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Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms about Executive Power

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ARTICLE

SEPARATION OF POWERS LEGITIMACY: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTO NORMS ABOUT EXECUTIVE POWER

CARY COGLIANESE† & KRISTIN FIRTH††

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Presidential fingerprints inevitably can be found on almost any highly consequential action undertaken by an executive branch agency. This also can be true when agencies refrain from taking action. For example, when the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced in 2011 that she would withdraw a proposal to tighten federal smog standards, her announcement came only after a White House official and the President sent her memos making it abundantly clear that the President wanted her to take that step.\footnote{See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement by EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/1e5ab112405f3b283257f8f0042ed40f411fc47ef4f13832578f00552bf8 [https://perma.cc/2SW9-NL2Z] (announcing that the EPA would “revisit” its draft revisions to the national ozone standards); Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards [https://perma.cc/2ZH-TWWY] (requesting that the EPA Administrator withdraw draft final revisions to the national ozone standards); Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK4E-3FLM] (memorailizing reasons that supported President Obama’s request that the EPA reconsider its draft revisions to national ozone standards).}

When the Department of Health and Human Services and the Treasury Department announced, during the period from 2012 to 2014, a series of delays in the enforcement of various requirements of the Affordable Care Act, the President and his staff were deeply involved in crafting these workaround measures that made it easier to implement a complicated statute.\footnote{For an account of the Obama Administration’s delays in the implementation of the health care reform law popularly known as “Obamacare,” see Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1721-25 (2016).} And when the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sent a memo to the heads of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and two other DHS agencies in late 2014, telling them to refrain from deporting millions of undocumented immigrants who met certain criteria, the President himself made a televised address to the nation announcing these sweeping immigration deferrals as if the actions being taken were solely his own.\footnote{Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dept’ of Homeland Sec., to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTC9-CS6N]; see also President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/XJ3M-PYCM] (announcing “actions I’m taking” to provide deferrals of deportation to certain undocumented immigrants). See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2016) (using President Obama’s deferred action immigration program to “explo[r]e the President’s obligation of faithful execution”).}
In each of these cases, as in many others across different administrations, White House intervention played an important, if not arguably decisive, role in the resulting outcomes. Yet the underlying legislation in most of these cases specifically delegated implementing authority to the head of each agency, not to the President. In such cases, may the President lawfully become the decisive factor in determining what actions an administrator takes or does not take?

From the nation’s earliest days, Presidents have tended to assume that, as the head of the executive branch and as the official who can remove the heads of most agencies at will, Presidents do have the authority to direct what executive branch agencies do. But the nature and extent of the President’s directive authority has also been vigorously debated by legal scholars, especially recently during the George W. Bush Administration, with its emphasis on the unitary executive theory, and through the duration of what President Obama’s political opponents have called his “imperial” presidency.

The continuing debate over the President’s directive authority is but one of the many separation-of-powers issues that have confronted courts, scholars, government officials, and the public in recent years. The Supreme Court, for instance, has considered whether the President possesses the power to make appointments of agency heads without Senate confirmation during certain congressional recesses. The Court has passed judgment recently, but has yet to resolve fully, questions about Congress’s authority to constrain the President’s power to remove the heads of administrative agencies. And the Court has considered the limits on Congress’s ability to delegate legislative authority to other

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4 When those outcomes seem to result in a systemic retreat from the enforcement of statutory rules, the question arises whether Presidents have failed to fulfill their constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Neither the Take Care Clause itself nor the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it makes any answer clear. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1864 (2016) (“[I]dentifying the line between a permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion and an impermissible dispensation of the law seems very much like a matter of degree, the limits of which are subjective and difficult to define in a principled way.”).

5 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESE & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4, 420-27 (2008) (concluding that “almost all of our presidents . . . have exercised the power to direct and control the actions of subordinates”).

6 See infra Part I.


8 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556-57 (2014) (finding that the President’s recess appointments, made in a three-day period between two pro forma sessions of the Senate, were invalid).

9 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 551 U.S. 477, 514 (2010) (“While we have sustained in certain cases limits on the President’s removal power, the Act before us imposes a new type of restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.”).
rulemaking institutions. In these and other cases involving disputes over interbranch relations, courts and academic analysts have perennially grappled with both legal interpretation as well as constitutional history and political theory. Yet, as much as these cases involve law, history, and theory, they also at least implicitly raise decidedly empirical questions about law’s effects on governmental behavior as well as its impacts on the legitimacy of constitutional government.

Empirical questions are embedded throughout all forms of law, but the empirical effects of structural aspects of constitutional law have so far largely escaped systematic study. Admittedly, political scientists have studied the three branches of government and their interactions extensively, but what have so far avoided systematic empirical study are the relationships between different choices about separation-of-powers doctrine and outcomes in terms of governmental behavior or public attitudes about governmental legitimacy. This Article offers an initial foray into this largely unexplored terrain, providing a distinctive empirical investigation of public norms about executive power and how doctrinal choices can affect perceptions of the legitimacy of legal judgments. We focus here on Presidents’ efforts to get involved in shaping what agencies do.

Part I begins with a brief overview of the main legal issue motivating this Article: legal limits on a President’s role in shaping action or inaction by executive branch officials appointed to lead administrative agencies. We

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10 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231-33 (2015) (assessing whether Congress improperly delegated authority to issue standards for certain railroad services and holding that Amtrak was a governmental entity rather than an autonomous private entity).

11 Of course, in recent decades, an important and growing body of empirical research on administrative law has arisen; however, most of this work has focused on administrative procedures rather than on structural issues of separation of powers. See generally Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111 (discussing major empirical findings with respect to various administrative procedures). More generally, research on procedural justice has informed researchers and process designers alike of the ways that choices about procedures can affect public judgments about the legitimacy of governmental institutions. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).

12 Some social science research has examined Presidents’ power in issuing executive orders. See, e.g., KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 10 (2002) (arguing that executive orders are a “potent source of presidential power” and providing examples of agencies that had their origins in executive orders, which ultimately increased presidential “administrative capacity”). Other work has even investigated patterns of judicial review of executive orders. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 136-74 (2003) (offering an empirical analysis of every litigated challenge to an executive order heard in court between 1942 and 1998). One study has suggested that doctrinal differences between presidential authority in foreign and military affairs versus domestic affairs help explain patterns of judicial outcomes in cases involving executive orders. Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era, 51 J. POL. 98, 112-15 (1989). Yet none of the existing work examines what interests us here—namely, how the doctrinal form of separation-of-powers law may affect perceptions of the legitimacy of law and legal institutions.
explain how norms constraining presidential involvement in administration can be conceived in the form of either standards or rules. We suggest that a leading conception of an applicable standard in this context—a standard that distinguishes between presidential oversight and decisionmaking—is unlikely to do much, if anything, to constrain Presidents from effectively controlling administrative agencies. We hypothesize further that the invocation of such a standard could actually undermine law’s legitimacy, a concern especially worthy of exploration given that the standard purportedly applies to a high-level, political setting where judgments about compliance with it will almost inevitably become politicized. A norm in the form of a rule will, we predict, turn out to be more resistant to illegitimacy concerns.

Part II details the four empirical studies we conducted to examine the expectations introduced in Part I. We begin by describing our research methods, which comprise vignette-based surveys, and then proceed to report our results. Taken together, the surveys provide a revealing window into public perceptions about responsibility for governmental action, disagreements between Presidents and the heads of agencies, and how the form of separation-of-powers norms can shape perceptions of legitimacy. We find, among other things, that people’s judgments about the legitimacy of constitutional law rulings can be affected by the form that legal doctrine takes, even when controlling for any perceived substantive differences in the law. Specifically, our evidence indicates that public views about the legitimacy of court decisions can be negatively affected by standard-like formulations of separation-of-powers doctrine relative to a formulation based upon a bright-line rule.

Part III concludes by highlighting the implications of our findings. Most broadly, our empirical results imply that what appears to be the prevailing view about the applicable doctrinal standard on executive power would benefit from reconsideration. Our results raise questions as to how much positive value, if any, comes from a standard based on a distinction between oversight and decisionmaking. Not only is the standard extremely difficult—if not impossible—to operationalize in any clear manner, but also our results suggest that, irrespective of such a standard, Presidents do face other meaningful constraints, due to, if nothing else, the responsibility the public assigns to Presidents when they start to get involved in administrative matters. Perhaps more striking than the prevailing oversight-versus-decisionmaking standard’s limited, if nonexistent, positive value, our results indicate that such a standard in this context brings with it certain negative effects, in terms of a loss to law’s legitimacy. Public attitudes about legal legitimacy are negatively affected by the invocation of standard-like norms on executive power, while by comparison such legitimacy remains more resilient when rule-like norms prevail.
I. EXECUTIVE POWER NORMS AND LAW’S LEGITIMACY

This Article brings new empirical inquiry to an old debate over the role of Presidents in directing the daily functioning of government by administrative agencies. The impact of federal administrative agencies is hard to overstate. They administer public subsidies, enforce civil rights laws, regulate everything from food safety to nuclear power plant operation, and perform every domestic function of federal government that affects the lives of Americans. Congress may adopt about one hundred statutes per year, but the more than one hundred administrative agencies, like the Department of Transportation and the EPA, collectively adopt several thousand new regulations every year.\(^{13}\) Officials at these myriad federal agencies routinely exercise discretion in ways that result in enormous consequential effects on individual and societal welfare—for good or ill.\(^ {14}\)

If much of government today is administrative government, who bears the responsibility and authority for directing administration? One answer emphasizes the heads of administrative agencies, whether they are cabinet secretaries, commissioners, or administrators. By their express terms, most statutes delegate administrative authority specifically to these heads of administrative agencies. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act delegates authority to the Secretary of Labor: “The Secretary may by rule promulgate, modify, or revoke any occupational safety or health standard . . . .”\(^ {15}\) The Clean Air Act similarly delegates authority to issue automobile emissions standards to the Administrator of the EPA:

The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.\(^ {16}\)

If an automobile manufacturer fails to comply with the vehicle emissions standards adopted by the EPA, the Clean Air Act further states that “[t]he Administrator may commence a civil action to assess and recover any civil penalty” provided for under the statute.\(^ {17}\) Much the same can be said for most other federal agencies and their underlying statutes.


\(^{14}\) Administrators can produce these significant consequences through both their action and inaction. Throughout this Article, we mean “action” to encompass both action and inaction. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (defining “agency action” to include “failure to act”).


\(^{17}\) Id. § 7524(b) (emphasis added).
Yet congressional delegations of authority to agencies are also made against the backdrop of a constitutional system of separated powers, with Article II of the Constitution stating that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” That same Article gives Presidents the authority to appoint the heads of administrative agencies, with senatorial advice and consent. Presidents also have the power to remove the heads of administrative agencies on an “at will” basis, at least absent any legislative restriction to the contrary.

Throughout U.S. history, Presidents have assumed the authority to lead the administrative parts of government, as an integral exercise of executive authority. Supporters of a “unitary executive” theory argue that by vesting executive authority in one President, the Constitution authorizes the President to coordinate and ultimately direct the actions taken by the appointees that head up administrative agencies. In recent years, Presidents of both political parties have publicly proclaimed their authority to direct the administration of the federal government. President George W. Bush famously declared, “I’m the decider,” while President Barack Obama asserted, “I’ve got a pen to take executive actions where Congress won’t.”

Scholars have sharply debated the nature and extent of such claims of presidential authority to direct administrative agencies. One side of this debate treats the President’s directive authority as virtually unconstrained, whether as a matter of constitutional law (the unitary executive theory) or as a matter of statutory presumption. As a law professor, for example, Justice Elena Kagan articulated the statutory form of this view when she argued for “broad control” by the President over the actions of administrative agencies, concluding that Presidents presumptively possess the power to impose legally binding orders for administrative action, absent some clear statutory prohibition to the contrary.

The other side of the debate holds that, even absent a specific statutory prohibition, presidential authority over administrators is constrained in that the President cannot make decisions that have been entrusted by Congress to

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18 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
19 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
21 E.g., Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 5, at 4.
Although Presidents are in this respect constrained, they are not so constrained as to be walled off from administrative agencies altogether. This second side of the debate recognizes that Presidents can oversee the work of administrative agencies; after all, Article II authorizes Presidents to “require” opinions from agency heads, and it imposes an obligation on the President to “take Care” that laws are “faithfully executed.” But under this view, Presidents are allowed only to oversee agency actions; they cannot make decisions for them.

This second view results in a standard-like executive power norm because the line between permissible presidential oversight and impermissible decisionmaking is far from clear. As Professor Peter Strauss has noted, the distinction between the President as overseer and the President as decider is “subtle.” Nevertheless, proponents of a standard based on this distinction argue that, despite the inherent difficulty in line-drawing, such a standard offers an important source of executive constraint.

The doctrinal debate over presidential administrative authority can be cast, at least in part, as a debate between rules versus standards. Against a unitary executive rule treating the President as supreme over the rest of the executive branch, at least absent an express statutory prohibition, advocates of a constrained presidency put forward a standard based on the spongy concept of a “decision.” Yet there exists still another alternative to a standard based on a subtle distinction between oversight and decisionmaking: adherence to a bright-line rule holding that, for policies or actions to take legal effect,

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25 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 159 (2009) (“[T]he elected President still exerts powerful influence over each agency, but final decision making authority on matters that the Constitution allows Congress to regulate would rest in those agencies to which our elected Congress delegates decision making authority.”); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKL J. 963, 966 (2001) (“[A]lthough the president’s ability to remove agency heads gives him enormous power to influence their decisions, it does not give him the authority to dictate substantive decisions entrusted to them by law.”); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (“In ordinary administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role—like that of the Congress and the courts—is that of overseer and not decider.”).

26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3.

27 Shane, supra note 25; Strauss, supra note 25; see also, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2490 (2011) (arguing that despite the influence that the President may exert over agency heads as a result of the executive removal power, the President cannot “dictate the substance of agency decisions that regulatory statutes entrust to agency heads”).

28 Strauss, supra note 25, at 704.

29 Shane, supra note 25, at 145 (“[T]he difference between the President as overseer and the President as decider can shape many a key decision.”).

applicable documents must be signed by the duly-authorized agency head. This alternative accepts that, when a statute expressly grants authority to the head of an agency, only that agency head can officially authorize agency action; however, this alternative is operationalized as a clear rule based on who signs the legally relevant documents announcing policies or authorizing agency actions.

As should be apparent, such a formal, bright-line signature rule can be accommodated within the fuzzy contours of an overseer–decider standard, for if a President were to sign a policy or approval document instead of the agency head, the signing itself would constitute evidence that the President had impermissibly crossed the line and made the decision for the agency. The key difference between a rule-based approach and an overseer–decider standard lies in the standard’s underlying assumption that something more than just a President’s signature could demonstrate that a President has gone too far. The bright-line rule approach makes the constraint on presidential involvement clear but limited, as any presidential action short of signing the applicable document would be permitted; the overseer–decider standard, by contrast, places additional, albeit murky, constraints on presidential involvement.

As a practical if not legal matter, determining whether the Constitution imposes a rule or a standard on executive power in this context seems to have no chance of resolution by the courts. For one, the chances of someone taking a claim to court, and then having the court deciding to pass judgment on the matter, are virtually nil. Presidents and their administrators will certainly not be suing themselves; standing will be a barrier for others; and the courts will continue to be very reluctant to entertain political questions, especially those pertaining to the internal management of the executive branch.

But there is another important reason the debate between bright-line rules and subtle standards in this context will not be resolved by the courts: any purported standard based on an overseer–decider distinction can be easily interpreted and applied in such a way as to be as non-constraining as a bright-line signature rule. In another article, one of us has shown how easy it is for Presidents to work around an overseer–decider standard and achieve their policy objectives in a

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31 For a discussion of this type of executive power norm and its strength in allowing agency heads to resist pressure from White House officials, see Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).

32 As Sid Shapiro and Richard Murphy have noted, “Remarkably, after more than two centuries, we are still not sure if the President . . . plays the role of ‘overseer’ or ‘decider’ in our administrative state.” Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5-7 (2009).

33 An empirical study of litigation filed by private parties against government agencies reveals the virtual absence of judicial constraint. Only about 1% of all executive orders issued during the final six decades of the last century were subjected to any judicial challenge, and even in those few adjudicated cases, the President’s authority was affirmed 83% of the time. HOWELL, supra note 12, at 54 & fig.6.2.

34 Coglianese, supra note 31 (manuscript at 12-13) (on file with authors).
manner that still complies with the standard. Presidents can and do make decisions and impose them on their administrators; however, especially under conditions of secrecy, they can also easily adopt several techniques to circumvent the supposed legal limitation on their making of decisions. For example, Presidents can engage in “we-speak,” proclaiming that decisions have been made by “the [A]dministration.” They can also make “requests” rather than impose directives, even though it is known that such requests are not really asking for favors.

Absent any meaningful prospect of judicial enforcement, and with easy ways of evading the subtle overseer–decider standard, the benefits that this standard could potentially deliver in terms of protecting administrative agencies from presidential overreach would appear to be trivial or merely symbolic, if not altogether nonexistent.

If the overseer–decider standard yields no real benefits, we might ask whether there is nevertheless anything wrong with clinging to it. After all, a standard that lacks benefits may also lack any costs. Yet with the overseer–decider standard, there is a distinct possibility that it is not as innocuous as it might seem. It may actually present some costs in terms of weakening law’s legitimacy. If the standard is so subtle that determining whether a President has crossed the line between oversight and decisionmaking rests in the eyes of the beholder, then presidential involvement in the administrative state will remain continuously susceptible to criticism for being unconstitutional, especially in times of divided government. In such an inherently political climate, practically any consequential attempt a President makes to shape the work of administrative agencies will be prone to criticism by politicians of the opposite party. When these criticisms are couched in terms of assertions “that the Constitution imposes an overseer-decider limit,” the risk arises of “undermining administrative law by unnecessarily politicizing it and thereby diminishing the respect for it needed to help to sustain its behavioral force.”

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35 Id. (manuscript at 17-22).
36 Id. (manuscript at 18).
37 See id. (manuscript at 19) (“It is quite easy for a President to make clear what he expects his political appointees to do when it comes to domestic policy matters such as rulemaking, without explicitly commanding those appointees to adopt a rule. He can simply ‘request’ that they do so.” (footnote omitted)).
38 Id. (manuscript at 3). For a general explication of the relationship between legal legitimacy and compliance, see generally Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006). Political scientists have shown empirically that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court declines in the face of “politicization”—i.e., when people “substitute a political frame for a legal frame”—such as during politically contentious confirmation battles. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations 12 n.11 (2009).
Consider the following example of how a standard could lead to such unnecessary politicization. Under the Clean Air Act, automobile emissions standards are normally set by the federal EPA. But Section 209 of the Act gives the EPA Administrator the authority—indeed, the duty—to grant a waiver to the state of California to create its own vehicle emissions standards under specified conditions. As with other delegations, the statute specifically names the Administrator, not the President: “[t]he Administrator shall . . . waive application of this section,” “[n]o such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds,” and so forth. During the George W. Bush Administration, the EPA announced a denial of an application California had filed to be allowed to adopt greenhouse gas emissions standards for automobiles—something the federal government had yet to impose at that time. The circumstances under which the EPA announced its denial—namely, shortly after a meeting the EPA Administrator attended at the White House—gave rise to charges that President Bush had overstepped the overseer–decider line. In a congressional hearing following the EPA’s announcement, then-Representative Henry Waxman, a Democrat, rebuked then-Administrator Stephen Johnson, stating that “[t]he law does not provide that it is the president’s decision.” And yet barely a year later, within one week of assuming office, President Obama issued a formal memo to the EPA directing the new Administrator to reconsider the agency’s denial of California’s waiver request. In a speech that accompanied the release of his memorandum, President Obama made it clear that the days when “Washington stood in [the] way” should come to an end. And Mr. Waxman’s response was nothing but laudatory praise. “President Obama is taking the nation in a decisive new direction that will receive broad support across the country,” Waxman approvingly declared.

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39 For a further discussion of the episode described in the following example, see Cary Coglianese, *Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over Law or Politics?*, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 642-45 (2010).
41 Id. § 7543(b).
42 Id.
45 Id.
47 Remarks on Energy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 14, 16 (Jan. 26, 2009).
Democrats like Henry Waxman are not the only ones who flip-flop. Examples abound on both sides of the aisle. Politicians on the political right tend to view Democratic Presidents’ influence as impermissible (i.e., deciding), while seeing the same influence by Republican Presidents as permissible (i.e., oversight). House Republicans who were silent about President George W. Bush’s assertions of presidential directive authority, for example, have sharply criticized executive actions taken by President Obama. They have even authorized the filing of litigation against the Administration over certain of its executive actions taken under the Affordable Care Act.

The very predictability of partisan posturing raises pivotal questions relevant to the choice between rules and standards over executive power. What happens to law’s legitimacy when it enters into a polarized political contestation? When Henry Waxman criticizes President Bush for action contrary to “the law,” does this risk contaminating the law with partisanship and undermining its legitimacy? Might the very subtlety of the overseer–decider distinction actually encourage politicians to exploit it as a political tool and conceal partisan arguments as legal ones?

If such outcomes can be expected, then what might appear to be a plausibly attractive, even if unenforceable, doctrinal standard could ultimately prove harmful. The overseer–decider standard might not only fail to deliver benefits in terms of reducing presidential influence over administrative decisions; it might also generate tangible costs in terms of diminishing the legitimacy of law. The very sponginess of the overseer–decider standard, when applied in such a politically charged environment (inherent in separation-of-powers disputes), could undermine the respect for law and legal institutions and, at the margin, might reduce its ability in other settings to deliver real benefits in terms of shaping governmental and private-sector behavior. In short, under the overseer–decider standard, there may be the risk that the Constitution will “come[] to serve as a rhetorical football in a highly polarized ideological game.”


50 See Parker, supra note 7 (describing Republicans’ characterization of Obama’s presidency as “imperial” and “dictatorial” while noting that the second Bush administration also expanded the scope of executive power).

51 Press Release, John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, House Files Litigation over President’s Unilateral Actions on Health Care Law (Nov. 21, 2014) (retrieved through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/house-files-litigation-over-presidents-unilateral-actions-health-care-law [https://perma.cc/QBT4-ENQT]. This suit is, however, based on grounds other than excessive directive authority. Id.

52 Cognizance, supra note 31 (manuscript at 9). This is not to deny that some constitutional questions, even nonjusticiable ones, may be worth debating in a political setting. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). Rather, our motivation here is to explore an empirical question. Regardless of any
II. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND LEGAL NORMS

To begin to assess the potential legitimacy impacts associated with different executive power norms, and learn more about how the public assigns responsibility for executive action, we conducted four vignette-based surveys. Vignette-based research has been used extensively for years in the social sciences, and it has also been relied upon in a number of areas of the law, including torts, criminal law, and contracts. To our knowledge, it has yet to be used to inform doctrinal decisions and scholarly deliberations in the domain of administrative law.

benefits, what are the costs produced by embroiling law in political debate? If such costs exceed any benefits with respect to a certain constitutional issue, this would hardly seem irrelevant to a choice about legal doctrine. A doctrinal position that only incurs costs, without ever yielding any corresponding benefits, would seem particularly worrisome.

53 See, e.g., V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Everyday Justice 89-109 (1992) (describing the vignette method used to measure perceptions of responsibility in wrongdoing within everyday life in the United States and Japan).


55 See, e.g., Mark Kelman & Tamar Admati Kreps, Playing with Trolleys: Intuitions About the Permissibility of Aggregation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 203-09 (2014) (using a vignette study to measure how individuals would respond to the classic trolley problem); Trent W. Maurer & David W. Robinson, Effects of Attire, Alcohol, and Gender on Perceptions of Date Rape, 58 SEX ROLES 423, 426-28 (2008) (discussing the study’s design involving a two-part heterosexual date-rape vignette for U.S. undergraduates in order to measure students’ perceptions of sexual assault); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 273 (2012) (describing an experiment using vignettes to test the judgments of participants about the elements of criminal liability and whether those are colored by inferences of the moral character of the transgressor).


57 Cass Sunstein has recently used vignette surveys to study public perceptions about certain kinds of regulatory design—that is, designs for how agencies or legislatures can structure rules to try to shape private behavior—but not about the design of norms governing administrative behavior. Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 185 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, Which Nudges Do People Like? A National Survey (June 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619899 [https://perma.cc/A3ZD-ULLU]. Others have used non-vignette surveys, of course, in an effort to speak to the design of administrative procedures. See, e.g., Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 593, 600-02 (2000) (using surveys to assess individuals’ satisfaction with outcomes under negotiated rulemaking as compared to conventional rulemaking); David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 12-16 (2008) (using a questionnaire to assess the procedural preferences of those likely to be involved in environmental litigation).
Our respondents participated in short survey studies where they read a scenario about a particular decision involving the President, the Treasury Secretary, and various other actors. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of a number of conditions, where we varied aspects of the scenario to determine which factors influence perceptions of decisionmaking, as well as the legality and appropriateness of the President’s actions and the legitimacy of the legal system.

The first two studies varied the level of action taken by the President. The Decisionmaking Study focused on who respondents perceived to be the “decider” in the vignette, while the Responsibility Study looked at who respondents thought deserved blame or credit when the results of the governmental actions in the vignette were said to turn out poorly or well. A third study, the Disagreement Study, varied whether the President and Treasury Secretary agreed or disagreed on the desirable outcome, and who actually authorized the decision. The final study, the Legal Norm Study, used a different scenario involving the postponement of a compliance deadline and varied whether the legal norm that was supposed to guide the President’s action was a rule or a standard.58

Drawing on the findings from these surveys, we can begin to understand better how people think about the separation of powers, but, more importantly for our main purpose here, how different doctrinal choices can affect judgments about the legality and legitimacy of governmental actions. As explained in the following Sections of this Part, we find evidence supporting the subtlety of the difference between overseeing and deciding. That is, while many of our respondents seem to be able to track this difference, nontrivial portions respond in ways contrary to expectations. More to the point, though, we find evidence supporting skepticism of the benefits of the overseer–decider standard: When outcomes turn out badly, respondents appear, irrespective of legal norms, more likely to blame Presidents when they were more involved than they are to give Presidents credit for being more

58 The four studies were conducted in the period of July to September, 2015; survey administration for each study was completed within a two-day window. All respondents were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were paid either $0.75 or $1.00 each to fill out an online survey. On the recruitment and consent page of the survey, respondents were told they would be “answering questions about government decision-making.” The use of MTurk is generally accepted among both social scientists and legal scholars engaged in empirical research. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 352-66 (2012) (evaluating benefits and tradeoffs of MTurk and recommending it as a valuable research tool); Joseph K. Goodman et al., Data Collection in a Flat World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples, 26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 213, 222 (2013) (“[W]e highly recommend MTurk to behavioral decision-making researchers . . . .”); David J. Hauser & Norbert Schwarz, Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform Better on Online Attention Checks than Do Subject Pool Participants, 48 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 400, 405-06 (2016) (concluding that MTurk participants are more attentive to instructions than are traditional subjects).
involved when outcomes turn out well. That is, the political risks to the President who gets involved already seem to provide, on their own, a palpable constraint on presidential involvement. Most significantly, the results that speak directly to our principal hypothesis about the effects of legal norms on perceptions of legitimacy reveal that respondents tend to view judicial decisions made under the overseer–decider standard as less legitimate than those made under a formal rule, even controlling for respondents’ substantive views about the merits of the case.

A. Decisionmaking Study

Our first study examined differences in presidential action levels and considered who respondents perceived to be the decisionmaker in a scenario about redesigning security features on the $50 bill.\(^{59}\)

1. Methods

We surveyed 591 respondents on MTurk who were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: neutral, ask, command, or sign.\(^{60}\) These conditions were intended to increase progressively the amount of involvement that the President had in the decision to move forward with the redesign.

All of the participants were presented with the following scenario:

*Please assume the following.

The Federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing (“Bureau”) carries out the design and printing of U.S. paper currency. The Bureau recently redesigned the $100 bill to incorporate new security features and these bills are currently in circulation. The question now is whether to update the security features in the $50 bill. Even though it made sense to redesign the $100 bill, there are both pros and cons to the redesign of the $50 bill. In a meeting at the White House, Bureau staff members*

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\(^{59}\) For all of our studies, we purposefully tried to choose an issue about which individuals would not already have strongly held political beliefs because we were interested in their views about executive power norms; therefore, we sought to minimize the extent to which their views about these norms might be affected by substantive public policy positions. For additional discussion, see *infra* Section II.E.

\(^{60}\) Respondents were paid $1.00 each to participate. We began with an MTurk “HIT” requesting 600 participants. In Qualtrics, our survey software, we received 603 fully completed surveys and 7 partially completed surveys. We removed the data for completed surveys that did not match an MTurk HIT ID, partially completed surveys, and completed surveys that had an ID or IP address that matched a partially completed survey (to avoid having data from participants who had potentially seen two versions of the study), which resulted in our final count of 591 participants. All participant data removals were chosen based on only this information and completed before and independent of any data analysis. We followed this process for each of the studies in this Article. The respondents in this first study were 50.4% female, and their overall median age was 34 (range 18 to 77). Respondents reported that they were 45.2% Democrat, 17.3% Republican, 32.0% Independent, and 3.9% Other; 1.7% selected the option, “Prefer not to say.” See Section II.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
brief the Treasury Secretary and the President of the United States on the pros and cons. At
the conclusion of the meeting, the President thanks the staff for an informative presentation.

The Bureau is situated within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Congress has given
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to make all decisions related to security features
on currency. The Bureau will only begin work on a new design of the $50 bill if it receives
proper written authorization.

Immediately following this text was a sentence indicating the presidential
action (or inaction) that varied by condition. Respondents in the neutral
condition had no additional action by the President and saw the following
sentence: “After the meeting, the Treasury Secretary signs a document directing the
Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”

Respondents in the ask condition saw the following: “After the meeting, the
President asks the Treasury Secretary to move forward with the plans to start the redesign.
The Treasury Secretary signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”

Respondents in the command condition saw the following: “After the
meeting, the President commands the Treasury Secretary to move forward with the
plans to start the redesign. The Treasury Secretary signs a document directing the
Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”

Finally, respondents in the sign condition saw the following: “After the
meeting, the President signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.”

After they were presented with the full scenario, respondents were first asked,
“Should the Bureau now begin work on the redesign of the $50 bill?” in an effort
intended to assess whether they thought proper authorization had indeed been
granted. On the next page, the scenario information continued with, “Assume that
immediately after the document is signed the Bureau starts working on the redesign.”
Respondents were then asked, “Who decided that the redesign work should begin?”

After answering these questions that formed our main dependent
variables, respondents answered a series of other questions assessing the
scenario, presidential actions in general, and the legitimacy of the legal
system in the United States, before answering a few demographic questions.

2. Results

Respondents answered the first question, about whether the Bureau “should”
begin work, on a 7-point scale ranging from “Definitely Not” (coded as 1) to
“Definitely Yes” (coded as 7). Table 1 contains the summary of the results.

For the most part, respondents clearly thought the Bureau should begin
work on the redesign. Although still concentrated on the “should” side of the
scale, there were slight but significant differences observed only between the
sign condition and the other conditions. When the President signed the
authorization document instead of the Treasury Secretary, participants were significantly less sure that the Bureau should proceed, as compared to the neutral condition, the ask condition, and the command condition.

Our primary dependent variable of interest was the question—presented after the scenario continued with plans having proceeded—of who made the decision that the redesign work should begin. Respondents were presented with four possible options: President, Treasury Secretary, Bureau Director, and Congress. The answers given by respondents for each question are shown in Table 2.

Since we are primarily concerned here with whether the President is perceived as the decisionmaker, we focus on whether the President was chosen as the decider (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0) for the following analysis. There were significant differences in the expected direction across all two-way comparisons. The respondents in the neutral group were significantly less likely on average to view the President as the decider than those in the ask.

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Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutral (n=151)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask (n=148)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command (n=152)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign (n=140)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>5.46**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05. ** p<.01. ***p<.001 – Significance levels are for tests of differences between each presidential involvement condition (ask, command, or sign) and the neutral condition. Differences in means use Welch Two Sample t-tests. Differences in medians use Wilcoxon rank sum tests.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neutral (n=151)</th>
<th>Ask (n=148)</th>
<th>Command (n=152)</th>
<th>Sign (n=140)</th>
<th>All Conditions (n=591)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>39%***</td>
<td>51%***</td>
<td>63%***</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Secretary</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>45%***</td>
<td>33%***</td>
<td>19%***</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Director</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%*</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05. ** p<.01. ***p<.001 – Significance levels are for tests of differences between each presidential involvement condition (ask, command, or sign) and the neutral condition. Differences in means use Welch Two Sample t-tests.

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61 t=2.73, df=257.8, p=0.007
62 t=3.04, df=262.5, p=0.003
63 t=2.73, df=264.2, p=0.007
64 t=6.67, df=228.9, p<.001
65 Answer choices were presented in randomized order.
command, sign groups. Ask was less than command and sign. Finally, command was also less than sign.

To analyze these differences further, we performed regression analyses. The results of these analyses, which included controls for demographics like age and gender, as well as for self-reported political and policy ideologies, are reported in Table 3.

After the main dependent variables, we asked the respondents to choose whether they thought the President was closer to “overseeing” or closer to “deciding” in the scenario. This was presented as a 7-point scale with only the endpoints “Overseeing” (coded as 1) and “Deciding” (coded as 7) being labeled.

Respondents in the neutral condition were more likely to say that the President was closer to “overseeing,” and respondents in the three other conditions were

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decisionmaking Study – President Chosen as Decider – Regressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Ask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test (joint significance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=588. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 The dependent variable is whether respondents chose “President” when asked “who decided”: a choice of President is coded as 1; any other choice is coded as 0. Non-categorical independent variable values are scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. R² is an adjusted R² for OLS and a pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) for Logit. All tests of overall model significance are significant at p<.001. Reported F-test statistics are for joint significance of the conditions. F-test statistics for Logit models are computed here by dividing the chi-squared test statistic by the numerator degrees of freedom.

66 t=9.23, df=232.7, p<.001  
67 t=11.79, df=214.7, p<.001  
68 t=2.12, df=298.0, p=0.034  
69 t=4.24, df=285.3, p<.001  
70 t=2.11, df=289.3, p=0.036
more likely to say that the President was closer to “deciding.” As indicated in Table 4, this was significant when comparing the neutral condition with all three of the other actions, including ask,\textsuperscript{71} command,\textsuperscript{72} and sign.\textsuperscript{73} No significant differences were observed between these three types of presidential action.

Respondents were less certain that the Bureau should proceed when the President was the one who signed the document instead of the Treasury Secretary (regardless of whether the Treasury Secretary signed immediately, or whether the President asked or commanded the Treasury Secretary to move forward). The President was seen as being closer to “deciding” than overseeing when the President performed any additional action, whether asking or commanding the Treasury Secretary to move forward, or even signing directly. In the end, when respondents were asked to determine who the “decider” was among all of the actors mentioned in the scenario, the President became increasingly viewed as the decider as the level of presidential involvement increased across the conditions. The President was least likely to be viewed as the decider in the neutral (no additional action) condition, but more likely when asking the Treasury Secretary to move forward, then still more likely when commanding the Treasury Secretary to move forward, and, finally, most likely of all when signing the document.

**B. Responsibility Study**

Our second study examined how differences in the types of presidential action might affect who respondents perceive as deserving of credit or blame in the same scenario as in the Decisionmaking Study.

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\textsuperscript{71} t=8.35, df=288.9, p<.001
\textsuperscript{72} t=9.46, df=298.9, p<.001
\textsuperscript{73} t=9.79, df=281.1, p<.001
1. Methods

The introductory scenario for this study was identical to the previous study, centering on a redesign of the $50 bill. Respondents were again randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: neutral, ask, command, or sign. As with the Decisionmaking Study, these conditions progressively increased the level of presidential involvement in the process to move forward with the currency redesign.

After the main scenario, respondents read the following additional paragraph indicating that the redesign had taken place, and then they were asked who deserved the credit (if the result was positive) or blame (if the result was negative) for the redesign.

Assume that immediately after the document is signed the Bureau starts working on the redesign. Upon completion, the redesigned $50 bill is released into general circulation. Banking and local law enforcement professionals are [happy / unhappy] with the additional security features. Who deserves [credit / blame] for this?

Respondents were each presented with the same four possible options of President, Treasury Secretary, Bureau Director, and Congress. This time, they were provided with sliders on a 100-point scale and had to move the sliders to distribute 100% of the responsibility among the four choices.

2. Results

Summaries of the average credit or blame assigned to each choice by respondents are displayed in Table 5 and Table 6. As an initial analysis, looking only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
<th>Responsibility Study – Credit Mean Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral (n=99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Secretary</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Director</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 – Significance levels are for tests of differences between each presidential involvement condition (ask, command, or sign) and the neutral condition. Differences in means use Welch Two Sample t-tests.

74 See supra Section II.A.

75 We surveyed 800 respondents on MTurk who were each paid $1.00 to participate. The respondents were 45.9% female, and their overall median age was 31 (range 18 to 73). Respondents were 44.0% Democrat, 17.8% Republican, 31.2% Independent, and 3.8% Other; the remaining 3.1% selected “Prefer not to say.” See Section I.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
at the level of responsibility assigned to the President (whether it was blame or credit), we mostly duplicated the decider results from the Decisionmaking Study. The credit or blame allocated to the President under the neutral condition was significantly less than under the ask, command, and sign conditions. Ask was less than sign and command was less than sign. The only comparison for which significant differences were not observed was the one between ask and command.

We continued to look at the level of responsibility assigned to the President by performing regression analyses to control for demographics and self-reported policy ideologies. To disentangle differences based on whether the question was phrased as credit or blame, we provide full data models that include the question type as an independent variable, as well as partial results for each of the credit and blame versions individually. These results are reported in Table 7.

Regardless of how the responsibility question was phrased, the level of presidential action appeared to affect significantly the amount of credit or blame assigned to the President. We looked further at differences between credit and blame by condition, and a difference emerged in the command condition. When the President commanded that action be taken, the mean credit assigned to the President was 23.7% when things turned out well, while the blame assigned to the President was 33.9% when things did not go well—a difference that was significant. This was also true in the responses on the seven-point overseeing–deciding scale. For respondents in the credit version, after being told how the redesign was ultimately received, the mean result was

| Table 6 |
| Responsibility Study – Blame Mean Percentages |
| Neutral | Ask | Command | Sign | All Conditions |
| (n=102) | (n=100) | (n=101) | (n=98) | (n=401) |
| President | 8% | 27%*** | 34%*** | 22%*** | 23% |
| Treasury Secretary | 45% | 32%*** | 31%*** | 35%** | 36% |
| Bureau Director | 32% | 27% | 21%** | 29% | 27% |
| Congress | 15% | 14% | 14% | 14% | 14% |

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 – Significance levels are for tests of differences between each presidential involvement condition (ask, command, or sign) and the neutral condition. Differences in means use Welch Two Sample t-tests.

76 t=10.73, df=291.1, p<.001
77 t=10.70, df=276.1, p<.001
78 t=8.77, df=319.3, p<.001
79 t=2.56, df=385.1, p=0.011
80 t=3.27, df=370.6, p=0.001
81 t=0.84, df=393.6, p=0.403
82 t=3.12, df=181.8, p=0.002
3.9, which was just below the halfway point of 4, on the “overseeing” side. For respondents in the blame version, the mean result was 5.1, which was on the “deciding” end. This was, again, a statistically significant difference.83

In summary, although the Responsibility Study showed similar results when looking at the same variations in levels of presidential involvement as in the Decisionmaking Study, it revealed differences in how the President reaped credit and blame when commanding policy outcomes. Both the blame and credit groups saw that the President commanded the Treasury Secretary to move forward, but respondents who read about the decision going poorly were more likely to assign blame to the President and more likely to say that the President was the one who was “deciding” in the scenario.

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83 *t*=4.11, *df*=198.2, *p*<.001
C. Disagreement Study

Our third study examined how differences in viewpoints between the President and Treasury Secretary affected respondents' perceptions of who was the “decider.” Again, we used the same scenario as in the Decisionmaking Study about redesigning the security features on the $50 bill.

1. Methods

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: agree-secretary-signs, disagree-secretary-signs, agree-president-signs, or disagree-president-signs. These conditions varied the agreement between the President and Treasury Secretary over whether to move forward with a currency redesign, and they varied in who expressed a preference versus who signed a document directing the redesign. The scenario text was the same as in Section II.A. Respondents in the conditions with the Treasury Secretary signing the document were presented with the following:

After the meeting, the President expresses a preference to the Treasury Secretary that plans [should / should not] move forward to start the redesign. The Treasury Secretary [agrees / disagrees] and signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.

Respondents in the conditions with the President signing the document saw this version:

After the meeting, the Treasury Secretary expresses a preference to the President that plans [should / should not] move forward to start the redesign. The President [agrees / disagrees] and signs a document directing the Bureau to redesign the $50 bill.

All respondents then saw the same questions as indicated in the Decisionmaking Study, beginning with whether the Bureau should proceed with the redesign, and then who the “decider” was.

2. Results

Respondents answered the first question—about whether the Bureau should commence work—based on a 7-point scale ranging from “Definitely Not” (coded as 1) to “Definitely Yes” (coded as 7). Table 8 contains a summary of the results.

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84 We surveyed 589 respondents on MTurk who were each paid $1.00 to participate. The respondents were 45.5% female, and their overall median age was 31 (range 18 to 78). Respondents were 45.3% Democrat, 15.1% Republican, 33.4% Independent, and 3.6% Other; the remaining 2.5% chose “Prefer not to say.” See Section II.E for robustness checks, which included party-weighted analysis.
Respondents still thought the Bureau should begin work on the redesign, but there were significant differences in how close they were to the “Definitely Yes” end of the scale, depending on whether the President and Treasury Secretary agreed. When the Treasury Secretary signed the document, respondents were significantly less sure that the Bureau should move forward if the President expressed a preference for not moving forward, compared to when the President agreed that the redesign should go ahead.\(^{85}\) Similarly, when the President signed the document, respondents were significantly less sure that the Bureau should move forward if the Treasury Secretary expressed a preference for not moving forward, compared to when the Secretary agreed with the President to go ahead.\(^{86}\) Respondents’ views appeared to be affected by the existence of agreement (or disagreement) between the President and Treasury Secretary and not by who signed the authorization. We observed no significant differences in views about whether the Bureau should move forward when comparing overall responses in the conditions with the

\(^{85}\) \(t=5.35, \text{df}=279.1, p<.001\)

\(^{86}\) \(t=5.47, \text{df}=259.5, p<.001\)
President signing versus the Secretary signing. Nor did we observe any differences based on who signed within each of the two agreement conditions, namely just comparing who signed when the President and Secretary agreed and then separately comparing responses when they disagreed.

Similar to the Decisionmaking Study, we presented the next question after the scenario, asking who made the decision that the redesign work should begin. Respondents were presented with the same four possible options: President, Treasury Secretary, Bureau Director, and Congress. The answers given for each question are provided in Table 9.

Again, we focused our attention on whether the President was chosen as the decider (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The presence of disagreement between the President and the Treasury Secretary led to significant differences in whether the President was chosen as the decider. When they disagreed, the President was significantly more likely to be chosen as the decider when the President signed

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**Table 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disagreement Study – President Chosen as Decider – Regressions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres &amp; Sec Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/Gender</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.171
F-test (joint significance) = 59.11***

n=585, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 The dependent variable is whether respondents chose “President” when asked “who decided”; a choice of President is coded as 1; any other choice is coded as 0. Non-categorical independent variable values are scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. R² is an adjusted R² for OLS and a pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) for Logit. All tests of overall model significance are significant at p<.001. Reported F-test statistics are for joint significance of the conditions. F-test statistics for Logit models are computed here by dividing the chi-squared test statistic by the numerator degrees of freedom.

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87 t=0.94, df=585.2, p=0.346
88 t=0.69, df=190.0, p=0.493
89 t=0.86, df=292.7, p=0.424
90 Answer choices were presented in randomized order.
compared to when the Treasury Secretary signed.\textsuperscript{91} Also, when the same individual signed, significant differences appeared in judgments about the decider based on whether the President and Treasury Secretary were in agreement. When the Treasury Secretary signed, the President was significantly less likely to be thought of as the decider if the President had expressed a preference for not moving forward.\textsuperscript{92} When the President signed, the President was significantly more likely to be viewed as the decider if the Treasury Secretary had expressed a preference for not moving forward.\textsuperscript{93} However, notably, when the President and Treasury Secretary were in agreement, there was no observed difference in whether the President was chosen based on who signed.\textsuperscript{94}

To analyze these differences further, we performed regression analyses controlling for demographics and political ideologies and separating out the variations in the two conditions, of who signed and of agreement. Regression results are reported in Table 10.

After the main dependent variables, we asked the respondents to choose whether they thought the President was closer to “overseeing” or closer to “deciding” in the scenario. This was presented as a 7-point scale with only the end-points “Overseeing” (coded as 1) and “Deciding” (coded as 7) being labeled. As Table 11 shows, these results matched very closely with the decider results in this study. When the President and Treasury Secretary disagreed, and the President signed the authorizing document, respondents were significantly more likely to say the President was “deciding” compared to when the Treasury Secretary signed.\textsuperscript{95} When the President and Treasury Secretary were in agreement, there was no difference observed.\textsuperscript{96} When the Treasury Secretary signed, the President was closer to “overseeing” if the President had expressed a preference for not moving forward.\textsuperscript{97} When the President signed, the President was closer to “deciding” if the Treasury Secretary had expressed a preference for not moving forward.\textsuperscript{98}

In summary, respondents were less certain that the Bureau should proceed when the President and the Treasury Secretary disagreed about whether to move forward (regardless of who signed). The President was seen as being closer to “deciding” than “overseeing” when the President signed or when the Treasury Secretary signed and both parties agreed about moving forward. The President

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item t=19.29, df=181.9, p<.001
\item t=8.39, df=176.4, p<.001
\item t=5.55, df=281.6, p<.001
\item t=1.28, df=289.6, p=0.200
\item t=13.90, df=293.3, p<.001
\item t=1.22, df=288.7, p=0.225
\item t=7.61, df=291.6, p<.001
\item t=6.72, df=283.4, p<.001
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
was seen as being closer to “overseeing” when the Treasury Secretary signed and they disagreed about moving forward. Finally, when determining who the “decider” was among all of the actors mentioned in the scenario, the President was more likely to be considered the decider when the President signed or when the Treasury Secretary signed and both parties were in agreement.

D. Legal Norm Study

The fourth study used a new scenario to examine how differences in the type of legal norm that a court would be expected to apply in a lawsuit may affect the legitimacy of a court’s decision about the legality of a President’s action. This scenario also used the Treasury Secretary and President as protagonists, but this time the scenario centered on amendments to credit card security regulations.

1. Methods

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three norm conditions: formal, reasonable, or decision. These conditions varied whether the prevailing legal norm was a bright-line rule or a standard, using either reasonableness language or overseer–decider language.

All of the participants were presented with the following scenario:

Please assume the following.
Congress has given the Secretary of Treasury the authority to make all decisions related to security features on credit cards. That includes the authority to create and

Table 11
Disagreement Study – Overseeing/Deciding Scale – Ranges and Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary Signs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree (n=147)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (n=152)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Signs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree (n=145)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (n=145)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The differences in means and medians between “agree” and “disagree” within each grouping (Secretary signs, President signs) are significant (p<.001).*
amend credit card security regulations, as well as to respond to petitions about these regulations, whenever and however the Secretary decides.

Some years ago, the Treasury Department used the authority Congress gave the Secretary to create a regulation that required many businesses to install a new anti-fraud security technology. The regulation allowed businesses a limited time period within which to come into compliance.

As the regulation’s deadline approached, it became clear that most businesses would not have completed the required installations in time. Several business groups jointly filed a petition asking the Treasury Secretary to amend the regulation to extend the deadline.

The Treasury Secretary wanted to keep the regulation unchanged. However, hearing the concerns raised by business groups and concluding that the impending deadline would pose potentially serious economic repercussions, the President of the United States commanded the Treasury Secretary to grant the petition and amend the regulation to extend the deadline.

The Treasury Department then used normal procedures to grant the petition and amend the regulation, issuing a deadline extension.

The amended regulation was then challenged in a lawsuit in federal court. The challengers’ lawyers argued that the President illegally pressured the Treasury Secretary to relax the deadline. They pointed out that Congress had given regulatory authority to the Treasury Secretary and not to the President.

In response, government lawyers pointed out that a Treasury Secretary is appointed by the President, who can remove a Secretary from office at any time.

In similar lawsuits in the past involving other government departments, courts have applied a rule derived from the U.S. Constitution that says [NORM]. This is the law the judge must apply to the dispute over the Treasury Department’s deadline extension.

The “[NORM]” in the last paragraph varied by condition. Respondents in the formal condition saw the following:

Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury Secretary, as long as departmental regulations (including amendments) are officially signed and approved by the department head and not the President.

Respondents in the reasonable condition saw,

Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury Secretary, as long as they only do so in “reasonable” ways.

Respondents in the decision condition saw the overseer–decider standard:

Presidents are allowed to influence department heads like the Treasury Secretary, but not to make decisions for them.

Respondents were first asked to evaluate their own opinion of the legality of the President’s actions. They were asked, “Based on your reading of this
scenario and on the law that the judge must apply, do you think the President acted legally or illegally? Respondents chose either “Illegally” (coded as 0) or “Legally” (coded as 1).

On the next page of the survey, respondents were reminded of the norm and further instructed, “Please now assume further that the judge decided the President did act legally.” Then they were asked to evaluate the decision by choosing agreement on a seven-point scale with the following statements:

- The judge’s decision is legitimate.
- The judge made the decision fairly on the basis of the facts and the law.
- Political ideology or bias likely entered into the judge’s decision.

2. Results

Respondents’ answers to the question about the legality of the President’s action are summarized in Table 12. Performing two-way comparisons between the norms and answers to legality, there is only one significant difference: respondents were more likely to say the President’s action was legal when the norm type was formal than they were when the norm type was decision (i.e., overseer–decider). These results are duplicated in regressions in Table 13.

Respondents’ perceptions of the judge’s decision were combined to form a total judge legitimacy score of up to 21 points. A higher judge legitimacy score indicates a greater level of agreement with the legitimacy and fairness statements, and a greater level of disagreement with the bias statement. A summary of the individual answers and total scores can be found in Table 14.

Considering two-way comparisons, the average judge legitimacy score is significantly higher when the norm type is formal rather than reasonable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Norm Study – Whether President Acted Legally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Standard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 – Significance levels are for tests of differences between each standard condition (reasonable, decision) and the formal rule condition. Differences in means use Welch Two Sample t-tests.

100 Respondents were then asked, “How confident do you feel about your answer above?” But, these responses did not vary widely (with most people choosing the midpoint), so we do not discuss them further.

101 t=2.68, df=190.4, p<.008

102 Cronbach’s Alpha for the 3-item judge legitimacy score is 0.8 (standardized is 0.89), which is considered reliable.

103 t=2.88, df=193.4, p<.004
### Table 13
**Legal Norm Study – President Acted Legally – Regressions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Logit</th>
<th>Logit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By</td>
<td>With</td>
<td>By</td>
<td>With</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norm Type</td>
<td>Political Views</td>
<td>Norm Type</td>
<td>Political Views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm type: Reasonable</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm type: Decision</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>-0.81*</td>
<td>-0.87**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/Gender</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test (joint significance)</td>
<td>3.27*</td>
<td>3.42*</td>
<td>3.26*</td>
<td>3.50*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=296, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. The dependent variable is the answer to the question of whether the participant thinks the President acted legally (coded as 1) or illegally (coded as 0). Non-categorical independent variable values are scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. R² is an adjusted R² for OLS and a pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) for Logit. All tests of overall model significance are significant at p<.05 or p<.01. Reported F-test statistics are for joint significance of the conditions. F-test statistics for Logit models are computed here by dividing the chi-squared test statistic by the numerator degrees of freedom.

### Table 14
**Legal Norm Study – Judge Evaluation – Means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree With Legitimate</th>
<th>Agree With Fairly</th>
<th>Disagree With Bias</th>
<th>Judge Legitimacy Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal Rule</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable Standard</td>
<td>5.1**</td>
<td>5.3**</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>14.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Standard</td>
<td>5.0***</td>
<td>4.8***</td>
<td>3.9**</td>
<td>13.7***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 – Significance levels are for tests of differences between each standard condition (reasonable, decision) and the formal rule condition. Differences in means use Welch Two Sample t-tests. Answers are scored on a seven-point scale from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (7). The political bias question is reverse coded so that all numbers presented here are in the form that a higher number means greater trust in the judge’s decision.
The two standard types—reasonable and decision—do not show any observable, statistically significant differences in the judge legitimacy score. However, these comparisons do not take into account the differences in respondents’ perceived legality of the President’s actions. Table 15 contains regressions that control for demographics as well as for whether respondents thought the President acted legally and how confident they were in their conclusions. Even though perceived legality accounts for some of the differences between conditions, there are still additional differences that are being observed when controlling for this perceived legality.

In summary, respondents were more likely to view the President as acting legally when the norm was a formal signature rule than they were when it was the overseer–decider standard. Yet, when a judge decided the President acted legally, respondents were more likely to view the judge’s decision as legitimate.

Table 15
Legal Norm Study – Judge Legitimacy Score – Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>By Norm Type</th>
<th>By Legal Choice</th>
<th>By Both</th>
<th>With Party/Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>15.8***</td>
<td>12.0***</td>
<td>12.3***</td>
<td>11.8***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm type: Reasonable</td>
<td>-1.4**</td>
<td>-1.0*</td>
<td>-1.0*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm type: Decision</td>
<td>-2.3***</td>
<td>-1.6***</td>
<td>-1.6***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6***</td>
<td>3.4***</td>
<td>3.4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Policy</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/Gender</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test (joint significance)</td>
<td>9.65***</td>
<td>6.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=296. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 The dependent variable is the total judge legitimacy score, which combines three 7-point questions. A higher score indicates greater trust in the judge’s decision. Non-categorical independent variables are scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. R² is an adjusted R². All tests of overall model significance are significant at p<.001. Reported F-test statistics are for joint significance of the conditions.

104 t=4.58, df=191.9, p<.001
105 t=1.66, df=195.8, p=0.099
fair, and unbiased when the norm was formal than they were when it was either of the two standards. This difference remained even after controlling for the perceived legality of the President’s actions.

E. Synopsis: Contributions and Robustness

These experimental studies provide new insights into how laypeople assess executive and judicial actors in the context of separation-of-powers issues that until now have escaped systematic empirical scrutiny. Our studies illuminate when individuals may be more (or less) ready to assign responsibility, whether based on the actions of the President or agency actors, or based on messages which are carefully crafted by the White House, agencies, or the media about those actions. We have shown that individuals are sensitive both to the level of presidential involvement in administrative decisionmaking as well as to the nature of the legal norms concerning this involvement that they are informed prevail.

In addition to our findings about the effect of norm type on assessments of legitimacy, we have shown that individuals are sensitive to the level of presidential involvement in an administrative decision. When merely being briefed on the issues, the President is not perceived to be the “decider” of the outcome, compared to when the President takes an explicit action, like asking or commanding a department head; however, in any of these other cases, individuals still think that the President’s direction should nonetheless be followed by the administrative agency. If the President explicitly bypasses the authority of the department head by directly signing the applicable legal documents, though, individuals begin to question whether the agency should proceed with the presidential direction.

Furthermore, individuals are discriminating when it comes to allocating credit and blame. They are generally more willing to assign blame to the President when there are poor outcomes than they are to give him credit when things go well. We have also shown that individuals apportion decisionmaking responsibility differently based on whether the President and department head find themselves in agreement. When it is obvious that the executive branch is working in sync, formalities such as signing matter less; but, if there is disagreement, then individuals consider whose preference was carried out, regardless of the hierarchy of authority.

We do acknowledge, of course, that these findings from our vignette-based experimental research, like those from any such research, have their limitations. For one thing, vignettes are, by definition, artificial. Outside of the experimental setting of a survey, public impressions on issues like those we have measured would be formed after exposure to multiple sources of potentially conflicting information, where it would probably not be as easy for members of the public to know exactly what had happened. However, using our simplified scenario with clear behavior allows us to capture how
individuals are influenced by the precise factors that we sought to investigate. This distinctive advantage of a vignette-based experimental method is undoubtedly why it is a well-accepted research strategy used in other legal domains, where it has also proven suitable for producing empirical insight under the constraints inherent in studying choices about legal doctrine.

We recognize, of course, that with respect to the presidency, members of the public are, in their daily lives, often exposed to highly politicized and salient issues of the kind covered in the media, while our four studies rely on fact patterns that deliberately avoided highly salient political issues. We made that decision self-consciously for appropriate research design reasons. Our principal aim has been to assess the effects of rules versus standards on public perceptions of the legitimacy of the law, not to capture the indisputably real effects of political ideology that would color judgments about highly salient, politicized issues. By choosing less salient examples, we were able to isolate better our respondents’ perceptions of responsibility and legitimacy, rather than of partisanship. We also instructed respondents explicitly that the vignettes were “hypothetical.” In these ways, our methodology allowed us to measure independently just the effects of our experimental manipulations, such as the level of presidential involvement or the nature of the applicable legal norm.

Our decision to focus on less contentious issues is reinforced by other empirical research demonstrating that politicization of legal actors and institutions significantly weakens public legitimacy in these institutions. At the same time that we excluded politically salient facts from our vignettes to isolate the effects of the conditions we manipulated, such as differences in legal norms, we recognize we could not study here the extent to which the presence of such politically salient facts might exacerbate the negative effects on legitimacy that we did find. Not only would the presence of politicized elements in real-world disputes presumably have their own independent effects on legitimacy, but we would hypothesize that politicization would interact with the overseer–decider standard to heighten the threats to legitimacy we observed. After all, it will surely be easier for a fuzzy standard than a clear rule to become manipulated and deployed inconsistently when

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106 In a relevant paper, political scientists Andrew Reeves and Jon Rogowski provide evidence showing that individuals’ partisanship affects their judgments about the unilateral exercise of power by the President. Andrew Reeves & Jon C. Rogowski, Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency, 78 J. Pol. 137, 139 (2016). However, they also find evidence that voters can and do “distinguish the president from the presidency.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added). We are, in this phraseology, much more interested in perceptions about the presidency—and ultimately in the law—that in judgments about any specific President. Cf. Tyler, supra note 38, at 29-30 (distinguishing support for institutions from support for those who lead them).

107 See, e.g., Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 38, at 120 (“Anything that drags the Court into ordinary politics damages the esteem of the institution.”).
politics enters the scene. Further investigation of the precise extent of this possible interactive effect will need to await future research.

We did, however, conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that our results were not affected by possible bias in the party affiliations or political ideologies of the respondents. The source of our samples, MTurk, does yield respondents in levels disproportionate to the U.S. population in terms of political party affiliation, which was the case for our samples. In the four studies we report here, we did not give any names or party identification to any of the protagonists in the vignettes. Of course, we still controlled for respondents’ partisan affiliations and social and economic policy ideologies in our regression analyses. In addition to controlling for party affiliations and policy ideologies, we also ran party-weighted versions of every OLS regression reported in this Article. Weighting adjusts for differences in sample size and is a well-accepted statistical approach used in circumstances similar to ours. For all of the regressions across all of our studies, weighting returned similar results. Our robustness checks lend further confidence to our findings, notwithstanding the sampling tendencies associated with our source of respondents.

Finally, we strived to ensure that our results were not affected by the possibility—given that our vignettes did not name a specific President of the United States—that our respondents were simply assuming that the vignette described actions by the current President, Barack Obama. If this were the case, we could have expected that party affiliation would have influenced our results. But as we just noted, our results were affected neither by political ideology nor by party affiliation. Nevertheless, we recognized the possibility that heightening the salience and reality of the vignette by naming a specific President could affect respondents’ answers, especially since this possibility has been realized in other surveys.

Although some of our respondents in our four studies probably did assume the vignette was about President

108 We also replicated on a party-weighted basis all the t-tests reported throughout the footnotes of this Article. All of the replicated t-tests also generated similar results after weighting, with one exception in which a single previously reported significant result became statistically insignificant. That one difference arose in the Decisionmaking Study’s comparison of whether the President was perceived as the decider between the command and sign conditions. Our earlier reported t-test result was significant with a p-value of 0.036. See supra note 70. However, the weighted t-test result was not significant. (t=1.23, df=270.93, p=0.221). Considering just the group most underweighted originally, Republicans, the mean value of command (0.44) was still less than the mean value of sign (0.63). This difference was not statistically significant (t=−1.43, df=50.6, p=0.159), but that is possibly due to the small sample size of n=25 and n=30, respectively.

109 Attaching President Obama’s name to actions can lead to different results than a neutral action. See, e.g., Roberta Rampton, Most Americans Support Obama’s Contested Immigration Plan: Poll, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2016, 6:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-immigration-idUSKCN0V67YV?feedType=RSS&feedName=domicestNews [https://perma.cc/6D32-NXWA] (reporting poll results indicating that “[m]ost Americans say they back a plan that would allow certain illegal immigrants to stay in the country, but support for the idea slips when President Barack Obama’s name is attached to the question”).
Obama, we believe that it was at most a very small minority who did so. We reach this judgment because we subsequently ran a separate study that included a replication of our Legal Norm Study as well as a question to check for this possibility. After asking the other experimental questions, we asked our respondents which President had been referred to in the vignette (even though the vignette did not name any President). Only 14% of our respondents answered that they either presumed or thought they remembered that it was President Barack Obama.\textsuperscript{110}

Future work could undoubtedly build on the work we have presented here. Other research could pursue scenarios with different policy issues and other governmental departments or offices. Researchers could also build on our framework to seek to assess how respondents’ attitudes might vary depending on the level of certainty about a President’s involvement, perhaps by exposing them to multiple or conflicting sources of information.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE POWER NORMS

Our results provide what we believe to be the first window into the ways that a broad cross-section of the public thinks about interbranch interactions under different formulations of separation-of-powers norms. Although these results reveal points of convergence with expectations, they also reveal subtle differences in the effects of different legal doctrines, and they raise important questions about potential costs of choices in the language of legal norms or the actions taken by Presidents. In this Part, we discuss some of the implications of what can be learned from these studies for understanding and assessing executive power norms. Overall, our findings raise new, important questions about the advisability of scholars, lawyers, and politicians continuing to invoke an overseer–decider standard as a purported constraint on presidential administration.

A. The Subtlety of Decisions and the Clarity of Bright-Line Rules

Our findings not only confirm the subtlety of the overseer–decider standard and its application with a large cross-section of the public, but they also suggest some additional potential limitations associated with the standard that might apply to those who inhabit the world of governmental agencies. We did find, as expected, that our respondents perceived the President to be more of a decider the greater the degree and formality of the President’s involvement in the process. But this was merely the trend. Strikingly, more than 35% of the respondents in the Decisionmaking Study

\textsuperscript{110} In addition to responses that specifically mentioned President Obama by name, we liberally included all answers that could have been remotely referring to President Obama, such as those stating “the current President” or “current one.”
did not view the President as “the decider” even when the President signed a document giving formal authorization of the currency redesign. Those 35%, moreover, did not all coalesce around the same non-presidential actor as the decider. This is an interesting result that suggests an additional, unacknowledged conceptual challenge presented by the overseer–decider standard. The standard may be subtle not merely because it is difficult to draw the line between “oversight” and “decision”; it may be subtle and difficult to apply in circumstances involving collective decisionmaking—precisely as exists in government. When different individuals from multiple offices and across the legislative and executive branches are involved, is it ever possible to consider any single individual as “the decider”? Who really can be said to be “the” decider in a system of checks and balances?

The line-drawing that the overseer–decider standard demands becomes even more challenging when making more fine-grained judgments. Once respondents were asked about the degree of deciding versus overseeing, there were no differences at all across the different levels of presidential involvement. That is, Presidents are viewed as more of the decider once they get involved at all—regardless of what form their involvement takes. Even if they are just asking and trying to influence—that is, “overseeing”—they are perceived by the public to be more of the decider. The degree to which Presidents are seen as the decider does not change if they are asking or commanding their cabinet officials, or even if they actually take over the signing of authorizing documents, all other things being equal.

Of course, all other things are not always equal. The Disagreement Study shows that respondents’ judgments vary about who was the decider, as well as about the degree of deciding versus overseeing, depending on whether Presidents and their cabinet officials agree or disagree about a course of action. When Presidents and cabinet officials disagree, respondents are more likely to see whoever gets their way by signing the authorizing documents as being more of the decider. This is as would be expected. After all, when the Bush EPA denied California’s waiver, critics drew significance from reports that EPA officials disagreed and had been ready to grant the waiver request up until the time that Administrator Johnson had his meeting at the White House. The existence of disagreement apparently makes respondents indifferent as to who signs the authorization document, notwithstanding the fact that they are aware that Congress has given the administrator the decisionmaking authority. In our Decisionmaking Study, respondents were less likely to report that the Bureau

111 For a recent account emphasizing the multiplicity of decisionmaking actors in the administrative state, see Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1157–60 (2014).
112 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
should proceed with the bill redesign when the President signed an authorization document versus the Secretary, but in the Disagreement Study that difference disappeared. Disagreement seems to be all that matters.

B. **Constraints on Presidential Involvement in Administration**

Disagreement is also the condition under which the principal benefit of the overseer–decider standard is supposed to be realized. The standard does not matter when the President and administrator agree. It is when they disagree that the existence of the overseer–decider standard is supposed to bolster the administrator’s fortitude to resist obeying a President’s command. As Professor Strauss has argued, “Distinguishing the legal from the political . . . reinforces the psychology of office.”113 The overseer–decider standard tells administrators that they are not legally obligated to substitute the President’s judgment for their own. If the President persuades them of the wisdom of his position, that is one thing. But if administrators should remain unpersuaded, they have no legal duty to obey. It then becomes a matter of administrators and Presidents making political risk management judgments. How likely is it that the President would really fire an administrator or accept a tendered letter of resignation? How much cost would the White House incur over a firing or resignation related to a disagreement?

These are key questions. However, as one of us has explained elsewhere, they are questions that can arise regardless of whether the overseer–decider standard is accepted as a matter of constitutional law.114 Since the standard at best only operates within administrators’ and Presidents’ (and their staffs’) minds—and not as something enforceable in a court—then one would expect these tactical, political questions about resignation and replacement to dominate anyway. They raise the only potential consequences confronting administrators and Presidents when they disagree; the purported standard of constitutional law is not only subtle, but provides no tangible incentives or consequences for either administrators or the White House.

Perhaps if administrators could psychologically internalize the overseer–decider standard, the standard could help reinforce their backbones so that they make independent judgments about how to implement the statutes they are responsible for carrying out. If one imagines the kinds of people who head administrative

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114 See Coglianese, *supra* note 31 (manuscript at 24) (explaining that while “partisans tend to view constitutional claims about presidential control of domestic policymaking using their own ideological lens . . . [t]he murkiness of the asserted legal doctrine would inherently limit its ability to come to the political appointee’s aid in resisting a motivated White House bent on using its available incentives to influence the administrator”); see also Coglianese, *supra* note 39, at 645 (“[T]he supposed constitutional rule limiting Presidents to mere oversight of agencies is incapable of neutrally circumscribing either presidential or administrative behavior.”).
agencies to be timid and meek, with very few strong opinions of their own, then perhaps the overseer–decider standard would be beneficial, even if it provides no judicially manageable standard. Professor Strauss, at least, appears to hold that view, as he writes about the “tendencies both of some leaders to appoint yes-men, and of other appointees (those not meeting this description) to feel the impulses of political loyalty to a respected superior and of a wish for job continuity.” This is an empirical claim, but there is much in the political science literature that could reasonably lead one to question it. Rather than presidential appointees being proverbial “yes-men,” the tendency appears to be the opposite. Appointees are accomplished leaders in their own right. They often have worked in a professional field related to the agency or otherwise have an interest in the agency’s policy domain. Obviously they may well start out by sharing many of the same views as the President who appoints them, but when they disagree, they presumably do so because of strongly held opinions or well-thought-out professional judgments. It seems doubtful that they would automatically fold were it not for the overseer–decider standard. On the contrary, it is commonly said that appointees have a tendency to “go native,” coming to see the world from their agency staff’s perspective, rather than the White House staff’s, and hence not automatically assuming the priorities and perspectives of the President.

Richard Neustadt had valid reasons for concluding that a President’s most important power is the “power to persuade.”

Of course, the degree to which administrators shrink in the face of presidential disagreement cannot be answered by our research. We did not study the behavior of elites who hold presidential appointments, and we also do not draw inferences about how presidential appointees behave under the different normative doctrines we studied. On the other hand, no one who has claimed

115 The psychological internalization might be reinforced by the existence of informal, nonlegal norms or conventions, if not legal ones. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1186 (2013) (explaining how a convention can constrain administrative behavior, especially when it “becomes genuinely internalized by the actor as a rule of political morality”).

116 Strauss, supra note 25, at 714.

117 Political scientist Richard Nathan attributes to President Richard Nixon’s aide, John Ehrlichman, the original use of this phrase to describe presidential appointees’ tendencies to assimilate into their agencies’ settings. Richard P. Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, 44 Pub. Int. 40, 44 (1976). The phrase remains used by White House officials. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Chief and President Walk Fine Line, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2014, at A1 (reporting that advisors to President Obama were concerned that “since being appointed director” of the Central Intelligence Agency, John O. Brennan “has ‘gone native,’ as they put it”); Dana Milbank, Bush Seeks to Rule the Bureaucracy: Appointments Aim at White House Control, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 2004, at A4 (quoting President Bill Clinton’s advisor, Bruce Reed, as saying, “When people take jobs at agencies, they tend to go native and start championing the institution rather than the agenda of the person who put them there”).

that the overseer–decider standard is needed to boost administrators’ fortitude has put forward any empirical evidence whatsoever in support of that claim.

The appropriate empirical test, in any event, would not be whether the overseer–decider standard is better than no norm whatsoever. It would instead be whether such a standard leads to a more optimal level of fortitude relative to the level induced by an alternative norm. We used one such alternative norm in our research: a bright-line rule that holds that, given a statutory delegation of authority to an administrator, the administrator’s signature, and only the administrator’s signature, can properly authorize action. Such a rule today appears to be widely honored, and occasions have arisen when White House officials have been unable to get their way because administrative officials have refused to sign off, literally, on actions presidential aides sought to have approved. Importantly, such a bright-line rule is also judicially manageable. A court would surely be willing to entertain an ultra vires claim if the White House Chief of Staff—or even the President—were to sign a waiver for California to develop automobile emissions standards instead of the EPA Administrator.

Our research offers relevant findings that cast doubt on the magnitude of any marginally constraining effects the overseer–decider standard may have in terms of reducing presidential overreach. Our Responsibility Study investigated how the public distributes credit and blame for administrative actions, and we found that members of the public are much more prone to blame the President when something goes wrong if the President “commands” rather than “asks.” These findings suggest a political incentive that presumably already serves to keep Presidents hewing to something like the overseer–decider line, even without any meaningful legal consequences associated with that line. Any President concerned about public opinion appears to face intrinsic risks when getting more heavily involved in administrative actions should things turn out badly. The Responsibility Study shows an asymmetry in how the public will blame a President when things go badly compared to the credit they will give the President when things go well. If these political risks already serve to constrain presidential overreach, any additional marginal effect that might be added from a legal standard based on oversight versus deciding will presumably be much smaller than commonly supposed, to the extent such an effect really exists at all.

119 For a dramatic account of one such occasion involving former Attorney General Ashcroft, see Coglianese, supra note 31 (manuscript at 25).
121 In an era of frequent media leaks and extensive electronic trials, these risks cannot be dismissed out of hand simply due to the (relative) secrecy that ordinarily surrounds presidential deliberations.
C. Preserving Law’s Legitimacy

Most strikingly, our research confirms our hypothesis that invoking the overseer–decider standard as a constitutional norm is not a costless exercise. The form that separation-of-powers doctrine takes appears to shape perceptions about fairness, bias, and legitimacy. In the Legal Norm Study, both standards were, relative to a formal rule, negatively associated with respondents’ judgments about the legitimacy of a judicial finding that the President acted legally.

We recognize, of course, that since the hypothetical court decision found the President had acted legally, it would be more likely under either the reasonableness standard or the overseer–decider standard for a respondent to question the court’s legal judgment, as the two standards are, as a substantive matter, less advantageous to the President. The standards qualify, in some manner, the President’s authority in a way that the formal rule does not. However, the regression results make clear that when we control for the substantive difference in the effect of the norm as reflected in respondents’ own judgments of legality, people are still less likely to view a judge’s decision as legitimate under either of the two standards than under the formal rule.

It is striking that we see a distinct and statistically significant diminution in public perceptions of the legitimacy of the legal system just by varying a single sentence describing how a norm about separation of powers might be expressed. Of course, perhaps for some judges and legal scholars, these findings will merely confirm what they have already long intuited when deciding separation-of-powers disputes. In articulating the political question doctrine, for example, the Supreme Court has emphasized caution about entering into disputes involving the powers of other branches of government, especially when the courts lack clear legal rules to apply. Some widely noted separation-of-powers cases have been decided on the basis of bright-line rules and, over the years, judges and scholars

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122 In other contexts, as well, empirical research shows that “rule-based decisionmaking” is generally positively associated with an increase in public perceptions of legitimacy in legal actors and institutions. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 661, 678-80 (2007) (summarizing the results of a series of empirical studies finding that support for legal authorities increases when they act consistent with “principles underlying the rule of law,” including “rule-based decisionmaking”).

123 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“We have said that ‘In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939))). For contemporary analysis of the political question doctrine, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2013).

124 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983) (finding unconstitutional statutory language authorizing a legislative veto because “Congress can implement [policy] in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President”).
have advocated for taking more formalist approaches in separation-of-powers cases. With the addition of our research findings, judges and scholars now have empirical evidence indicating that, in addition to traditional legal and interpretive issues, something else appears to be at stake in the debate over norms of executive power: public perceptions of the legitimacy of law.

CONCLUSION

When resolving interbranch disputes, the Constitution’s text and history matter, as do broader values such as democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Yet, as significant as the normative values underlying these questions are, values themselves will only go so far. If administrative law generally, and separation-of-powers doctrine in particular, stand to reinforce or induce governmental behavior that is normatively defensible (or at least reduce governmental behavior that is normatively objectionable), then any analysis of doctrinal choices should also be informed by empirical analysis.

To inform efforts to move closer to a normative optimum, we need to understand better the empirical impact of administrative law. In the interbranch context, law operates under much different institutional conditions. The branches being coordinate, legal doctrine is not applied by a judiciary in the same hierarchical fashion as it usually is in other contexts. In addition, the behavioral import of legal doctrine in other settings presumably benefits from cooperation and mutual reinforcement by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Such cooperation obviously does not exist when interbranch disputes arise. And of course, interbranch disputes are by definition highly political. The executive and legislative branches, if not also the judiciary, hold extremely high institutional stakes in the outcomes of these disputes. If law is anywhere little more than politics in disguise, such a venue presumably would lie in the realm of separation of powers.

Taking into account these challenging circumstances under which administrative law operates, it seems prudent to understand how specific types of doctrinal formulations affect public perceptions of legitimacy. In the

125 Formalism in the separation-of-powers context is often equated with an attempt to divide the federal government into three tidy branches, which, of course, other judges and scholars have rejected as unrealistic or simplistic. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 27-28 (1998) (“The Framers did not see such a profound gulf between form and function, and neither should we today.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608 (2001) (arguing that “distinguishing . . . among legislative, executive, and judicial powers” is not a “helpful starting point” for separation-of-powers analysis); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) (“[O]ur formal, three-branch theory of government—at least as traditionally expressed—cannot describe the government we long have had . . . and is not necessary to preserve the very real and desirable benefits of ‘separation of powers’ that form so fundamental an element of our constitutional scheme.”).
separation-of-powers context, to ask whether a particular doctrinal resolution is truly pro-executive or pro-legislative, or whether a formalistic or functionalist test better achieves a desired balance, is to ask an empirical question. Given how little is actually known about how doctrine and its different formulations affect governmental behavior and public perceptions, we offer this analysis to illuminate some of the consequences associated with choices about norms governing the governmental process, as well as to show what else is at stake in the particular debate over norms applicable to the President’s role in the administrative state.

In addition to offering new insights about how members of the public perceive responsibility in the administrative state and how different legal norms affect their views of legitimacy, we offer a path forward for additional research to assess how other administrative law doctrines may shape public perceptions of government and its legitimacy. When the House of Representatives sues the President, for example, any resulting court decision will not only have the potential to create a new equilibrium in the separation-of-powers game played by both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; it also has the potential to affect, for good or for ill, public perceptions of Congress, the presidency, the courts, or all three branches. Given that administrative law inherently aims to shape how government operates, further empirical research on the relationship between legal norms and public legitimacy will prove invaluable, especially in an era of declining trust in governmental institutions and of persistent concern about the law’s legitimacy.126

126 See, e.g., John R. Alford, We’re All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1938-1996 (analyzing "the decline in trust in government" for "different demographic and political subgroups" over a period of approximately forty years), in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 28-29 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001); WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT 1-18 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, & David C. King eds., 1997) (providing an overview of the decline of confidence in the government and offering possible explanations for the trend).