Reforming the Pentagon: Reflections on *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*

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REFORMING THE PENTAGON: REFLECTIONS ON HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING

Mark Patrick Nevitt*

ABSTRACT

What best explains “How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything?” — the provocative title of a recent book by Professor Rosa Brooks of Georgetown Law. In this Essay, I turn to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) unique agency design as the vehicle to address this question. Specifically, I first describe and analyze the role that the 1947 National Security Act and 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act play in incentivizing organizational behavior within the DoD. These two Acts have broad implications for national security governance. Relatedly, I address the consequences of these two core national security laws, focusing on the rise of overseas combatant commands. Led by four-star military officers, these commands are increasingly participating in a wide variety of both military and non-military missions. Second, I turn to Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a case study to highlight the rise of these combatant commands. Special operations forces now operate in over 70% of the world’s nations, and this percentage is only rising. And since President Trump was elected, the Commander in Chief has delegated even broader authorities to operational military commanders. This serves to reaffirm Professor Brooks’s prescient themes of “war everywhere” while raising additional concerns regarding the underlying health of civil-military relations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................70
   A. The National Security Act of 1947: Laying the Foundation for the Modern Pentagon Bureaucracy .71
III. THE MILITARY’S LEGAL ARCHITECTURE, COVERT ACTION, AND THE RISE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES..............74
IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................77
I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Rosa Brooks’s recent book, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon*,¹ is a welcome literary contribution to national security scholarship and the increasingly important field of civil-military relations. She brings a unique perspective to this issue: Already an accomplished legal academic, Professor Brooks also has professional experience serving as a special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon (then Michele Flournoy), as well as personal experience via her own service as a military spouse married to an Army Special Forces Officer.² Professor Brooks’s keen observational eye, intellectual background, and her willingness to ask tough, thoughtful questions all combine to create an extremely important and provocative book.

Indeed, controversial and difficult topics are not set aside. Professor Brooks addresses such weighty topics as how we go to war, how modern wars and conflicts end (if at all) what do we mean by “civilian control over the military,” and how might we go about reforming the United States Department of Defense (DoD) as an institution in light of the above?³

In this brief Essay, I pick up where Brooks left off, focusing on her discussion on reforming DoD as an institution, which has continual implications for national security governance. This Essay was inspired, in some respects, by my personal experience as an officer in the Navy—the final two years of which were spent at the Pentagon where I had the opportunity to witness up close the vast military apparatus viewed with a mixture of skepticism and awe throughout Professor Brooks’s book.

In this Essay, I first describe and analyze the two core laws that provide for the military’s legal organizational framework: the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Second, I highlight one example—the rise of special operations forces and covert action—where existing laws may be inadequate to restrain military action. This may, indeed, facilitate a world of “war everywhere”—a core theme of Professor Brooks’s book.

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2. *Id.* at 5–6.

What laws govern the DoD as a federal agency? It is an important question in light of the DoD’s sheer size and mission. The U.S. military has a history that predates the Constitution and remains the largest employer and bureaucracy in the world. The military also has a special place in the text of the Constitution with numerous military-related provisions sprinkled throughout. Perhaps most important, the DoD’s mission is unlike that of any other federal agency: “[Its] primary ‘output’ is lethal force, controlled in ways that compel people to do what they don’t want to do.”

The two laws that continue to have an outsized role in the DoD’s day-to-day activities include the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (“Goldwater-Nichols”).

A. The National Security Act of 1947: Laying the Foundation for the Modern Pentagon Bureaucracy

The National Security Act of 1947 fundamentally transformed U.S. national security governance. It established the modern national security processes as well as the organizational institutions to include the DoD, Central Intelligence Agency

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4. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 162 (“The Defense Department is the nation’s largest employer ... there were roughly 1.4 million active duty military personnel along with 843,000 reservists [at the end of fiscal year 2013].”); see, e.g., Niall McCarthy, The World’s Biggest Employers, FORBES (June 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/23/the-worlds-biggest-employers-infographic/#3ae7382c51d0.

5. Specifically, Congress has the constitutional authority “to raise and support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” and “to make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cls. 12–14, and the President is the Commander in Chief, U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.


Passed in the aftermath of the Second World War, it corresponded with the retention of a continual, standing Army for the first time in American history and the emergence of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Specifically, it established the “National Military Establishment” with three co-equal services—Army, Navy, Air Force—reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Former Army General Omar Bradley described the significance of the National Security Act as follows:

[The National Security Act] created what was called the National Military Establishment, with a Secretary of Defense presiding over three co-equal services: Army, Navy, and Air Force. . . . [T]he act established secretaries of the Army (instead of War), Navy and Air Force, and for the first time gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff legal standing. It also created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

But despite the scope and overall ambition of the Act, many aspects were left unresolved, and continue to remain unresolved—themes that Brooks picks up in her book. Consider, for example, existing questions around the precise role of the NSC. The NSC was established by the National Security Act to serve as an advisor to the President, but it was placed outside the formal military chain of command. It enjoys an enviable place at the very top of the national security pyramid, but the NSC staff lacks any direct authority over ongoing military operations. Its power (and access) is tremendous but inherently “soft.” It advises and makes recommendations to the President. It cannot direct operational military actions. A fundamental question arises: In the course of developing and executing plans, how should the NSC staff interact with Congress, DoD, and the operational commanders in the field?

The National Security Act’s silence on this issue came to the fore in Brooks’s book when she was faced with this question: How should she respond if an NSC staff member bypasses any semblance of the chain of command when making a request? In her book, Brooks recalled a tale when an NSC staff member contacted her at the Pentagon and requested that she facilitate the movement of a drone to conduct surveillance operations in Kyrgyzstan within the Central Command Area of Operations (AOR). While the ends may have been justified, the means—

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11. The role of standing armies was debated at the nation’s founding. In her book, Brooks makes the point about the size of the military and how standing armies—and military conscription—actually only occurred for a brief snapshot in American history, roughly between World War II and the end of the Vietnam War. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 257–58.
12. OMAR N. BRADLEY & CLAY BLAIR, A GENERAL’S LIFE 466 (1983). In 1949, two years after the National Security Act’s passage, the National Military Establishment was formally changed to the Department of Defense. Id. at 504.
14. See 50 U.S.C. § 3021(b)(1) (2017) (“[NSC’s duty is] to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States . . . in the interest of national security . . . for the purpose of making recommendations to the President . . . .”).
15. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 307–09. The National Security Council’s Staff has exploded
bypassing the normal bureaucratic process and established chain of command—were not. Brooks correctly demurred at the staff member’s awkward attempt at an order, explaining that “he . . . was the wrong civilian,” when the staff member invoked civilian control over the military in requesting that she take action. And this back and forth is not at all infrequent. In fact, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed frustration about National Security Council staff members routinely calling operational commanders in the field.


The Goldwater-Nichols Act is the second law having a continual and outsized influence on the modern military. Its passage followed a massive legislative effort that occurred over several years of intense debates within Congress and the Pentagon. It was passed in the aftermath of military tragedies that include the failed hostage rescue efforts in Iran and the poorly coordinated and executed “invasion” of Grenada. While it was passed with the noble goals of increasing military operational effectiveness, reducing inter-service rivalry, and reinforcing civilian control over the military, its legacy has been mixed and its influence immense.

Unlike the National Security Act, which is located within Title 50 of U.S. Code and addresses myriad national security organizations and actors, Goldwater-Nichols is a comparably “cleaner” Title 10 law that solely addresses Armed Forces matters. Today it serves as the critical component of DoD’s legal architecture, functioning as a sort of DoD “mini-Constitution.”

Thirty years following its passage, Goldwater-Nichols continues to provide the organizational blueprint for the DoD, establishing and defining two legal chains of command: administrative and operational. It also clarified the legal relationships between the senior uniformed members such as the operational combatant commanders, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior civilian leadership—Secretaries of the Military Departments. In doing so, it altered the power balance, favoring the rapid—and lethal—response of joint warfare embedded with the operational and uniformed chain of command at the expense of

in size since its inception and has lead to DoD-NSC coordination problems. \textit{Id.; see generally ROBERT GATES, DUTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY AT WAR} (2014). Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates implies that DoD-NSC coordination can be problematic. \textit{Id.} at 483. Central Command is the combatant command responsible for military operations in the Middle East and parts of Asia.

16. \textit{BROOKS, supra} note 1, at 309.
17. \textit{See generally ROBERT GATES, supra} note 15, at 482 (ordering direct phone line from NSS to operational command in center in Bagram Air Base removed).
Throughout her book, Brooks highlighted the need to reinvigorate civilian control over the military. This begins, I believe, with addressing Goldwater-Nichols’ consequences—unintended or otherwise. While it has been updated and provisions tweaked throughout the years, Goldwater-Nichols has not been substantively changed since its passage thirty years ago. But the world—and warfare—have changed dramatically since 1986.

Consider but one example. Under the Goldwater-Nichols scheme, a new combatant command with unique legal authorities was formed: Special Operations Command. Part III, infra, addresses the interplay between the National Security Act, Goldwater-Nichols Act, and this unique command.

III. THE MILITARY’S LEGAL ARCHITECTURE, COVERT ACTION, AND THE RISE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The National Security Act of 1947 addresses a broad range of security activities and authorities—which include not only DoD activities, but also CIA and intelligence activities. By placing different agencies with different authorities within the National Security Act, the seeds for future confusion may have been planted. Covert action, embedded within the Act, was later defined within the body of the National Security Act. Brooks highlighted the recent co-mingling of intelligence and military activities in her chapter titled “Secret Wars.” While care has historically been taken to differentiate CIA activities from DoD activities, this

22. For instance, the Secretaries of Military Departments were placed outside the operational chain of command and were required to assign all of their forces to combatant commands. In turn, the combatant commands resided at the heart of the operational chain of command, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a)–(b) (2017) (addressing the assignment of forces and prescribing the chain of command).

23. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 357–60.


25. See generally Robert Chesney, Military Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Divide, 14 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’y 539 (2012) (addressing the “armed forces” in Title 10); see also National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (50 U.S.C. App. § 3001 et seq. (2017)) (passed “[t]o promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.”).

26. Id.


28. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 122–23 (referring to covert action’s modern usage as “semi-covert action” in her chapter on Secret Wars).
has become an increasingly difficult task\textsuperscript{29} due to the nature and complexity of modern threats, and how we respond to them.

In 1991, Congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act, which defined covert action activities. Placed within Title 50 and the National Security Act statutory scheme, “covert action” is defined as:

\begin{quote}
[A]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government \textit{will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly}.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

Under this definition, covert action is purposely broad in scope and care is taken to not limit what actions are precluded or otherwise limited by law. This definition also has a defining characteristic that is exceptional within American law: In order for an activity to qualify as a bona fide covert action, it must “not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” to the American people or the world.\textsuperscript{31}

So how does the law ensure accountability over these secret actions that are never to appear as or be acknowledged in public as related to United States action? Within the statute, a certain check on executive power does exist—a written legal finding and notification to Congress must accompany a “covert action”.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, a Presidential finding triggers a notification process to senior congressional leaders in the intelligence committees.\textsuperscript{33}

But covert action \textit{does not} include traditional military activities (TMA), or activities that provide routine support to the overt activities of other U.S. government agencies abroad.\textsuperscript{34} One can see a certain appeal to the executive

\begin{footnotesize}\textsuperscript{29} See id. at 122 (“In practice, military and CIA personnel generally work together quite closely when planning and engaging in drone strikes or raids . . . But the increasing fuzziness of the line between the intelligence community and the military creates confusion and uncertainty.”).\textsuperscript{30} 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (emphasis added). Joint military doctrine does not use the term “covert action” in the context of special operations forces. It does, however, utilize the term “covert operation” defined as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” \textit{DEPT. OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 55} (2016), \url{https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf}.\textsuperscript{31} 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{32} Id.\textsuperscript{33} These senior congressional leaders make up the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Manu Raju & Tom LoBianco, \textit{FBI Director James Comey Meets with Congress ‘Gang of Eight’}, CNN (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:13 AM), \url{https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/09/politics/fbi-director-james-comey-meets-with-congress-gang-of-eight/index.html}; \textit{see BROOKS, supra} note 1, at 122 (“[A]ll activity designated as ‘covert’ requires a presidential finding and subsequent notification of the intelligence committee, even if just the so-called Gang of Eight; the Senate and House majority and minority leaders, and the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate intelligence committees.”)).\textsuperscript{34} 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2014). In his statement to Congress concerning the 1991 covert action statute, President Bush said in 1990: “I believe that the Act’s definition of ‘covert action’ is unnecessary. In determining whether particular military activities constitute covert actions, I shall continue to bear in mind the historic missions of the Armed Forces to protect the United States and its interests, influence foreign capabilities and intentions, and conduct activities preparatory to the execution of operations.” \textit{Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act on August 28, 1990, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3093(e)–(f) (2010)}.”\end{footnotesize}
branch of using such exemptions. If a military action falls into one of covert action’s exemptions, it may never be reported to Congress—or anyone. If history is any guide, the executive branch will continue to seek operational latitude and independence without complying with broader oversight requirements if it doesn’t have to. Hence, there is a built-in statutory incentive for the executive to utilize the TMA and other exemptions, eliminating the legal need to notify both Congress and the American people of such an operation. Since the attacks of September 11th, the TMA exception under covert action appears to have been widely invoked, although it is impossible to precisely know how many times this occurred (after all, secrecy is the name of the game).

Now enter special operational forces to the covert action mix. Today, special operations forces are the darling of the military, media and the executive branch. And they are operating almost everywhere throughout the world. In the face of new threats posed by transnational non-state actors, special operations forces now play an increasing role as part of the covert action congressional-executive notification dance. Congress has responded with increased funding and granting increased authorities to Special Operations Command, a transnational combatant command with worldwide reach and authorities.

Brooks is rightly concerned about the change in the nature of these so-called “gray zone” conflicts that muddy the intelligence/military divide. Such activities include both special operations forces (military) and CIA personnel (civilian),


The Intelligence Authorization Act, which lays out most of the rules for covert activities, exempts ‘traditional military activities’ from its definition of covert action—through the definition and scope of ‘traditional military activities’ remains hotly contested.”)

As of the time of this article, within the special operations community alone, there are special operations forces in over 137 countries of the world (70% of all nations). See, e.g., Nick Turse, American Special Ops Forces Have Deployed to 70 Percent of the World’s Countries in 2017, THE NATION (June 26, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/american-special-ops-forces-have-deployed-to-70-percent-of-the-worlds-countries-in-2017/.

See Eric Gomez, Book Review, 37 CATO J. (2) 430–34 (2017) (reviewing ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016)) (“The key premise of How Everything Became War is that, in an age of non-state actors, new technology, and general interconnectedness, the distinction between war and peace has broken down. Instead of there being clear states of war and peace, the world is now faced with a continuum where most activities fall somewhere in between. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, characterized by disinformation operations, ‘little green men’ in Crimea, and proxy forces, is an example of such ‘gray zone’ conflicts. Brooks argues that such conflicts are not a temporary aberration but a new paradigm that is already affecting the international legal system and the U.S. military.”).
further obscuring the lines between intelligence collection and kinetic operations.

Special operations forces are everywhere, and Congress often does not know about where they are and the nature of their activities. The missions run from intelligence gathering to direct kinetic action. Special operations forces now operate pursuant to two distinct threads in the national security tapestry: Title 10 activities, and activities pursuant to a covert action Title 50 TMA exemption. Hence, the rise of what Brooks calls “semi-covert” action.

Questions arise: If an action is not clearly an intelligence or military activity (with many Special Operations Forces personnel not in military uniform), then what is the combatant status of the personnel engaging in covert action? Indeed, her book is more relevant than ever in light of the Trump administration’s recent announcements that they are considering the use of contractor forces as part of covert actions. How should military “covert” contractors be treated under international humanitarian law?

IV. CONCLUSION

The success of Brooks’s book is encouraging. And the book is timelier than ever in light of President Trump’s election and the placement of active and retired

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41. During the recent military tragedy in Niger and Mali where four U.S. special forces personnel were killed, Senators Schumer (D-NY) and Graham (R-SC), both charged with military oversight, were unaware that the U.S. military was even present in that part of the world. Dionne Searcey & Eric Schmitt, In Niger, Where U.S. Troops Died, a Lawless and Shifting Landscape, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2017, at A5 (quoting Senator Graham as stating, “[w]e don’t know exactly where we’re at in the world, militarily, and what we’re doing”).

42. See, e.g., Nick Turse, Why are U.S. Special Operations Forces Deployed in Over 100 Countries?, THE NATION (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-us-special-operations-forces-deployed-over-100-countries/. Title 50 refers to a section of the U.S. Code that addresses the Central Intelligence Agency’s authorities to include other intelligence authorities. Title 10 is a section of U.S. Code that is devoted exclusively to the armed forces of the United States. See also Robert Chesney, supra note 25.

43. Title 50 refers to a section of the U.S. Code that addresses the Central Intelligence Agency’s authorities to include other intelligence authorities. Title 10 is a section of U.S. Code that is devoted exclusively to the armed forces of the United States. See also Robert Chesney, supra note 1, at 123 (“The end result is the same: when the covert goes semi-overt, and the overt goes semi-covert, the public is left in the dark.”); Rosa Brooks, By Other Means: Shadow Wars, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 20, 2012, 10:37 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/20/shadow-wars/ (“All covert activity requires a presidential finding and subsequent notification of the intelligence committee (even if just the Gang of Eight)—a fact that gives the Pentagon a strong incentive to insist that whatever it is that special operations forces are doing, it’s not covert activities.”).

44. Some legal scholars have argued that the military members lose their protected combatant privilege and status under the Geneva Convention due to this co-mingled chain of command. To highlight one prominent example, the Osama bin Laden raid involved both military and CIA personnel. And there has been an increased interest in using contract personnel for such activities in the Trump administration.

45. See Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing Covert Activities, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 521 (2012) (describing the increased role that contractors have played in gathering intelligence, interrogating detainees, and engaging in hostile activities); see also Lindsay Windsor, Note: James Bond Inc.: Private Contractors and Covert Action, 101 GEO. L.J. 1427 (2012).
military members to senior civilian positions at the White House, DoD, and National Security Council. Further, President Trump has demonstrated a willingness to delegate more and more authority to operational military commanders. It is no exaggeration to state that President Trump “loves his generals.”

Since President Trump was elected, Brooks’s themes of “war everywhere” have, unfortunately, been reaffirmed. And the threat of conflict continues to be everywhere and has infiltrated our daily lives respective social media feeds—Twitter is but one prominent example. Indeed, a sequel to Brooks’s book addressing “How Everything Truly Became War” in the Trump administration is waiting to be written.


49. Consider the number of high-profile military and retired military officers within the Trump Cabinet. See Rob Garver, Trump’s Military Buildup Makes Even His Generals Nervous, THE FISCAL TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2017/02/28/Trump-s-Stake-Military-Industrial-Complex-Makes-His-Generals-Nervous (“President Donald Trump loves his generals . . . . In the first weeks of his presidency, he has stocked the top ranks of his defense and national security team with them.”).