic effects of regulation, especially when made by industry representatives and politicians. One such claim made by some industry lobbyists and Republican politicians grows out of analysis commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) purporting to show that regulation imposes about $2 trillion in annual costs to the economy—roughly equivalent to dropping the entire state of New York out of the U.S. economy. But as others have explained, the basis for this assertion suffers from numerous methodological problems that contribute to a vastly overstated assertion. In commenting on an earlier, similar study by the same authors as the NAM-funded report, legal scholar Cass Sunstein noted that the claim is “deeply flawed and should not be relied on as a basis for quantifying

216. Houser et al., supra note 31, at 22.
217. Id. at 38–39.
218. Id. at 39.
219. See supra notes 48, 216, 217 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the key role played by competition from natural gas in the coal industry’s demise, see Roman Mendelevitch et al., The Death Spiral of Coal in the U.S.: Will Changes in U.S. Policy Turn the Tide?, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 1310, 1320 (2019) (noting that, “in the U.S. electricity sector, coal suffers less from climate and other environmental regulation and more from lower competitiveness compared to recently built gas-fired power plants and renewables”); Karin Kirk, The “War on Coal” Myth, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (July 15, 2019), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07/the-war-on-coal-myth/ (“Are environmental regulations and fringe litigation to blame for coal’s downturn? In short, the answer is no. The real answer comes down to simple economics . . . . [C]oal has been upstaged by cheaper alternatives”).
220. See, e.g., Crain & Crain, supra note 3.
221. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44348, METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COST OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (2016) (methodically reviewing concerns with the Crain and Crain estimate); Parker, supra note 3 (discussing the “flawed methodology” underlying the Crain and Crain estimate). The $2 trillion per year claim is not one of net costs either; it leaves out the benefits of regulation.
regulatory costs.”222 Economist Austan Goolsbee put it still more succinctly, calling the claim “utterly erroneous.”223

Of course, no one denies that specific regulations can and do sometimes impose substantial costs on industry—even if they also deliver substantial benefits to society at the same time. But getting precise, reliable estimates of the negative ramifications of all regulations across the entire U.S. economy, or even all regulations within a particular substantive area of regulation, can be difficult. Still, credible research does exist on the effects of environmental regulation as a general matter. Specifically, this research considers the impacts of environmental regulation on industrial competitiveness and on employment. With respect to both of these impacts, existing research tends to find the negative ramifications of regulation relatively modest.

For example, in one of the most extensive reviews of the literature on the relationship between environmental regulation and the international competitiveness of U.S. industry, economist Adam Jaffe and several colleagues conclude that “[o]verall, there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on competitiveness.”224 They report that “studies attempting to measure the effect of environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions have produced estimates that are either small, statistically insignificant, or not robust to tests of model specification.”225 One of the main reasons for their finding was that, by and large, “the cost of complying with federal environmental regulation is a relatively small fraction of total cost of production.”226 Subsequent research has tended to continue to show only relatively modest impacts of environmental regulation on U.S. industry’s competitiveness in a global marketplace.227

Similarly, the overall effects of environmental regulation on employment levels in the United States appear at best quite modest, to the extent that they amount to anything at all perceptible in the aggregate. In one of the earliest

225. Jaffe et al., supra note 224, at 157–58.
226. Id. at 158.
studies, economists Eli Berman and Linda Bui analyzed the effects of air pollution regulation on manufacturing jobs in Southern California, with its more stringent air pollution rules, and other parts of the country, finding no substantive or statistically significant effects.\textsuperscript{228} Economist Richard Morgenstern and his colleagues have examined four major industrial sectors throughout the United States and have found no substantively or statistically significant association between spending by firms on compliance with environmental regulations and levels of employment.\textsuperscript{229}

Economist Michael Greenstone has compared air quality regions in attainment status with those in nonattainment (the latter being subject to greater regulation), finding an average of about 40,000 fewer jobs per year among the facilities located in nonattainment regions. To place this finding in some context, consider that one to two million people can be laid off from their jobs every month, even in normal economic times.\textsuperscript{230} More importantly, Greenstone’s analysis could not distinguish between jobs actually being eliminated versus jobs instead being shifted from higher regulated areas of the country to lower regulated areas.\textsuperscript{231}

Without question, regulation can sometimes affect the viability of some companies, just as it can help other businesses, such as those that supply pollution control technology. But in the aggregate, the research on environmental regulation does not support the view of regulation as a massive job killer. Indeed, “what we know about the relationship between regulation and employment contrasts strikingly with the grandiose claims found in contemporary political debate about either dramatic job-killing or job-creating effects of regulation.”\textsuperscript{232}

Based on the broader body of empirical research on regulation, there exists “little reason to expect that U.S. economic woes can be solved by reforming the regulatory process.”\textsuperscript{233} Our findings in this paper raise the possibility that stock market investors reached a similar conclusion about the economic woes afflicting the coal industry.

\section*{C. Scapegoats and Saviors: Implications for Regulatory Law and Policy}

Our findings, combined with the results of other studies, also suggest immediate implications for what can be expected from current reforms to

\begin{itemize}
\item \hspace{1em} Eli Berman & Linda T. M. Bui, \textit{Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin}, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 265 (2001).
\item \hspace{1em} Richard D. Morgenstern et al., \textit{Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective}, 43 J. ENV. ECON. MGT. 412 (2002). For two of the four industrial sectors, Morgenstern and his colleagues actually found some indication of small increases in employment associated with greater spending on regulatory compliance.
\item \hspace{1em} U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: LAYOFFS AND DISCHARGES LEVELS AND RATES, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.t05.htm (last visited June 2, 2020).
\item \hspace{1em} Michael Greenstone, \textit{The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures}, 110 J. POLIT. ECON. 1175, 1208 (2002).
\item \hspace{1em} Coglianese & Carrigan, \textit{supra} note 184, at 10.
\item \hspace{1em} Id.
\end{itemize}
environmental regulation. The Trump administration, for example, has rescinded the CPP and replaced it with a new regulatory regime that delegates much regulatory authority to states to set emissions standards.\footnote{Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).} It has also proposed additional deregulatory efforts, such as scaling back environmental permitting requirements to make it easier to allow the construction of new coal-fired power plants.\footnote{See Benjamin Storrow, This Section Buried in EPA's Rule May Be the Most Important, GOVERNORS’ WIND & SOLAR ENERGY COAL. (2018), http://governorswindenergycoalition.org/this-section-buried-in-epas-rule-may-be-the-most-important/; Benjamin Storrow, Coal Stock Prices Barely Budge After Trump’s Coal-Boosting Plans, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 6, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/coal-stock-prices-barely-budge-after-trumps-coal-boosting-plan.} Yet these deregulatory efforts do not appear to have boosted market expectations about coal companies’ profitability.\footnote{Stephen Lee, Coal Stock Prices Barely Budge After Trump’s Coal-Boosting Plans, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 6, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/coal-stock-prices-barely-budge-after-trumps-coal-boosting-plan.} At least eleven coal companies have declared bankruptcy since the start of the Trump administration, and more than fifty coal plants have shut down.\footnote{See, e.g., Irina Ivanova, For the First Time, the U.S. Got More Electricity From Renewables Than Coal, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/renewable-energy-electricity-surpasses-coal-in-us-for-the-first-time/ (on plant closings); Jeremy Hill, Blackhawk Files Chapter 11, Joins List of Bankrupt Coal Miners, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-19/blackhawk-files-chapter-11-joins-list-of-bankrupt-coal-miners (on bankruptcies); see generally Jonathan Chait, Trump Has Lost His War on the War on Coal, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 18, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/trump-tva-climate-change-coal.html (discussing declining coal jobs and contracting industry, despite President Trump’s attempt to revive the coal industry).} According to one estimate, twice as much coal-fired electrical generation shut down in Trump’s first two years than Barack Obama’s first four.\footnote{Erik Sherman, Coal Power Plant Shutdowns Surge Under Trump, FORTUNE MAG. (Jan. 14, 2019, 9:04 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/01/14/coal-power-plants-trump/.} If coal is to be rescued by the Trump administration—if it even can be—then it seems that doing so will require more than regulatory rollbacks. This realization may help explain why the Trump administration has taken additional, even if less visible, steps to propose subsidies to the coal industry.\footnote{For examples of these less visible policies—such as subsidies—see supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. In addition, as the last of the coal companies contributing to the union pension fund for mineworkers used bankruptcy to shed pension obligations, President Trump signed bipartisan legislation in December 2019 to offset the industry’s retreat by authorizing the use of funds originally set aside for federal mine reclamation to keep the pension fund afloat. See H.R. 1865, 116th Cong. 558 (2019) (signed Dec. 2019); UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA: CURRENT LEGISLATION, http://umwa.org/policy-politics/current-legislation/ (last visited June 3, 2020); Congress Reaches Deal to Prop Up Coal Miners’ Pension Fund, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-nation/2019/12/17/United-Mine-Workers-America-coal-workers-pension-retirement-Joe-Manchin/stories/201912160143. Less visible efforts such as these fit into a more general pattern of...}
A broader implication follows from our work. In any area of law and regulation, there is value in treating with some skepticism the rhetorical claims that business leaders and their political boosters make.\textsuperscript{240} If financial markets do not appear to exhibit signs consistent with a regulatory war on a particular industry, then policy makers should have little reason to take that industry’s claims seriously when making regulatory decisions. Government agencies should instead make regulatory policy decisions on the basis of careful regulatory impact analyses grounded in reliable evidence—an important but sometimes still debated principle for effective regulatory decision making.\textsuperscript{241} Courts should similarly be especially attentive when reviewing deregulatory actions under the arbitrary and capricious standard, ensuring that agencies have not overstated the positive economic effects to industry expected to follow from specific regulatory changes.\textsuperscript{242}

Regulators, courts, and the public have particular reason to view skeptically any claims of the mortal effects from regulation that business leaders make when their firms struggle in the face of new competition or other unfavorable economic conditions. When businesses start to fail, the members of these firms’ management teams have ample incentive to shift the blame from themselves to someone or something else. After all, business failures result in serious, negative repercussions for investors and workers, as well as their family members and communities. Failing businesses short their workers’ pay, decline to contribute to pensions and health care funds, and renege on community financial commitments—not to mention ultimately shut down operations and lay off workers.\textsuperscript{243} It takes courage and honesty for leaders to accept responsibility for concealing distributional policy making in tax expenditures and subsidies—a phenomenon that Suzanne Mettler calls the “submerged state.” \textsc{Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy} 4 (2011).

\textsuperscript{240} Cary Coglianese \textit{et al.}, \textit{Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking}, 89 \textit{Minn. L. Rev.} 277, 288 (2004) (noting that, although firms are often in a position to have better information than government agencies, “[r]egulators should certainly not rely on all, or perhaps even most, of the information volunteered by industry”).

\textsuperscript{241} The terms of debate over regulatory analysis have been largely set for decades, particularly with regard to the question of requiring that agencies conduct benefit-cost analysis of their most economically significant rules. See, \textit{e.g.}, \textsc{Frank Ackerman \& Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing The Price Of Everything And The Value Of Nothing} (2005) (objecting to the monetization of certain benefits, such as the saving of human life); \textsc{Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit State: The Future Of Regulatory Protection} (2003) (arguing that benefit-cost analysis is an important component of sound policy decision making); \textsc{Richard L. Revesz \& Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect The Environment And Our Health} 9 (2011) (defending benefit-cost analysis as a means to avoid undue emphasis on compliance costs and insufficient attention to regulatory benefits); \textsc{Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation}, 99 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 1059 (1986) (raising institutional concerns about White House oversight of agency rulemaking).

\textsuperscript{242} On the arbitrary and capricious standard, see \textsc{5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)} (2012) and \textsc{Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.}, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Courts should, of course, also ensure that regulators have taken into account any loss of benefits that might follow the relaxation or modification of regulations.

\textsuperscript{243} The loss of jobs has been acutely and profoundly felt in the coal mining industry. In 1985, the industry employed more than 170,000 workers; today, that number is closer to about 50,000. \textsc{U.S. Bureau
the scarcity and suffering that follows a business collapse. Cognitive dissonance would lead even empathic managers to want to deflect responsibility. The anticipated hostility and anger that can be unleashed by workers, investors, and community leaders also give managers reason to find a scapegoat. That scapegoat needs to be someone other than the failing firms’ business competitors too. After all, admitting that competitors beat out a business (or even an entire industry) is just another way of admitting that the managers of the losing firm (or industry) failed to succeed in the market game.

When searching for someone or something else to blame, business leaders and politicians find government regulation an easy target. Regulators are a bit like the referees in a sports game—and anyone with passing familiarity with sports knows that a losing team and its fans can readily blame the referee for their loss. Of course, a regulatory agency is more than just a referee, but the policies adopted by an entity such as EPA are outside the control of the management team, which means that blaming industry failure on regulation imputes no responsibility to managers themselves. It cuts off the argument that

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244. As an example of such latent anger manifested, consider the two-month blockade of a train loaded with a million dollars’ worth of coal that mineworkers in Harlan County, Kentucky staged until they received at least partial payment of back wages from the bankrupt coal company Blackjewel.

245. Psychologists and sociologists have long recognized the tendency of humans to scapegoat others—that is, to place blame for a tragic or failed circumstance on those who bear no responsibility for that circumstance. This tendency is thought to be most pronounced under times of stress—as surely is any period of economic dislocation or the collapse of a major industry’s competitive position. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 404 (1995). Furthermore, the targets of scapegoating tend to be those who are disfavored, lower status, or powerless. Seldom popular, and serving in a position of constant oversight by and dependence on other political actors, regulators can make an easy and soft target for scapegoating whenever a firm or industry fails or an economic crisis occurs. Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Oversight in Hindsight: Assessing the U.S. Regulatory System in the Wake of Calamity, in REGULARITY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 3, 6–9 (Cary Coglianese, ed., 2012). Furthermore, the target of scapegoating need not even be other people, but “can also apply to non-human entities.” NEEL BURTON, HIDE AND SEEK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DECEPTION (2019). Thus, regulation, probably even more than regulators, becomes an even easier target for scapegoating, as it is a thing—even an abstraction—that is entirely incapable of defending itself. Moreover, the word’s connotation is hardly revered by most people. Cary Coglianese, Building a Better World: A Framework for Making Regulation Work, in MAKING REGULATION WORK (Cary Coglianese, forthcoming). The negative connotations surrounding the word “regulation,” which no doubt exhibit a certain ideological valence, have led some commentators to recommend that progressives abandon the use of the term in favor of a word such as “protection.” GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 210 (3d. ed. 2016); George Lakoff, The Public’s Viewpoint: Regulations are Protections (Jan. 28, 2017), https://georgelakoff.com/2017/01/28/the-publics-viewpoint-regulations-are-protections/.

246. As one sports commentator has noted, “[t]here’s a major psychological reason fans and competitors blame referees for a loss. . . . [B]y blaming the officials you can deny your team actually deserved the loss. In other words, it is more acceptable to ignore the loss if it can be blamed on the referees, rather than your team’s play.” Kevin Burke, Leave the Refs Alone, It’s Not Their Fault Your Team Lost, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-referees-blown-calls-controversy-fans-college-football/vz9xja888os1m4mntpolgitis; see also id. (noting also that “it is not uncommon when they lose for athletes and coaches to blame referees”).
the firm simply did not compete well enough in the market. It avoids the need to acknowledge that other firms or another industry—say, the natural gas industry, with its falling prices due to technological innovations—had simply done a better job of competing in the marketplace. Regulation can be easily framed as an invading force that distorts competition, tilts the playing field, and causes industry failure.247

Regulated businesses’ incentives go still further beyond engaging in cheap talk and scapegoating. They have another strategic reason to employ antiregulatory rhetoric, even when it is overstated: It can help advance other, larger policy goals. Even if coal executives, industry association lobbyists, and politicians knew that CSAPR, MATS, and CPP (or any of their repeals) would be unlikely to change the underlying business fundamentals facing the coal industry, blaming regulations for killing the coal industry nevertheless moves to the forefront of political discourse the need for government relief. Blaming utility-plant regulation potentially puts on more favorable terrain political demands about other policies—including subsidies, tax benefits, and federal leases.248 Normally, it might be difficult to convince a president or an administration to take up the cause of bailing out particular industrial plants. Yet by investing in a narrative that government policy has decimated its viability, and then succeeding in making that narrative central on the macropolitical stage, the coal industry and its political boosters may have made it more likely that politicians would support subsidies and tax benefits that might more effectively prop up dying firms, at least for a time. Donald Trump accepted the “war on coal” narrative and used it as a central part of his successful presidential campaign, so it comes as little surprise that his administration has given serious consideration to granting subsidies to the coal industry—a controversial but consequential prospect for any industry that is failing to compete in the marketplace. It is also not surprising that other elected officials propagating the regulatory “war on coal” narrative have also sought to build support for direct subsidies and tax benefits. The latter are an easier sell politically when they aim

247. For example, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, in a public statement endorsing legislation to keep solvent a rapidly collapsing mineworker pension fund, apparently found it easier to blame regulation than to hold mining firms to account for failing to meet their responsibility for maintaining the solvency of the fund. Manchin, McConnell, and Capito Introduce the Bipartisan American Miners Act to Secure Pensions and Healthcare, JOE MANCHIN (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-mcconnell-and-capito-introduce-the-bipartisan-american-miners-act-to-secure-pensions-and-healthcare (“Unfortunately, eight years of regulatory assault on coal country can’t be undone overnight.”).

248. To put this broader incentive in terms of a concept getting a great deal of attention in contemporary politics, the rhetoric of a “war on coal” may have expanded the “Overton Window” to the coal industry’s benefit—that is, expanded the range of acceptable public discussion, normalizing policies that might otherwise be deemed out of the realm of the possible. Given at least the surface-level antipathy to subsidies in the stereotypical conservative canon—as exemplified by the political Right’s vitriol of the subsidies awarded under the Obama administration to Solyndra and other renewable energy firms—the “war on coal” rhetoric may have helped prepare the ground for subsidy proposals for the coal industry after 2017. After all, it is easier to convince others that “anything goes” when a war is raging.
to help an industry that has “just gone through the God-awfullest war on coal for the last eight years prior to President Trump.”

Political leaders have their own independent incentives to push a regulatory “war” narrative. When they define problems afflicting an industry as ones created by excessive regulation, they can more easily make themselves look like saviors—standing up for workers by fighting against the scapegoat of burdensome regulation. Although Presidents do reap credit when the overall economy is doing well and incur the public’s blame when it is not, in reality there is only so much any administration can do to affect the overall economy or to salvage an industry getting beat out by larger competitive forces. Fundamental changes in the economy or to a major industry are usually brought about by technological innovation, global events, and other macroeconomic forces outside the day-to-day control of the White House, or even Congress. Regulation is an advantageous target to would-be political saviors because a regulatory fight is actually one that politicians can wage. The Trump administration certainly cannot reverse the technological developments that brought about the shale revolution and the plummeting cost of natural gas. Changing regulatory law is feasible, while changing the economic law of supply and demand is not. Furthermore, an administration can make a big public display of making regulatory changes in a way that is simply not as politically acceptable to do when it comes to doling out subsidies to industry or giving away targeted tax credits to corporations. Practically speaking, then, regulatory change is the best way, if not at times the only realistic way, for political candidates and elected officials to trumpet themselves as the saviors of a dying industry. Even if the payoff in terms of real economic benefits to a dying industry might be limited or nonexistent, regulatory reform still can deliver symbolic outcomes that are helpful to politicians.

None of this is to suggest that every business leader or politician who has perpetuated the “war on coal” narrative has acted insincerely or deliberately to promote their own self-interests. The strategic, self-interested reasons for blaming regulation may at times simply reinforce, at least for some leaders, an ingrained psychological self-defense mechanism that accentuates biases against regulation.

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accepted unconsciously. Especially for someone already predisposed to a political ideology that opposes regulation, a decline in coal production coterminous with policy initiatives by the Obama administration may have activated a confirmation bias that only reinforced the “war on coal” narrative. But acknowledging that the psychological possibility of implicit tendencies to accept a regulatory war narrative does not diminish the need for policy decision makers to exercise caution. Regulatory officials and courts should be especially on guard against the possibility of deregulatory overreaction when any major industry’s fortunes are in decline.

One final point bears mentioning. Just as antiregulatory rhetoric should not be taken at face value, the assumption that regulation of any kind will always achieve its ultimate aims seems also deserving of suspicion. We note that President Obama, seeking to underscore his administration’s commitment to combating climate change, appears to have been willing at times to accept the “war on coal” narrative, perhaps no less than coal industry executives. Yet even if some in the Obama administration desired to drive the coal industry out of existence, the administration’s signature climate initiatives appear to have added little to no further momentum to the decline of the coal industry—at least, that would be another plausible inference from our failure to see clear evidence

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253. On confirmation bias generally, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 81 (2013). We accept that anyone—including stock market investors—can be susceptible to confirmation bias or other cognitive limitations. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 205–53 (2015). Yet market analysts and investors do not have the kind of incentives that industry leaders and politicians have to accept overstated claims about regulatory “wars.” Quite the contrary, investors with money on the line have incentives to investigate and understand how regulatory and other events will actually affect the financial performance of publicly traded firms. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. In this regard, it seems at least somewhat ironic that both EPA and the electric utility industry later came to agree, when the agency went to rescind the Clean Power Plan, that this climate rule would have resulted in very little, if any, meaningful economic effects, given the underlying market fundamentals that are leading utilities to shift to natural gas. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, and the Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units 2-4–2-7, 2-12–2-13 (June 2019); Quinlan J. Shea, III, Vice President, Environment & Natural Resources, Edison Electric Institute, Comments on “Proposed Rule: Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units: Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; New Source Review Program” 4 (Oct. 2018).

254. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 185, at 10–15. Recent scholarship has suggested that, under highly limited circumstances, regulators ought to take into account broad macroeconomic considerations, such as when the economy as a whole is in a deep recession and interest rates have already been lowered virtually to zero. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019); see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34 YALE J. REG. 857 (2017). Whatever the merits of these arguments, they apply only in response to economy-wide conditions, not to the continued viability of a particular industry.

255. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
in investors’ behavior consistent with a “war on coal.” For those who are concerned about climate change, this might imply that the Obama administration’s regulatory efforts were too timid. Some scholars have indeed suggested that the CPP, even as it offered great symbolic purchase to the public, was in some ways a limited measure with critical design weaknesses. Our findings suggest that, whether a policy maker is concerned with regulation’s costs or with its benefits, it is always important to scrutinize claims about its effects. Regulatory policies, after all, can amount to symbolic gestures just as deregulatory ones can.

CONCLUSION

For much of the last decade, the coal industry’s decline has stood at the center of a national debate over government regulation in the United States. Some of the loudest voices in that debate have claimed that major rules that the Obama administration imposed on coal-powered electricity plants worked to the severe detriment of the coal industry. These regulations have even been said to have brought about a large decline in coal production during the last ten years. Yet notwithstanding industry leaders’ and politicians’ strong charges of a regulatory “war on coal,” we find no meaningful support from our analysis for placing responsibility for coal’s decline on environmental regulation.

Our research, the first to address how financial analysts and market participants assessed news of environmental regulation on the coal industry’s fortunes, may seem to yield puzzling results in light of the “war on coal” rhetoric. After all, if EPA’s Clean Power Plan was the signature battle in the “war on coal,” then surely the market would have responded positively to the U.S. Supreme Court’s unprecedented stay of that rule. Yet, if anything, coal investors’ reaction to the Court’s decision was negative. Across a range of key regulatory events, the stock market appears to have failed time and again to respond in ways that would have confirmed industry leaders’ and their political allies’ confident “war on coal” story.

It would even seem as if investors simply did not worry much about the regulatory “war on coal” narrative. Their main worry presumably centered on the bigger battle that the coal industry faced with its competitors in the natural gas sector. As such, investors may have figured out that natural gas had already sealed the industry’s doom long before the “war on coal” regulations could have any appreciable economic effects. Of course, investors did seem to worry about,

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256. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 156 (2016) (noting that, although the CPP was the most ambitious regulatory effort to regulate carbon emissions to date, its state-based model also mapped awkwardly onto the regional energy governance structures that were best positioned to ensure that climate regulation would work).

257. See supra notes 61–62, 67, and 166–167 and accompanying text.

258. See id.

259. See supra Part III.
and respond to the news of, other events having potentially more immediate implications for the short-term profitability of coal firms, such as bankruptcies in the industry. But altogether, the lack of meaningful response of stock prices to major regulatory events is consistent with a view, supported by other evidence as well, that environmental regulations had little to do with the decline of coal production over the last decade.

The findings reported here are also not surprising in light of a considerable body of research showing how little environmental regulations more generally seem to matter in shaping the international competitiveness of U.S. industry or affecting overall employment. Caution seems warranted whenever business leaders and politicians make regulation the scapegoat for economic woes and promise to save entire industries by rolling back regulations. After all, scapegoats and saviors operate in the world of political symbols. Symbolic appeals can serve the self-interest of business leaders and politicians, especially when a major industry finds itself in decline, but they will not help much when making meaningful public policy decisions. Government officials need to see regulatory scapegoating for what it is and seek to analyze all regulatory impacts with care, taking into account both the potential costs of regulatory decisions and their potential benefits.

260. See supra Part IV.
261. See supra Subpart V.B.

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