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Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census of Judicial Review Under the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968

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STILL LIVING AFTER FIFTY YEARS: A CENSUS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1968
Seth F. Kreimer

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Introduction

The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968.1 The year dramatized also the contrast between the United Supreme Court’s continued reluctance to engage with the problem of partisan gerrymandering and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s deployment of its independent authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to dispatch the flamboyantly gerrymandered map of Pennsylvania’s congressional districts.2 It occasioned the first time that members of the Pennsylvania Legislature moved for the wholesale impeachment of a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over the exercise of its power of judicial review under the state constitution.3


3 For an image of the florid nature of Pennsylvania’s gerrymander see, e.g., Aaron Blake, Name that District Contest Winner: ‘Goofy Kicking Donald Duck’, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/name-that-district-contest-winner-goofy-kicking-donald-duck/2011/12/29/glQ29fa0p_blog.html; see also League of Women Voters of Pa., 181 A.3d at 1110 (containing images of districts); League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 749 (same).

The year 2018 saw, as well, the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy, portending a shift in the trajectory of the constitutional sensibility of the working majority of the United States Supreme Court. The inflection of federal constitutional law that accompanied the appointments of Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens between 1969 and 1975 generated a surge of interest in independent state constitutional protection of individual rights abandoned or slighted in federal jurisprudence that became known as the “New Judicial Federalism.”

We can expect renewed interest in independent state constitutional interpretation the coming decade.

There was one precursor. In 1805, Pennsylvania’s Republican legislators tried to impeach and convict the three Federalist Justices, Shippen, Yeates, and Smith, who served on the four-member Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The precipitating claims regarded their treatment of a litigant in a non-constitutional case. The impeachment failed to achieve the requisite two-third majority. See Elizabeth K. Henderson, The Attack on the Judiciary in Pennsylvania, 1800-1810, 61 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 113, 113-14 (Apr. 1937); see also RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 165-70 (1971). Justice Yeates referenced the possibility of impeachment three years later in Emerick v. Harris:

Every one can readily see that the judges may be thrown into a delicate situation by the exercise of this constitutional right [to judicial review]. They are subjected to the lawmaking power by impeachment…. [T]he constitution of this state contemplates no wilful perversion of the power of impeachment or removal; and it is to be hoped, for the honor of human nature, that such instances will seldom occur. Whenever it does happen, the judge must derive consolation from the integrity of his own mind, and the honest feelings that he has discharged his duty with fidelity to the government. When he accepted his commission he knew the tenure of his office; and it is much better that individuals should suffer a private inconvenience, than the community sustain a public injury. Posterity sooner or later will do him complete justice.

1 Binn. 416, 421 (Pa. 1808).

The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. This Article constitutes—so far as I can determine—the first such comprehensive exploration.5

This Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968, and of Pennsylvania’s practice of independent judicial review. It then presents a census of the cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has deployed independent state constitutional review under the Constitution of 1968. The core of the census was a review of the 1586 reported Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases in the fifty years since the adoption of the 1968 Constitution referring to claims of unconstitutionality under the Pennsylvania Constitution.6 This Article analyzes the 372 identified cases in which the Supreme Court has vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania constitutional rights.7

5The collections of essays edited by Dean Gormley and Mr. Hare provide valuable resources. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (Ken Gormley et al. eds., 2004); THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA: LIFE AND LAW IN THE COMMONWEALTH, 1684-2017 (John J. Hare ed., 2018). So does the important collection of materials at The Pennsylvania Constitution Webpage (https://www.paconstitution.org/), the constellation of articles on specific provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the galaxy of commentary on the New Judicial Federalism. Readers interested in exploring this galaxy are encouraged to input “New Judicial Federalism” or “Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights” or (“Robert F. Williams” and “state constitution”) into their favorite research engine.

But no author has undertaken a comprehensive census of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s work of independent constitutional review under the 1968 Constitution.

6Lexis searches of [(“Pennsylvania constitution” or “constitution of Pennsylvania” or “state constitution”) and ("unconstitutional" or violat!)] in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court file covering cases decided between the adoption of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution yielded 1586 cases. This sample was supplemented by Shepardizing those cases in which judicial review invalidated or limited government actions. For details, see Appendix A infra.

7It does not analyze cases in which the Court concluded that the action under review was wholly consistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution; nor does it analyze the set of cases in which the Superior Court or Commonwealth Court has engaged in independent state constitutional review, but the Supreme Court has not expressly evaluated that determination.

As to the first limitation, while the “ratifying function” of judicial review can be important, it does not generate either the independent analysis or the degree of controversy accompanying the invalidation or modification of the work of other branches of government. As to the second, while these cases are often consequential, e.g., Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 449 50 (Pa. Commw. 2000),
The first contribution of the project is descriptive, undertaken in the spirit of the young Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He wrote:

History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know.... When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.\(^8\)

To begin the process of taming the dragon, Appendix C sets forth the census of cases in a form that provides lawyers, judges, and scholars with a resource that can be deployed in research, advocacy, and analysis.\(^9\) The Article proceeds to analyze those cases and place their exercises of judicial review in historical context. It concludes with reflections on the nature of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s judicial review under the Constitution of 1968. The Pennsylvania Constitution is not, as the late Justice Scalia would have it, “dead, dead, dead.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has engaged in a continuing process of judicial statesmanship that looks to text, history, structure, and ongoing doctrinal elaboration to bring evolving constitutional traditions and values to bear on the issues confronting the Commonwealth. The process has not always been unanimous, or without contention. But it is precisely what the

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\(^8\) Oliver Wendell Holmes, *The Path of Law*, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).

\(^9\) An earlier ten-year version of Appendix C was presented to a conference commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution, sponsored by the Pennsylvania Commission on Judicial Independence on March 18, 2018. It proved welcome among the judges and attorneys attending the conference.
people of the Commonwealth had reason to expect when they adopted the amendments that constitute the 1968 Constitution.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND OF PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL REVIEW

Between 1701 and 1776, Pennsylvania’s pre-Revolutionary governments functioned under a series of Frames of Government, and a Charter of Privileges established by William Penn as Proprietor and his successors. The first independent and popular Pennsylvania Constitution was promulgated in July 1776 by an extralegal Constitutional Convention, elected in the shadow of the American Declaration of Independence by an electorate of 6000, from which both loyalists and Quakers were excluded. The 1776 Constitution enacted a Declaration of Rights, which included the lineal predecessors of much of the current Declaration of Rights. Judges of the Supreme Court were appointed for seven-year terms by a popularly elected executive council; an elected Council of Censors was responsible for determining “whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate,” recommending repeal of unconstitutional statutes and convening subsequent Conventions by a two-thirds vote.

In 1789, the Council of Censors received a petition from 18,000 persons seeking adoption of a new constitution. When the Censors failed to achieve the two-thirds majority required by the existing constitution for amendment, a majority of the Pennsylvania Assembly issued an

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11 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I; PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I.
12 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 19 (executive council elected, president chosen by council and general assembly); id. ch. II, § 20 (appointment of judges by president and council); id. ch. II, § 23 (seven-year terms for judges); id. ch. II, § 24 (judges have powers “usually exercised by such courts”); id. ch. II, § 47 (Censors “shall be to enquire whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part ... shall have authority to pass public censures, to order impeachments, and to recommend to the legislature the repealing such laws as appear to them to have been enacted contrary to the principles of the constitution”); id. (establishing a two-third quorum requirement to call for Convention).
extralegal call for a constitutional convention. Delegates were popularly elected pursuant to that call, and in September of 1790, the Convention proclaimed a new constitution without popular ratification. The 1790 Constitution retained much of the Declaration of Rights of the 1776 Constitution. It added the declaration “That elections shall be free and equal.” It abolished the Council of Censors, but did not otherwise address issues of constitutional enforcement and provided for lifetime gubernatorial appointment of judges and justices to serve on good behavior.

Justices appointed under the 1790 constitution asserted power to declare legislation inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution and hence void well before Justice Marshall exercised authority under the federal Constitution in *Marbury v. Madison* in 1803. In 1808, having survived an impeachment effort, Justice Yeates declaimed “until lately there was but one opinion on this subject; it being uniformly conceded by the bar, and held by the bench, that the courts of justice must necessarily possess and exercise the power of judging of the constitutionality of all laws, brought before them judicaiially.”

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14 *Id.* at 19-20.
15 The Declaration of Rights was placed at the conclusion of the document as Article IX. The “inherent rights” provision (Article I, Section I) eliminated reference to “natural” and “inalienable” rights and replaced it with a declaration of “indefeasible” rights, recognized a right to “protect reputation,” and eliminated reference to a right of “pursuing and obtaining … safety.”
16 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § V.
17 *Id.* art. II, § 8 (appointment); *id.* art. V, § 2 (good behavior).
18 Compare *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803), with *Austin v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa.*, 1 Yeates 260, 261 (Pa. 1793) (“The plaintiff’s claim then must be *chiefly* founded on the act of the 6th August 1784, which it is said vested the real estate of his brother in him. But the act was repealed… and I have no difficulty in declaring for the same reasons, that the former act was *unconstitutional.*”), *Hubley’s Lessee v. White*, 2 Yeates 133, 146 (Pa. 1796) (per curiam) (declaring in dictum: “We possess also the power of declaring a law to be unconstitutional, and such power has heretofore been exercised… a very clear case only can warrant it.”), *Respublica v. Duquet*, 2 Yeates 493, 501 (Pa. 1799) (noting in dictum: “As to the constitutionality of these laws, a breach of the constitution by the legislature, and the clashing of the law with the constitution, must be evident indeed, before we should think ourselves at liberty to declare a law void and a nullity on that account.”).
19 Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 421 (Pa. 1808).
In 1825, in *Eakin v. Raub*, Chief Justice William Tilghman maintained for a majority “when a judge is convinced, beyond doubt, that an act has been passed in violation of the constitution, he is bound to declare it void.” By contrast, Justice John Bannister Gibson’s dissent in *Eakin* argued at length that judicial review of legislative determinations under the Pennsylvania Constitution was an improper usurpation of the authority of the people of Pennsylvania.21

After an unsuccessful legislative call for a constitutional convention in 1825 and a decade of popular dissatisfaction with the 1790 Constitution, in 1835, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute submitting a call for a constitutional convention to a popular referendum.22 Upon approval by the voters, the Legislature provided for popular election of convention delegates, and the delegates framed a revised constitution, which retained the Declaration of Rights from the 1790 Constitution. The convention debated objections to judicial review, but rejected calls for popular election of judges. The compromise adopted limited the terms of the Supreme Court Justices to fifteen years.23 In 1838, the electorate of Pennsylvania ratified the new constitution by a closely divided vote.24 This was the first electoral ratification of a Pennsylvania Constitution.

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20 See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 339-40 (Pa. 1825) (Tillman, C.J.); accord id. at 381 (Duncan, J.) (“Under this view of the judicial department, it is surely the best, the safest, and in our republic can be the only mediation between a citizen and an unconstitutional act of the legislature.”).  
21 See id. at 355 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“I am of the opinion that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing their representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the government, is reserved by the people for their own immediate use; and to redress an infringement of their rights in this respect…”).  
24 BRANNING, supra note 10, at 30; John L. Gedid, supra note 22, at 60.
In the aftermath of the 1837 constitutional debate over judicial review and elections, and the compromise reached and ratified in 1838, Justice Gibson—who had become Chief Justice in 1827—receded from his prior skepticism regarding judicial review. He viewed the new constitution as an acquiescence by the People in the exercise of judicial review and adopted as his own the concern that constitutional rights would otherwise be insecure.25

In 1850, the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to provide for popular election of judges.26 During the ensuing generation, Justice Gibson27 and his colleagues continued to wield

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25 See, e.g., Menges v. Wertman, 1 Pa. 218, 222 (1845) (Gibson, C.J.) ("My theory, however, seems to have been tacitly disavowed by the late convention, which took no action on the subject, though the power had notoriously been claimed and exerted. But experience has taught me the futility of mere theory. There must be some independent organ to arrest unconstitutional legislation, or the citizen must hold his property at the will of an uncontrollable power. It would be useless for the people to impose restrictions on legislation, if the acts of their agents were not subject to revision."); see Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 284 (1845) (in the course of argument, Chief Justice Gibson observed: "I have changed that opinion for two reasons. The late Convention, by their silence, sanctioned the pretensions of the courts to deal freely with the acts of the legislature; and from experience of the necessity of the case"); Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg. 171, 173 (Pa. 1843) (Gibson, C.J.) (addressing statute retroactively allowing inheritance by illegitimate offspring: "We dare not say that more was intended, and by that accuse the Legislature of an attempt to break their promise in the presence of Almighty God, to support the Constitution, which declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land...The design of the convention was to exclude arbitrary power from every branch of the government; and there would be no exclusion of it, if such rescripts or decrees were allowed to take effect in the form of a statute. The right of property has no foundation or security but the law; and when the Legislature shall successfully attempt to overturn it, even in a single instance, the liberty of the citizen will be no more."); see also Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 90-91 (1847) ("The act of 1846 makes important alterations in the will of the testator... The bill of rights, which is for ever excluded from legislative invasion, declares that the trial by jury shall remain as heretofore, and the right thereof be inviolate; that all courts shall be open, and that every man shall have redress by the due course of law, and that no man can be deprived of his right, except by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land...The talismanic words, I am a citizen of Pennsylvania, secures to the individual his private rights, unless they are taken from him by a trial... according to the laws and customs of our fathers, and the securities and safeguards of the constitution.").

26 BRANNING, supra note 10, at 32; Gedid, supra note 22, at 61-63; Witte, supra note 23, at 1112-17.

27 After the change to popular election of the judiciary, Chief Justice Gibson was the only sitting justice elected to stay on the bench. However, he no longer served as Chief Justice, and was replaced by Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black in 1851. Eulogy Delivered by Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black (May 9, 1853), reprinted in THOMAS P. ROBERTS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN BANNISTER GIBSON, LATE CHIEF JUSTICE OF PENNSYLVANIA 102 (1890); id. at 106.
state constitutional authority to invalidate an array of legislation which they determined to be tyrannical interferences with vested rights.28

In the decades following the Civil War, industrial development, urbanization, political corruption, and the rise of corporate manipulation generated an array of legislative and political abuses that precipitated calls for another Constitution Convention.29 In 1871, the Pennsylvania

28 See De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850) ("It is idle to say the authority of each branch is defined and limited in the constitution, if there be not an independent power able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that it is thoughtlessly but habitually violated; and the sacrifice of individual right is too remotely connected with the objects and contests of the masses to attract their attention."); In re Washington Ave., 69 Pa. 352, 363 (1871) (invalidating paving assessment, holding: "There is a clear implication from the primary declaration of the inherent and indefeasible right of property, followed by the clauses guarding it against specific transgressions, that covers it with an aegis of protection against all unjust, unreasonable and palpably unequal exactions under any name or pretext."); Craig & Blanchard v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399 (1870) (determining that log owners were entitled to notice and an opportunity to show that they did not set the logs afloat contrary to law); Reiser v. William Tell Sav. Fund Ass’n, 39 Pa. 137, 145-46 (1861) (declaring retroactive removal of usury prohibition unconstitutional); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495 (1859) (holding that act declaring a sheriff's sale of mortgaged property valid was unconstitutional); McCabe v. Emerson, 18 Pa. 111, 112-13 (1851) (invalidating legislative interference with plaintiff’s $400 judgment as unconstitutional); cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Roney v. Warwick, 172 Pa. 140, 143-44 (1895) (“It was unavoidable in their earlier administration that conflict should have arisen between the legislative and judicial branches of our government. The form of government was new, and the exact limitations of duty and power were imperfectly understood... the feeble resistance offered by the judiciary naturally encouraged encroachments by the legislature. The mischief which resulted became so great that this court was compelled in to take a stand in assertion of the power which the constitution had conferred.”).

29 See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 810-11 (1987) (“Legislative abuses led to the specific limitations on legislative procedure inserted into the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874.”); Gedid, supra note 22, at 31; see also Washington v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 2018 Pa. LEXIS 3695, at *13-14 (July 18, 2018) (“By the time of the Civil War, large corporations, particularly the railroads, and other wealthy special interest groups and individuals had acquired such influence over the General Assembly that they routinely secured the passage of legislation which exclusively served their narrow interests to the detriment of the public good.... As a result, during the decade after that conflict ended, the populace became increasingly dissatisfied with the manner in which the General Assembly was functioning, such that the people lost confidence in the legislature's ability to fulfill its most paramount constitutional duty of representing their interests.”); Nextel Commun's. of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682, 694 (Pa. 2017) (“[A] larger package of constitutional provisions the people of the Commonwealth approved in adopting the ‘Reform Constitution’ of 1874 for the purpose of altering certain legislative practices which had become commonplace during the 19th century, but which, by the latter part of that century, had fallen into serious disfavor with the populace, who rightly perceived that these practices were intended to advance private or personal interests at the expense of the public's welfare.”); William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dept' of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 423 n.13 (Pa. 2017) (“This Court previously has observed that the 1874 Constitution ‘was drafted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust of the legislative body and of fear of the growing power of corporations,’ and reflected a ‘prevailing mood...
The Legislature authorized a referendum on a convention, which prevailed by a margin of better than four to one.\(^{30}\) The enabling legislation in 1872 decreed that delegates to the convention were to be elected by a combination of elections by senatorial districts, elections by counties and at large elections that preserved representation for minorities in each constituency.\(^{31}\)

The Convention was not authorized by its enabling legislation to “alter in any manner” the Declaration of Rights, though ultimately the Convention marginally strengthened several of its provisions.\(^{32}\) The delegates debated and rejected the substitution of appointive for elective judges, but increased the term of service for Supreme Court judges from 15 to 21 years.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{30}\) Gedid, *supra* note 22, at 151 n.66 (332,119 to 62,738); Branning says 328,000 to 70,000. BRANNING, *supra* note 10, at 56. The most valuable and thorough exploration of the historical sources regarding the pathologies that precipitated the 1874 Constitution that I have found in the legal literature is Donald Marritz, *Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Special Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution*, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161, 185-94 (1993), which includes the striking statistic that in the seven years preceding the 1873 Constitutional Convention, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted 475 general laws and 8755 special or private laws. Id. at 187 n.124.


\(^{32}\) See Harry L. Witte, *Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania*, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 463 n.322 (1993) (Convention added “the prohibition on civil or military interference with the right of suffrage, PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I, § 5; somewhat strengthened the protection of the press, id. § 7; required that the ‘just compensation’ for private property taken for public use be ‘made or secured’ prior to the taking, id. § 10; and prohibited the legislature from ‘making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities,’ id. § 17.”).

The convention generated substantial revisions to the rest of the governmental structure that were “decisively” ratified by popular vote in December of 1873 and became effective January 1, 1874.34

The new constitution lengthened the term of the governor and strengthened his veto authority by providing a line item veto over appropriation bills; it established the office of lieutenant governor, and established an independent Supervisor of Common Schools. It reformed municipal governance and required cumulative voting in corporate elections. It required railroads to act as common carriers and imposed barriers to corporate collusion. It established a legislative duty to “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools, wherein all the children of this Commonwealth above the age of six years may be educated, and shall appropriate at least one million dollars each year for that purpose.”35

But the bulk of the new provisions were prohibitive. By one count the new constitution added more than sixty “thou shalt nots” in the legislative article alone.36 Among other limits, the

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34 See BRANNING, supra note 10, at 122 n. 49 (253,560 to 109,198); see also ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577 (1985).
35 PA. CONST. of 1874, art. X, § 1.
36 See Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 539, 565 (1893) (“Article 3 is almost wholly prohibitory. It enjoins very few duties, but the ‘thou shalt nots’ number more than 60….”); cf. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III § 7 (prohibiting special laws “relating to cemeteries”).

This profusion of prohibitions was on occasion cited to suggest a limit on judicial review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moir, 49 A. 351, 352 (Pa. 1901) (“The fact that the action of the state towards its municipal agents may be unwise, unjust, oppressive, or violative of the natural or political rights of their citizens, is not one which can be made the basis of action by the judiciary.... [The constitutional detail is] incontrovertible evidence that the constitution is the result of a full, detailed, exhaustive consideration of the subject of legislative control over merely local affairs is of itself a conclusive argument against any further additions by the courts to its 60 and more expressed prohibitions. There is no sounder or better settled maxim in the law than, ‘Expressio unius, exclusion est alterius,’....”).
1874 Constitution prominently originated the constitutional prohibitions on “special legislation” in 27 specified areas and the requirement that “taxes shall be uniform.”

The 1874 prohibitions laid the groundwork for decades of judicial review. Looking back from the turn of the century, Justice Mitchell observed:

The constitution of 1873 was a new departure in the history of the law. Instead of being confined, in accordance with the traditions of American institutions, to the framework of the government as composed of general and fundamental principles, it was converted into a binding code of particulars and details which had previously been left to the province of ordinary legislation. And the ruling motive with which we are now specially concerned was profound distrust of the legislature. As pointed out by our Brother Dean in Perkins v. Philadelphia, article 3 contains 60 specific prohibitions of legislation, besides other restrictions and regulations not absolutely prohibitory. Through these the pathway for honest and desirable and necessary laws even yet is not always clear, and it was inevitable that there should be some uncertainty and even divergence in the views of judges thus forced to enter on an untrodden and difficult field.

37 PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 7 (amended as PA. CONST. of 1968, art. III, § 32). The provision also prohibited enactment of “special or local law by the partial repeal of a general law” or “any law... granting powers or privileges in any case where the granting of such powers and privileges shall have been provided for by the general law.”

38 PA. CONST. of 1874, art. IX, § 1 (amended as PA. CONST. of 1968, art. VIII, § 1).

39 See, e.g., Appeal of Ayars, 16 A. 356, 364-65 (Pa. 1889) (“It has also been suggested that the question of necessity for classification, and the extent thereof, as well as of what are local or special laws, is a legislative, and not a judicial, question. The answer to that is obvious. The people, in their wisdom, have seen fit, not only to prescribe the form of enacting laws, but also, as to certain subjects, the method of legislation, by ordaining that no local or special law relating to those subjects shall be passed. Whether, in any given case, the legislature has transcended its power, and passed a law in conflict with that limitation, is essentially a question of law, and must necessarily be decided by the courts. To warrant a conclusion that the people, in ordaining such limitations, intended to invest their law-makers with judicial power, and thus make them final arbiters of the validity of their own acts, would require the clearest and most emphatic language to that effect. No such intention is expressed in the constitution, and none can be inferred from any of its provisions.”).

40 Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504, 512-14 (1900) (citation omitted); see Perkins, 156 Pa. at 565-66 (“[I]t is a fact that notwithstanding the respect which, as citizens of a free commonwealth, we all have for the fundamental law, since 1874 more than 300 bills have been passed by the legislature, which four governors have vetoed because they were unconstitutional; nearly 100 of these because they violated section 7, art. 3, prohibiting local and special laws. In the same time, 33, which received executive approval, have been pronounced unconstitutional by this court, most of them because violative of the same section 7, art. 3.”)
These limits chafed, \(^{41}\) but over the next eight decades, efforts to revisit the Constitution of 1874 comprehensively proved unsuccessful. A referendum seeking to hold a constitutional convention was approved by the legislature but rejected by the electorate in 1891. \(^{42}\) The failure of efforts to reform the constitution by convention repeated itself five more times in the next seventy years, though particular provisions of the constitution were amended more than seventy times. \(^{43}\)

Ultimately, a comprehensive revision was achieved over the period between 1963 and 1968 by seriatim constitutional amendments legislatively proposed and electorally ratified in 1966 and 1967 followed by a convention approved by referendum in 1967, with the Convention’s revisions electorally ratified in 1968. \(^{44}\) The result has been legislatively anointed the “Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968.” \(^{45}\)

For purposes of this Article, several elements of the rather baroque process that generated the Constitution of 1968 are particularly salient.

First, provisions of the Declaration of Rights of 1776 and 1790, which were retained by the 1838 and 1874 constitutions, contained neither express “due process” nor “equal protection” provisions. \(^{46}\) The Pennsylvania Bar Association’s “Project Constitution” at the outset of the

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\(^{41}\) Cf. Perkins, 156 Pa. at 569 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) (“Article 3, on ‘Legislation,’ …is a barbed-wire fence around all legislative action, bristling with points of danger even to the most honest, and desirable, and essential laws.”).

\(^{42}\) For a full account of the maneuvering, see Robert Sidman, Constitutional Revision in Pennsylvania—Problems and Procedures, 7 W. Va. L. Rev. 306 (1969); Gedid, supra note 23; Gedid, Discarding the Myths, supra note 21, at 164; Branning, supra note 9, at 127-55.


\(^{44}\) For details, see Sidman, supra note 42, at 310-19.


\(^{46}\) “Equal” appears in Article I, Section 1 (“All men are born equally free and independent, and
process that led to the Constitution of 1968, proposed an amendment to Section 10 of the Declaration to include the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment: “No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.” 47 No such addition made it through the legislative process.

Second, “Project Constitution” proposed two amendments to Article I, Section 8, which bars unreasonable searches and seizures. One would have added to the right to security “from unreasonable searches and seizures and other invasions of privacy.” The second would have provided: “Except as proof in a suit or prosecution for the violation of this provision, no evidence obtained as a result of violation of this provision shall be admissible in any judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative proceeding.”48 These proposals also were never adopted.49

Third, “Project Constitution” declared that “the extent to which private citizens of the Commonwealth shall be prohibited or discouraged from discriminating against other persons on the basis of race is a question for the legislature,” but proposed a new, “express and unequivocal” provision barring official discrimination on the basis of race: “No Discrimination by Commonwealth and its Political Subdivisions: Neither the Commonwealth nor any political

have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”), which originated in 1776, and implies some protection for life, liberty, property and reputation rights. “Equal” also appears in Article I, Section 5 (“Elections shall be free and equal”), which originated in 1790.

The 1790 protections of Article I, Section 9 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused... cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”) make reference to the Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision from which the due process clause is derived, but by their terms apply only to criminal prosecutions.

And the requirements of “uniformity of taxation” and the prohibition of “special legislation” from 1874 impose limitations on unequal treatment.


48 Id. at 246 (Resolution 1C) (emphasis added).

subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right because of race, color or national origin.”

This language was embedded in the proposals for amendment initially introduced into the State Senate in 1965. It was amended by the House to prohibit discrimination because of “race, creed, color, sex, or national origin.” The Senate refused to concur in the amendment on the basis of disagreement with the insertion of protection against sex discrimination. Ultimately the conference committee reported Article I, Section 26 in its current form, stating that public actors may not “deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right” nor “discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right,” and remitting the definition of prohibited denials of civil rights and discrimination to future constitutional construction. The voters of Pennsylvania, faced with the question of whether to adopt an amendment summarized on the ballot to the people of Pennsylvania as “Prohibit discrimination or denial of any person of his civil rights,” ratified Article I, Section 26 on May 16, 1967 by a vote of 1,232,575 to 638,365.

---

53 149 PA. LEGIS. J. SENATE 937-38 (1965) (Mr. McGregor, quoting Elizabeth Johnson, former Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Women and Children: “To insert sex into the pending Constitutional Civil Rights Amendment would be to harness ourselves with Constitutional blinders to reality.”).
Fourth, at the May 1967 election, the voters faced a ballot question seeking approval of a wholesale amendment of the limits on the legislature adopted by the Constitution of 1874. The descriptive question which faced the ratifying voters was even more opaque than the description of the prohibition of “discrimination.”

Among other changes, the text of this omnibus amended article broadened the constitutional prohibition of “special laws.” The 1874 constitution had prohibited the adoption of “special laws” regarding 27 specified subjects. The new provision, Article III, Section 32, reduced the number of specified subjects to 8, but prefaced the list with a command applicable to all statutes adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature: “The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law.” Voters ratified the proposal by a vote of 1,233,709 to 621,381.

Fourth, a ballot question presented in the May 1967 election sought authority to convene a Constitutional Convention, limited to addressing proposals to amend the structural articles of the Constitution including the Judiciary, Reapportionment, State Finance, and Local Government.

---

56 According to a record of the questions, it read as follows: Shall articles three, ten and eleven of the Constitution relating to legislation be consolidated and amended to modernize provisions relating to the power, duties and legislative procedures of the legislature; removing the limitation on the classification of municipalities; establishing a system of competitive bidding on State purchases; restricting the legislative power on special and local legislation; incorporating an unnumbered section relating to land title registration and repealing duplicate provisions made obsolete by this consolidation?

57 See Donald Marritz, supra note 30, at 203; Pa. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Special Committee on Project Constitution, supra note 54, at 8 (reporting on 1965 Senate Bill 532: “In view of the broad prohibition with which the section now begins, it would be unnecessary to specify any special subjects on which local or special legislation should not be enacted”).

58 PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 55, at 14.
Articles, but specifically excluding the Tax Uniformity Clause.\(^{59}\) The electorate approved the proposal by a vote of 1,140,931 to 703,576.\(^{60}\) The amended judiciary article proposed by the convention and ratified by voters on April 23, 1968 retained a modified system for the contested election of judges for ten-year terms, followed by uncontested retention elections.\(^{61}\) A subsequent proposed amendment that would have provided for merit selection of judges was narrowly defeated on May 29, 1969 by a vote of 643,960 to 624,453.\(^{62}\)

The flowering of constitutional revision of the late 1960s closed with the electoral approval on May 18, 1971 of two amendments introduced during the 1969-70 Legislative session: the Equal Rights Amendment, approved by a vote of 783,441 to 464,882,\(^{63}\) and the Environmental Rights Amendment, approved by a vote of 1,021,342 to 259,979.\(^{64}\)

\(^{59}\) See Act of March 16, 1967, P. L. 2, § 7(b) (Pa. 1967) (“The convention shall not consider or include in its recommendations any proposal which clearly permits or prohibits the imposition of a graduated income tax by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions nor shall that part of Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution providing that: ‘All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general law. . . ’ be modified, altered or changed in any respect whatsoever.”).

\(^{60}\) PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 55, at 13.

\(^{61}\) Id. at 19.

\(^{62}\) Id. at 21.

\(^{63}\) Id. at 23 (Question 2 on the ballot). It is now Article 1, Section 28 (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.”).

\(^{64}\) Id. at 23 (Question 3 on the ballot). It is now Article I, Section 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”); see Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 961-62 (Pa. 2013) (“[T]he proposed Environmental Rights Amendment received the unanimous assent of both chambers during both the 1969-1970 and 1971-1972 legislative sessions.... Pennsylvania voters ratified the proposed amendment of the citizens’ Declaration of Rights on May 18, 1971, with a margin of nearly four
II. FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1968

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply the provisions of the Federal Constitution as the United States Supreme Court construes them. But it has long recognized that it is free to apply the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide independent rights and impose independent obligations. The classic formulation is that the United States Constitution provides a “floor” but not a “ceiling.” Over the first half century of adjudication under the 1968 constitution, I have identified 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has engaged in independent constitutional review in ways that change rights and obligations. Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:

i. Exercise of independent constitutional review is not a once-in-a-life-time, or once-in-a-decade experience under the 1968 Constitution. Over half a century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exercised independent review on average in seven cases a year. It has invalidated or modified statutes in light of the demands of the Pennsylvania Constitution at an aggregate rate of more than twice a year. Independent review is not the province of an idiosyncratic group of jurists. Thirty-two Justices have authored opinions undertaking independent constitutional review, and twenty-five have deployed the 1968 Constitution to review statutes. Among the sitting Justices, only Justice Mundy has not yet authored such an opinion.

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to one, receiving 1,021,342 votes in favor and 259,979 opposed.”); cf. Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 596 (Pa. 1973) (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the amendment received more affirmative votes than any candidate seeking election to statewide office that same day).

The electorate also approved an amendment that allowed permit a verdict, in a civil case, to be rendered by no less than five-sixths of the jury. PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 6.


66 See infra app. B.
ii. Pennsylvania’s constitution contains provisions that parallel the wording of federal guarantees, provisions that address similar norms in congruent wording and provisions that are wholly disanalogous to federal provisions. Independent review of actions by prosecutors, courts and law enforcement officers in the area criminal procedure has focused on provisions whose text directly parallels federal provisions, prominently Pennsylvania’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures\(^{67}\) and its guaranties regarding the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions.\(^{68}\) By contrast, independent constitutional review of statutes rests mainly on state constitutional provisions that are congruent with federal provisions but not precisely parallel, and on provisions that have no federal counterparts.

iii. The Pennsylvania Constitution is not, as the late Justice Scalia would have it, “dead, dead, dead.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has engaged in a continuing process of judicial statesmanship that looks to text, history, structure, and ongoing doctrinal elaboration to bring evolving constitutional traditions and values to bear on the issues confronting the Commonwealth.\(^{69}\) This process is not always unanimous, or without contention, but it is exactly what the people of the Commonwealth had reason to expect when they reenacted the constitution in 1968.

\(^{67}\) PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 8 (“Security from Searches and Seizures”).
\(^{68}\) PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 9 (“Rights of the Accused in Criminal Prosecutions”).
\(^{69}\) Compare Thomas G. Saylor, *Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule*, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 309-12 (2003) (“[C]ourts should at the outset identify the constitutional value or norm at issue... [and determine] whether the salient, constitutional value is, in some way, under-protected by the application of the prevailing rule or standard,” and follow an “exercise in practical judgment,” involving “a predictive comparison of possible outcomes form the application of various candidate doctrinal forms”), with *id.* at 325 (“Many constitutional questions lack answers that can be proved correct by straightforward chains of rationally irresistible arguments”); *see also*, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 635-42 (2013) (quoting Saylor with approval)); In re Bruno, 627 Pa. 505, 547 n.13 (2014) (same).
A. The Frequency of Independent Constitutional Review: The Size of the Dragon

In half a century of adjudication under the 1968 Constitution, judicial review under the Pennsylvania Constitution has been a regular feature of the work of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The 372 cases in which independent Pennsylvania judicial review has occurred have been spread out over the five decades. In the aggregate, the current Court is neither abnormally assertive, nor abnormally deferential compared to its recent predecessors.70

Chart 1: Independent Judicial Review By Year, 1968-201871

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71 The data in Chart 1, and subsequent charts includes decisions in the 50 years between electoral ratification on April 23, 1968 and April 23, 2018. Thus he 1968 represents eight months, and the 2018 entry represents a four months.
Table 1: Pennsylvania Independent Judicial Review By Year, 1968-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | **372**
Independent state constitutional review has addressed each of the branches of state
government under the 1968 Constitution, as well as municipal decision makers. The
Pennsylvania Court has deployed the Pennsylvania Constitution to review statutes, criminal trial
procedure, the actions of law enforcement officials, state executive officers, and municipal
governments. Review of statutes is by far the most frequent posture.

Chart 2: Actions Reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Trial</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Action</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Action</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Action</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>372</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In two-thirds of these cases, the state constitutional violation was fully independent: the
action under review did not transgress federal constitutional constraints. The pattern differs
greatly, however, among the subjects of review.
In the area of criminal trials, only a minority (37%) of the Pennsylvania constitutional decisions were fully independent; most overlapped with federal violations, and the opinions found both state and federal violations. Half of the cases involving actions by law enforcement (51%) found state but no federal violations. By contrast, the proportion of fully independent state constitutional violations rose to 80% with respect to review of statutes, 89% in review of actions by state executive officials and agencies, and 92% in review of municipal actions.

**Table 3A: Federal Violation As Well As State Violation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Violation</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remand</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>372</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3B: Federal Violation By State Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>138</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Trial</th>
<th>89</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remand</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal action</th>
<th>38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Action</th>
<th>28</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judicial Action</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most contentious exercise of review, the most frequent, and the one that recently occasioned threat of wholesale impeachment,\(^7\) is invalidation of the work of the Pennsylvania Legislature. While the current Court has been active in constitutional review of statutes, the level of deference to legislative determination does not fall outside of the bounds of historical norms, whether judged by all reviews of statutes or by reviews under independent Pennsylvania norms.

**Chart 3: Statutory Review by Year**

**Chart 4: Statutory Review by Year Without a Federal Violation**

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court can avoid direct confrontation with other branches of government by construing statutes, rules, and regulations to avoid conflict with state constitutional norms, or remanding cases for further determination in light of constitutional constraints. The Court adopts this strategy in roughly 20% of cases reviewed in the past fifty years.

\(^7\) See supra note 3.
years. In roughly a quarter of cases involving statutory review, the Court has deployed constitutional norms as occasions for statutory construction, trimmed statutes to avoid constitutional violations, or remanded for further adjudication rather than invalidating them outright.

Table 4A: Invalidation and Avoidance – All State Action

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invalidation</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory construction</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remand</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>372</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4B: Invalidation and Avoidance – Statutes

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Invalidation</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory construction</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remand</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Teeth and Claws: The Constitutional Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exercised independent judicial review under the Constitution of 1968 in 372 cases. Of these, 138 involved statutory review. The tables that follow illustrate the relative frequency of different types of claims.

In the aggregate sample of 372, claims under provisions constraining the criminal process (147) accounted for the most exercises of review, followed by cases vindicating provisions requiring uniform taxation and equal treatment (47),\(^{74}\) cases limiting oppression under Article I, Section 1 (40), and cases protecting judicial autonomy (38).

\(^{73}\) This category refers not only to construction of statutes but also of municipal codes and state regulations.

\(^{74}\) Between 1971 and 1979, Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment was deployed successfully almost twice a year. The pace of ERA cases abated in 1979 with the adoption of a statutory presumption of gender reciprocity. See George v. George, 409 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1979) (noting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 (1979
Among the 138 cases reviewing statutes, successful claims involving equal treatment and tax uniformity (31) were most common, followed by protection of judicial autonomy (23), and claims involving criminal process (11).

### Table 5: Total Cases by Provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Criminal Process</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 9</td>
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<td>Art. I, § 8</td>
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<td>Art. I, § 10</td>
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<td>Art. I, § 6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Judicial Autonomy and Administration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. V, § 10</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>Art. V, § 18</td>
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<td>Art. V, § 16</td>
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<td>Separation of Powers</td>
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<td>Art. IV, § 9</td>
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<td>Art. V, § 5</td>
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<td><strong>Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression</strong></td>
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<td>Art. I, § 1</td>
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<td><strong>Tax Uniformity</strong></td>
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<td>Art. VIII, § 1</td>
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<td><strong>ERA</strong></td>
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<td>Art. I, § 28</td>
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<td><strong>Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32, Art. I, § 1</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Limits on Municipal Action</strong></td>
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<td>Art. III, § 27</td>
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<td>Art. IX, § 2</td>
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<td>Art. VI, § 7</td>
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<td>Art. IX, § 10</td>
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<td><strong>Cruel Punishment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pamphlet) provided “where in any statute heretofore enacted there is a designation restricted to a single sex, the designation shall be deemed to refer to both sexes unless the designation does not operate to deny or abridge equality of rights under the law of this Commonwealth”.

27
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking Art. I, § 10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedies Art. I, § 11</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Delegation</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. II, § 1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. VI, § 7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits on Legislative Process</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. III, § 9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. IV, § 8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of Powers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. VI, § 7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. III, § 11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. II, § 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. II, § 15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Subject Rule</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. III, § 3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. XI, § 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jury Trial Art. I, § 6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Limits Art. I, § 1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits on Executive Action</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. VI, § 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. IV, § 16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. II, § 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. IV, § 15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections Art. I, § 5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. II, § 17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Art. I, § 27</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education Art. III, § 14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Statutory Review by Provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Autonomy and Administration</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. V, § 10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. V, § 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. V, § 16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. V, § 13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of Powers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. IV, § 9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. V, § 12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32, Art. I, § 1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. PARALLEL, CONGRUENT AND SKEW PROVISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

There is a lively academic debate among academic jurispruders about the degree to which state constitutional analysis should give primary attention to the language of the commands embodied
in text when state courts interpret their constitutions. But in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, constitutional text exerts substantial claims. In thinking about Pennsylvania’s approach to the New Judicial Federalism under the Constitution of 1968, it seems useful to divide constitutional provisions into three groups on the basis of the relation between the wording and import of the state provisions and those contained in the federal constitution: parallel provisions, congruent provisions, and skew provisions. Each type raises distinct interpretive issues.

Parallel provisions track—or provide the template for—federal provisions. Thus, for example, the terms of Article I, Section 8—initially adopted in 1790, and largely prefigured in 1776—and those of the Fourth Amendment are virtually identical. It is here that the gravitational pull of federal jurisprudence is strongest.

---


78 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”), with PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 8 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue
Congruent provisions govern issues and embody norms that are also addressed by the federal constitution but utilize distinctive wording and often have distinctive history. Pennsylvania’s protections of free expression, which antedate the free expression protections of the First Amendment, address the same issues in similar though not identical terms.\(^79\) Its equality provisions diverge substantially in wording from their federal counterparts, but embody cognate norms.\(^80\)

Finally, like most state constitutions, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968 is well endowed with what might be described as disanalogous or skew provisions.\(^81\) These constitutional constructions have no parallel in the federal structure; they go off in another direction entirely. Thus, Pennsylvania constitutional provisions such as the Single Subject Rule,\(^82\) adopted in 1864, the definition of the authority of the Supreme Court over judicial

\(^{79}\) Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”), \textit{and} PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § X (“The people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure....”).

\(^{80}\) See discussion of equality provisions infra at pp qqq.

\(^{81}\) Those, like the author, for whom geometry is a somewhat distant memory can refresh their recollections regarding lines that are neither parallel nor intersecting at \textit{Skew Lines}, WIKIPEDIA, \url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skew_lines}.

\(^{82}\) PA. CONST. of 1968, art. III, § 3.
administration, adopted in 1968, and its Environmental Rights provision, adopted in 1971 have neither parallel nor correlate in the federal canon. Charts 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of these types of provisions in the census.

**Chart 5: Judicial Review By Provision Type – All Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruent</th>
<th>Parallel</th>
<th>Skew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chart 6: Judicial Review By Provision Type – Statutes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruent</th>
<th>Parallel</th>
<th>Skew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. **PARALLEL PROVISIONS**

Parallel provisions accounted for almost half (47%) of the cases construing the 1968 Constitution, but only 31% of cases which find violations of state but not federal constitutions. Over half (54%) of the cases involving these provisions also find federal violations. Parallel provision cases are concentrated in judicial control of the criminal justice system: criminal trials and searches. They involve only a handful of provisions of the Declaration of Rights.

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83 *Id.* art. V, § 10.
84 *Id.* art. I, § 27.
85 *Id.* art. I, § 9 (rights of accused); *id.* art. I, § 8 (search and seizure); *id.* art. I, § 10 (double jeopardy and taking); *id.* art. I, § 13 (cruel punishment); *id.* art. I, § 17 (ex post facto and impairment of contracts).
Invocations of parallel provisions comprise all but two of the 147 cases involving criminal process, but account for only 20% of the cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronts the legislature by exercising judicial review over statutes.

Table 7: Constitutional Review Under Parallel Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Process Art. I, §§ 8, 9, 10</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking Art. I, § 10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>174</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Finding State But No Federal Violation Under Parallel Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Process Art. I, § 8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking Art. I, § 10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Statutory Review Under Parallel Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Process Art. I, § 8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. I, § 10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking Art. I, § 10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The canonical modern codification of the “factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania constitution” was set forth by Justice
Cappy in *Commonwealth v. Edmunds*, a case explicating the Pennsylvania Court’s divergence from federal jurisprudence in the constitutional adjudication of searches and seizures:

The recent focus on the “New Federalism” has emphasized the importance of state constitutions with respect to individual rights and criminal procedure. It is important that litigants brief and analyze at least the following four factors:

1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law;
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.86

While the application of *Edmunds* has regularly occasioned debate on the Pennsylvania Court, the practice of looking to the *Edmunds* factors in criminal procedure cases involving parallel state constitutional provisions has become deeply entrenched. And, as Chief Justice Saylor has observed, in crafting state prophylactic rules for governance of the criminal process that may diverge from federal doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can draw on the explicit commitment to that Court by the 1968 Constitution of the authority to establish rules for the governance of the judicial system.87

Competent attorneys who practice criminal law in the Pennsylvania courts are well aware of the potential to argue for variant readings of identical constitutional language. As a result, they raise the arguments; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has had occasion to elaborate an extensive fabric of Pennsylvania case law interpreting protections regarding search and seizure and

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86 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991). The *Edmunds* Court applied the four factors and concluded that “a ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule would frustrate the guarantees embodied in Article I, Section 8 of our Commonwealth's constitution.” *Id.; cf. id.* at 898 (“During the first decade after *Mapp*, our decisions in Pennsylvania tended to parallel the cases interpreting the 4th Amendment. However, beginning in 1973, our case-law began to reflect a clear divergence from federal precedent … this Court began to forge its own path under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, declaring with increasing frequency that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution embodied a strong notion of privacy, notwithstanding federal cases to the contrary.”).

criminal trials. The Pennsylvania Justices are equally aware of the potential to push evolution of federal interpretation while holding the possibility of independent interpretation as a backup.88

B. CONGRUENT PROVISIONS

Congruent provisions instantiate norms cognate to those found in federal constitutional law, but diverge from the text of the federal models. Claims brought under these provisions account for 105/372 (28%) of the cases exercising review over government actions under the 1968 Constitution, and 84/253 (33%) of cases which find violations of state but not federal constitutional provisions. They constitute 54/138 (39%) of the cases exercising judicial review over statutes. The most prevalent grounds for judicial review in this group involve Article I, Section 1's protection of “inherent and indefeasible rights” (41 cases) and cases under Pennsylvania’s constitutional variant equality protections, embodied in the mandates of Tax Uniformity, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the prohibitions on special legislation and discrimination (47 cases).89

88 E.g., Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 479 n.3 (Pa. 2018) (granting relief for opening cell phone under emerging federal constitutional analysis, but noting “[b]ecause of the manner by which we decide this case, we need not address Fulton's claim under Article I, Section 8.”); cf. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (finding federal violation, then performing an Edmunds analysis to find the state ex post facto clause afford greater protections than its federal counterpart, and that SORNA's registration provisions constituted punishment violated both federal and state ex post facto clauses); Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 732 (Pa. 2016) (upholding cause of action for constitutionally inadequate funding under federal constitution, but finding a potential violation of Article I section 8 nonetheless); id. at 732 n.6 (“We do not provide a separate discussion of the right to counsel enshrined in Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is now well-settled that the right to counsel recognized in Article I, Section 9 and in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution are jurisprudentially coextensive.”).

89 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in earlier decades pushed beyond the federal floor in protecting rights of free expression. See, e.g., DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa. 2009) (protecting political contributions): This Court has found that Article I, Section 7 provides broader protections of expression than the related First Amendment guarantee in a number of different contexts. See [Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 571 Pa. 375 (2002)] (nude dancing entitled to greater protection under Pennsylvania Constitution); Commonwealth, Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs v. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 556 Pa. 268 (Pa. 1999) (commercial speech in form of advertising by chiropractors entitled to greater protection so long as not misleading); Ins. Adjustment Bureau v. Ins. Comm'r,
Table 10: Constitutional Review Under Congruent Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art I, §1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA Art. I, § 28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jury Trial Art. I, § 6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Limits Art. I, § 1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Process Art. I, § 14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Finding State but not Federal Violation Under Congruent Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art I, §1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA Art. I, § 28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jury Trial Art. I, § 6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procedural Limits Art. I, § 1</td>
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<td>Criminal Process Art. I, § 14</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Table 12: Statutory Review Under Congruent Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERA Art. I, § 28</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

518 Pa. 210 (Pa. 1988) (Article I, Section 7 does not allow prior restraint or other restriction of commercial speech by governmental agency where legitimate, important interests of government may be accomplished in less intrusive manner); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 (Pa. 1981) (political leafleting on college campus deemed protected expression under Article I, Section 7 where First Amendment may not protect same); Goldman Theatres v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83 (Pa. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961) (statute providing for censorship of motion pictures, while not necessarily violative of First Amendment, violates Article I, Section 7).

But it seems unlikely in the near future that the Pennsylvania Justices will exceed the speech protective enthusiasm of the current majority of the United Supreme Court. See note __ infra.
1. Article I, Section 1: Liberty, Property, Reputation, and “Due Process” Without Benefit of Text

a. Procedure without due process

Since 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has recognized the “inherent” rights of “life,” “liberty” and “property”; a protection for “reputation” dates from 1790. Unlike the federal constitution, the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution contains no generally applicable procedural guaranties; the words “due process of law” are entirely absent. Yet by the middle of the nineteenth century, well before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Pennsylvania Court extended constitutionally based procedural protections against state action, declaring:

The whole clauses in our constitutions on the subject were established for the protection of personal safety and private property. These clauses address themselves to the common sense of the people, and ought not to be filed away by legal subtleties. They have their foundations in natural justice, and, without their pervading efficacy, other rights would be useless... The great principle is, that a man's property is his own, and that he shall enjoy it according to his pleasure (injuring no other man) until it is proved in a due process of law that it is not his, but belongs to another.

See PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § 1 (“That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 1 (“That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”).

Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 263-64 (1851). At some points, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rooted protections in the “law of the land” provision (originating in PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9), eliding its textual limitation to “criminal prosecutions.” See, e.g., Palairet’s Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 485 (1871) (“If, however, an Act of Assembly… operates retroactively to take what is, by existing law, the property of one man, and, without his consent, transfer it to another, with or without compensation, it is in violation of that clause in the Bill of Rights, Const., Art. IX., sect. 9, which declares that no man ‘can be
Under the 1968 Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has imposed procedural protections that exceed the floor laid by contemporary U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, though it has provided no comprehensive account of the means of discerning the parameters of these protections.92

b. “Inherent and indefeasible rights”: “Acquiring, Possessing and Protecting Property”

deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” If this is true of a person accused of crime, to whom literally the words are applied, a fortiori is it so as to one against whom no accusation is made.”’); Craig & Blanchard v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399, 413 (1870) (“If... a forfeiture can take place without notice... and without an opportunity of being heard... then it seems to us to be contrary to the provision in the bill of rights, that [sic] no one shall be deprived of his property unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. The law of the land means by due process of law...The design of the Convention was to exclude arbitrary power from every branch of the government.”); Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 90 (1876) (statute “does not furnish due process of law, within the protection of the 9th section of the Declaration of Rights...the law must furnish some just form or mode, in which the duty of the citizen shall be determined before he can be visited with a penalty for non-performance of the alleged duty.”).

Current doctrine limits “law of the land” protection under Section 9 to criminal prosecutions in accordance with its text. See R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 535 Pa. 440, 448 (1994) (“Section 9 of Article I...is explicitly addressed to ‘criminal prosecutions.’ However, R. was not criminally prosecuted.”); id. at 460 n. 10 (“[T]he guarantees only apply to criminal proceedings”). Modern decisions discern Pennsylvania’s general procedural protections in the “emanations” of Article I, Section 1. See id. at 460 (“Even though the term ‘due process’ appears nowhere in those sections, due process rights are considered to emanate from [Article I, Section 1]”); Pa. Game Comm’n v. Marich, 542 Pa. 226, 229 n.4 (1995) (“Due process rights emanate from Article I, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution”); cf. Lyness v. Commonwealth, 529 Pa. 535, 541 (1992) (“The guarantee of due process of law, in Pennsylvania jurisprudence, emanates from a number of provisions of the Declaration of Rights, particularly Article I, Sections 1, 9 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”).

92 See Lyness v. Commonwealth, 529 Pa. 535, 546 (1992) (“What our Constitution requires, however, is that if more than one function is reposed in a single administrative entity, walls of division be constructed which eliminate the threat or appearance of bias.”); In the Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 19-20 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]he Commonwealth fails to speak to the Pennsylvania Constitution's inclusion of reputation as an inherent right under Article I, Sections 1...Given that juvenile offenders have a protected right to reputation encroached by SORNA's presumption of recidivism, where the presumption is not universally true, and where there is a reasonable alternative means for ascertaining the likelihood of recidivating, we hold that the application of SORNA's current lifetime registration requirements upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption.”); City of Phila. v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 (Breary), 604 Pa. 267 (2009) (holding that arbitrator’s unfair exclusion of critical evidence violated Pennsylvania procedural rights).
Pennsylvania’s recognition of “inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness” provides a stronger textual basis for substantive protection of important interests than do the federal due process clauses. By the middle of the nineteenth century, well before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment applied federal protections of liberty and property to the states, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution to limit the substantive authority of government to infringe on property and liberty rights. Some opinions relied on the a fortiori argument from the criminal “law of the land” clause to strike down interferences with vested property rights. Others looked to the implicit presuppositions of the Constitution. And others invoked the

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94 E.g., Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg 171, 173 (Pa. 1843) (noting in dictum that a statute allowing illegitimate child to inherit would be a violation of the “law of the land” clause if applied retrospectively); Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 90-91 (1847) (holding that legislative interference with execution of will was unconstitutional: “the talismanic words, I am a citizen of Pennsylvania, secures to the individual his private rights, unless they are taken from him by a trial, where he has an opportunity of being heard by himself, his counsel, and his testimony, more majorum, according to the laws and customs of our fathers, and the securities and safeguards of the constitution”); Shoenberger v. Sch.Dirs., 32 Pa. 34, 39 (1858) (invalidating statute appointing trustees to dispose of property under named will, declaring that “if the property of a citizen who had forfeited the protection of society, could not be taken from him except in due course of law, much less could theirs, for their claims to protection had never been forfeited or impaired”); Menges v. Dentler 33 Pa. 495 (1859) (statute validating sheriff’s sale held unconstitutional) (“The bill of rights, §§ 9, 11, declares that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land: and that the courts shall be always open to every man, so as to afford remedy by due course of law for all invasions of rights...they most plainly forbid both the act and the decision.”); Reiser v. William Tell Sav. Fund Assoc., 39 Pa. 137, 145-46 (1861) (relying on “law of the land” provision to hold retroactive removal of usury prohibition unconstitutional, noting that “[t]his section of the Bill of Rights is violated when civil and criminal rights are not both alike tried by due course of law”).
95 See McCabe v. Emerson, 18 Pa. 111, 112-13 (1851) (“I have no hesitation in saying that the Act [overturning final judgment for plaintiff] is unconstitutional and void. The legislature have no power, as has been repeatedly held, to interfere with vested rights. To give the property of A. to B. is clearly beyond legislative authority.... There is no limit to successful usurpation. Everything will depend on the will of an irresponsible majority.”).
“inherent and indefeasible rights” of Article I, Section 1, as part of a constitutional tapestry protecting property to strike down interventions judged excessive or tyrannical.⁹⁶

After adoption of the 1874 Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to monitor legislative interferences with property and extended its remit to protect freedom of contract as an “inherent and indefeasible right.” Thus, in striking down a statutory imposition of a mechanic’s lien, the Court declared:

The legislature has all power not withheld from it by the people in their fundamental law. Article 1, section 1, of the constitution declares that: ‘All men are born equally free and independent and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.’ Life, liberty and property are put upon the same plane, and an indefeasible right to the enjoyment of the first two, and to the acquirement and possession of the third, are placed beyond the power of any department of the government… “The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right” .... If there be such power in the legislature as is assumed in the second section of this act, then every business relation between any two persons may be declared that of principal and agent, with unlimited authority in the agent to contract debts which shall bind the property of the principal, in the face of positive agreement to the contrary. Such interference with the indefeasible rights of freedom of contract in the acquisition and protection of property, the people have plainly reserved from legislative power.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ In re Washington Ave. 69 Pa. 352 (1871) (invalidating tax on street-front property to finance improvements for the benefit of the public) (“When, therefore, the Constitution declares in the ninth article, that among the inherent and indefeasible rights of men is that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, -- that the people shall be secure in their possessions, from unreasonable seizures, -- that no one can be deprived of his property unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land -- that no man's property shall be taken or applied to public use without just compensation being made -- that every man for an injury to his lands or goods shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay -- and that no law impairing contracts shall be made -- and when the people, to guard against transgressions of the high powers delegated by them, declared that these rights are excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall for ever remain inviolate, they, for their own safety, stamped upon the right of private property, an inviolability which cannot be frittered away by verbal criticism on each separate clause, nor the united fagot broken, stick by stick, until all its strength is gone…Like the rain, [taxation] may fall upon the people in districts and by turns, but still it must be public in its purpose, and reasonably just and equal in its distribution, and cannot sacrifice individual right by a palpably unjust exaction…it becomes the judiciary to stand firmly by the fundamental law, in defence of those general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free government, for the establishment and perpetuation of which the Constitution itself was ordained.”).

⁹⁷ Waters v. Wolf, 162 Pa. 153, 168 (1894); see also McMaster v. West Chester State Normal Sch., 162 Pa. 260 (1894) (statute invalidating waiver of mechanic’s lien unconstitutional); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886) (invalidating statute forbidding payment of employees in goods “utterly unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do
During the *Lochner* era, limits imposed by federal and Pennsylvania constitutional constraints on government interferences with rights of property and contract ran along similar lines. With the New Deal Revolution, however, the United States Supreme Court receded from efforts to monitor legislative oppressive adjustments of economic rights and opportunities under the rubric of substantive due process.\(^98\) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was less emphatic in abandoning the field under Article I, Section 1.\(^99\)

Under the Constitution of 1968, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has continued to deploy constitutional protections of property to invalidate zoning ordinances determined to be what, in this country, cannot be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts... subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States. He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void.”).


\(^99\) See Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 191(1971) (“We have held unconstitutional... an act regulating car rental agencies as a public utility, an act forbidding gasoline stations from displaying price signs in excess of a certain prescribed size, an act forbidding the sale of carbonated beverages made with sucaryl, an act forbidding the sale of ice-milk milk shakes, and an act forbidding nonsigners from selling fair traded items below the price specified in price maintenance contracts.” (citations omitted)); see also Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. 357 Pa. 581 (1947) (declaring Community Property Act unconstitutional).
exclusionary or arbitrarily oppressive. The Pennsylvania Court has retained a distinctive doctrinal framework under Article I, Section 1 that diverged from the federal “substantive due process” doctrine with respect to other regulation. In 1971, three years after adoption of the Constitution of 1968, Justice Roberts, writing to invalidate a ban on drug store advertising as lacking legitimate justification, explicitly rejected emerging federal standards of review. Instead, he read the Pennsylvania Constitution to prohibit interferences which were “unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case” and to require that “the means which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained.” More recently, the Pennsylvania Court invalidated a lifetime ban on ex-offenders’ employment in the nursing home industry as unreasonable and unduly oppressive. It has


102 Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 191-92 (1971). Ironically, the United States Supreme Court came to similar conclusions regarding pharmacy advertising five years later under the renovated “commercial speech” doctrine of the First Amendment. See note __, supra.

reiterated that Pennsylvania’s constitutional standards for “reasonable” regulation reach higher than the deeply permissive or nonexistent federal floor,\textsuperscript{104} though it continues to extend substantial deference to commercial regulation.\textsuperscript{105}

c.“Defending…liberty…protecting…reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness”

In the last half century, the Pennsylvania Court has deployed judicial review to forge lines of substantive protection for non-economic interests under Article I, Section 1 that reach more broadly than their federal counterparts.

One line has highlighted the distinctive presence in the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of the “inherent and indefeasible” interest in “reputation” added by the 1790 revision.

\textsuperscript{104} See Shoul v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 173 A.3d 669, 677-78 (Pa. 2017) (“This Court, by contrast, applies what we have deemed a ‘more restrictive’ test… we must assess whether the challenged law has ‘a real and substantial relation’ to the public interests it seeks to advance, and is neither patently oppressive nor unnecessary to these ends.”); id. at 681 (“[A]s Chief Justice Castille explained [concurring] in Nixon, a law which fails to account for persons’ inherent potential for rehabilitation may well be ‘unreasonable,’ ‘unduly oppressive,’ or ‘patently beyond the necessities of’ its regulatory aims.”), But cf. id. at 690 (Wecht, J., concurring) (“Oddly enough, as the federal courts evolved toward a ‘rational relationship’ standard, this Court nonetheless has persisted in employing the language of Gambone to superintend legislation…. The Gambone/Nixon standard validates and encourages judicial overstepping…. It is time to cease adherence to the outdated and overbroad language of Gambone in applying the rational basis test in Pennsylvania.”).

\textsuperscript{105} See, e.g., id. (finding lifetime disqualification from commercial driver’s license of license holder who retrieved marijuana from a co-worker and delivered it to a State Police informant did not violate Article I, Section 1, but remanding for evaluation under Cruel Punishment Clause); Driscoll v. Corbett, 620 Pa. 494 (2013) (mandatory judicial retirement); Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 842 A.2d 936 (Pa. 2004) (reciprocal discipline of auctioneer).

Federal due process doctrine does not recognize impingements on reputation as deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty.106 By contrast, in the past half century the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found constitutional violations of the “right to protect and defend reputation” in government-imposed stigma107 and construed statutes narrowly to avoid undue impingement on interests in reputation.108

While the right to informational privacy holds a less than fully secure position in federal due process doctrine,109 a second robust line of Pennsylvania case law in the last half century reads Article I, Section 1 in conjunction with the fabric of the Pennsylvania Constitution to establish substantive constitutional protection of informational privacy rights beyond the limits on search and seizure.110 Under the 1968 Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

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106 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (a government act of defamation does not deprive a person “of any ‘liberty’ protected by the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment”; stigma, standing alone, does not “significantly alter[ ]” a person's legal status so as to “justify[ ] the invocation of procedural safeguards.” (citation omitted)).

107 See In re J.B., 630 Pa. 408 (2014) (determining that SORNA's lifetime registration provision as applied to juvenile offender was an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, highlighting right to reputation under art. I, § 1); Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 568 Pa. 471, 474 (2002) (“[T]here exists a right to petition for expungement of a PFAA record where the petitioner seeks to protect his reputation. This right is an adjunct of due process and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and is not dependent upon express statutory authority.”); Wolfe v. Beal, 477 Pa. 477 (1978) (holding that a person who has been unlawfully committed to a state mental hospital has an Art. I, § 1 right to the destruction of hospital records, which were created as a result of the illegal commitment).


109 Compare NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147 (2011) (“As was our approach in Whalen, we will assume for present purposes that the Government's challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitutional significance.”), with id. at 160 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“A federal constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist… I must observe a remarkable and telling fact about this case, unique in my tenure on this Court: Respondents’ brief, in arguing that the Federal Government violated the Constitution, does not once identify which provision of the Constitution that might be.”).

110 See, e.g., Pa. State Educ. Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 148 A.3d 142, 150 (Pa. 2016) (“In identifying rights to informational privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution, this Court has focused its attention not on the rights of persons accused as set forth in Article 1, section 8, but rather to the broader array of rights granted to citizens under Article 1, Section 1, which is entitled "Inherent rights of
vindicated the Article I right to informational privacy both by invalidating infringing actions\textsuperscript{111} and by reading statutes to incorporate appropriately weighty consideration of privacy interests under the Pennsylvania Constitution.\textsuperscript{112}

A third strand of doctrine has vindicated Pennsylvania constitutional limits on the government’s authority to infringe on matters of intimacy and bodily integrity, rooted in “inherent and indefeasible rights” more protective than those recognized by the United States mankind”); In re “B”, 482 Pa. 471, 482 (1978) (“The parties in this appeal have not cited, and our research has not revealed, any Pennsylvania appellate court decision dealing explicitly with this constitutional right of privacy…the patient's right to prevent disclosure of such information is constitutionally based. This constitutional foundation emanates from the penumbras of the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights, as well as from the guarantees of the Constitution of this Commonwealth, see especially, Article I, Section 1 (inherent right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to protect reputation and pursue happiness); Article I, Section 2 (all political power is inherent in the people); Article I, Sections 3 and 4 (people's right to freedom of religion); Article I, Section 7 (freedom of press and speech guaranteed to every citizen so that they may speak, write, or print freely on any subject…); Article I, Section 8 (people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable search and seizures); Article I, Section 9 (an accused in a criminal proceeding cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself); Article I, Section 11 (courts are to be open to all to provide remedy for injury done to reputation); Article I, Section 20 (right of assembly); Article I, Section 23 (prohibition of the peacetime quartering of troops in any house without the consent of the owner); and Article I, Section 25 (reservation of powers in the people); and Article I, Section 26 (prohibition against the denial by the Commonwealth of the enjoyment of any civil right). In some respects these state constitutional rights parallel those of the Federal Constitution…. In other respects our Constitution provides more rigorous and explicit protection for a person's right of privacy….”); see also Seth F. Kreimer, The Right to Privacy in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 77, 83 (1993) (“Pennsylvania's courts have relied on the insights under one constitutional provision to give texture to cognate rights.”); cf. The Castle Movie Clip – The Vibe of the Thing, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2011), \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssukL9a99JA}.

\textsuperscript{111} See In re “B”, 482 Pa. at 484-85 (barring subpoena of disclosure of records of inpatient psychiatric treatment of juvenile's mother); Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, 504 Pa. 191 (1983) (plurality opinion) (declaring the reporting provisions of the Ethics Act relating to family members unconstitutional “in that they violate the due process rights of the public official and the family's right to privacy under Art. I § 1”); cf. Fischer v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 509 Pa. 293, 299 n.8 (1985) (“The court did however affirm Judge MacPhail's conclusion that the rape and incest reporting provisions offended constitutional safeguards, and the Commonwealth was permanently enjoined from enforcing them…We note that the Commonwealth chose not to appeal this aspect of the Commonwealth Court's decision.”).

Supreme Court under contemporaneous federal law.\textsuperscript{113} Strikingly, at a time when the same sex intimacy was entirely bereft of federal protection, a plurality opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse” as an unconstitutional infringement on liberty.\textsuperscript{114} And well before the United States Supreme Court had reversed its refusal to recognize equal rights for same sex couples, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed Pennsylvania statutes in light of Article I, Section 1 to facilitate second parent adoption.\textsuperscript{115} In the last decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had occasion to forge ahead of the protections increasingly recognized by the federal courts in this area.

a. Protecting Equality Without Equal Protection

The words “equal protection” do not appear in the Pennsylvania Constitution. Rather, equality is addressed by a series of separate textual elements that have accreted over two and a half centuries.

\textsuperscript{113} See In re T.R., 557 Pa. 99, 108 (1999) (“Compelling a psychological examination in [juvenile dependency dispositional review] is nothing more or less than social engineering in derogation of constitutional rights… we find such state intervention frightening in its Orwellian aspect.”); John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306 (1990) (refusing to allow court-ordered blood tests); In re Baby Girl D., 512 Pa. 449 (1986) (construing guardian ad litem's standing to question the propriety of the fees charged for adoption to be grounded in the standing of the infant children themselves because “it is every American's right not to be bought or sold” pursuant to Art. I, § 1).

\textsuperscript{114} Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), with Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) (Flaherty, J., writing for himself and Eagan, C.J.) (declaring statute forbidding “deviate sexual intercourse” unconstitutional and arguing that “the police power should properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others”). The majority of the Court in Bonadio invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds. 415 A.3d at 50 (“Such a purpose [to regulate the private conduct of consenting adults], we believe, exceeds the valid bounds of police power while infringing the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of this Commonwealth.”).

\textsuperscript{115} Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The present case does not involve...whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”), with In re Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269 (2002) (construing Adoption Act in light of Article I, Section 1 to find that the Act provides same-sex second-parent adoption petitioners to establish cause why the legal parent need not relinquish parental rights).
Since 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has declared that “all men are born equally free and independent.”\(^{116}\) The 1790 Declaration of Rights mandated “That elections shall be free and equal.”\(^{117}\) The Constitution of 1874 adopted a prohibition against the adoption of “special laws” on twenty-seven specified subjects, and a requirement that “taxes and duties shall be uniform... and shall be levied and collected under general laws.”\(^{118}\) The participants in the process that generated the Constitution of 1968 considered adopting the “equal protection” language of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that proposal fell by the wayside.\(^{119}\) The text that emerged broadened the prohibition of “special laws” to apply to all legislation,\(^{120}\) retained the requirement of uniformity and “general laws” for taxation,\(^{121}\) and adopted a prohibition of “discrimination... against any person in the exercise of any civil right.”\(^{122}\) In 1971, the Equal Rights Amendment prohibited denial of “equal rights under law . . . because of sex.”\(^{123}\)

A long line of discussion in opinions construing the 1968 Constitution asserts that the standards for addressing unequal treatment under the Pennsylvania Constitution mirror those of the federal Equal Protection Clauses.\(^{124}\) But examining actual Supreme Court holdings reveals

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116 PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § I; cf. id. ch. II, § 18 (“In order that the freemen of this commonwealth may enjoy the benefit of election as equally as may be until the representation shall commence, as directed in the foregoing section, each county at its own choice may be divided into districts, hold elections therein... And no inhabitant of this state shall have more than one annual vote at the general election for representatives in assembly.”).
117 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § V.
118 PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 7; id. art. IX, § 1; cf. Appeal of Ayars, 16 A. 356, 363 (Pa. 1889) (“[G]eneral laws... apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities.”).
119 Supra at xxxx
120 Id. CONST. of 1968, art. III, § 32. See supra at yyy
121 Id. art. VIII, § 1.
122 Id. art. I, § 26.
123 Id. art. I, § 28.
124 The first assertion under the 1968 Constitution appears to be Balt. & O. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Labor & Indus., 461 Pa. 68, 83 (1975), where Justice Roberts states that “we must also consider appellees’ contentions under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution and Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. These issues may be considered together, for the content of the two provisions is not significantly different.” See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kramer, 378 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa. 1977) (“[T]he protection afforded by the equal protection clause of the federal
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has independently deployed Pennsylvania equality review on a regular basis in cases beyond the remit of federal equal protection doctrine.\textsuperscript{125}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Independent Judicial Review Under Equality Provisions}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1} & 17  \\
Statute & 8  \\
Municipal Action & 5  \\
Administrative Action & 4  \\
\textbf{ERA Art. I, § 28} & 12  \\
Statute & 8  \\
Judicial Action & 4  \\
\textbf{Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32} & 7  \\
Statute & 6  \\
Municipal Action & 1  \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & 36  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{125} For citations, see app. C.
In each of these areas, the state constitutional text diverges from the federal text, and was adopted in different time periods.\textsuperscript{126} And in each of them, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has in fact exercised judicial review under doctrinal analyses that are quite distinct from federal standards.

\textbf{a. Tax Uniformity}

The independent nature of Pennsylvania review is clearest with respect to the Tax Uniformity Clause. The 1873 Convention adopted the provision to address the “considerable popular anger generated by... preferential tax treatment, This anger fueled the clamor for a constitutional convention.”\textsuperscript{127} Before the 1967 Convention, the provision was deployed to invalidate state taxation regimes that met federal constitutional standards.\textsuperscript{128} Both the legislation authorizing and the referendum question convening the Convention of 1967 explicitly insulated the clause from possible revision,\textsuperscript{129} notwithstanding the contemporaneous observation that “the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution has followed a path through our courts that is easily as unpredictable and winding as Alice’s road through Wonderland. No provision in our constitution has been so much litigated yet so little understood.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126} Of course, text and history have not been the sole axes around which federal “equal protection” doctrine spins. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (racial classification by the federal government held subject to strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment, deploying tests developed under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine notwithstanding the absence of “equal protection” language in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and its 1791 drafting and ratification by slave-holders); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (relying on the “equal protection” component of the 1791 Due Process clause to invalidate refusal to recognize same sex marriages).


\textsuperscript{129} Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971); see supra note 59.

\textsuperscript{130} Madway v. Bd. for the Assessment & Revision of Taxes, 233 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 1967).
The current state of doctrine was recently summarized by the opinion of Justice Wecht in

Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Department of Revenue:

In the past, this Court has held [sic] that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution are "largely coterminous" and "are to be analyzed in the same manner." Nevertheless, we have struck down numerous tax statutes that unquestionably would survive the highly deferential rational basis review attendant to a federal Equal Protection challenge. This is so because the two constitutional provisions are only sometimes in alignment.  

b. Equal Rights Amendment

The first in the nation, Pennsylvania’s Equal Rights Amendment—explicitly forbidding denial of equality under the law because of sex—was proposed and ratified by the people of Pennsylvania at a time when federal constitutional constraints on sex discrimination were a gleam in the eye of Ruth Bader Ginsburg. While the federal doctrine has obviously evolved substantially in the last half century, it still does not embrace the stark proposition embedded in Pennsylvania’s uniformity assessment”;

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131 638 Pa. 140, 149-50 (2016) (citations omitted); see also id. at 150 (“In order to determine the standards associated with a particular Uniformity Clause challenge, we look to our precedent, as well as the text and history of the clause itself.”); Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d 587, 606 n.26 (Pa. 2013) (“In some contexts the Uniformity Clause has been recognized as reflecting more stringent limitations. We do not foreclose the possibility that the Uniformity Clause provides greater protections in other ways as well, based on a developed analysis of its text, history, and meaning.” (citation omitted)); Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 913 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. 2006) (explaining that “federal equal protection jurisprudence . . . sets the floor for Pennsylvania's uniformity assessment”); see also Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist. & Keystone Realty Advisors, LLC, 163 A.3d 962, 967 n.4 (Pa. 2017) (“[T]ax uniformity incorporates equal protection precepts.... One difference... is that the Uniformity Clause is more restrictive in that it does not allow the government to engage in disparate tax treatment of different sub-classifications of real property, such as residential versus commercial.”); id. at 973 (“[T]he federal Equal Protection Clause guarantees this level of protection to property owners, and it also sets the constitutional ‘floor’ for the protection of property owners' rights under the Uniformity Clause.”).

132 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971), the first case Supreme Court case invalidating sex discrimination under the equal protection clause, was decided November 22, 1971. This extension of federal “rational basis” review took place six months after adoption of the Pennsylvania ERA, and two years after the ERA was introduced into the Pennsylvania legislature. Cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (“Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civil duty of jury service.”).
Pennsylvania constitutional doctrine that “The law will not impose different benefits or different burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact that they may be man or woman.”\(^{133}\)

c. Generic Constitutional Equality Analysis

Pennsylvania’s generic constitutional equality analysis\(^{134}\) bears greater similarity to federal doctrine than does doctrine under the Tax Uniformity Clause and Equal Rights

\(^{133}\) See Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101 (1974) (“The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure equality of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights and legal responsibilities.”); see also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of Commonwealth, 505 Pa. 571, 586 (1984) (“The rationale underlying the ‘state action’ doctrine is irrelevant to the interpretation of the scope of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, a state constitutional amendment adopted by the Commonwealth as part of its own organic law…. [I]n light of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s clear and unqualified prohibition of discrimination ‘under the law’ based upon gender, we conclude that the Commissioner’s disapproval of Hartford’s discriminatory sex-based rates on the ground they were ‘unfair’ and contrary to established public policy was... an appropriate exercise of his statutory authority.”).

A generation after \textit{Henderson}, federal doctrine remains considerably less severe in discountenancing sex discrimination. \textit{See} Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (“[T]he imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one, is justified by two important governmental objectives.”); \textit{cf.} Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (“[A]t least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996))).

\(^{134}\) The term “constitutional equality analysis” elides the fact that Pennsylvania courts have variously found the basis for this analysis in: Article III, Section 32; Article I, Section 1; and Article I, Section 26. \textit{Compare} League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 784 (Pa. 2018) (referring to “Article I, Sections 1 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution” as the “Equal Protection Guarantee”), \textit{with} William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 417 n.3 (Pa. 2017) (“Section 32 does not speak expressly in terms of equal protection. Nonetheless, we long have gleaned equal protection principles from Section 32”), Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 637 Pa. 239, 312-13 (2016) (Article III, Section 32 “requires consideration of whether ‘the challenged legislation promotes a legitimate state interest, and that a classification is reasonable rather than arbitrary and rests upon some ground of difference, which justifies the classification and has a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation.’” (citation omitted)), \textit{and} Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096, 1117 (Pa. 2014) (referring to “[t]he equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution (or, more precisely, the non-discrimination provision)” as Article I, Section 26); \textit{cf. id.} at 34 n.9 (“[C]ommon constitutional principle at the heart of the special legislation proscription [of Section 32] and the equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances should be treated similarly by the sovereign.” (citing Pa. Turnpike Comm’n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1094 (2006))); Kramer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Rite Aid Corp.), 584 Pa. 309, 332 (2005) (referring to “Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution” as the “equally free and independent” clause and as the basis for “equal protection claims under the Pennsylvania constitution”); Erfer v. Commonwealth, 568 Pa. 128, 177 (2002) (“Article I, §§ 1 & 26, together, constitute an equal protection guarantee.” (citing Love v. Borough
Amendment. Opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regularly repeat versions of the following heuristic for addressing claims of unequal classification:

The types of classifications are: (1) classifications which implicate a “suspect” class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications implicating an “important” though not fundamental right or a “sensitive” classification; and (3) classifications which involve none of these. Should the statutory classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strictly [scrutinized for] a “compelling” governmental purpose; if the classification falls into the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is applied to[require] an “important” governmental purpose; and if the statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if there is any rational basis for the classification.135

This tracks a number of elements of federal equal protection analysis; but similarity is not identity.136 Three differences are particularly salient.

First, an interest may be “fundamental” for purposes of Pennsylvania analysis, though not of federal analysis.137 Second, while the origin of the Pennsylvania reference to “important though not fundamental” rights lies in federal case law from the early 1970s, the United States Supreme Court has largely abandoned the category of “important” interests in equal protection doctrine.138 By contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continues to identify “important”

of Stroudsburg, 528 Pa. 320 (1991)); DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 562 Pa. 431, 436 (2000) (“In Pennsylvania, constitutional equal protection is grounded in the following language: ‘The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law.’” (citation omitted)).


137 See e.g., William Penn Sch. Dist., 170 A.3d at 461 (“This leaves the question of what sort of right is at issue. In turn, this will dictate what standard of review applies to Petitioners’ equal protection claim, should it proceed. We need not resolve that question presently, but we underscore that whether education is a fundamental right under Pennsylvania law is not a settled question.”).

interests that trigger “intermediate” scrutiny for equal protection purposes. And Pennsylvania doctrine does not seem to have assimilated the concern for “animus” that loomed large in Justice Kennedy’s equal protection jurisprudence.

Third, and most broadly important, the “rational basis” test which has evolved in federal doctrine in the last half century upholds distinctions when any reasonably conceivable state of facts could support a post hoc rationalization connecting the distinction to some legitimate public classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard of review.” (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)).

Justice Marshall’s focus on “important” rights and “sensitive” classification was hotly contested in 1973, and had gone into eclipse in federal doctrine by the end of the 1980s. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 467-68 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court should focus on ‘the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.’” (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting))). Compare with U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980) (“Justice Brennan’s dissent cite[s] a number of equal protection cases including... F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) ... U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) ... and James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). The most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles. And realistically speaking, we can be no more certain that this opinion will remain undisturbed than were those who joined the opinion in Lindsley, Royster Guano Co., or any of the other cases referred to in this opinion and in the dissenting opinion. But...we have no hesitation in asserting, contrary to the dissent, that where social or economic regulations are involved ... together with this case, state the proper application of the test. The comments in the dissenting opinion about the proper cases for which to look for the correct statement of the equal protection rational-basis standard, and about which cases limit earlier cases, are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.”).

See Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096, 1119-20 (Pa. 2014) (“Without revisiting the disagreement between the Smith Court plurality and concurrence concerning whether rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny is the more appropriate approach to a [regarding distinctions in the availability of remedies] we have little difficulty in rejecting the notion that we should engage in strict scrutiny; and, consistently with James, which represented a majority view, we will employ intermediate scrutiny.”).

E.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (invalidating statutory refusal to recognize sex marriages due to improper animus: “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). With Justice Kennedy’s departure from the Court, the federal role of “animus” may wane.
purpose. In applying Pennsylvania’s constitutional equality protection, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disavows the authority to second guess the wisdom of legislative policy choices. But under the 1968 Constitution the Pennsylvania Court continues to invalidate arbitrary and oppressive statutory classifications which lack a “fair and substantial” relation to the statutory purpose rooted in real distinctions. The Pennsylvania Court addressed the difference between

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141 One competing line of federal equal protection cases reaching back to *F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia*, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), which required “a fair and substantial relation” between classification and legitimate state goals, rather than raw speculation, and conceivable relation. But the tipping point for federal doctrine came with *Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980), rejecting F.S. Royster’s requirement that statute “must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” See id. at 179 (“Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end.”).

Since Fritz, the lowest level of federal rational basis scrutiny can be met by virtually any speculation that can be argued to have a potential correspondence with reality. See, e.g., *FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.*, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”; there is such a plausible reason if “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification”); *Heller v. Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (2003) (quoting *Beach*); *Cent. State Univ. v. AAUP*, 526 U.S. 124, 131 n.1 (1999) (quoting the lower court opinion that there was “not a shred of evidence in the record”); *Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quoting *Heller*, 509 U.S. at 320); *Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n*, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (“Iowa Supreme Court found that the 20 percent/36 percent tax rate differential… ‘frustrated’ what it saw as the law’s basic objective, namely, rescuing the racetracks from economic distress. And no rational person, it believed, could claim the contrary.”); *Armour v. City of Indianapolis*, 566 U.S. 673, 68 (2012) (quoting *Beach*); *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (“We will uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds...the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny.” (citing *Fritz*)).

142 In *re Estate of Cavill*, 329 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1974); *Moyer v. Phillips*, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975); *Commonwealth v. Bonadio*, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980); see *Snider v. Thornburgh*, 436 A.2d 593, 597 (Pa. 1981) (“[T]he mistaken assumption that the phrase ‘rational basis’ implies a greater assumption of constitutionality or connotes a less strict standard of review than the phrase ‘fair and substantial relation’, should be discarded.”); *Ridley Arms, Inc. v. Ridley*, 515 Pa. 542, 549 (1987) (“[T]he payment of approximately $58,000 to government for the performance of services which can be, and actually were provided by the private sector for approximately $23,000, less than half the amount charged by government, is not ‘reasonable.’”); *Curtis v. Kline*, 666 A.2d 265, 268 (Pa. 1995); *DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 562 Pa. 431, 436-37 (Pa. 2000); *Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Commonwealth*, 587 Pa. 347, 365 (2006) (“[T]here is no rational reason to treat first-level supervisors of the Commission differently than all other first-level supervisors of other public employers when it comes to collective bargaining.”); *Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth*, 637 Pa. 239, 304 (2016) (“Commonwealth has not identified any difference between the oil and gas industry and the myriad of other industries operating within our Commonwealth, many of which use chemicals in their manufacturing processes, which justify these heavy constraints on health professionals’ access to, and ability to use or further disclose, this type of information while carrying out the vital responsibilities of their vocation, and we cannot reasonably hypothesize any such justification”); id. at 315 (“[R]equirement that only public water facilities must be informed in the event
state and federal standards in the course of invalidating the distinctions drawn by Sunday closing laws in *Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township*:

While there may be a correspondence in meaning and purpose between the two, the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution is substantially different from the federal constitution. We are not free to treat that language as though it was not there.... In Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution we find eight areas explicitly mentioned as areas which are not to be encumbered by special laws treating certain citizens differently than others.... We therefore find that it is our judicial duty to carefully examine any law regulating trade.... “Fair and substantial” means that the classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary, and the classification must rest upon some ground of difference which has a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike.... There is no fair and substantial relationship between the objective of providing a uniform day of rest and recreation and in permitting the sale of novelties but not Bibles and bathing suits; in permitting the sale of fresh meat patties but not frozen meat patties; or in permitting the installation of an electric meter but not a T.V. antenna.143

The Pennsylvania Court recently reiterated in *William Penn School District. v. Pa. Department of Education*, that to be rational for purposes of Pennsylvania’s constitutional equality analysis, “a classification must rest upon some ground of difference which justifies the classification and have a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation.”144

C. DISANALOGOUS/SKEW PROVISIONS

Provisions that lack a federal analog accounted for a quarter (93/372, 25%) of the cases exercising judicial review under the 1968 Constitution over the last fifty years and over a third (91/253, 36%) of cases which find violations of state but not federal constitutional provisions.

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144 170 A.3d 414, 458 (Pa. 2017); see id. at 458 n.64 ("[T]his ‘reasonable relationship’ terminology closely tracks that of the ‘reasonable relation’ test invoked, if opaque[ly] employed, by this Court in the Teachers’ Tenure Act Case, Danson, and Marrero."); see also the discussion of the “fair and substantial” requirement adopted in *Shoul* and *Nixon*, supra.
They make up 41% (57/138) of the cases exercising judicial review with respect to statutes, comparable to the incidence of cases invoking congruent provisions (39%).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rate of review under these provisions increased from under one case per year in the first decade of the 1968 Constitution to almost two cases per year in the second, third and fourth decades and again to 2.5 cases per year in the latest decade.

The rate of review of statutes under disanalogous provisions, doubled from 5 cases during the decade 1968-77 (.5/year) to 12/ decade during the second and third decades and 14/year in the fourth and fifth decades.

### Table 14: Judicial Review Under Skew Provisions

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Elections Art. I, § 5 3 3
Limits on Municipal Action 2 1 1
Environmental Art. I, § 27 2 1 1
Education Art. III, § 14 1 1
Total 57 5 12 12 14 14

b. Judicial Autonomy

The most numerous class of cases raised under skew provisions, both in total (38) and in statutory review (23), involves constitutional claims to judicial autonomy.

A concern with legislative interventions abridging judicial autonomy is not new in Pennsylvania constitutional doctrine. But the wholesale restructuring of Pennsylvania’s

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145 See, e.g., McCabe v. Emerson, 18 Pa. 111, 112-13 (1851) (holding statute overturning final judgment for plaintiff unconstitutional as inconsistent with constitutional scheme); Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862) (invalidating legislation reducing prisoner’s sentence); In re Investigation by Dauphin Cty. Grand Jury, 332 Pa. 342 (1938). (statute suspending grand jury
judicial system into a unified judiciary by the Constitution of 1968 Article V, Section 1, combined with the wording of Article V, Section 10, vesting the Supreme Court “general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts” laid the groundwork for a particularly aggressive assertion of judicial primacy, beginning in 1978 with the *sua sponte* prospective announcement that application of the Public Agency Open Meeting Law to the Supreme Court was unconstitutional.146 This set of constitutional interventions peaked during the decades between 1978 and 2007, with six cases of statutory review in each decade. The last ten years, by contrast, contain only two statutory cases, and none in the last four years. The reduction could either be tied to the Pennsylvania legislature coming to terms with the judicial declaration of institutional independence or by the Pennsylvania Court’s conclusion that legislative confrontation is not without costs.147

investigation pending impeachment held unconstitutional). The Court in *Leahey v. Farrell* expressed constitutional concerns regarding legislative interference with the judiciary:

“The legislature cannot, by an act of assembly, overrule a judicial decision; it may not direct a statute to be construed in a certain way; it cannot grant a new trial; or order an illegitimate child to be regarded as legitimate under terms of prior deed; it may not change the effect of judgments or decrees previously rendered…. Should the legislature, or the county salary board, act arbitrarily or capriciously and fail or neglect to provide a sufficient number of court employees or for the payment of adequate salaries to them, whereby the efficient administration of justice is impaired or destroyed, the court possesses the inherent power to supply the deficiency. Should such officials neglect or refuse to comply with the reasonable requirements of the court they may be required to do so by mandamus. 66 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. 1949) (citations omitted).


147 Compare Cty. of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 517 Pa. 65 (1987) (statutory scheme obligating county to fund courts within its judicial system violated mandate for unified judicial system under Article V, § 1), and Pa. State Assoc. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 324 (1996) (granting petition for mandamus and order that the General Assembly enact a funding scheme for the court system pursuant to Article V, Section 1), with Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 617 Pa. 231, 263-64 (2012) (declining to issue enforcement orders, and instead reasoning that “we believe that the better course is for further enhancements of the unified judicial system to be a product of inter-branch cooperation…we are encouraged that the changes implemented as a result of the 1997 Interim Report have served as a foundation for further evolution toward a better, administratively unified judicial
c. Due Process of Lawmaking

The second most numerous class of cases invoking disanalogous provisions involves judicial policing of constitutional constraints on legislative process (14 cases total, 11 involving statutory review).

Most of these provisions have their origin in the distrust of the legislature that characterized the Convention of 1873.¹⁴⁸ But within years of their enactment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a posture of abstention as “essential to the peace and order of the state”; the “enrolled bill” doctrine prevented courts from looking behind the face of a final bill to determine the constitutional propriety of its passage.¹⁴⁹ And with respect to the “single subject” requirement of Article III, Section 3, which could be raised by examining the face of the bill, by the middle of the twentieth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court came to apply “almost an irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality.”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ See Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 394 (Pa. 2005) (“[W]hile these changes to the Constitution originated during a unique time of fear of tyrannical corporate power and legislative corruption, these mandates retain their value even today by placing certain constitutional limitations on the legislative process.”); cf. City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 586 (Pa. 2003) (“Although Section 3’s single-subject and clear-expression requirements were originally added to the Constitution by amendment in 1864, their inclusion in the 1874 Constitution was consistent with the electorate's overall goal of curtailing legislative practices that it viewed with suspicion.” (citation omitted)).

¹⁴⁹ See Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877) (“[W]hen a law has been passed and approved and certified in due form, it is no part of the duty of the judiciary to go behind the law as duly certified to inquire into the observance of form in its passage….The presumption in favor of regularity is essential to the peace and order of the state.”); Mikell v. Sch. Dist., 58 A.2d 339, 346 (Pa. 1948) (“[T]he enrolled bill is the conclusive evidence of statutory enactment and no other evidence is admissible to establish that the bill was not lawfully enacted.”); see David B. Snyder, The Rise and Fall of the Enrolled Bill Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 315, 321 (1987).

¹⁵⁰ Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Problems of Judicial Enforcement and Legislative Compliance, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987); see City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 575-76 (2003) (“In the early part of the Twentieth Century, this Court applied the ‘germaneness’ test in a fairly strict manner. In more recent decisions, however…Pennsylvania courts have become extremely deferential toward the General Assembly in Section III challenges.”); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 400 (Pa. 2005) (“[I]t is plain that the Court’s interpretation of Article III, Section 3 has fluctuated over
The Pennsylvania Court abandoned the enrolled bill doctrine in 1986 as inconsistent with the proper understanding of the mandates of the 1873 Convention and the proper role of the Court.\(^{151}\) And in the twenty-first century—recapturing the distrust of the legislature surrounding the 1873 Convention\(^{152}\)—the Court has invalidated legislation repeatedly for failure to comply with the single subject rule.\(^{153}\)

2. **Skew Provisions and Public Impact**

Cases construing disanalogous constitutional provisions originating over two centuries of constitutional development account for many of the highest profile and highest impact exercises of judicial review under the Constitution of 1968.

The Pennsylvania Court’s recent, controversial, and consequential invalidation of extravagantly gerrymandered Congressional districts and consequent reapportionment in *League of Women Voters* rested on the 1790 guarantee in Article I, Section 5 of “free and equal elections.”\(^{154}\) Its determination preventing the implementation of restrictive voter ID time.”\(^{154}\).

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\(^{151}\) Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 180 (1986) (“[T]he people speaking through their Constitution have mandated a procedure to provide each legislator the opportunity to properly perform that obligation. That directive is mandatory and not precatory and the judicial branch cannot ignore a clear violation because of a false sense of deference to the prerogatives of a sister branch of government…However, for the reasons that follow, we find that Article III, section 1 has not been violated in this instance.”). For cases invalidating legislation under procedural limits not manifest on the face of the bill, see Washington v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 2018 Pa. LEXIS 3695, at *13-24 (July 18, 2018), and app. C.

\(^{152}\) See *Washington*, 2018 Pa. LEXIS 3695, at *14, 18 (reviewing history and noting that “the people lost confidence in the legislature's ability to fulfill its most paramount constitutional duty of representing their interests... consistent with the intent of the electorate who ratified the 1874 Constitution, the overarching purpose of these and the other restrictions on the legislative process contained in Article III was to furnish essential constitutional safeguards”).


requirements was grounded in the 1874 mandate of Article I, Section 5 that “no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” The justification for opening review of Pennsylvania’s system of unequal education funding relied on the 1874 command of Article III, Section 14 to ensure a “thorough and efficient education,” as modified in 1967. Review of the complex statutes facilitating fracking construed Pennsylvania’s 1971 Environmental Rights Amendment, Article I, Section 27. The Pennsylvania Court has relied on provisions that “lack a federal counterpart” to limit the unilateral authority of the Governor, and on the distinctive provisions for removal of civil officers in Article VI, Section 7 to invalidate a hotly contested mayoral recall. It has grounded sweeping orders requiring funding of the “unified judicial system” on 1968 provisions that are not mirrored by the federal structure. And–just beyond the scope of the fifty-year time


160 See Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 617 Pa. 231, 264 (2012) (reviewing two decades of litigation to hold that “we will not grant further mandamus relief; and neither are we inclined to go backward and overrule our prior decisions, rendered in light of the realities of that time. We are optimistic.
frame—the Court recently invalidated a statute that “made sweeping changes to the administration of the state’s human services programs” based on a failure to comply with the 1874 legislative procedure mandates of Article III, Section 4.161

d. STILL LIVING AFTER FIFTY YEARS

In high profile cases exercising judicial review under disanalogous provisions of the Constitution of 1968, the Pennsylvania Court has engaged in extensive analyses of the text, history, policy, case law, traditions and values associated with the provisions in question. And it has regularly been willing to revisit matters that had previously been settled. Thus, in construing the “free and equal elections” clause, *League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth* rejected prior precedent declaring partisan gerrymandering non-justiciable.162 In *William Penn School District v. Pa. Department of Education*, it revisited and reversed precedent precluding judicial enforcement of the Education Clause.163 In *Robinson Township v.*

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162 See 178 A.3d 737, 813 (Pa. 2018) (“To the extent that *Erfer* can be read for that proposition, we expressly disavow it, and presently reaffirm that, in accord with *Shankey* and the particular history of the Free and Equal Elections Clause, recounted above, the two distinct claims remain subject to entirely separate jurisprudential consideration.”); cf. Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 758-59 (2012) (“[Technological] development suggests that this Court’s early establishment of the primacy of equalization of population in formulating redistricting plans…may warrant reconsideration…our own review of our governing precedent in deciding these appeals has led us to conclude that it should be recalibrated…Our prior precedent sounds in constitutional law; to the extent it is erroneous or unclear, or falls in tension with intervening developments, this Court has primary responsibility to address the circumstance.”).

163 See 170 A.3d 414, 456-57 (Pa. 2017) (“To the extent that our prior cases have suggested, if murky, that a court cannot devise a judicially discoverable and manageable standard for Education Clause compliance that does not entail making a policy determination inappropriate for judicial discretion, or that we may only deploy a rubber stamp in a hollow mockery of judicial review, we underscore that we are not bound to follow precedent when it cannot bear scrutiny, either on its own terms or in light of subsequent developments…We find irreconcilable deficiencies in the rigor, clarity, and consistency of the line of cases that culminated in *Marrero II*.”).
Commonwealth\textsuperscript{164} and \textit{Pa. Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth},\textsuperscript{165} the Court invalidated statutes under the Environmental Rights Amendment, notwithstanding precedent dating from shortly after its adoption to the effect that the amendment was non-self-executing.\textsuperscript{166}

The Pennsylvania Court has similarly been willing to revisit and revise prior doctrine under both parallel provisions\textsuperscript{167} and congruent provisions.\textsuperscript{168}

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\textsuperscript{164} See 83 A.3d 901, 946 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion) (“In circumstances where prior decisional law has obscured the manifest intent of a constitutional provision as expressed in its plain language, engagement and adjustment of precedent as a prudential matter is fairly implicated and salutary…Our charter…is not easily amended and any errant interpretation is not freely subject to correction by any co-equal branch of our government, other than this Court. For this reason, we are not constrained to closely and blindly re-affirm constitutional interpretations of prior decisions which have proven to be unworkable or badly reasoned.”).

\textsuperscript{165} 161 A.3d 911, 937 (Pa. 2017).

\textsuperscript{166} Compare \textit{Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield}, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973), \textit{with} Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. \textit{v. Commonwealth}, 161 A.3d 911, 936 n.28 (Pa. 2017) (“As noted in \textit{Robinson Township}, this Court previously misstated that a plurality of the justices in \textit{Gettysburg} concluded that the Section 27 was not self-executing in \textit{United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia}, when in fact only two justices specifically found it to require legislative action.” (citations omitted)); \textit{id.} at 937 (“[W]e re-affirm our prior pronouncements that the public trust provisions of Section 27 are self-executing.”).

\textsuperscript{167} Compare, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Commonwealth v. Edmunds}, 526 Pa. 374, 397 (1991) (rejecting federally crafted good faith exception to exclusionary rule under Article I, Section 8 and remarking that “From \textit{DeJohn} forward, a steady line of case law has evolved under the Pennsylvania Constitution, making clear that Article I, Section 8 is unshakably linked to a right of privacy in this Commonwealth.”), \textit{with} \textit{Commonwealth v. Russo}, 934 A.2d 1199, 1207 (Pa. 2007) (“[Before 1961] this Court's historical interpretation of Article I, Section 8 always followed ‘the fundamental principle of the common law that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained.’” (quoting \textit{Commonwealth v. Chaitt}, 112 A.2d 379, 381 & n.1 (Pa. 1955))).

\textsuperscript{168} The process started with respect to protection of free expression as the 1968 Constitution was being beginning to be framed, as reflected in Justice Eagen’s dissenting opinion in \textit{William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana}:

The majority opinion reasons that even though prior restraint, in exceptional cases, do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, it does violate Article I, § 7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In order to reach this conclusion, the Majority does a little selective picking from both Constitutions. They go first to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution in order to bring motion pictures into the ambit of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press (Burstyn v. Wilson, supra) and imply, therefore, that Article I, § 7, also covers motion pictures. But, they then reject the First and Fourteenth Amendments and one hundred seventy one years of Pennsylvania law and state that the Pennsylvania Constitution is different from the United States Constitution, and that the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits all prior restraints no matter how unlawful the publication may be, which, as pointed out before, is directly contrary to the United States Constitution.


Modern protection under Article I, Section 7, reaches considerably beyond the shelter provided
In today’s climate, such evolution raises the question of whether the Pennsylvania Court is subject to the argument, raised regularly and pungently by the late Justice Scalia that the concept of a “living constitution” licenses judicial misfeasance, and that courts should be bound by the Constitution’s “original intent” or perhaps “original meaning.” Justice Scalia has passed on from his active role in public life, but his claim that the United States Constitution is “dead, dead, dead” is very much alive.169

There are reasons to be skeptical of a Scalian critique of a living Pennsylvania Constitution. To begin with, even if one were to grant that “original intent” or “original meaning” is a desirable and useful interpretive mandate in the federal context—a point of some substantial contention—it is a bit mysterious what “original meaning” would govern in construing the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968.

by the provision in the era of its framing. Compare Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 612 (Pa. 2002) (protecting the right of women to engage in erotic dance without wearing pasties), with Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 271 (Pa. 1805) (“[I]f the consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisfied that the publication was seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of the United States, the constitution thereof, or of this state, they should convict the defendant.”), and Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 409 (Pa. 1824) (“[F]rom a regard to decency and the good order of society, profane swearing, breach of the Sabbath, and blasphemy, are punishable by civil magistrates, these are not punished as sins or offences against God, but crimes injurious to, and having a malignant influence on society.”); cf. Pap's A.M., 812 A.2d at 613 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (doctrine “extending greater protection to communication than that provided under the First Amendment…has previously been applied to forms of pure speech as opposed to the communicative aspects of conduct or symbolic speech.”). Compare also Ullom v. Boehm, 142 A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. 1958) (summarily rejecting Article I, Section 7 challenge to prohibitions on price advertising by opticians because “it impairs the plaintiff’s right of freedom of speech.”), with Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs v. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d 340 (Pa. 1999) (invalidating advertising by chiropractors under Article I, Section 7). 169 See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Fool for the Original Constitution, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 27 (2015) (“The Justice had at least two black beasts. First, he rejected the claim that the meaning of laws could drift or change without a formal change in text. This opposition made him dead set against the theory of the living Constitution. He was certain that something could not become unconstitutional (or constitutional) merely because political views or moral sensibilities had changed. Hence he liked to exclaim that the Constitution was not living but ‘dead, dead, dead.’ Second, and in keeping with his opposition to a living Constitution, the Justice combated the tendency of judges to read their preferences into the law. ‘Now the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution . . . is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.’”).
The language of Article I, Section 1 recognizing “men are born equally free and independent,” for example, was a part of the original Declaration of Rights adopted by the Convention of 1776. The provision was readopted verbatim in 1790, 1838, and 1874 and became part of the Constitution of 1968. Should the original meaning of “equality” date from the extra-legal Convention of 1776, when the provision was adopted by a group chosen by a narrow electorate of 6000, or from 1790 when the provision was readopted and modified by a more broadly elected, but still extra-legal, convention? From 1838 when a Constitution was first adopted by a convention that was legally convened, and was ratified by Pennsylvania voters? From the most recent rounds of electoral ratification in 1968?

Mysteries proliferate. Pennsylvania’s constitutional equality analysis actually springs doctrinally not only from Article I, Section 1, but also from Article III, Section 32, adopted in 1874 by Convention and electorally ratified, and modified by legislatively proposed and electorally ratified amendment in 1967. And from Article I, Section 26 legislatively proposed and adopted by the electorate in 1967. If—to simplify matters—each of these provisions should be construed according to the “original meaning” when they were initially promulgated, would courts need to shuttle back and forth among the centuries in evaluating claims of unconstitutional differential treatment? Should they look for consensus? Should they give primacy to legal as opposed to extra-legal initiatives? Should they seek a majority of decision makers, or provisions, or a flow of understanding?

And what of the requirement of tax uniformity in Article VIII, Section 1? The provision was originally proposed and ratified in 1874. Voters rejected efforts to amend it in 1913 and 1938. It was specifically preserved inviolate by the legislature that called for a referendum on a Convention in 1967, and by the question put to the voters who passed the referendum in 1967,
and retained by the Convention and the Constitution of 1968. Yet at the time that the legislators and voters preserved it, informed observers understood, for better or worse, that the clause had manifestly taken its meaning from a process of continued judicial construction and evolution.\textsuperscript{170}

Both the actual participants and reasonable observers had every reason to expect that the process would continue. So the “original understanding” in 1967 was that judges would not be particularly constrained by a static originalism.\textsuperscript{171}

Acknowledging the reality of a “living constitution” seems the only sensible way to begin to think about construing a constitution when the underlying document really does grow, the courts’ explication of the changing text manifestly evolves over time, and the ratifying People recast the document without challenging the evolution of doctrine.

The challenges to originalism as a singular and preclusive strategy for construing the Pennsylvania Constitution run deeper still. “Original intent” or “original meaning” must incorporate some conception of the ways in which language will be judicially construed. Even if we were persuaded that Pennsylvania constitutional analysis might be appropriately tied to 1776, or 1790 or 1838 or 1874 or 1967 or 1968, the process of deriving the “original meaning” of the provisions in that era would confront the question raised pointedly a generation ago by Professor Powell, and mooted since: did the promulgators understand, or would a contemporaneous reasonable legal observer expect their work to be construed in originalist terms—and more broadly, what was the original legal meaning, in light of the strategy the framers or ratifiers expected the courts to deploy in constitutional interpretation and construction?\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{170} See Madway v. Bd. for the Assessment & Revision of Taxes, 427 Pa. 138, 143 (1967) (“[T]he uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution has followed a path through our courts that is easily as unpredictable and winding as Alice's road through Wonderland.”).

\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, in 1968, Pennsylvania’s courts had retained their practice of examining exercises of government authority for a “fair and substantial relation” to legitimate government interests.

\textsuperscript{172} See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
In 1968, the Convention proposed, and the Pennsylvania electorate adopted an extensive reworking of the judicial system. Any politically aware citizen would have understood the judicial authority of constitutional review in light of the recent work of the United States Supreme Court. Such a citizen would be aware of the New Deal Revolution. The accepted canon for a legally sophisticated observer would include Chief Justice Hughes declaiming:

It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning: “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding… a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” When we are dealing with the words of the Constitution, said this Court in *Missouri v. Holland,* “we must realize that they have called into life a

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173 Compare, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (“There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent economic experience has brought into a strong light. The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community…Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital should be, and it is, overruled”), with id. at 587 (Sutherland, J., dissenting, joined by Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, JJ.) (“It is urged that the question involved should now receive fresh consideration, among other reasons, because of ‘the economic conditions which have supervened’; but the meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events. We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be construed in the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words that apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when written that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have applied then is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.”).
being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters . . . The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.”

Nor is it helpful to attempt to draw a fine distinction between the intended meaning of the
words of the Constitution and their intended application…. The vast body of law which
has been developed was unknown to the fathers, but it is believed to have preserved the
essential content and the spirit of the Constitution…. This development is a growth from
the seeds which the fathers planted.”

In 1968 the alert citizen would understand the proposed Pennsylvania Constitution in the
context of the Warren Court’s growing edifice of living constitutionalism, from Reynolds v.

Sims\textsuperscript{175} in 1964, to Griswold v. Connecticut\textsuperscript{176} and Miranda v. Arizona\textsuperscript{177} in 1965, Harper v.

Virginia Bd. of Elections\textsuperscript{178} in 1966, and to Loving v. Virginia\textsuperscript{179} and Katz v United States\textsuperscript{180} and

In re Gault\textsuperscript{181} in 1967. A sophisticated legal observer would have noted as well that the premise
of a “living constitution” was a standard understanding not only of liberal lions but of the most
staid and lawyerly of Justices.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{174} Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-44 (1934) (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{175} 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
\textsuperscript{176} 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
\textsuperscript{177} 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
\textsuperscript{178} 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
\textsuperscript{179} 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
\textsuperscript{180} 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
\textsuperscript{181} 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
\textsuperscript{182} See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The balance of
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For reasons stated at length
in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, I believe…the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one
or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.”); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“[T]he verbal symbols of the Constitution does
not give them a fixed technical content. It exacts a continuing process of application…. To believe that
this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage
of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function
for inanimate machines and not for judges, for whom the independence safeguarded by Article III of the
Constitution was designed.”); cf. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 798 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting,
joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.) (“[T]he Constitution—a vital and living charter after nearly two
centuries because of the wise flexibility of its key provisions.”).
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the expectation that Pennsylvania judges would construe a “living constitution” would have been bound up with the “original meaning” of a unified judicial system; and that the “original intent” of the 1968 Constitution—if it is relevant—was that judges should transcend originalism.

Conclusion

In 1976, Justice Rehnquist observed: “At first blush… a living constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, a dead constitution. It would seem that only a necrophile could disagree.”\(^{183}\) In 1968, the People of Pennsylvania had no reason to expect that their judiciary would be afflicted by constitutional necrophilia. And today, the Justices who have construed a living Pennsylvania constitution, with due regard for text, history, and tradition over the last half century have no reason to be abashed by their failure to adopt it.

Appendix A

Methodology: Fifty Years of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judicial Review Under the Constitution of 1968

Selection of cases for this census began with the cases identified in the Lexis Pennsylvania Supreme Court file using the following search: (“pennsylvania constitution” or “constitution of pennsylvania” or “state constitution”) and (“unconstitutional” or violat!), undertaken between January 2018 and July 2018. The search generated a total of 1586 entries over the fifty-year period following ratification of the 1968 Amendments on April 23, 1968. This constituted roughly 16% of the cases reported during this period. [A search for “held” during the fifty-year period in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court file generated 9242 cases].

Within this sample, we then identified the opinions in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked the Pennsylvania Constitution as part of the rationale for a decision exercising judicial review. This search was supplemented by Shepardizing the identified cases to find additional relevant cases within the period, and also searching for references in cases to constitutional provisions invoked as authoritative in identified cases.

This process generated a total of 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised its authority of judicial review under the Pennsylvania Constitution during the fifty-year period April 23, 1968-April 23, 2018. The fifty-year period provides a convenient closing date for the sample.

The cases selected included:

- Cases in which official actions were declared unconstitutional as violating the Pennsylvania Constitution (coded as “yes,” 284 cases)
- Cases in which legal rules were interpreted in light of the mandates of the Pennsylvania Constitution (coded as “statutory construction” – although in 18 of the 49 cases, actions were undertaken by entities other than the state legislature)
- Cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the viability of a state constitutional challenge but remanded the case for resolution in light of that ruling (coded as “remand,” 29 cases)
- Cases that did not rely on the Pennsylvania Constitution for a rule of decision were excluded from the sample, as were cases in which challenged official actions were held to be wholly consistent with Pennsylvania constitutional norms.

The identified sample of constitutional review cases was coded to identify:

- The state constitutional provision on which the case turned
  - Because of limitations of the data analysis program, cases could only be coded in one category. Where two or more categories potentially applied (as where more than one constitutional provision was the basis for determination) the cases were coded on the basis of which mode of analysis predominated. Appendix C contains multiple entries for cases which invoked multiple provisions.
- Whether the Pennsylvania Court also found a federal constitutional violation (118 cases in the sample), and whether the interpretation of the state constitution followed federal rules (130 cases in the sample)
- The relation between the wording of the state constitutional provision invoked and federal constitutional provisions:
  - “Parallel” provisions (173 cases), using the same wording
  - “Congruent” provisions (104 cases), analogous but using different wording
  - “Skew” provisions (93 cases), disanalogous subject and wording
- The source of the official action reviewed:
  - Administrative action by state executive officials or agencies (28 cases)
  - Ballot measure (2 cases)
  - Criminal trial, including judicial rulings and prosecutorial actions (89 cases)
  - Judicial action in a non-criminal context (26 cases)
  - Law enforcement action by state or local officers (49 cases)
  - Municipal action (39 cases)
  - Statute (139 cases)
An excel spreadsheet incorporating this coding was provided to the Rutgers Law Review, and is available for review on request.

**Appendix B: Independent Constitutional Review by Justice**

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## INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF STATUTES BY JUSTICE

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Appendix C:

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 1968-2018

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 1968-2018
Seth F. Kreimer
Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania and Maura Douglas, University of Pennsylvania Law School 2018

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A. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF LAW MAKING

Art. II, § 1 [Non-Delegation Doctrine]
- Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (holding provision of Workers’ Compensation Act requiring physician to determine a claimant's degree of impairment by applying methodology set forth in the most recent version of guide issued by the American Medical Association was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority)
  o Majority: Wecht, joined by Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Mundy
  o Concurrence: Saylor
  o Dissent: Baer

- West Phila. Achievement Charter Elementary Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 635 Pa. 127 (2016) (holding that Distress Law Section 696(i)(3) of the School Code, which gave the Secretary of Education power to appoint a school reform commission, violated the non-delegation rule in Art. II, § 1)
  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Todd, Dougherty, Wecht
  o Dissent: Baer, joined by Donohue

- Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275 (2005) (finding provision of Race Horse Development and Gaming Act that barred local subdivisions from prohibiting or regulating licensed gaming facility was unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Board)
  o Majority: Cappy, joined by Castille, Nigro, Saylor, Eakin, Baer

- Probst v. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 578 Pa. 42 (2004) (statute requiring individuals who received a DUI to install an ignition interlock before license
suspension was lifted violated separation of powers and an unconstitutional delegation of power of certain responsibilities to the courts
  o Majority: Cappy, joined by Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin

• Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 575 Pa. 5 (2003) (Act 63, which delegated sentencing courts’ responsibilities over installation of ignition interlock devices violated separation of powers doctrine)
  o Majority: Castille, joined by Cappy, Nigro, Newman, Saylor

• Blackwell v. Commonwealth, State Ethics, Comm’n, 523 Pa. 347 (1989) (holding that the purported one-year extension of the life of the Commission by Leadership Committee pursuant to provision of the Sunshine Act was an unconstitutional delegation of power by the Legislature to another branch of government)
  o Majority: Larsen, joined by Nix, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala

• Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. McKechnie, 467 Pa. 430 (1976) (holding that provision of the Administrative Code delegating appointment of person elected by the State Dental Society as president to the State Dental Council and Examining Board violated the non-delegation doctrine of Article II, § 1)
  o Majority: Manderino, joined by Eagen, Roberts, Nix
  o Dissent: Pomeroy, joined by Jones, O’Brien

• Hetherington v. McHale, 458 Pa. 479 (1974) (“Section 16(e) violates this principle [of only being governed by elected representatives in a democratic form of government] by surrendering to private organizations the power to select eight of seventeen members of a committee responsible for the disbursement of public funds.”)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Manderino
  o Concurrency: Manderino
  o Concurring in the result: Eagen
  o Dissent: Jones, joined by O’Brien, Pomeroy

Art. III, § 3 [Single Subject Rule]
• Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723 (Pa. 2017) (finding the State lacked authority to prosecute defendant for failing to comply with sex offender registration and waiting five days to report his address change under Megan’s Law, which had already been ruled unconstitutional in Neiman under Art. III, § 3)
  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy
  o Concurrency: Wecht
  o Concurrency: Mundy

• Leach v. Commonwealth, 636 Pa. 81 (2016) (holding municipal firearm legislation, Act 192—which added a newly-defined offense of theft of secondary metal while also giving
persons adversely affected by local gun-control laws standing to bring an action against the municipality—violated the single subject requirement of Art. III, § 3)
  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht

  o Majority: Todd, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer, McCaffery
  o Dissent: Castille

  o Majority: Baer, Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Todd, McCaffery

- *Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth*, 583 Pa. 275 (2005) (finding provision of Race Horse Development and Gaming Act that barred local subdivisions from prohibiting or regulating licensed gaming facility was unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Board)
  o Majority: Cappy, joined by Castille, Nigro, Saylor, Eakin, Baer

  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Eakin, Lamb

  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
  o Concurrence: Saylor
  o Note: single-subject rule with respect to constitutional amendments, Art. XI, § 1)

**Judicial Autonomy and Administration**

- *Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester City. Bd. of Assessment Appeals*, 627 Pa. 446 (2014) (holding that retroactive application of a real estate tax exemption for nonprofit entities associated with charter schools violated separation of powers because it operated as “a legislative command to open a final judgment and to have the rights and obligations resolved in that final judgment reassessed in accord with the subsequently expressed legislative will”)
  o Majority: Baer, joined by Castille, McCaffery, Stevens
  o Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Todd (finding the exemption violates the Uniformity Clause, not separation of powers)
Concurrence: Eakin, joined by Castille (finding the exemption violates both separation of powers and the separation of powers doctrine)

- *In re Bruno*, 627 Pa. 505 (2014) (holding that Art. V, § 18 creating the Judicial Conduct Board did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over juridical discipline matters, and that the Court had supervisory power to order the interim suspension of a sitting judge without pay)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Eakin, Baer, Stevens
  - Special Concurrence: Castille
  - Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Todd
  - Concurrence: Todd
  - Concurrence: McCaffery

- *In re Merlo*, 619 Pa. 1 (2012) (affirming decision that magisterial district judge violated Art. V, § 18(d)(1) by neglecting or failing to perform the duties of her office and by engaging in conduct which brings the judicial office into disrepute, as her repeated failure to appear, and lateness in appearing, for court hearings warranted removal from office)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, McCaffery

- *Jefferson Cty. Court Appointed Employees Ass’n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd.* 603 Pa. 482 (2009) (examining, in the context of a labor dispute, the inherent conflict between a board of county commissioners’ constitutional right, in its legislative capacity, to implement a budget and the judiciary's constitutional right to administer justice by hiring, firing, and supervising its employees, within that budget—ultimately holding that the county violated judiciary’s constitutional rights, and separation-of-powers doctrine mandated county present judiciary with reduced budget and allow judiciary to determine how to operate within it)
  - Majority: Baer, joined by Castille, Todd, McCaffery
  - Concurrence: Greenspan
  - Dissent: Eakin

- *Commonwealth v. McMullen*, 599 Pa. 435 (2008) (finding statute (§ 4136) that granted the right to jury trial in all indirect criminal contempt cases involving a violation of a restraining order or injunction violated the Court’s exclusive constitutional authority to establish rules of procedure under Art. V, § 10(c))
  - Majority: Eakin, joined by Castille, Baer, McCaffery, Greenspan
  - Concurrence: Castille, Greenspan
  - Concurrence: Greenspan, McCaffery
  - Concurrence and Dissent: Saylor

- *Beyers v. Richmond*, 594 Pa. 654 (2007) (holding that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law did not apply to attorneys practicing law because the General Assembly did not have constitutional authority to regulate attorney conduct, given the
Supreme Court’s “exclusive constitutional authority to regulate [and monitor] the practice of law” under Art. V, § 10(c))
  - Majority: Fitzgerald, joined by Castille, Baldwin
  - Concurrence: Cappy, joined by Baer (agrees with the majority “to the extent that it holds that as a matter of statutory construction, the [UTPCPL] does not apply to attorneys practicing law”)
  - Dissent: Saylor
  - Dissent: Eakin

- **Commonwealth v. Whitmore**, 590 Pa. 376 (2006) (finding the Superior Court lacked authority to sua sponte order a new judge be assigned to preside over resentencing of defendant because such authority is within the Supreme Court’s Article V, Section 10(c) general supervisory and administrative power over all courts).
  - Majority: Newman, joined by Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Baldwin
  - Concurrence: Cappy

- **Stilp v. Commonwealth**, 588 Pa. 539 (2006) (statute (Act 72 of 2005) repealing legislation that increased salaries for judiciary was unconstitutional “to the extent that it diminished judicial compensation” pursuant to Article V, § 16(a))
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Newman, Eakin, Baer, Baldwin
  - Concurrence and Dissent: Saylor

- **Payne v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Corrections**, 582 Pa. 375 (2005) (determining that PLRA provision, Section 6605(a), which required a prisoner pay costs when granted in forma pauperis status, was unconstitutional because it “intrudes upon this Court’s exclusive rulemaking authority granted under Article V, Section 10(c)”)’
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Eakin, Baer, Castille, Nigro, Newman, and in Parts V-VII by Saylor (who also concurs in the result)

- **Shaulis v. Pa. State Ethics Comm’n**, 574 Pa. 680 (2003) (Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act was held unconstitutional in violation of Art. V, § 10, because it imposed restrictions upon former government employees who are also attorneys, thus specifically targeting attorneys)
  - Majority: Newman, joined by Cappy, Castille
  - Concurrence: Lamb
  - Concurrence and Dissent: Eakin
  - Dissent: Saylor, joined by Nigro

- **In re Melograne**, 571 Pa. 490 (2002) (Court of Judicial Discipline lacked the authority to disbar a judge pursuant to Art. V, § 10(c) based on his conviction of a felony—conspiracy to violate civil rights)
  - Majority: Cappy
  - Concurrence: Zappala
Concurrence and Dissent: Saylor, joined by Nigro

  - Plurality: Zappala, joined by Cappy
  - Opinion in Support of Affirmance: Castille
  - Opinion in Support of Reversal: Saylor, joined by Nigro, Newman

  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
  - Concurring in result: Zappala

  - Per curiam: Castille
  - Concurring in the result: Zappala, Nigro

- *Commonwealth v. Stern*, 549 Pa. 505 (1997) (Section 4117(b)(1) of the Crimes Code prohibiting payment for referrals violated separation of powers, under Art. V, § 10, as Supreme Court has exclusive authority to supervise conduct of attorneys)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman

  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty, Castille
  - Concurrence: Cappy
  - Dissent: Zappala

- *Pa. State Assoc. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth*, 545 Pa. 324 (1996) (granting petition for mandamus and order that the General Assembly enact a funding scheme for the court system on or before January 1, 1998 pursuant to Article V, Section 1)
  - Per curiam
  - Opinion by Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Nigro, Newman
  - Concurrence: Newman
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by Castille
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Nix
• *Commonwealth, ex rel. Jiuliante v. Cty. of Erie*, 540 Pa. 376 (1995) (“We are persuaded that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers, which preserves the independence of the judiciary, warrants recognition of a limited exception to the general rule and therefore hold that attorney's fees may be awarded in a successful action challenging conduct which genuinely threatens or interferes with the inherent authority of the judiciary.”)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Cappy, Castille, Montemuro

• *In re Act 147 of 1990*, 528 Pa. 460 (1991) (“Act 147 is unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers doctrine [under Article V, sections 2 and 10] in our Constitution because it attempts to place constables within the judicial branch of government and under the supervisory authority of the judicial branch.”)
  - Per Curiam: Papadakos, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: McDermott
  - Dissent: Larsen

• *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A*, 528 Pa. 83 (1991) (Because Art. V, § 18 mandates the procedure for bringing disciplinary actions against judicial officers and no other body or agency has jurisdiction to bring an action against a judicial officer for misconduct, Office of Disciplinary Counsel could not proceed against attorneys after they were removed from judicial office)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala
  - Dissent: Papadakos

• *Goodheart v. Casey*, 521 Pa. 316 (1989) (holding that State Employees’ Retirement Code of 1974, which reduced pension benefits for members of the Commonwealth judiciary, violated separation of powers pursuant to Art. V, § 16(a))
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Flaherty (judgment of the court)
  - Concurring in the result: Larsen, Zappala, Papadakos
  - Dissent: McDermott

• *Klein v. Commonwealth, State Employees’ Retirement System*, 521 Pa. 330 (1989) (“We hold, therefore, that the two-tiered system of retirement benefits establishing radical disparities in the deferred compensation paid to the members of the two classes of judges is unconstitutional as inimical to and destructive of the “unified judicial system” mandated by Article V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”)
  - Majority: Larsen, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Stout
  - Concurrence: Nix, joined by Flaherty, Stout
  - Dissent: McDermott

• *Sprague v. Casey*, 520 Pa. 38 (1988) (ordering the removal from the ballot in the 1988 general election the offices of Justice of the Supreme Court and Judge of the Superior Court because “the vacancies, having occurred during the term of office, were required to
be filled by gubernatorial appointment exercised in accordance with section 13(b) of Article V”)

- Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos

- *Cty. of Allegheny v. Commonwealth*, 517 Pa. 65 (1987) (statutory scheme obligating county to fund courts within its judicial system was void as violative of constitutional mandate for unified judicial system under Article V, § 1)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Larsen, Zappala
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by McDermott
  - Dissent from denial of reargument: Papadakos, joined by Nix, McDermott

- *In re Subpoena on Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd.*, 512 Pa. 496 (1986) (holding that constitutional provision Art. V, § 13 cloaking record of proceedings before Board with permanent and absolute confidentiality where no disciplinary action is recommended prevails over statutory authority granted Pennsylvania Crime Commission, and thus, Commission could not obtain confidential record of proceedings before Board with respect to investigation of judicial misconduct charge)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by McDermott, Hutchinson, Papadakos

- *In re Casale*, 512 Pa. 548 (1986) (holding that common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to require defendant appear at the office of the assistant district attorney and order suspect to submit handwriting exemplar)
  - Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos

- *Commonwealth v. Lutz*, 508 Pa. 297 (1985) (holding that provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code requiring Courts of Common Pleas to establish a program of accelerated rehabilitative disposition (ARD) in all first offender drunk driving cases are in contravention of rules and, as such, are invalid pursuant to Art. V, § 10)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Larsen, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Nix, joined by Zappala

- *Kremer v. State Ethics Comm’n*, 503 Pa. 358 (1983) (holding that financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act, insofar as they are applied to judges, infringe on Supreme Court's power to supervise courts and are thus unconstitutional pursuant to Art. V, § 10 and separation of powers)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Roberts, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott
  - Concurrence: Larsen
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Hutchinson, Nix

- *Mezvinsky v. Davis*, 500 Pa. 564 (1983) (holding that “legislatively prescribed system requiring election of judges to the Commonwealth Court and precluding all of the
electors from participating in the selection of the candidates for each vacancy on that court is contrary to the mandate of [Art. V] Section 13(a)"
  
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Nix, Larsen
  - Concurrence: Zappala
  - Dissent: Roberts, joined by McDermott, Hutchinson

- *Commonwealth v. Sorrell*, 500 Pa. 355 (1982) (holding that 42 Pa. C.S. § 5104(c) was unconstitutional pursuant to Art. V, § 10(c) establishing “general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts”)
  
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by O’Brien, Larsen, Flaherty
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by Hutchinson
  - Dissent: McDermott

- *Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n*, 491 Pa. 255 (1980) (“We are persuaded the [Ethics Act] was intended to apply to former judges, but, when so interpreted, it is unconstitutional. There can be no doubt that the statute has infringed on this Court's exclusive power to govern the conduct of an attorney, and is, hence, unconstitutional...”)
  
  - Majority: Eagen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman

- *In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703*, 482 Pa. 522 (1978) (Supreme Court writes a direct letter to the General Assembly to express the view that the provision of the Public Agency Open Meeting Law that made it applicable to the Supreme Court while exercising its rule-making authority violated Art. V § 10(c))
  
  - Unanimous letter

  
  - Per curiam
  - Dissent: Nix

- *Flegal v. Dixon*, 472 Pa. 249 (1977) (Magisterial District Reform Act, prohibiting a person from filing nominating petitions until that person has successfully completed the course of training and instruction and passed examination, violates Art. V, § 12(b), requiring only that a course of training and instruction be completed and examination passed “prior to assuming office”)
  
  - Per curiam

- *Commonwealth v. Sutley*, 474 Pa. 256 (1977) (holding that amended statute, reducing penalties, was unconstitutional because it fatally interferes with final judgments of the judiciary and thus violated separation of powers doctrine)
  
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy
  - Concurrence: Pomeroy
• Dissent: Roberts
• Dissent: Manderino

• *Com. ex rel. Specter v. Vignola*, 446 Pa. 1 (1971) (holding that governor could not remove president judge of traffic court during his fixed five-year term pursuant to the Schedule to Art. V, § 16(i))
  o Majority: Bell, joined by Jones, O'Brien, Barbieri
  o Dissent: Eagen
  o Dissent: Roberts, joined by Pomeroy

**Limits on Legislative Process**

• *Hospital & Healthsystem Ass'n of Pa. v. Dep't of Public Welfare*, 585 Pa. 106 (2005) (General Appropriations Act of 2002 violated Art. III, § 11, which requires that a “general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations…” because the legislature improperly attempted to impose certain reimbursement rates for emergency services by out-of-network hospitals)
  o Majority: Baer, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin

• *Independent Oil & Gas Ass’n of Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Fayette Cty.*, 572 Pa. 240 (2002) (determining that the General Assembly did not have the statutory authority to impose real estate tax in question, which was an ad valorem tax on oil and gas interests)
  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Cappy, Castille, Newman, Eakin
  o Concurrence: Nigro, joined by Saylor

• *West Shore Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd.*, 534 Pa. 164 (1993) (under section 7(b) of the Sunset Act, “the legislature need not seek the Governor's approval for any adopted resolution. Merely the passage of a resolution by both chambers would reestablish an agency set for termination…. [W]e hold that section 7(b) as drafted violates Article 3, Section 9 of our State Constitution.”)
  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Papadakos, Cappy
  o Concurring in the result: Larsen

• *Commonwealth v. Sessoms*, 516 Pa. 365 (1987) (striking down provisions of Sentencing Code where guidelines were the result of a rejection resolution that was not presented to the Governor, in violation of Article III, § 9)
  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Papadakos, Nix, McDermott
  o Concurrency: Papadakos
  o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Hutchinson
  o Dissent: Larsen
• **Consumers Ed. & Protective Ass’n v. Nolan**, 470 Pa. 372 (1977) (statutory construction – “[W]e observe that even were we to agree that the meeting in question was subject to the Sunshine Law so as to invalidate the committee vote there taken, appellants provide no authority for a judicial holding that the subsequent confirmation vote, taken by the Senate as a whole as provided by the Constitution, was similarly invalid.”)
  - Majority: Eagen, Roberts, Jones, O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurrence: Roberts
  - Dissent: Pomeroy

• **Frame v. Sutherland**, 459 Pa. 177 (1974) (“We hold that the Senate's attempt to adjourn sine die failed because of the absence of consent by the House of Representatives. Our holding rests on a conclusion that the Constitution prohibits either house from adjourning since die without the consent of the other.”)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Jones, O’Brien
  - Concurring in the result: Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Nix
  - Dissent: Eagen

**Limits on Executive Action**

• **Scarnati v. Wolf**, 173 A.3d 1110 (Pa. 2017) (holding that the Governor’s attempted partial vetoes of the proposed General Appropriations Act of 2014 did not adhere to the requirements set forth in Article IV, Section 15, of the state constitution)
  - Majority: Wecht, joined by Todd, Mundy, Saylor, Baer (Parts I and III), Donohue (Parts I and II)
  - Concurrence: Saylor
  - Concurrence: Donohue
  - Concurrence and dissent: Baer, Donohue

• **Arneson v. Wolf**, 633 Pa. 224 (2015) (adopting Commonwealth Court’s opinion that the Governor could not terminate the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records (OOR) in accordance with the RTKL and the state constitution under Art. VI, §§ 1, 7 because the Office is a unique and sui generis independent body insulated from the Governor’s constitutional power to remove his appointees at-will)
  - Majority: Baer, joined by Saylor, Eakin
  - Dissent: Todd
  - Stevens did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case

• **Jubelirer v. Rendell**, 598 Pa. 16 (2008) (Governor is not constitutionally authorized under Art. IV, § 16 to veto portions of the language defining a specific appropriation in an appropriations bill without disapproving the funds with which the language is associated)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery
• **Perzel v. Cortes**, 582 Pa. 103 (2005) (Secretary of Commonwealth’s rejection of writ of election to fill vacancy in the General Assembly “offends” separation of powers because such authority is vested exclusively in General Assembly pursuant to Art. II, § 2)
  - Majority: Newman, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Saylor, Eakin, Baer

**Limits on Municipal Action**

• **Buckwalter v. Borough of Phoenixville**, 603 Pa. 534 (2009) (invalidating ordinance that eliminated pay to council members for violating Art. III, § 27’s limitation that no “law” (which includes municipal ordinances) shall decrease public officer salary after election or appointment)
  - Majority: Eakin, joined by Castille, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Greenspan
  - Concurrence: Saylor

• **Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City Council of Phila.**, 593 Pa. 241 (2007) (enjoining city council from placing question on ballot regarding the location of gaming facilities because the ordinance is an unlawful and unconstitutional exercise of power under home rule charter provision, Art. IX, § 2)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Baldwin, Fitzgerald
  - Concurrence: Baer
  - Dissent: Castille
  - Dissent: Saylor

• **South Newton Township Electors v. South Newton Township Supervisor**, 575 Pa. 670 (2003) (Section 503 of the Second-Class Township Code, which provides for the recall of a township supervisor, violated Art. VI, § 7, which provides the exclusive method of removal for elected officials)

• **Eakin v. Keller**, 556 Pa. 656 (1999) (pursuant to Art. III, § 27, district attorney could not receive a salary increase from statute enacted within first year of term)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman

• **In re Petition to Recall Reese**, 542 Pa. 114 (1995) (“[I]n providing for recall the municipality of Kingston exceeded the powers conferred by Article IX, Section 2 and the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law. This method of removal is specifically denied by the Constitution.”)
  - Majority: Zappala

• **Clark v. Troutman**, 509 Pa. 336 (1985) (holding that issue preclusion did not bar petition to open prior unappealed declaratory judgment that the state constitution did not preclude increased salaries for county officials elected prior to the enactment of statute providing for increased salaries because “[t]o hold otherwise in this case would not only perpetuate an error of constitutional dimension at public expense, but would place appellees in the...”)

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unique position of being the only county officials in the Commonwealth who were
elected prior to enactment of Act 223 who may receive salaries at the increased rate
prescribed in that Act”)
  ○ Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, Larsen, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala
  ○ Concurrence: Hutchinson, joined by McDermott

  light of Art. IX, § 10 (local government debt) and “the principle that tax statutes are to be
  strictly construed and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, we find the
  language in Section 505 relied upon by appellants was enacted to clarify that unpaid tax
  anticipation notes, not converted into funding debt, may be included in the budget of the
  ensuing fiscal year.”)
  ○ Majority: Nix, joined by Roberts, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala
  ○ Concurrence: Roberts

- **Bakes v. Snyder**, 486 Pa. 80 (1979) (construing Act 223 to apply ““when permitted by the
  Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,”” thus emphasizing the traditional
  presumption that the Legislature does not intend an unconstitutional result. Proper
  recognition of legislative and judicial functions requires this Court to reject plaintiffs’
  invitation to increase, on any theory, county officers' salaries fixed by the Legislature” in
  light of Art. III, § 27)
  ○ Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
  ○ Dissent: Larsen

- **Citizens Comm. to Recall Rizzo v. Bd. of Elections of City & Cty. of Phila.**, 470 Pa. 1
  (1976) (in separate opinions, the Court held that recall provisions of the Philadelphia
  home rule charter were unconstitutional under Art. VI, § 7)
  ○ Majority: Jones, O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
  ○ Dissent: Eagen
  ○ Dissent: Roberts
  ○ Dissent: Pomeroy

B. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS

**Art. I, § 1** ["All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness”]

a. Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Castille, Eakin, McCaffery
  - Dissent: Todd, Baer

  - Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Baer, Todd, McCaffery
  - Dissent: Eakin

  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Castille, Saylor, Lamb
  - Concurrence: Castille
  - Concurrence in result: Cappy, joined by Newman
  - Dissent: Eakin

• **In re Realen Valley Forge Greens Assocs.**, 576 Pa. 115 (2003) (holding that agricultural zoning designed to prevent development of property was “reverse spot zoning” outside the scope of municipality’s powers and violated Art. I, § 1)
  - Majority: Lamb, joined by Cappy, Castille, Eakin
  - Dissent: Saylor

• **In re Adoption of R.B.F.**, 569 Pa. 269 (2002) (construing Adoption Act in light of Art. I, § 1 to find that in same-sex second-parent adoption petitioners the legal parent need not relinquish parental rights)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Cappy, Castille, Newman, Saylor
  - Concurring in the result: Nigro

• **C&M Developers v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.**, 573 Pa. 2 (2002) (holding that zoning ordinance’s one-acre minimum lot size was not reasonable or substantially related to township's interest in preserving its agricultural lands and activities)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Newman, Saylor, Eakin

• **Mahoney v. Twp. of Hampton**, 539 Pa. 193 (1994) (zoning ordinance that prohibited private enterprise from operating gas wells in residential districts but permitted public operation of wells was an invalid exercise of police power)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Papadakos, Castille, Montemuro
Dissent: Cappy, joined by Nix

- **Pa. Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Tp. Of Moon, 526 Pa. 186 (1991)** (Adult book store owner challenged zoning ordinance which required amortization and discontinuance of property's lawful preexisting nonconforming use, and the Court held that the amortization and discontinuance was per se confiscatory and violative of Art. I, § 1)
  - Majority: Larsen, joined by Nix, Papadakos, Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  - Concurrence: Nix, joined by Papadakos
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: McDermott

- **In re Appeal of Shore, 524 Pa. 436 (1990)** (holding that zoning ordinance improperly prohibited the development of mobile home parks)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, McDermott, Papadakos
  - Concurrence: Nix
  - Concurrence: McDermott, joined by Papadakos
  - Dissent: Larsen

- **Council of Middletown Twp. v. Benham, 514 Pa. 176 (1987)** (construing “public sanitary sewer system” in zoning ordinance to not limit systems to existing government-owned systems because if the municipality were to have a monopoly it must be provided in a reasonable manner)
  - Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala
  - Concurrence in the result: Papadakos

- **Craig v. Magee, 512 Pa. 60 (1986)** (holding damages for delay under Rule 238 violated due process and altered the substantive rights of litigants)
  - Majority: McDermott, joined by Nix, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala
  - Concurring in the result: Hutchinson
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Papadakos

- **In re Baby Girl D, 512 Pa. 449 (1986)** (construing guardian ad litem’s standing to question the propriety of the fees charged for adoption to be grounded in the standing of the infant children themselves, and “it is every American’s right not to be bought or sold” pursuant to Art. I, § 1)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, Larsen, McDermott
  - Dissent: Hutchinson, joined by Zappala, Papadakos

- **Geiger v. Zoning Hearing Bd., Township of N. Whitehall, 510 Pa. 231 (1986)** (holding that zoning ordinance unconstitutionally excluded use of mobile homes on individual lots, and unconstitutionally discriminated against property owner who wished to permanently affix mobile home to his realty and make improvements rendering the structure immobile)
• **Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors**, 509 Pa. 413 (1985) (holding that township zoning ordinance which prohibited multi-family dwellings was unconstitutional)
  - Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Papadakos
  - Concurrence: Nix
  - Concurring in the result: McDermott, joined by Zappala

• **Krenzelak v. Krenzelak**, 503 Pa. 373 (1983) (refusing to retroactively apply new legislation to conveyances before effective date of new Divorce Code so as to avoid due process conflict)
  - Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Roberts, Nix, Larsen, McDermott, Zappala
  - Concurrence: Nix
  - Concurrence: Flaherty, joined by Larsen

• **Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla**, 499 Pa. 246 (1982) (“[T]he restrictions on landowner rights imposed by the [township zoning ordinance] are too severe to be regarded as ‘clearly necessary’ when their burdens are balanced against the public interest sought to be protected; hence, they do not meet the standard constitutionally required of municipal zoning ordinances.”)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Hutchinson
  - Concurrence: Hutchinson, joined by Nix
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Larsen
  - Dissent: McDermott

  - Majority: Nix, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts
  - Concurring in the result: Manderino
  - Concurrence: Roberts

• **Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.**, 462 Pa. 445 (1975) (holding zoning ordinance to be unconstitutionally exclusionary when it provided for apartment construction in only 80 out of the 11,589 acres in the township)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Eagen, Roberts, Nix
  - Concurrence: Roberts
  - Concurring in the result: Manderino
  - Dissent: Pomeroy
• **Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd.**, 459 Pa. 219 (1974) (upholding landowner’s attack on a zoning ordinance and finding it unconstitutional, but remanded the issue of the requested building permit to the Zoning Hearing Board because “the right thereto is conditioned on other prior approvals which have not been given”)
  o Majority: Eagen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Manderino
  o Concurring in the result: Pomeroy
  o Dissent: Jones

• **Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co.**, 452 Pa. 77 (1973) (construing Clean Streams Law and the Sanitary Water Board’s denial of coal companies’ applications for mine drainage permits as a constitutional regulation to promote general welfare of the community)
  o Majority: Jones, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix

• **Pa. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Pastor**, 441 Pa. 186 (1971) (statute that made it unlawful for pharmacists to advertise prices of dangerous drugs because it was an unreasonable exercise of police power and therefore unconstitutional)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Bell, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy
  o Dissent: Jones

• **Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough**, 445 Pa. 571 (1971) (holding that borough zoning ordinance that operated as a total ban on gas stations anywhere within the limits of the borough was unconstitutional because the municipality did not establish the regulation bore a relationship to public health, safety, morals, and general welfare)
  o Majority: O’Brien, joined by Jones, Eagen, Roberts, Pomeroy
  o Concurrence: Jones, joined by Pomeroy

• **Appeal of Girsh**, 437 Pa. 237 (1970) (striking down as unreasonable a zoning scheme that failed to provide for apartments in an area of 4.64 square miles with a population of nearly 13,000 people
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Bell, Eagen, O’Brien
  o Dissent: Jones, Cohen, Pomeroy

• **Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Concord Township**, 439 Pa. 466 (1970) (“Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.”) (zoning ordinance requiring lots at least of two acres along existing roads but at least three acres in the interior to be unconstitutional under Art. I, § 1 and the Fifth Amendment)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Bell, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy
  o Concurrence: Bell (arguing that the zoning ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on an owner’s right of ownership and use of property as unsustainable under general welfare principles)
  o Dissent: Jones, joined by Cohen
b. Procedural Limits

- **City of Phila. v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 (Breary), 604 Pa. 267 (2009)**
  (affirming decision to vacate grievance arbitration award to police union because City’s procedural due process rights under Article I § 1 were violated by the arbitrator who excluded critical evidence to the City, since the City cured any prejudice resulting from a discovery violation which was no done in bad faith)
  - Majority: Baer, joined by Castille, Saylor, Todd, Greenspan
  - Dissent: Eakin, McCaffery
  - Dissent: McCaffery

- **Lyness v. State Bd. of Medicine, 529 Pa. 535 (1992)** (“[A] violation of due process occurs under the Pennsylvania Constitution when an administrative board… determines that a professional licensing prosecution should be initiated, and then acts as the ultimate fact-finder in determining whether a violation has occurred” due to the “commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions within a single multi-member administrative board”)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Papadakos, Zappala
  - Concurrence: Papadakos
  - Dissent: McDermott, joined by Flaherty

- **Tracy v. Chester Cty., Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa. 288 (1985)** (holding that tax sale of property violated partner owners’ due process rights where reasonable efforts to effect actual notice were not carried out after mailed notice had not been delivered because of an inaccurate address)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, McDermott, Hutchinson, Papadakos
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Zappala, joined by Larsen

- **Hardee’s Food Sys. v. Dept of Transp., 495 Pa. 514 (1981)** (holding that record was insufficient to support action of Department of Transportation in denying application, on basis of internal communications between lower level employees of the Department to the effect that there was a “high volume of traffic” on the highway, and without affording restaurant chain any opportunity to be heard)
  - Majority: Kauffman, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty
  - Dissent: Roberts

- **Conestoga Nat. Bank of Lancaster v. Patterson, 442 Pa. 289 (1971)** (Department of Banking order approving bank application to establish a branch bank constituted a “judicial determination” and violated due process without affording notice and a hearing to competing protesting banks)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Bell
c. Reputation and Privacy

- **Reese v. Pennsylvanians For Union Reform**, 173 A.3d 1143 (Pa. 2017) (reading RTKL in light of Article I to require State Treasurer to balance public access rights against “right to informational privacy” with regard to list of the names of all state employees as well as their position, date of birth, voting residence, salary, appointment date, whether he/she was continuously employed, periods of service and positions held.)
  - Majority: Donohue, joined by Saylor, Baer, Dougherty
  - Concurrence: Wecht (“it is not the role of agencies or the legislature to adjudicate constitutional rights…Executive branch agencies—like the Treasurer—are subject to constitutional limitations, which are expounded and interpreted by this Court.”)
  - Todd did not participate in the decision of the case

- **Pa. State Educ. Ass’n v. Commonwealth**, 637 Pa. 337 (2016) (finding that school employees’ home addresses were exempt from disclosure under the RTKL because there is a “right to informational privacy…guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and may not be violated unless outweighed by a public interest favoring disclosure”)
  - Majority: Donohue, joined by Saylor, Baer, Todd, Dougherty
  - Concurrence: Wecht (finding the case “is not one of statutory interpretation. It is one of constitutional right” as there is a right to privacy enshrined in Art. I, § 1)

- **In re J.B.**, 630 Pa. 408 (2014) (determining that SORNA’s lifetime registration provision as applied to juvenile offender was an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, highlighting right to reputation under Art. I, § 1)
  - Majority: Baer, joined by Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Todd
  - Dissent: Stevens

- **Carlacci v. Mazaleski**, 568 Pa. 471 (2002) (“[T]here exists a right to petition for expungement of a PFAA record where the petitioner seeks to protect his reputation. This right is an adjunct of due process and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and is not dependent upon express statutory authority.”)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Castille, Nigro
  - Dissent: Saylor, joined by Newman
  - Dissent: Newman

- **In re T.R.**, 557 Pa. 99 (1999) (“Compelling a psychological examination in [juvenile dependency dispositional review] is nothing more or less than social engineering in derogation of constitutional rights, and where, as here, there is an abundance of information about the ability of the parent to be a parent, there is no state interest, much
less a compelling state interest, in the ordering of parental psychological examinations. In fact, we find such state intervention frightening in its Orwellian aspect.”)

- **Majority:** Flaherty, joined by Nigro, Cappy
- **Concurrence:** Nigro
- **Concurring in result:** Zappala
- **Dissent:** Newman, joined by Castille

  - **Majority:** Montemuro, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  - **Concurrence:** Castille, joined by Papadakos

- **John M. v. Paula T.,** 524 Pa. 306 (1990) (a person’s privacy interests in preserving bodily integrity and the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure precluded court-ordered blood tests)
  - **Majority:** Larsen, joined by Nix, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos
  - **Concurrence:** Nix, joined by Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos

- **Sprague v. Walter,** 518 Pa. 425 (1988) (declining to interpret the Shield Law privilege broadly to avoid conflict with Art. I, § 1, reasoning that the privilege was not intended to allow media defendant to use any of its sources and information as proof of verification or evidence of responsibility, but extrinsic evidence could be introduced in that regard without abandonment of privilege)
  - **Majority:** Nix, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Papadakos

- **Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,** 516 Pa. 184 (1987) (construing Pennsylvania Shield Law to hold that unpublished documentary information was discoverable by plaintiff in libel action as long as the information did not reveal or could redact the identity of personal source of information)
  - **Majority:** Nix, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Papadakos

- **Denoncourt v. Commonwealth,** 504 Pa. 191 (1983) (holding that the reporting provisions of the Ethics Act relating to family members were unconstitutional “in that they violate the due process rights of the public official and the family’s right to privacy under Art. I § 1”)
  - **Majority:** Flaherty, joined by McDermott, Zappala, and Roberts (Part I)
  - **Concurring in part and dissenting in part:** Hutchinson
  - **Dissent:** Nix, joined by Larsen
- *In re “B”,* 482 Pa. 471 (1978) (establishing right to privacy under penumbras of various guarantees of the state constitution and barring disclosure of records of inpatient psychiatric treatment of juvenile’s mother)
  - Majority: Manderino, joined by Roberts, Larsen
  - Concurrence: Roberts
  - Concurring in the result: O’Brien
  - Dissent: Eagen
  - Dissent: Pomeroy, Nix

- *Wolfe v. Beal,* 477 Pa. 477 (1978) (holding that a person who has been unlawfully committed to a state mental hospital has an Art. I, § 1 right to the destruction of hospital records, which were created as a result of the illegal commitment)
  - Majority: Larsen, joined by Roberts, Nix, Manderino
  - Dissent: Pomeroy, joined by Eagen, O’Brien

**Art. I, § 3 [Religious Freedom]**

- *Commonwealth v. Eubanks,* 511 Pa. 201 (1986) (grounding 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5902(b) in the First Amendment and Art. I, § 3 to remand for a new trial because defendant was cross-examined with questions concerning his religion, in violation of the legislation)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala
  - Concurrence: McDermott
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Papadakos

**Art. I, § 5 [Elections]**

  - Majority: Todd, joined by Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Baer
  - Dissent: Saylor and Mundy
  - Dissent: Mundy

  - Per curiam order
  - Dissent: Saylor
  - Dissent: Baer
  - Dissent: Mundy

  o Per curiam order
  o Dissent: Todd, joined by McCaffery
  o Dissent: McCaffery, joined by Todd

• *Cf. Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n*, 614 Pa. 364 (2012) (per curiam order finding the 2011 Legislation Reapportionment Plan is contrary to law, violating Art. II, § 17(d) because of subdivision splits that were not absolutely necessary)
  o Per curiam order.
  o Dissent from per curiam order: Saylor (“I am not persuaded that the 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan is contrary to law as reflected in the existing precedent.”), joined by Eakin, Orie Melvin

  Art. I, § 6 [Jury Trial]

• *Blum by Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 534 Pa. 97 (1993) (holding that Article I, Section 6 requires entitles a party who properly demands a 12-person jury to a verdict from a jury of 12 persons)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Papadakos, Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  o Concurrence: Larsen, joined by Papadakos

• *Heller v. Frankston*, 504 Pa. 528 (1984) (holding arbitration procedures of Health Care Services Malpractices Act was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to the regulation of attorney fees, following *Mattos v. Thompson*, under Art. I, § 6)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos
  o Concurring in the result: Larsen
  o Dissent: Hutchinson

• *Stein Enterprises, Inc. v. Golla*, 493 Pa. 502 (1981) (construing statute “to ensure that qualified parties would be able to take advantage of their right of appeal, regardless of their financial condition. In order to give full effect to the language and purpose of s 72, we hold that the costs of an appeal bond and the arbitrators' fees are ‘costs of the suit’ under s 72.”)
  o Majority: Larsen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Flaherty, Kauffman

• *Mattos v. Thompson*, 491 Pa. 385 (1980) (“Today, we are satisfied that sufficient time has passed to allow for a meaningful evaluation and must regretfully conclude that the lengthy delay occasioned by the arbitration system therein does in fact burden the right of a jury trial with ‘onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which ... make the right practically unavailable.’ We are compelled, therefore, to declare unconstitutional section 309 of the Act, giving the health care arbitration panels ‘original exclusive jurisdiction
over medical malpractice claims because the delays... result in an oppressive delay and impermissibly infringes upon the constitutional right to a jury.”
  
  o Majority: Nix, joined by O’Brien, Flaherty, Kauffman
  
  o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Larsen
  
  o Dissent: Roberts, joined by Eagen

- *Weber v. Lynch*, 473 Pa. 599 (1977) (holding that Rule 303 J of Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas violated the Arbitration Act, and that “[w]e need not here determine the extent of the legislature’s power to go beyond the present statute without impinging upon the constitutionally protected right to trial by jury”)
  
  o Majority: Eagen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  
  o Concurrence: Roberts, joined by Manderino

**Art. I, § 7 [Free Expression]**

- *DePaul v. Commonwealth*, 600 Pa. 573 (2009) (finding provision of Race Horse Development and Gaming Act imposing an absolute ban on state political contributions by a class of individuals affiliated with license gaming violated the state constitution’s protection of freedom of expression and association under Art. I, §§ 7, 20, 26)
  
  o Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd
  
  o Dissent: McCaffery

  
  o Majority: Castille, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Nigro, Eakin
  
  o Dissent: Saylor (would remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding alleged secondary effects of ordinance)

  
  o Majority: Cappy, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Castille, Nigro, Newman
  
  o Concurrence: Castille

- *Insurance Adjustment Bureau v. Insurance Comm’r for Commonwealth*, 518 Pa. 210 (1988) (“Article I, Section 7, will not allow the prior restraint or other restriction of commercial speech by any governmental agency where the legitimate, important interests of government may be accomplished practicably in another, less intrusive manner. Since the legitimate governmental goals in this case could be accomplished by enforcement of civil, criminal and administrative remedies already in place, Commonwealth Court was in error in upholding the validity of the statute's restriction on speech.”)
  
  o Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, Larsen, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos
- **Commonwealth v. Tate**, 495 Pa. 158 (1981) (“[W]e are of the view that the Constitution of this Commonwealth protects appellants' invaluable right to freedom of expression against the enforcement, by state criminal statute, of the college's standardless permit requirement,” which prevented them from distributing leaflets in outdoor campus grounds)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by O'Brien, Nix, Flaherty, Kauffman
  - Dissent: Larsen

- **Willing v. Mazzocone**, 482 Pa. 377 (1978) (determining that court order enjoining former client from demonstrating outside lawyer’s office by carrying a “sandwich-board” sign was an invalid prior restraint on former client’s speech)
  - Majority: Manderino, joined by O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy
  - Concurrence: Roberts, joined by O'Brien
  - Concurrence: Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Eagen
  - Dissent: Nix, Larsen

- **Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Van Emberg**, 464 Pa. 618 (1975) (reversing decree enjoining operation of a print shop because “a blanket prohibition against the dissemination of all ‘books, papers, magazines and all other materials’ cannot be tolerated”)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O'Brien, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino

- **Appeal of Chalk**, 441 Pa. 376 (1971) (suspension of public assistance caseworkers for comments made at a public meeting was unconstitutional as the statements were constitutionally protected under Art. I, § 7)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Jones, O'Brien
  - Concurring in the result: Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Bell
  - Dissent: Eagen

**Art. I, § 10 [Taking]**

- **Robinson Township v. Commonwealth**, 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016) (**Robinson III**) (“we determine that Section 3241 is unconstitutional on its face, as it grants a corporation the power of eminent domain to take private property for a private purpose, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution..”)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Saylor [joined takin holding]
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Baer [joined takings holding]
  - Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case
• *Reading Area Water Authority v. Schuylkill River Greenway Assoc.*, 627 Pa. 357 (2014) (construing Property Rights Protection Act in light of Article I, § 10, to hold that the Act prohibited water authority from using its eminent domain powers to condemn the easement)
  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Castille, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Stevens

• *In re Opening Private Road for Benefit of O'Reilly*, 607 Pa. 280, 5 A.3d 246 (Pa. 2010) (Private Road Act would constitute unconstitutional taking in the absence of showing of public benefit)
  o Majority: Saylor joined by Todd, McCaffery and Orie Melvin
  o Dissent: Eakin, joined by Castille and Baer

• *In re De Facto Condemnation and Taking of Lands of WBF Assocs. ex rel. Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority*, 588 Pa. 242 (2006) (failure of landowner’s real estate development project after airport expansion project was announced constituted a de facto taking under Art. I, § 10, and landowner was unconstitutionally deprived of the “full and normal use” of his property)
  o Majority: Newman, joined by Cappy, Castille, Baer
  o Concurrence and Dissent: Saylor
  o Concurrence and Dissent: Eakin

• *Redevelopment Authority of Oil City v. Woodring*, 498 Pa. 180 (1982) (holding that city redevelopment authority’s action in requiring location of all electrical wires underground substantially deprived property owner of use and enjoyment of property by requiring her to spend large sums of money to install new electrical connections in her buildings and thus constituted taking within meaning of Eminent Domain Code)
  o Majority: Larsen, joined by Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson
  o Concurrence: Roberts, joined by Nix, Hutchinson

• *City of Chester v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp.*, 495 Pa. 382 (1981) (“As we believe the loss suffered by residents of any political subdivision from the taking of a road or bridge is no less real than the loss suffered by private individuals as condemnees, we hold that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not allow the Commonwealth to escape its financial obligation owed to a public condemnee for property taken.”)
  o Majority: O’Brien, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman
  o Concurrence: Nix
  o Dissent: Roberts

• *Redevelopment Authority of City of Phila. v. Lieberman*, 461 Pa. 208 (1975) (condemnee whose retail liquor license lost value as a result of condemnation of premises for which the license was issued was entitled to have such loss considered in the award of just compensation to be paid by condemnor)
Majority: Manderino, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix
Dissent: Eagen

Art. I, § 11 [Remedies]

• *Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp.*, 577 Pa. 138 (2004) (held unconstitutional under Art. I, § 11 a statute that limited successor asbestos-related liabilities of corporations that had merged or consolidated because it took away their right to remedy)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Castille, Nigro, Baer
  - Dissent: Newman, joined by Eakin
  - Dissent: Saylor, joined by Eakin

• *Jenkins v. Hospital of Medical College of Pa.*, 535 Pa. 252 (1993) (holding that retroactive application of statute that eliminated a cause of action for wrongful birth would violate due process and equal protection guarantees of state and federal constitutions)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: Nix, Papadakos

• *Masloff v. Port Authority of Allegheny Cty.*, 531 Pa. 416 (1992) (holding that collective bargaining provision of the Port Authority Act violated right to remedy under Art. I, § 11 to the extent that it restricted the ability to “seek redress for a legal injury in an entity [the PAT] other than the one who sustains the injury”)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, McDermott, Papadakos, Cappy
  - Dissent: Nix
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined in part by Nix

• *Boettger v. Loverro*, 521 Pa. 366 (1989) (construing Wiretapping and Surveillance Control Act to avoid conflict in Art. I, § 11 and determining that newspaper reporter, who made notes on contents of conversation which district attorney inadvertently filed with clerk of court in response to criminal defendant’s discovery motion, was not statutorily authorized to disclose contents of wiretapped conversations)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Papadakos
  - Dissent: Nix

• *Boyle v. O’Bannon*, 500 Pa. 495 (1983) (determining that the Commonwealth Court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint one day after it was filed and before the complaint was served on the defendant, conflicting with due process inherent in Art. I, § 11)
  - Majority: Larsen, joined by Flaherty
  - Concurring in the result: Zappala, Roberts
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by McDermott
  - Dissent: McDermott
  - Dissent: Hutchinson
• *Commonwealth v. Contakos*, 499 Pa. 340 (1982) (“This right of the public to attend criminal trials and of the accused to be assured of the freedom of the public to attend these trials and to monitor what goes on there has been abridged in this case. The trial court failed to preserve the appellant's constitutional right to an impartial public trial.”)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Roberts, O’Brien
  - Concurrence: Roberts, joined by O’Brien
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by Hutchinson
  - Dissent: McDermott

• *Commonwealth v. Hayes*, 489 Pa. 419 (1980) (granting newspaper’s motion to reverse decision to close suppression hearing to the public in light of Art. I, § 11 because “closure may not be ordered where some other available procedural device can fully protect the defendant’s right [to a fair trial]”)
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman
  - Concurrence: Larsen
  - Concurrence: Flaherty
  - Concurrence: Kauffman
  - Dissent: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien

• *Bershefsky v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Public Welfare*, 491 Pa. 102 (1980) (following the Court’s decision in *Gibson*, 490 Pa. 156 (1980), to hold that Act 152—creating statutory sovereign immunity in certain cases—cannot be constitutionally applied to actions such as the one at issue)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman
  - Concurrence: Larsen
  - Dissent: Nix
  - Dissent: Eagen, joined by O’Brien

• *Gibson v. Commonwealth*, 490 Pa. 156 (1980) (holding that Act 152 (sovereign immunity) did not apply to plaintiff’s actions alleging the Commonwealth negligently supervised a dam that caused a flood, otherwise plaintiffs would be in without a remedy in violation of Art. I, § 11)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Larsen, Flaherty
  - Concurrence: Larsen, joined by Flaherty
  - Dissent: Eagen, O’Brien, Nix

**Art. I, § 13 [Cruel Punishment]**

  - Majority: Todd, joined by Saylor, Baer, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
• **Commonwealth v. $34,440.00**, 174 A.3d 1031 (Pa. 2017) (declining to address constitutional issues, construing statute to allow rebuttal of presumption of drug relatedness without establishing “innocent owner” defense)
  - Majority: Baer joined by Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
  - Dissent: Saylor, joined by Mundy
  - Dissent: Mundy

• **Commonwealth v. Batts**, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (adopting a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender, and determining that defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional)
  - Majority: Donohue, joined by Saylor, Todd, Dougherty, Wecht
  - Concurrence: Wecht, joined by Todd
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Baer

• **Shoul v. Dep’t of Transportation**, 173 A.3d 669 (Pa. 2017) (finding no violation of Article I § 1 rights under *Nixon v. Commonwealth*, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003), but remanding for gross disproportionality analysis to consider whether life disqualification of commercial driver’s licenses for convictions of certain drug crimes constituted cruel and unusual punishment)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Saylor, Donohue. Wecht joins Parts I, II(B), and III, Dougherty joins Parts I and II(B), and Mundy joins Parts I and II(A)
  - Concurrence: Wecht
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Dougherty, joined by Baer
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Mundy

• **Commonwealth v. Eisenberg**, 626 Pa. 512 (2014) (mandatory minimum fine of $75,000 for misdemeanor theft of $200 under Gaming Act violated Cruel Punishments Clause Art. I, § 13)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery

• **Commonwealth v. Boczkowski**, 577 Pa. 421 (2004) (vacating death sentence based on the fact that aggravating circumstance of prior murder committed in another state was based on an arbitrary factor due to prosecutor’s violation of a court order)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Cappy, Newman, Saylor, Nigro
  - Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Nigro
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Eakin

• **Commonwealth v. Jasper**, 558 Pa. 281 (1999) (absence of jury instruction telling jury they were not required to impose death penalty when they found one mitigating circumstance violated Art. I, § 13)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Nigro
  - Concurrence: Zappala
- **Dissent**: Castille, joined by Newman

- *Commonwealth v. Baker*, 511 Pa. 1 (1986) (“We conclude that the inherent bias and prejudice to Appellant engendered by the Assistant District Attorney's remarks necessitates reversal of the death sentence in the instant case, and that under the circumstances said remarks also violated Appellant's rights under the Eighth Amendment… as well as violating Appellant's rights under Article I, § 13.”)
  - Majority: Papadakos, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala

- *Commonwealth v. Story*, 497 Pa. 273 (1981) (vacating defendant’s death penalty sentence for a homicide allegedly committed in 1974: “Because the previous law governing this case has been declared unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the death penalty, the sole permissible maximum punishment for appellant's crime committed in 1974 is life imprisonment.”)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by O’Brien, Nix, Wilkinson
  - Concurrence: Nix
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Flaherty, Kauffman

**Art. I, § 17 [Ex Post Facto]**

- *Commonwealth v. Muniz*, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (performing an Edmonds analysis to find the state ex post facto clause afford greater protections than its federal counterpart, and that SORNA’s registration provisions constituted punishment violated both federal and state ex post facto clauses)
  - Majority: Dougherty, joined by Baer, Donohue. Todd and Wecht join with the exception of Parts V and VI.
  - Concurrence: Wecht, joined by Todd
  - Dissent: Saylor

- *Commonwealth v. Reed*, 168 A.3d 132 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam order reversing decision of the Superior Court in light of *Muniz*, which found that SORNA violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitution)
  - Per curiam order
  - Concurrence: Mundy
  - Concurrence: Saylor

  - Per curiam order
  - Concurrence: Mundy
  - Concurrence: Saylor
• *Commonwealth v. Rose*, 633 Pa. 659 (2015) (determining that defendant must be sentenced under statute in effect at the time of the assault, under ex post facto clauses of both federal and state constitution)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer
  - Concurrence: Saylor
  - Concurrence: Eakin
  - Dissent: Stevens

  **Art. I, § 17 [Impairment of Contracts]**

• *Parsonese v. Midland Nat’l Insurance Co.*, 550 Pa. 423 (1998) (refusing to apply statute making designation of spouse as beneficiary ineffective after divorce because, “if applied to this case, [it] would be unconstitutional, in violation of the contract clause”)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman

• *First Nat’l Bank of Pa. v. Flanagan*, 528 A.2d 134 (1987) (holding that legislative amendment, restoring disclosure requirements to loan transactions, which attempted to give retroactive effect, so as to require certain disclosures on business loans involving residential real estate during interim period when disclosure was not required, violated contract clauses of State and Federal Constitutions)
  - Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos

• *Allentown v. Local 302, Int’l Assoc. of Fire Fighters*, 511 Pa. 275 (1986) (construction in light of constitution: “An implicit power reserved by the public employer to unilaterally alter a bargained for provision in the contract would render the bargaining process established by Act 111 entirely illusory. We find no warrant in the language of the Retirement Act or elsewhere to impute such an intention to the legislature. We also note that since the decision of the trial court a majority of this Court has repudiated the “actuarial enhancement” rule and held that a unilateral change in retirement benefits to non-vested members cannot pass constitutional muster under Article I, § 17, of the State Constitution, prohibiting the impairment of contracts.”)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson
  - Concurring: Larsen

• *Assoc. of Pa. State College & Univ. Faculties v. State System of Higher Educ.*, 505 Pa. 369 (1984) (affirming order declaring unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the enforcement of an amendment to the State Employees’ Retirement Code, requiring each member to contribute an additional 1.25% of wages to the system’s retirement fund)
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Hutchinson
• *Pa. Federation of Teachers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila*, 506 Pa. 196 (1984) (holding that “the increased contribution rate prescribed in section 2 of Act 31 cannot constitutionally be imposed on employees who were members of PSERS prior to the effective date of the Act” pursuant to Art. I, § 17)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos
  o Concurrence: Hutchinson

• *Bellomini v. State Employees’ Retirement Bd.*, 498 Pa. 204 (1982) (denial of former state employees’ retirement benefits due to retroactive application of Act 140 was unconstitutional)
  o Majority: O’Brien, joined by Nix, McDermott
  o Concurrence: Nix, joined by McDermott
  o Dissent: Roberts, joined by Larsen

• *McKenna v. State Employees’ Retirement Bd.*, 495 Pa. 324 (1981) (holding that class of all active state court judges and had 10+ years of service as of 6/22/1972 had their retirement benefits impermissibly impaired under Art. I, § 17 by provisions of the revised State Employees’ Retirement Code)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Larsen, Kauffman
  o Concurrence: Nix
  o Concurrence: Flaherty
  o Concurrence: Larsen, joined by Flaherty, Kauffman

**Art. 1, § 27 [Environmental]**

• *Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth*, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) (because state parks and forests, including the oil and gas minerals therein, are part of the corpus of Pennsylvania’s environmental public trust, the Commonwealth, as trustee, must manage them as a fiduciary under Article I, § 27, finding statutes allocating oil and gas royalties to general fund facially unconstitutional)
  o Majority: Donohue, joined by Todd, Dougherty, Wecht
  o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Baer (concurs in holdings of enforceability that “solidify the jurisprudential sea change begun by Chief Justice Castille’s plurality in *Robinson Twp*”, dissents from application of “inflexible trust requirement”)
  o Dissent: Saylor, joins “central analysis” of Baer opinion

  Holding enforcement provisions of Act 13 were not severable from invalidated portions, declining to reconsider *Robinson II* because issue was not properly before the Court
  o Majority: Todd, joined by Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
  o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Saylor [dissents from severability]
Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Baer [joins severability]

(invalidated provisions of Act 13 regulating oil and gas extraction under Environmental Rights Amendment: provision preempting municipalities' obligation to plan for environmental concerns for oil and gas operations; statutory requirement that municipal zoning ordinances be amended to include oil and gas operations in all zoning districts; statutory well location restrictions that allowed Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to grant waiver from setback requirements; and provision that precluded municipalities from seeking appellate review of DEP's decisions on restriction waivers)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Todd, McCaffery, and Baer joins Parts I, II, IV, V, VI(A), (B), (D)-(G)
  - Concurrence: Baer
  - Dissent: Saylor, Eakin
  - Dissent: Eakin

Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Locust Point Quarries, Inc., 483 Pa. 350 (1979) (construing Air Pollution Control Act pursuant to Article I, Section 27, and that the legislature had the power to enact policy to protect air resources to the degree necessary for the protection of the health, safety, and wellbeing of citizens)
  - Majority: Eagen, joined by Roberts, Nix, Manderino, Larsen

Art. I, § 28 [Equal Rights Amendment]

Phila. Hous. Auth. v. AFSCME, Dist. Council 33, Local 934, 617 Pa. 69 (2012) (Relying in part on Equal Rights Amendment Article I §28 to support the proposition that “a public employer must be permitted to do more than engage in adjectival condemnation when faced with [egregious sexual harassment]… the arbitrator's award of reinstatement with back pay violates the public policy of this Commonwealth”)
  - Majority: Castille joined by Saylor, Eakin, Todd
  - Concurrence: Saylor
  - Concurrence; Eakin
  - Dissent: McCaffery, Baer

  - Majority: Nix, joined by Flaherty, Hutchinson
  - Dissent: McDermott, joined by Zappala
  - Dissent: Zappala, joined by McDermott
• *Commonwealth ex rel. Stein v. Stein*, 487 Pa. 1 (1979) (reading statute “to provide for reciprocity of remedy by spouses seeking to effectuate support orders” to avoid equal rights amendment conflict)
  o Majority: Nix, Roberts, Larsen
  o Concurring in the result: O’Brien
  o Concurring in the result: Manderino
  o Dissent: Eagen

• *George v. George*, 487 Pa. 133 (1979) (construing statute allowing wives to obtain divorce from bed and board to avoid constitutional conflict with ERA: “We believe the proper disposition of this case is to apply the statute in question in such a way as to read it as providing for reciprocity of remedies for spouses.”)
  o Majority: Flaherty, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Nix, Larsen
  o Concurring in the result: Roberts

• *Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson*, 470 Pa. 290 (1977) (affirming trial court’s grant of custody to father, rejecting tender years doctrine that created a presumption against the male parent, in light of the Equal Rights Amendment)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by O’Brien, Roberts
  o Concurring in the result: Jones, Eagen, Pomeroy

• *Adoption of Walker*, 468 Pa. 165 (1976) (statute providing that in the case of an illegitimate child, consent to adoption of mother only shall be necessary creates impermissible distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, in violation of the equal rights amendment)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Manderino
  o Concurring in the result: Pomeroy, Nix

• *Commonwealth v. Santiago*, 462 Pa. 216 (1975) (rejecting female defendant’s defense of “coverture” that she was coerced by her husband, in light of “present day considerations” including *Conway v. Dana* and the Equal Rights Amendment)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy
  o Concurrence: Roberts, joined by Manderino

• *DiFlorido v. DiFlorido*, 459 Pa. 641 (1975) (classifying certain household goods and furniture acquired during the marriage and used by both spouses to be marital property, even though primarily bought with husband’s savings—rejecting earlier presumptions regarding household property ownership)
  o Majority: Jones, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino

• *Butler v. Butler*, 464 Pa. 522 (1975) (holding that wife was not entitled to constructive trust on the basis that she provided most of the money for their home while her husband contributed his salary to the marital unit and his labor in building the home)
- Majority: Jones, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Nix
- Concurrence: Pomeroy (“[D]ifferent in treatment of transfers of property as between spouses violates the Equality of Rights Amendment.”)
- Dissent: Roberts
- Dissent: Manderino

  - Majority: Manderino, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Nix

- **Conway v. Dana**, 456 Pa. 536 (1974) (“We hold that insofar as these decisions suggest a presumption that the father, solely because of his sex and without regard to the actual circumstances of the parties, must accept the principal burden of financial support of minor children, they may no longer be followed,” pursuant to the Equal Rights Amendment)
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Manderino
  - Dissent: Jones

- **Commonwealth v. Butler**, 458 Pa. 289 (1974) (“[W]e hold unconstitutional that portion of the new Muncy Act directing that no minimum sentence be imposed on women convicted of crime” because it violates the Equal Rights Amendment)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Jones, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurrence: Pomeroy
  - Concurring in the result: Eagen

- **Henderson v. Henderson**, 458 Pa. 97 (1974) (determining that former statutory provision, which permitted the payment of alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and expenses to the wife in a divorce action but not to the husband, was invalid as violative of the Equal Rights Amendment)
  - Per curiam

- **Hopkins v. Blanco**, 457 Pa. 90 (1974) (“[I]f the husband may recover for loss of consortium, to deny the wife an equal right would be invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitution. To draw such a distinction would have no rational or proper foundation at law, and would clearly be a form of invalid discrimination based strictly on sex.”)
  - Majority: Eagen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurring in the result: Jones

**Art. III, § 14 [Education]**

any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right”); Article III § 32

- Majority: Wecht, joined by Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Mundy
- Concurrence: Dougherty
- Dissent: Saylor
- Dissent: Baer

**Art. III, § 32 [Equal Treatment]**

  (Provision restricting health care professionals’ access to and ability to disseminate information regarding chemicals used in fracking process constituted “legislative favoritism of particular industry” in violation of § 32. Commonwealth “has not identified any difference between the oil and gas industry and the myriad of other industries … which justify heavy constraints on health professionals.” Exclusion of private well owners from mandatory spill notification provided to public water systems was unconstitutional because it furthered no legitimate legislative goal. Notice provisions struck entirely, with effect stayed for 180 days)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Saylor [dissents from notification holding]
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Baer [dissents from notification holding]
  - Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case

- *West Mifflin Area Sch. Dist. v. Zahorchak*, 607 Pa. 153 (2010) (holding that statutes concerning closure of high school programs by third class school districts created a class of one member that is closed or substantially closed to future membership, which is “special legislation” that is per se unconstitutional in violation of Art. III, § 32)
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Castille, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Orie Melvin

- *Pa. Turnpike Comm’n v. Commonwealth*, 587 Pa. 347 (2006) (First-Level Supervisor Collective Bargaining Act violated the constitutional prohibition against special laws, because “there is no rational reason to treat first-level supervisors of the Commission differently than all other first-level supervisors of other public employers when it comes to collective bargaining”)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Cappy, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Baldwin

- *Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Hickok*, 563 Pa. 391 (2000) (amendment to Education Empowerment Act that exempted school district in state capital from treatment mandated for other school district was unconstitutional special legislation because it created a class of one member)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Castille
Concurring in result: Nigro
Concurrence and Dissent: Saylor

- Majority: Flaherty, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
- Concurrence in the result: Zappala

*Hoffman v. Township of Whitehall*, 544 Pa. 499 (1996) (Statutory preference in Veterans' Preference Act accorded to veterans seeking promotion in public employment was unconstitutional, a holding grounded in due process and equal protection)
- Majority: Flaherty, Nix Cappy
- Dissent: Zappala, joined by Castille
- Dissent: Castille

*Curtis v. Kline*, 542 Pa. 249 (1995) (invalidating statute on the basis that there is “no rational reason why those similarly situated with respect to needing funds for college education, should be treated unequally”)
- Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Castille
- Dissent: Montemuro, joined by Cappy

- Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, Hutchinson, Zappala
- Concurrence: Nix
- Dissent: Zappala

*Commonwealth v. Bonadio*, 490 Pa. 91 (1980) (“Not only does the [Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute] exceed the proper bounds of the police power, but, in addition, it offends the Constitution by creating a classification based on marital status (making deviate acts criminal only when performed between unmarried persons) where such differential treatment is not supported by a sufficient state interest and thereby denies equal protection of the laws.”)
- Majority: Flaherty, joined by Eagen, Larsen, Kauffman
- Concurrence: Eagen, joined by Larsen, Kauffman
- Concurrence: Larsen
- Dissent: Roberts, joined by O’Brien
- Dissent: Nix
• **Kroger Co. v. O’Hara**, 481 Pa. 101 (1978) (holding Sunday Trading Laws, which prescribe criminal sanctions for all labor, business, and commercial activities on Sunday, violated equal protection)
  o Majority: Manderino, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen
  o Concurrence: Nix
  o Concurrence: Larsen
  o Dissent: Eagen, joined by Pomeroy

• **Moyer v. Phillips**, 462 Pa. 395 (1975) (slander and libel exception within statutes, providing that all causes of action or proceedings, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive the death of plaintiff or defendant constituted an arbitrary denial of equal protection)
  o Majority: Jones, joined by Roberts, Nix, Manderino, Eagen, O’Brien
  o Concurrence: Roberts, joined by Nix
  o Concurrence: Manderino

• **Goodman v. Kennedy**, 459 Pa. 313 (1974) (holding that family status classification in the Sunday Trading Law violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 3, § 32, noting that economic discrimination “in and of itself, is not a legitimate legislative objective which justifies the closing of some stores on Sunday and not others”)
  o Judgment: Manderino, joined by Eagen, Pomeroy and Nix (Parts I, III-IV), Jones and Roberts (Parts II-IV)
  o Concurrence: Roberts, joined by Jones
  o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Nix, joined by Pomeroy
  o Dissent: O’Brien

• **In re Cavill’s Estate**, 459 Pa. 411 (1974) (statute generally invalidating bequest in wills to religious and charitable organizations made within 30 days of testator’s death denies charitable beneficiaries equal protection of the laws)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Jones, O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
  o Dissent: Pomeroy, joined by Eagen (“[T]he majority comes perilously close to assuming the posture of a super-legislature which judges the wisdom rather than the validity of legislation.”)

• **State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pa.**, 441 Pa. 293 (1971) (holding unconstitutional under Art. III, § 32 a provision of the Chiropractic Registration Act because the exemptions afforded a specific organization for certain standards of educational and professional competence were not grounded in “sound reason and real necessity”)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Cohen, O’Brien
  o Concurring in the result: Bell, Eagen
  o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Pomeroy, joined by Jones
Art. VIII, § 1 [Tax Uniformity]

- *Nextel Comms Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth*, 171 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2017) (finding net-loss-carryover provision in the revenue code, which restricted the amount of loss a corporation could carry over from prior years as a deduction, violated the Uniformity Clause)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Saylor, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy
  - Concurrence: Baer, Donohue, Wecht

- *Valley Forge Towers Apts. v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist.*, 163 A.3d 962 (Pa. 2017) (holding that the Uniformity Clause did not permit a school district to selectively appeal only assessment commercial properties, such as apartment complexes, while choosing not to appeal assessments of other types of property, such as single-family residential homes)
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy

- *Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue*, 638 Pa. 140 (2016) (finding the municipal portion of the local share assessment levied on gross slot machine revenue under the Race Horse Development and Gaming Act imposing flat levy above cut-off income violated the Uniformity Clause of the state constitution—which the Court referred to as the “provision in our constitution [that] has been so much litigated yet so little understood”)
  - Majority: Wecht, joined by Baer, Donohue, Dougherty
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Saylor
  - Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Todd

- *Cf. Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals*, 615 Pa. 463 (2012) (affirming conclusion that property owner was not an institution of a “purely public charity” entitled to exemption from real estate taxes within the meaning of Art. III, § 2(a)(v))
  - Majority: Eakin, joined by Baer, Todd, McCaffery
  - Dissent: Saylor, joined by Castille, Orie Melvin

- *Clifton v. Allegheny Cty.*, 600 Pa. 662 (2009) (ordinance providing for continued, indefinite use of a base year method of valuation for property tax purposes violated the Uniformity Clause as applied in Allegheny County—but not facially—because it resulted in (1) a form of classification that was (2) unreasonable and not rationally related to any legitimate state purpose)
  - Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Todd, McCaffery, Greenspan
  - Concurrence: Baer

challenge if common level ratio was within 15% of the established predetermined ratio violated the Uniformity Clause)
  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Castille, Newman, Baer, Baldwin
  o Dissent: Cappy, joined by Eakin

• *Devlin v. City of Phila.*, 580 Pa. 564 (2004) (legislative provisions exempting transfers of real estate between “life partners” from the real estate transfer tax violated the Uniformity Clause)
  o Majority: Nigro, joined by Cappy, Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer

• *Cf. Community Options, Inc. v. Bd. of Property Assessment*, 571 Pa. 672 (2002) (determining that non-profit providing housing and employment services for individuals with intellectual disabilities was considered a “purely public charity” under Art. VIII, § 2, and qualified for tax-exempt status)
  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman
  o Concurrence: Nigro
  o Dissent: Saylor, joined by Eakin

• *City of Harrisburg v. School Dist. of Harrisburg*, 551 Pa. 295 (1998) (Resolution 276 violates Uniformity Clause because it distinguishes between lessees of public and nonpublic property, without a reasonable and just basis for the difference in treatment)
  o Majority: Newman, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro

• *Cf. PICPA Found. For Educ. & Research v. Com., Bd. of Finance & Revenue*, 535 Pa. 67 (1993) (construing Section 204(10) of the Tax Code in light of constitutional requirement that only institutions that are “purely public charities” be exempted from taxes to deny nonprofit corporation’s requires for sales tax refund)
  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Cappy, Montemuro
  o Concurring: Nix, joined by Cappy, Montemuro

• *Automobile Trade Ass’n of Greater Phila. v. City of Phila.*, 528 Pa. 233 (1991) (“As argument before this Court focused on the retroactivity question, we are unprepared, on this meager record, to decide [whether the Mercantile License Tax violated the uniformity clause]. We must, therefore, remand the matter to the Court of Common Pleas for decision on the claim that the Mercantile License Tax was unconstitutional, and for determination of the appropriate remedy, if any.”)
  o Majority: Zappala, joined by Papadakos, Larsen

• *Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth*, 507 Pa. 1 (1985) (determining that plaintiff organization was not entitled to sales and use tax exemptions because it was not a “purely public charity” within the meaning of the state constitution, and construing Section 204(10) in light of constitutional limitation “to exempt only those charitable organizations which are institutions of ‘purely public charity’”)

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Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos

*Gilbert Assocs. Inc. v. Commonwealth*, 498 Pa. 514 (1982) (holding that difference in treatment of domestic and foreign corporations in calculating franchise tax by the Board of Finance and Revenue, solely based on their place of incorporation, was constitutionally impermissible)
  - Majority: Roberts (Opinion of the Court)

  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Larsen, Wilkinson, Kauffman
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Roberts, joined by O’Brien
  - Concurring in the result: Nix

*Commonwealth v. Molycorp., Inc.*, 481 Pa. 208 (1978) (holding that where Tentative Tax Act provided two methods for computation of tentative tax, Commonwealth could not systematically discriminate against taxpayers, choosing second method by assessing additional tax against them for underpayment of tentative tax, while allowing taxpayers using other method to escape such additional tax)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurring in the result: Larsen

*Commonwealth v. Staley*, 476 Pa. 171 (1978) (construing phrase “payments to reimburse actual expenses” in Section 301(d)(v) so as to avoid constitutional conflict with Article VIII, Section 1)
  - Majority: Manderino, joined by O’Brien, Roberts
  - Concurrence: Roberts, joined by O’Brien
  - Concurring in the result: Nix
  - Dissent: Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Eagen

*Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Commonwealth*, 468 Pa. 145 (1976) (treating a foreign corporation, once it is allowed entry, differently than domestic corporations in the absence of any reasonable basis for separate treatment violated the tax uniformity clause)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Manderino
  - Concurring in the result: Nix

*I-T-E Imperial Corp. v. Commonwealth*, 469 Pa. 255 (1976) (Department of Revenue order sustaining an excise tax on foreign corporations could not be enforced as it violated the tax uniformity clause)
  - Per curiam
• *Amidon v. Kane*, 444 Pa. 38 (1971) (statute purporting to impose flat 3.5% tax but excluding from taxable income all interest received on obligations of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions violated the tax uniformity clause)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Bell, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Barbieri
  - Concurring: Bell
  - Concurring: Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Eagen, joined by Jones

C. CRIMINAL PROCESS

Art. I, § 8 [Search and Seizure]

• *Commonwealth v. Shabezz*, 166 A.3d 278 (Pa. 2017) (held that the passenger had automatic standing to challenge the illegal search of his vehicle under Art. I, § 8)
  - Majority: Wecht, joined by Saylor, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty
  - Concurrence: Mundy, joined by Baer

• *Commonwealth v. Loughnane*, 173 A.3d 733 (Pa. 2017) (rejecting automobile exception in defendant’s vehicle search, and remanding to determine whether probable cause and exigent circumstances existed to justify search under Art. I, § 8)
  - Majority: Donohue, joined by Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy
  - Concurrence: Mundy
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Saylor

• *Commonwealth v. Myers*, 164 A.3d 1162 (Pa. 2017) (determining that the implied consent statute did not authorize warrantless blood test of unconscious defendant; the blood test violated defendant’s Art. I, § 8 and Fourth Amendment rights)
  - Majority: Wecht, joined by Donohue, Dougherty and Todd in Parts I, II(A), II(B), II(D) and mandate
  - Concurrence: Saylor, Baer, and Donohue in part
  - Concurrence: Todd
  - Dissent: Mundy

• *Commonwealth v. Arter*, 637 Pa. 541 (2016) (conducting an *Edmunds* analysis and determining that the exclusionary rule derived from Art. I, § 8 of the state constitution applies to parole and probation revocation proceedings, unlike the federal exclusionary rule)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Baer, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
  - Dissent: Saylor

• *Commonwealth v. Enimpah*, 630 Pa. 357 (2014) (reasoning that the defendant had the right to compel prosecution to prove its evidence was not obtained in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights under Art. I, § 8)
Majority: Eakin, joined by Castille, Baer, Todd, Stevens
Concurrence: Saylor, Castille joins n.2 (n.2: “I would also note that there is a good argument to be made that a threshold focus, before assessing hearing burdens, should be on the sufficiency of the suppression motion in the first instance.”)

Commonwealth v. Dunnavant, 630 Pa. 455 (2014) (affirming by an equally divided court the Superior Court’s order to suppress videotape made in defendant’s home by a confidential informant, invoking the strong privacy interest individuals possess in the home)
- Opinion in support of affirmance: Saylor, joined by Baer, Todd
- Opinion in support of affirmance: Todd
- Opinion in support of reversal: Castille, joined by Eakin, Stevens
- Opinion in support of reversal: Stevens

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 624 Pa. 325 (2014) (following Edmunds and holding that good faith exception to exclusionary rule enshrined in Art. I, § 8 would not be adopted for purpose of admitting physical evidence seized incident to arrest based solely on an expired arrest warrant)
- Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd
- Dissent: McCaffery, Stevens

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 620 Pa. 251 (2013) (holding that the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act did not empower sentencing court to direct probation officer to conduct warrantless, suspicionless searches of a probationer as a condition of probation, in light of Art. I, § 8)
- Majority: Castille, joined by Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd
- Dissent: McCaffery

Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 623 Pa. 434 (2013) (holding that officer could not conduct warrantless search of immobilized and safely parked vehicle, and finding “the Fourth Amendment and Art. I, § 8 to be coextensive”)
- Majority: Todd, joined by Castille, Baer, McCaffery
- Concurrence: Saylor
- Dissent: Eakin

Commonwealth v. Marconi, 619 Pa. 401 (2013) (affirming grant of motion to suppress evidence obtained when defendant’s car was stopped at a roadside sobriety checkpoint because sheriffs and their deputies lacked authority independently to establish and conduct suspicionless roadside sobriety checkpoint)
- Majority: Saylor, joined by Castille, Baer, Todd
- Concurrence: Eakin
- Dissent: McCaffery
• Commonwealth v. Wallace, 615 Pa. 395 (2012) (confirming adoption of Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test with respect to Art. I, § 8, the Court held that the anticipatory search of defendant’s home violated his constitutional rights and granted motion to suppress seized evidence)
  - Majority: Todd, joined by Saylor, Baer, Orie Melvin
  - Dissent: Eakin, joined by Castille
  - Dissent: McCaffery, joined by Castille

• Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 614 Pa. 539 (2012) (affirming “by an equally divided vote, the Superior Court’s holding that a search warrant is invalid if the affidavit of probable cause included a confidential informant’s deliberate misstatement”)
  - In support of affirmance: Saylor, Baer, Todd (no opinion)
  - Opinion in support of reversal: Eakin, joined by Castille, McCaffery

• Commonwealth v. Grahame, 607 Pa. 389 (2010) (finding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct warrantless search of defendant's handbag for safety reasons based solely on the fact that defendant was in a residence where another individual had sold illegal drugs about ten minutes earlier outside of defendant's presence—in violation of Art. I, § 8 and the Fourth Amendment)
  - Majority: Orie Melvin, joined by Castille, Saylor, Baer
  - Concurrence: Eakin, joined by McCaffery
  - Concurrence: Todd

• Commonwealth v. Mistler, 590 Pa. 390 (2006) (finding suspicionless stop of defendants to determine if they had engaged in underage drinking, in the absence of paramount public interest, violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution)
  - Majority: Newman joined by Cappy, Baer
  - Concurrence: Baldwin
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Saylor
  - Dissent: Eakin, joined by Castille

• Commonwealth v. Laventure, 586 Pa. 348 (2006) (arrest warrant failed to describe unknown defendant “as nearly as may be” requirement in Art. I, § 8—which “requires more specificity than the federal particularity requirement”—and was thus ineffective for tolling Section 5552(b)’s period of limitations)
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Cappy, Castille, Newman, Baer

• Commonwealth v. Cruz, 578 Pa. 263 (2004) (finding defendant entitled to post-conviction relief on the same grounds for which co-defendant was granted for his Art. I, § 8 claim because certain evidence obtained should have been suppressed)
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Cappy, Nigro, Newman, Baer
Dissent: Castille

- **Commonwealth v. Shaw**, 564 Pa. 617 (2001) (hospital release of blood test results was unconstitutional when done at the request of a police trooper without a search warrant)
  - Majority: Zappala
  - Concurrence: Nigro (citing to *Edmunds*, argues that the majority opinion “does damage to the settled methodology this Court has used to analyze state constitutional provisions in comparison to their federal counterparts to determine whether the former provide additional protections which the latter do not”)
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Saylor (“[A] warrantless police request [like the one at issue] is just as reasonable, and hence as constitutionally permissible, under Article I, § 8 as it is under the Fourth Amendment.”)

- **Commonwealth v. Torres**, 564 Pa. 86 (2001) (affirming grant of motion to suppress evidence collected because affidavit of probable cause did not provide substantial basis upon which to issue a warrant)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Saylor
  - Concurrence and Dissent: Castille and Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Freeman**, 563 Pa. 82 (2000) (finding law enforcement officer’s seizure of driver and subsequent search of her car by obtaining her consent was the product of an illegal detention)
  - Majority: Saylor
  - Concurring in the result: Nigro

  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Nigro
  - Concurrence and dissent: Saylor, joined by Castille
  - Dissent: Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Wimbush**, 561 Pa. 368 (2000) (held that police officer’s investigatory stop violated defendant’s Art. I, § 8 and Fourth Amendment rights, noting in n.2 that “Pennsylvania has consistently followed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in stop and frisk cases”)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Saylor
  - Concurrence: Flaherty
  - Dissent: Zappala
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Goodwin**, 561 Pa. 346 (2000) (companion case to Wimbush, noting in n.3 that Pennsylvania follows Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in stop and frisk cases)
  - Majority: Nigro
Concurrence: Zappala, joined by Flaherty
Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

*Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger*, 560 Pa. 222 (1999) (holding that warrantless use of infrared thermal imaging device to scan private residence for heat from suspected marijuana growing operation was unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment and Art. I, § 8)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Newman, Saylor, Nigro
  - Concurring: Nigro
  - Dissent: Castille

*In re D.M.*, 560 Pa. 166 (1999) (held that police officer did not have cause pursuant to state and federal constitutions to stop juvenile based on an anonymous tip, citing *Cook* that an officer must have “specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experiences”)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman
  - Dissent: Saylor

*Commonwealth v. Clark*, 558 Pa. 157 (1999) (officer did not have probable cause to justify warrantless arrest, and evidence seized during search incident to arrest must be suppressed)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

*Commonwealth v. Ardestani*, 558 Pa. 191 (1999) (applying *Brion*, the Court determined that police illegally recorded defendants’ conversations with informants in their respective homes)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Nigro
  - Concurrence: Nigro
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

*Commonwealth v. Wilson*, 550 Pa. 518 (1998) (holding that “when the prior inconsistent statement is a contemporaneous verbatim recording of a witness’s statement, the recording of the statement must be an electronic, audiotaped or videotaped recording in order to be considered as substantive evidence”)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Castille, Nigro
  - Dissent: Newman

*Commonwealth v. Graham*, 554 Pa. 472 (1998) (police search of defendant’s back pockets and seizure of drugs was beyond what was necessary to determine whether the suspect was armed)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty
• Concurring in the result: Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Graziano-Constantino**, 553 Pa. 150 (1998) (police officer did not have probable cause to stop defendant’s truck pursuant to search warrant issued for the premises)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Cappy, Nigro, Saylor
  - Concurring in result: Zappala
  - Dissent: Newman, joined by Castille

- **In Interest of S.J.**, 551 Pa. 637 (1998) (pat-down search of juvenile pursuant to investigatory stop arising from observation of group of males smoking marijuana on street corner was unjustified)
  - Majority: Nigro
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Cappy
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Jackson**, 548 Pa. 484 (1997) (*Terry* stop and pat-down without reasonable suspicion violated Art. I, § 8 rights, which are broader than those afforded under federal Constitution)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Nigro
  - Dissent: Newman, joined by Castille

- **Commonwealth v. Hawkins**, 547 Pa. 652 (1997) (applying the rule set forth in *Queen* and holding that police radio broadcast describing a man carrying a gun, and based on an anonymous tip, did not justify the search of that person and seizure of his weapon)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: Nigro
  - Dissent: Newman, joined by Castille

- **Commonwealth v. Selby**, 547 Pa. 31 (1997) (holding that wiretap recording in individual's home and recording his conversations violated his Art. I, § 8 rights, “as individual’s right to privacy in his home should remain inviolate”)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Nigro
  - Concurring in the result: Nigro
  - Dissent: Castille
  - Dissent: Newman, joined by Castille

  - Majority: Newman, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Nigro
  - Dissent: Castille
• **Commonwealth v. White**, 543 Pa. 45 (1995) (warrantless search of vehicle did not fall into any exception to justify search under Art. I, § 8)
  - Majority: Flaherty
  - Concurrence: Montemuro
  - Dissent: Castille

• **Commonwealth v. Brion**, 539 Pa. 256 (1994) (Article I, § 8 precludes the police from sending a confidential informer into the home of an individual to electronically record his conversations and transmit them back to the police)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Montemuro
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by Papadakos, Castille

• **Commonwealth v. Queen**, 536 Pa. 315 (1994) (declaring the rule that “a stop and frisk may be support by a police radio bulletin only if evidence is offered at the suppression hearing establishing the articulable facts which support the reasonable suspicion,” and holding that, after applying said rule, the suppression court violated both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Papadakos, Cappy, Montemuro

• **Commonwealth v. Lewis**, 535 Pa. 501 (1994) (use of “drug courier profile” as a law enforcement technique violated the Fourth Amendment and Art. I, § 8)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Cappy
  - Dissent: Papadakos
  - Dissent: Montemuro, joined by Papadakos

• **Commonwealth v. Schaeffer**, 547 Pa. 53 (1993) (affirming by an equally divided Court that the Pennsylvania Constitution precludes police from sending confidential informants into the homes of individuals to electronically record conversations and transmit them back to police)
  - Opinion in support of affirmance: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy
  - Opinion in support of reversal: Nix, joined by Larsen, Papadakos
  - Opinion in support of reversal: Larsen
  - Opinion in support of reversal: Papadakos

• **Commonwealth v. Mason**, 535 Pa. 560 (1993) (knocking down apartment door with battering ram before warrant was issued, and absent exigent circumstances, violated Art. I, § 8, following *Edmunds* analysis)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Cappy, Zappala, Nix
  - Concurrence: Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: Montemuro
  - Dissent: Papadakos
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: Larsen
  - Dissent: Papadakos

  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala
  - Dissent: Papadakos

  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Cappy
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Papadakos

  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: Larsen
  - Dissent: McDermott, joined by Papadakos

- **Commonwealth v. Edmunds**, 526 Pa. 374 (1991) (Court establishes new “methodology” to analyze future state constitutional issues, then analyzing Art. I, § 8 to determine there is no “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala, Papadakos
  - Concurrence: Papadakos
  - Dissent: McDermott

- **Commonwealth v. Hashem**, 526 Pa. 199 (1990) (construing Wiretap Act to meet the standard of reasonableness, and that at a minimum, all the requirements directed by the Legislature be met: the Commonwealth’s failure to obtain permission of crime different than targeted crime, prior to disclosing contents of communications, irreversibly tainted defendant’s conviction)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Papadakos
  - Dissent: McDermott

- **Commonwealth v. Bricker**, 525 Pa. 362 (1990) (holding that the failure to give corrupt source charge regarding prosecution witness was reversible error where evidence permitted inference that witness was accomplice, even though trial court gave “false in one false in all” charge and defense counsel effectively cross-examined witness and made
closing argument alerting jury to scrutinize witness' testimony carefully; and sending unredacted plea agreements of prosecution witnesses to jury was reversible error)
  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Larsen, Zappala, Papadakos
  - Dissent: Flaherty, joined by Nix, McDermott

- **Commonwealth v. Grossman**, 521 Pa. 290 (1989) (holding that search warrant authorizing seizure of “all files” was unconstitutionally overbroad)
  - Majority: Stout, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala
  - Dissent: McDermott, joined by Papadakos

- **Commonwealth v. Melilli**, 521 Pa. 405 (1989) (holding that pen register, used to investigate alleged organized illegal gambling operation of defendant, could not be used by law enforcement authorities without order based on probable cause; and evidence obtained from pen registers was not within good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
  - Majority: Papadakos, joined by Larsen, Zappala, Stout
  - Concurring in the result: Nix, Flaherty
  - Dissent: McDermott

- **Commonwealth v. Ionata**, 518 Pa. 472 (1988) (affirming by an equally divided court that the Commonwealth failed to establish that exigent circumstances were present to validate warrantless search of defendant's automobile)
  - Opinion in support of affirmance: Flaherty, joined by Nix, Zappala
  - Dissent: McDermott, joined by Larsen
  - Dissent: Papadakos, joined by Larsen

- **Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. McFarren**, 514 Pa. 411 (1987) (statute permitting police to request second blood alcohol test to substantiate accuracy of first test was unreasonable and in violation of the Constitution)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty
  - Concurring in the result: McDermott
  - Concurring in the result: Papadakos
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Hutchinson

  - Majority: Nix, joined by Roberts, Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala
  - Dissent: McDermott
  - Dissent: Hutchinson

- **Commonwealth v. Long**, 489 Pa. 369 (1980) (“[W]e conclude that the search of the locked automobile trunk was unreasonable, in violation of Art. I, s 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the evidence seized must be suppressed.”

- **Majority**: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
- **Dissent**: Flaherty, joined by Larsen, Kauffman

- **Commonwealth v. DeJohn**, 486 Pa. 32 (1979) (reversing defendant’s third-degree murder conviction on the ground that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank record, consisting of cancelled check, and admission of the check was prejudicial error)
  - **Majority**: O’Brien, joined by Eagen, Roberts, Nix
  - **Concurrence**: Roberts
  - **Concurring in part and dissenting in part**: Larsen
  - **Dissent**: Manderino

- **Commonwealth v. Wagner**, 486 Pa. 548 (1979) (warrantless arrest of defendant was illegal because even though police had probable cause to arrest on a theft charge, it was not a crime of violence, and entry into fiancée’s premises was forcible)
  - **Majority**: Flaherty, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Manderino
  - **Concurrence**: Eagen
  - **Concurrence**: Roberts
  - **Concurring in the result**: Nix
  - **Dissent**: Larsen

- **Commonwealth v. Walker**, 477 Pa. 372 (1978) (“The suppression court denied relief… even though it found that appellant was a juvenile and was denied the right to consultation. It did so, however, on April 24, 1974, prior to our decisions holding that all juveniles are entitled to consultation before they can effectively waive their constitutional rights. Under those cases, appellant… is entitled to relief. We agree therefore with appellant that all statements should have been suppressed.”)
  - **Majority**: Manderino, joined by Roberts
  - **Concurring in the result**: O’Brien, Nix
  - **Dissent**: Pomeroy, joined by Eagen, Larsen

- **Commonwealth v. Knowles**, 459 Pa. 70 (1974) (holding that narcotics recovered from dollar bill abandoned by defendant during search incident to his arrest were a fruit of the primary illegality and that such contraband and evidence obtained from subsequent search of defendant's residence were inadmissible)
  - **Majority**: Roberts, joined by Pomeroy, Eagen
  - **Concurrence**: Pomeroy, joined by Eagen
  - **Concurring in the result**: Jones

- **Commonwealth v. Platou**, 455 Pa. 258 (1973) (determining that warrant authorizing search of friend's apartment did not authorize search of defendant's suitcases, which were
found on the apartment floor, where defendant had not relinquished control over suitcases and police had been informed that suitcases did not belong to the friend)
  ○ Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  ○ Dissent: Jones

Art. I. § 9

d. Assistance of Counsel

- **Commonwealth v. Rosado**, 637 Pa. 424 (2016) (determining that a failure to file or perfect a direct appeal, guaranteed as of right in Art. V, § 9, is ineffective assistance of counsel per se because the error completely forecloses appellate review)
  ○ Majority: Todd, joined by Baer, Donohue, Dougherty
  ○ Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Wecht, Mundy

- **Kuren v. Luzerne Cty.**, 637 Pa. 33 (2016) (“We recognize for the first time in Pennsylvania a prospective cause of action enabling indigent criminal defendants to prove that the level of funding provided by a county to operate a public defender's office has left that office incapable of complying with Gideon, creating the likelihood of a systematic, widespread constructive denial of counsel in contravention of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution”—noting in n.6 that “It is now well-settled that the right to counsel recognized in Article I, Section 9 and in the Sixth amendment… are jurisprudentially coextensive”)
  ○ Majority: Wecht, joined by Saylor, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty
  ○ Concurrence: Baer

- **Commonwealth v. Tharp**, 627 Pa. 673 (2014) (finding trial counsel's investigation into mitigation evidence fell below the constitutional standard of effectiveness of counsel under Strickland performance prong)
  ○ Majority: Baer, joined by McCaffery
  ○ Concurrence: Castille, joined by Eakin
  ○ Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Todd, Eakin
  ○ Concurrence: Eakin
  ○ Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Stevens

- **Commonwealth v. Martin**, 607 Pa. 165 (2010) (holding that Counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present mitigating evidence at penalty phase of capital murder trial)
  ○ Majority: Baer, joined by Todd
  ○ Concurrence: Castille, joined by McCaffery
  ○ Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Saylor
  ○ Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Eakin
• *Commonwealth v. Smith*, 606 Pa. 127 (2010) (holding that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of murder prosecution)
  o Majority: Eakin, joined by Castille, Todd, McCaffery
  o Concurrence: Baer
  o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Saylor

• *Commonwealth v. Sneed*, 587 Pa. 318 (2006) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing)
  o Majority: Castille, joined by Cappy, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Baldwin

• *Commonwealth v. Collins*, 585 Pa. 45 (2005) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to reasonably attempt to uncover mitigating evidence in the penalty phase) **Court does not specifically rely on state constitution in reaching its conclusion**
  o Majority: Cappy, joined by Nigro, Newman, Baer, Saylor
  o Concurrence: Saylor
  o Concurrence and Dissent: Castille, joined by Eakin

• *Commonwealth v. Halley*, 582 Pa. 164 (2005) (counsel’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement on behalf of criminal defendant seeking to appeal his conviction, which resulted in a waiver of all claims asserted on direct appeal, was ineffective assistance)
  o Majority: Saylor, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Eakin, Baer

• *Commonwealth v. Moore*, 580 Pa. 279 (2004) (finding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present any mitigating evidence at sentencing)
  o Majority: Eakin, joined by Cappy, Castille, Newman
  o Concurrence and Dissent: Saylor, joined by Nigro, Baer

• *Commonwealth v. Malloy*, 579 Pa. 425 (2004) (counsel was ineffective during capital sentencing phase)
  o Majority: Castille, joined by Cappy, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer

• *Commonwealth v. Brooks*, 576 Pa. 332 (2003) (held counsel was ineffective for failing to meet in person once with defendant before a capital trial)
  o Majority: Nigro, joined by Cappy, Newman, Saylor, Castille, Eakin, Lamb
  o Concurrence: Castille (arguing that *Strickland/Pierce* test does not support prophylactic rule by Majority of requiring face-to-face meeting)
  o Concurrence: Eakin
  o Concurrence: Lamb

• *Commonwealth v. Johnson*, 574 Pa. 5 (2003) (holding defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Art. I, § 9 attached when trial court was giving jury instructions, and exclusion of defense counsel violated such rights)
  o Majority: Eakin, joined by Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
- **Commonwealth v. Chambers**, 570 Pa. 3 (2002) (held that counsel was ineffective for failure to object to jury instruction on death penalty mitigating circumstances)
  - Majority: Newman, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Saylor, Eakin
  - Concurrence in the result: Castille, Nigro

- **Commonwealth v. Rucker**, 761 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2000) (defendant was entitled to change of counsel from court-appointed counsel)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Saylor

- **Commonwealth v. McAleer**, 561 Pa. 129 (2000) (defendant’s right to counsel was violated when his chosen attorney was unable to appear for trial, and the judge failed to grant his substitute counsel’s request for continuance)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Newman, Saylor

- **Commonwealth v. Lantzy**, 558 Pa. 214 (1999) (failure to file a requested direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance and relief was available under the PCRA)
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman

- **Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz**, 525 Pa. 413 (1990) (holding that “the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates a criminal defendant's right to confrontation and cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. In this case, Buchanan was denied the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.”)
  - Majority: Larsen, joined by Flaherty, Cappy
  - Concurrence: Flaherty, joined by Cappy
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by McDermott
  - Dissent: McDermott

- **Commonwealth v. Henderson**, 496 Pa. 349 (1981) (maintaining Commonwealth’s interested-adult rule, premised on the Court’s belief that “administering of Miranda warnings to a juvenile, without providing an opportunity to that juvenile to consult with a mature, informed individual concerned primarily with the interest of the juvenile, (is) inadequate to offset the disadvantage occasioned by his youth” (quoting Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 498 (1977)))
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by O’Brien, Nix, Wilkinson
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Flaherty, Kauffman
  - Dissent: Kauffman, joined by Larsen, Flaherty

- **Commonwealth v. Newmiller**, 487 Pa. 410 (1979) (holding that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel by failing to object to counsel’s arguments about applying the missing witness rule when defendant’s wife wasn’t called but was present at the time)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Eagen
  - Concurrence: Eagen
• Commonwealth v. Romberger, 464 Pa. 488 (1975) (holding that failure of police to advise indigent defendant of his right to free counsel before interrogating him violated his Fifth Amendment rights and Art. I, § 9 rights)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by Jones, O’Brien, Roberts, Manderino
  o Concurrence: Roberts
  o Concurring in the result: Eagen, Pomeroy

• In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29 (1973) (indigent natural mother was entitled to be advised of her right to counsel and to appointment of counsel, and appointment of counsel after decree terminating rights was insufficient)
  o Majority: O’Brien, joined by Jones, Eagen, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  o Concurrence: Pomeroy
  o Concurrence: Nix, joined by Manderino

• Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35 (1971) (holding that a person charged with a drunk driving offense is entitled to representation by counsel)
  o Majority: Pomeroy, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Barbieri
  o Dissent: Bell

  e. Law of the Land

• Commonwealth v. Noel, 579 PA. 546 (2004) (holding that Vehicle Code provision which treated horse riders like vehicle drivers except for those provisions “which by their very nature can have no application” was unconstitutionally vague)
  o Majority: Nigro, joined by Cappy, Castille, Baer
  o Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Newman
  o Dissent: Eakin

• Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 (1998) (finding Art. I, § 9 “law of the land” and federal due process provide the same protection in this case, and defendant’s due process rights were violated for pre-arrest delay of more than 11 years)
  o Majority: Newman, joined by Castille, Nigro, Saylor
  o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy

• Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297 (1996) (Statute allowing a DUI conviction if driver's blood alcohol content exceeded .10% within three hours after driving was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad)
  o Majority: Castille, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
• Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 (1991) (affirming by an equally divided court the Superior Court’s decision to suppress hearsay evidence that was gathered in violation of the “due process clause of our state constitution,” the Article I, Section 9 “law of the land” provision)
  o Opinion in support of affirmance: Flaherty, joined by Larsen, Zappala
  o Concurrence: Larsen
  o Dissent: Nix, joined by McDermott, Papadakos
  o Dissent: McDermott

• Commonwealth v. Lewis, 528 Pa. 440 (1991) (holding that failure of the trial judge to include the "no-adverse-inference" charge in his jury instructions violated defendant's rights pursuant to Article I, Section 9)
  o Majority: Cappy, joined by Flaherty, Larsen, Papadakos, Nix
  o Concurrence: Nix, joined by Papadakos, Flaherty
  o Dissent: McDermott

• Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, 468 Pa. 618 (1976) (Section 1212 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which “mandates a finding that the owner of a motor vehicle was driving that vehicle at the time of a Vehicle Code violation, unless the owner-defendant takes the stand and submits to examination,” was an unconstitutional presumption in criminal cases under Art. I, § 9)
  o Majority: O’Brien, joined by Jones, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  o Concurring in the result: Eagen

• Commonwealth v. Devlin, 460 Pa. 508 (1975) (holding that proof that defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted on some date within a 14-month period was insufficient to fix the date of the crime with certainty required by due process)
  o Majority: Jones, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Manderino

• Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102 (1974) ("We hold that appellant was denied a fair trial, guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury with a full and adequate charge on reasonable doubt.")
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  o Dissent: Jones

• Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299 (1973) (rule prohibiting an attorney to take any additional criminal defendant clients if he has 10+ criminal cases which are over a year old was defective as too vague and overbroad for lack of any standard as to assigning responsibility for the delay and for failure to provide any adequate standard or procedure)
  o Majority: Nix, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy, Manderino
Concurring in the result: Jones, Roberts
Concurrence: Manderino

f. Additional Rights of the Accused

- **Commonwealth v. Cooley**, 632 Pa. 119, n.8 (2015) (holding that interrogation of defendant by parole agents violated his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment—and Article I, § 9 affords no greater protection than the Federal Constitution)
  - Majority: Eakin, joined by Castille, Baer, McCaffery, Todd, Saylor
  - Dissent: Stevens

- **Commonwealth v. Molina**, 628 Pa. 465 (2014) (finding defendant’s right against self-incrimination was violated by the use of his pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilty: “After reviewing Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pursuant to *Edmunds*, we conclude that the factors weigh in favor of diverging from the currently asserted minimum standard of federal protection of the right against self-incrimination in regard to the use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence.”)
  - Majority: Baer, joined by Saylor, Todd
  - Concurrence: Saylor, joined by Todd
  - Dissent: Castille
  - Dissent: Eakin

- **Commonwealth v. Sloan**, 907 A.2d 460 (Pa. 2006) (construing Rule 600(E)’s mandatory remedy of nominal release after 180 days in light of article I, section 14, to hold that it is not the same as unconditional release—instead, “[r]elease may be conditioned on terms that not only give adequate assurance that the accused will appear for trial, but also assures that victims, witnesses, and the community will be protected”)
  - Majority: Baer, joined by Cappy, Castille, Newman, Saylor, Eakin

  - Majority: Cappy, joined by Saylor, Zappala, Nigro
  - Concurring: Saylor
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman
  - Dissent: Eakin, joined by Castille, Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Chmiel**, 558 Pa. 478 (1999) (Prior counsel's testimony from ineffectiveness hearing was inadmissible at second trial and violated defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination and right to effective assistance of counsel)
  - Majority: Saylor, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Nigro
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman
• *Commonwealth v. Franciscus*, 551 Pa. 376 (1998) (admission of incriminating statements that defendant made to jailhouse informant violated right to counsel guaranteed by Federal and State Constitutions—conducting two separate analyses)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Flaherty, Cappy, Nigro
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

• *Commonwealth v. Louden*, 536 Pa. 180 (1994) (interpreting statutes to limit the use of videotaped in closed circuit television testimony so as to comport with Art. I, § 9 right to “fact to face” confrontation)
  - Majority: Papadakos, joined in Part A by Zappala, Cappy; joined in Part B by Nix, Flaherty
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Flaherty, joined by Nix
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Zappala, joined by Cappy

• *Commonwealth v. LaRosa*, 533 Pa. 479 (1993) (holding that admission of prior recorded testimony of unavailable witness which implicated defendant and exculpated codefendant was reversible error given that jury's verdict could only have been justified had they disbelieved codefendant's testimony and at same time use witness' prior recorded testimony against defendant, despite trial court's instructions not to do so)
  - Majority: Papadakos, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  - Concurring in the result: Nix

• *Commonwealth v. Hess*, 532 Pa. 607 (1992) (determining that state forfeiture statute violates Article I, Section 9 “insofar as it applies to the payment of attorney's fees for legitimate criminal defense representation prior to conviction”—not any federal constitutional provision)
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Cappy

• *Commonwealth v. Ludwing*, 527 Pa. 472 (1991) (use of closed-circuit television to transmit child’s testimony violated defendant’s Art. I, § 9 right to a “face to face” confrontation, choosing not to follow the U.S. Supreme Court in *Maryland v. Craig*).
  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Larsen, Papadakos, Cappy
  - Concurring in part and dissenting in part: McDermott
  - Dissent: Nix, joined by Flaherty
  - Dissent: Flaherty, joined by Nix

  - Majority: Zappala, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, Papadakos, Cappy
  - Concurrence: Flaherty
Concurring in part and dissenting in part: McDermott
Dissent: Nix

Commonwealth v. Africa, 524 Pa. 118 (1990) (holding that 27-month delay between arrest and trial violated speedy trial rule under both federal and state constitutions)
- Majority: Papadakos, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala
- Dissent: Larsen
- Dissent: McDermott

Commonwealth v. Green, 525 Pa. 424 (1990) (“The inability of Appellant to cross-examine this inmate was particularly blatant error here because Appellant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, was effectively denied.”)
- Majority: Papadakos, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott
- Concurring in the result: Nix, Zappala

- Majority: Zappala, joined by Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Papadakos, Stout
- Concurrence: Papadakos, joined by Nix, Flaherty, McDermott

Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427 (1989) (“We now hold under the confrontation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, that the appellant in the instant action was denied his right to confrontation when his attorney was denied access to the contents of the victim's psychotherapeutic records.”)
- Majority: McDermott, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala
- Dissent: Larsen, joined by Papadakos

Commonwealth v. Uhrinek, 518 Pa. 532 (1988) (“Because the trial court excluded evidence of the intoxication of the deceased pedestrian, which was relevant to appellant's theory of the cause of the accident, we reverse his homicide by vehicle conviction and remand for a new trial.”)
- Majority: Stout, joined by Nix, Flaherty, Zappala
- Dissent: Larsen
- Dissent: Papadakos, joined by McDermott

Commonwealth v. Evans, 511 Pa. 214 (1986) (holding that pursuant to Art. I, § 9, the defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s key witness about other charges then pending against witness, not just his role in crime in question, and error in restricting scope of cross-examination of key witness was not harmless)
- \textit{Commonwealth v. Majorana}, 503 Pa. 602 (1983) (interpreting Rape Shield Law in light of Article I, Section 9 to admit evidence that offers an explanation of an alternative account of alleged rape, given an accused’s fundamental right to present in defense his own version of the facts)
  - Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Roberts, Flaherty, Zappala
  - Concurring specially: McDermott
  - Concurring in the result: Nix
  - Dissent: Larsen

- \textit{Commonwealth v. Turner}, 499 Pa. 579 (1982) (“[W]e decline to hold, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, that the existence of \textit{Miranda} warnings, or their absence, affects a person’s legitimate expectation not to be penalized for exercising the right to remain silent.”)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Larsen
  - Dissent: Nix
  - Dissent: McDermott, joined by Hutchinson

- \textit{Commonwealth v. Pounds}, 490 Pa. 621 (1980) (holding that the trial court’s refusal of a request to instruct the jury on the defense of alibi was reversible error and sufficient prejudice to require a new trial)
  - Majority: Eagen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix, Flaherty
  - Dissent: Larsen, joined by Kauffman

- \textit{Commonwealth v. Rolon}, 486 Pa. 573 (1979) (“We agree with appellant that the court of common pleas deprived appellant of his right of compulsory process by accepting the unsupported claim of privilege against self-incrimination of appellant's witness.”)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Manderino, Larsen
  - Dissent: Nix

- \textit{Commonwealth v. Frazier}, 471 Pa. 121 (1977) (defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and by Article I Section 9, was violated because the nature of the pretrial publicity was such that one exposed to it would be unable to serve as an impartial juror, and virtually every prospective juror in the county was exposed to it)
  - Majority: Manderino, joined by Eagen, Roberts, Pomeroy
  - Concurring in the result: O’Brien
  - Dissent: Nix
- **Commonwealth v. Brenizer**, 467 Pa. 347 (1976) (determining that comments made by the DA “as to possible ‘explanations’ of appellant’s plea of not guilty, when coupled with the fact that appellant did not take the stand or offer any evidence in defense, constitutes impermissible and prejudicial comment on appellant's Fifth Amendment right…and Art. I, s 9… not to have any adverse comment on his not taking the witness stand”)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Jones, Eagen, Roberts, Nix, Manderino
  - Dissent: Pomeroy

- **Commonwealth v. Whitaker**, 467 Pa. 436 (1976) (construing Rule of Criminal Procedure, which requires that trial commence within 270 days of a complaint, to affirm trial court’s dismissal of all charges, despite contention that entry of nolle prosequi tolled running of 270-day time period specified by rule)
  - Majority: Manderino
  - Concurring in the result: Eagen

- **Commonwealth v. Roundtree**, 469 Pa. 241 (1976) (defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to raise pretrial motion asserting his speedy trial claim without any reasonable strategic basis to not do so)
  - Majority: Jones, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Manderino

- **Commonwealth v. Triplett**, 462 Pa. 244 (1975) (“[A]ny statement of a defendant declared inadmissible for any reason by a suppression court cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who elects to testify on his own behalf at trial.”)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurrence: Pomeroy
  - Concurring in the result: Roberts
  - Dissent: Jones
  - Dissent: Eagen

- **In re Silverberg**, 459 Pa. 107 (1974) (holding that use of prior claim of privilege against self-incrimination during a disciplinary proceeding, which raised impermissible inference of inconsistency in testimony of two of the subjects, required reversal and new disciplinary hearing at which no use of prior claim of privilege against self-incrimination would be permitted)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurrence: Nix, joined by Roberts
  - Dissent: Jones, joined by Pomeroy
  - Dissent: Pomeroy, joined by Jones

- **Commonwealth v. Williams**, 457 Pa. 502 (1974) (The three-and-a-half-year delay between arrest and trial denied defendant his constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy trial)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino
Concurring in the result: Eagen, O’Brien

- *Commonwealth v. McCloud*, 457 Pa. 310 (1974) (holding the use of an autopsy report in the absence of the medical examiner who made the autopsy, used “as direct evidence in establishing the Cause of death (an element of the crime) denied appellant the fundamental constitutional right of confrontation”)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by O’Brien, Nix, Manderino
  - Concurring in the result: Jones, Eagen, Pomeroy

- *Commonwealth v. Davis*, 452 Pa. 171 (1973) (holding prosecutor's persistent references in his closing argument, over objection, to evidence against defendant being 'uncontroverted' violated defendant's rights against self-incrimination where he did not testify and offered no other witnesses or evidence at trial)
  - Majority: Roberts, joined by O’Brien, Pomeroy
  - Concurrence: Pomeroy
  - Concurring in the result: Eagen
  - Dissent: Jones

- *Commonwealth v. Dixon*, 454 Pa. 444 (1973) (reading Rule 118 with Rule 119, where the preliminary arraignment is meant to guarantee a citizen the same rights to which he is entitled under the Pennsylvania Constitution)
  - Majority: Manderino, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Nix
  - Dissent: Pomeroy, joined by Jones, Eagen

- *Commonwealth v. Hamilton*, 449 Pa. 297 (1972) (defendant was denied right to a speedy trial under both federal and state constitutions when almost six years passed from when the authorities lodged a detainer against him to when he petitioned to dismiss the indictment)
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Manderino

- *Commonwealth v. Dillworth*, 431 Pa. 479 (1968) (construing statute to determine the legislature never intended to authorize a determination of paternity by a judge alone, to avoid analysis of Art. I, §§ 6, 9 right of jury trial)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Bell, Cohen, Roberts, Eagen
  - Concurrence: Roberts, joined by Bell, Cohen
  - Dissent: Musmanno
  - Dissent: Jones

**Art. I, § 10 [Double Jeopardy]**

- *Commonwealth v. Ball*, 637 Pa. 100 (2016) (defendant could not be retried in court of common pleas after being acquitted by magisterial district judge for a driving under
influence charge under the double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, Art. I, § 10)
  - Majority: Wecht, joined by Saylor, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty
  - Concurrence: Wecht (writing separately to offer response to concerns voiced in the dissent)
  - Dissent: Baer

- **Commonwealth v. States**, 595 Pa. 453 (2007) (holding double jeopardy and collateral estoppel barred the Commonwealth from retrying defendant on homicide and other charges, and that the Commonwealth’s constitutional right to a jury trial under Art. I, § 6 is not violated by so holding)
  - Majority: Fitzgerald, joined by Cappy, Baldwin
  - Concurrence: Saylor (joins majority opinion except for n.8)
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Baer
  - Dissent: Eakin

- **Commonwealth v. Gibbons**, 567 Pa. 24 (2001) (holding that the verdict of acquittal entered by the municipal court constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, thus barring the state’s appeal)
  - Majority: Nigro, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Saylor
  - Concurrence: Saylor
  - Dissent: Castille

- **Commonwealth v. Martorano**, 559 Pa. 533 (1999) (retrying defendants after they were granted a new trial on the ground of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct would violate double jeopardy clause)
  - Majority: Newman, joined by Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy
  - Dissent: Saylor, joined by Castille, Nigro

- **Commonwealth v. Comer**, 552 Pa. 527 (1998) (Defendant's convictions and sentences for involuntary manslaughter and homicide by vehicle, based upon same conduct that caused a single death, violated state and federal double jeopardy clauses)
  - Majority: Zappala
  - Dissent: Castille, joined by Newman

- **Commonwealth v. Smith**, 532 Pa. 177 (1992) (“Because the prosecutor's conduct in this case was intended to prejudice the defendant and thereby deny him a fair trial, appellant must be discharged on the grounds that his double jeopardy rights, as guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution, would be violated by conducting a second trial.”)
  - Majority: Flaherty, joined by Nix, Zappala, Papadakos, Cappy

- **Commonwealth v. Goldhammer**, 507 Pa. 236 (1985) (Defendant who, through successful appeal, had some of his convictions vacated on ground that counts were barred by statute
of limitations, could not be resentenced to increased terms on his remaining convictions without violating double jeopardy clauses)
  - Majority: Nix, joined by Larsen, Flaherty, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos
  - Dissent: McDermott

- **Borough of West Chester v. Lal, 493 Pa. 387 (1981)** (holding that Commonwealth Court’s order subjected defendant to double jeopardy in violation of both the federal and state constitutions)
  - Majority: Larsen, joined by O’Brien, Roberts, Flaherty, Kauffman
  - Concurrence: Roberts
  - Concurring in the result: Nix

- **Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600 (1980)** (construing Section 110(2) narrowly to comport with constitutional double jeopardy requirements, but holding that as applied to the instant case, the question of defendant’s credibility was litigated so as to prevent relitigation of that issue)
  - Majority: Nix
  - Concurring in part: O’Brien, Roberts, Flaherty
  - O’Brien and Larsen concurring in the result as to the first defendant
  - Larsen concurring in the result as to further prosecution of the second defendant
  - Flaherty, O’Brien, and Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part as to second defendant

- **Commonwealth v. Tome, 484 Pa. 261 (1979)** (holding that increase in sentence on murder indictment constituted double jeopardy)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Eagen, Roberts, Manderino
  - Dissent: Nix
  - Dissent: Larsen

- **Commonwealth v. Peluso, 481 Pa. 641 (1978)** (double jeopardy clause of both constitutions was violated when defendant’s prior trial had resulted in a determination that there was no evidence to prove he knew or had reason to know that a certain rifle was in fact stolen, but second trial resulted in a conviction from the same facts)
  - Majority: O’Brien, joined by Eagen, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino, Larsen

- **Commonwealth v. Brown, 455 Pa. 274 (1974)** (finding that the court’s amendment to defendant’s sentence three days later, increasing the maximum term to 20 years (compared to his original 8.5-10 years) violated the double jeopardy clause)
  - Majority: Jones, joined by Roberts, O’Brien, Manderino, Eagen, Pomeroy
  - Concurrence: Roberts, joined by O’Brien, Manderino
  - Concurring part and dissenting in part: Nix
• Commonwealth v. Lee, 454 Pa. 526 (1973) (defendant could not be sentenced for a crime for which he was not indicted without proper notice pursuant to Art. I, § 10)
  o Majority: Manderino, joined by Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Robert, Pomeroy, Nix
  o Concurrence: Eagen, joined by Jones, O’Brien

• Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 (1973) (“All charges resulting from the criminal ‘episode’ of each appellant should have been consolidated at one trial, and consequently the second prosecutions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause” of the federal and state constitutions)
  o Majority: Roberts, joined by Eagen, Jones, Nix, Barbieri
  o Concurrence: Eagen, joined by Jones
  o Concurrence: Nix
  o Dissent: Pomeroy