Terry Stops-and-Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data

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The investigative detention doctrine first announced in *Terry v. Ohio* and amplified over the past fifty years has been much analyzed, praised, and criticized from a number of perspectives. Significantly, however, over this time period commentators have only occasionally questioned the Supreme Court’s “common sense” judgments regarding the factors sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for stops and frisks. For years, the Court has provided no empirical basis for its judgments, due in large part to the lack of reliable data. Now, with the emergence of comprehensive data on these police practices, much can be learned about the predictive power of suspect conduct and other predicates for law enforcement interventions. And what has been learned calls into question a number of factors that have been credited over many years.

No observer of the legal system can fail to notice the growing role of data and empirical analysis in the courts. A disparate set of cases have turned in large part on rigorously analyzed data. Yet this trend has not taken root in an important set of cases involving the widely used practice of stop-and-frisk. When stop-and-frisk practices become the subject of litigation, courts generally either have no data to review or have failed to engage in empirical analysis of the data that are available and which could be used to test the claims of reasonable suspicion. Rather, the courts invoke the conventional wisdom that as a matter of common sense certain conduct, for example, furtive movement, flight, bulges in clothing, and suspect location, indicates criminal conduct.

We have no argument with common sense propositions; we have no aversion to clear, straightforward thinking. But what this phrase often reflects is a set of unexamined (even if widely held) assumptions. The proliferation of data on these basic questions provides the means for empirical analysis, and it is our argument that courts should do so in assessing reasonable suspicion factors in the same manner that they have engaged in empirical judgments, using both big and targeted data, in other areas.

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I. INTRODUCTION

When the United States Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio in 1968, it created new constitutional rules to govern long-standing practices in American policing. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, fully applicable to the states since 1961, required that officers have probable cause to suspect a person of involvement in a crime in order for police to conduct any search or seizure. Yet officers on the street had continued to focus on people who simply looked suspicious, perhaps for a concrete reason or just because of an officer’s gut feeling, and police had stopped the people, refused to let them go, and searched them—sometimes with less than probable cause, and sometimes with no basis whatsoever. For example, New York State permitted police to stop people and perform cursory searches, with less than probable cause but requiring some level of fact-based suspicion.

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
3 E.g., REMO FRANCESCHINI, A MATTER OF HONOR: ONE COP’S LIFELONG PURSUIT OF JOHN GOTTI AND THE MOB 35–36 (1993) (discussing the common practice of “giv[ing] him a toss”: stopping and detaining a person on a hunch and going through the person’s pockets and possessions in search of evidence or weapons).
4 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a, at issue in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1968), provides in full:

1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the offenses specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession of which may
Terry was the Supreme Court’s opportunity to assess these practices. The Court would decide whether, as the defense in the case argued, all police-enforced stops, however temporary, and all searches, however cursory, required that police have probable cause, or whether a temporary stop and a frisk amounted to “a mere ‘minor inconvenience and petty indignity,’” which could be based on any suspicion by a police officer.

The Court declined to adopt either of these opposing positions and limited its ruling to the question of the grounds required for a frisk of the suspect. A hunch or a gut feeling about possible criminal conduct would not suffice; an officer needed to have facts, and inferences drawn from them, that would raise a suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer that the person under observation was armed and dangerous, the officer could perform a frisk—a limited pat down of the suspect’s outer clothing—in order to avoid the danger posed by a weapon. Justice Harlan’s concurrence emphasized that the use of stop-and-frisks constituted a two-step process, and likewise required a two-step analysis. The officer would need reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot, but this alone would not necessarily support a frisk. The frisk would require reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous. By the same token, the police could not justify a frisk unless reasonable suspicion first existed that would allow a temporary stop.

The Terry opinion told the story of how the defendant and two other men came to be observed, stopped, frisked, and then arrested in downtown Cleveland by Officer McFadden, a veteran police officer. McFadden, having patrolled the downtown beat for decades, noticed two of the men walking up and down the same short stretch of a city block, pausing to stare into the same jewelry store window; the men did this, first one man, then the other, twenty-four times in all. At the end of each trip up and back, they conferred on a nearby corner, and were sometimes joined by the third man, who quickly walked away. Observing all of this, McFadden suspected that the men were “casing a job, a stick-up”—i.e., performing reconnaissance for a planned armed robbery of the store. McFadden stopped them, asked some questions, and then frisked...
suspect Terry—locating a gun.\textsuperscript{16} He found another gun on one of the other men as well, and arrested them both.\textsuperscript{17} This sort of police work, the Court said, constituted exactly the correct process: an officer, looking at the behavior of the suspects and interpreting what all of it meant, would have reasonable, fact-based suspicion to temporarily detain and question them, and then (because an armed robbery seemed to be the goal) to frisk them for weapons.\textsuperscript{18}

By taking the facts as central to its conclusion that Officer McFadden had performed in exactly the way that would comply with the new \textit{Terry} standard, the Court made clear an important concept: the reasonable suspicion determination turns in large part on the predictive value of a range of conduct and information made known to an officer. Based on this inference—in essence, making a prediction that the men, walking back and forth repeatedly with particular attention to a jewelry store’s display window, had plans for an immediate robbery of the store—McFadden may have intuited correctly.\textsuperscript{19} But a reviewing court operating under \textit{Terry} need not necessarily find that the prediction was correct in order for the actions of the police to pass muster. Rather, the prediction, based on the observed facts and circumstances and the inferences McFadden could draw, need only have been reasonable.\textsuperscript{20}

Over the run of cases decided since \textit{Terry}, the Court has put very little meat on the bones of the analysis necessary for determining the sufficiency of the predictive value in a particular cluster of facts to constitute reasonable suspicion. What substance the Court has supplied has come largely in the form of the ever-ready, ever-malleable phrase “common sense.” The Court instructs us to take a non-technical, everyday lay person’s common sense view of the facts to ascertain whether the officer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to perform a \textit{Terry} stop-and-frisk. For example, in \textit{United States v. Cortez},\textsuperscript{21} the Court stated a theme that echoes in many of its stop-and-frisk cases:

The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} at 7.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Terry}, 392 U.S. at 7.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Id.} at 27–28.
\textsuperscript{19} The \textit{Terry} Court acknowledged the possibility that racial bias could affect stop-and-frisk practices but apparently did not think the problem serious enough to restrict this practice. Some commentators addressed this issue and as later litigation and studies would show, see infra Part IV.D, race bias is a serious matter. See Adina Schwartz, “Just Take Away Their Guns”: The Hidden Racism of \textit{Terry} v. Ohio, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 323–24 (1996).
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Terry}, 392 U.S. at 28 (“[Officer McFadden] had observed enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that [the suspects] were armed; and nothing in their response[s] . . . served to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot say that [Officer McFadden’s] decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination . . . .”).
formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are law enforcement officers . . . . [T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.22

The Court avoids empirical reasoning with respect to what meets the legal standard; rather, it looks at the question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion through the experienced eyes of the police officer on patrol, with minimal consideration of whether these judgments are based on proven, reliable factors.23 Further, the Court gives substantial deference to an officer’s judgment based on the supposition that her experience provides unique expertise.24

We do not write to oppose common sense or the usefulness of experience in decision-making. Neither of us have any aversion to clear, straightforward thinking. Rather, we believe that common sense as that concept informs the Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence often means something different than what it sounds like: not obvious, homespun, solid judgment, but unexamined assumptions with which many people may agree (and which may be problematically reinforced by the fact that evidence was actually seized). However, wide-spread belief in the truth of what may seem obvious is not the same thing as actual proof. And where there is empirical data that can substantiate or call into question the predictive value of these “common sense” facts, it is our view that courts should adjust their perceptions accordingly.

In this article, we will use empirical data to examine assumptions about the predictive value of observed facts in the context of the Terry stop-and-frisk jurisprudence. In a world where data and empiricism are becoming important metrics for determining the efficacy and reliability of a vast array of legal, scientific and social science standards, including the use of data and algorithms in criminal justice decision-making, “common sense” resolutions may no longer be justified. Our project is informed by the growing literature examining the possibilities and implications of so-called “big data” and on the use of predictive analytics and algorithmic prediction for public safety and law enforcement.

We seek to answer the question of whether statistically-driven analysis makes stop-and-frisk more efficient and fairer by paving the way to more productive stops, fewer encounters, and a reduction in racial and ethnic bias. In doing so, we make a modest claim: given the growing availability and use of data in criminal justice, courts should consider data in deciding whether to accept the empirically-testable claims by police and other criminal justice actors, instead of relying upon content-free, unsubstantiated assertions of “common sense.” And we conclude that the disturbingly low hit rates for weapons and other contraband in police frisks calls into question many of the court-approved justifications for this invasive police practice.

22 Id. at 418; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–25 (2000).
23 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123–25; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
24 See supra note 23.
We proceed as follows. In Part II, we examine the *Terry* doctrine in greater depth, and in particular its concept of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Part III discusses the emergence of “big data” and empiricism. Part IV brings us to what data analysis and empiricism have been able to tell us about stop-and-frisk practices, beginning with a discussion of how the availability of data and empirical judgments have grown in the law generally, with a focus on voting rights and the Supreme Court’s most recent case on abortion restrictions. Part V brings us to the heart of our argument: what data and empirical analysis can tell us about frisks, why courts must make use of data analysis instead of unexamined “common sense” assumptions, and what our analysis of predictive values and metrics means for the criminal law and for policing.

II. THE TERRY DOCTRINE

In *Terry v. Ohio* the United States Supreme Court ruled that a person who was stopped for investigation by the police could be frisked if the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the person was “armed and dangerous.”25 The Court had not previously authorized a seizure or search of a person on less than probable cause, but by focusing on the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of “unreasonable” searches or seizures, the Court determined that probable cause was not necessary given the limited intrusion into personal privacy by a stop-and-frisk.26 While *Terry* did not directly involve the issue of the permissible grounds for a “stop,” the Court’s opinions made clear that it was approving as well forcible stops of persons based upon “reasonable suspicion” of involvement in serious criminal conduct.27

The Supreme Court has expanded the *Terry* doctrine in several significant respects. First, the Court has permitted stops (and consequently possible frisks) of all persons who are reasonably suspected of any criminal activity, including possessory offenses, traffic violations, and “quality of life” summary offenses, thus significantly widening the scope of this practice.28 These cases rejected arguments that expanding stop-and-frisk beyond investigations of violent and other serious crimes would lead to arbitrary and excessive enforcement practices.29 This development coincided with an era of proactive and order-

25 Id. at 27, 30.
26 Id. at 21, 25, 29–31.
27 Id. at 29–31; see also id. at 33 (Harlan, J. concurring), 34–35 (White, J., concurring); 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court expressly adopted this doctrine in *Adams v. Williams*, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
29 Judge Friendly argued against application of stop-and-frisk in non-violent crime investigations. See *Adams*, 436 F.2d at 38–39, rev’d *en banc*, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); see also *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring); Richard E. Myers II, *Challenges to Terry for the Twenty-First Century*, 81 Miss. L.J. 937, 943 (2012); Carol S. Streiker, *Terry Unbound*, 82 Miss. L.J. 329, 335 (2013). Data from jurisdictions
maintenance policing that has generated broad debate regarding “broken windows,” “zero tolerance,” and “quality of life” policing methods. Designed to prevent serious crime and disorder by punishing even minor deviances, these controversial practices have become a mainstay of modern policing.30

Second, the Court has approved stops and frisks on the assumption that certain conduct is predictive of or associated with criminal behavior and weapon possession, but has not required an empirical basis for these judgments, many of which rest on conduct that is entirely consistent with innocence.31 The Court has repeatedly stated that it would apply “common sense” judgments and permit officers to make reasonable inferences from a suspect’s behavior in determining that document investigatory stops show that the majority of these stops (and frisks) are for non-violent offenses. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report to Court at 19, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report to Court]; Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court at 19, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2017) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court]; Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey E. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 819 (2011) (only 20% of arrests following stops in New York City were for felony investigations).


31 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (finding that conduct that appears to be innocent may still provide reasonable suspicion based on the “totality of circumstances”).
whether there were legal grounds for a stop-and-frisk.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, in \textit{Illinois v. Wardlow}, the Court permitted a stop-and-frisk where the suspect fled from police in a high crime area even though it had no data showing that persons who avoided the police in high crime areas were reasonably likely to be involved in criminal conduct.\textsuperscript{33} And while the Court has cautioned against use of characteristics that would permit frequent stops of a “very large category of presumably innocent travelers,”\textsuperscript{34} its cases over the years have provided police with vast stop-and-frisk discretion, permitting stops and frisks on vague and subjective standards such as nervousness, officer experience, furtive movements and suspicious activity.\textsuperscript{35} This approach is similar to that followed by some courts in assessing airport “drug courier profiles.” As recounted by Professor Barry Friedman, the Drug Enforcement Agency and other law enforcement organizations used passenger behavior—often entirely innocent and often inconsistent—in their interdiction efforts. Thus, people were considered couriers if they “arrived at night/arrived early in the morning,” “[were] one of the first to deplane/one of the last to deplane/deplaned in the middle,” “used a one-way ticket/used a round-trip ticket,” “traveled alone/traveled with a companion,” “acted too calm/acted too nervous,” etc.\textsuperscript{36} Not surprisingly, when

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{id.} (discussing stop of car for immigration investigation based on location and reactions of occupants to police presence); \textit{United States v. Cortez}, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[C]ommon sense conclusions about human behavior . . . weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by . . . law enforcement.”).
\item \textit{Id.} at 124–25. As we discuss, infra notes 60 and accompanying text, there was data that contradicted the Court’s analysis. \textit{See Meares & Harcourt, supra} note 30, at 790 (citing New York State Attorney General’s Report on stop-and-frisk practice in New York City where only 1 in 45 stops made on flight in a high crime area resulted in an arrest). Moreover, as Justice Stevens stated in his dissent, innocent residents of minority neighborhoods might have good reason to avoid contacts with the police. \textit{Wardlow}, 528 U.S. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
\item \textit{Reid v. Georgia}, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).
\item \textit{Barry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing Without Permission} 152–53 (2017). The Supreme Court did not validate drug courier profiles as grounds for a stop, but did permit
\end{enumerate}
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the full data set, as opposed to the very occasional successful stop, was examined, there was less than a 2% hit rate for persons carrying drugs.\textsuperscript{37}

Use of vague and indeterminate standards has been rejected in other contexts. The Court has ruled that vague statutory language such as “vagrancy,” “loitering,” and “suspicious conduct” is not a valid ground for arrest and prosecution under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.\textsuperscript{38} More recently, the Court struck down as too indeterminate the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act that punished non-enumerated crimes by their likeness to specific criminal acts.\textsuperscript{39} The Court has the extended vagueness doctrine to other contexts, including standards for imposing costs on criminal defendants,\textsuperscript{40} rules regulating the Bar,\textsuperscript{41} and agency regulations.\textsuperscript{42}

Yet, the Court has failed to explain why the maxim that “[n]o one should have to ponder the totality of circumstances to determine whether his conduct is a felony,”\textsuperscript{43} that precludes prosecutions based on vague statutes, does not apply to forcible stops and frisks of individuals. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the investigative detention rationale of \textit{Terry} has become a substitute for vague loitering and vagrancy laws and has provided police with an even broader policing power.\textsuperscript{44} The vagueness of the factors that may justify stops and frisks increases the risk that police will act on biases in deciding whether there is sufficient suspicion for forcible intervention. Thus, if police associate racial minorities with criminal conduct where the same actions by whites are not

\textsuperscript{37}FRIEDMAN, \textit{supra} note 36, at 153.

\textsuperscript{38}See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 361 (1983) (finding requirement that detained person provide “credible and reliable” identification is void for vagueness; law must provide “ordinary people” with notice to “understand what conduct is prohibited” so as to avoid “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Shuttersworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (definiteness needed to prevent “the net to be cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of the police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense”); Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding law prohibiting use of cars as “living quarters” void for vagueness); Stahl v. City of St. Louis, 687 F.3d 1038, 1040–41 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding conduct that “impede[s] traffic” is too vague a standard); Anthony G. Amsterdam, \textit{The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court}, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 73–75 (1960).


\textsuperscript{40}Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966).


\textsuperscript{43}Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). \textit{See also} McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2543 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that abortion protesters should not be subject to seizure based on an offense of “follow[ing] and harass[ing]”).

\textsuperscript{44}See Tracey Meares, \textit{This Land is My Land?}, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1880 (2017).
regarded as suspicious, or if they consider race or ethnicity as surrogates for criminal conduct, even on a sub-conscious level, bias may become a causative factor. For this reason alone, courts should scrutinize the reasons provided for stops and frisks to ensure that they have predictive value on the issue of “reasonable suspicion,” and where empirical evidence bears on this question, should use that evidence in the constitutional calculus.

Third, stop-and-frisk doctrine has developed primarily as a function of the exclusionary rule, which means that the cases in which courts adjudicate the issue are those in which contraband or other evidence of criminal conduct has been uncovered in the investigative detention. In this context, fact-finding and legal analysis can be compromised by false or misleading police officer testimony and the court’s reluctance to suppress otherwise probative evidence.

Indeed, where evidence of crime is uncovered in a stop-and-frisk encounter, the weapon or drugs or other evidence provides a kind of “self-validating” reason for an officer’s intervention.  


47 Occasionally courts expressly recognize the pressures to validate searches that uncover evidence, regardless of the Fourth Amendment limitations. See, e.g., United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Appeals based on the Fourth Amendment from denied motions to suppress evidence of illegal weapons or contraband (drugs, etc.) are often difficult because the Government is in a sense proven right. Whatever prompted the
Similar criticisms can be made of the Court’s “probable cause” jurisprudence, as the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard also involves inferential judgments from facts that may be innocent in nature. Probable cause requires a showing of a “fair probability” that the suspect has committed a crime or that evidence will be found at a certain location.\footnote{Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983).} The courts have not quantified the probability standard, but judges and commentators have suggested a 35-50\% probability of criminal conduct.\footnote{See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34–35, 47–48 (2000) (finding invalid under Fourth Amendment, highway drug checkpoint that resulted in a 7.4\% drugs related arrest rate, and 8.96\% overall arrest rate); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (probable cause does not require proof by a preponderance of the evidence); Orin Kerr, \textit{Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure} 131–32, 132 n.6 (Michael Klarman, ed. 2012); Bambauer, \textit{ supra} note 35, at 468; Kit Kinports, \textit{The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence}, 108 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUIY 64, 68 (2013); Max Minzner, \textit{Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause}, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 925 (2009); Jeffrey L. Rachlinski et al., \textit{Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight}, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 86–88 (2011); Richardson, \textit{Arrest Efficiency}, \textit{ supra} note 45, at 2075–77.} Reasonable suspicion is satisfied by “considerably less” proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance of the evidence,\footnote{United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).} and commentators have suggested a significantly lower range.\footnote{Greenawalt, \textit{ supra} note 45, at 187; Rudovsky & Rosenthal, \textit{ supra} note 30, at 117.}

The differences in assessing probabilities, however, are more than one of degree. Probable cause analysis is usually anchored to a specific, completed criminal act and the police investigation is based on information provided by witnesses, personal observations by the police, forensics, and culpable behavior of the suspect. Accordingly, in most cases there are relatively clear factors on which a court can determine the “fair probability” of guilt standard. If a robbery has been committed, the description of the suspect, method of flight, and other distinguishing factors can be assessed. Similarly, where police are searching for evidence, the reliability of a witness or informant, the personal observations of the officer, as well as other information related to the specific crime or evidence will determine whether probable cause exists.

Some stops are based on similar, if less detailed factors (e.g., report of recent robbery with description of suspect), but more often the reasonable suspicion analysis rests solely on observed behavior of the suspect. The discretion given to the police in assessing what is “suspicious” conduct is far more malleable than the discretion exercised in the probable cause context. It is not surprising, therefore, that the “hit-rates” for stops and frisks (where police actually seize weapons or contraband or effectuate an arrest or issue a summons) are
substantially lower than for arrests or searches conducted on full probable cause.\textsuperscript{52}

To date, courts have rarely employed an “evidence based” approach to police stop, frisk or search practices.\textsuperscript{53} But with newly emerging comprehensive and reliable data sets, there is an opening to new perspectives on Fourth Amendment issues, including the scope of the programs, analysis of compliance performance, and “hit-rates,” all of which are critical to the development of reliable standards for balancing Fourth Amendment public safety and privacy and personal dignity.\textsuperscript{54}

\section*{III. The Emergence of Big Data and Empiricism}

Over the last decade, a new phrase has emerged: big data. The idea is that there now exists an almost inexhaustible stream of data concerning a wide array of human activities—business and commercial, financial, scientific, medical, industrial, governmental, and social. Using powerful analytical computing, we

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{52}See infra notes 83 and accompanying text. Indeed, where police have engaged in random stops without any particularized suspicion, for example at highway checkpoints, the hit rates have in some cases been higher than hit rates for stops and frisks where police are supposedly acting on objective evidence of suspicious conduct. \textit{Edmond}, 531 U.S. at 35 (drug checkpoint yielded drug seizures in 4.7\% of stops). \textit{See also} Jeffrey Fagan, \textit{Terry’s Original Sin}, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 54–55 (2016); Minzner, supra note 49, at 925.


can examine these vast troves of data to discover patterns that might otherwise remain hidden.

The criminal justice system is capable of generating substantial data, from the earliest phases of an investigation and proactive policing tactics through final adjudications, sentencing and parole and probation. With these data, scholars from multiple disciplines have begun to examine the potential, the pitfalls, and the contradictions to existing practice that analysis provides. More specifically, data collection on police stops of pedestrians over the past fifteen to twenty years has led to research and studies on the relationship of the data to doctrinal issues in stop-and-frisk practices.55

Even before “big data” became a central focus point, Professors Tracey Meares and Bernard Harcourt addressed the problem of “common sense” judgments on the predictive value of human behavior.56 In particular, they were critical of Supreme Court assertions of fact, rarely supported by data analysis—they called them “pseudo-empirical statements”57—about consequential and case determinative issues. Rather, “these are . . . purely rhetorical statements intended to render authoritative the Court’s decisions.”58 As an example, in Illinois v. Wardlow,59 Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded the empirical nature of the question of whether flight from a police officer raises reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, given the many other legitimate reasons to flee from an officer but stated that in the absence of “empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior,” the Court need do no more than look to its own “commonsense judgements and inferences about human behavior.”60

Meares and Harcourt argued that courts cannot justify an approach that ignores “contested empirical claims that are hotly debated in legal and social scientific circles”61 and for which data and studies exist that could help to resolve the debates. They proposed “a mode of judicial decision-making and academic debate that treats social scientific and empirical assessment as a crucial element in constitutional decision-making . . . .”62

With the advent of big data, even more attention is being paid to potential uses (and abuses) of data mining and empirical determinations. For example, Professor Ric Simmons has expressed faith in the ability of “predictive algorithms” to “revolutionize” the criminal justice system.63 Algorithms will do

55 See infra Part IV.D.
56 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 30, at 784.
57 Id. at 739.
58 Id. at 740.
60 Id. at 124–25. As Meares and Harcourt noted, there was empirical data that called into question the inferential judgments that the Court made about flight in a high crime area. Meares & Harcourt, supra note 30, at 790.
61 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 30, at 750–51.
62 Id. at 735.
this by, among other things, making “far more accurate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.”64 This will increase both efficiency—police will spend time and energy much more selectively, on a more promising set of targets—and also fairness, because “fewer innocent people will be stopped and searched.”65

In the same vein, Professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, one of the most prolific scholars of big data and criminal justice, asks: what if big data analytics could replace the typical “small data”—that is, observable actions and activities of individuals—upon which police now rely to decide whether they believe reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists?66 Ferguson promotes the use of networked data sources, as this will increase knowledge and will allow for more accurate and targeted judgments of whether police have reasonable suspicion. Now, “[w]ith little effort,” Ferguson says, “officers can identify most unknown suspects, not through their observations, but by accessing a web of information containing extensive personal data about suspects.”67

Both Simmons and Ferguson present uses of big data that could make the system fairer, but both recognize troubling issues. Simmons prudently warns of “obstacles” to overcome, first and foremost attaining the assurance that neither the algorithms nor the data rely on “improper factors, such as the race of the suspect.”68 He also cautions that predictive algorithms must still take

64 Id. at 947.
65 Id.
67 Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 66, at 329–30. In a similar vein, Professor Andrew Manuel Crespo argues that data analytics can improve the criminal justice process in a more big-picture way: by bringing broad institutional contours into focus. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2053 (2016). As currently structured, the system of constitutional criminal procedure, in particular its one-off, one-case-at-a-time nature, impedes any attempt to understand the system or to regulate the actors in it from a systemic point of view. The nature of the system “den[ies] courts an opportunity to ‘see’ the systemic features of law enforcement behavior,” creating a “mismatch” between courts’ “institutional task and their institutional capacity.” Id. at 2050. Other commentators have urged similar use of data relevant to particular aspects of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Chao et al. supra note 46, at 220–21; Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1057, 1061–62 (2015); Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 125–30 (2012).
68 Simmons, supra note 63, at 947. Other commentators have made similar arguments regarding the integrity of algorithms. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805–06 (2014); see also Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-criminal-justice.html?_r=0 (discussing problem of assertions of confidentiality of proprietary
individualized suspicion into account, and that the legal standard must be quantified—something the Supreme Court has resisted. Ferguson’s proposal for making known an unknown suspect relies on an ability to identify the person, for example through biometric identification like facial recognition. But sufficiently accurate facial recognition is a ways off, and other types of biometric identification, for example fingerprint or retina scans, which seem closest to field deployment, would require a seizure of the individual, and that would require reasonable suspicion.

In other works on the subject, Ferguson recognizes that big data and its predictions “necessitate a careful understanding of the technology,” because some flaws, while invisible, are baked into the finished product. In other words, if the data reflect actions that have their bases in biased policing practices, the data will carry this forward, in the guise of clean, neutral metrics. While big data-based predictive policing “has been promoted as a data-driven, race neutral, objective solution to the failed policing policies of the past,” Ferguson says, it deserves a sustained examination and critique that scrutinizes the collection of data, the methodology used, transparency, accountability, and implementation, at the very least. Moreover, even with full data sets, there can be serious disputes over analysis and predictive accuracy. For example, in a 2003 opinion upholding an Alaska sex offender registration law, Justice Kennedy relied on a Department of Justice study to assert that the risk of re-offending by sex offenders is “frightening and high.” But it turns out that this assertion, which has been repeated in lower court cases since that decision, was based on single source in a compendium of papers reviewed by DOJ that claimed an 80% re-offending rate. Recent research shows that this figure,
taken from an article in Psychology Today, is highly dubious and most likely false; to the contrary, sex offenders re-offend at much lower rates.76

But whatever the merits and limits of big data, there is good reason to examine even more limited data sets reflecting specific police practices. In a series of articles, Professor Sharad Goel and various colleagues employ data analysis to suggest ways in which stop-and-frisk practices can be fairer, rarer, and more productive.77 Using data from New York City’s Stop, Question and Frisk program, these scholars show how “a particular kind of calculation made possible by modern, large-scale datasets—determining the likelihood that stopping and frisking a particular pedestrian will result in the discovery of contraband...could be used to reduce the racially disparate impact of pedestrian searches and to increase their effectiveness.”78 Thus, the data show that around 40% of the stops made by the police in New York City in the period studied were based on observations or other factors that had only a one percent chance of finding a weapon, usually a knife, and that police have used these low-percentage stops disproportionately on Blacks and Latinos.79 By contrast, where more reliable factors were the basis of stops, it was determined that six percent of all stops were far more likely to result in the discovery of weapons, and simultaneously to mitigate racial disparities.80

Professor Ferguson and Professor Damien Bernache capture the idea in the context of another claim based on resort to common sense reasoning: police testimony that a particular location constitutes a high-crime area.81 Using the Wardlow case as a prototypical example, they suggest a framework for courts to use to identify a high-crime area, based on “objective and verifiable evidence.”82 The judgment of whether or not the location is a high-crime area


78 Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination, supra note 77, at 181.

79 Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?, supra note 77, at 374–75, 382.

80 Id. This study is referenced in more detail, infra notes 247–258 and accompanying text.


82 Id.
should follow from real data based on the actual experience of police officers on the ground.

Max Minzner makes a similar argument in contrasting the assertions that police officers make in support of probable cause in applications for search warrants—which, he finds, are correct in about 80% of the cases—with those made in quick, on-the-street judgments, which are no more than 12% accurate.83 In the latter category, which includes Terry stops and frisks, the judicial assessment of probable cause or reasonable suspicion should include evidence regarding the officers’ “differential success rates”—in other words, proof of their “hit rates” or rates of success over the great run of stops and frisks. “These success rates,” Minzner says, “capture information not currently analyzed in the search process and their addition would improve the accuracy of probable-cause decisions.”84

Professor Jeffrey Fagan argues that the low standard of reasonable suspicion for Terry stops and frisks—what Fagan calls Terry’s “original sin”—has allowed police to take action against members of the public that the probable cause standard would have disallowed, all without evidence of any effectiveness.85 Using large datasets from the Floyd litigation in New York City, Fagan shows that the lower standard of reasonable suspicion makes policing less, not more, effective at controlling crime.86 Stated differently, the data prove that stops police made using the probable cause standard actually result in reductions in crime; stop activity utilizing the more subjective and vague Terry reasonable suspicion standard may have very little effect on crime.87

84 Id. at 913. Professor Anna Lvovsky addresses this issue from a different angle: examining the ways in which courts have accepted “police expertise” in a range of judgments relating to the detection and investigation of criminal conduct. She notes that the Court frequently assumes that police possess “rare and reliable ‘expert’ insight,” without supporting empirical evidence. Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2081 (2017). Similar criticism has been made of police forensic science, much of which has been shown to be unreliable by DNA testing. See, e.g., Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Reform: More Sharks in Dirty Water, YALE L. J. F. 348, 348 (2017).
85 Fagan, supra note 52, at 45.
87 The recent data regarding stops and frisks and violent crime rates in New York City supports this thesis. In 2016 police reported approximately 15,000 pedestrian stops (representing a huge and precipitous drop from the peak of stop-and-frisk policing of a close to 700,000 stops per year), yet the violent crime rate continued to fall. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LATEST DATA: STOP-AND-FRISK AND CRIME BOTH LOWEST IN YEARS 1–2 (Oct. 2016) (finding there were 7,636 stops for the first six months). However, the court appointed monitor in Floyd v. City of New York, Peter Zimroth, has found a pattern of non-documented stops by police officers. Al Baker, City Police Officers Are Not Reporting All Street Stops, Monitor Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/nyregion/nypd-stop-and-frisk-monitor.html [https://perma.cc/25B4-YNGD].
IV. DATA, EMPIRICISM AND POLICE STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES

These analytical articles and related research are dependent on the availability of comprehensive and reliable data. Indeed, as data collection and analysis has grown, so has empiricism, a process greatly enabled by big (and little) data. We turn therefore to an overview of empirical evidence in administrative and judicial decision-making.

A. The Role of Empiricism and Data in the Courts

The United States Supreme Court has given inconsistent signals regarding the role of statistics, economic analysis, and empirical evidence in judicial adjudications. In some areas, the Court has emphasized the need for empiricism. For example in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,88 the Court rejected the long-standing “Frye test” of “general acceptance” with respect to the introduction of expert testimony.89 Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which imposed a standard for the use of expert testimony based on scientific or technical expertise, the Court opted for a test with increased scientific rigor.90 Rule 702 requires that “all scientific testimony or evidence” must be “not only relevant but reliable.”91 Reliability is based on sound scientific processes and “scientific knowledge” is dependent upon “known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.”92 “[I]n order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”93 The Daubert revolution has produced uneven results, but at its core, it supports the use of empirical evidence and analysis in situations presenting the relevance of testable factual propositions.94

89 Id. at 597 (rejecting test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923)).
90 Id. at 589 (“That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. . . . To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”) (footnote omitted).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 590 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
93 Id.
94 Daubert, 509 U.S. at at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (describing Rule 702, as construed in Daubert, as requiring the trial court to take on a “basic gatekeeping obligation” to ensure that scientific and technical testimony are not only relevant but reliable and based on good grounds). A number of commentators have pointed to the lack of Daubert standards in criminal litigation where untested police “science” is not infrequently admitted. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being
Yet, just a few years before Daubert, the Court had rejected what seemed decisive statistical proof of racial bias in capital sentencing practices. In McCleskey v. Kemp,95 a challenge to the Georgia death penalty system rested upon statistical studies by Dr. David Baldus that examined 2,000 Georgia murder cases from the 1970s, in an attempt to discern patterns in the jury decisions on the death penalty.96 Professor Baldus showed that “defendants charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases.”97 The numbers also indicated a “reverse racial disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants.”98 The results of Baldus’ more sophisticated analysis, controlling for thirty nine non-racial variables, were even more damning. “[D]efendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks. According to this model, black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.”99 Thus, the Court said, the “Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”100

Even with this dramatic statistical evidence of racial disparity in a high-stakes process, the Court found the empirical evidence beside the point as it did not show that “the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”101 The Court allowed that it had considered statistical proof in other areas of the law, for example, statistical disparities as proof of an equal protection violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district, and “multiple-regression analysis to prove statutory violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”102 There seems little doubt but that the Court believed that the statistical evidence of disparity as evidence of discrimination, even if the strength and rigor of that evidence seemed unassailable, would prove too powerful in ways that the Court did not welcome. Not only would such a ruling jeopardize the institution of capital punishment, but given the evidence of race discrimination throughout the criminal justice system, the impact could be even

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96 Id.
97 Id. at 286.
98 Id. at 286.
99 Id. at 287.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 292.
102 Id. at 294.
broader, a concern that Justice Brennan rightly captured in his dissenting opinion as a fear of “too much justice.”

The Court turned to empiricism again in *Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,* a case that examined a Texas law that imposed new requirements on medical facilities in which women could obtain abortions. The Court reviewed the statute under the *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* “undue burden” test. The Texas law required that any doctor performing abortions have “admitting privileges” at a hospital not more than thirty miles from the location of the abortion clinic and required that the abortion facility meet the minimum standards set for “ambulatory surgical centers.” The plaintiffs challenged these requirements as “undue burdens” on the constitutional right to obtain abortions, alleging that physicians could not obtain the required admitting privileges, and that because the cost of retrofitting existing clinics to comply with the ambulatory surgical center standards would prove so great that many clinics would close, leaving huge areas of Texas without any abortion providers or putting them so far away that the right to an abortion would exist in name only.

In the view of the majority, in the absence of relevant legislative findings, the factual record showed no medical need for the law. Peer-reviewed studies and expert testimony showed “no significant health related problem for the [admitting privileges requirement] to cure” and the state’s evidence failed to show that the new law advanced any interest in women’s health beyond what the prior law already provided. “At the same time,” the Court said, the evidence showed that the admitting privileges requirement created a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman wanting a legal abortion, in the form of a “dramatic” drop in the number of clinics, fewer available doctors to perform the procedures, and thus longer wait times. Similarly, the ambulatory surgical center standards imposed requirements that provided “no benefit when complications arise,” and that statistically, “abortions taking place in abortion facilities are safer than common procedures that occur in outside clinics not subject to Texas’ surgical-center requirements.” The empirical facts in the record, the Court said, support the trial court’s “ultimate legal conclusion that the requirement is not necessary.”

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103 *McCleskey*, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 *Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). The plurality opinion stated that a law creates an undue burden on a woman’s right to have a legal abortion, making the law unconstitutional, if the “purpose or effect” of the law is to “place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman” seeking a pre-viability abortion. *Id.*
106 *Whole Woman’s Health*, 136 S. Ct. at 2292.
107 *Whole Woman’s Health*, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
108 *Id.* at 2312–18.
109 *Id.* at 2298–99.
110 *Id.* at 2299.
The use of data analysis has also come to the fore in cases challenging voter identification statutes. These statutes are premised on voter fraud by persons voting in the place of others. A robust debate and many investigations have found no evidence for these claims, but legislators persist in these enactments. The legal challenges to these laws are based on allegations that they disenfranchise poor and minority voters, because they are typically less likely to have acceptable forms of identification. To prove these claims, the challengers have presented experts from various disciplines who have used statistical tools to examine, compare, and analyze the effect of voter identification laws on voting populations, in order to measure just how many voters, from what demographic groups, the laws would disenfranchise.

For example, Pennsylvania required particular kinds of state-issued identification bearing a photograph of the person attempting to vote. In Applewhite v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Court looked closely at the statistical, data-based evidence on the issue of how many people the law would disenfranchise. The court credited statistical analysis that showed that 511,415 registered voters in the state lacked a form of identification acceptable for voting. On the related question of voter awareness of the voter ID requirement, plaintiffs presented data on the results of inquiries based on telephone interviews that showed that minority voter disenfranchisement would result from the law.

In Veasey v. Perry, a challenge to the Texas voter identification law was based on claims that the law constituted a substantial burden on the right to vote, discriminated against minority voters, and constituted a poll tax. Empirical evidence was presented by “an expert in quantitative and qualitative historical analysis of voting, political, and statistical data,” whose report showed “intentional discrimination against minorities to achieve a partisan political advantage.” For example, the “provision allowing the use of concealed handgun permits,” favored Anglos “because they are disproportionately represented among those permit holders,” and that was true as well for military veterans’ identification because “Anglos are a disproportionate share of Texas’s military veterans of voting-age population relative to African-Americans.”

The evidence also showed that “[w]hen the legislature rejected student IDs, state

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113 Id. at *6.
114 Id. at *9.
116 Id. at 633.
117 Id. at 658.
118 Id.
government employee IDs, and federal IDs, they rejected IDs that are disproportionately held by African-Americans and Hispanics.”119 In addition, two different experts used database matching (as in the *Applewhite* case in Pennsylvania) and other statistical methods “to determin[e] the number of registered voters who might lack SB 14 ID, along with their demographic characteristics.”120 Based on their work, the court found that “approximately 608,470 registered voters in Texas, representing approximately 4.5% of all registered voters, lack qualified SB 14 ID, and of these, 534,512 voters do not qualify for [an] exemption. Moreover, a disproportionate number of African-Americans and Hispanics populate that group of potentially disenfranchised voters.”121 The statistical evidence formed the foundation for the court’s finding that the law disenfranchised and discriminated against minority voters.122

Yet, for each area in which the courts have looked to statistical and other empirical evidence to inform their fact-finding process, in others there continues to be reliance on intuition and common sense, even where science and social science provides more advanced metrics. For example, in *Manson v. Braithwaite*,123 the Court ruled that in determining reliability of identifications, a court should consider the opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator, his degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description, level of certainty, the time between the crime and confrontation.124 This due process analysis has remained unchanged for over 40 years, notwithstanding a multitude of studies that demonstrate that the factors that the Court has credited in assessing reliability where suggestive practices may have been used are not

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119 *Id.*
120 *Id.* at 659.
121 *Feasey*, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 659.
122 Statistical analysis also played a significant role in the ruling of a three-judge district court in North Carolina finding unconstitutional the 2016 North Carolina redistricting plan on grounds that the plan discriminated against voters who support Democratic Party candidates. Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1026, 2018 WL 341658 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2018), stay granted, 2018 WL 472142 (2018). In *Common Cause*, the plaintiffs presented a range of expert testimony showing that the plan is an “extreme statistical outlier” in its disfavoring of non-Republican candidates, and that there is a large “partisan symmetry” resulting in a translation of votes into a Republican Party advantage. *Id.* at *9–10.
124 *Id.* at 114.
valid. And, there are continuing debates about empirical data and normative constitutional principles in other areas.

B. Risk Assessment Tools

Risk assessment tools are data-based instruments that allow judgments and decisions to be made on an empirical measure of the actual, as opposed to an assumed or intuited risk. These tools could assist judges and others to assess the risks inherent in a criminal justice decision, based on data reflected in thousands of individual cases with respect to bail, sentencing and parole. For example, under most governing statutes and rules, the bail/pretrial release decision centers upon the questions whether the arrestee, if released, will appear at later court proceedings. In practice, however, courts regularly place significant weight on their assessment of whether the suspect, if released, would pose a danger to the community. Where a court has serious concerns about the dangerousness of the suspect, bail will be set at an amount the defendant is unlikely to make.

In some jurisdictions, courts do not do any risk balancing; instead, there is a bail “schedule” laying out the pre-set amounts of bail, based solely on the charge and criminal history information. Many have noted the irrational aspects

125 See, e.g., Dennis v. Secretary, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 314 (3d Cir. 2016) (McKee, C.J., concurring); Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 414–16 (Alaska 2016); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011), modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 938 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695 (Or. 2012); Gary S. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2008) (criticizing continued use of criteria for assessing reliability of identifications that have been shown to be faulty by social science studies); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999). The Supreme Court had the opportunity to revise these criteria in Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012), but avoided the issue in ruling that that there was no “state action” in the particular identification procedure used in that case.

126 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Supreme Court’s Confused Empirical Jurisprudence, 84 U.S. L. Wk. 62 (July 14, 2015) (criticizing decision in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) for applying the “clearly erroneous” standard review in a lethal injection case). In cases presenting the issue of whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment review, the doctrinal question of whether the expectation is objectively reasonable has been made in many instances without regard as to how a majority of persons assess their privacy interests in various locations and contexts. Public surveys and polls show a large disconnect between what many persons view as private areas and conduct and what the Supreme Court has recognized as an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 772–73 (1993); see also Williams v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 2017) (impact of long term solitary confinement on physical and mental health of inmates).
of these approaches. A judge considering a defendant for possible release will almost always have some concerns about the possibility that the suspect will offend while on release, perhaps violently. But when judges set bail, a suspect who has sufficient resources can secure release by posting money or property even if she represents a true risk. By contrast, an indigent suspect in a low-level, non-dangerous offense, no matter how sure to show up in court, will remain in custody if a money bond is set.

Might there be empirically-based alternatives? Several years ago, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation designed a tool to give judges “the benefit of data-driven, objective assessments of the risks individuals posed.” The goal was to enable the courts to release those defendants who did not pose a risk of committing crimes, especially violent crimes, or who were not serious flight risks. Some jurisdictions used risk assessment tools, and though they were imperfect, there was some evidence that these systems had “been able to spend less on pretrial incarceration, while at the same time enhancing public safety.” Arnold researchers created a tool that included nine factors, all available from the suspects’ record as the most pertinent risk predictors for “new crime, new violence, and failure to appear [for court].” Their studies suggested that defendants failed at similar rates in each of the three risk categories, regardless of race or gender, which would support the assertion “that the assessment [tool] does not over-classify non-whites’ risk levels, which has been a concern in some other areas of risk assessment.”

When testing began, preliminary results showed that the Arnold Foundation tool—called PSA-Court—”successfully predict[s] criminal reoffending and failing to return to court.” By July 2015, PSA-Court had been rolled out nationally, in courts across the United States, “in 29 jurisdictions, including three entire states—Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey—as well as three of the largest cities in the country—Charlotte, Chicago, and Phoenix.” As these jurisdictions implemented their use of the tool, results seemed promising. In

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129 Id. at 1.
130 Id. at 2.
131 Id. at 3–4.
132 Id. at 5.
133 Id.
Kentucky, both jail populations and pretrial crime rates fell; in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (the location of the city of Charlotte), the jail population fell by almost 20%. However, these reported trends, as well as the causative relationship between the risk assessment tools and releases of pre-trial defendants, have been called into question in more recent studies.

But with the increasing use of data-based risk assessment across the criminal justice system, criticism has arisen. One such system, created by a private company, Northpointe, is used to predict the likelihood of re-offending for purposes of sentencing decisions. An investigation by ProPublica of seven thousand cases in Broward County, Florida, for 2013 and 2014, provided a disquieting picture. ProPublica found that “[o]nly 20 percent of the people predicted to commit violent crimes actually went on to do so.” With respect to re-offending at any level, including lower level, misdemeanor crimes, the tool worked somewhat better: “Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61 percent were arrested for any subsequent crimes within two years.” More disturbing, ProPublica’s examination appears to have uncovered racial bias in the process. “The [Northpointe] formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as white defendants. White defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants.” Northpointe, which did not disclose its entire process and formula for arriving at the risk assessment scores—the company says that information is proprietary—denied ProPublica’s findings, disagreeing

135 Id. at 2.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id; see also Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm [http://perma.cc/622Y-45WG]. There has also been scholarly analysis and criticism. See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, RISK ASSESSMENT IN SENTENCING, ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 77–78 (Erik Luna, ed. 2017); Cecilia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537 (2016); Starr, supra note 68, at 808.
with the methodology used and the accuracy of ProPublica’s testing.\textsuperscript{142} Others have suggested that the bias findings may have more to do with biases in the underlying criminal justice system, and not with Northpointe’s tool.\textsuperscript{143}

The lessons seem clear. Risk assessment tools may well provide more reliable and predictive information than current methodologies, but they present their own problems. Validation by uninterested sources should be universal requirement, and as Professor Christopher Slobogin has stated, “risk assessments should be impermissible unless both parties get to see all the data that go into them. It should be an open, full-court adversarial proceeding.”\textsuperscript{144}

\textbf{C. Data, Empiricism and Stops and Frisks}

Even with considerable data regarding stop-and-frisk practices potentially available to police departments and ultimately to the courts, only a few departments collect and maintain this data in a comprehensive and usable form. Nothing in \textit{Terry} or in any other Supreme Court decisions or in any federal law required or incentivized the collection of this data. The few police departments that have collected data—most prominently, New York City and Philadelphia—have done so as a result of litigation.\textsuperscript{145}

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{142} Angwin et al., supra note 138.
  \item \textsuperscript{144} See \textit{State v. Loomis}, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761–63 (Wisc. 2016) (examining the use of risk assessment at sentencing); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 564, 575 (Ind. 2010) (upholding the use of a risk assessment tool in the sentencing context); Monahan, \textit{supra} note 141, at 93; Angwin et al., \textit{supra} note 138; Sandra G. Mayson, \textit{Dangerous Defendants}, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 566–67 (2017); Wexler, \textit{supra} note 68. Predictive analytics is being employed in a wide range of disciplines and industries, and these analytics continue to show the inherent weaknesses in common sense judgments not tested by reliable data. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, \textit{Will You Graduate? Ask Big Data}, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/education/edlife/will-you-graduate-ask-big-data.html (study on early course performance as best predictor of graduation rates).
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Missouri is the only state that requires collection of stop data, but even there it is limited to traffic stops. MO. ANN. STAT. § 590.650 (West 2011). The ABA and NAACP Legal Defense Fund have remarked: “We cannot understand what we cannot measure, and we cannot change what we cannot understand.” \textit{American Bar Association and NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Joint Statement on Eliminating Bias in the Criminal Justice System} 3 (July 2015). \textit{See also Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?}, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1123–24 (2013) (detailing the complexities of local politics and their impact on police department data transparency).  
\end{itemize}
But there are signs of change. In a 2014 article, David Harris published the results of a survey of fifty-five of the largest police departments in the country.\textsuperscript{146} The survey, conducted in 2011 and 2012, garnered forty-four responses, and out of those, twenty-three reported a requirement for police officers to collect at least some data on stops and frisks.\textsuperscript{147} Three others made data collection discretionary; eighteen had no requirement.\textsuperscript{148} Of the twenty-three departments requiring some data collection, twenty-one reported that the data included racial and ethnic characteristics of those stopped; thirteen reported that the data were available to the public in some form.\textsuperscript{149} The departments included most of the major law enforcement agencies, thus encompassing a significant number of police officers.\textsuperscript{150}

No doubt some aspects of this change—while too little and too slow, but a noticeable shift nonetheless—are motivated by supervisors’ desire to effectively oversee day-to-day precinct-level operations. The old saw from the business world, “you can’t manage what you don’t measure” applies as well to police management.\textsuperscript{151} In other departments, pressure to collect data about stop-and-frisk practices has come from the public. Stops and frisks have long constituted a frequent point of friction and contention between police officers and members of the public, particularly with members of African American and other minority communities, a fact noted in the \textit{Terry} opinion.\textsuperscript{152}

The stop-and-frisk crime suppression strategy of the New York City police department became a major political and legal issue and ultimately played a significant role in the 2013 New York mayoral election.\textsuperscript{153} Thereafter, the combination of a change of mayoral administrations and the limits imposed by the \textit{Floyd} court, has led to a precipitous reduction in the number of stops and frisks.\textsuperscript{154} Similarly, in Chicago, in March, 2015, months before the city erupted after the release of the video of the police shooting of Laquan McDonald,\textsuperscript{155} the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[146] Harris, \textit{supra} note 53, at 856.
\item[147] \textit{Id.} at 870–71.
\item[148] \textit{Id.} at 871.
\item[149] \textit{Id.}
\item[150] \textit{Id.}
\item[152] \textit{Terry v. Ohio}, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968).
\item[153] Annie Karni, \textit{How Bill de Blasio’s Nimble Campaign Made Him Mayor}, \textit{N.Y. DAILY NEWS} (Dec. 5, 2013) (“[De Blasio] campaigned relentlessly against . . . stop and frisk tactics that have resulted in police stopping hundreds of thousands of innocent minorities.”).
\end{footnotes}
ACLU of Illinois had turned a spotlight on the Police Department’s unlawful use of stops and frisks, especially against African Americans and other people of color. The ACLU and others demanded considerably improved data collection for all stops and frisks. Complaints that stops and frisks targeted African Americans in Boston led to changes in the collection of data in that city. A paper-based system, that a high-ranking police department spokesperson conceded had “a lot of potential for data errors,” was changed into an electronic system. According to Boston City Council President Michelle Wu, who made more transparency in city government one of her top issues, “the goal is to say [to the public,] here is the information we’re collecting, can you help us out, look for trends we haven’t seen.”

In Newark, New Jersey, then Mayor (currently Senator) Cory Booker came to an agreement with citizens and advocacy groups to make all police reports of stops and frisks available to the public. The city pledged to make stop-and-frisk reports, “detailing the race, gender, age, forced used, and arrests made,” available monthly. The idea was to improve police/community relations by building trust with the community, since it would have all the information necessary to see what the police did and whether any abuses had taken place, and to simultaneously help police to focus less on the wrong targets—those searches yielding few arrests and seizures of contraband than others.

The extensive data collection efforts in New York and Philadelphia came about as a result of settlements of lawsuits brought by private parties represented by non-governmental organizations. In New York, the police department had kept internal records of stops and frisks for years, requiring officers to record the details of the encounters on a form known as UF-250. In a 1999 class action lawsuit, Daniels v. City of New York, filed by plaintiffs represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a court required that New York

157 Id. at 2–3 (“Currently, officers are not required to record when they frisk someone... Absent a record, supervisors and the public have no means to determine whether officers’ searches are lawful. Officers should record frisks, the reason for the frisk (which must be separate from the reason for the stop), and the results of the search (i.e., whether there was a weapon or other contraband and if so, what type.”).
159 Id.
161 Id.
163 Id. at 565.
Police Department provide all UF-250s completed by officers to CCR, thus creating a database of stop-and-frisk data from the largest police department in the country, which was making increasingly intense use of stops and frisks. In Philadelphia, the ACLU of Pennsylvania’s 2010 lawsuit, *Bailey v. City of Philadelphia*, resulted in a consent decree that required the collection and electronic maintenance of data on all stops and frisks to be shared with an independent monitor and the ACLU lawyers for use in monitoring the stop-and-frisk program under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards.

The federal government has also imposed data collection requirements on police departments. Pursuant to authority granted by Congress in a 1994 statute known as the “pattern or practice” law, the U.S. Department of Justice may now investigate and if necessary bring suit in federal court upon findings that a state or local police department has engaged in a pattern of conduct or consistently engages in practices that deprive people of their constitutional rights. The Civil Rights Division of DOJ has investigated a number of U.S. police departments, starting with Pittsburgh, in 1997. In the usual course of events the Special Litigation Section conducts an in-depth investigation which often includes search and seizure practices, use of force, training and policies and practices concerning the use of police custody, restraints, and particular weapons. If, upon completion of the investigation, the Special Litigation Section finds that the agency has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating the constitutional rights, it proposes reforms to the agency; these reforms often become the basis for a court-supervised consent decree. A number of these consent decrees have required that police departments collect stop-and-frisk data, including those in effect in Los Angeles and New Orleans.

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[https://perma.cc/XZ4F-A33C].

165 Id.


169 Id. at 20–21.

170 The Los Angeles Consent Decree is no longer available on the U.S. Department of Justice web pages, but for reference, see ANALYSIS GROUP, INC., PEDESTRIAN AND MOTOR VEHICLE POST-STOP ANALYSIS REPORT 3 (July 2016), http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/cases/lapd_data_analysis_report_07-5-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/M25E-QZUD].

Recently, the Department of Justice reached a “Settlement Agreement” with the City of Cleveland over various aspects of police conduct, including use of force and search and seizure practices. The agreement mandates the collection and analysis of data on a variety of police conduct that the Department of Justice investigated, and specifically requires the collection of specified data on all stops and searches by police, including stops and frisks of pedestrians. And, in the closing days of the Obama Administration, the Department of Justice entered into agreements with the Baltimore Police Department that required the Department to collect and maintain data on all stops, searches, and arrests to ensure that officers’ enforcement activities promote public safety and are consistent with constitutional and legal standards. A similar agreement was reached with the City of Chicago.

Of course, there is never a pure linear progression or assurance of continued best practices. And, as the Trump Administration takes control of the Department of Justice in 2017, there is good reason to believe that much of the work of the Civil Rights Division with regard to local law enforcement agencies will be reduced or terminated.

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173 Id. at 60–61, 100.


175 See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO REGARDING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (Jan. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925901/download. In light of more recent developments indicating that the City and the DOJ would not follow through with a Consent Decree, a lawsuit by persons alleged to have been harmed by past practices and policies has been filed. Complaint at 1–2, Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 17-4467 (N.D. Ill. 2017).

D. Litigation and Studies

Over the past twenty years, a number of cases and studies have employed statistical analysis to assess the legality, racial distribution, and efficacy of stop-and-frisk practices, with significant debate about the proper “benchmarks” and standards to be applied on all of these issues. In this section, we summarize a number of the leading studies and court cases and then turn our attention to the largely overlooked significance of hit rate data in the assessment of the predictive value of many of the generally accepted grounds for stop-and-frisk interventions.

1. New Jersey Turnpike and Racial Profiling

In one of the first cases presenting the issue of racial disparities in police stop practices, State v. Soto, the court found that car stops and searches on the New Jersey Turnpike disproportionately targeted African-Americans. Relying on traffic and violator surveys and a large set of data regarding traffic stops on the Turnpike, the court determined that approximately 14% of all drivers on the Turnpike were black, that virtually all drivers violated the traffic laws (in particular for speeding), and that blacks and whites violated traffic laws at almost exactly the same rate. Yet, 46.2% of stops were of black motorists, representing a statistically significant disparity of 16.35 standard deviations. Further, the court found that while radar stops made by the radar unit were relatively consistent with the percentage of black violators, discretionary stops made by the patrol division -- a unit involved in drug interdiction -- resulted in double the percentage of blacks stopped.

A study conducted by the Attorney General of New Jersey expanded upon these findings. The Attorney General determined that searches of cars on the Turnpike were even more racially disparate than the initial stops: 77.2% of all “consent” searches were of Hispanics and blacks. The Attorney General concluded that the use of arrest statistics could not justify racially disparate stops and searches, as those arrests were the product of racially discriminatory law enforcement practices.

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178 Id. at 352–53.
179 Id. at 353.
180 Id. at 354, 361.
182 Id. at 26–28. Seizures of contraband on the Turnpike were made at a rate of 10.5% from white drivers and 13.5% from African-American drivers. Id. at 28.
183 Id. at 67–68. There are a broad range of studies and litigation on the issue of the racial distribution of traffic stops. See STEPHEN M. HAAS ET AL., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS.,
2. New York City Stop-and-Frisk Practices

In 1999, the New York Attorney General conducted a study of 175,000 pedestrian stops by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) over a fifteen-month period in 1998-99 and found a highly disproportionate rate of stops of minorities.\textsuperscript{184} The Attorney General determined that (1) African-Americans were stopped six times more frequently than whites;\textsuperscript{185} (2) in precincts with a white population of 80\% or more and where African-Americans constituted 10\% or less of the population, stops of African Americans constituted 30\% of all stops, more than ten times their percentage of the population;\textsuperscript{186} (3) stops of African Americans were less likely to result in arrests than stops of whites;\textsuperscript{187} and (4) adjusting for crime rates by race, the differences in stops of minorities compared to stops of whites was statistically significant,

\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 95.
\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 106.
\textsuperscript{187} Id. at 93.
with African-Americans stopped more than twice as often as whites for suspected violent crimes and weapons offenses. The Attorney General also reported that where the police provided a full factual statement concerning the stop, 15.4% of the stops failed to comply with Fourth Amendment standards. In addition, 23.5% of the stops failed to provide a sufficient factual basis to determine whether the stop was constitutionally proper. However, these findings were largely overshadowed by the racial analysis of the stops.

Floyd v. City of New York was a lawsuit built on the foundations of the 1999 Attorney General investigation and on data on stops and frisks in New York City for the period 2004-2012. During that time period, the NYPD made 4.4 million pedestrian stops, of which over 80% were of African-Americans or Latinos. More than half of those stopped were also subjected to a frisk. Floyd presented a challenge to these stop-and-frisk practices on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.

Crediting a number of statistical methodologies, including regression analysis, that had been presented by the plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Jeffrey Fagan, the court determined that the stop-and-frisk program in New York City was marked by intentional race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Fagan determined that more stops were made of Blacks and Hispanics; that the best predictor of stops was the racial composition of the precinct, that blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped (even in predominantly white areas); that Blacks and Hispanics were 30% more likely to be arrested (as opposed to receiving a summons) and 14% more likely to be subjected to the use of force during the stop; and that the hit rate for blacks and Hispanics (as measured by recovery of contraband, arrests made, or summonses issued following a stop and/or frisk) was 8% lower for Blacks and Hispanics than for Whites.

\[^{188}\text{Id. at 126.}\]
\[^{189}\text{Id. at xiv.}\]
\[^{190}\text{REPORT, supra note 184, at xiv.}\]
\[^{192}\text{Id. at 556.}\]
\[^{193}\text{Id.}\]
\[^{194}\text{Id. at 559–60, 572.}\]
\[^{195}\text{Id. at 589. Beyond the statistical evidence, the court found evidence of intentional discrimination through an examination of “institutional evidence,” and specifically the deliberate indifference of the NYPD to patterns of racial discrimination in stop-and-frisk practices. Id. at 590. Patterns of race discrimination were known to the NYPD as early as 1999 when the State Attorney General issued a report on stop-and-frisk practices that documented unexplained racial disparities in stops. Id. at 560, 590–91. Further, the NYPD put great pressure on Commanders and others in the chain of command (down to patrol officers) to increase the number of stops (from 97,000 in 2002 to 686,000 in 2011), but that the NYPD failed to audit the stops in a manner that would examine possible racial discrimination. Id. at 591–96. And there was evidence that officers were encouraged to make stops based on racial characteristics or stereotypes and direct orders to the target the “right people,” which was explained as blacks and Hispanics since it was young men of color who were committing violent crimes most often. Id. at 603–04.}\]

On the Fourth Amendment issue, based on an analysis of the reasons provided on the NYPD stop forms for stops and frisks, the court ruled that a significant number of stops were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. Further, the court determined that certain factors frequently cited by police for their interventions were poor indicators of crime. Thus, “Furtive movements” and presence in “High Crime Areas” were each cited in over 40% of the stops, yet they rarely produced any evidence of criminal conduct. The court further found that “52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons,” but that a weapon was found in only 1.5% of these frisks and that “6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons.” The remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement action.

The low “hit-rates” in New York City (and as we discuss, infra, in other departments as well) present a host of issues regarding the reasonable suspicion legal standard. In particular, the low rate of seizure of guns raised serious questions regarding the validity of the factors upon which police rely in frisking for guns. In 2011, the NYPD made 524,873 more stops than in 2003, an increase of over 300%, but recovered only 176 more guns, an incremental recovery rate of 0.03%. And in 2012, the police conducted approximately 297,000 frisks

Similar findings regarding racial bias have been made with respect to other major police departments. For Los Angeles, see, IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 27 (Oct. 2016) http://islander.law.yale.edu/Ayres%20LAPD%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF5X-VSU7]. The authors stated that “it is implausible that higher frisk and search rates were justified by higher minority criminality . . . when these frisks were less likely to uncover contraband.” Id. See also CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 22 (2009), http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5CY-DS2M]. For Boston, see ACLU OF MASS., BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010 1 (Oct. 2014). For Chicago, see ACLU OF CHI., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO (2015), and see also REPORT OF MONITOR, CITY OF CHICAGO AND ACLU AGREEMENT (2016).

196 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
197 Id. at 579–83.
198 Id. at 581–83.
199 Id. at 573.
200 Id.
202 NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011 2, 6–12 (May 2011), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YR6-AHTL]. See also United States v. McCrae, 2008 U.S. District LEXIS 2314 (50 stops made on “telltale signs” of possession of guns as reported by officer making stops, resulted in a single gun seizure). A study by the New York Attorney General on the outcome of the cases in which arrests were made after a stop in New York City for the years 2009-2012 (6% of the total stops) showed that close to a half did not result
(56% of all stops) and weapons were found in only 2% of these cases. Blacks and Latinos were more likely to be frisked than Whites, even though Whites were much more likely to be found in possession of weapons.

Moreover, with the sharp drop in the number of stops in New York City following *Floyd* and the election of Mayor DeBlasio, it is possible to conduct at least a preliminary comparative analysis of the relationship between and among stop-and-frisk practices, crime control, and constitutional policing. Notwithstanding the dispute as to the size of the drop in stops due to questions of police non-reporting of some stops, the reduction from the nearly 700,000 stops in 2011, is dramatic. And, with far fewer stops, the hit rates have increased and violent crime has continued to decline.


In 2011, in a class action lawsuit filed against the City of Philadelphia, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in stop-and-frisk practices, the parties agreed to a Consent Decree that required the City to conduct stops and frisks within constitutional limits, prohibited stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion (specifying certain conduct that did not establish reasonable suspicion, such as “loitering,” “high crime areas,” “disturbances” and “furtive movements”), prohibited the use of race as a basis for a stop except in cases of suspect identifications by race, mandated the creation of an electronic data base of all stops and frisks with relevant information as to each stop, provided for the appointment of a monitor, and established monitoring and auditing process under which plaintiffs’ counsel and the monitor would have access to all relevant data and information.
The long-standing problems of stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion and large racial disparities in stop practices have proven to be slow to remedy, even with court oversight. Thus, an analysis of stops and frisks in the first half of 2015 showed that approximately 35% of all stops were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion and 56% of all frisks were made without reasonable suspicion or were the “fruit” of an illegal stop.\footnote{Id. at 31.} Indeed, the data suggests that the unreasonable frisk rate may even be higher, as only 13.6% of stops resulted in a frisk and of 159 stops in which guns or gun-related activity were referenced as a basis for the stop, there were no frisks recorded on 55 stops, or 35% of the total.\footnote{Id. at 18.} Following the implementation of new internal accountability measures, some progress was seen in 2016. As documented in Plaintiffs’ Eighth Report to the Court, the percentage of stops without reasonable suspicion was reduced to 21%, and frisks without reasonable suspicion occurred in 41% of the incidents reviewed.\footnote{Plaintiffs’ Eighth Report to Court at 18, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Eighth Report to Court].}

On the Fourteenth Amendment racial distribution issue, the 2015 data showed patterns of racial bias. For each police service area (sub-units of police districts) there were an average of 1,251 stops of black pedestrians, 375 of white pedestrians, and 136 of Latino pedestrians.\footnote{Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report to Court, supra note 29, at 24.} The stop rate by race per 100,000 residents was 1,611 for blacks, 747 for whites, and 583 for Latinos.\footnote{Id. at 27–29.} A regression analysis that controlled for possible non-racial causative factors, including demographic makeup and crimes rates by district, showed that non-racial factors did not explain the deep racial disparities in stop-and-frisk practices.\footnote{Id. at 25.} Further, of all frisks, 79% were of blacks, 11% were of whites, and 10% were of Latinos, and 1 in 6.4 stops of Blacks resulted in a frisk while the rate for Whites was 1 for every 15.2 stops.\footnote{Id. at 30–31.} There was also significant variation by race in the share of stops lacking reasonable suspicion, which ranged from 31% for whites and Latinos to 35% for blacks.\footnote{Id. at 31.} For frisks without reasonable suspicion, the rates were 47% for whites, 57% for blacks, and 62% for Latinos.\footnote{Among other reports on stop-and-frisk practices is a 2014 Department of Justice investigation of the Newark Police Department (NPD). The DOJ reported that for the period from January 2009 through June 2012, there were approximately 39,000 pedestrian stops documented by the NPD. Dep’t Justice, Investigation of the Newark Police Department 8 (July 2014). Of these stops, 6,200 (15.8%) had no reason provided by the officer, and a study of a random sample of the rest of the stops showed that 75% were without legal justification based on the officer’s stated reasons for the stop. See id. at 8–9. Thus, 93% of the stops appeared to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 9 n.7. The population...}
racial disparities (driven in part by the reduction in the overall number of stops and in the number of stops without reasonable suspicion). 218

V. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES

In the ongoing debate over the most appropriate Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards for assessing stops and frisks, relatively little attention has been paid to the significance of stop-and-frisk data on the predictive value of the kinds of conduct and other factors that have been recognized by courts as sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.

We believe that data analysis provides a highly reliable basis for empirical evaluation of the factors that courts have identified as relevant to the issue of reasonable suspicion. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has resorted to “common sense” and “reason” in determining the inferential power of these factors. 219 But even if there seems to be a basis to believe that certain types of behavior and observations provide a rational ground for reasonable suspicion, where empirical evidence does not support the unexamined “common sense,” courts should carefully review the predictive quality of these factors. This is particularly the case where categorical judgments for assessing Fourth Amendment individualized suspicion standards are based on conduct that can often be entirely innocent in nature. 220

The same is true for the Supreme Court’s view that police experience leads to a special expertise regarding judgments as to reasonable suspicion and probable cause. In Terry and in many other cases, the Court has stressed the “experience” factor and has given great deference to officers who testify that their experience informed their decision-making. 221 To be sure, experience can provide insight and special knowledge, but where data demonstrates that the professed expertise does not yield the expected results, there is no basis for broad deference. Indeed, the Court’s earlier insight into the dangers of deferring
to officers “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”\footnote{Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).} may provide a more accurate benchmark for analysis.\footnote{For a comprehensive analysis of the police expertise issue, see Anna Lvovsky, \textit{The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise}, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2026 (2017), and see also Josh Bowers, \textit{Annoy No Cop}, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 204–05 (2017).}

These empirical judgments will require comprehensive and reliable data. As discussed above, there is an expanding universe of stop-and-frisk data, particularly in large urban police departments, and, as demands for transparency and accountability of policing agencies grow, it is likely that the data base will continue to expand. This data has provided significant insight on the issues of whether police have the requisite reasonable suspicion to support stops and frisks and whether racially disproportionate stop-and-frisk practices are explainable on grounds other than race—in other words, on the critical issue of intentional race discrimination barred by the Equal Protection Clause.\footnote{See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Plaintiffs’ First–Eighth Report to Court, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia; Ayres, supra note 195, at 27; JOHN C. LAMBERTH, DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT: FINAL REPORT FOR THE CITY OF KALAMAZOO 7 (Sept. 2013).}

Beyond the use of data to determine overall compliance of stop-and-frisk programs with constitutional standards, some courts have recognized the relevance of empirical evidence in providing a more particularized Fourth Amendment analysis of the reasons provided for stops and frisks. Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that flight in a high crime area in Boston was not sufficient grounds for a \textit{Terry} stop on the ground that stop data in Boston showed substantial and intentional racial disparities in stop-and-frisk rates of black men in that city.\footnote{Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342–43 (Mass. 2016); see also People v. Horton, 78 N.E.3d 489, 504 (Ill. App. 2017), appeal denied, judgment vacated, No. 122461, 2017 WL 5635931 (Ill. Nov. 22, 2017).} As the court stated: “[T]he finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for [stop-and-frisk] encounters suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt. . . . Given this reality for black males in the city of Boston, a judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings [on the reasonable suspicion issue].”\footnote{\textit{Warren}, 58 N.E.3d at 342.}

In another setting, the Seventh Circuit determined that the fact that a car had been “re-painted” does not provide reasonable suspicion that it had been stolen.\footnote{United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2013).} The court reviewed empirical data with respect to the incidences of car re-painting and determined that such re-painting occurs far more often for legitimate purposes than to disguise stolen cars.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} In large part, however, courts
without access to empirical data accept subjective judgments regarding behavioral patterns to find reasonable suspicion.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (counting nervousness a factor contributing to a finding of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a suspect’s evasive or erratic movements are part of the totality of the circumstances); United States v. Logan, 526 F. App’x 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (considering presence in a high crime area); United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (seeing individuals sitting in a car for an extended period may add to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Himmelwright, 406 F. Supp. 889, 892–93 (S.D. Fl. 1975) (holding that a suspect’s “unusually calm” demeanor supported the finding of reasonable suspicion); Bambauer, supra note 35, at 505.}

Hit rate data has the power of informing the inquiry into the predictive value a number of the factors that courts have credited as relevant on the issue of whether a stop and/or frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion.\footnote{See Fagan, supra note 52, at 84 (arguing that factors that would establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment are more likely to be predictors of criminal conduct than those just sufficient for reasonable suspicion).} Hit rates are available with respect to stops and separately with respect to frisks, but for the reasons that follow we focus on the frisk data as the most reliable. The effectiveness of stops can be measured in part by the percentage of cases in which police seize contraband, make arrests, or issue citations or summonses. And using these metrics, the hit rates in various cities is low as an absolute numerical matter. Thus, in New York City, for the years 2004–2012, during which the police made over four million stops, they effectuated arrests or issued citations in approximately 12% of the stops.\footnote{Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558, 575.} Similar results are shown in Philadelphia, where in the first half of 2014, approximately 7.5% of the stops resulted in arrests or citations.\footnote{Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court at 18, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report].} Far fewer cases resulted in the seizure of weapons or other contraband.\footnote{Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court, supra note 29, at 7–9.}

While this data suggest that the predictive power of court-validated stop-and-frisk factors is very low, the data can be misleading from two different directions. On the one hand, since the hit rate includes arrests or citations for post-stop conduct or new information unrelated to the stop (for example, the existence of an outstanding warrant or criminal conduct such as an assault on the officer after the stop), a hit rate measured by whether the stop resulted in an arrest would be artificially high. On the other hand, the lack of an arrest or seizure of contraband does not necessarily prove that the stop or frisk was illegal. First, police may exercise discretion, particularly for low level offenses, simply to issue a warning and not to take any official action even where there are grounds to do so. Second, in many stops supported by reasonable suspicion, there may be no permissible sanction, as it turns out that the suspicious conduct
was not criminal in nature. And third, many legitimate stops will not be expected to yield contraband or weapons (for example, quality of life stops, disturbances, curfew stops). Thus, a low hit rate for stops does not necessarily mean that the officers did not have good cause for their intervention. To be sure, low hit rates raise a number of questions about the benefits and costs of stop-and-frisk practices and ought to be considered very carefully by police departments as to the impact of stop-and-frisk both on crime control and on police community relations.234

The same problems do not arise in the hit rate analysis for frisks. Under the Terry doctrine, frisks can only be conducted where the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. This standard allows the officer to consider the reason for the stop, other information known about the suspect, and observations made at or after the stop that would provide grounds for a reasonable officer to believe that the person was armed and dangerous.235 Reasonable suspicion to stop does not automatically provide grounds for a frisk; indeed, many stops are for quality of life offenses that would not justify a frisk without more observations indicating that the person was armed.236 Thus, assuming that the officer asserts that the person stopped is armed and dangerous, the hit rate is a powerful tool in assessing the factors cited by officers in support of this belief. One would expect that truthful assertions would yield weapons on more than a very occasional basis, and, if not, there is good reason for courts to use the empirical data, as opposed to “common sense,” to determine which factors can be used by officers.237

Existing data provides strong grounds for doubting the predictive value of many of the factors regularly cited by officers in support of their belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous. First, on a macro level, the hit rate for all frisks in departments that have collected comprehensive data on stop-and-frisk practices, shows a hit rate that rarely exceeds 1%–2%.238 Thus, in Philadelphia, data for the years 2012–2016 show a frisk hit rate for weapons of approximately

234 The issue of the “effectiveness” of stop-and-frisk practices in terms of crime reduction and police-community relations, is much disputed. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 30, at 1504–05; Rudovsky & Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 126.
235 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–27.
236 See 4 Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.6(a) (5th ed. 2012); see also, Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him, but to be in his presence.”).
237 We stress the importance of understanding the significance of this empirical data only on the assumption that the officer has accurately reported the basis for the frisk. No doubt, there are instances of false allegations of conduct or observations that could support a frisk.
238 Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19.
In New York City, the hit rate for frisks over the period 2004–2012 was 1.5%.\textsuperscript{239} On a more particularized basis, examination of the reasons that officers give for engaging in frisks can yield significant insight when viewed in relationship to hit rates. Since frisks may target weapons only, one would think that officers would rely on factors that most frequently result in the seizure of a weapon. And, no doubt, officers using “common sense” have relied on factors they believe are strongly predictive. Thus, an observation of a suspicious weapon-shaped bulge under a suspect’s clothing, seems unlikely to conceal anything else. But this is where actual data—as opposed to “common sense” assumptions—are perhaps most surprising. The data shows that certain factors regularly reported by police, such as observation of a “bulge,” a suspect not being cooperative, hands in pocket, a high crime neighborhood, nervous or furtive movements, and “flight” are poor predictors of whether one is armed and dangerous, yet the courts have regularly credited these explanations in sustaining police frisks.\textsuperscript{241} “Bulges” inevitably turn out to be cell phones or wallets, and the other triggering factors are also very weak indicators of criminal activity.\textsuperscript{242} Thus, in audits conducted in 2014–2016, of 220 frisks based on a “bulge,” only one weapon was seized, a hit rate of less than 0.5%.\textsuperscript{243}

Frisks conducted where officers reported that suspects failed to take their hands out of pockets were not “cooperative,” engaged in furtive movements, or were stopped in high crime areas were similarly unproductive. In the 2016 audit, frisks based on these factors in 288 cases yielded only a single weapon.\textsuperscript{244} The fact that so few frisks lead to the recovery of a weapon (in the second half of 2016, 722 frisks yielded only 14 weapons)\textsuperscript{245} raises serious questions as to whether the police are accurately reporting what they observe and, if so, whether the grounds that the courts have regularly approved for conducting frisks are reliable indicators of weapon possession. The data show otherwise.

The data from New York City are strikingly similar.\textsuperscript{246} A perceptive study of the NYPD stop-and-frisk practices focused on stops that were based on

\textsuperscript{239} Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court at 17, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013); Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court, supra note 232, at 32; Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19; Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19. The hit rate is likely even less than this figure given that a number of frisks go unreported. See Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to the Court, supra note 29, at 19.

\textsuperscript{240} Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).


\textsuperscript{242} Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19.

\textsuperscript{243} Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court, supra note 232, at 19; Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19–20; Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19.

\textsuperscript{244} Plaintiffs’ Seventh Report to Court, supra note 29, at 19.

\textsuperscript{245} Id. at 9.

reports of weapons, to determine the “stop-level hit rate” (“SHR”) for these encounters.\textsuperscript{247} For the period 2008–2010, there were close to 475,000 such stops, with only a small number of stops resulting in a seizure of a weapon.\textsuperscript{248} The study sought to determine whether there were certain factors that were of a significantly higher predictive quality in terms of actual weapon possession. The study employed logistic regression analysis to identify the factors from the 2008–2010 stops that were most productive.\textsuperscript{249} These included the demographics of the person stopped, location of stop, date and time of day, the “recorded reason” for the stop (e.g., furtive movements, bulge, high crime area), officer observations, and the source of information from third parties.\textsuperscript{250} This regression showed that in 80% of the stops, there was less than a 3% chance of finding a weapon, and in 43% of the stops there was less than 1% chance of discovery of a weapon.\textsuperscript{251} Not surprisingly, the least effective stops were made on amorphous factors like “furtive movements.”\textsuperscript{252} Moreover, the stops in which there was a very low SHR were also highly racially disparate: 49% of these stops were of blacks, 34% of Latinos, and 19% of whites.\textsuperscript{253}

Reliance on more reliable factors significantly increased the rate of recovery: one-half of all stops were responsible for 90% of the weapon seizures, and 8% of all stops were responsible for 66% of these seizures.\textsuperscript{254} Using this data, the authors created a model to estimate the \textit{ex ante} likelihood that the stops in 2011 and 2012 would turn up a weapon.\textsuperscript{255} The results strongly supported the thesis: the factors that were present in cases in the 2008–2010 data base that more often led to a weapon seizure, were predictive of a similar SHR in 2011–2012.\textsuperscript{256} For example, the factors in 7,310 cases in the base study that led to a 5% SHR, led to the same 5% SHR for the later years.\textsuperscript{257} The point, of course, was that data analysis could lead the NYPD (and other departments) to better stop-and-frisk practices. But regardless of whether police departments will use data to enhance their programs (and there is good reason to be skeptical on this point), our view is that courts must engage in this analysis to properly define the boundaries of \textit{Terry} stops. Surely, if empirical evidence shows that certain factors that the courts have previously credited as “common sense” grounds for

\textsuperscript{247} Goel et al., \textit{Combatting Police Discrimination}, supra note 77, at 187; see also Goel et al., \textit{Personalized Risk Assessments}, supra note 77, at 120.
\textsuperscript{248} Goel et al., \textit{Combatting}, supra note 77, at 211–13.
\textsuperscript{249} Id. at 211–12.
\textsuperscript{250} Id. at 212.
\textsuperscript{251} Id. at 188, 214, 218.
\textsuperscript{252} See id. at 188.
\textsuperscript{253} Id. at 215.
\textsuperscript{254} Goel et al., \textit{Combatting}, supra note 77, at 219.
\textsuperscript{255} Goel et al., \textit{Personalized Risk Assessments}, supra note 77, at 120.
\textsuperscript{256} Goel et al., \textit{Combatting}, supra note 77, at 212–13.
\textsuperscript{257} Id. at 213.
believing one is armed and dangerous have no or very minimal predictive value, reconsideration of their validity is in order.\textsuperscript{258}

It may be the case that, even with very low hit rates, certain conduct (for example, suspicion of violent criminal conduct or of weapon possession based on credible sources) should continue to be a basis for a frisk, but with respect to more circumstantial evidence such as bulges, hands in pockets, furtive movements, and high crime areas, “common sense” should yield to empirical data. As discussed, in numerous other areas, courts have updated their validation analysis given new data and new information, and there is very good reason to do so here, where so many persons are adversely affected by practices that may bear little or no relation to their purported goals.

Of course, if empirical data is considered, there is a very important normative question regarding the appropriate hit rate for weapons that would satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion. The debate regarding quantification or not for probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations has centered on both the theoretical issue of whether such analysis is reliable under the Fourth Amendment and the more data-driven question of determining statistical minimums in assessing probable cause and reasonable suspicion issues.\textsuperscript{259}

The Supreme Court has resisted quantifying the concepts of reasonable suspicion or probable cause and even where it has considered hit rate data, the Court has provided no consistent set of controlling metrics.\textsuperscript{260} With respect to

\textsuperscript{258}While we suggest that the data provides grounds for reconsidering the factors that the courts have justified as grounds for stops and frisks, there are other ways in which the data might impact Fourth Amendment doctrine and litigation. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 625–26 (2014) (discussing that data can provide stronger arguments that an officer’s impermissible actions should result in suppression under the Herring v. United States rationale limiting suppression to “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).


\textsuperscript{260}This may be the result of different analysis for different Fourth Amendment contexts, and in particular with respect to the degree of intrusiveness of the police intervention. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35, 48 (2000) (finding unconstitutional the use of checkpoints to interdict drugs on highways, even though there was a 9% hit rate
probable cause, the Court has required a showing of a “fair probability” that the facts alleged show criminal conduct or the presence of relevant evidence;\textsuperscript{261} but has not specified where on the spectrum of probability that showing is located.\textsuperscript{262} Commentators, including judges (in surveys) have suggested a range of metrics.\textsuperscript{263}

Reasonable suspicion by definition requires something less in terms of probabilities. But whether that is in the 20%–25% range or even as low as 5%–10%, current data on frisks consistently show a far lower hit rate that in many studies of no more than 1%–2%, a rate we believe is so low as to be outside any reasonable quantification of suspicion. Even if a rate as low as 5% was deemed acceptable, the current rates of 1%–2% (and sometimes lower) are clearly not sufficient.\textsuperscript{264}

All of this takes us back to our original focus. Collection, analysis, and wide use of data as a basis for public policy and legal decision-making has become more common. Empirical bases for legal and policy choices have become the norm in a growing number of areas including the criminal justice arena, as shown by the proliferation of predictive risk assessments tools for setting bail and assessing sentences.

In this era, the continued use of unexamined “common sense” assumptions to validate police practices when data can be used to empirically test factual propositions is anachronistic. Data testing of frisk hit rates in which officers use


\textsuperscript{262} \textit{See} Goldberg, \textit{supra} note 259, at 801 n.62.

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{See}, e.g., Minzner, \textit{supra} note 49, at 915 (advocating use of historic hit rates in assessing individual officer allegations of probable cause); C.M.A. McCauliff, \textit{Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?}, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1324–25, 1327–28 (1982) (citing a 1981 survey of 195 federal judges who quantified probable cause at an average of 46% (but ranging from 10–90%) and reasonable suspicion at an average of 31%).

\textsuperscript{264} In \textit{United States v. Jones}, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012), the Court ruled that the use of a GPS device that tracked the defendant’s car movements for 28 days, 24/7, was unconstitutional in the absence of a valid search warrant. Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion (joined by four Justices) that supported a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to such long range and intrusive surveillance and left open the question as to the threshold point where privacy interests prevailed. \textit{Id.} at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring). Presumably, surveillance for one hour or even one day might not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the difficulty in making decisions along the time spectrum should not cause a court not to act where the time frame enables the government to collect a large amount of personal information sufficient to objectively determine that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in that context. \textit{Id.} at 412 (majority opinion).
“common sense” signs of the presence of weapons to justify frisks do not support the predictive efficacy of those “common sense” indicators, something more than “the way we’ve always done it” is at play. Courts should not participate in this type of willful avoidance of reality.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have seen how data analysis has become a valuable tool across many aspects of American law. This makes it all the more striking that the Supreme Court and lower courts have failed to grasp the significance of the available empirical data and the role it can play regarding judicial judgments of reasonable suspicion and particularly *Terry* frisks. Hit rate data on frisks is but one striking example. There is strong evidence that the hit rate analysis discussed here can provide police departments with critical information regarding the most salient predictors of criminal conduct and weapon possession. Properly used, this would lead to fewer civilian stops and frisks and higher rates of weapon seizures and other legitimate law enforcement actions.

Equally important, big data regarding police law enforcement practices and crime rates can provide the government and the citizenry with information integral to the most basic questions of law enforcement methods and democratic community participation.265 In jurisdictions in which comprehensive data is maintained, the debate about stop-and-frisk practices, crime control, and racial and procedural justice takes place in a fact-based world. The legal standards employed by the courts should move the system in the same direction. Comprehensive data regarding stops and frisks, including hit rates, racial disparities, and concurrent crime rates, can yield significant information about best policing practices and the impact on crime rates and community-police relations of stop-and-frisk practices. This empirical data should inform both policymakers and the courts in their consideration of police interventions.