Manipulative Games of Gifts by Corporate Executives

S. Burcu Avci,* Cindy A. Schipani** & H. Nejat Seyhun***

Executives appear to use a variety of manipulative games to maximize the value of their tax deductions for gifts of stock of their firms. These games may include backdating the gifts, spring-loading or bullet-dodging release of information, and use of insider information. We find a number of legal loopholes providing opportunities for executives to play these games. We also find that stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year period before the gift date and fall abnormally by about 5% during the one year after the gift date, supporting the likelihood these games are in play. In addition, this pattern is stronger for gifts for which there is a reporting lag, also consistent with illicit behaviors. We therefore suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the requirements of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws.

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* Visiting researcher at the University of Michigan, Ross School of Business, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
** Merwin H. Waterman Collegiate Professor of Business Administration and Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
*** Jerome B. & Eilene M. York Professor of Business Administration and Professor of Finance, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
INTRODUCTION

Studies have shown that corporate insiders tend to make favorable charitable gifts just prior to a severe decline in the company's share prices. The timing of these gifts is troubling; it suggests that the corporate insiders may have acted using material, non-public information to reap an unfair benefit. Many of these donations were made at a time when it would have been illegal to make a sale of the same securities due to their access to this information.

To explore whether these timing games may be played across the
board generally and whether these manipulations continue to this day, we analyze the timing of gifts of common stock by corporate executives using a comprehensive dataset covering 1986-2014. Specifically, we investigate five non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses for executives’ behavior regarding the timing of gifts in their own firms’ stock: 1) wait until after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the announcement of good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside information about the future prospects of their own firms stock to maximize their donation and tax deductions (inside information).

Unlike previous studies that use a very limited sample of firms or time periods, we investigate these hypotheses by utilizing a comprehensive database that includes all gifts of common stock where executives donate the stock of their own firms, in all publicly listed firms in the United States. Our dataset covers all reported gifts of common stock and contains over 200,000 observations. The total volume of gifts contained in our dataset is approximately 9.5 billion shares, with a dollar value of approximately $300 billion. Consequently, our findings are general and apply to all executives’ gifts of their firms’ stock. Given the large dollar volume of gifts covered and the comprehensive nature of the study, our findings are important from legal, economic, and public policy perspectives.

Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed over the time period of 1986-2014. Our research demonstrates that each of our five hypotheses explains at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving of stock in the United States during this time period. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one year after the gift date. We find this pattern is stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the fraudulent backdating hypothesis. We also find that almost two-thirds of gifts are reported late, taking advantage of an exception in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), further contributing to the lax regulatory conditions that make it easy to manipulate the timing of gifts. We suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the requirements of SOX as well as general anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws.

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Our finding that executives’ gifts are well-timed has economic and policy implications for the federal tax laws as well. Under U.S. tax law, the donor of gifts of stock to public or private charitable foundations may obtain a personal income tax deduction for the market value of the shares while simultaneously avoiding the capital gains tax that would be due if the shares were sold.\(^3\) Furthermore, although open market sales of stock are undoubtedly within the purview of federal insider trading law, whether stock gifts to charity are so constrained is an unresolved question.\(^4\) These loopholes create an opportunity for exploitation: empirical evidence suggests that corporate insiders use their access to inside information to time their stock donations prior to price declines and thereby increase their federal income tax deductions.\(^5\)

To address these issues, this paper proceeds as follows. Section I offers, by way of background, a discussion of previous studies on executives’ gifts of common stock. Section II analyzes the legal issues presented by timing gifts of stock. Section III contains our empirical findings together with the legal implications of those findings. In Section IV we offer proposals for reform followed by our concluding remarks.

I. BACKGROUND – PREVIOUS STUDIES

Three types of motivation determine an individual’s desire to donate.\(^6\) The intrinsic motivation represents the subjective value of donating for its own sake, which is shaped by the individual’s altruism and other private preferences.\(^7\) The extrinsic motivation is related to external benefits gained from donations.\(^8\) Image (signaling) motivation links to the individual’s desire to be positively perceived by others, which affects both the individual’s reputation with others and her own self-esteem.\(^9\)

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3. Suppose that a stock purchased at $100 was gifted when the stock price reached $200 and subsequently, the stock price declined back to $50 after the gifting. In this case, the individual can take a deduction for $200 instead of holding a share worth $50.
4. Yermack, supra note 1, at 107.
5. Id.
8. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 489, 492 (2003). Extrinsic motivation is often described as a reinforcement mechanism or contingent reward in behavioral economics and human resources management literature.
9. Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior, supra note 6, at 1653-54. See also Zachary Grossman, Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving 1-2 (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (describing how social signaling, actions taken to influence
literature basically seeks answers for the second motive.

Studies on charitable gifting have focused on the income and price elasticities of donations. One of the earlier studies on this topic, conducted by Professors Martin Feldstein and Amy Taylor, explores income tax benefits of donations by analyzing special tax returns filed in 1962 and 1970. The study concludes that tax deductibility of donations provides an efficient subsidy for charities. Alternative tax policies affecting the volume and distribution of gifts and distribution of tax liabilities, and net disposable income among donors and donees, are important determinants of donations as well as matters of public policy.


11. Martin Feldstein & Amy Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44 ECONOMETRICA 1201, 1201 (1976). In the 1970s, the charitable tax break was generally equivalent to the fair market value of the donated item(s), just like today. Id. at 1203. However, the federal income tax marginal rates have varied significantly over the past half-century, arguably affecting the prevalence of, and trends in, charitable giving. See List, infra note 12, at 170 (discussing how marginal tax rate variations over the past administrations were accompanied by “changes in the charitable deduction caps” – a phenomenon in which “changes in tax deductibility represent another source of variation that can affect giving.”).


13. Studies typically support the importance of tax policy on donor behavior. Although they suggest other factors affecting donor behavior exist, studies have provided conflicting evidence about the relative significance of these factors. For example, Professor William Randolph finds evidence that income elasticity is important, and because people have a tendency to smooth their consumption over time, the volume of donations is affected by transitory income elasticity as well as permanent price elasticity. William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709, 710 (1995). On the other hand, Professor Gerald Auten and colleagues argue that transitory income and tax effects have no impact on gift-giving behavior – what matters are the persistent tax and income effects. Since tax policies have long-lasting effects on company income level, they are the most important elements determining the amount and timing of donations. Entities adjust donations more on based on tax regulation than on income shocks. See Gerald E. Auten et al., Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes:
Very few studies have looked specifically at CEOs’ stock gifts. Four studies are relevant to note: the first conducted by Yang Ho Kim and Man-U Lee,14 the second by Woon-Oh Jung and Sung Ook Park,15 the third by David Yermack16 and the last by Sudip Ghosh and Maretmo A. Harjoto.17 In the first paper, Professors Kim and Lee examine the transfers and subsequent cancellations of stock gifts in the period between 1993 and 2002 by South Korean controlling shareholders attempting to minimize their gift tax.18 They discover that prior to 2000, executives donated stocks to their families on the days they estimated that the stock prices would be at local minimums.19 If stock prices continued to decline after the donation dates, executives cancelled the gifts.20 After a more restrictive gift-tax valuation rule for stock gifts was enacted in Korea in 2000, however, the incidence of this form of passive timing manipulation decreased significantly.21 Professors Jung and Park, in the second study, analyze stock gifts of controlling shareholders to their families in Korea for the 2000-2004 period. Their study finds that companies would depress their stock prices close to these transfer dates by disclosing negative news to or withholding positive news from the market, thereby reducing the donor’s gift taxes.22 In the third study, Professor Yermack considers 150 stock gifts made by public company Chairmen and CEOs to their family charities in the U.S.,23 and finds inflated stock prices around the days of gift. Increased stock prices provide income tax shields, and an opportunity to offset capital...
gains yields to donors in the U.S. In the last study, Professors Ghosh and Harjoto find price movements in the U.S. market similar to those described in Professor Yermack’s study. Executives time their donations to benefit from tax advantages.

The motivations that affect stock prices around gift dates in Korea are different from those that affect such prices in the U.S. Historically, most Korean companies were effectively managed by their controlling shareholders and their families, and aspects of the huge, multi-conglomerate, family-controlled “chaebol” system still persist today. Controlling families maximize and propagate their personal wealth by donating shares to their children. However, the extremity of inheritance and gift taxes, which reaches a maximum at 50% in Korea, forces executives to look for astute ways to protect their level of wealth.

Professors Kim and Lee document that before the Korean law began to use time periods after the gift date to calculate the gift tax on stock gifts, executives gave stocks to their families when they estimated the stock prices would not drop further. In line with this policy, they cancelled donations if stock prices continued to drop. This is a passive strategy: executives do not change the timing of information disclosures, nor do they attempt backdating in order to minimize stock prices around the date of donation; rather, they appear to use their insider information to find the most appropriate date.

In 2000, Korean law changed the valuation base for assessing the gift tax on a stock gift to the average market value of the underlying stock over the four-month period encompassing the two months before and two months after the gift date. Under this law, Korean executives might keep stock prices low before and after gift dates. To test this hypothesis, Jung

24. See Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 831 (“[I]nvestigate[j] whether Korean controlling shareholders attempt to influence stock prices by managing the timing of information disclosures when they transfer stocks to related parties as gifts.”).

25. See Charlotte M. Powers, The Changing Role of Chaebol: Multi-Conglomerates in South Korea’s National Economy, 10 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 105, 105 (2010) (discussing how “chaebols” are often seen as antiquated, but actually remain at the heart of South Korea’s economic prosperity).


27. Id. (explaining how, in order to alleviate the “severe tax bites” from “cross-generational stock transfers,” controlling shareholders are incentivized to “influence stock prices during the period in which they transfer stock to related parties by gift.”).

28. Id. at 835-36 (“[Kim and Lee] discover[ed] that in the period before 2000 the controlling shareholders of most firms chose gift dates to fall on the days when their stock prices were perceived to be the lowest . . . .”).

29. Id. at 836.

30. Id.

31. Id. at 834.
and Park analyze timing of information disclosures when company executives made stock gifts.\textsuperscript{32} In accordance with the stock price valuation period, they analyze the prices of stock starting from two months prior to two months after the gift date. During the valuation period for a gifted stock, its price would remain low, but after the valuation period ended, the price would go up again.\textsuperscript{33} This suggests that Korean executives consciously keep stock prices low during the valuation period of gifted stocks so that donations seem less valuable. The study concludes that executives delay good news and bring bad news forward during the valuation period, and release good news only after the valuation period is over.\textsuperscript{34}

To control for possible endogeneity resulting from up and down-markets, they compare donating firms with non-donating peers, and conclude that their results are robust.\textsuperscript{35}

In contrast, the American legal system provides incentives for U.S. executives to make donations of stock gifts. First, U.S. executives are not generally affected by a gift tax in the case of charitable contributions, and the larger the value of their donation, the larger their tax benefit.\textsuperscript{36} Consequently, executives in the United States are interested in maximizing the value of their stock donations, not minimizing them. Second, personal stock gifts in the U.S. are exempted from at least some insider-trading laws which would otherwise restrict their open market sales and purchases, enabling executives to make stock gifts (as opposed to open market sales) even during company blackout periods.\textsuperscript{37} Executives are also subject to more relaxed reporting requirements (Form 5 instead of Form 4) with respect to gifts, and the short-swing profit prohibitions of Section 16(b) do not apply to gifts.

Stock gifts provide two additional types of benefits to managers. They provide income tax deductions, and they offset the personal capital gains tax owed if the shares were sold at a premium in lieu of donating them. Thus, we should interpret the findings in U.S. studies in the light of these facts.

Professor Yermack’s study considers 150 stock gifts made by public

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Id. at 832.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Id. at 852.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Id. at 844-846 (discussing the study’s empirical results).
\item \textsuperscript{35} Id. at 851-57.
\item \textsuperscript{36} See 26 U.S.C. § 2522 (2015) (stating that charitable contributions are generally deducted from the base for computing gift tax).
\item \textsuperscript{37} Yermack, supra note 1 at 107-08. See also Coles C. Bettis & M. Lemmon, Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. Fin. Econ. 191, 199 (2000) (analyzing corporate policies to regulate stock trading by insiders and how blackout periods affect trading rates and profitability).
\end{itemize}
company chairmen and CEOs to their family charities.\textsuperscript{38} He found that the stock price creates a local maximum at the actual reported gift date, with the stock price rising and falling by an irregular 3\% in the two-month period around that date.\textsuperscript{39} Yermack found a pattern of “excellent timing,” observing that CEOs tend to donate shares following run-ups in their companies’ stock prices.\textsuperscript{40} On average, the gift date coincided with a peak in the stock price trajectory, with prices falling in the months after the date of gift.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, this post-gift price drop was more dramatic for larger gifts than for smaller ones, regardless of the methodology used to calculate abnormal stock returns.\textsuperscript{42}

Professor Yermack presents two possible explanations for the favorable timing of these stock gifts. First, he suggests that this is the result of insider information, wherein corporate insiders time their donations of stock on the basis of material, non-public information in a manner that will increase their personal income tax deductions.\textsuperscript{43} Executives may thus wait to donate stock just prior to negative earnings announcements or just after positive ones.\textsuperscript{44} Second, he suggests that perhaps the executives are backdating the date of the stock donation to increase their tax deductions. Ex-post, CEOs may increase the value of their tax deduction for charitable contributions by backdating the date of their stock gifts to local peaks in the company’s stock price trajectories.\textsuperscript{45} Stock gift backdating is likely to violate IRS regulations, which look to the date the stock gift is donated when assessing its value for tax purposes.\textsuperscript{46}

Yermack found evidence consistent with both theories. The data suggest CEOs are taking advance information about earnings releases into account when choosing the timing of stock gifts.\textsuperscript{47} He noted a pattern where some CEOs would make their donations just before negative earnings announcements, and others would delay them until just after positive announcements.\textsuperscript{48} Yermack also found evidence consistent with the backdating of stock gifts by CEOs to their family foundations for gifts

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Yermack, \textit{supra} note 1, at 108.
\item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Id.} at 114.
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{Id.} at 114-15.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Id.} at 118-19.
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} at 119.
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{See} 17 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(b) (2015) (stating that “[o]rdinarily, a contribution is made at the time delivery is effected.”).
\item \textsuperscript{47} Yermack, \textit{supra} note 1, at 108.
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.} (“Some CEOs made gifts of stock just before adverse quarterly earnings announcements, a time when company blackout periods would almost always prohibit open market sales.”).
\end{itemize}
made outside the month of December. The data showed a positive relationship between the favorable timing of CEO stock gifts to family foundations and the time lag between the purported gift date and the date the donor filed the donation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which did not hold true for CEO’s gifts of stock to other donees. This finding is consistent with backdating, as it implies that non-December donations tend to be better timed when CEOs have a larger temporal range of dates on which to report the gift. Yermack’s data also shows that for all stock gifts, favorable timing is positively associated with the size of the stock gift.

Yermack drew a number of conclusions from these results. First, many corporate executives opportunistically time their gifts on the basis of inside information or backdate their gifts to increase the value of their income tax benefits in the guise of charity. Second, less-than-charitable motives illuminate the popular use of private family foundations as recipients of charitable contributions. The majority of the family foundations in the sample fail to follow the prudent investor rule of investment management: the trustees, which are usually comprised of the CEO and his family members, retain stock gifts instead of diversifying their assets. Yermack’s conclusion indicates that there is “a surprising mix of motives by corporate executives who make large charitable contributions: while seeking to subsidize good works in society, they simultaneously follow aggressive tax evasion strategies.”

Professors Ghosh and Harjoto analyze the personal stock donations of top executives and board directors in the United States for the 1993-2005 period. The study focuses on executives’ timing of stock gifts in relation

49. Id. at 121. Many of the CEO’s stock gifts occurred in December, which is when most tax-motivated charitable donations are made. Many taxpayers wait until the end of the taxable year to determine their charitable contributions once they have full knowledge of their annual taxable income.

50. Id. at 117-118.

51. Id. at 108.

52. Id.

53. Id. at 109.


55. Yermack, supra note 1, at 122.

56. See Ghosh & Harjoto, supra note 17 at 347 (explaining that stock donations by
to the shareholder returns and corporate social responsibility of their companies. They find evidence that corporate executives opportunistically time their gifts to obtain tax benefits. The price patterns around stock gift announcement dates support Yermack’s inside information and backdating theories. They then analyze the relationship between insider stock donations and returns to shareholders. By comparing the “no insider donation” and “insider donation” data, they find evidence that short-term and long-term returns of donating companies are inferior to peers in which managers do not donate. This result shows that stock donations provide personal benefits to executives but reduces holdings of shareholders. Thus, executives’ personal donations of company stock may be described as a principal-agent problem. Ghosh and Harjoto also find that top executives make fewer insider stock gifts in companies with stronger notions of corporate social responsibility. This indicates that the more socially responsible the company, the less the shareholders are harmed by executives opportunistically extracting personal benefits from stock donations. This behavior is consistent with stakeholder theory.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Federal Tax Laws

The tax benefits stemming from the charitable donation of stock depend on the length of time the stock is held, whether the stock is closely or publicly held, and whether the recipient of the gift is a public or private

insiders frequently work against shareholder wealth).  
57. Id. at 343.  
58. Id. at 347.  
59. Id. at 348-49.  
60. Id. at 349-50 (explaining that stock donations are triggered by self-interest and have a negative effect on both short- and long-term shareholder returns).  
61. Principal-agent problems refer to situations where the agents act to maximize their own preferences and not those of the principal. In general, agents do not make the same choices as would the principal. In the current context, when executives donate stock, they look to maximize their personal benefit instead of that of their shareholders. See id. at 346 (applying agency theories to executives’ stock donations).  
62. Id. at 351 (confirming that executives at companies with fewer indicators of corporate social responsibility are more likely to make stock donations).  
63. Id. at 354 (“[Corporate social responsibility] as a measure of fulfilling stakeholder interest is associated with less likelihood and lower intensity of insiders’ stock donation, which is consistent with stakeholder theory.”).
entity. Generally, for charitable contributions of stock, any excess not deductible in the year of contribution is carried forward for up to five subsequent tax years. The contribution of any stock held long-term— that is, for more than one year— permits the donor to deduct the fair market value of contributed stock. The contribution of any securities held short-term— for one year or less— limits the deduction to the lower of the donor’s cost basis and the fair market value of the security.

The contribution of long-term marketable stock to public charities permits the donor to deduct the fair market value of the donated stock in an amount up to 30% of the donor’s adjusted gross income (AGI), with a five-year carry-forward; cost basis is not taken into account. In the case of short-term marketable stock contributed to public charities, the donor’s deduction is the lower of donor’s cost basis and the stocks’ fair market value, and is limited to 50% of the donor’s AGI. The fair market value of the contributed marketable stock is the mean between the high and low price on the date of the contribution.

Taxpayers who contribute marketable stock to a private foundation receive more limited tax benefits. Donors are subject to a maximum deduction of 20% of AGI for contributions to private foundations. Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares; however, if the donor contributes stock valued at over 10% of all of the corporation’s outstanding shares, the deduction becomes the donor’s cost basis for the additional amount. For contributions of short-term stock, the donor’s cost basis deduction is limited to 30% of AGI.

Contributions of closely held stock to public charities or donor-advised funds are subject to the same deduction, AGI limitation, and carry-forward rules as those for contributions of marketable securities. For transfers of closely held stock to private foundations, donors are permitted only a deduction equal to the lower of their cost basis or fair market value,

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65. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2012) (defining long term capital gain as “gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, if and to the extent such gain is taken into account in computing gross income.”).
66. Id. § 170(a)(1), (e)(1), (e)(5).
67. Id. § 170(e)(1)(A).
68. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
72. Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares for up to 10% of the value of the corporation’s outstanding shares. Id. § 170(e)(5).
subject to a cap of 30% of AGI with the five-year carry-forward.73 Furthermore, if the donor claims a value in excess of $5,000 for the donation of securities that are not publicly traded, the value of the donation must be established by an independent appraisal conforming to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Regulations.74 In a nutshell, the appraisal must be prepared by a qualified appraiser who has earned a designation from a recognized professional organization.75 The appraisal must include a description of the property transferred, the date of contribution, any terms or conditions put on the property transferred, information on the qualified appraiser, the basis for making the valuation, the appraiser’s signature, and the date of the appraisal.76 Further, the appraisal must be made within 60 days prior to the date of gift.77 The donor must attach an appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283), signed by both donee and appraiser, to her tax return.78

The federal income tax law may also impose an “excess business holdings” tax on private foundations.79 This rule limits a private foundation’s ownership of voting stock in a particular corporation to 20%, less the percent of voting stock owned by “all disqualified persons.”80 This 20% ceiling is increased to 35% if the voting control of the corporation is effectively held by unrelated third parties who are not disqualified persons.81 A private foundation that violates this rule will be subject to an initial tax equal to 10% of the excess holdings.82 If the foundation continues to have excess business holdings, it will be penalized with an additional 200% excise tax.83

73. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C).
74. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(1)-(2) (2015). See also, id. at § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi) (defining “publicly traded securities”).
75. According to the IRS Regulations, a qualified appraiser is an individual who (a) “holds himself or herself out to the public as an appraiser or performs appraisals on a regular basis,” (b) pursuant to 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), “is qualified to make appraisals of the type of property being valued,” and (c) is not i) the donor, donee, or a party to the transaction in which the donor acquired the relevant property, ii) any employee or relative of any persons described in (c)(i), iii) any appraiser who performs the majority of her appraisals for a person described in (c)(i). 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5). However, a person cannot be a qualified appraiser if “the donor had knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonable person to expect the appraiser falsely to overstate the value of the donated property.” Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)-(ii).
76. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(ii).
77. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A).
78. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i).
80. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
81. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
82. Id. § 4943(a).
83. Id. § 4943(b).
The category of disqualified persons includes “any person . . . in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs” of the foundation, such as substantial contributors, officers, directors, trustees, and related parties. Thus, a high-level corporate executive, such as a CEO, who wishes to contribute her company’s stock to her own foundation may be subject to the excess business holdings tax. The federal tax law provides very limited safe harbors: 1) a de minimis exception that allows the private foundation to hold up to 2% of the voting stock, regardless of the percent of voting stock held by disqualified persons, and 2) a five-year time frame for the foundation to reduce its excess business holdings if the foundation receives the stock by gift or bequest before imposing the tax.

The corporate insider benefits from the gift in two ways. First, the fair market value of a gift of stock held long-term is deductible from her taxable income, decreasing the overall tax paid. The tax benefits are especially substantial for top-bracket taxpayers. A donor who is a corporate executive is likely to be subject to the highest marginal tax bracket of the Alternative Minimum Tax, which is currently 28%, thus this donor would receive a federal tax benefit of 28% of the fair market value of the stock. Second, the donor is able to escape the capital gains tax on the difference between the fair market value of the stock and her cost basis, which is particularly advantageous if the stock has significantly appreciated in value.

B. Analysis of Liability under Federal Securities Laws

When the donor of securities is also a corporate insider, the question of liability for insider trading becomes important. This Part addresses the securities laws at issue with respect to potential liability for insider trading. This includes Sections 16(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act or Exchange Act), as well as corresponding SEC Rule

84. Id. § 4943(f)(4)(A).
85. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(C).
86. Id. § 4943(c)(6).
88. The donor would potentially also benefit from any charitable deductions available in state income taxes.
89. See infra notes 90-132 and accompanying text.
10b-5. In addition, implications for the charity arising under SEC Rule 144, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, are discussed.

1. Short Swing Profits: Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act

The short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act does not permit corporate insiders to retain a profit from acquiring a security and disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within six months. Section 16(a) requires that corporate officers, directors, and 10 percent shareholders publicly report all attainment and disposition of stock, which includes gifts. This implies that a charity with at least 10 percent ownership of a publicly traded company’s stock is also subject to Section 16.

SOX provides further details regarding time requirements for reporting. According to SOX, all open market sales and purchases must be disclosed on Form 4 within two business days. SOX, however, did not update the reporting rules for bona fide gifts of stock, which are subject to less stringent requirements: gifts are reported on Form 5, which must be filed within 45 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year. Yermack finds that nearly half the executives in his sample delayed reporting their gift beyond two business days. Importantly, current law provides an exemption to insider trading liability for bona fide gifts. In proposing an amendment to Rule 16b-5(a), which removed gifts from the scope of short-swing profit liability, the SEC stated that it believed “[b]ona fide gifts represent less likelihood for opportunities for abuse.” This exemption originated in Truncale v. Blumberg, where the court stated: “[b]y no stretch of the imagination . . . can a gift to charity . . . when made in good faith and without pretense or subterfuge, be considered a sale or anything in the nature of a sale” within the meaning of Section 16(b).

Furthermore, Section 16(b) requires that any insider’s “short-swing” profit (the difference between purchase and sale prices for any two

93. Id. at § 78p(a).
94. Id.
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3.
97. Yermack, supra note 1, at 110.
98. Id. at 111 n.8 (quoting Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal Stockholders, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,997 (Dec. 13, 1988)).
99. Id. (quoting Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.Supp 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)).
transactions within any six-month period) be forfeited to the company.\textsuperscript{100} The short-swing profit rule bars corporate insiders from acquiring a security and then disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within any interval shorter than six months. But bona fide gifts to a charity are exempt from Section 16(b) matching.\textsuperscript{101}

Any charity that owns more than 10% of a publicly traded company’s stock will be subject to Section 16.\textsuperscript{102} A donor who is required to report under Section 16 and who transfers shares to a charity, including a private foundation created by the donor and for which the donor serves as a director, must report the transfer in the annual filing of (the more lenient) Form 5, or voluntarily report earlier on Form 4.\textsuperscript{103} Ordinarily, assuming the shares cannot be used for the donor’s benefit, the donor will no longer have beneficial ownership in the stock once the charity owns the shares. The charity will be the Section 16 reporting party as long as it owns at least 10% of the shares and the donor will no longer have any Section 16 reporting responsibility with respect to the transferred shares.

2. Anti-Fraud Provisions: Section 10b and SEC Rule 10b-5

Section 10b of the 1934 Act\textsuperscript{104} and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5\textsuperscript{105} prohibit fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”\textsuperscript{106} Unlike Section 16(b), there is no exemption for anti-fraud liability. Those who violate this prohibition must disgorge any profit, may be liable for damages, and may face criminal charges.\textsuperscript{107} A corporate insider making a charitable gift and realizing a tax benefit may be in violation of Rule 10b-5 if the donation was made with knowledge of yet to be announced negative news that will drive the value of the stock down shortly after the grant.\textsuperscript{108} As Yermack points out, although a charity could sue a donor under Rule 10b-5 if it relied upon the fair market value of the stock donated, such litigation would have a “chilling effect” on future donations.\textsuperscript{109}

There is a question regarding whether an ostensibly charitable transfer

\textsuperscript{100} 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
\textsuperscript{101} 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2012).
\textsuperscript{103} 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (2015).
\textsuperscript{104} 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
\textsuperscript{105} 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
\textsuperscript{106} 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2015).
\textsuperscript{108} Yermack, supra note 1, at 111.
\textsuperscript{109} Id. at 112 n.9.
should be considered a sale under Section 10(b) of the Act. This question has not yet been considered by the courts. The 1934 Act defines “sale” broadly: “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of [securities].” Therefore, the main question that arises is whether the gift is a “sale” or is “in connection with” a sale for the purposes of a violation of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5. To determine whether a gift will be treated like a sale under the anti-fraud provision, case law establishes a three-prong test: 1) change of ownership; 2) donor receives consideration of pecuniary value; and 3) the treatment is “consistent with the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.” Furthermore, there must be scienter, “meaning an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”

Generally, the gift is not a sale as there is no consideration for the donor for the transfer of the securities. Yet, the gift may be a disguise for a sale if the donor receives some type of economic benefit from the transfer. Courts have construed the personal benefit requirement quite broadly, including elusive expectation of future economic gain, improvement of friendship, or reputation. It can be quite easily argued that the donor receives a personal benefit when making a gift, as there is a tax benefit. A corporate insider who “controls or significantly influences” the organization to which the securities are being donated is more likely to be perceived by a court to have received a personal benefit.

In addition, if the charity has knowledge of material inside information through the insider, it follows that it should be prohibited from transferring those shares until the information becomes public. If the charity will immediately or shortly thereafter sell the securities, a gift may

112. Id. (citing Sulcoski, supra note 111, at 623-24).
113. Tulli, supra note 89.
114. Id.
115. Id.
be an action “in connection with” a sale of securities, making the donor potentially liable. This establishes a similar tipper and tippee relationship to that discussed in Dirks v. SEC, where the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” Therefore a corporate insider’s gift of securities that are then quickly sold seems to resemble tipping with a prompt trade and thus could be in violation of Rule 10b-5 for both parties.

Although research has disclosed no court opinions specifically addressing when a charitable donation may constitute a “sale” within the context of insider trading, the SEC has brought a number of actions in federal court based on, at least in part, claims of illicit profits by insiders through charitable donations of stock. For example, in SEC v. Zomax, the SEC successfully brought an insider-trading action against executives who sold stock through a charitable remainder annuity trust. The SEC filed a civil injunction alleging that James T. Anderson, the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO, and his wife, Michelle Bedard-Anderson, the former Executive Vice-President of Sales and Marketing of Zomax, violated securities laws when they liquidated their 821,250 shares of stock on the basis of material, non-public information that the company’s revenue and earnings would be considerably lower than expected in the third quarter of 2000. The two executives sold hundreds of thousands of shares in August 2000 on the open market, and later used the Jim and Mikki Anderson Charitable Reminder Annuity Trust (the Trust) to sell the rest. By doing so, the two allegedly avoided $9 million in losses. The Commission also claims that Anderson tipped his friend to sell shares of the company as well.

The SEC argued that Zomax violated Section 10(b) and 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, and 13a-13 when it filed a materially misstated Form 10-Q. In addition, it claimed Anderson and James Flaherty, Zomax’s previous CFO, violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when they made material misstatements or omissions and aided and abetted Zomax in violating Section 13(a) and Rules 12b-20

116. Id.
118. . Id.
119. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
and 13a-13.\textsuperscript{124} It further alleged Anthony Angelini, Zomax’s former COO and President, also aided and abetted Zomax’s violations and that Anderson, his wife, friend, and the Trust violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by trading the securities and tipping others.\textsuperscript{125} Anderson was also said to have violated Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act and rules promulgated thereunder when he failed to report the sales of the stock by the Trust.

Zomax, Flaherty, and Angelini consented to the permanent injunction against them without admitting or denying the wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{126} Zomax agreed to pay $2 million dollars in civil penalties.\textsuperscript{127} Flaherty agreed to disgorge over $16,000 (plus prejudgment interest) and pay a $75,000 civil penalty, and Angelini agreed to disgorge over $43,000 and pay $50,000 in civil penalties.\textsuperscript{128} Litigation against all other parties continues.

In another case, \textit{SEC v. Buntrock,}\textsuperscript{129} the SEC alleged that “[t]hrough the gift of inflated stock, Buntrock was unjustly enriched in form of the increased tax benefit.”\textsuperscript{130} Buntrock, Waste Management’s CEO, gave a gift of 100,000 shares to his college alma mater 10 days before the new management stated that the previous year’s statements were inflated.\textsuperscript{131} The case was settled with entry of an injunction against future violations of the Exchange Act and disgorgement.\textsuperscript{132}

3. Rule 144

Rule 144 adopted pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 applies to: 1) sales of unregistered stock (“restricted securities,” that is, shares that were not issued in registered public offerings) and 2) sales of stock by “affiliates” of a public corporation (“control securities”).\textsuperscript{133} Restricted securities are subject to information availability, a minimum holding period, and a variety of other requirements before they may be publicly

\textsuperscript{124} Id.
\textsuperscript{125} Id.
\textsuperscript{126} Id.
\textsuperscript{127} Id.
\textsuperscript{128} Id.
\textsuperscript{130} Id.
\textsuperscript{131} Id.
\textsuperscript{133} See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2015) (describing an “affiliate” of a stock-issuing corporation as “a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.”).
resold without registration. For shares in reporting companies, the required holding period is a minimum of six months after the shares have been paid for fully, and for shares in non-reporting companies, the minimum holding period is one year after full payment. Once the restricted securities are donated to a charitable organization, the organization is treated as having acquired the shares at the time they were acquired by the donor.

Even when the stock earmarked for donation is already registered, if the donee organization is deemed to be an “affiliate” of the issuer corporation (due to, for example, significant ownership of the issuer corporation’s shares), Rule 144 requirements – other than the holding period requirement – may apply to any subsequent sales of the stock by the donee. It would not, however, apply to the gifting of the stock from the donor to the donee.

III. Empirical Results and Legal Implications

A. Empirical Results

1. The Data

We obtain stock price information from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The insider trading data come from the union of the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (1986 to 2014) and backward extensions using archived annual purchases from the National Archives (1975 to 1995). Our sample includes U.S. common stocks that are covered by all three databases. The time period is from January 1986 through December 2014. Our final dataset has over 9,000 unique Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures numbers (CUSIPs) and over 200,000 observations.

The Insider Filing Database includes all trades reported to the SEC - Ownership Reporting System. The data contains all open market gifts by officers, directors, and beneficial owners (direct or indirect owners of more than 10% of any equity class of securities) of publicly traded firms. To

134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
135. Id. § 230.144(d).
136. Id. § 230.144; § 230.144(d)(3)(ii).
138. For most of the sample period analyzed here (prior to August 29, 2002), Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act required that insider gifts be disclosed within the first 10 days of the month following the month of the trade. SOX modified insider trading regulations in significant ways. For example, the new reporting requirement states that
focus on executive gift-giving, we exclude all gifts by large shareholders. Gifts are designated by the transaction code “G”. The final sample is limited to firms for which stock return data are available in CRSP. In addition, to address potential misreports and incorrect outliers, we use cleansed data from Thomson-Reuters.

Our gift database also provides two dates associated with an insider gift. The transaction date is the date of the actual gift giving, when an insider donates the shares of their own company. The report date is the date when an insider transaction is made public by the SEC. Although our main emphasis is on the information content of insider gifts, we also consider the report dates to analyze potential timing games by insiders.

2. Sample Characteristics

Table 1 shows the sample characteristics of our dataset. Our sample is large and covers a 29-year period, from 1986 to 2014, inclusive. It includes all gifts of their firms’ shares by all executives in all publicly listed firms. As shown in Table 1, the overall sample contains gifts by insiders in 9,676 unique firms from 1986 to 2014. The total number of gifts equals 222,561. Given the comprehensive nature of our dataset, our conclusions apply to all gifts by corporate executives and are not sample specific.
Table 1 also shows that the average gift size is about 43,000 shares. Gift size increases with the size of the firms. In small firms, gift size equals about 35,000 shares, doubling to about 69,000 shares in large firms. The total number of shares gifted is also large, equaling about 9.5 billion shares: about 5.6 billion shares were gifted by top executives and the remaining 3.9 billion shares by officers and directors. The average number of shares gifted per firm is about one million shares. Insiders in large firms appear to gift a lot more shares than insiders in small firms. The average number of shares gifted by insiders in small firms equals about half a million shares. This number rises about 15-fold to 7.4 million shares gifted by insiders in large firms.

The average stock price of the gifted shares is about $30 during the sample period. Consequently, the dollar magnitude of the total gifted shares in our sample is about $300 billion per year. This large amount makes the regulations about executive gift-giving important from legal, economic, and policy perspectives.

3. Measurement of Abnormal Returns

To explore whether insiders time their gifts, we compute abnormal
returns\textsuperscript{139} by subtracting the return to the equally weighted index of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) stocks from the returns for the stocks gifted by insiders.\textsuperscript{140}

This approach controls for market movements and implicitly assumes that average beta or risk-exposure is one. Given that our sample contains over 9,000 firms, this assumption is satisfied. Hence, abnormal return $AR_{it}$ for stock “i” and day “t” is computed as:

$$AR_{it} = (R_{it} - R_{mt})$$

for each firm “i” and day “t”,

Where $R_{it}$ is the simple daily return on the stock “i” gifted by insiders on day “t”, $R_{mt}$ is the daily return to the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on day “t”. For each event date $t$, these returns are first averaged across all gifting firms “i” to compute average abnormal returns:

$$AAR_{t} = \frac{1}{n_t} \sum_{i=1}^{n_t} AR_{it}$$

The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event dates as follows:

$$CAR_{T} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} AAR_{t}$$

These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the behavior of abnormal returns around gifting dates.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{139} The term “abnormal returns” refers to the movements on stock price that cannot be attributed to market movements. They are abnormal in the sense that there are not explained by normal market relation. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., \textit{In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Securities Reform Act’s Pleading Standard}, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 773, 793 (2000) (defining abnormal returns).

\textsuperscript{140} Although not reported here, using as the benchmark the total return to the S&P 500 index or to the value-weighted market portfolio instead of the total return to the equally weighted market portfolio gives similar results. We prefer the equally weighted returns because most of the firms in our sample are small firms and the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms is a better match for small firms.

\textsuperscript{141} For a discussion of event studies and calculation of cumulative abnormal returns, see Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, \textit{Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The
4. Empirical Findings

At this point, it is useful to summarize our five hypotheses regarding executives’ motivations for gifting their own company stock: 1) wait until after the stock price has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material and undisclosed inside information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize their donation and tax deductions (inside information).

Next, we examine the evidence to determine which of these five hypotheses best explain insiders’ behavior. Figure 1 shows the pattern of abnormal returns for the overall sample period. To get a clear picture about timing games, we provide abnormal stock price behavior before from one year before (250 trading days) to one year after the gifting date. Figure 1 further confirms the timing games. Stock prices rise about 5.5% abnormally relative to the market index during the one-year before executives gift their stock. Hence, if the overall market was up, the gifted stocks rose 5.5% more than the market. If the overall market was down, the gifted stocks fell 5.5% less than the market during this period. Following the gifting date, stock prices fall abnormally by about 5% relative to the overall stock market. The absolute maximum stock price occurs on the precise day of the gift.

The conclusion from Figure 1 is that executives are able to avoid a 5% decline in the value of their gifts by acting when they did rather than accelerating or delaying another year. Hence, by carefully timing their gifts, executives are able to increase the size of their gifts, and their corresponding tax deduction by 5%.

This evidence is consistent with all five hypotheses. That stock prices rise abnormally prior to the gifting date is consistent with both the passive-timing and spring-loading hypotheses. That the stock prices drop abnormally after the gifting date is consistent with the bullet-dodging, backdating and inside information hypotheses. To further distinguish among our five different hypotheses and to see if any of them could be rejected, we conducted the additional tests described below.

In Figure 2, we group our sample by the role of the executives into two separate groups: 1) top executives, including the CEO, CFO, and Chairperson of the Board of Directors and 2) all other executives including officers and directors. All shareholders without executive titles are
excluded. Figure 2 shows a similar picture for both officers and top executives. Stock prices run up more prior to top executives’ gifting dates and they decline less after the top executives’ gifting dates. Hence, this evidence tells us that all insiders, regardless of title, use similar devices to time their gifts.

![Cumulative abnormal returns around gift days, by relation](image)

Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees. Top executives are defined as CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, and Chairman of the Board.

In Figure 3, we group our sample by decades to explore the time-series properties of executive gift-giving decade by decade. During the first decade of our sample, 1986-1994, executives appear to gift stocks when the stock price was declining by about 7% prior to the gift date. After the gift date, stock prices continue their decline and fall another 17%. This evidence of the decade of 1986-1994 is inconsistent with the natural
timing and spring-loading hypotheses, but consistent with the other three.

Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.

During the second decade (1995-2004), stock prices rise abnormally by about 6% during the one-year before the gift date. Gifting takes place at the maximum relative stock price. Furthermore, the stock prices fall abnormally by about 6% during the one-year after the gifting date. This decade appears to be characterized by a classic pump-and-dump pattern.

142. This evidence suggests that executives donate stocks that are experiencing extreme declines in price as the stock price falls abnormally by about 30% over the two years. The perpetrator of a classic pump and dump scheme “pumps” the price of a stock by misleading the public about the future profits or health of the company; after the market has absorbed this misleading information and it is reflected in the stock price, the perpetrator “dumps” her position and realizes a gain. Meanwhile, the price often reverts to what it was before the misleading information was injected into the market. David B. Kramer, *The Way It Is and the Way It Should Be: Liability Under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Thereunder for Making False and Misleading Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and Dump” a Stock*, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (2005).
This evidence is again consistent with all five hypotheses.

During the most recent decade (2005-2014), stock prices rise by about 9% prior to the gifting date and they fall about 1% after the gifting date. The gifting still takes place near the maximum prices, at least in the short-run. This picture suggests that recent scandals and publicity about backdating may have played a role in influencing executives to scale back in some of the timing games they play around the gifting of their stock. This evidence is most consistent with the natural timing and spring-loading hypotheses.

Next we explore the relation between the size of the gifts and potential timing games. This evidence is shown in Figure 4, which indicates a strong relation between the number of shares gifted and the price patterns. Large gifts (greater number of shares gifted) appear to be associated with larger stock price increases before the gift date, while smaller gifts are associated with bigger stock price declines after the gift date. Stock prices rise the most (by about 10% abnormally) for the largest category of more than 100,000-shares gifted (approximately more than $3 million). The increase in stock prices is smaller for the fewer-share groups. For the smallest share groups, stock prices rise abnormally by about 5%.
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.

The post-gift-date stock price behavior also depends on the size of the gift. For the largest size category, stock prices do not decline at all. For the smallest share-categories, stock prices decline between 4% and 7% during the year after the giving date.

The evidence shown in Figure 4 indicates that the motivation behind gift-giving may be different depending on the amount of the gift. For small and mid-sized gifts (up to about $3 million or less), executives not only receive a larger deduction as a result of the gift, but they also avoid the subsequent stock price decline. This evidence is consistent with all five hypotheses.

For very large gifts (more than $3 million), there is no subsequent stock price decline. In this case, the gifting individuals are simply able to take a larger deduction by giving recently appreciated stock. This evidence is most consistent with natural timing and spring-loading hypotheses.

To explore the backdating hypothesis in more detail, we group our sample by reporting delays as shown in Figure 5. Because reporting
requirements for gifts changed in September 2002 due to SOX, we restrict our attention in Figure 5 to gifts reported after September 1, 2002. In the post-SOX period, our sample contains 83,909 gifts with valid transaction and reporting dates.

![Cumulative abnormal returns around gift days, by reporting lags](image)

Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives' gift dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees. Reporting delays (lags) are computed from the gift date to the SEC receipt date. Time period is restricted to post September 1, 2002 period.

Our backdating hypothesis suggests that if executives engage in fraud and backdate their gifts, then these gifts will necessarily appear to be reported with delays, even if in reality they are reported promptly.

143. Before the enactment of SOX in 2002, corporate insiders had between 10 days and 40 days to report their gifts to the SEC (they could report by the 10th day of the following month in which the gift took place).
Furthermore, the greater the reporting delay, the greater the degree of fraud.

To explain this further, an example may be useful. Suppose that executives decide to gift their stock on March 2, when the stock price is $50. Also suppose that the stock price started at about $50 last April and had risen to a peak of $100 on January 2 before declining back to $50 at the time of gifting in March. In order to maximize their donation, suppose that executives report January 2 as the date of their donation and take a tax deduction for the trading price on that date, when the stock price was $100. Executives then immediately report their donation in March on Form 4 to the SEC without any further delays.

At this point, anyone examining Form 4 who is unaware of the fraud committed by the executive will deduce the following: 1) executives donated $100 worth of stock on January 2 and 2) executives reported this donation on March 2 with a two month delay. Consequently, all that can be inferred is a late-reported gift. Furthermore, given that gifts are allowed to be reported late in general, these delayed filings should not raise any suspicion.

To the extent executives go back into stock price history and backdate their donations, these gifts will be necessarily associated with reporting delays. Furthermore, to the extent executives go further back into stock price history to find even higher stock prices in the past, those with greater delays will have a bigger peaks and bigger declines (ex-post). Thus, the greater the reporting delays, the greater degree of fraud.

Our evidence is consistent with backdating. First, although not shown in the figure, many gift transactions are reported with significant delay, taking advantage of an exemption created by SOX, which allows executives to report gift transactions on Form 5 (instead of Form 4) up to 45 days after the end of the fiscal year. In our sample, of the total of 83,909 observations post-September 1, 2002 where gifting and reporting dates are both available, 53,379 observations involve delayed reporting. This corresponds to almost two-thirds of the entire sample. Although legal under SOX, this high proportion of delayed reporting certainly raises a red flag.

Second, the evidence in Figure 5 indicates a relation between reporting time lags and the inverse-V-shaped stock price patterns. In the promptly reported group (33,487 observations), stock prices rise about 7% prior to the gift date and they decline 1% to 1.5% during the one-year after gifting. For those gifts with short reporting delays of 3 to 20 days (19,892 observations), stock prices rise about 6.5% prior to the gift date and they decline between 0.5% and 1% during the one-year after gifting. Finally, for those gifts with long reporting delays of more than 20 days (30,520
observations), stock prices rise about 6% prior to the gift date and they decline between 2% to 2.5% during the one-year after gifting. 144

That those gifts with the greatest reporting delays show the greatest stock price declines after the gift date is consistent with the backdating hypothesis. Furthermore, that there are over 30,000 observations during the past 12 years in this category indicates that backdating could still be a problem with the timing of gifts. Overall, our evidence suggests that executives are likely exploiting the delayed reporting provision available under SOX to backdate their gifts. This finding indicates that immediate policy intervention is necessary to bring executive stock donations into compliance with anti-fraud statutes.

As an additional test of backdating, we also classify the gifts by the abnormal stock returns around the gift date. Since backdating involves picking a date with the highest stock price, we group gifts into two categories, one showing an abnormal stock price decline 30-days before the grant date, and the other showing an abnormal stock price increase during the 30 days before the grant date. The backdating hypothesis predicts that the group with a stock price increase should show a greater stock price decline subsequently.

The evidence is shown in Figure 6. Consistent with the backdating hypothesis, the group with a prior 30-day stock increase shows about a 7.7% drop during the next 250 days. In contrast, the group with a prior 30-day stock price decline before the grant date shows only a 6.2% drop during the next 250 days. Once again, this evidence corroborates the conclusion that at least some gifts grants are still likely backdated.

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144. The overall sample period shows stronger evidence of backdating. For the overall period, the promptly reported gifts show a 2% subsequent decline. For gifts reported between 3 and 20 days, the decline is 4.6%. For late reported gifts with more than 20 days of delay, the decline is 5.1%.
Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees. Reporting delays are computed from the gift date to the SEC receipt date. If the 30 day cumulative abnormal return from day -30 to day -1 is positive, then prior return is classified as “Up.” If the 30-day cumulative abnormal return from day -30 to day -1 is negative, then prior return is classified as “Down.” Time period is restricted to post September 1, 2002 period.

B. Legal Implications of the Study

As described above, our study demonstrates that all five of our hypotheses may be in play in various ways. That is, the results can be explained by executives whom have 1) waited until after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerated the good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) delayed the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) backdated the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax deductions (backdating); and 5) used material and undisclosed inside
information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize their donation and tax deductions (inside information). The legal implications of these hypotheses are analyzed below.

1. Waiting for Natural Appreciation of Stock Value

The first behavior that may explain some executive gift timing, waiting until the stock appreciates naturally then making a donation, does not raise any of the tax or securities law issues described in Part IIB above. Although this pattern provides a way for the owner of securities to avoid paying capital gains on the appreciation, this is no different than donating other property that has appreciated in value. This would be a legally appropriate way for an insider to donate stock to a charity.

Under federal tax law, charitable contributions receive significant preferred treatment. The charitable deduction, which is available to corporations and individuals who choose to itemize their deductions, has continued to be one of the largest federal tax expenditures in terms of estimated revenue cost. This tax subsidy ostensibly motivates donors to provide financial support for a variety of organizations that the U.S. Tax Code has designated as charities. The tax preference is greater for higher-income individuals because the amount of the charitable deduction is a function of the donor’s marginal tax bracket.

Donating appreciated property, such as stock that has increased in value, provides further tax advantages by allowing the donor to avoid paying capital gains tax on the appreciation. Furthermore, charitable contributions of appreciated property are treated differently from other transfers of appreciated property because the allowable deduction is equal to the fair market value of the entire property, rather than the difference between fair market value and basis – that is, cost basis is disregarded for purposes of the charitable deduction.

Although recent studies have shown that the tax deduction for charitable giving may be an inefficient tax subsidy, there is no debate about its legality. Maximizing one’s charitable deduction by waiting for the value of stock to appreciate before donating it is comparable to maximizing one’s stock option compensation by waiting for the underlying

146. Id. at 1002.
147. Id.
148. Id.
150. See Cordes, supra note 145 (discussing various criticisms of the tax subsidy for charitable contributions).
stock to appreciate before exercising the option. In both scenarios, the owner of the relevant securities does not take any steps to mislead the public, nor does she use any material inside information to increase her personal wealth. Waiting for stock to appreciate naturally before donating it to charity is consistent with the 1933 and 1934 Acts’ “philosoph[ies] of full disclosure.”

2. Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging

The second and third hypotheses of executive behavior, accelerating good news prior to the gifts, or spring-loading, and delaying the release of bad news, or bullet-dodging, raise securities law concerns. These behaviors have not been without controversy when occurring in the context of dating games played to maximize executive compensation through stock options. In the options context, spring-loading refers to the practice of either manipulating the date of the options grant so that it occurs just before information is released or delaying the release of positive information to a date just after the option is granted. In either case, the executive’s stock options become immediately more valuable after the release of good news. This is analogous to spring-loading the donation of securities, in that the executive is manipulating information to the market in order to make the gift of stock provide greater personal benefit – in this case, a higher tax deduction – although the practice involves acceleration of the release of positive information rather than delay.

Bullet-dodging, in the context of the grant of executive stock options, refers to the practice of accelerating the release of bad news to just before the grant of options, or manipulating the grant date of the option so that the option is granted just after the release of bad news. Our data shows analogous behavior with respect to the executives’ gifting of securities, except that rather than accelerate the release of bad news, the news is delayed until after the gift, yielding a higher tax deduction than the executive would be afforded had the news been released prior to the gift.

It would seem against the legislative intent of the federal securities laws to allow executives to manipulate information flow to shareholders solely for personal benefit. Indeed, one of the major purposes of the 1934 Act was the hope of Congress to curb an “unscrupulous insider . . . [from using] inside information for his own advantage.”

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transparency was a key motivator of the 1934 Act: “devices designed to create a misleading appearance of activity with a view to enticing the unwary into the market on the hope of quick gains” were explicitly frowned upon, and Congress called on “the corporate managers of companies whose securities are publicly held of their responsibilities as trustees for their corporations” to spur a renewal of investor confidence. Executives who engage in spring-loading and bullet-dodging practices – whether in the context of executive stock options or charitable contributions of stock – harm investor confidence by deliberately misrepresenting the value of their stock. Decreased investor confidence may also lead to stock values plummeting; therefore, stockholders may have a viable argument that executives’ manipulation of information flow to increase their own tax deductions runs contrary to executives’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.

Assuming that charitable contributions of stock could be viewed as disguised sales, bullet-dodging and spring-loading contributions should violate Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud provisions. Bullet-dodging – the practice of withholding negative information until after the gift is made – is particularly egregious because it involves actively concealing material information from the public. It also artificially inflates the value of the donation at the time it is made; the later release of the negative information reduces the value of the stock in the hands of the charity, while the donor is still permitted a high tax deduction for the contribution.

In addition, particularly with respect to bullet-dodging, the practice also seems to run afoul of the rules of disclosing or abstaining from trading as articulated by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. In that case, where stock options were at issue, the court found that the recipients were required to disclose the positive information before accepting stock options. It follows that executives should not be permitted to gift shares of stock until the negative information in their possession has been disclosed.

3. Backdating

Falsifying the date that a gift of securities was granted in order to reap higher tax deductions is fraudulent behavior under the federal tax laws.

154. Id. at 10.
155. Id. at 13.
156. See id. (noting that one primary purpose of the bill is to “encourage the voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control” of registered companies).
157. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
158. Id. at 848.
The IRS rules analyze the stock gift’s value on the actual transfer date. Backdating, in the charitable stock-gift context, occurs when the transfer date of the stock gift is changed ex-post to artificially increase the amount of appreciation and, in turn, the amount of the associated tax deduction.

Backdating of executive option grants was discovered simultaneously by Professors Lie, Heron, Narayanan, and Seyhun, and reported in the financial press as early as February 2005. Researchers showed that managers falsified grant dates to receive options with lower strike prices.

159. See I.R.S. Publication 561 (Rev. 1) at 2 (Apr. 2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p561.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHD7-FM83] (“If you deliver the certificate to a bank or broker acting as your agent or to the issuing corporation or its agent . . . the date of the contribution is the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation.”).

160. See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 271 (2007) [hereinafter Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain] (finding significantly less abnormal stock returns after SOX passed, and that “in those cases in which grants are reported within one day of the grant date, the pattern has completely vanished, but it continues to exist for grants reporting with longer lags, and its magnitude tends to increase with the reporting delay.”); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 803 (2005) (proposing that stock return patterns are due to awards being timed ex post facto so that the grant date is set in the past); M.P. Narayanan & Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 975, 1943 (2008) (presenting evidence of selecting an advantageous grant date on an ex-post basis); M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Managers Influence Their Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Option Grants 31 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 927, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649804 [https://perma.cc/3GNS-DAXF] (finding that executive options are backdated); M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Influencing of Executive Compensation 23-24 (Nov. 2005), (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=852964 [https://perma.cc/VK58-DEGQ] (again finding that options are backdated and that SOX mandatory grant date reporting decreases, but does not eliminate opportunism). See also Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (2008) (stating that “thousands of firms continued to secretly backdate options by weeks or months after SOX, even though it entailed—in addition to other legal violations—a blatant disregard of the Act’s two-day reporting requirement.”); Ritter, infra note 161, at 133 (explaining why a company might backdate grants); Mark Hulbert, Test of Good Corporate Citizenship, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 18 2005), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/timing-of-managers-option-grants-a-good-litmus-test [https://perma.cc/85P8-5DLD] (“It appears as though many of them actually are back-dating the effective date of their option grants.”).

161. Jay Ritter writes: “On January 19, 2000, when computer manufacturer Apple’s stock closed at $106.56 per share, Apple announced that one week previously it had granted options to buy 10 million shares to CEO Steve Jobs with an exercise price of the January 12 closing market price of $87.19. The January 12th close was the lowest closing price of the two months prior to January 19. Seven years later, Apple admitted that the dates of many options grants had been chosen retroactively, and that documents purporting to show that the board of directors had approved the grants on the dates chosen had in some cases been fabricated. Wealth transfers from option backdating can be large. For the January 2000 grant alone, if there was a 70 percent chance that the options would eventually be exercised,
The stock price of the company would decline just before the exercise of the grant and increase thereafter. Research conducted in more recent years further suggests that managers are likely to make accounting adjustments favorable to the CEO before option grant dates.

Options backdating is a practice whereby the date of the option grant is changed to a date prior to when the option was in fact granted. This practice was even easier to execute when the SEC rules did not require reporting of the issuance of stock option grants until after the end of the fiscal year. This reporting delay allowed companies to wait until the exercise price dropped relative to that day’s market price. The option would then be backdated at its lowest point or near that point, so that this lower exercise price could then be reported to the SEC. Backdating of stock options thus allows the person who owns the stock options to realize larger potential gains without requiring the company to show these gains as compensation on the financial statement.

Shortly after SOX was signed into law, the SEC changed its rule to require option grants to be disclosed within two days of the grant. In the difference between the January 12th and 19th dates for the exercise price was worth almost $140 million to Jobs due to the difference between the $87.19 and $106.56 exercise prices.” Jay R. Ritter, Forensic Finance, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 131-32 (2008). See also Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 160, at 294 (attributing abnormal stock price patterns to backdating); Randall Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 524 (2009) (“We estimate that 13.6% of grants between 1996 and 2005 have been backdated or manipulated in some fashion.”); Robert M. Daines et al., Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism (Mar. 31, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that abnormal changes suggest various methods of managerial opportunism).

162. This is illustrated by a V-shape on a graph.

163. See, e.g., Terry A. Baker et al., Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings around Option Grants, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 649, 667-69 (2009) (explaining multiple factors that affect managers’ incentives); Mary L. McAnally et al., Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets, and Earnings Management, 83 ACCT. REV. 185, 212-13 (2008) (summarizing information about managers’ and CEOs’ incentives regarding earnings targets).

164. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning Options Backdating at the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 6, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm [https://perma.cc/6B4T-38TQ] (explaining that before SOX, “a grant in January might not have to be disclosed until more than a year later.”).

165. See id. (explaining that companies “granted an ‘in-the-money’ option—that is, an option with an exercise price lower than that day’s market price. . . . by misrepresenting the date of the option grant, to make it appear that the grant was made on an earlier date when the market value was lower.”).

166. Id.

167. Id.

addition, this information must be disclosed electronically, allowing shareholders access to the information almost instantly.\textsuperscript{169} Furthermore, the SEC approved changes to the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Market listing standards, which require shareholder approval of nearly all equity compensation plans.\textsuperscript{170} The terms of the grant must be disclosed, as well as whether the option grant allows for the exercise price to be less than the fair market value at the time of the grant.\textsuperscript{171} However, the evidence in options backdating scandals also shows that executives ignored the timely reporting requirements because the SEC did not explicitly provide for penalties for late reporting. Thus, the SOX requirements and the SEC Rule have been ineffective in controlling executives’ incentives or their opportunities to backdate their option grants.

In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 123R, which again attempted to eradicate the accounting advantage of stock options issued at-the-money.\textsuperscript{172} The Standards require that all stock options granted to an employee be recorded as an expense on the financial statements regardless of whether the exercise price is at fair market value.\textsuperscript{173} In 2006, the SEC began to require all public companies to also report information including:

the grant date fair value under FAS 123R (which is aggregated in the total compensation amount that is shown for each named executive officer); the FAS 123 grant date; the closing market price on the grant date if it is greater than the exercise price of the option; and the date of the compensation committee or full board of directors took action to grant the option, if that date is different than the grant date.\textsuperscript{174}

Companies are also required to explain the goals and policies of the executive compensation plans.\textsuperscript{175} Reports to investors must discuss whether the company has engaged in backdating or might do so in the

\textsuperscript{169} Cox, \textit{supra} note 164.
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{173} Cox, \textit{supra} note 164.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Id}.
future and, if so, how.\textsuperscript{176}

In addition, in 2007, the SEC enacted rules requiring full disclosure of all aspects of executive and director pay and benefits, including stock options. These rules require the company to disclose the full amount of an executive’s compensation in a single number, and whether a stock option is backdated.\textsuperscript{177} If a stock option is backdated, the corporation must provide the reason why. The goal of the rule is to make executive compensation more transparent to the shareholders, thereby ending the practice of executive backdating. However, as we demonstrate in this paper, additional regulatory supervision is still needed to ensure the end of the backdating practice.

Backdating gifts of stock involves many of the same economic and legal concerns that arise with backdating executive stock options. Although the link is less obvious than in the case of executive stock options, backdating charitable gifts also weakens the link between shareholder value and management incentives. Executives who backdate their donations receive the benefit of a larger deduction, without providing any corresponding performance for their firm. Furthermore, the treasury and taxpayers in general lose when donors of backdated stock underpay their taxes. In order to raise a given amount of revenue, other taxpayers must pay higher taxes. To the extent that executive backdating practices and the executive is denounced for tax fraud, the company may incur litigation costs and costs associated with reputational damage, which in turn harm the company’s investors.

4. Using Insider Information

The final hypothesis presented and evidenced in the data is the inside information hypothesis: executives use inside information to time their gifts for the highest deduction. For example, they may choose to donate stock just prior to a negative announcement that causes the stock prices to plummet. Unlike in the case of spring-loading, the insider-executive does not necessarily manipulate the flow of information. She does, however, time her stock donations based on material information that, at the date of donation, is not available to the public. This behavior is analogous to the type of insider trading that is prohibited under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.

As mentioned previously, insider trading cases are generally brought

\textsuperscript{176} Id.

under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” used “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder; or Section 16(b).\textsuperscript{178} Although Section 16(b) was initially drafted with the express purpose of targeting insider trading, today it is Rule 10b-5 that is more commonly used to bring insider trading cases.\textsuperscript{179}

One of Congress’s primary concerns when drafting the 1934 Act was “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets[].”\textsuperscript{180} In In re Cady, Roberts, & Co., the administrative law court stated that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “are not intended as a specification of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.”\textsuperscript{181} In other words, even if nondisclosure of inside information does not constitute fraud, it nonetheless “may be viewed as a . . . practice which operate[s] as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers” in violation of Rule 10b-5.\textsuperscript{182} Although recent insider trading cases have not read Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 so broadly, the “disclose and abstain” principle articulated in Cady, Roberts, whereby an insider in possession of material nonpublic information must disclose the information before trading, and further addressed in Texas Gulf Sulphur, still remains. In addition to encouraging “vigorous market competition,”\textsuperscript{183} the “disclose or abstain” rule promotes fairness to public investors.\textsuperscript{184}

Using inside information to opportunistically time gifts of stock presents similar problems of unfairness as insider trading “in connection with the purchase or sale” of stock. The ability to maximize the value of a tax deduction on the basis of inside information places insider-executives at an unfair advantage relative to other taxpayers. Moreover, like many tax loopholes, this advantage is available primarily to those in high income tax brackets, creating skewed distributional effects favoring high-income individuals.\textsuperscript{185} Other taxpayers are indirectly harmed by strategic timing of stock gifts as they bear the brunt of decreased funding for government-

\textsuperscript{178} 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
\textsuperscript{179} See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 56-57 (1980) (“The conventional wisdom is that Congress . . . expressed its concern with insiders’ informational advantage by enacting section 16.”).
\textsuperscript{181} In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
\textsuperscript{182} Id. at 913.
\textsuperscript{185} Furthermore, “CEOs who make major stock gifts to family foundations tend to be older and considerably richer than the general population of CEOs.” Yermack, supra note 1, at 116.
funded public facilities and services and higher tax rates than if the charitable contributions had not been opportunistically timed.\textsuperscript{186} Further, to the extent that executives often time stock donations just before a decrease in the underlying stock price, the use of inside information to time stock gifts is dishonest to the charities that receive the contributions and believe that they are receiving something of greater value. Such behavior, if made public, may lead to further erosion of investor confidence.

IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Taxpayers are hurt by opportunistic stock gifting by insiders.\textsuperscript{187} Yet, some argue that there is no easy solution. Executives often donate to take advantage of the tax subsidies, and if there were stricter rules and harsher insider trading liability, perhaps insiders would not donate stock as frequently. Many studies conclude that donations increase substantially as the availability of tax deductions increase.\textsuperscript{188} The government, however, also has an interest in ensuring that gift tax exemptions are appropriately applied for those donations that will serve the public good. Further, the government has an interest in upholding the integrity of the securities markets.

We thus propose four regulatory reforms to address these issues. First, we propose that the delayed-reporting exemption given to the gifts should be eliminated. Under current law, gifts can be reported up to forty-five days after the end of the fiscal year. Our research finds that executives are exploiting this exemption to backdate their gifts. We propose that the reporting requirements for gifts be similar to any other insider transactions, namely within two business days of the gift transaction. Second, we propose increased penalties for late reporting of gift transactions. These penalties should be stated as a percentage of the amount of the gift and should increase with the number of days gifts are reported late. Third, if any gift transactions are reported late, we propose that the executives be required to explain the circumstances that led to the late reporting and certify that the gift was not backdated.

Because insiders have an incentive to use inside information and use a variety of manipulative games to time their gifts, spring-loading or bullet-dodging must also be controlled. To address these issues, we suggest an ex-post settlement device. Following the lead of the Private Securities


\textsuperscript{187} Yermack, \textit{supra} note 1, at 122.

\textsuperscript{188} See id. ("These studies generally conclude that donations to charity rise when the availability of valuable tax deductions increases, especially for wealthy taxpayers.").
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, we suggest that a look-back provision be implemented for tax deductions for insider gifts of stock.\textsuperscript{189} If the stock price drops over the 90 days following the date of gift-giving, then the average share price during the 90-day period following the gift should be used for the purpose of the corresponding tax deduction, instead of the price at the date of the gift. This provision will help de-incentivize both inside information-motivated donations as well as spring-loading and bullet-dodging. Executives would have little or no incentive to manipulate information flow in the immediate short-term to increase the tax deduction because the deduction allowed would be a value averaged over a 90-day period.

CONCLUSION

This paper explores five non-mutually exclusive hypotheses regarding how executives time the donations of their own firms' stock: 1) wait until after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize their donation and tax deductions (inside information). The first timing behavior involves no illicit behavior. However, as discussed above, there are serious legal and policy issues raised by the other four behaviors.

Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed. Using a comprehensive database of over 200,000 gifts during 1986-2014, our research demonstrates that each of the five hypotheses, including the backdating hypothesis explain at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving in the United States. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year

\textsuperscript{189} Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was enacted in response to concerns that large damage awards potentially available in securities fraud class action lawsuits were encouraging the proliferation of frivolous suits. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Legislators were apparently motivated in large part by a perceived need to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact large settlement recoveries.”). The PSLRA addresses this in part by a 90-day “look back provision,” which reduces a plaintiff’s recovery to the difference between the purchase price and mean price of the security at issue during the 90-day period after corrective disclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2012).
before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one year after the gift date. We find that this inverse-V shape pattern is stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the back-dating hypothesis. We also find that reporting of almost two-thirds of gifts is delayed, thus exploiting an exemption given to them under SOX, further contributing to the regulatory conditions that make it easier to manipulate the timing of gifts.

Due to the differing behaviors that may be in play when gifts are well-timed and the difficulty in determining whether the motive is legitimate, we propose relatively simple regulatory reforms to curb incentives for illicit timing. Our policy recommendations should improve the compliance of gifts with anti-fraud provisions and decrease tax fraud by eliminating the exemption for late-reporting and imposing a penalty, as well as support the general anti-fraud provisions of securities laws by imposing a 90-day look-back period for determining the stock value for purposes of the tax deduction. Furthermore, these proposals should strike a balance among competing policy considerations by continuing to provide incentives for insider charitable donations of stock while at the same time reducing tax and securities fraud.

Finally, in light of our data showing that stock returns following gifts of insider stock are negative, a charity receiving shares of an executive’s own firm’s stock as a donation might be well be advised to sell the stock immediately, provided that the charity is not subject to Section 16(b). It is probably also a good idea to institutionalize this rule for all stock donations in order combat any resistance from the donors.