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THE PECULIAR ROLE OF THE DELAWARE COURTS IN THE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS

Jill E. Fisch*

More large publicly-traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware than in any other state.1 Since the early 1900s, Delaware has been the dominant choice as state of incorporation for the largest U.S. companies.2 Almost half the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and nearly 60% of Fortune 500 companies have chosen to incorporate in Delaware.3 This success in attracting corporate charters has been profitable; incorporations bring Delaware approximately $440 million per year in franchise taxes and related fees.4

Scholars continually attempt to explain Delaware’s success.5 Reasoning that the choice of a state of incorporation involves the selection of a body of corporate law, they posit that the incorporation statistics reflect a preference for Delaware law. Although there is disagreement in the academic community as to whether this process leads to the selection of a value-maximizing body of corporate law or one that permits management self-dealing at the expense of shareholders or other corporate constituencies, scholars agree that the process is appropriately characterized as regulatory competition.6 States compete for corporate charters by offering variations in corporate law. Whether

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1 See, e.g., Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 1010 (1995) (stating that “Delaware remains the preeminent state for incorporation” for publicly traded companies).
2 See id. at 969-71 (explaining Delaware’s rise to prominence in 1913 when New Jersey passed legislation effectively outlawing trusts and holding companies).
3 See, e.g., Sara-Ellen Amster, Bureaucrats Move Money Around Globe—all from Delaware, WILMINGTON NEWS-J., March 24, 1998; Delaware Division of Corporations (last modified Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.state.de.us/corp/index.htm> (Web page of the Secretary of State stating that more than 310,000 companies are incorporated in Delaware including 60% of Fortune 500 and 50% of New York Stock Exchange companies).
6 See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5, at 1909 (describing consensus that corporate law has bred a system of regulatory competition and disagreement about whether the competition results in a race to the top or to the bottom).
the competition is described as a race to the bottom or a race to the top, Delaware emerges as the undisputed winner.

Several factors, however, weaken the explanatory power of the regulatory competition model. First, variations in state corporation laws are minimal. If there are few substantive differences between Delaware law and that of other states, it is difficult to understand the incorporation decision as reflecting a preference for Delaware law. Second, empirical analysis fails to demonstrate the superiority or inferiority of Delaware’s substantive law. For example, studies indicate that state antitakeover statutes reduce shareholder value. A race to the top theory would therefore predict that Delaware would not adopt an antitakeover statute; a race to the bottom theory would predict the adoption of a strong antitakeover statute. In fact, Delaware has opted for a middle ground and adopted a moderate antitakeover statute that is not adequately explained by either theory. Third, Delaware’s advantage in attracting charters seems immune from competition. Despite efforts to enter the race, other states appear to be unable to compete. Indeed closer examination reveals regulatory competition to be essentially a two horse race. Corporations choose between incorporating in their home state and incorporating in Delaware. Virtually no corporation chooses any other alternative.

Importantly, choosing to incorporate in Delaware is not costless. Delaware’s franchise fees for large corporations are significantly higher than those imposed by any other state. The largest corporations pay $150,000 a year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware. Although these fees may not be financially material for a Fortune 500 company, Delaware’s continued ability to impose fees substantially in excess of those charged by other states suggests that Delaware incorporation offers nontrivial value. In other words, it suggests that the corporate preference for Delaware is real.

As a result, scholars have continued their efforts to explain this preference by looking beyond substantive differences in Delaware

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7. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 5, at 729-34 (concluding that corporate law is relatively uniform).
8. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. Mccahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1881 n.65 (1995) (describing "a large body of empirical work [that] confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a harmful effect on shareholder value").
10. See Daines, supra note 5.
11. See Delaware Division of Corporations Schedule of Franchise Tax, (last modified Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.state.de.us/corp/sch-tax.htm> (describing the maximum annual franchise tax as $150,000).
corporate law. For example, commentators have developed transaction cost models of Delaware law, arguing that Delaware reduces regulatory costs because of network externalities, its commitment to regulatory responsiveness, and the superiority of specialized chancery courts. These alternatives provide explanations for Delaware's success that do not depend on proof that Delaware law is substantively superior. Many of the nonsubstantive explanations look to Delaware's body of case law as an important advantage. The large volume of business litigation in Delaware, coupled with Delaware's specialized court system, results in a well developed collection of corporate law precedents. Commentators have argued that this collection may account both for Delaware's competitive success and the inability of other states to duplicate that success. It is accepted legal lore that well developed precedent is particularly valuable to business decisionmaking. Legal rules that are easy to ascertain, with predictable consequences, reduce the cost of business transactions.

A closer look at Delaware precedent reveals, however, that, although well developed, it is far from clear and predictable. Recent work demonstrates a degree of indeterminacy in Delaware law that casts substantial doubt on the transaction cost model. Because of this indeterminacy, it has been suggested that Delaware case law may impose excessive costs on Delaware corporations. This finding

16. See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 918 (1990) (arguing that specialized judiciary makes Delaware incorporation more attractive); Black, supra note 13 at 589-90 (arguing that Delaware's prominence is due to the expertise of its judiciary).
21. See id.
22. See Kamar, supra note 5, at 1919-22 (suggesting that the amount of indeterminacy in Delaware law may be suboptimal and impose excessive costs on business decisionmakers).
presents a puzzle to those who seek to explain the dominance of Delaware incorporation. This article offers a solution to the puzzle and an alternative explanation for Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters—the unique lawmaking function of the Delaware courts. The article focuses on the peculiar role of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking, a role that has received little attention from corporate law scholars. The article demonstrates that Delaware uses an unusual process to make corporate law. Delaware relies heavily on judge-made law, but the structure and operation of the Delaware courts causes Delaware's judicial lawmaking to differ from that in other states. Indeed, the process by which Delaware courts make corporate law resembles legislation in some ways.23 The article then evaluates this lawmaking structure from a standpoint of comparative institutional advantage. In particular, the article compares Delaware's process to the political process. The article concludes that Delaware lawmaking offers Delaware corporations a variety of benefits, including flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from undue political influence, and transparency. These benefits increase Delaware's ability to adjust its corporate law to changes in the business world. By identifying the role of the Delaware courts as central to Delaware's dominance of the market for corporate charters, this article has important implications for the application of Delaware's success to continuing questions of regulatory design.

I. Regulatory Competition and the Cary-Winter Debate

Analysis of regulatory competition in corporate law begins with the classic Cary-Winter debate. In 1974, William Cary published a seminal article identifying Delaware's leadership status as a corporate domicile.24 Cary analyzed Delaware's success and concluded that, because of its substantial reliance on corporate franchise taxes, Delaware deliberately sought to attract corporate charters. Moreover, because the choice of state of incorporation is made by management, Cary posited that Delaware structured its corporation law to appeal to corporate management. According to Cary, the result was lax legal standards that favored management interests over those of shareholders. Cary termed

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the competition a "race to the bottom" and recommended federal minimum standards to stop the race.\textsuperscript{25}

Cary's conclusions were challenged, most famously by Judge Ralph Winter.\textsuperscript{26} While agreeing with Cary's observation of regulatory competition in corporate law, Winter argued that the competition was more accurately described as a "race to the top." Significantly, Winter argued that market constraints preclude managers from sacrificing shareholder interests by choosing a domicile with inferior rules of corporate law. Indeed, the markets within which firms operate create incentives for managers to choose the corporate law that maximizes firm value.

Corporate law scholars have aligned themselves with Cary or Winter and expanded on the analysis of regulatory competition. Lucian Bebchuk, for example, agrees with Cary that at least some aspects of regulatory competition are value-decreasing.\textsuperscript{27} Bebchuk warns that state competition is unlikely to produce efficient rules governing "issues that are 'significantly redistributive';" issues that directly affect the strength of the market, particularly takeover regulation; and issues that implicate the interests of third parties.\textsuperscript{28} Accordingly Bebchuk argues that Cary correctly concludes that state competition will, in some cases, cause states to provide legal rules that favor manager interests over those of shareholders. In his most recent work, Bebchuk, together with Allen Ferrell, argues that states have produced bad takeover law and suggests that takeover regulation is not an isolated example of the failure of regulatory competition but rather a reason to give greater credence to Cary's analysis.\textsuperscript{29} William Bratton and Joseph McCahery offer a similar perspective, describing charter competition as an example of regulatory capture by corporate management and explaining that, as a result of this capture, state competition is unlikely to produce optimal corporate law.\textsuperscript{30}

Most corporate law scholars, however, align themselves with Winter. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for example, concur in Winter's assessment that market factors are likely to result in corporate law

\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 666, 696-705.
\textsuperscript{29} See id.
\textsuperscript{30} See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 8, at 1862.
maximizing firm value.31 Roberta Romano argues that an extensive body of empirical work demonstrates the success of regulatory competition in producing a body of corporate law that increases firm value. Indeed Romano goes so far as to defend the federalist structure that results in regulatory competition as "The Genius of American Corporate Law."32 Recent empirical work by Robert Daines lends further support to Winter's assessment by demonstrating that Delaware law increases firm value.33

The regulatory competition model has important implications for corporate law. Cary sought to predicate a defense of federal incorporation or, at least, federal minimum standards, on his description of regulatory competition as producing a race to the bottom.34 Romano, in contrast, uses her defense of state competition to argue against federal regulation of takeovers.35 In fact, Romano asserts that the demonstrated success of regulatory competition in corporate law supports adoption of a similar approach to securities regulation in place of the existing system of mandatory national rules.36

It is difficult, however, to explain Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate charters on the basis of the substantive superiority of Delaware corporate law, whether substantive superiority is defined as better for shareholders as in Winter's view, or better for managers, as Cary claimed. For one thing, state corporation statutes contain relatively little substantive variation. Careful empirical research reveals that corporate codes tend toward uniformity.37 Even though innovations may initially cause statutory differences, the statutes rapidly converge.38 Although convergence is a predictable result of regulatory

32. Romano, supra note 15.
33. See Daines, supra note 5 (concluding that firms which incorporate in Delaware have statistically higher Tobins Qs).
34. See Cary, supra note 9, at 701.
35. See Romano, supra note 15, at 75-84.
36. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998) (arguing that issuers should be able to choose which jurisdiction's disclosure requirements apply to it).
37. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence of Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 641, 702 (1998) ("the best documented finding in the empirical literature on the U.S. corporate chartering competition is that a high degree of uniformity has emerged in American corporate laws"); Carney, supra note 3, at 717 (empirical study concluding that American corporate law is "relatively uniform across most states"); Romano, supra note 18, at 709 (finding "substantial uniformity across the states").
38. See Carney, supra note 5, at 729-34.
competition, Delaware's ability to dominate the market in light of this convergence is less explicable.\textsuperscript{39}

In addition, evidence suggests that, although Delaware is successful in attracting charters, its law is not optimal. Cary and Bebchuk have noted a variety of ways in which Delaware law appears to favor management interests at the expense of shareholder interests.\textsuperscript{40} Bebchuk's more recent analysis of takeover regulation indicates that Delaware's substantive law of takeovers is particularly problematic, an analysis that is not contradicted by Romano's efforts to defend Delaware law.\textsuperscript{41} Romano and other scholars in the Winter camp agree that state antitakeover regulation inefficiently interferes with the market for corporate control, yet these scholars are unable to reconcile this inefficiency with their defense of regulatory competition.\textsuperscript{42} If states compete for charters by offering superior products, it is difficult to understand why competition has not addressed the observed problems in Delaware law.

Indeed, if there is a competitive market for corporate charters, why has no state been able to supplant Delaware by offering a superior statute? To the contrary, no state has been able to duplicate Delaware's success at attracting charters. Although other states have attempted to compete by modeling their law after that of Delaware, they are unable to attract incorporations.\textsuperscript{43} Cary and other commentators point to the relatively recent effort by Nevada to become a "Delaware of the West."\textsuperscript{44} In addition to adopting the Delaware statute, the Nevada legislature adopted Delaware case law.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, courts construing Nevada law appear to follow Delaware precedent.\textsuperscript{46} Nonetheless,
Nevada has not persuaded corporations to consider Nevada incorporation as a viable alternative to the traditional choice between their home state and Delaware.\textsuperscript{47}

These observations have led to a refinement of the academic models of regulatory competition. Commentators have replaced the initial attempts to defend Delaware's dominance on the basis of substantive superiority by a broader range of explanations. Roberta Romano, for example, has done extensive work explaining why Delaware, from a transaction cost perspective, has an incentive to compete for corporate charters and is able to maintain its existing advantage in the race.\textsuperscript{48} Romano explains that, because Delaware is a small state and is heavily dependent on the revenues it obtains from corporate franchise taxes, it is able to commit to its regulatory structure in a way that is impossible for states that lack similar financial incentives.\textsuperscript{49} This viewpoint is shared by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, who further explain the selection of Delaware as driven by interest group dynamics.\textsuperscript{50} Under the Macey & Miller model, Delaware competes by making its law attractive to the lawyers who benefit from litigation conducted in Delaware.\textsuperscript{51} This competition need not increase firm value; indeed it may lead to a litigation intensive regulatory structure that sacrifices the interests of the firm and its shareholders in favor of the interests of counsel.

Scholars have expanded on the transaction cost approach and identified a variety of nonsubstantive explanations for Delaware's success. Although a complete analysis of these explanations is beyond the scope of this article, they include the responsiveness of the Delaware legislature and its commitment to updating the Delaware statute,\textsuperscript{52} Delaware's specialized and expert judiciary which provides both rapid and high quality litigation decisions,\textsuperscript{53} network externalities provided by Delaware law,\textsuperscript{54} and herd behavior.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{47} See Kamar, supra note 5, at 1911.
\textsuperscript{48} See Romano, supra note 5; Romano, supra note 15.
\textsuperscript{49} See Romano, supra note 15, at 37-42.
\textsuperscript{50} See Macey & Miller, supra note 5.
\textsuperscript{51} See id. at 470 (explaining that "the rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state").
\textsuperscript{52} See, e.g., Kaouris, supra note 1, at 973 (describing responsiveness of Delaware legislature to corporate needs).
\textsuperscript{53} See infra notes 112-121.
\textsuperscript{54} See supra note 14.
\textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 37, at 703 (explaining that "[c]orporations may prefer to locate in a popular jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not the inherent
Whatever the source of Delaware's advantage, firms pay for the privilege of Delaware incorporation. The largest firms pay $150,000 a year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware. Although this amount may seem small relative to the operations of a large public corporation, it is five hundred to one thousand times the amount those firms would pay to incorporate elsewhere. Troubled by the evidence that Delaware can persistently charge what appears to be a noncompetitive price for the privilege of incorporation, scholars persist in an effort to explain how Delaware incorporation adds value. In terms of transaction costs, the choice of Delaware can be explained if Delaware incorporation reduces the costs of business operations. The benefits of Delaware incorporation may include such nonsubstantive advantages as better courts or more readily available case law. So long as the benefits outweigh the slightly higher cost of Delaware incorporation, firms will continue to choose Delaware.

The problem with many of the nonsubstantive explanations for Delaware's success is the inability of scholars to tie Delaware's supposed advantages to predictable cost savings for Delaware firms. For example, although a competent and expert judiciary might reduce the cost of litigation, Delaware law seems to create an increased risk of litigation for Delaware firms. The combination of reduced litigation costs but increased incidence of litigation is likely to have an indeterminate effect on firm value. Scholars also attribute Delaware's success to network externalities, which reduce information and compliance costs. Yet there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that Delaware firms incur
lower legal costs.\textsuperscript{62} Indeed, the limited scholarship on this issue suggests that interest groups such as Delaware corporate lawyers have market power of their own and are able to extract additional fees from firms that incorporate in the state.\textsuperscript{63} In addition, the increased legal costs associated with out-of-state incorporation have been cited as a downside to Delaware incorporation.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, a reduction in attorneys' fees, like the more general reduction in legal costs, would have to be weighed against the greater risk of litigation associated with Delaware incorporation.

Delaware's body of decisional law provides a more general transaction cost explanation for Delaware's success. Commentators argue that, because of the substantial volume of business litigation in the state, Delaware has built up a store of precedent that serves as an independent and valuable resource for firms subject to Delaware law.\textsuperscript{65} Thus Romano explains that Delaware's "well-developed case law with a pool of handy precedent" makes Delaware decisions "more predictable than those of other states."\textsuperscript{66} Mel Eisenberg describes Delaware's rich case law as increasing predictability.\textsuperscript{67}

Extensive and predictable case law reduces the cost of business operations in two ways. A well developed body of precedent makes it cheaper and easier to ascertain the legal consequences associated with business decisions, thereby reducing the information cost of structuring transactions. In addition, clear legal rules reduce the risk of subsequent litigation. Notably, these benefits are independent of the substantive merits of the applicable legal rules. Commentators have observed that, with respect to business transactions, it is often more important that the applicable legal rules be settled than that they be settled correctly.\textsuperscript{68}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item\textsuperscript{62} See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 577 (1998) (questioning extent to which network externalities can be expected to reduce the cost of legal services).
\item\textsuperscript{63} See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 472; Kamar & Kahan, supra note 12, at 54.
\item\textsuperscript{64} See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, Why Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 4-6 (1994) (describing the extra costs for an Illinois business to incorporate in Delaware).
\item\textsuperscript{65} See, e.g., Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 894 (1969) (offering as the reason for Delaware's dominance: "the large body of precedent that has been built up since 1899—lawyers know what they are getting into").
\item\textsuperscript{66} Romano, supra note 5, at 277.
\item\textsuperscript{67} See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1508 (1989).
\item\textsuperscript{68} See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obev Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 827 (1994), Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 598 (1987) (citing predictability as more important than optimality in contract and real estate transactions); Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 218 (1990) (common approach to the rules of offer and acceptance in contract law is that "it is more important
a consequence, the predictability and stability provided by Delaware's extensive body of precedent are described as one of the affirmative advantages of Delaware incorporation.  

Upon closer examination, however, Delaware law is revealed not as predictable, but rather as surprisingly indeterminate. A number of factors contribute to this indeterminacy. Delaware's corporate law rules are standards based, Delaware precedents are narrow and fact-specific, and Delaware courts employ weak principles of stare decisis leading to extensive doctrinal flux. It is difficult to reconcile this reality of Delaware law with the received economic wisdom that stable and predictable legal rules are optimal. As a result, Ehud Kamar and Marcel Kahan raise questions about the efficiency of Delaware law, suggesting that the indeterminacy of Delaware law may be value-reducing. Moreover, Kamar argues that Delaware effectively employs indeterminacy to impede the ability of other states to compete with Delaware for corporate charters. Thus indeterminacy increases Delaware's market power. These conclusions create a puzzle for Kamar and Kahan. If Delaware law is suboptimal, is Delaware's market power merely the result of anticompetitive behavior? Is Delaware a successful monopolist that has taken advantage of imperfections in the market for corporate law?

This article suggests another answer. In the following section, the article explores in greater detail the manner in which Delaware produces corporate law. The article demonstrates that Delaware employs an atypical lawmaking process. A substantial portion of Delaware's corporate law is made by the courts, but the Delaware courts make law in a manner traditionally associated with legislative rather than judicial lawmaking. The following section of the article explores the normative implications of this process.

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69. See, e.g., Kaouri, supra note 1, at 1011; Massey, supra note 17, at 702-3 (stating that "there is widespread agreement that one important reason [that more large corporations incorporate in Delaware than any other state] is that Delaware offers a more certain and predictable body of law").

70. See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1256 (1999) ("Ideal rules of corporate law should be consistent.").

71. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 12, at 67 (concluding that "it is likely that Delaware law is more litigation-intensive than is optimal").

72. See Kamar, supra note 5. Kamar does not argue that Delaware's use of indeterminacy is purposeful.
II. THE DELAWARE COURTS AS LAWMAKERS

A. The Traditional Lawmaking Role of the Courts

In other projects, I have analyzed the lawmaking role of the courts and some of the structural differences between judicial and legislative lawmaking.\(^{73}\) I have developed what might be described as a model of traditional judicial lawmaking. I argue that traditional judicial lawmaking is generally evolutionary in nature.\(^{74}\) More specifically, judicial lawmaking is characterized by incremental legal change within the framework of a fixed set of objectives.\(^{75}\) Unlike legislatures, courts rarely change legal rules as a result of a shift in political power or a rejection of the policies that motivated the adoption of the original rule, preferring to leave those decisions for the legislative process.

Courts are also limited in the scope of the legal change that they can effect due to limitations on control of their agendas.\(^{76}\) Courts, unlike legislatures, generally cannot initiate legal change but must wait for litigants to commence an action.\(^{77}\) Courts may also, in some circumstances, be constrained by requirements such as justiciability as to the issues that they can reach.\(^{78}\) As a consequence of these limitations, adjudicative legal change is more predictable, coherent and, frequently, smaller in magnitude than legislative change.

These characteristics are enhanced by the doctrine of stare decisis which operates to limit the circumstances under which a court may deviate from a previously adopted legal rule. In another pending project, I explain how stare decisis enhances the stability of judicial lawmaking.\(^{79}\) While a legislature requires no justification to overturn a previously adopted statute or reject a policy objective embraced by its predecessor, a court's disagreement with the wisdom of a previously adopted legal rule is rarely sufficient to justify overruling. Instead, a court that wishes to overturn a precedent must generally demonstrate that the prior legal rule suffers from some sort of substantive or

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74. See Fisch, supra note 23, at 1107-8.
75. See id.
79. See Fisch, supra note 73.
procedural defect. Although a court may seek to escape the consequences of a contrary precedent by distinguishing it, that very act narrows the scope of the court’s decision. This distinction between the legislative and judicial processes permits the government to choose greater legal stability by committing particular subject matter to the courts. Thus the doctrine of stare decisis fosters stable legal rules and privileges courts over legislators as creators of those rules.

Finally, the temporal scope of judicial lawmaking reinforces the traditional judicial role. Judge-made rule changes typically apply retroactively. This operation can be justified on both fairness and efficiency grounds because of the nature of judicial lawmaking. A variety of doctrinal constraints limit the ability of courts to apply new legal rules in a purely prospective manner. In the federal courts, for example, prospective adjudication may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause or the constitutional ban on advisory opinions. Forward-looking aspects of judicial opinions may also be characterized as dicta, a characterization that allows subsequent courts to disregard such statements as authoritative rulemaking. These constraints effectively limit the extent to which judicial rulemaking can focus on the regulation of future transactions.

These characteristics of traditional judicial lawmaking increase the stability and predictability of judge-made law relative to legislation. I argue elsewhere that these features may explain the dominance of common law rules in areas such as property and contract law, where stability and predictability are said to reduce transaction costs and facilitate transactions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified the primacy of stability and predictability in these areas as a basis for applying principles that restrain judicial lawmaking to this traditional mode, such as requiring courts to adhere closely to precedent.
B. Characteristics of Delaware law

Although Delaware’s role in the competition for corporate charters is frequently analyzed in terms of Delaware’s corporation statute, judge-made law is at least as, if not more, significant. Despite their statutory source, the majority of Delaware’s important legal rules are the result of judicial decisions. The scope of the business judgment rule, the analysis of transactions that implicate the duty of loyalty, the legal standards governing management’s response to a hostile tender offer, all are based on legal principles articulated by the Delaware courts. Lawyers tend to think of corporate law as statutory, but there is a substantial common law component to Delaware corporate law.

From a transactional perspective, the importance of decisional law increases. Although the Delaware statute provides general guidelines about corporate formalities such as the scheduling of annual meetings and the required components of a corporate charter, the statute does not deal with the fiduciary principles that provide the foundation of corporate law and allow, under appropriate circumstances, judicial scrutiny of corporate decisionmaking. As a practical matter, the interpretation and application of these fiduciary principles is the heart of corporate law, yet the Delaware statute provides almost no guidance on the subject. Apart from the provision that relates to interested director transactions, the Delaware statute does not even address the subject of fiduciary duties.

Moreover, Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a greater extent than other states. Other state statutes, for example, define the standard of care applicable to corporate directors, the Delaware statute does not. Although Delaware decisions authorize directors to

87. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1991) (requirements regarding annual shareholder meeting). Indeed, even with respect to these types of issues, literal compliance with the statutory requirements may not save a transaction from judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (the court rejected advancement of the date of an annual meeting, in compliance with the relevant statute, holding that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”).


89. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).


91. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 44, at 21 (explaining that Nevada has codified the standard of care applicable to directors, but Delaware has not).
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, Delaware has no “other constituency” statute. Other states have codified the business judgment rule; Delaware has left development of the rule to common law. Georgia has a statutory provision addressed to the corporate opportunity doctrine; Delaware relies on precedent. Even the circumstances under which a demand is excused in a shareholder derivative suit are addressed in Delaware by judge-made chancery court rules rather than by statute.

The lawmaking by Delaware courts is also distinctive. As noted above, Delaware decisional law is relatively indeterminate. Delaware’s judicial lawmaking also has a number of atypical characteristics that cause it to resemble the legislative process. Despite the similarities, Delaware courts do not face the political pressures associated with legislative lawmaking; indeed, for state courts, the Delaware courts enjoy a high degree of political independence.

Recent scholarship has highlighted the indeterminacy of Delaware law. As Ehud Kamar shows, Delaware cases have adopted a largely

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95. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 90, at 1505 (stating that Delaware does not have a statute on the business judgment rule).
96. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-871(a)(1)(C) (1994) (authorizing an action against corporate officers or directors for the appropriation of any business opportunity of the corporation).
97. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (developing Delaware common law corporate opportunity doctrine).
98. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (addressing demand requirement); DEL. CODE ANN tit. 10, § 361 (1999) (authorizing chancellor to adopt rules of chancery court). Compare N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1999) (statutorily specifying when demand is required); Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 196 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding that changing the scope of demand requirement was properly a subject for the legislature not the court).
99. Some commentators go further and characterize substantive areas of Delaware law as incoherent. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 70, at 1287 (describing “current Delaware rules on minority discounts [as] incoherent, unpredictable, and inconsistent with the appraisal statute”).
100. The discussion here focuses on the indeterminacy of Delaware's liability rules. The nature of corporate law creates highly indeterminate remedial law as well. For example, difficulties in valuation make it difficult to predict the result of a judicial determination to award fair price or fair value. See generally Ruthford B. Campbell, Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N. CAR. L. REV. 101, 103 (1999) (describing absence of underlying principles in valuation determinations and resulting lack of consistency and predictability in case outcomes). This ambiguity is both inherent in business law and not unique to Delaware.
standard-based approach. Kamar focuses on cases dealing with fiduciary duties and demonstrates that fact-intensive legal standards dominate the case law. Legal tests that turn on the proportionality of management’s response to a perceived threat, that assess the legitimacy of a self-dealing transaction based on whether it meets a test of “entire fairness,” and that use reasonableness as a benchmark for evaluating business decisionmaking are standard based. Standards apply general principles that judges must use to evaluate transactions from an ex post perspective. Louis Kaplow explains that standards, in comparison to rules, increase judicial discretion. This discretion, in turn, reduces the ability of decisionmakers to predict the legal consequences of their actions ex ante.

Delaware courts also apply the relevant legal standards in a fact and case specific manner. As a result, one court’s determination that a particular course of dealing was reasonable under the relevant legal test provides little guidance to corporate actors about subsequent decisions applying the same legal test. One of the best known illustrations of this problem is the takeover cases. Some commentators have struggled to formulate a theory of Delaware takeover doctrine that permits them to reconcile cases such as Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. Such a reconciliation is extremely difficult, however, and leaves the courts open to the charge that their decisions are random or arbitrary. Although the outcomes in these decisions can be explained instead on the basis of factual differences, this analysis can only be performed on an ex post basis. As a result, the decisions offer little insight to those who seek predictive power from doctrinal analysis.

Kamar’s observations about Delaware law admittedly are true, to some extent, about corporate law in other states. Indeed, many states choose to follow Delaware decisional law. Nonetheless, to the extent

101. See Kamar, supra note 5.
103. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox? The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 383 (1994) (arguing that Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence is based on the scope of authority allocated to directors).
104. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
105. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
106. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 166 (1997) (“From a doctrinal perspective, Time-Warner [571 A.2d at 1140] and QVC are extremely difficult to reconcile.”).
107. See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5, at 1918 (explaining that the “key” to reconciling Time and QVC is “a close reading of factual nuances”).
108. See, e.g., Alva, supra note 16, at 903 n.92 (describing frequency with which prominent Delaware decisions have been cited by other courts).
that legal standards diverge, the principles adopted by Delaware courts retain the greatest degree of ambiguity. For example, under Delaware law, a court faced with a motion by a special litigation committee to dismiss a derivative suit may, in addition to considering the degree to which the committee was informed and independent, also evaluate whether, in the court’s independent business judgment, dismissal is appropriate. The New York courts have rejected the second component of this test, significantly reducing the degree of judicial discretion. Similarly, Delaware’s controversial intermediate standard of review in the takeover context is not universally accepted as the appropriate test for evaluating the directors’ conduct.

Delaware decisional law is also characterized by a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness. Not only are Delaware courts active lawmakers, they are willing to revise previously announced legal doctrines on the theory that a different approach reflects sounder policy. In part, the flexibility of Delaware case law results from the structure of the Delaware courts. The Delaware chancery courts, which are the trial level courts on corporate issues, are courts of equity. Delaware adheres closely to traditional English principles of equity and is one of only three states to retain the equity/law distinction. The nature of equity jurisprudence contributes to the flexibility in Delaware corporate law and, because chancery courts sit without a jury, they are able to resolve corporate issues rapidly. Delaware courts are also known for their ability to respond to business litigation quickly through, for example, granting expedited hearings and providing a rapid turnaround time on decisions.

The Delaware chancery courts are also specialized courts. Approximately three quarters of the cases pending before the chancery

111. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (rejection of Unocal and codification of existing common law).
112. See Alva, supra note 16, at 903.
113. See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery - 1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 840 (1993) (explaining that “the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, has adhered more closely to the English Court of Chancery and to English precedents, than those of any of her sister States”) (footnote omitted).
114. See Alva, supra note 16, at 903.
115. See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5, at 1943 (describing how Delaware courts remain faithful to tradition as courts of equity); Massey, supra note 17, at 703 (describing how equity jurisdiction contributes to flexibility and responsiveness of Delaware decisional law).
116. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (providing that the Chancery court sits without a jury); Massey, supra note 17, at 704 (explaining that absence of a jury enables the court to act more quickly).
117. See Massey, supra note 17, at 704.
118. See id. at 705.
court are corporate. Delaware chancery judges are known for their expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation for its sophistication in corporate law. As a result, chancery court opinions are widely quoted, and the legal standards announced by the chancery courts are widely taken to reflect the current state of Delaware law.

The fact that a specialized trial court is, in Delaware, the primary judicial lawmaker, increases the degree of flexibility in Delaware corporate law. The decision of one chancery court does not bind another, and chancery court decisions are readily overturned by the Delaware Supreme Court even when they appear to have developed workable or predictable legal standards. Thus, as a practical matter, Delaware case law is based on a large number of decisions that have little stare decisis effect.

Although decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court are, of course, binding on the chancery court, the supreme court also appears ready to distinguish or overrule a precedent without regard to considerations of stare decisis. The absence of attention to stare decisis is partially a consequence of the fact-intensive nature of the court’s decisions; the court can easily deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case specific facts to distinguish its prior holding. Similarly the court can narrow the precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings narrowly and tying those holdings to specific facts. Yet even when the court overrules itself, it does so seemingly unconstrained by the considerations of stare decisis that commonly limit overruling. For example, when the court explicitly overturned several of its own precedents in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the opinion made no reference to the doctrine of stare decisis. Instead, the court operates on the basis that it, like a legislature, can rewrite its prior doctrine based solely on a reassessment of the relevant policy considerations.

The unanimity norm of the Delaware Supreme Court further distinguishes the Delaware judiciary from that of other state courts. David Skeel explains that the norm also contributes to the instability of Delaware legal doctrine. As Skeel has observed, the Delaware Supreme

119. See Alva, supra note 16, at 903.
120. Delaware courts also enjoy a greater degree of political independence than that of many state courts. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1989) (describing the argument that a court which distinguishes a precedent by narrowing the previously announced rule to the facts of the prior case is, in effect, unconstrained by the precedent).
123. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
Court has an unusual tendency to issue unanimous decisions. Skeel explains that the unanimity norm destabilizes Delaware law by masking the degree to which varying judicial preferences may lead to cycling from one doctrinal approach to another. Skeel demonstrates how the varying preferences of individual justices as to the appropriate legal approach in takeover cases may explain the doctrinal shift from Time-Warner to QVC. In addition to departing from the decisionmaking process used by other states, the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process, in which a single result masks conflicting or cycling lawmaking principles that are likely to animate future results, more closely resembles legislative decisionmaking.

Delaware judges also control their lawmaking agenda to an unusual degree. Chris Peters explains that, as a general principle, judges cannot generally choose the legal issues that they wish to decide, but rather must wait for the appropriate case to present itself. Legal rules announced by a court that are unnecessary to the result in a given case are disparagingly characterized as dicta. Similarly, courts are constrained as to the temporal scope of their lawmaking. Recent Supreme Court precedent finds constitutional support for the principle that judicial lawmaking should be retroactive, and that it is improper for a court to announce a legal rule in a case and then fail to apply that legal rule to the parties before it.

Delaware courts seem unconstrained by these principles. They have repeatedly announced legal principles solely to guide future business decisionmaking. Ron Gilson explains Chancellor Allen’s practice of providing doctrinal guidance for future transactions through dicta. Despite upholding the structure of a transaction or the decision of the board, Allen went out of his way on a number of occasions to point out

124. See Skeel, supra note 106. Skeel points to a number of factors that contribute to the unanimity norm, including an unusual Supreme Court rule that provides for an automatic en banc hearing in any case in which a justice dissent from a panel decision.
125. See id. at 166.
126. Indeed, Delaware recently amended its Constitution to permit the Delaware Supreme Court to answer questions certified to it by other State Supreme Courts. See Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8) (granting Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine questions of law certified to it by the highest appellate court of any other state). Most states only accept certified questions from federal courts. See Gen J. Yonover, A Primer, Gentle Eric: Raising In the Use of Certification, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 305, 314 (1994) (describing state certification rules as of 1998).
127. See Peters, supra note 76, at 2048.
128. See generally Dorf, supra note 85 (describing legal significance of characterizing reasoning as dicta).
129. See Fisch, supra note 23, at 1060-63 (analyzing decisions requiring retroactive adjudication).
130. Doug Branson terms these announcements “roadmaps.” See Branson, supra note 20, at 104-05.
weaknesses or deficiencies that should be remedied.\textsuperscript{132} A notable example is the \textit{Caremark} decision\textsuperscript{133} in which Chancellor Allen provided a comprehensive description of the duties of corporate directors\textsuperscript{134} in the context of approving a settlement and despite concluding, at the outset of the opinion, that "there is a very low probability . . . that the directors of Caremark breached any duty to appropriately monitor and supervise the enterprise."\textsuperscript{135} The fact that the description was dicta did not seem to affect its importance as an addition to Delaware law. The principles announced in \textit{Caremark} have been among the most frequently cited by subsequent courts and commentators.\textsuperscript{136}

Delaware courts have also reached out to apply newly announced doctrines to cases seemingly outside the courts' reach. For example, concerned that stockholders would not anticipate its new rules governing appraisal rights and take the necessary steps to preserve their rights, the court in \textit{Weinberger} announced that it would permit stockholders in a variety of ongoing transactions and lawsuits to retroactively claim the benefits of the new rule.\textsuperscript{137} This decision was in clear contravention of the statutory limitations on the assertion of appraisal rights. The supreme court's action in \textit{Weinberger} was a departure from the lawmaking norm that judges lack the freedom to adjust the timing with which their newly announced legal rules take effect in order to reflect policy considerations.\textsuperscript{138}

In conclusion, Delaware courts are not structured like typical state courts and do not restrict themselves to traditional judicial lawmaking. Instead, Delaware courts aggressively adopt and modify corporate law doctrine, exhibiting a degree of activism that more closely resembles the legislative process. This resemblance is enhanced by the nature of

\textsuperscript{132} Gilson cites this practice with approval.
Such self-conscious attention to influencing the conduct of future transactions, independent of the case before the court, gives special meaning to the phrase "mere dicta." In the fast moving environment into which events thrust the Court of Chancery, traditional common law accretion of precedent was too slow to help. The Chancellor's instrumental use of dicta, directed explicitly at transaction planners, was a creative and elegant response to the problem of keeping the law moving at a pace at least close to that of the market.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig.}, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Id.} at 966-70.
\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.} at 961.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{See}, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, \textit{Corporate Governance: The Board of Directors and Internal Control}, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 237, 261 (1997) (describing Chancellor Allen's statements in \textit{Caremark} as the "most comprehensive and authoritative statement on the current status of [the board's monitoring obligation]").
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{See Weinberger v. UPO, Inc.}, 457 A.2d 701, 714-15 (applying its remedy to pending and proposed mergers in which prospective plaintiffs might have already lost the right to pursue an appraisal).
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{See Fisch, supra note 23, at 1119} (discussing \textit{Weinberger} approach as a way of providing courts with greater temporal flexibility).
Delaware decisional law, which, although largely indeterminate and standard based, appears to be driven by policy considerations, including an effort to respond on an ongoing basis to developments in the business world. In short, Delaware judicial lawmaking may seem more closely tied to legislation. Nonetheless, as the next section will explain, the Delaware courts should not be seen as part of the political process. Indeed, Delaware judges enjoy a number of comparative advantages over state legislators as corporate lawmakers.

III. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DELAWARE’S LAWMAKING PROCESS

Thus far, this article has characterized Delaware judicial lawmaking as unusual. Does this unusual lawmaking matter? In particular, of what relevance is Delaware’s lawmaking process to the debate over regulatory competition? In this section, this article evaluates the normative consequences of Delaware’s lawmaking. The article considers whether Delaware’s approach to corporate lawmaking is likely to increase firm value, thereby offering an efficiency-based explanation for Delaware’s ability to attract corporations. Alternatively, Delaware’s lawmaking structure may, as suggested by Kamar, simply be a mechanism by which Delaware can maintain its position and increase its market power.

This article concludes that Delaware’s unusual lawmaking structure enhances firm value and perhaps explains the widespread preference for Delaware incorporation. Delaware’s lawmaking process is valuable in three ways. First, Delaware’s indeterminate corporate law may have benefits as well as costs. Indeterminacy induces negotiation and removes some incentives for strategic behavior. Indeterminate law also gives the courts greater flexibility. Second, Delaware’s lawmaking is uniquely structured to maximize responsiveness to changing business developments. Finally by vesting a high degree of legislative lawmaking power in a decisionmaker that is largely insulated from political pressure, Delaware reduces the potential for rent-seeking in connection with the lawmaking process.

A. The Value of Indeterminacy

Traditional analysis favors clear legal rules both because clear rules reduce information and litigation costs and because clear rules are viewed as more likely to induce primary behavior in compliance with
those rules. A legal system that relies on standards and muddy rules increases uncertainty which, in turn, increases transaction costs. Accordingly, traditional analysis suggests that business is more efficiently conducted under a clear rule based system.

Obviously this argument is overstated. A standard based approach can provide more realistic treatment of particularized facts. In cases in which factual distinctions are important, a rule based approach is likely to be unworkable. A broadly written rule will prove overinclusive and discourage valuable transactions; a narrowly written rule will be underinclusive and easy to avoid through careful planning. For example, if one takes the view that management resistance to a hostile tender offer is sometimes desirable, it would be legislatively difficult to specify the circumstances under which such resistance is permissible. A muddy "reasonableness" standard reduces the difficulty of specification while preventing opportunism.

Standards thus increase lawmaking efficiency in two ways. Standards permit the lawmaker to tailor the result in a case and to thereby avoid the hardship or unfairness associated with application of a crystalline rule without destroying the applicable doctrinal structure. Standards also create an affirmative role for the courts as gapfillers. In the business context, the absence of an explicit prohibition may imply that a transaction is unrestricted although, as a practical matter, it may be impossible to predict and specify the full range of limitations on business decisionmaking. Private business contracts are similarly likely to contain gaps due to changing or unanticipated circumstances or the practical impossibility of complete specification. Standards allow the courts to fill

139. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 5, at 1919 (describing importance of legal determinacy to business decisionmaking); see generally, Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Tort Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (1991) (discussing indeterminacy and the relative impact of rules versus standards on primary behavior).

140. The characterization of indeterminate legal rules as "muddy" originated with Carol Rose. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). Rose describes muddy rules as "fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision." Id. at 578. Muddy rules and standards are closely related concepts, although, as Dan Burk explains, commentators generally choose their terminology based on the focus of their analysis. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 129 (1999). Rules are described as muddy by commentators who are focusing on the indeterminacy of the rules. Commentators emphasize a standards based approach when they are focusing on the flexibility that standards provide to decisionmakers. See id. For purposes of this article, the choice of terminology is unimportant, Delaware decisional law can accurately be described as both standard based and muddy.

141. Indeed, even perfect rules are both under and overinclusive. See Johnston, supra note 139, at 363.

142. See Rose, supra note 140, at 603-04.

these gaps through ex post determinations. As Ian Ayres has observed, courts and the common law process are particularly well suited to this role. 144

Muddy rules may have particular utility in the business context because of their effect on the bargaining process. Ian Ayres and Eric Talley characterize muddy rules as an example of divided entitlements, in which each party has a probabilistic claim. 145 They then use game theory to demonstrate that muddy rules may facilitate bargaining. First, in the absence of the ability to predict a winner if the dispute results in litigation, the parties may be more willing to negotiate. Second, muddy rules can reduce the incentives to engage in strategic behavior by forcing parties to reveal information during negotiations. 146

Rules that encourage negotiation instead of litigation are especially valuable in corporate transactions, in which litigation costs can be large and create a deadweight loss for shareholders and society. Although Delaware law is often described as encouraging litigation, 147 a careful examination reveals that many Delaware cases settle early in the litigation process and that Delaware law both encourages and facilitates settlement. 148 Indeed, it is possible to explain some of the muddiness of Delaware case law as resulting from the procedural posture of the relevant judicial proceedings. Cases in which a court is considering a request for preliminary relief are apt to appear more indeterminate than cases in which the litigants have developed a complete factual and legal record. 149 Similarly, Delaware’s pro-settlement orientation may cause courts to announce legal rules in the context of approving a settlement. The Caremark 150 decision is an example of this practice. Another example is Kähn v. Sullivan, 151 in which the Delaware Supreme Court announced the legal principles that determine when corporate

144. See id. at 1394 (“Common law courts are the only institution that could possibly fill gaps better than the firms themselves.”).
146. See also Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995) (demonstrating that contingent ex post entitlements may induce efficient bargaining better than clear ex ante entitlements).
147. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlement Fever, BUS. LAW TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 7 (describing 2 1/2 year study of settlement practices in Delaware Chancery court and finding that court approved 96 of 98 proffered settlements and awarded an average of 52% of the attorneys fees requested).
149. See Gibson, supra note 151, at 915 (describing how fast-paced takeover market caused much takeover litigation to be resolved after a Chancery court decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction and prior to appellate review or trial on the merits).
151. 594 A. 2d 48 (Del. 1991)
philanthropy amounts to waste. Although in reviewing a settlement, the court must consider the strength of the plaintiff's claims, the Kahn court warned that its role was extremely limited. This limited role may result in rules that differ from those that would be announced in a different procedural context.

Muddy rules also enable courts to engage in ex post tailoring of the legal structure to the particular factual context presented. The nature of the litigation process provides courts with information that gives them a comparative advantage over legislatures with respect to this type of tailoring. Although legislatures may be better suited than courts at gathering information ex ante, they are less likely to see the ex post consequences of their chosen rules. Corporate law, in particular, because of the essentially unlimited range of structural possibilities, may make ex ante specification difficult. Corporate lawmakers may be unable to determine the appropriate legal standards until they see a range of factual scenarios. Muddy rules provide courts with the flexibility to respond to these scenarios.

The foregoing analysis does not mean that indeterminate corporate law is an unqualified good, merely that indeterminacy has benefits as well as the costs that have been identified by Kamar and others. Whether these benefits exceed the costs of indeterminacy to Delaware firms is an empirical question.

The costs of indeterminacy may, however, be overstated. Although indeterminacy increases the risk of liability, the penalties for corporate decisionmakers who guess wrong are particularly limited. To the extent that legal rules are indeterminate, corporate officers and directors are able to engage in a broader range of conduct without acting in bad faith. So long as they act in good faith, corporate decisionmakers are unlikely to face personal liability for their decisions. Indeed, good faith is typically the key to insuring their protection under statutory and charter limitations on personal liability and corporate indemnification.

153. See 394 A.2d at 59.
154. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1102 (1997) (explaining that "the Delaware legislature and courts cannot promulgate ex ante the standards to govern new situations until they see a variety of cases and figure out how well or badly people behaved").
155. See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5.
156. Ehud Kamar, for example, argues that indeterminacy subjects corporate decisionmakers to the risk of costly sanctions such as liability for money damages. See Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 892-96 (1999).
provisions. As a result, decisionmakers may not face a substantial risk of personal monetary liability under indeterminate legal rules. To the extent that a court's ex post application of a muddy rule results in injunctive relief, the injunction may simply have the effect of instructing the corporation as to the legal limits on its conduct. Thus, for example, if directors adopt a poison pill of questionable validity, the court's decision to strike it down is more informational than punitive, and the directors are unlikely to be worse off as a result of the decision than if they had decided not to adopt the pill in the first place.

B. The Value of Responsiveness

At the recent Business Associations session of the Annual Meeting of The Association of American Law Schools, Ron Gilson observed that corporate law matters when the real world changes. The evolution of Delaware case law reflects the truth of this observation. Delaware's law of fiduciary duties in the takeover context was the product of the frenzied takeover market of the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the extensive use of junk bond financing, public concern about the effect of corporate mergers on labor and community members, and the development by corporate management of a range of antitakeover devices. As the independent board of directors grew in importance, and shareholders began to rely on the independent board to monitor management decisionmaking, the Delaware courts responded by developing the scope of the duty of care and the circumstances under which the business judgment rule would protect board decisions. Recent controversies between large shareholders and management over the potential conflict between shareholder voting power and management authority over corporate decisionmaking present questions such as the legality of the dead hand poison pill and the permissibility of shareholder rights bylaw amendments.

Delaware's lawmaking process is ideally suited to respond to developments in the business world. First, Delaware is able to respond quickly. Although courts can, by nature, respond more rapidly than legislatures to a new development—the filing of a lawsuit is all that is

158. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1999) (permitting indemnification so long as officer or director acted in good faith); cf. Waltuch v. Commodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996) (interpreting Delaware indemnification statute to require good faith).
159. Cf. Kamar, supra note 156, at 855-86 (arguing that risk of liability constrains behavior of corporate fiduciaries).
required to trigger the lawmaking process—the traditional common law process is slow. The unique features of Delaware judicial lawmaking, including the activism of the courts and the limited role of stare decisis, allow Delaware to overcome this problem. Rather than considering themselves constrained by an evolutionary lawmaking process, Delaware courts respond with the type of broad and aggressive lawmaking more commonly seen in legislatures and administrative agencies. Procedural features of the Delaware courts enhance their responsiveness, including the courts' historic receptiveness to requests for expedited proceedings and their willingness to issue rulings quickly in the context of a fast-paced business transaction. The specialized caseload and the overall small size of Delaware's dockets further add to the judiciary's ability to respond quickly.

Second, Delaware is able to respond in a preliminary fashion to initial developments, which enables it both to signal the potential legal response to the business community and to await the development of further information in response to that signal. The procedural context of many chancery court decisions, in which the court is ruling on a request for expedited relief, allows the court to provide tentative guidance about a fast-paced business development while awaiting a full factual record before committing itself. Similarly, the courts can use their standards based fiduciary principles to defer the development of bright line rules.

Delaware's analysis of dead hand poison pills illustrates this process. The first legal guidance on the subject was issued by the chancery court in *Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.* The court narrowly held, in the context of a motion to dismiss, that dead hand pills were subject to challenge.
both under the Delaware statute and under fiduciary principles. Additionally, the court explicitly observed that it had no occasion to consider whether a pill of limited duration would present similar problems to the pill in the case at bar. A subsequent Chancery Court decision, Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., struck down a variation, a "no-hands" poison pill of limited duration, on narrow fiduciary duty grounds. Finally, on the appeal of the Mentor Graphics decision, the Delaware Supreme Court, working with the benefit of a full trial and an opportunity for appellate review, addressed the broader legal principle underlying both these decisions. The supreme court concluded that the pill's restrictions on subsequently-elected directors' ability to redeem the pill and sell the company conflicted with the board's statutory power under Delaware section 141(a).

With respect to many legal issues, the Delaware Supreme Court never provides such definitive resolution. Although appellate courts are generally viewed as playing a greater lawmaking role than trial courts, the exigencies of the business world, in many cases, force the chancery court to be the primary lawmaker. Thus, as Ron Gilson has explained, during the 1980s, the rapid transactional demands in the takeover market resulted in the resolution of many cases before they could be reviewed by the supreme court. This caused the Chancery Court to be "the court of first and last resort for many takeover contests."

Third, Delaware courts anticipate the effect of business developments and try to develop responsive legal principles. Procedurally, as noted above, the Delaware courts structure the temporal reach of their decisions in a manner that extends beyond the case at bar. The courts seem to be deliberately designing rules for future business transactions. Indeed, as Doug Branson has observed, the Delaware courts self-consciously instruct the business community as to future legal standards through lecturing tools such as roadmaps and dicta.

169. See id. at 1195 n.52.
170. 728 A.2d 23 (Del. Ch. 1998).
171. See id. at 38 n.53 (explaining that, because the pill was invalidated on fiduciary duty grounds, it was unnecessary for the court to address alternative arguments that it was invalid).
173. See id. at 1290-91 (concluding that delayed redemption provision violates "fundamental Delaware law").
174. See Gilson, supra note 131, at 915.
175. Id. at 916.
It is possible to understand the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in *Smith v. Van Gorkam* 177 in this way. *Van Gorkam* generated a tremendous amount of controversy, even criticism, about the court’s decision to subject the independent directors to personal liability for violating the duty of care. 178 Yet the court’s decision can be seen as an early signal of concern about the degree of oversight exercised by independent directors. 179 Moreover this signal anticipated, by several years, recognition by the investment community of the risks posed by independent directors who do not devote sufficient attention to corporate decisions. 180

Finally, Delaware can fine-tune and even replace its preliminary attempts at regulation if further developments demonstrate that the initial rules are problematic. Both the standards based approach, which permits easy adjustment to new situations, and the other elements of Delaware’s flexible use of precedent, allow it easily to adjust legal doctrine. As noted above, this flexibility is a function of the atypical nature of Delaware corporate decisional law and causes the chancery courts, in particular, to act something like administrative agencies. 181 The courts’ developed corporate law expertise allows them to assess the impact of their decisions. The facility with which Delaware courts can change doctrine allows them to respond to their assessment that a prior approach was unworkable or reflected a poor policy judgment.

### C. Political Advantages of Judicial Lawmaking

As the preceding sections have demonstrated, Delaware relies heavily on its courts to develop principles of corporate law, and Delaware courts make law in an unusual way. Why is this structure advantageous to

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177. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

178. See Elson, supra note 176, at 676 n.52 (describing criticisms of court’s decision).

179. This signal was not silenced by the Delaware legislature’s adoption of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). Although corporations are now statutorily authorized to eliminate some types of director liability, the default rule still imposes liability, and not every corporation opts out of the default rule. See Ayres, supra note 143, at 1412. Moreover, the statute does not permit liability to be eliminated for breaches of the duty of loyalty, acts in bad faith, or acts for which the director derives an improper personal benefit. See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 11 (1987) (providing technical analysis of §102(b)(7)).


181. The analogy to administrative agencies is based both on the specialization of the chancery courts, see supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text, and on their structure, see infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
Delaware corporations? This article has argued that Delaware is able to use its courts to fine-tune its legal rules in response to business developments in a manner that is more difficult through the legislative process. It has also argued that the Delaware courts are highly responsive.

Other commentators have, however, emphasized the responsiveness of the Delaware legislature as one of the particular advantages of Delaware incorporation. Moreover, if Delaware’s judicial lawmaking resembles legislation, why not rely on the legislative process? This section argues that Delaware’s lawmaking structure offers advantages over the legislative process by providing superior access, reducing political influence, and increasing transparency. These attributes give Delaware’s lawmaking structure comparative advantages with respect to the development of corporate law principles.

Neil Komesar has done some of the most extensive analysis of institutional competence and comparative institutional advantage. Komesar suggests that legislative and judicial lawmaking may each have strengths and weaknesses, but that careful analysis should consider the relative competence of each institution. In particular, legislatures may suffer from undue political influence, distortions due to rent-seeking, and the ability of well-organized interest groups to control the flow of information and, to some extent, the legislative agenda. Courts in general, and the Delaware courts in particular, may be less susceptible to these weaknesses. Moreover, the particular dynamics of corporate litigation give courts specific advantages as lawmakers.

One obvious advantage of judicial lawmaking in the business area is that it is litigant driven. In essence, the business community has control over the lawmaking agenda to a degree that cannot be obtained through efforts at legislative influence. Legislators can simply refuse to respond to a lawmaking request, deciding that the transaction is too difficult to understand, that it is improper to cater to business interests by making more corporate law rules, or that the interests of other constituencies have a more urgent claim on the lawmaking resources. Although the Delaware legislature has traditionally been very responsive to corporate requests for rulemaking, many other state legislatures have been less responsive, resulting in out-of-date and unworkable corporate statutes.
In contrast, business litigants can essentially force the court to evaluate the legality of a new type of transaction by bringing the issue to court.

Komesar argues that the costs of participation represent an important consideration in comparing alternative lawmaking institutions. He warns that courts are at a comparative disadvantage relative to the political process because of the variety of barriers to participation in the legal system, particularly in cases in which stakes are small and widely dispersed. Komesar suggests that it is generally easier and less expensive for consumers and voters to register their preferences through the political process.

Particular attributes of corporate law suggest, however, that litigation may offer advantages over the political process in terms of participant access to lawmaking. Many participants in corporate litigation are large corporations, the type of sophisticated, large stakes, participants for which the access barriers associated with adjudication are unlikely to pose a substantial burden.

Shareholders are the other major participants in corporate litigation. Komesar's analysis would seem more applicable to shareholders, but corporate litigation relies on a variety of substantive and procedural rules that affirmatively empower shareholders, increasing their access to the lawmaking process in a way that is not replicated in the political process. Mechanisms such as the shareholder derivative suit and the class action enable dissatisfied shareholders to challenge corporate decisionmaking. Most importantly, the rules for shareholder litigation free individual shareholders from responsibility for funding the costs of litigation. A range of fee shifting structures enable courts to award attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs, allocate responsibility for fees to the corporation, or assess fees against the trial judgment or settlement proceeds. By allowing entrepreneurial plaintiff's lawyers to fund...
shareholder litigation, these rules permit shareholders with limited funds to challenge corporations with substantial assets.

Moreover, the political process is poorly suited for participation by investors and competing business interests such as potential acquirers. Because of the structure of corporate law, only businesses resident in or incorporated in a state will have sufficient interest or ability to participate in the political process. Resident corporations can and do participate in the legislative process effectively, but this participation is, for the most part, not possible for other affected groups. Shareholders invest in a variety of corporations that are not incorporated in their home state. Even if an investor's stake were sufficient to make participation in the political process rational, dispersed nonresident shareholders are unlikely to have any influence with the legislature in the state of incorporation. Given individual investors' relatively small stakes as well as the dispersion of corporate domiciles, investors are even less likely to attempt to buy political influence by making political contributions to out of state legislators. Out of state businesses may have larger stakes, but are similarly likely to lack political influence in a state in which they are not a resident. Moreover, even if political activism were viable, a potential acquirer is unlikely to be able to anticipate where a future target will be incorporated. Accordingly, although the litigation playing field between corporate defendants and shareholder challengers may not be level, given that shareholder participation in the political process is likely to be nonexistent, shareholders clearly achieve greater voice through litigation.

In addition, various aspects of Delaware law facilitate shareholder access to the litigation process. Delaware imposes less onerous procedural burdens than many other states on shareholders seeking to initiate derivative suits. For example, Delaware does not require


194. Voting is the traditional manner by which large dispersed groups exercise political power. See Kosmer, supra note 77, at 74. Nonresident shareholders cannot vote in the state of incorporation. Indeed few investors can vote in Delaware.

195. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1176 (explaining that potential bidder is less likely than potential target to care about influencing Delaware law, because the law will only affect the bidder if it decides to bid for a Delaware target).
plaintiffs to post security for expenses,\textsuperscript{196} and makes it easy for plaintiff shareholders to serve nonresident directors.\textsuperscript{197} Delaware law makes it more difficult for a corporate board to dismiss shareholder-initiated litigation.\textsuperscript{198} Delaware courts have been generous in granting plaintiff requests for attorneys' fees in connection with shareholder suits.\textsuperscript{199} Some commentators even argue that Delaware decisional law reflects a pro-shareholder bias.\textsuperscript{200}

A second advantage of judicial lawmaking is its independence from political influence. Large public corporations have substantial funds available to influence political decisionmaking, and they do not hesitate to use these funds.\textsuperscript{201} Many commentators have expressed concern that corporations can exert a distorting influence on the political marketplace by drowning out competing arguments through extensive political spending.\textsuperscript{202} Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the regulation of corporate political expenditures based, in part, on the particular threat of political domination.\textsuperscript{203} Despite existing regulation, corporations have a variety of avenues of political influence available. Corporations can and do influence political campaigns through political action committees (PACs) and soft money contributions to the national

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\item \textsuperscript{196} See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 511 (contrasting Delaware with New York, Pennsylvania, Florida and California, all of which require the posting of a bond).
\item \textsuperscript{197} See id. at 511-12 (explaining how Delaware legislature rapidly responded to continue this approach after Delaware sequestration statute was ruled unconstitutional).
\item \textsuperscript{198} See, e.g., William T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship—A Response to Professor Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 121 (1993) (describing Delaware hurdles to dismissal as "prodigious" and more onerous than those imposed by several courts outside of Delaware).
\item \textsuperscript{199} See, e.g., Andrew G.T. Moore, II, Shareholder Rights Still Alive and Well in Delaware: The Derivative Suit—A Death Greatly Exaggerated, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 947, 958-59 (1994) (describing generosity of Delaware's approach to awarding attorneys' fees in derivative suits and explaining that attorney is entitled to a fee if he or she can show any benefit to the corporation, monetary or nonmonetary); Skeel, supra note 59, at 23 (explaining that Delaware is "notably generous in granting attorneys' fees in shareholder suits").
\item \textsuperscript{200} See Branson, supra note 20, at 105 (finding evidence supports hypothesis that Delaware law has both substantive and procedural pro-shareholder biases).
\item \textsuperscript{201} See, e.g., Matt Keller, Ending Greenback Politics, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at 12 (revealing that soft money donations in the 1996 elections totaled $262 million); Ann Reilly Dowd, Look Who's Cashing in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 128 (describing the amount and influence of corporate soft money contributions to political action committees).
\item \textsuperscript{202} See, e.g., Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse Over Corporate and Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDozo L. Rev. 1343, 1370-72 (1993) (describing the arguments that corporate political spending corrupts the political marketplace); David R. Lagasse, Note, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. Rev. 1347, 1349 (1995) (arguing that corporations can control outcome of initiative votes because of their ability to outspend other groups).
\item \textsuperscript{203} See Austin v. Michigan St. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990) (finding that corporate spending can unfairly influence elections); see also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1957) (explaining the fear that corporations will use their raw economic power to buy influence with elected officials to advance their interests over those of the public).
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political parties.\textsuperscript{204} State campaign finance laws, are, in many cases more permissive than federal law in allowing direct corporate expenditures in connection with state elections. Finally, corporations exert extensive political pressure through lobbying, which is not subject to the legal restrictions that apply to election contributions and expenditures.\textsuperscript{205}

Commentators have observed how interest groups may influence the legislative process.\textsuperscript{206} The ability of politicians to extract funds from corporations creates the potential for legislators to extract rents through regulation. This focus on rent extraction, in addition to imposing substantial costs on political participants, can distort the ultimate choice of legal rules.\textsuperscript{207} Indeed, although legislative lawmaking is sometimes defended as the product of more complete information than that which is available to courts,\textsuperscript{208} the interest group dynamics in corporate lawmaking present particular risks of distortion because in-state corporations, as the only effective political participants, can manipulate the information available to political decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{209}

Judges obviously are not subject to the same types of direct political influence as legislators.\textsuperscript{210} Ethical rules and prohibitions on ex parte communications prohibit litigants from lobbying judges. Delaware

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\item \textsuperscript{204} See, e.g., Keller, supra note 201, at 12 (explaining how the “soft money loophole” allows corporations to circumvent legal limits on political contributions); Adam Winker, Election Law As Its Own Field of Study: The Corporation of Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1265 (1999) (“Corporation are allowed to use shareholder funds to create and administer corporate PACs, and make unregulated and unlimited soft money contributions to the national political parties from their general treasuries.”) (citations omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{206} See, e.g., Carney, supra note 5 at 716 (citing concerns expressed over interest group influence over corporate law); Komesar, supra note 77, at 54-55 (explaining concerns expressed over interest group influence over corporate law).
\item \textsuperscript{207} See, e.g., CARNEY, supra note 5 at 717 (describing rent-seeking in connection with the production of corporate law and describing rent-seeking problem as greater with respect to management sponsored changes in corporate rules).
\item \textsuperscript{208} Of Saul M. Fisch, Politics v. the Closet: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Refer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 375-76 (1984) (critiquing the argument that the legislative investigative apparatus is superior and that, as a result, legislatures are better factfinders than courts).
\item \textsuperscript{209} See Komesar, supra note 77, at 62-63 (explaining how concentrated groups with large stakes can present distorted pictures of the public interest to political officials).
\item \textsuperscript{210} See at 124 (describing structure of judicial independence).
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judges also enjoy an unusual degree of political independence relative to other state judges. Delaware is one of only twelve states to use appointed rather than elected judges. Both chancery and supreme court judges are appointed, based on a system of merit selection, for renewable twelve year terms, thereby insulating the courts, to a large degree, from the political pressures that judges in other states may face. Finally, the Delaware Constitution mandates balance between the two major political parties in appointment of Delaware judges. These factors contribute to insulating Delaware judges relative to legislators from political influence.

A comparison of Delaware's legislative and judicial lawmaking in the takeover area provides some support for the hypothesis that Delaware's judiciary is subject to less political influence than its legislature. The political process leading to state adoption of antitakeover statutes has been widely analyzed. Commentators have observed that state antitakeover legislation was widely adopted in response to local corporations seeking protection from hostile bidders. As Romano explains, antitakeover statutes "are frequently pushed through the legislature at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of a hostile bid or apprehension that it will become a target." Delaware was not exempt from this process; indeed the Delaware statute was the

211. See Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative Control of Judicial Merit Selection, 49 S.C.L. REV. 1217, 1222 n.39 (1998) (citing Delaware as one of nine states in which judges are appointed by the governor; in three others, the legislature appoints judges). Because many states use a combination of methods in selecting their judiciary, some sources classify states differently. See id. at 1222, n.38. See also Edwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1998) (explaining that state judges are elected in 23 states and face periodic retention elections in fifteen other states).

212. Delaware Const. of 1897, Art. 4, § 3. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 26, at 835 (describing development of Constitutional provisions for appointment of Delaware judges); Moscow, supra note 57, at 1917 (explaining the structure of the Delaware Supreme Court).

213. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1998) (discussing degree to which election of state judges may subject judicial decisionmaking to political influence).


215. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takerover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987) (exploring politics behind enactment of Connecticut antitakeover statute); Romano, supra note 192, at 461 (describing political process leading to adoption of state antitakeover statutes); Carney, supra note 5, at 750-51 (describing process of enacting state antitakeover statutes).

216. See, e.g., Carney supra note 5, at 750-51 (listing corporate sponsors of state antitakeover statutes); Romano, supra note 192, at 461 n.11 (citing examples of statutes passed in response to pressure imposed by local corporations on state legislatures).

217. Romano, supra note 193, at 461; see also Romano, supra note 215, at 120 (describing the political process by which Aetna enlisted the support of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association to lobby effectively for the adoption of an antitakeover statute in Connecticut).
product of corporate influence and lobbying efforts.\textsuperscript{218} The result of this political influence is legislation that uniformly favors the interests of corporate management.\textsuperscript{219} Although state antitakeover statutes vary in the extent to which they limit the potential for a hostile takeover, in all cases, the statutes, including Delaware's antitakeover statute, make takeovers more difficult.

In contrast, courts have responded to takeover litigation with an attempt to balance deference to management decisionmaking with concern over shareholder treatment.\textsuperscript{220} The result, in Delaware, is a series of decisions\textsuperscript{221} that increase the degree of judicial scrutiny and heighten management obligations beyond the traditional business judgment rule analysis.\textsuperscript{222} In other words, corporate management has been able to obtain more favorable takeover regulation in the legislature than in the courts. This outcome is likely the result of the greater opportunity for potential target corporations to influence lawmaking through the political process than through litigation.

Finally, judicial decisionmaking has the advantage of greater transparency than legislative lawmaking. The specific effects of corporate influence in politics are difficult to identify. Disclosure of corporate political spending is spotty and incomplete. More importantly, the substantive arguments that corporations make to legislators through lobbying and political spending are made in private, with no forum for response or public debate. The political process thus creates a real possibility that legislators will not receive a balanced perspective or even hear both sides of an issue.\textsuperscript{223} When legislators

\textsuperscript{218} See Romano, supra note 193, at 462-64 (describing adoption of Delaware statute and lobbying by corporate executives over the legislation).

\textsuperscript{219} Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell explain that the political process is poorly suited to reflect the views of those who oppose antitakeover legislation. In addition to shareholders, who face collective action problems, prospective bidders are likely to oppose restrictions on takeovers. Yet, because antitakeover statutes protect targets, not bidders, a prospective acquirer is unlikely to find it useful to oppose antitakeover legislation even in its home state, since it cannot predict which state's law will apply to a future acquisition. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1176-77.

\textsuperscript{220} See, e.g., Skel, supra note 106, at 152 n. 75 (describing Revlon and Unocal decisions as acknowledging the importance of shareholder prerogative and management discretion).


\textsuperscript{222} See Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 97 (1999) (describing Delaware takeover law as providing that board decisions approving change of control will be subjected to substantive judicial review without any threshold showing by stockholder that board breached its fiduciary duty); cf. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law) (placing the initial burden on the plaintiff to prove a director's breach of fiduciary duty in a takeover situation).

\textsuperscript{223} See Komesar, supra note 77, at 63 (explaining how concentrated groups can distort information about the public interest and mislead even a public-interested public official).
decide to act, the legislative process provides a poor record of the basis for the legal rules that are enacted. Legislative history is incomplete and readily manipulated. Without an indication of why legislators made their decisions, it is more difficult for critics to challenge the resulting laws.

Judicial lawmaking is far more transparent than legislative lawmaking. The adversary process provides a mechanism for presenting both sides of an issue to the decisionmaker. The litigation process itself is open to the public, and the pendency of legal questions is a matter of public record. Even nonlitigants have the opportunity to ensure that the court has the benefit of full information on an issue by submitting amicus briefs. Finally, by making law through the process of issuing written opinions, judges provide the business community and the public with an explanation of the reasons for their decisions. Because the Chancery courts are courts of equity they sit without juries and maintain a tradition of issuing written opinions. These practices distinguish them from trial courts in other states.

IV. THE ANALYSIS APPLIED—INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM

Institutional activism provides a case study with which to apply the foregoing analysis and consider Delaware’s ability to respond to changes in the business world. The activism of institutional investors represents a major and relatively recent business development. Institutions are becoming increasingly involved in corporate governance. Institutions have experimented with negotiation, litigation, and shareholder voting as tools for influencing corporate decisionmaking on topics ranging from

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executive compensation to board composition to corporate employment policies. 227

The academy is sharply divided on the implications of institutional activism for firm value. 228 On the one hand, activism offers the possibility of reducing agency costs through the involvement of sophisticated monitors with substantial stakes. 229 On the other hand, institutional interests may differ from those of other investors, causing activism to reduce overall firm value. 230 In addition, institutions' access to managers creates the possibility for collusion. 231

States can approach the issue of institutional activism in several ways. One possibility is for state lawmakers to determine the appropriate level of institutional participation in corporate governance and to adopt legal rules tailored toward achieving that level. A second possibility is for states to maintain the existing legal allocation of decisionmaking responsibility, which largely reserves such decisionmaking for corporate management and limits opportunities for shareholder voice. A third alternative would expand the opportunities for shareholder voice and monitoring, with the expectation that institutional activism would improve corporate decisionmaking. 232

These regulatory approaches have several problems. Each requires states to make a normative judgment about the appropriate level of institutional activism. In light of the inability of even academics to agree on the potential value of institutional participation in corporate governance, it is unclear that state lawmakers are capable of making this assessment. Structural flaws in the legislative process are likely further to detract from legislators' ability to evaluate institutional activism. Like state antitakeover statutes, regulation addressing institutional activism

227. See id.


230. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1993) (expressing concern that political pressure will cause public pension funds to pursue goals other than maximization of share value).


232. This is not unlike the SEC's 1992 amendments liberalizing the federal proxy rules to facilitate increased shareholder activism through the proxy process. See Fisch, supra note 228, at 1018-19 (describing amendments as a "direct response to complaints by institutional investors that the proxy rules prevented them from ... participating effectively in corporate governance").
is likely to be strongly influenced by interest group dynamics. In particular, corporate management has an obvious stake in limiting the degree to which corporate law facilitates institutional activism. Moreover, institutions are unlikely to be effective counterweights to management’s political influence. Institutions are poorly organized political actors, with little ability to lobby effectively. Their political weakness is evidenced by their relative impotence in connection with state adoption of antitakeover legislation.

Additionally, responding to institutional activism is responding to a moving target. As institutions and issuers work through corporate governance issues, the nature of institutional activism has evolved, and this evolution is likely to continue. Even a careful legislative assessment of the appropriate regulatory approach may rapidly become out of date as institutions become more sophisticated, more corrupt or more innovative in their activism.

Finally, clear rules that specify the appropriate degree of institutional involvement create incentive problems. Rules favoring management discretion can potentially frustrate institutional attempts to monitor and can eliminate any incentive on the part of corporate management to negotiate with institutions. Rules favoring institutions create the potential for excessive litigation and give institutions a tool that they can use strategically. Indeed, rules that broadly empower institutions can lead to rent-seeking and the extraction of private gains.

Delaware law takes a different approach. First, Delaware’s muddy rules encourage institutions and management to bargain over governance changes rather than litigating or stonewalling. Second, judicial review of management responses to institutional activism conducted through the framework of fiduciary principles allows courts to oversee and respond to changes in the nature of institutional activism. Judicial review also allows courts to rebalance the legal structure in response to perceived overreaching on the part of either institutions or management. The flexibility provided by Delaware law enhances judicial power to prevent opportunism. This backdrop of judicial oversight may give the parties increased confidence to negotiate voluntarily. Finally, judicial lawmaking provides institutions with

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233. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Inves!r Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1981 (1997) ("Fragmented among tens of thousands of pension and mutual funds, and lacking the lobbying resources of corporate managements, institutional investors are anything but an efficiently organized political or economic force. Coordination among them remains largely ad hoc and crisis-driven.").

234. See, e.g., Wimerson & Dorn, supra note 226, at 234 (describing how nature of institutional activism has changed).
greater access to the lawmaking structure than they are likely to achieve in the legislature.

V. CONCLUSION

In analyzing regulatory competition in corporate law, commentators have focused on substantive law. A comparative institutional perspective suggests, however, that a regulator can also provide advantages through its lawmaking process. Because of the inherent difficulty in evaluating substantive provisions of corporate law and in tracing incorporation decisions to differences between states, a process oriented approach offers the potential for new insights about the value of state competition.

Although it has received little attention, Delaware's corporate lawmaking process addresses systematic challenges in structuring corporate regulation. These challenges include the difficulty of assessing the impact of corporate rules on various corporate constituencies and the problems associated with designing rules that must function in a rapidly changing business environment. Delaware's equity courts are able to formulate flexible yet responsive legal principles that permit transactional evolution without increasing strategic behavior.

The manner in which Delaware courts maintain an aggressive lawmaking agenda, focus on articulation of principles to govern future standards, and freely adjust previously announced principles based on policy considerations, resembles the legislative process. At the same time, the standards based muddiness of Delaware law retains a degree of ex post review for which courts are well suited. In addition, Delaware's extensive reliance on judicial lawmaking offers several advantages over the legislative process, including greater and more balanced access to the lawmaking process, increased political independence, and enhanced decisionmaking transparency. This article has argued that this lawmaking structure is particularly appropriate in corporate law.

In conclusion, the peculiar role of the Delaware courts may provide greater explanatory power for Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters than previously identified theories. Delaware has developed a unique corporate lawmaking structure and process. If, as this article

suggests, Delaware lawmaking addresses the needs of corporations, it may explain why Delaware is consistently winning the race.