THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE:
THE OLD AND THE NEW IN FEDERAL
JURISDICTIONAL REFORM

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INTRODUCTION

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)† was the product of an extended and well-organized political campaign. In Congress, its passage required a grinding eight-year effort, several modifications to the original proposal, numerous committee hearings, multiple reports by both Houses, political compromises that drew some Democratic support, two unsuccessful attempts to terminate debate in the Senate by imposing cloture, and strenuous efforts to amend in both the House and Senate when the bill came to the floor for a final vote.‡ Passage also required Republican control of both Houses of Congress and the presidency as well.

Compared to the determined political campaign necessary to secure its passage, CAFA itself might seem a relatively minor measure. Ostensibly, it altered no substantive law, denied no one a judicial forum, left the federal judicial power untouched, relied on established congressional authority, and bowed to federalism by limiting its extension of national authority to class actions with significant interstate connections. Indeed, the changes it made might appear to some nar-
row and technical. Principally, CAFA provided for federal diversity jurisdic-
tion over multistate class actions and established a “Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights” that imposed mild limitations on certain types of settlements and required that defendants give notice of proposed settlements to state and federal officials. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in fact, termed CAFA a “modest” measure.

The apparent contrast between the “modest” label and the eight-year congressional battle might seem puzzling, and the seeming discordance between effort and result suggests the utility of seeking some historical perspective. Has such discordance been common in jurisdictional reform efforts? Was CAFA a relatively ordinary and typical measure, or did it involve new or unusual elements? Was it truly a “modest” reform? Indeed, what, exactly, did it seem likely to accomplish?

Pursuing those questions, this Article proceeds in four sections. Part I considers five basic characteristics that marked federal jurisdictional reform in the past, and Part II examines CAFA in light of those traditional characteristics. Part III then identifies some aspects of CAFA that are relatively new in the history of federal jurisdictional reform. Finally, Part IV considers what the historical comparison suggests about federal jurisdictional reform and, more broadly, about the operations of American law and government.

3 The jurisdictional provisions appear in section 4 (original jurisdiction) and section 5 (removal jurisdiction). See CAFA, §§ 4-5 119 Stat. at 9-13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453). The former extends jurisdiction to class actions where the aggregated value of the class members’ claims exceeds the sum of $5 million and where diversity of citizenship exists between any class member and any defendant (minimum diversity). It also contains complex provisions limiting that jurisdiction when class members and defendants are predominantly from a single state. The latter provision authorizes removal of class actions and liberalizes the ordinary rules by allowing removal at any time during the suit, allowing any single defendant to remove, and allowing removal even when one or more defendants are citizens of the forum state. It also makes remand orders reviewable by interlocutory appeal. See id. § 5, 119 Stat. at 12-13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453).

4 The “Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights” appears in section 3. See id. § 3, 119 Stat. 5-9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715). It requires that each participating defendant provide detailed notice of any proposed settlement to relevant state and federal officials, prohibits the court from giving final approval to any proposed settlement until ninety days after such notice has been given, and imposes certain restrictions on all settlements involving coupons, net losses to class members, or differential payments to class members based solely on geographical proximity to the forum.

I. TRADITIONAL FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REFORM

Since the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, efforts to establish and alter the rules of federal jurisdiction have exhibited five prominent characteristics. Together, those characteristics suggest the complexities of federal jurisdictional reform and highlight not only its multifaceted legal nature but also its inherently political and social nature.

A. Practicality

Above all, jurisdictional reform in the United States has been an intensely practical matter, a series of pragmatic responses to pressing real-world problems. Over the centuries those problems came in many forms, and they found their sources in the multitude of diverse social, racial, ethnic, cultural, political, and economic interests that energized and divided the American people. As the nation changed, the nature of both the problems and the interests changed, but their dynamic interplay remained ever present. "Legislation concerning judicial organization throughout our history," Felix Frankfurter concluded some eight decades ago in his classic study of federal jurisdictional reform, "has been a very empiric response to very definite needs."6

At the nation's outset, the Founders battled over the most basic question: whether or not the new national government should even have its own courts. They finally agreed on the serviceable but uncertain "Madisonian Compromise," mandating "one supreme Court" but punting to the legislative branch the decision whether to establish "inferior" federal courts.7 When the First Congress subsequently decided to establish a system of lower courts, its efforts were understandably

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6 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 13 (1928); see also id. at 263 ("The empirical nature of judiciary legislation is strikingly illustrated by the anomalous condition of appellate jurisdiction over cases arising in the District of Columbia."); id. at 281 ("The entire history of judiciary legislation demonstrates its inevitably empiric character.").

shaped by compelling political and practical considerations. In the First Judiciary Act, Congress balanced a belief that the new nation needed its own system of courts against state pressures to rely exclusively on existing local courts and a variety of other serious practical concerns, including the heavy expenses that a system of national courts would impose on the new government, the uncertain nature of the substantive law they would enforce, and the burdens of travel and inconvenience they would impose on poorer and distantly located litigants.  

Over the next two centuries alterations to that original structure were equally products of practical needs, and jurisdictional reforms often came only belatedly and as a result of far-reaching social changes and decades of intensifying pressures. It required more than a century of westward expansion, population growth, and swelling dockets to convince Congress to end circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices and to establish a tier of intermediate appellate courts, and only the Civil War and a dozen strife-filled years of Reconstruction could induce it to confer general federal question jurisdiction on the national courts. Even more limited jurisdictional changes, however, also commonly required similar concentrations of practical and political pressures. For example, Congress enacted the first statutes allowing removal of actions against federal officials only to counter extreme threats of state resistance—first, New England's effort to interfere with the collection of customs duties during the War of 1812, and then, South Carolina's announced determination to block federal tariff laws in the nullification crisis of 1832–1833. Similarly, other spe-
cific extensions of federal jurisdiction—to civil rights cases, habeas corpus to state officials, broadened categories of diversity suits, and actions against federal officials and federally chartered corporations—came only with the crises of secession, the Civil War, and continuing and violent Southern resistance to national authority.

The years that followed the Civil War brought not only turmoil but transformation, as new social and economic conditions generated new challenges for the federal judicial system. Drives for reform in the early republic had arisen for the most part from sectional conflicts and the politics of federalism, but in the late nineteenth century those driving conflicts began to arise increasingly from the all-encompassing social consequences of urbanization, industrialization, and economic nationalization. When Congress responded to those new conflicts in the early twentieth century by repeatedly restricting the jurisdiction of federal judges to issue injunctions, it was seeking to limit the ability of those who used the federal courts to fight government regulation, and when it prohibited removal under the Federal Employers' Liabil-

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ity Act (FELA) in 1910 and then again under the Jones Act ten years later, it was seeking to assist injured workers who sought compensation from their employers. Indeed, in 1914 when Congress altered the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by making a technical change in what seemed a relatively abstruse area of law, it was intervening in a fiercely contested issue: the constitutionality of state workers' compensation statutes.

As those examples suggest, over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries federal jurisdictional reform became more closely intertwined not just with issues of institutional structure and federal-state relations but also with issues of private economic conflict and public social policy. More particularly, reform efforts became increasingly intertwined with what might be called "litigation-generated" issues, that is, issues that arose not from traditional structural or institutional conflicts but from pervasive and socially resonant patterns of litigation, especially the rapidly escalating number of cases that pitted national corporations against a wide variety of claimants—suppliers, customers, employees, and adversely affected third parties. Indeed, much if not most of the "law of the federal courts" during the first half of the twentieth century could be studied simply by considering the

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15 Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007. For the congressional aim of helping injured workers, see, for example, S. REP. No. 61-432, at 2 (1910), stating that "[i]t was the intention of Congress . . . to shift the burden of the loss resulting from these casualties from 'those least able to bear it' and place it upon those who can."
16 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6, at 193-98 (explaining how workers' compensation legislation met with fierce opposition in state courts); Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 907, 933 (1997) (explaining that the 1914 amendment's expansion of Supreme Court jurisdiction was prompted largely by a prior New York Court of Appeals decision that struck down a state workers' compensation statute on federal constitutional grounds). The Supreme Court also responded to those changing conditions. It construed jurisdictional statutes to allow the federal courts to hear cases that seemed of greatest national importance, for example, and it gradually expanded the permissible reach of the courts over nonresident corporations engaged in interstate commerce. On the former, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 262-91 (1992); on the latter, see Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 577-86 (1958).
litigation between employers and employees that arose under a single responsive statute, the FELA.  

B. Debating and Adapting Diversity Jurisdiction

A second characteristic of federal jurisdictional reform was its relatively continuous debate over diversity jurisdiction, especially during the century and a half after the Civil War. At the nation's inception, diversity came to be relatively well accepted by the mid-nineteenth century and served, along with admiralty, as a mainstay of the federal docket. The intensely practical nature of federal jurisdiction and the rise of litigation-generated problems in the late nineteenth century, however, transformed it into a perennial battleground. One obvious reason for its centrality was that it was the jurisdictional basis that allowed the federal courts to hear the controversial and rapidly multiplying number of cases between national corporations and their numerous adversaries. In 1906, in his famous address, *The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice*, Roscoe Pound emphasized the disruptive and wasteful excesses

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17 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2000). By 1915, litigation under the FELA and related statutes accounted for almost ten percent of the cases that reached the Supreme Court's docket. See S. REP. NO. 64-775, at 2-3 (1916). Those intense litigation battles gave rise to important decisions developing federal law dealing with venue, anti-removal provisions, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the jurisdictional line between intrastate and interstate commerce, the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to state courts, the constitutional obligation of state courts to hear federal claims, the mandate that state courts hearing federal claims conform to certain federal procedural requirements, and the authority of federal courts to make new substantive rules of law when construing federal statutes— together with the far-reaching 1948 congressional statute that authorized the transfer of cases from one federal district to another. PURCELL, supra note 16, at 165-72, 221-24, 233-37.

18 At various times, of course, reform efforts and debates involved, in one way or another, every basis of federal jurisdiction. See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6. None of those other grounds, however, was as continuously and commonly debated as diversity jurisdiction.

19 See Henry J. Friendly, *The Historic Basis of the Diversity Jurisdiction*, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 487 (1928) ("On no section of the new Constitution was the assault more bitter than on the provisions for the federal judiciary. And while the main attack was directed to the failure to make provisions for trial by jury, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction came in for its share of criticism."); Charles Warren, *New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789*, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 81 (1923) ("There was no part of the Federal jurisdiction which had sustained so strong an attack from the Anti-Federalists, or which had received so weak a defense from the Federalists as that which gave them power over 'controversies between citizens of different states.'" (footnote omitted)).
involved in diversity litigation against corporations,20 and by the end of the 1920s two types of diversity cases—tort and insurance claims brought by individuals against corporations—accounted for seventy percent of all the diversity cases on the federal docket.21

There were, however, two additional reasons why diversity became a central battleground for jurisdictional reformers. One was that it became increasingly apparent that the jurisdictional grant was exceptionally flexible. The Constitution referred to it only in the barest of phrases, authorizing jurisdiction over controversies “between Citizens of different States.”22 Initially, Congress and the Court shaped the jurisdiction narrowly, the former adding an amount in controversy requirement and restrictions on diversity removals,23 and the latter holding that diversity between plaintiffs and defendants had to be complete and that corporations were not “citizens” for jurisdictional purposes.24 Over the years, however, both branches repeatedly stretched the jurisdiction until it seemed that the constitutional authorization could be shaped in almost any way Congress and the Court desired.

The key accordion points were familiar. Most obvious was the fact that the jurisdictional amount and other more specific restrictions on the jurisdiction were only statutory limits, and Congress could vary them as it wished.25 Less obvious but more important, both Congress

22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23 The First Judiciary Act established the jurisdictional amount at $500, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000)), and it limited removal under diversity to three classes of defendants: aliens, nonresident defendants sued by residents of the forum, and defendants in certain actions involving state-granted titles to land. Thus, the Act denied the right of removal to, among others, resident defendants sued by out-of-state plaintiffs. Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 79-80 (1789).
24 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806) (holding that section 11 of the Judiciary Act requires complete diversity for the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809) (holding that corporations were not “citizens” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
and the Court came to realize that the concept of “citizenship” for diversity purposes could be manipulated to serve a wide variety of policy goals. Before the Civil War, the Court extended jurisdictional “citizenship” to corporations and then worked out additional rules for determining how to treat the “citizenship” of other jurisdictionally ambiguous entities—partnerships, unincorporated associations, and “classes” involved in representative suits. Even more boldly, it ruled that federal jurisdiction simply did not extend to citizens seeking relief in matrimonial or probate matters even when their actions met the jurisdiction’s explicit statutory requirements. Similarly, Congress decided that the jurisdiction should not extend to diverse parties who had brought themselves within its requirements “improperly or collusively,” and it subsequently redefined the meaning of jurisdictional citizenship for corporations and a variety of other special categories—insurance companies, permanent resident aliens, citizens of


The change began with Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson, which argued that the Court’s decisions in Strawbridge and Deveaux went too far and asserted that “[a] corporation created by a state to perform its functions under the authority of that state... seems to us to be a person... and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state.” 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844). For later developments, see GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50-76 (1918).

See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1965) (using the citizenship of an unincorporated association’s members to determine the association’s citizenship); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1921) (determining that in class actions only the citizenship of the named class representatives is relevant for jurisdictional purposes); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456 (1900) (holding that the citizenship of partnerships was determined by the citizenship of each partner).


Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)) (providing that for jurisdictional purposes corporations were to be considered citizens of the state of their incorporation and of the state of their “principal place of business”).

The Supreme Court held that an insured was not an indispensable party in a tort action seeking recovery for the insured’s alleged wrongdoing but brought only against his or her insurance company. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 52 (1954). At least two states, Wisconsin and Louisiana, had “direct action” statutes that encouraged such suits. See Donald T. Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment:
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and representatives of decedents, infants, and incompetent persons. Finally, and of greatest potential significance, Congress and the Court came to understand "complete diversity" as only a statutory requirement. Expanding the jurisdiction to reach specific targeted classes of cases, they agreed

Congressional Indirect Action Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 268, 272. Congress responded in 1964 by amending the diversity statute to provide that "in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance," where the insured was not joined, "such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen" in addition to retaining its otherwise proper citizenship for diversity purposes. See Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, 78 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). The amendment was designed to prevent the "manipulation" of diversity and to limit the federal docket. S. REP. NO. 88-1308 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2778. For a critical analysis, see Weckstein, supra, at 272-82.


Congress, in effect, overruled an early Court decision, Hepburn v. Ellzey, which held that Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution does not consider a citizen of the District of Columbia to be a citizen of a state. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452-53 (1805). This result had been repeatedly reaffirmed, e.g., Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 287-88 (1867), before Congress provided that citizens of the District of Columbia were to be considered "citizens" of a "state" for diversity purposes, Act of Apr. 20, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-463, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143, 143 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 76-1756, at 1, 3 (1940) (characterizing the Act of April 20, 1940, as a "reasonable exercise of the constitutional power of Congress"). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, though the five Justices in the majority could not agree on a rationale, and four Justices dissented. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).


In 1988, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to provide that, for diversity purposes, legal representatives of the estates of decedents and of infants and incompetent persons would be deemed citizens of the same state as the decedents, infants, and incompetents. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act § 202(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646.

See, e.g., Act of Jan. 20, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-422, 49 Stat. 1096 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (2000)) (extending the remedy by bill of interpleader to cases where the claimants are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is $500 or more). During the first half of the twentieth century, the Court was cautious in modifying the complete diversity requirement. See, e.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939) (avoiding the constitutional question of whether Article III required "complete diversity" and upholding the 1936 federal interpleader act on the ground that there was diversity between the "adverse" interpleaded parties). The relevant provision of the current federal interpleader statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a).
during the second half of the twentieth century that the Constitution itself required not "complete" but only "minimum" diversity.\footnote{37}

Equally important in ensuring diversity's plasticity was its ostensible rationale, so vague and uncertain that it could be shaped almost at will.\footnote{38} The historical record gave sparse indication why the framers and ratifiers adopted the jurisdiction, and the scattered bits of evidence suggested only that they intended it to provide protection against some kind of bias or unfairness, real or anticipated, that nonresidents might encounter in the states.\footnote{39} In 1978 the House Judiciary Committee concluded simply that the "debates of the Constitutional Convention are unclear as to why the Constitution made provision for [diversity] jurisdiction."\footnote{40} Over the years, moreover, the Court used

\footnote{37} "Minimum diversity" requires only that some one plaintiff be diverse from some one defendant, with the citizenship of all other parties being irrelevant. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (finding diversity jurisdiction to be within the constitutional grant of Article III "so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens"); accord Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978) (citing several cases to conclude that "[i]t is settled that complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement"). Congress subsequently utilized the "minimal diversity" standard in the Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, § 15(c)(2), 113 Stat. 185, 201 (1999), and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-273, sec. 11020(b)(1)(A), § 1369(b)-(c), 116 Stat. 1758, 1826.

\footnote{38} For the argument that there are constitutional limits on the scope of diversity jurisdiction, see C. Douglas Floyd, \textit{The Limits of Minimal Diversity}, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 695 (2004), which argues that expansions of federal jurisdiction should be evaluated under the "necessary and proper" standard of Article III, and C. Douglas Floyd, \textit{The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005}, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006), which challenges Congress's articulation of an "interstate commerce" theory of the Diversity Clause to justify the CAFA.


the jurisdiction to serve a variety of purposes, for the most part shaping it pragmatically to bring into the federal courts the kinds of cases it deemed of national importance.41 Indeed, insofar as Congress and the Court were motivated by any actual concern about bias and local prejudice in the states, they were highly selective at best—and severely derelict at worst—in shaping federal jurisdictional rules to combat those dangers.42

The amorphous nature of diversity's rationale offered jurisdictional reformers a perennial opportunity. The complexities of legal processes and the variety of conditions that existed in the states made charges of bias or unfairness endemic, and repeat-player parties who preferred federal forums advanced them regularly. Further, diversity's purported rationale could readily be stretched to any level of generality, for the dangers of bias or local prejudice could easily be broadened to include a wide range of alleged flaws or inadequacies in state courts—including different procedures or institutional arrangements—that arguably caused risks to nonresident litigants and therefore demonstrated the need for federal jurisdiction.43

The other reason why diversity became a focus of jurisdictional reform was that changing conditions in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries began to alter prevailing ideas about federalism and increasingly made the jurisdiction seem anomalous and illogical. On one hand, the transformations wrought first by the Civil War and Reconstruction and then by industrialization, urbanization, and economic centralization spurred expanding exercises of national legislative and judicial power. On the other hand, a concurrent transformation in American legal thought—declining belief in natural law and the declaratory theory and the growing intellectual domi-
The Old and the New in Jurisdictional Reform

nance of empirical science and jurisprudential positivism—increasingly identified "law" with sovereignty, instrumental policy-based rules, and the idea of a government's proper "legislative jurisdiction." The first transformation led to the establishment of federal question jurisdiction, the proliferation of congressional legislation, and the establishment of ever more muscular national constitutional rights. The latter transformation made federal question jurisdiction seem the natural and logical field for the federal courts, while casting diversity jurisdiction as ill-fitting and discordant, a view that the Supreme Court strengthened in 1938 when it abolished the federal "general" common law and required federal courts to follow the common law decisions of the state courts. The federal courts, the standard argument began to run, should not waste their resources and squander their expertise on cases that held merely local interest and that were, in any event, governed by state law. Instead, they should concentrate on questions of national law and the kinds of broad national issues that properly commanded the attention of the national judiciary.


45 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

As a result, legal rules inconsistent with that positivist assumption, such as the "well-pleaded complaint rule," came to seem not merely undesirable but facially illogical. The federal courts should serve as the authoritative voice of federal law and national interests, and state courts should serve as the authoritative voices of state law and local interests. By the 1950s, Henry M. Hart, Jr. saw those principles as obvious corollaries of an inherent "logic of federalism," and a decade later Judge Henry J. Friendly became ecstatic when he contemplated their jurisprudential elegance. The paired principles were "so beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful," he exclaimed, "that we must wonder why a century and a half was needed to discover them."

The revealing element of Friendly's rapture, of course, was his statement that "a century and a half" was needed to "discover" them, that is, that the principles had presumably existed all along in the Constitution itself rather than being newly shaped legal constructs that flowed not from the Constitution but from a distinctly twentieth-century jurisprudential positivism.

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47 *See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal.*, 463 U.S. 1, 4 (1983) (noting that the "well-pleaded complaint rule" was based on "reasons involving perhaps more history than logic"); *see also* Donald L. Doernberg, *There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction*, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 599 (1987) (arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule "for all its venerability, produces neither reason nor coherence, is not dictated by sound judicial policy, and ought to be abandoned").


50 Hart made a similar ahistorical assumption. *Purcell, supra* note 43, at 248-49. Interestingly, while Hart was a strong defender of diversity jurisdiction, *id.* at 246, Friendly was a long-time opponent. *See* Henry J. Friendly, *FEDERAL JURISDICTION* 139-
By the second half of the twentieth century those nationalist and positivist attitudes underlay most formal jurisdictional thinking in the United States, and their logic underwrote a broadening consensus that led Congress, the Court, and many prominent judges and scholars to support the steady narrowing or abolition of diversity jurisdiction and the concomitant expansion of federal question jurisdiction. In the 1970s Chief Justice Warren E. Burger urged the outright abolition of diversity jurisdiction and complained that it "still plagues us, despite numerous studies which advocate such jurisdiction of federal courts be curtailed or abolished." At the Pound Conference on civil justice reform in 1976, Lawrence E. Walsh, president of the American Bar Association, commented that "the suggestion of curbing diversity cases... seemed to provoke relatively little opposition." Two years later, when the House Judiciary Committee recommended a bill to abolish diversity jurisdiction, its report declared that, after extensive

52 (1973) (asserting that diversity jurisdiction has had no significant justification for many years).


hearings, there was "virtual unanimity" that "diversity jurisdiction be abolished or curtailed."\(^{54}\)

The influence of those positivist assumptions was limited not so much by theory but by practical interests. Diversity's supporters seemed to lose the jurisprudential debate, but they won the political battle, working assiduously to maintain their favored jurisdiction. Increasingly, they were identified with the practicing bar, especially its trial lawyers and corporate counsel, whose views seemed rooted in professional and client interest.\(^{55}\) Although they advanced a variety of arguments for retaining the jurisdiction, their defense seemed animated ultimately by neither jurisprudential principles nor ideas of systemic efficiency but by the desire of litigators to protect an exceptionally useful tactical tool and by the preference of elite lawyers and their corporate clients for federal forums. In 1977, as the push for abolition intensified, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates reaffirmed its long support for diversity, and some of its members even urged that it be expanded.\(^{56}\) When the House held hearings on its bill to abolish the jurisdiction, the measure's most outspoken opponents included the American Bar Association, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.\(^{57}\)


\(^{56}\) See Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 46, at 29; see also, e.g., Brent Caslin, Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Ford: 120 Years of Shenanigans Designed To Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction, 42 WILAMETTE L. REV. 439 (2006) (arguing that Congress should prevent the destruction of diversity jurisdiction by sham transaction in the same way it has prohibited the creation of diversity by sham transaction). Similarly, corporate interests had opposed serious limitations on diversity when Congress had considered the issue in both 1932 and 1958. See PURCELL, supra note 43, at 77-85, 265-69, 271-72, 280.

\(^{57}\) See, e.g., 1979 House Hearings, supra note 55, at 52 (statement of Edward M. Mullinix, Council Member, Section of Litigation, and John C. Shepherd, Chairman, House of Delegates, American Bar Association); id. at 95 (statement of Robert G. Begam, past President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America); H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 6-7. The American College of Trial Lawyers opposed significant limitations on diversity jurisdiction, while the other two groups opposed all proposed limitations. H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 6-7. In addition, the Department of Justice supported only "partial elimination" of diversity. Id. Similar professional battle lines had appeared a decade earlier when Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking to the ALI, proposed the severe restriction of diversity in order to rationalize federal jurisdiction according to "principles
Those two qualities of diversity jurisdiction—its plasticity and its so-called “illogical” jurisprudential nature—inspired quite different agendas. They meant that the jurisdiction would appear particularly dubious to general theorists and those interested in systemic judicial efficiency but would seem particularly useful to practicing lawyers and those who strove to serve the interests and preferences of repeat-player clients. Thus, diversity jurisdiction increasingly became a battleground between those who sought, usually for general and systemic reasons, to curtail or abolish it and those who sought, commonly for narrower professional or client-based reasons, to retain or expand it.

C. Obscured Duality: Goals and Results

A third characteristic of federal jurisdictional reform was its sometimes-obscured dual nature. Efforts to reform substantive law addressed practical issues and interests directly, and reformers’ announced goal was to alter the way people behaved and to change substantive outcomes in relevant cases. Efforts to reform jurisdictional law, however, tended to downplay such particular issues and interests and to highlight broader and more socially abstracted institutional goals, such as increasing fairness, efficiency, neutrality, rationality, and coherence in the legal system as a whole.

Regardless of formal goals and institutional rhetoric, however, federal jurisdictional reform invariably brought twin results: it altered, supposedly for the better, the operations of the legal system, and it shifted the balance of advantage and disadvantage among at least some of the system’s different litigant groups. Such duality, characteristic of much legal reform, seems particularly acute in this area, for jurisdictional and procedural matters are generally and in theory considered to be separate and distinct from “substantive” law issues.

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of federalism.” Id. at 1. Then, the National Association of Claimants Counsel of America and the National Board of the American Trial Lawyers Association joined in opposing the jurisdiction’s “emasculcation.” PURCELL, supra note 43, at 280.

54 Such duality, characteristic of much legal reform, seems particularly acute in this area, for jurisdictional and procedural matters are generally and in theory considered to be separate and distinct from “substantive” law issues.
vanced proposals, draped in the language of fairness and efficiency, designed to achieve such differential results.

The paradigmatic example of such blending was Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis's famous 1928 study, *The Business of the Supreme Court*.\(^5\) Bristling with appeals to science, neutral standards, objectivity, professionalism, empirical evidence, and disinterested judgment, the book pleaded for a set of laudable institutional goals—the rationalization of federal jurisdiction, the maintenance of high professional standards on the federal bench, the achievement of judicial efficiency by organizing the national judiciary as a coherent "system" of courts, and the establishment of jurisdictional rules that would enhance the ability of the Supreme Court to serve its essential role as the voice of the Constitution and the umpire of the federal system. All that, however, was only the surface story. On another level the book was a shrewd and carefully calculated effort designed to serve a variety of distinctly Progressive political goals. Its analysis and prescriptions were intended to assert the power of Congress over the anti-Progressive federal judiciary, limit the ability of the lower federal courts to block state regulatory efforts, deny corporations many of the practical litigation advantages they enjoyed under existing jurisdictional rules, and stop the Supreme Court from hearing certain types of cases and from reaching the constitutional issues that it used to invalidate Progressive legislation.\(^6\)

The dual nature of Frankfurter's work was broadly illuminating. Lawyers and scholars like Frankfurter understandably led efforts to reform federal jurisdiction, and that fact severely complicated ensuing debates. It meant that cleverness was at a premium and that almost any reform proposal—and any opposition to such proposals—could and would be robed in eminently plausible and seemingly public-oriented raiments. Further, it meant that many of those who participated in the debates were likely representing, formally or informally, the interests of clients or distinct social groups and that the litigation needs of those groups shaped their views and arguments.\(^6\)

Judging

\(^{5}\) Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 6.

\(^{6}\) Purcell, supra note 46, at 698-706.

the true need for, and wisdom of, various jurisdictional reform proposals, then, was generally an exceptionally perplexing and demanding task.

D. Limited and Inadequate Empirical Evidence

As Frankfurter suggested, empirical evidence about the operation of the judicial system seemed essential to wise jurisdictional reform. Over the course of more than two centuries, however, advocates and opponents advanced little such evidence to support their positions. Instead, they relied for the most part on legal and constitutional arguments, anecdotes based on personal experience, and collections of supposedly illustrative and allegedly representative cases found in the law reports. Beginning in the early twentieth century, jurisdictional reformers began to seek more comprehensive statistical evidence, but their efforts commonly produced little more than compilations drawn from general caseload statistics and, beginning in the 1920s, occasional studies of dockets in individual states or federal judicial districts.62 In terms of data on the judicial system, Charles E. Clark and William O. Douglas concluded in 1933 that the United States was "still in the 'prestatistical age.'"63 Until comprehensive and reliable statistics became available, they emphasized, jurisdictional debates would involve little more than "conflicting, uncertain opinions and vague speculations."64

Southerners and Progressives, for example, had sought to restrict or abolish diversity jurisdiction for more than half a century after Reconstruction, but over that entire period they produced little statistical evidence to support their charges that the jurisdiction caused systemic unfairness to those who sued national corporations. Four times between 1880 and 1887 the House passed bills eliminating corporate

62 One of the earliest significant efforts to produce a comprehensive statistical survey was a 1934 study of the work of thirteen federal judicial districts. See ALI, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1934). Its findings were for the most part unilluminating, and it inspired no immediate change in federal jurisdiction.


64 Id. at 1453.
citizenship for diversity purposes, but statistical evidence added little to the discussion beyond showing that dockets were expanding and that corporations did, in fact, commonly use diversity jurisdiction. Why corporations did so, and whether their use of the jurisdiction was unfair or abusive, remained matters of deep dispute.

As late as 1932, when Progressives made another concerted effort to abolish diversity, they could offer little more in the way of evidence than a collection of testimonial letters from plaintiffs' attorneys and law professors and a survey of federal judges showing that diversity cases accounted for approximately twenty-seven percent of the civil caseload. Their opponents did little better. Representatives of the insurance industry produced a compilation of almost 18,000 insurance cases, but their numbers showed only that most such cases were brought in state courts and that the companies seemed to invoke federal jurisdiction when they could.

For its part, even the U.S. government could add nothing more in the way of statistical data. To counter the Progressive effort, President Herbert Hoover presented an alternate proposal that would preserve diversity jurisdiction while limiting its corporate use, but he offered no new evidence to support his proposal. The President, Clark and Douglas noted, "was unable, for lack of data, to advise Congress on the simple and primary questions of how much of a burden . . . [diversity] jurisdiction casts upon the federal courts and to what extent his proposal would relieve the congestion of their dockets."

Even in the later twentieth century, jurisdictional reformers continued to rely primarily on legal arguments, case reports, and personal anecdotes rather than comprehensive and meaningful statistical stud-

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65 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6, at 90, 136 ("[T]he House in 1887, by an overwhelming vote, for the fourth time sought to withdraw from the federal courts the growing volume of litigation drawn to them by the fiction of corporate citizenship.").

66 See S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 10-21 (1932). From the survey of federal judges the committee reported that, during the calendar year 1929, there had been 34,774 cases filed in the district courts and that 9,630 of them were diversity actions. Id. at 9-10.

67 See Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: Hearings on S. 937, S. 939, and S. 3243 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong. 44-47 (1932) (statement of Hobart S. Weaver, Attorney, Association of Life Insurance Presidents) (stating that in a study of life insurance companies over a five-year period, 530 cases were removed to the federal court); PURCELL, supra note 16, at 21, 298 nn.49-50 (citing similar numbers).

68 Clark & Douglas, supra note 63, at 1449. Even if meaningful statistics had been available, the administration would likely not have used them, as Hoover's counter-proposal was merely a tactic designed to help defeat the Progressives' abolition bill. See PURCELL, supra note 43, at 82.
ies. In 1948, when the railroads pushed Congress to adopt a provision for the interdistrict transfer of cases between federal courts, they introduced a compilation of some 3000 cases to demonstrate what no one denied: that FELA claimants frequently filed their suits in federal districts where neither the accident occurred nor the plaintiff resided at the time of injury. 69 Ten years later, Congress decided to make workers' compensation claims nonremovable on the basis of simple caseload statistics that came primarily from a single state, 70 and in 1964 it amended the diversity statute to keep "direct action" suits against insurers out of the federal courts on the basis of similar docket evidence from two states. 71 As late as 2002, when Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction to reach a new class of multiparty and multiforum disputes, 72 it offered almost no empirical evidence to show its likely impact. 73 Indeed, the year before the statute's passage, Deborah Hensler reported that she had "been able to find only one empirical analysis of multi-district litigation." 74

The failure of jurisdictional reformers to produce comprehensive statistical evidence was, of course, entirely understandable. The federal government did not even begin to gather docket data systematically until the 1870s, and relatively comprehensive and reliable statistics were not available until the twentieth century. Worse, it was not until the late twentieth century that most states began to collect reli-

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69 See H.R. REP. NO. 80-613, at 3 (1947) (citing more than 2500 cases).
71 See S. REP. NO. 88-1308, at 2 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2778, 2779-80 (describing the effect of "direct action" statutes in Louisiana and Wisconsin). At the time, only two states had such "direct action" statutes, and Congress feared that others might adopt similar measures. Id.
73 The provision constituted one small part of a much larger bill. The House Report discussed it only briefly, offered no statistical evidence, and cited the testimony of just one airline attorney. It justified the provision by pointing to the practical problems and "waste of judicial resources" that resulted when single accidents led to the filing in different states of multiple suits raising the same legal and factual problems. H.R. REP. NO. 107-685, at 199-200 (2002), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1120, 1151-52. See generally Laura Offenbacher, The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act: Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REV. LITIG. 177 (2004); Angela J. Raffo, Congress and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002: Meaningful Reform or a Comedy of Errors?, 54 DUKE L.J. 255 (2004).
74 Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 195 n.42 (2001).
able—though often still not fully comparable—sets of judicial statistics, and without state data it was impossible to evaluate the overall operations of the dual federal-state judicial system. Worst of all, however, was the fact that the increasingly comprehensive and reliable sets of state and federal docket statistics failed to answer the truly pivotal practical and social questions that ultimately underlie debates over jurisdictional reform. Those available collections understandably focused on the formal characteristics of cases—jurisdictional basis, nature of claim, number and type of motions filed, manner of disposition, appeals taken, and duration from filing to termination—that failed for the most part to illuminate the driving issue that animated jurisdictional politics: who held, and who was vulnerable to, the different types of legal and practical leverage that were available under existing rules, as well as who would benefit, and who would suffer, from proposed changes that would shift the balance of litigation advantage.

The relatively extensive judicial statistics that gradually became available during the twentieth century, then, proved useful primarily for two purposes: demonstrating the growing caseload of the courts and identifying its general sources by jurisdictional head and type of claim. Thus, statistical evidence tended to become a stock resource for those who sought, for whatever reason, to curtail federal jurisdiction. Limitation, they insisted, would provide a remedy for "congestion." Conversely, those who opposed such restrictions or sought to expand federal jurisdiction downplayed such statistical evidence and stressed the compelling practical goals the jurisdiction served. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Southerners and Progressives portrayed their restrictive proposals as remedies for a growing "congestion" that burdened the federal courts, while their opponents discounted statistics and emphasized the protections the na-

75 The president of the American Bar Association complained in 1976 that the legal profession "just doesn't have the necessary funds to conduct proper studies." Walsh, supra note 53, at 288.
76 As a general matter, federal caseloads rose during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dropped during the 1930s and 1940s as a result of the Depression and war, and then rose sharply from the 1950s onward. See David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 84-88 (1981).
77 Progressives tried to abolish diversity jurisdiction in 1932 because they saw it as an unfair corporate litigation tool, but they naturally advanced their proposal, in part, as a measure "to relieve congestion in Federal courts." S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 10 (1932).
tional courts provided against "the perils of sectional bitterness, narrow prejudices, or local indifference to integrity and honor." 78

The pattern continued throughout the twentieth century. When Congress again tried to abolish diversity jurisdiction in the late 1970s, the House Judiciary Committee supported its proposal by citing docket statistics showing that "some reduction in intake is imperative" and that abolishing diversity jurisdiction would be "an important step in reducing endemic court congestion." 79 Opponents discounted the statistics, rejecting the very idea that "the cure for any overburdened justice system is to limit the public's access to the system by reducing the scope of its jurisdiction." 80

While statistical data demonstrated the continuing growth of the federal caseload, by themselves they seldom overcame congressional reluctance to impose significant jurisdictional limitations. Instead, Congress tended to respond to caseload pressures by increasing the number of federal judgeships and expanding the judiciary's institutional resources. 81 The growing availability of elaborate sets of judicial statistics, then, had relatively little impact on the rules of federal jurisdiction. 82

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78 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6, at 92 (quoting Representative George D. Robinson, a Massachusetts Republican, arguing in 1880 that diversity jurisdiction was necessary to protect eastern capital). See generally id. at 77-102 (detailing the efforts to relieve court congestion between 1875 and 1891).

79 H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 2-3 (1978). Statistics showed that during 1977 there were 31,678 diversity cases filed in the federal courts, a quarter of the civil caseload, and that there were 1714 diversity cases in the courts of appeals, approximately eleven percent of the appellate caseload. Id. For the contemporaneous debate, see, for example, Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197 (1982), arguing that diversity jurisdiction should be modified to accentuate its strengths rather than abandoned; and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66 A.B.A.J. 177 (1980), arguing that the benefits of abolishing diversity jurisdiction outweigh the costs.

80 1979 House Hearings, supra note 55, at 55 (statement of Edward W. Mullinix, Council Member, Litigation Section, American Bar Association).

81 "The most obvious solution is to increase the capacity of the system . . . . Another possibility is to improve the efficiency of the system." Id.; see also DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988) (examining the decision of Congress to divide the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals into two circuits); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Caseload Burdens and Jurisdictional Restrictions: Some Observations from the History of the Federal Courts, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 7, 11-14 (2002) (noting various methods Congress has used to control the caseload burdens on federal judges).

82 By the late twentieth century, the expanded administrative capacities of the federal courts generated more sophisticated data sets, and judicial reform efforts became increasingly professionalized. When jurisdictional issues impinged on social interests
E. The Question of State-Federal "Parity"

The last characteristic of federal jurisdictional reform was the debate it provoked over "parity," the question of whether the state courts were truly equal to the federal courts in quality and fairness. There were, of course, many differences between federal and state courts and consequently many reasons why a party in any given case might prefer one to the other. Federal and state courts could differ in procedural rules (e.g., scope of allowable discovery), institutional characteristics (e.g., elected versus life-tenured judges), docket conditions (e.g., time to trial or final judgment), and informal contextual factors (e.g., the social make-up of jury pools). Whether those and other such observable differences led to any systematic differences in results, and whether any such differences were caused by "bias" or resulted in "unfairness," were the decisive questions.

While debates over proposed reforms usually raised the parity question, they never resolved it, at least as a general matter. Instead, participants gave voice to widely varying perceptions, with advocates of federal jurisdiction extolling the superiority of the national courts and their adversaries trumpeting the equal virtues of state courts. Judicial statistics, even in the early twenty-first century, provided little enlightenment. In specific areas they sometimes revealed problems with particular courts or with certain types of cases, but they furnished no general answer to the two basic questions of federal-state parity. Ulti-
mately, Erwin Chemerinsky concluded, “the issue of parity is an empirical question for which no empirical measure is possible.”

Not surprisingly, the parity debate often revolved around the stock rationale of diversity jurisdiction. Advocates of preserving or expanding federal jurisdiction stressed the grave dangers of “bias” and “local prejudice,” while those who sought to limit or abolish the jurisdiction minimized or denied these dangers. The former presented little in the way of affirmative evidence and wholly disregarded other evidence suggesting that, if “bias” and “local prejudice” did affect the judicial system, they might influence federal as well as state courts. The latter...
ter relied primarily on simple assertions of skepticism about the existence of such bias or prejudice. In pushing its bill to abolish diversity in 1978, for example, the House Judiciary Committee simply declared that it was "doubtful that prejudice against an individual because he is from another State is any longer a significant factor in this country's State courts." The bill's opponents responded with predictable, but equally unproven, assertions. "There is local prejudice," representatives of the American Bar Association maintained. "Nearly every lawyer who has significant trial experience has encountered local prejudice . . . ."

Except in the most obvious and egregious cases, charges of "bias" and "local prejudice" were exceptionally difficult—if not impossible—to prove. Differences in results could readily flow from any number of fair and reasonable differences between individual courts and judicial
systems. Judges could rely, for example, on different but equally reasonable interpretations of legal rules, especially when the rules contained vague terms or required application of a "reasonableness" standard. Similarly, juries could easily draw differing but equally plausible conclusions when evaluating the credibility of witnesses or deciding hotly contested issues of fact. Any number of other factors, including differing but equally legitimate procedural rules and institutional arrangements, could also explain any noticeable differences in results between the two court systems. "There are perfectly sound tactical reasons for a lawyer in a given case to welcome the presence of diversity jurisdiction," Chief Justice William Rehnquist commented in 1993, "but they have almost nothing to do with" the existence of bias or local prejudice.90

Perceived differences between federal and state courts were, in fact, often based on assumptions about the differing political and social orientation of the judges themselves. For more than half a century, from Reconstruction to the New Deal, tort plaintiffs suing national corporations preferred state courts, in part because they believed that federal judges were biased against them. It was for that reason, among others, that Congress conferred a jurisdictional boon on FELA claimants when it made their actions nonremovable. It was for the same reason that, with no change in substantive law, FELA claimants suddenly began to bring their actions in federal court after World War II when Democratic appointments had transformed the political and social orientation of the federal judiciary.91 Similarly, civil rights plaintiffs favored the federal courts after Brown v. Board of Education92 and Monroe v. Pape,93 but they began to hesitate and reconsider their preferences during the 1980s after Republicans began remaking the federal bench.94 The political and social values of judges

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91 PURCELL, supra note 16, at 165, 220. On the reasons for the different forum preferences, see id. at 28-86.
shaped their articulation and application of the law;\textsuperscript{95} presidents generally selected appointees whose political values and policy preferences reflected their own;\textsuperscript{96} and lawyers and their clients understood that reality and responded accordingly.

The fact that judges were influenced by their personal political and social views was an awkward fact, for it called attention to an inherently political element in the nation's heralded "rule of law." For that reason, perhaps, the availability of a stock rationale—fear of "bias" and "local prejudice"—proved particularly serviceable. It allowed participants to make practical comparisons between federal and state courts—and to account implicitly for perceived differences in the social and political values of their respective judges—on grounds that were sanctioned by tradition and built in as justifications for the nation's dual court system. Thus, such charges could be advanced generally and without need for specific accusations. Charges of "bias," in fact, often emphasized merely "anticipated" as opposed to actual "bias"; when they did became specific, they were usually directed at local juries or local "popular" opinion. Moreover, when complaints did nod toward state judges, the blame often fell on the institution of elective judgeships, which purportedly placed undue political pressures on an otherwise fair-minded bench. Regardless of the covering

\textsuperscript{95} Cf. Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (1997) (surveying research that has identified a variety of motivations influencing judges); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make, at xiii (1998) ("[T]he choices of justices can best be explained as strategic behavior, not solely as responses to either personal ideology or apolitical jurisprudence."); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 208-60 (1993) ("[P]olitical attitudes are crucial to understanding the decisions made by Supreme Court justices."); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 147 (2006) ("We have found striking evidence of a relationship between the political party of the appointing president and judicial voting patterns."). There is some evidence, too, that judges may be influenced by contributions to their election campaigns. See Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections 73 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, Campaign Contributions, Judicial Decisions, and the Texas Supreme Court: Assessing the Appearance of Impropriety, 90 Judicature 214 (2007) (suggesting a link between campaign contributions and judicial decisions in the Texas Supreme Court).

\textsuperscript{96} See Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan 361 (1997) ("In short, the evidence presented in this book at the least suggests that presidential agendas and judicial selection are intimately tied and that the policy agenda tends to predominate in times of political re-alignment."). "Many, perhaps most, of the [George H.W.] Bush appointees actively share Bush's judicial philosophy and conservative views. This surely is a legacy to be reckoned with." Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 94, at 297.
rhetoric, however, debates over the parity question were often influenced by the participants' perceptions of the political and social orientations of federal and state judges.

II. CAFA: JURISDICTIONAL REFORM IN THE CLASSIC MODE

Considered in light of those five characteristics, CAFA appeared for the most part a typical example of federal jurisdictional reform. With two notable exceptions—its innovative exploitation of diversity's plasticity and its unusually blunt attack on state courts—CAFA followed the classic reform path in genesis, shaping, and enactment.

A. Practicality

CAFA was surely a response to practical problems that were both weighty and pressing. To a large extent those problems grew out of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which introduced in subsection (b)(3) a new and expanded form of class action based on the presence of "common issues" of law and fact.\(^{97}\) After witnessing an initial burst of class action litigation, the federal courts held the new form in tight check until the mid-1980s when rapidly expanding docket pressures from mass tort claims induced them to begin certifying "common issue" class actions.\(^{98}\) Those actions quickly proliferated in number and expanded in variety for a decade until the federal courts again changed course and demonstrated a growing suspicion, if not outright hostility, toward them.\(^{99}\)

\(^{97}\) FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).

\(^{98}\) From the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the federal courts were unwilling to certify even relatively simple "single event/single situs" mass accident torts as class actions, but by the late 1980s they were certifying far more complicated and multifaceted "mass exposure" class actions. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344-45 & nn.2-3, 1358 (1995). In 1984 the Second Circuit affirmed the certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action in In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'g In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), and two years later the Third and Fifth Circuits affirmed class certifications in similar mass tort class actions. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). The next decade brought a growing number of such cases into the national courts. "The hypothesis that best explains this puzzling inconsistency," John Coffee wrote, "is that the burden on the courts from a failure to certify was far greater in the latter context where individual actions would otherwise proliferate," and "the end of saving the federal docket justified means that otherwise might seem improper." Coffee, supra, at 1358, 1364.

\(^{99}\) Two decisions are commonly cited as pivotal: the Fifth Circuit's decision in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), and the Seventh Circuit's de-
That change in attitude spurred plaintiffs' attorneys to turn to the state courts where "common issue" class actions were sometimes treated more sympathetically and certified more readily.\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, during the preceding decade the Supreme Court had, in effect, encouraged such state court class actions by upholding the power of state courts to enter judgments binding out-of-state class members who lacked "minimum contacts" with the forum state.\textsuperscript{101}

It was in that context that Congress took up the issue in the late 1990s,\textsuperscript{102} seeking to remedy a range of problems attributed to class actions, their rapidly expanding use, and their shift into the state courts. First were difficulties that inhered in the representative form itself. Class members were generally unable to monitor and control class attorneys, and during the course of litigation many critical decisions were made with inadequate or no notice given to class members. Further, the form created potential conflicts of interest among class members, between class members and their named representatives, decision, written by Judge Richard A. Posner, \textit{In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.}, 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).


\textsuperscript{101} Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-12 (1985) (holding that a state court does not violate due process when it asserts personal jurisdiction over absent members of a Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff class who have been given opt-out notice, even when some members do not otherwise have minimum contacts with the forum state). Two other decisions also contributed: \textit{Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein}, 516 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1996), which held that the state court class action judgment based on a settlement is binding under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, notwithstanding the fact that the settlement released claims within exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, and \textit{Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman}, 486 U.S. 717, 731 (1988), which refused to review a state court choice of law decision applying forum-state law in a multistate class action on the ground that the law of other potentially relevant states was the same as that of the forum state.

\textsuperscript{102} For discussions of congressional criticisms of the class action form, see Andre-eva, supra note 2, at 392-99; Justin D. Forlenza, \textit{CAFA and Erie: Unconstitutional Consequences?}, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1083-89 (2006).
and between class members and their attorneys. Thus, the form was susceptible to abuse because class members had little knowledge of or control over the litigation and because potential conflicts of interest created opportunities for class representatives and attorneys to collude with class adversaries.

Second were problems that arose because most class actions were settled out of court and, increasingly, filed solely as comprehensive settlement devices. Such settlements, many critics charged, often provided little or no monetary relief to class members and functioned primarily to allow defendants to buy a cheap "global peace" by paying large legal fees to class attorneys. The practice raised even more acute problems when settlements sought to resolve claims that had not yet matured or that belonged to class members who had not yet been identified.

Third were problems that class actions posed for courts. Such suits often involved massive numbers of class members, exceptionally complex legal and factual issues, and unusually heavy administrative burdens. In addition, they increasingly induced the courts to adopt a variety of procedural shortcuts and experiments to make cases more manageable. Such ad hoc approaches often fit poorly with ostensibly

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103 It is questionable whether attorneys representing classes are, in fact, subject to less supervision than attorneys representing most individual clients. See, e.g., DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995). On the importance of "client-centered" representation in class actions, see Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 709 (1989).

104 A study by the Federal Judicial Center found that of 152 suits certified as class actions in the mid-1990s, fifty-nine were certified for settlement purposes only. In addition, class actions settled at a high rate and were two to five times more likely to settle than uncertified cases that contained class allegations. THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT F. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 7, 10 (1996).


107 One study found that, compared to nonclass civil actions, class actions tended to take two to three times longer to move from filing to disposition and to require five times more "judicial time." WILLGING, HOOPER & NIEMIC, supra note 104, at 7.
controlling rules of law, and creative adaptations sometimes generated as many or more problems as they resolved. Further, class actions required special judicial scrutiny at both the certification and settlement stages, compelling judges to apply vague rules to massively complex facts and to make exceptionally difficult and essentially pragmatic judgments.

Fourth, the modern class action also raised a variety of federalism-related issues. Class action attorneys shopped for the most promising forum, and when they wished to avoid the federal courts in suits raising state law claims they were able to do so by adding diversity-destroying parties or bringing small-claims actions. Further, multistate class actions based on state law claims raised complex choice of law problems and generated pressure for the application of a single state's law or for the creation of supervening national rules that would allow class actions to be relatively easily and uniformly resolved. Perhaps most important for at least some critics, multistate class actions gave state courts a major role in resolving cases of broad national significance, cases that involved parties from many states, issues that affected all Americans, and disputes that were central to interstate and international commerce. Thus, some argued, such actions placed state courts in the inappropriate position of establishing rules and rights that were national in scope and impact.

108 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 956-60 (1995) (noting that such innovative approaches undermine the predictability that induces efficient settlements). Because they "were not free to fashion law as they saw fit" in state law class actions, federal judges "continued to grind their teeth about state law." Marcus, supra note 106, at 863; see also id. at 872-82 (discussing Erie problems raised by class actions).

109 Cramton, supra note 105, at 822-23. The breadth of class action settlements and judgments even led to the charge that the form was an affront to democracy and democratic lawmaking. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71.


111 CAFA's supporters attacked what they called "false federalism," the alleged practice of state courts adjudicating multistate class actions to apply their own law and thereby ignore the interests of the other states and the applicability of their laws. See S. REP. 109-14, at 62; S. REP. 108-123, at 61-62 (2005); H.R. REP. 108-144, at 15 (2003). "This practice is an affront to federalism," the House Judiciary Committee declared, "because it results in one State court judge effectively making the law of that State applicable nationwide." H.R. REP. 108-144, at 13. Yet, it was not clear that such state court class actions commonly or necessarily transgressed any constitutional limit on either state choice of law rules or state assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident class members. See, e.g., Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988) ("To constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause, it is not
Finally, in the view of some critics, class actions brought harmful consequences to American society generally. They created the lure of large fees that could spur attorneys to file “frivolous,” and sometimes duplicative and “dueling,” suits designed to compel “deep pocket” defendants to fund nuisance settlements that included large fee awards for class attorneys. The result was unnecessary litigation that wasted the resources of both courts and parties. Further, the potentially massive damages that class actions threatened could unfairly intimidate honest businesses and force them into paying for baseless claims. Even worse, massive judgments could disrupt industries, destroy companies, and increase bankruptcies. Most broadly, some critics charged, class actions severely handicapped the entire economy by raising business costs and making American corporations less competitive in world markets.

To the extent that those problems existed—issues that were sharply and widely contested—they were truly serious, indeed grave. What was perhaps most intriguing about CAFA, however, was that it chose not to address most of those problems, at least not directly. The statute’s principal provisions simply gave the federal courts original and removal diversity jurisdiction over most multistate class actions involving state law claims. Beyond that, its “Consumer Class Action

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enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another state. Rather, our cases make plain that the misconstruction must contradict the law of the other State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985) (requiring a “material” conflict “with any other law which could apply” to prove a Due Process violation); Woolley, supra note 2, at 1726-35 (reviewing Shutts, Sun Oil, and other cases).

112 See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000) (stating that dueling class actions “are rampant,” and that they “enhance the pressure to settle and increase the likelihood of inadequate settlements”).

113 CAFA summarized the findings on which Congress acted. “Over the past decade,” it declared, “there have been abuses of the class action device,” including harm to plaintiffs, defendants, interstate commerce, and the nation’s judicial system. CAFA § 2(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005). More specifically, the statute identified two general types of harm that the abuses caused: harm to class members (inadequate remedies for class members, excessive fees for class attorneys, discrimination between class members, and confusing notices to class members), and harm to the economy and the judicial system (due to the fact that, when state courts hear interstate cases, they keep cases of national importance out of the national courts, sometimes demonstrate “bias” against “out-of-[s]tate defendants,” and improperly impose local laws on other states and parties resident in those other states). Id. § 2(a)(3)–(4).

114 Id. §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453. The provisions contained various elaborate exceptions designed to allow class actions rooted overwhelmingly in a single state (those in which most class members and principal defendants were citizens of the fo-
Bill of Rights" addressed only three narrow settlement situations, and its provision requiring defendants to serve notice of proposed settlements on government officials imposed no duties or responsibilities on those officials. Thus, CAFA's design seemed apparent. It sought to reverse the litigation trend of the preceding decade by bringing most multistate class actions into the national courts, and it sought to reduce or eliminate the problems that class actions created by subjecting them to what would purportedly be the superior and more exacting supervision of the federal courts.

B. Debating and Adapting Diversity Jurisdiction

In seeking to use diversity jurisdiction to resolve class action problems, CAFA reflected continuity with the past. It followed a long line of reform proposals that sought to adapt the jurisdiction to changing social, political, and economic conditions. It also relied for the most part on established doctrines in doing so. In altering the amount in controversy requirement and the technical rules of removal, it employed long-established techniques, and in utilizing the newer doctrine of "minimum diversity," it followed the path marked out by several recent statutes.

CAFA was atypical, however, in two related respects. First, it moved against the general trend toward limiting diversity jurisdiction that had marked most reform campaigns since the late nineteenth century and, unlike the majority of those restrictive efforts, became

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115 Id. § 3, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715. The section dealt with settlements involving (1) possible "net loss" to class members, (2) awards giving class members different recoveries based on "geographic proximity to the court," and (3) fee awards to plaintiffs' attorneys in "coupon settlements." Id. § 3, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1714, 1712. Although the Act imposed certain strictures on such settlements, it did not proscribe any of them but left their evaluation to the judgment of the court. Even much-maligned "coupon settlements," for example, had their defenders. See James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443 (2005). For a general criticism of CAFA's settlement provisions, see Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006).


law. Second, it opened new vistas for the expanded and highly flexible use of the jurisdiction by exploiting its two most potentially powerful instrumental characteristics: its nearly illimitable plasticity and its precise targeting capability. CAFA illuminated and exploited the vast potential for expanded federal power that was inherent in combining "minimum" diversity with congressional authority to establish special rules for particular categories of litigants. Thus, CAFA showed that diversity jurisdiction—for the past century largely scorned as an inappropriate jurisdiction for the national courts—was capable of becoming a particularly supple and far-reaching tool of national power, and of providing the elastic basis for a potentially vast and sharply focused federal "protective jurisdiction."

Indeed, the statute and its underlying theory construed the Constitution in a way that would allow Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to any case involving any kind of state law claim or any particular

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118 See Curry, supra note 82, at 455-56.
119 See James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 1925, 1927-28 (2004) ("Congress may have the authority to protect an area of federal interest from potentially hostile state court adjudication by shifting the litigation into the presumptively more friendly confines of a federal court . . . ."). The idea of a federal "protective jurisdiction" was advanced in the famous casebook, HENRY M. HART JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 371-72, 744-47 (1st ed. 1953). Essentially, they argued that Congress could extend federal jurisdiction to cases involving some kind of federal interest even in the absence of both diversity jurisdiction and a claim based on federal law. Although there are Supreme Court decisions that arguably support the concept of protective jurisdiction, the Court has never expressly adopted it and has appeared, rather, to reject it. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (upholding jurisdiction over a suit between a foreign corporation and a foreign government on the ground that the suit involved a preliminary issue of federal law); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (upholding jurisdiction on the ground that a federal jurisdictional statute also conferred authority on federal courts to make substantive federal law to govern cases brought under the statute); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (plurality opinion) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute extending diversity jurisdiction to suits between citizens of the District of Columbia and a state). Ironically, it was Justice Felix Frankfurter, a determined opponent of diversity, who suggested that the jurisdiction constituted a kind of "protective jurisdiction" operating within the limits of Article III. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 473-77 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Linda Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. Rev. 169 (1990) (discussing theories of jurisdiction and critically analyzing actions by Congress to alter the rules of federal jurisdiction); Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 731 (examining congressional power over state courts and reasoning that it is the national interest that defines the general scope of Congress's powers over both federal and state courts); Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 933 (1982) (describing the "forum-based" theory of protective jurisdiction).
category of party as long as the case involved, somehow and somewhere along the line, a diverse party. In the context of twenty-first-century commerce and communications, the reach of such a jurisdiction seemed, with respect to cases of any social or economic resonance, virtually unlimited. By combining the statutory definition of corporate citizenship with the minimum diversity doctrine, for example, Congress could extend federal jurisdiction to any and all suits between any corporation in the world and any citizen of any state in the Union. Further, were Congress to combine its power to shape diversity jurisdiction with the specification of "necessary" and "indispensable" parties, it could single out and pull into the national courts any kind of suit it wished to control. Indeed, were Congress to try to stretch its power to make certain kinds of claims "exclusive” to the national courts, it might even be able to exclude selected state law actions entirely from the state courts.

A constitutional "case" is a broad concept. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 & n.12 (1966) (defining a constitutional "case" broadly to include all claims that arise out of the same "common nucleus of operative fact").

For diversity purposes, a corporation is considered a citizen of the state of its incorporation and of the state where its "principal place of business" is located. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000). Thus, except for corporations whose "principal place of business" is located in their state of incorporation, every corporation could be considered minimally diverse from every human person who is a citizen of any state. In addition, using alienage jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), Congress could extend jurisdiction to foreign corporations or foreign citizens or subjects, limited only by the requirement that a citizen of a state be a party to the suit.

Given the de facto conditions of twenty-first-century life, CAFA’s "originalist" rationale for diversity jurisdiction—combined with the doctrine of "minimum diversity" and the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—would allow Congress to provide for federal jurisdiction over almost any lawsuit in which one original or subsequently added party sought a federal forum. At the same time, the ability to identify particular categories of cases, define "citizenship for diversity purposes," raise or lower jurisdictional amounts, and impose other special restrictions or definitions would allow Congress to pick and choose carefully among the cases it wished to see brought into the federal courts.

Further, CAFA strengthened the legitimacy of such a potentially vast and pliable protective jurisdiction with its originalist constitutional justification, asserted not once but twice in the statute's statement of "Findings and Purposes." Its goal, CAFA declared, was to "restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction." CAFA was soundly based, the Senate Judiciary Committee explained, because the "Framers established diversity jurisdiction to ensure fairness for all parties in litigation involving persons from multiple jurisdictions." President Bush assured Americans on the same point. "If I were someone who was out there wondering whether or not we were making the right decision [in enacting CAFA], I would go back and harken back to the papers of the Founding Fathers, when they talked about adjudicating disputes like this." CAFA, the President declared, was rooted in "the framers' view of how a fair system is to work." Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee maintained that class actions were an ideal fit with the Founders' original intent. "Interstate class actions which often involve millions of parties from numerous states—present the precise concerns that diversity jurisdiction was designed to prevent . . . ." Such cases, the Committee continued, were often subjected to "state court provincialism against out-of-state defendants or a judicial failure to recognize the interests of other states in the litigation."
Those varying formulations of diversity's "original" rationale—especially the alleged intent to reach "cases of national importance," protect the "interests" of other states, and guard against state "provincialism"—were essentially boundless. Exhibiting the amiable and inviting free-form potential of "originalism," those rationales could easily justify Congress in stretching diversity jurisdiction to reach almost any type of lawsuit it wished—and do so, of course, with the full blessing of the Founders themselves. The expansive potential of CAFA's "originalist" rationale was particularly broad, too, because nothing like the modern class action, especially in its "common issue" form, had existed in eighteenth-century America. Thus, the form was entirely absent from the Founders' thinking. In adapting those elastic rationales and exhibiting diversity's powerful nationalizing potential, CAFA opened new possibilities for future federal jurisdictional reform and for the virtually unlimited—if precisely targeted—expansion of federal judicial power.

C. Obscured Duality: Goals and Results

In its goals and anticipated consequences, CAFA was entirely typical. Efforts to address troublesome legal problems blended with efforts to secure benefits for favored interests, and efforts to serve accepted public values blurred with efforts to shape those values into weapons of partisan advantage. The statute's final shape, moreover, was determined by two classic conditioning factors. No reform, how-
ever well intentioned, could alter federal jurisdiction in an entirely "neutral" way, and not even the wisest reform could become law without the support of powerful political and social interests.

The statute’s final version was a product of legislative compromise. Early drafts were designed to sweep class actions into the federal courts more broadly, and they provided narrower exclusions and required a smaller jurisdictional minimum of only one million dollars. Subsequent versions attempted to clarify and broaden the exceptions and eventually raised the jurisdictional amount to five million dollars. Further, under continued prodding from critics, Congress added the statute’s notice and consumer rights provisions.

The political battle lines were clear and sharp, and some observers attributed the bill’s final passage to Republican congressional gains in the 2004 election. One of CAFA’s principal drafters was John Beisner, a partner at O’Melveny & Myers, who was a leading class action defense attorney. The statute’s passage was the product of Republican majorities whose support for the bill was virtually unanimous. In the House, 229 Republicans supported it, while 1 opposed, and in the Senate, 53 Republicans voted in favor and none against. Further,
business groups lined up solidly in support. Public Citizen, a consumer rights organization, counted more than one hundred large corporations and business associations that supported CAFA and helped push the bill to passage. In addition to other assistance, those organizations enlisted the services of almost five hundred Washington lobbyists. During the preceding three election cycles from 2000 to 2004, moreover, twenty-nine of them had given Republicans approximately $49 million in contributions. Finally, some companies forthrightly announced the bill's operative purpose. Citicorp boasted that CAFA's "practical effect" would be "that many cases will never be heard," while Forbes magazine predicted approvingly that the bill would "make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail."
Opposing passage were most congressional Democrats\(^{143}\) and literally "dozens of civil rights, consumer, environmental and public interest advocates and several state Attorneys General."\(^{144}\) The opposition included almost every well-known "liberal" organization in the country,\(^ {145}\) as well as many highly respected nonpartisan organizations, such as the American Association of Retired Persons, the American Cancer Society, the Consumer Federation of America, the National Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club.\(^ {146}\) Joining them in opposition were national organizations that represented all state judges and all state legislators.\(^ {147}\) Indeed, the Judicial Conference of the United States, while acknowledging that it might be "appropriate" to bring some class actions into the national courts, seemed to remain true to its long-standing opposition to expanding federal jurisdiction and refused to support the bill. CAFA's provisions, the Judicial Conference had declared in 2003, "would add substantially to the workload of the Federal courts and are inconsistent with principles of federalism."\(^ {148}\)

\(^{143}\) On the final vote some Democrats—50 in the House and 18 in the Senate—supported CAFA, but the great majority—147 in the House and 26 in the Senate—remained opposed. See Office of the Clerk, supra note 138; U.S. Senate, supra note 138. The same party lines marked earlier procedural votes. When the Senate voted on cloture on a predecessor bill in 2004, 42 of the 44 votes to terminate debate came from Republicans. Three Republicans voted against cloture, as did 39 Democrats. On a similar vote the previous year, 50 Republicans voted to terminate debate along with 8 Democrats and 1 independent. Thirty-eight Democrats voted against, as did 1 Republican. Wynne, supra note 135, at 751 n.8. More generally, a study of congressional voting on twenty related issues found that "Democrats voted for the pro-litigation side on an average of 67 percent of the [time], Republicans 17 percent." Thomas F. Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights: The Battle over Litigation in American Society 188 (2002); accord Thomas J. Campbell, Daniel P. Kessler & George B. Shepherd, The Causes and Effects of Liability Reform: Some Empirical Evidence 23-24, 38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4989, 1995).


\(^{145}\) Included in opposition were the AFL-CIO, Americans for Democratic Action, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the NAACP, the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Center on Poverty Law, the National Consumers League, the National Organization for Women, and People for the American Way. \textit{Id.} at 83 n.4.

\(^{146}\) \textit{Id.}


\(^{148}\) Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Orrin Hatch, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 26, 2003), in 149 CONG. REC.
The conviction that animated most of CAFA’s supporters was that the federal courts were much less likely to certify suits as class actions than were state courts and that denials of certification would, one way or another, quickly and abruptly end many, if not most, of them.\footnote{CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2005), defines “class action” to mean any civil suit filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 or any similar state rule authorizing representative suits. Thus, CAFA makes the allegation of “class action” status dispositive for jurisdictional purposes under the act.} The federal courts imposed more rigorous certification standards and refused certification in larger numbers of cases.\footnote{Since 1995, federal courts have articulated an increasingly conservative class action jurisprudence that has directed federal courts to stringently scrutinize proposed litigation and settlement classes.” Linda Mullenix, *Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?*, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2000); see also Kevin M. Clermont, *Jurisdictional Fact*, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1015-16 (2006) (discussing the denial of certification after removal to federal court); Danas, *supra* note 100, at 1314-20 (discussing recent state law class action cases in federal court); James E. Pfander, *The Substance and Procedure of Class Action Reform*, 93 ILL. B.J. 144, 144 (2005) (“By providing for removal of these and other cases, the class action reform legislation will shift cases from certification-friendly state judges to more cautious federal judges . . . .”); Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, *Resolving the “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions*, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 835-36 (2000) (noting federal courts’ resistance to certifying cases where multiple states’ laws would be applied).} Moreover, at early dates, they also dismissed many class actions, often before they even decided the certification issue.\footnote{A study of four judicial districts by the Federal Judicial Center found that approximately thirty percent of federal class actions were terminated by a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. WILLGING, HOOPER & NIEMIC, *supra* note 104, at 8, 33. The study also found that “approximately two of five cases were dismissed in whole or in part or had summary judgment granted in whole or in part in two districts and that approximately three out of five cases were so treated in the other two districts.” Id. at 33. As a result, “at least one-third of the cases in our study, judicial rulings on motions terminated the litigation without a settlement, coerced or otherwise.” Id. at 34. Three of the four districts decided motions to dismiss before certification in more than seventy percent of the cases; the fourth district did so in sixty percent of its cases. In all} Indeed, most plaintiffs’ attorneys
were convinced that federal courts were less likely to certify and more likely to dismiss than were state courts.\textsuperscript{152}

In addition to bringing most multistate class actions into the federal courts, CAFA promised to impose a de facto federal certification requirement on state court class actions within its coverage. Qualifying actions would presumably be removed and, if dismissed by a federal court and subsequently refiled in state court, removed again and again as necessary. Thus, because CAFA allowed defendants to remove at any time, it would prevent covered suits from going forward in state courts unless those courts, at a minimum, applied federal standards stringently and denied certification on their own.\textsuperscript{153}

Congress finessed the critical constitutional question as to its power to force such a de facto national class certification standard on the states. First, it avoided the substance of the problem by claiming as a matter of formal law that "there are no wide variations between federal and state court class action policies."\textsuperscript{154} Second, it implied, though it did not explicitly claim, that the "lax" application of state court certification rules violated the "due process rights of both unnamed class members and defendants."\textsuperscript{155} Thus, it suggested, the federal standard should properly be applied in the state courts because it was consistent with existing state law and, more fundamentally, because it represented a federal constitutional requirement. The former claim was exaggerated, and the latter unsettled and uncertain.\textsuperscript{156}

Under reigning federal standards, the biggest de facto obstacle to certification appeared to be the choice of law difficulty. In multistate class actions based on state law claims, federal courts were required to apply the choice of law rules of the state within which they sat. That,

\textsuperscript{152} THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 31 & tbl.7 (2005).

\textsuperscript{153} See Clermont, supra note 150, at 1015-17 (arguing that there is "no difficulty" in saying that a suit is a "class action" for removal purposes but nonetheless not certifiable as a class action for purposes of going forward). CAFA allows a defendant to remove at any time. CAFA § 5(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).


\textsuperscript{155} Id.

in turn, often forced them to look to the substantive laws of many different states and to determine which state’s law was properly applicable to which class members and to apply that law correctly to each. Such complex analyses were extremely burdensome and bore directly on the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. More important, in dealing with “common issue” classes—CAFA’s paramount target—the difficulty of conducting such multistate choice of law analyses was a major factor in determining whether an action met the rule’s additional “predominance” and “manageability” requirements.\(^{157}\) Since the mid-1990s the federal courts had, in fact, commonly found such complex choice of law problems a fatal bar to class certification,\(^{15}\) and the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor* strengthened that tendency by instructing the lower courts to construe Rule 23 cautiously and seek “narrowly defined class certifications.”\(^{159}\)

CAFA’s supporters relied heavily on this choice of law difficulty to achieve the practical results they sought. The statute’s legislative history is replete with references to the choice of law problem and the belief that it “would effectively bar nationwide class actions” based on

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\(^{159}\) 521 U.S. at 629.
diversity jurisdiction. The minority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee underscored the point. "Federal courts," it declared, "are not certifying class actions involving the laws of multiple states." Consequently, Democratic senators tried to amend CAFA during the floor debate to prevent the federal courts from denying certification on choice of law grounds. Republicans denounced the amendment, acknowledging in the process the centrality of the choice of law issue to their goals. Senator Charles Grassley, CAFA’s principal sponsor, charged that the Democratic amendment “guts” the bill; Senator Jeff Sessions insisted that it would perpetuate the “abuses that the legislation seeks to end”; and Senator Trent Lott called it “a poison pill.” The amendment went down 38-61 on an overwhelmingly party-line vote. Revealingly, as soon as CAFA became law, one of its drafters argued in court that the statute’s legislative history showed that it was intended to make most multistate state law class actions noncertifiable in either federal or state court because of the choice of law problem.

Beyond CAFA’s likely anti-plaintiff operation, other considerations pointed similarly to the highly partisan nature of the statute’s substance and purposes. One was the proffered justification for the statute, what might be called its “belonging” theory. CAFA’s advocates insisted that national class actions properly “belong” in the federal


162 Democratic Senators Diane Feinstein and Jeff Bingaman offered an amendment that would have prevented the federal courts from denying class certification “in whole or in part, on the ground that the law of more than one State will be applied.” Woolley, supra note 2, at 1749 n.134. For the proposed amendment, see 151 CONG. REC. S1215 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005), and for the vote, see U.S. Senate, Roll Call Votes, 109th Congress—1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_109_1.htm (follow link for vote 0007) (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).

163 All three quotes are cited in Marcus, supra note 158, at 1309-10 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S1166 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005); id. at S1174; and 151 CONG REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005)). The senators’ objections were especially interesting because the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly denied that CAFA would aid defendants and claimed it would merely create “a level playing field.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 57, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53; S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 57 (2003).

164 Woolley, supra note 2, at 1749 n.134 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1184 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005)). Every Republican voted against the amendment except Senator Arlen Spector (with Senator John Sununu not voting). Thirty-seven Democrats voted in favor, while seven voted against (Senators Bayh, Carper, Dodd, Kohl, Lieberman, Lincoln, and Nelson). See U.S. Senate, supra note 162.

165 Sherman, supra note 137, at 1609.
courts because they involve important national issues. The problem with the theory, however, was that a great many categories of cases similarly “belong” in federal court and yet are consigned to state court adjudication. Professor Paul Bator, a distinguished conservative critic of the Warren Court, demonstrated more than a quarter of a century ago the dual fallacy of the “belonging” theory. First, the nation’s dual federal-state court system meant that many categories of cases within federal jurisdiction—including both federal question and diversity cases—“belonged” every bit as much in the state courts as they did in federal courts; second, most of the cases that “belong” in federal court would, and necessarily must, remain in state court for the simple reason that the federal judicial system could not possibly handle them all. The decision to confer federal jurisdiction over some selected category of cases from among the innumerable categories that arguably “belong” in federal court, then, was necessarily a decision of policy and practicality, not one of normative theory or constitutional principle. Thus, believing that national class actions “belong” in the federal courts was, at most, a reason why one might choose to send them there, not a sufficient reason for actually doing so. Indeed, for the previous thirty years, Congress—and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts—had firmly believed that those very same state law class actions properly “belonged” in the state courts, not the federal courts. CAFA’s supporters, then, could not have chosen to send


167 Large numbers of cases involving federal law defenses and counterclaims, for example, are excluded from federal question jurisdiction by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule.

168 See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981) (discussing the role of state courts in interpreting the Federal Constitution). On the constitutional authority of state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over federal law claims absent express preemption by Congress, see, for example, Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990), which held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims; Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990), which allowed concurrent jurisdiction in Title VII Civil Rights Act actions; and Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), which held that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

169 See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that each class member in a state law class action had to meet the jurisdictional amount require-
class actions to the federal courts simply because those cases "belong" there. Rather, they had to have had some additional reason for acting, a reason of practical policy and anticipated consequences. That reason, the evidence suggests, was their belief that CAFA would terminate large numbers of class actions and prevent many more from ever being filed.

Equally revealing was the extent to which, in justifying CAFA, its conservative, Republican, and business supporters abandoned substantial elements of their familiar rhetoric. For decades, business groups had sought to resolve their disputes out of court, methodically pursuing private settlements and seeking to impose, where possible, court-excluding mandatory arbitration.\textsuperscript{170} Defending CAFA, however, they suddenly claimed to see the disadvantages that unsophisticated plaintiffs faced in out-of-court settlements and insisted on the need for judicial protections to ensure that they were treated fairly.\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, they altered their views about the amount and kind of evidence that was proper to prove causation. Persistently, business interests had criticized tort plaintiffs and accused them of relying on dubious evidence and "junk" science, while class action defendants from the early tobacco cases to the more recent Vioxx litigations had insisted on the


most stringent and demanding standards for proving causation. In heralding the evil consequences of class actions, however, those same groups made sweeping charges and readily accepted as proof evidence that was manifestly inadequate, often dubious or unreliable, and sometimes simply false. Their views about conflicts of interest also seemed to shift. Republicans, business spokespersons, and economic conservatives often downplayed or denied the significance of conflicts that flourished within the structure of corporate governance and in the close relationships that existed among banks, corporations, rating agencies, accounting and brokerage firms, and those who moved back and forth between those institutions and the government agencies entrusted with regulating them. Generally, they criticized or opposed efforts to regulate and restrict such conflicts. In contrast, however, when they addressed the class action, they immediately recognized the presence of conflicts of interest, portrayed them as inordinately dangerous and abusive, and demanded that they be subject to exacting judicial scrutiny. Along the same lines, many had embraced then-Professor Richard A. Posner's economic theory of negligence, which seemed a useful way to defend narrow standards of corporate liability. Among its central elements, Posner's theory held that plaintiffs' negligence claims may be rejected if certain conditions are not met. For instance, plaintiffs must prove that they sustained damages as a proximate cause of the defendant's actions. This concept, known as 'proximate cause,' requires that there be a direct relationship between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injury. Posner argued that this standard was necessary to prevent the 'spillover' effect, where small, isolated incidents could lead to very large liability judgments.

Reagan's "Tort Policy Working Group," for example, blamed many of the nation's woes on "a veritable explosion of tort liability in the United States" and attributed much of the problem to the "undermining of causation through a variety of questionable practices and doctrines," including the use of "junk science." TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 2, 35 (1986) [hereinafter TPWG, REPORT].

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Professor Posner originally advanced his theory in Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). For an economic analysis by another conservative federal judge, see In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1017 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.). Whether and to what extent tort law actually deters negligent behavior is a disputed question. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic
attorneys' fees had no economic significance, for the only requirement for economic efficiency was that defendants paid in damages an amount equal to the total "costs" of the injuries they negligently caused.\textsuperscript{176} Yet, in the class action context, CAFA's supporters suddenly focused on large plaintiffs' attorneys' fees as an outrageous abuse that demanded reform, wholly abandoning Posner's once useful theory of economic efficiency.\textsuperscript{177}

Even more obviously, CAFA inspired an astonishing reversal in the attitude of conservatives and Republicans toward the state courts. For half a century they had praised the state courts and stressed the necessity of allowing them wide latitude to hear not only state claims but federal claims as well. Indeed, they demanded respect for state courts as a fundamental principle of American law, and their profound commitment to that principle inspired some of the loftiest assertions of modern judicial conservatism.\textsuperscript{178} Under both Chief Justice Warren Burger and Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court's conservative Justices repeatedly sought to prevent federal courts from intruding into the operations of state courts and repeatedly stressed the neces-


\textsuperscript{176} That theory held that the "important point, viewing the negligence system as a system for bringing about an efficient quantum of safety and accidents, is that the total costs of the accidents in which the defendant is negligent be made costs to the defendant." Posner, \textit{supra} note \textsuperscript{175}, at 93. Thus, plaintiffs' litigation costs, and the ultimate "adequacy" of the compensation they received, were irrelevant as matters of economic efficiency. The only relevant issue was whether all of the "costs" of accidents were transferred to defendants. Thus, under Posner's theory, it would not make any economic difference whether most or even all of a defendant's costs went to plaintiffs' attorneys. On the complexity of any true "cost-benefit" analysis, see generally \textsc{Matthew D. Adler \& Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis} (2006).

\textsuperscript{177} As Senator Frank E. Moss noted more than thirty years ago, corporate attacks on class action attorneys' fees were hardly lacking in irony: "Staunch defenders of the right to make a profit worry about profits for consumers' attorneys." \textsc{Hensler et al., supra} note \textsuperscript{100}, at 17.

\textsuperscript{178} Paul Bator wrote:

But there is a different, richer, and more coherent account of lawmaking which asserts that it is a cooperative enterprise in which each participant, including the citizen, shares in the privilege and duty of principled elaboration. And this competing account is not inapplicable to federal constitutional law. In respect to federal constitutional principles, too, there is a moral and legal community which is mutually and reciprocally charged with the mutual and reciprocal elaboration of these principles. We are not entitled to deny to state court judges the competence to participate in this process; to do so would deny them \textit{pro tanto} membership in this cooperative moral and legal community.

\textsc{Bator, supra} note \textsuperscript{168}, at 634-35.
sity of giving those latter courts the high respect and deference they deserved. Rejecting the idea that there was any reason for "a general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues," the Burger Court announced its "emphatic reaffirmation" of its "confidence in their ability to do so." The Rehnquist Court, too, insisted that state courts be recognized as proper forums for the resolution of all legal issues, including those of federal law. It underscored the need to honor the "deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction," a presumption that "lies at the core of our federal system." Indeed, in 1996 the Republican Congress seemed to embrace those same views, broadening the leeway of state courts to decide federal law issues by severely constraining federal habeas corpus and requiring expanded deference to state adjudicatory bodies in prison litigations.

When conservatives and Republicans turned to support CAFA, however, that fundamental principle suddenly fell from view, replaced by its opposite. "Four legs good," they now seemed to shout, "two legs better." Now, they saw state courts as "lax" tribunals that applied the rules of law "inconsistently." Worse, they saw the state courts as perpetrating "judicial inefficiencies," demonstrating a dysfunctional "provincialism," and actively promoting "collusive activity." Indeed, compared to the federal courts, they saw the state courts as simply "less careful." Led by the American Tort Reform Foundation, many of CAFA's supporters went even further. Some state courts were not only inferior tribunals but horrifying "judicial hellholes."

179 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980). A "proper respect for state functions," the Burger Court declared, requires "a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).


183 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946).


185 Id. at 6, 4, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7, 6.


those same groups had supported limitations on federal jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions and civil rights suits by prisoners, of course, they had given neither heed nor mention to the terrors that lurked in any such "judicial hellholes."

The content of CAFA's "Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights" was equally revealing. It dealt with only three relatively minor risks to class members, and its requirements for notice to government officials seemed more likely to complicate and delay suits than to improve settlements. More importantly, although the class action form presented a variety of potential risks for class members, CAFA did not eliminate them. Rather, it left defendants who sought to collude with plaintiff-class attorneys entirely free to do so, for it allowed them to choose to remain in state court and free from federal supervision. CAFA imposed restrictions, for example, on "coupon settle-
ments," a device that could be used to shortchange class members by enabling class attorneys to collude with defendants and exchange sweetheart settlements for handsome attorneys' fees. If class attorneys and defendants wished to use a "coupon settlement" as a collusion device, however, the statute did not stop them. Class attorneys had merely to file in state court and have defendants refuse to remove. CAFA, in other words, guaranteed class members no protection from the precise dangers it purported to check.

Worse, CAFA handed defendants a new weapon that could actively encourage the very collusion the statute purported to end. CAFA conferred on defendants the right to remove to federal court at any time they wished. That right, then, allowed defendants to remain in state court while continuously threatening class attorneys with removal—and the accompanying risk that a federal court would deny certification, dismiss the suit at an early date, or severely diminish any fees they might ultimately win—unless the class attorneys agreed to collude on a mutually profitable sweetheart settlement in a "lax" state court. Thus, CAFA not only failed to provide meaningful protection against the dangers to class members that it invoked, but its provisions magnified those very dangers by giving the power of forum control—and with it added leverage to promote anti-class collusion—to the parties whose interests were directly adverse to the interests of the class.

Worst of all, CAFA appeared to give that added leverage to defendants quite purposely, for in preparing the statute's final form, its supporters made a critical change. They deleted a provision contained in earlier drafts that allowed for removal by any plaintiff class member who was not a named party or class representative. Previously, both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees had identified the purpose of that provision: it was intended, in the words of the

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194 A "coupon settlement" involves payment to class members, in whole or in part, in the form of coupons providing some kind of discount on future purchases of a defendant's products. Allegedly, such payments give class members little or nothing of value while conferring significant benefits to defendants (cheap settlements as well as continued patronage).


196 CAFA eliminated the one-year time limitation on removal petitions that applied to general diversity actions. CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. V 2005). Thus, defendants could hold the threat of removal over class attorneys for an extended period of time.

former, to "combat collusiveness between a corporate defendant and a plaintiffs' attorney who may attempt to settle on the cheap in a State court at the expense of the plaintiff class members." The final Senate Report failed to note the deletion, much less to offer an explanation for it. The practical significance of the deletion, however, seemed apparent.

Equally salient was the attitude of CAFA's supporters toward the "costs" and "burdens" of litigation. They consistently showed a deep and pervasive solicitude for the plight of defendants, especially for the intense pressure to settle that the threat of potentially massive class action damages exerted. They portrayed plaintiffs and their attorneys—especially the demonized figure of the rapacious class action attorney—as persistently using "judicial blackmail" to collect on "frivolous" claims. The Senate Judiciary Committee expressly denied the charge that CAFA "would unfairly tilt the playing field by providing an advantage to defendant corporations at the expense of consumers," and it insisted that its bill was designed to "ensure that all parties can litigate on a level playing field." Yet, at no point did Congress or the Judiciary Committee of either house seriously consider whether the playing field that existed was in fact "level." Instead, they focused on

200 The threat, many claimed, allowed plaintiffs' attorneys to "blackmail" defendants into settling weak or "frivolous" claims. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not"); In re Rhone-Poulenc, Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) ("[D]efendants might, therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to settle."). Many scholars agreed. "[M]ost mass tort defendants can successfully defeat almost every claim, yet still be threatened with bankruptcy if even a single adverse jury decides to impose ruinous liability." Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 480 (1998). More broadly, Richard Epstein argued that "the aggregation of individual claims within the class-action format leads to a distortion of the substantive law that works typically in favor of the plaintiffs." Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 490.
the disadvantages that class actions imposed on defendants and ignored the disadvantages that the alternative form—separate actions by individuals—imposed on members of plaintiff classes. Congress did not, in other words, seriously consider either the social and economic conditions that limited the ability of wronged individuals to pursue their claims or the powerful pressures that frequently compelled them to settle out of court for a relative pittance or abandon their claims entirely. And CAFA did nothing to remedy any of those problems.

Indeed, by strengthening the ability of corporate defendants to defeat class actions, CAFA seemed to promise that those corporations would be able to operate more effectively in the out-of-court claims attrition and discounting process where they enjoyed their greatest practical advantages—and reaped their greatest rewards—against individual claimants. There, corporations knew with statistical certainty that most potential plaintiffs would settle their suits relatively cheaply or, better, fail to file suits in the first place or, better yet, fail to secure lawyers to represent them in negotiations or, best of all, fail even to understand that they had cognizable claims to assert. The decisive advantage for corporations in limiting class actions, then, arose not from their ability to win favorable decisions in court, but from their ability to profit systematically from the fact that—once class standing was denied—most individual claimants would either settle relatively cheaply, abandon their claims altogether, or remain wholly unaware that they even had claims to assert. Thus, CAFA’s greatest practical significance lay in the way it tilted the playing field even more sharply in favor of

corporate defendants by expanding the scope of the out-of-court claims attrition and discounting process.\textsuperscript{204}

CAFA's obvious failure to balance its pro-business provisions with effective new remedies for class members was stark. Almost two decades ago, Linda Mullenix identified the class action problem as a "political" challenge that required a substantive national solution. Bringing class actions within the federal courts, without providing an effective federal program for compensation, she argued, could not provide a fair and reasonable solution.\textsuperscript{205} Indeed, a wide range of individuals and organizations had addressed class action problems and advanced a variety of thoughtful proposals designed to minimize or eliminate the kinds of litigation abuses that CAFA purported to remedy while, at the same time, providing more reliable and effective methods for ensuring compensation to injured and defrauded persons.\textsuperscript{206} Neither CAFA nor its supporters, however, even made a pre-

\textsuperscript{204} The same point was true if CAFA were considered from the point of view of the judicial system as a whole. The "inefficiencies" of class actions are far less than the inefficiencies of litigating 10,000 or 100,000 or a million individual lawsuits. Thus, class actions are "inefficient" only if the demands they place on the judicial system are compared to the demands placed by a relatively miniscule number of individual actions. To assume that limiting class actions would make the judicial system more efficient, in other words, means that one has to assume that the overwhelming majority of class members would, in fact, never bring their claims to court.

\textsuperscript{205} Mullenix, supra note 119, at 197, 222; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1623, 1630 (1992).

tense of attempting as much. Four years before CAFA was enacted, the conservative scholar Robert A. Kagan acknowledged the point: "Republican reform advocates," he concluded, "have not proposed any meaningful alternatives, such as reliable, administratively operated compensation plans, which would satisfy the public's and the Democratic Party's concern about adequate care and income replacement for accident victims."\textsuperscript{207}

The wide range of remedial proposals that CAFA's sponsors ignored, together with the narrow and defendant-oriented provisions they did adopt, support only one conclusion. Putting it "charitably," Stephen B. Burbank fairly concluded, "any sentient reader of the statute's statement of findings and purposes" would recognize that it was, "at best, window dressing."\textsuperscript{208} In truth, as Georgene Vairo declared more bluntly: "Congress appears to be seeking to dump its dirty work, disempowering plaintiffs' attorneys and protecting its corporate constituents, on the federal courts."\textsuperscript{209} Considering both what CAFA did


\textsuperscript{207} ROBERT A. KAGAN, \\textit{ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW} 247 (2001). Kagan criticized "tort reformers," \textit{id.} at 150, 152-53, and Democrats, \textit{id.} at 245-46, for the same failure. He noted that both political parties failed to advance such reforms for their own interests and that both had, in fact, sponsored "reforms" that would exacerbate many of the problems caused by what he called "adversarial legalism." \textit{Id.} at 245-47.

Both in principle and in practice, the most potent method of reducing social inequality is not to provide the socially marginalized with lawyers and rights to litigate but to provide more generous governmental funding for high quality education, job training, and social welfare programs and for well-staffed bureaucracies to administer them.

\textit{Id.} at 242.

\textsuperscript{208} Burbank, \textit{supra} note 195, at 1942.

and what it failed to do, there seems to be no ground for disagreeing with such assessments.

**D. Limited and Inadequate Empirical Evidence**

Not surprisingly, given the difficulties involved, neither CAFA’s proponents nor opponents were able to produce convincing evidence about the statute’s ultimate impact and significance. The only results that seemed obvious were that hundreds of additional class actions would pour into the federal courts, largely by removal, and that large numbers of them would be denied certification or dismissed outright. Whether those anticipated results would actually occur, whether they would achieve the lofty goals the statute proclaimed, and whether they would prove fair to all litigants remained, at the time of CAFA’s enactment, matters of dispute.

To show the need for CAFA, its advocates relied for the most part on two types of evidence. First, they cited several empirical studies to establish that there had been a rapid increase in state court class action filings over the past decade and that disproportionate numbers of class actions had been filed in a handful of “small” counties with “magnet” courts. Few disputed those two propositions, and by

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2008] THE OLD AND THE NEW IN JURISDICTIONAL REFORM 1879


210 There were, of course, some empirical studies that cast light on one or another aspect of class action litigation. For examples, see Hensler, supra note 74, at 180-81, and the sources cited therein, especially in footnotes 4 and 8.

211 Were CAFA enacted, the Congressional Budget Office reported, it “expect[ed] that a few hundred additional cases would be heard in federal court each year. According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, class-action lawsuits tried in federal court cost the government, on average, about $23,000.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 77 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 72. The total estimated cost of CAFA to the federal judiciary, then, would be “about $7 million annually.” Id.

212 See WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 152, at 8, 30-34 (discussing the perception of defense attorneys that federal judges are less receptive to class actions).

213 The evidence suggested that some problems, such as duplicative suits and unwise or improper state court decisions, did exist. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 21-23, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21-24.

214 H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 11-12 (2003). The report cited a study by the Manhattan Institute that identified Madison County in Illinois, Jefferson County in Texas, and Palm Beach County in Florida as “magnets,” id. at 12, and one of its own studies to show that “six ‘small’ counties in Alabama were experiencing a tidal wave of class action filings,” id. at 11-12. The Senate Judiciary Committee singled out two Illinois counties, Madison and St. Clair, as “magnet courts.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14. It noted that Madison County was “mostly rural” and home to “less than one percent of the U.S. population,” that the number of class actions filed
themselves they established little more than that ordinary and traditional federal-state and interstate forum shopping existed.

Second, they pointed to dozens of cases in which various kinds of alleged abuses had occurred. Most obvious, CAFA's supporters made no showing that the cases were representative. Indeed, the cited cases constituted a minuscule percentage of class actions, most likely less than one-tenth of one percent of the total number filed since the early 1990s. Further, many of them illustrated little more than the fact that class counsel received in its court rose from 2 in 1998 to 39 in 2000 and then to 106 in 2003, and that most of the class actions filed there "had little—if anything—to do with" the county. Id. During his remarks as he signed the Act, President Bush also singled out Madison County, "where juries have earned a reputation for awarding large verdicts." Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 265, 266 (Feb. 18, 2005).

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15-27, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6 (citing and commenting on several dozen illustrative cases); S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 12-26 (2003) (discussing or citing a similar number of cases); H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 12-22 (discussing a similar number of individual cases, many or most of which appeared in the Senate Report). Supporters, for example, highlighted the "Bank of Boston" case, Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), in which class counsel earned more than $8.5 million in fees, while many class members received no monetary award and some wound up owing money to their attorneys. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14-15, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14-16.

They were nonetheless politically effective. "On Capitol Hill, the wise advice is to come armed with a good story. . . . Congress frequently moves the law in response to anecdotes. Washington insiders know this well." MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND Cuts 50 (2005). In addition to their dramatic and humanizing impact, such stories are particularly useful because they can be "brought forth when they fit" an immediate political need "but more easily disregarded when they [do not]." Id. at 60; see also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); Michael McCann et al., Java jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113 (2001) (discussing the impact on the popular imagination of the case of the woman burned by McDonald's coffee). At CAFA's signing, President Bush introduced three individuals—two class members and the owner of a drugstore—and told stories of their terrible experiences with class actions. Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, supra note 214, at 266.


There are no comprehensive statistics available. John H. Beisner, one of CAFA's drafters and most ardent supporters, told the House Judiciary Committee that "[e]very year, thousands of class actions are filed in the United States." Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 House Hearing] (statement of John H. Beisner, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP). Available studies support the inference that there may have been in excess of 50,000 class actions filed since the early 1990s. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 100, at 63-67.
large fees and that individual class members received little or no monetary relief.\textsuperscript{219} That, of course, proved nothing of significance. One of the principal reasons why the class action form was created, after all, was precisely to make small claims viable; hence it was only to be expected that large numbers of class actions would bring but the smallest monetary awards to individual class members. Indeed, statistical evidence showed that potential recoveries for class members would usually have been inadequate to support the litigation of individual actions and hence that the class action form was necessary if those claims were to be pursued. More importantly, available statistical evidence contradicted the claim that abuses involving settlements and attorneys’ fees were common. To the contrary, it suggested that abuses were relatively rare and that class members usually made worthwhile gains from class settlements.\textsuperscript{220} Perhaps of greatest significance, CAFA’s supporters commonly slighted or assumed away such issues as the wrongfulness of defendants’ underlying conduct, the salutary deterrent effects of the suits, the general social value of ensuring that legal norms were enforced, and the basic question of whether class members—and the broader general public—were safer, more fairly treated, or otherwise better off as a result of the suits than they would have been without them.

There were, of course, relatively few comprehensive statistical studies of class actions available, and those that existed were generally unable to answer critical questions about the ultimate utility and social value of existing class action rules.\textsuperscript{221} The Federal Judicial Center pro-

\textsuperscript{219} "Through several hearings over the past several years, the Committee has become aware of numerous class action settlements approved by state courts in which most—if not all—of the monetary benefits went to the class counsel . . . ." S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15, \textit{reprinted in} 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 16. Some of the cases cited seemed to have little probative value. One involved an allegedly improper settlement that the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged in a footnote “ultimately did not proceed,” and another was a case that was “properly dismissed” by the court. \textit{Id.} at 15 n.52, 21.

\textsuperscript{220} See WILLGING, HOOPER & NIEMIC, \textit{supra} note 104, at 11, 90; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, \textit{Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study}, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 60 tbl.3 (2004). Indeed, if one accepted Posner’s economic theory of negligence, the way in which defendants’ costs were divided between parties and their attorneys was irrelevant.

\textsuperscript{221} “[P]olicymakers who hear calls to reform class action rules have little objective evidence on class action processes or outcomes to guide their decisions.” HENSLER ET AL., \textit{supra} note 100, at 5. The few reliable empirical studies of class actions that are available include, in addition to the work just cited, WILLGING & WHEATMAN, \textit{supra} note 189; WILLGING & WHEATMAN, \textit{supra} note 152; WILLGING, HOOPER & NIEMIC, \textit{supra} note 104; and Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, \textit{Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?}, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591 (2006)
duced a useful study in 1996, for example, but it examined only four federal judicial districts and covered only cases that had been filed during a single two-year period. The most extensive study available, a RAND Study on class action dilemmas published in 2000, concentrated on in-depth examinations of ten individual class actions while compiling more general survey evidence that was useful but—by RAND's own admission—limited, incomplete, and inconclusive. Worse, there seemed little or no useful comparative data on class actions in the state courts. "I am aware of no reliable data, historical or current, concerning state court class actions," Stephen B. Burbank reported, "and I doubt that reliable data exist for most states." Most scholars agreed that the available evidence was inadequate and inconclusive. Reviewing the RAND Study, Peter Schuck noted that its "most striking finding is uncertainty" and concluded that partisans would consequently be able to continue to "confuse the issues surrounding class actions, exaggerate their claims, and cite misleading analogies, atypical cases, and unrepresentative anecdotes." Reassuringly, the authors of the RAND Study largely agreed. "Because there is so little systematic data on state court class actions," they admitted, "we have no empirical basis for assessing the argument that federal judges generally manage damage class actions better than state court judges." Ultimately, convincing and objective empirical evidence could not resolve class action disputes, they explained, for the class action dilemma was "a deeply political question, implicating fundamental beliefs about the structure of the political system, the nature of society, and the roles of courts and law in society." Thus, like earlier jurisdictional reforms, CAFA was based on limited and inadequate data, evidence that consisted for the most part of impressions, anecdotes, partisan interpretations, and biased collections of allegedly "representative" cases. "Thus, as with many legal

[hereinafter Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum]. For the handful of earlier class action studies, see HENSLER ET AL., supra note 100, at 39 n.38.

222 See WILLING, HOOPER & NIEMIC, supra note 104, at 4. The study warned that the "four districts were not selected to be a scientific sampling of class actions nationwide" and that "our results cannot and should not be viewed as representative of all federal district courts." Id. at 5.

223 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 100, at 141-43.

224 Burbank, supra note 2, at 1500.

225 Peter H. Schuck, Class Clarity, AM. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 41.

226 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 100, at 482.

227 Id. at 472; accord Hensler, supra note 74, at 205 (explaining the difficulties involved in analyzing whether the benefits of class actions outweigh the costs).
matters,” Edward F. Sherman concluded, “we ultimately have to rely on anecdotal evidence to assess to what extent consumers as a class benefit from class action litigation.”\textsuperscript{228} Indeed, he continued, echoing the conclusions of the RAND Study, “the assessment of the merits of class actions is heavily bound up with social and political considerations that do not provide a definitive solution as to what should be done in the future.”\textsuperscript{229}

E. The Question of State-Federal “Parity”

Not surprisingly, CAFA’s supporters criticized state courts and accused them of bias and unfairness. In certain states and counties, the American Tort Reform Foundation charged, the “judges systematically apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against defendants in civil lawsuits.”\textsuperscript{230} Coming from partisans in jurisdictional debates, such charges were standard.

CAFA, however, was unusual in the extent to which such charges came not just from private groups pressing for advantage but from Congress itself. In the past the House and Senate had usually remained circumspect, framing their reports and legislation to avoid direct and harsh accusations against state courts. Not, however, in CAFA. Indeed, Congress leveled the ultimate accusation in the statute itself: “State and local courts,” CAFA announced baldly, were “sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants.”\textsuperscript{231} The Judiciary Committees of both houses, moreover, seemed to hint at even more sinister charges. The House committee noted suspiciously that state courts would “rubber-stamp” settlements “that offer little if anything to the class members while enriching their lawyers,”\textsuperscript{232} and the Senate Committee warned darkly that “judicial integrity” was “strongly implicated by class actions.”\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{228} Sherman, supra note 209, at 233.
\textsuperscript{229} Id. at 237.
\textsuperscript{230} AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 187, at ii.
\textsuperscript{232} H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 8 (2003). The accusation echoed the charge of John H. Beisner, the class action defense attorney who helped draft the statute. Some state courts, Beisner told the House Judiciary Committee, “are rubber-stamping class action settlements with little regard to whether they benefit the plaintiffs on whose behalf the cases were supposedly brought.” 2003 House Hearing, supra note 218, at 15 (statement of John H. Beisner, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP).
Both Judiciary Committees, in fact, indicted the state courts bluntly and directly. "[T]he class action abuse problem, particularly with respect to class settlements," the Senate Committee charged, "is primarily a state court issue."234 The extent to which abuses took place in federal court "in no way even approaches the level of abuse evidencing itself in state court."235 There had been a "dramatic increase" in state court class actions, and the increase was attributable not to differences in formal rules for class certification but to the characteristics of the state courts themselves.236 First, "some state court judges are less careful than their federal court counterparts when applying the procedural requirements that govern class actions."237 In following the law, the committee charged, they were unacceptably "lax."238 Second, "a large number of state courts lack[ed] the necessary resources to supervise proposed class settlements properly."239 The result was an "inconsistent administration of class actions in state courts" and, consequently, "several forms of abuse."240

The House Judiciary Committee was equally harsh. Class action "abuses are occurring primarily in our State court system," it announced, and "considerable evidence" showed that there were "increasing problems with State court class actions."241 Indeed, "abuse has become pervasive in certain county courts."242 They "ignore the procedural requirements that govern class actions" and "readily certify classes or approve settlements with little—if any—regard for class certification standards."243 As a result, inadequate and collusive settlements were "far more prevalent in State courts than in Federal courts."244 Indeed, the House Committee charged sweepingly, "abusive State court settlements abound."245

Insofar as CAFA's supporters sought to invoke the rationale of diversity jurisdiction by charging the state courts with "bias" or "local

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234 S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 54.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 14.
237 Id. at 14-15.
238 Id. at 15.
239 Id.
242 Id. at 8.
243 Id. at 12.
244 Id. at 16.
245 Id.
prejudice,“ their claims were dubious and, in any event, unproven. First, there was no evidence that bias or unfairness existed in state courts generally, and in spite of their extreme and sweeping rhetoric, not even CAFA’s most unrestrained advocates purported to show otherwise. Second, CAFA’s supporters identified only a handful of counties that hosted the dreaded “magnet” courts. Thus, on the basis of their specific accusations, whatever problems existed were limited, at most, to a few counties in a few states. Remedy such a localized problem neither justified nor required CAFA’s wholesale expansion of federal jurisdiction. Indeed, even assuming the worst about

246 In spite of commonly accepted views to the contrary, a study by the Federal Judicial Center found that state courts “were not typically more favorable for plaintiffs, and federal forums were not typically more favorable for defendants.” Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum, supra note 221, at 654. The “bias” argument that CAFA’s supporters advanced was also somewhat inconsistent. While they claimed that a bias existed against out-of-state defendants, they designed CAFA to cover most “nationwide” and “multistate” class actions, that is, class actions that involved class members who resided in many different states. If there were state court “bias” against those from out of state, then, it would likely have affected not only defendants but also most members of plaintiff classes.


248 In 1990, moreover, the Federal Courts Study Committee had discounted the importance of such spotty appearances of “bias” and concluded that they did not justify retaining diversity jurisdiction. FCSC, REPORT, supra note 46, at 40. Further, Congress could have remedied the alleged problem by allowing removal only in certain narrow and carefully tailored circumstances: when, for example, class actions were filed in (1) courts in particularly inconvenient locations, (2) courts with a certain number of other class actions already pending on their dockets, (3) courts where defendants could show that rulings on certification or other preliminary matters violated due process, (4) counties with less than a certain population, (5) counties having less than a certain number of class members as residents, or (6) courts located in states that lack appellate procedures allowing interlocutory appeals of class action certification decisions. In addition, Congress could have limited removal to cases where there was evidence that actual “bias” or “local prejudice” might actually influence the court. Over the years, many federal judges urged an “actual prejudice” standard for diversity
any "magnet" court, state judicial systems provided a variety of remedies by way of appellate review, and, to the extent that such remedies were inadequate in any particular state, the most obvious and effective solution was to press for reforms in that state's appellate procedures. Third, even in the counties that CAFA's supporters singled out as containing "magnet" courts, there was little, if any, evidence of actual bias or prejudice. Nor was there significant evidence that, in selecting those forums, plaintiffs' attorneys were hoping to exploit bias and prejudice, rather than seeking advantage from any number of other legitimate characteristics of those courts, including judges or jurors who viewed the class action form more favorably. Forum shopping based on lawful differences between federal and state courts was a long-established and long-accepted—indeed, an inherent and inevitable—characteristic of the federal structure's dual court system.

If evidence of actual bias or local prejudice in state courts was thin or nonexistent, another factor helped explain why CAFA's supporters denounced state court abuses and worked to bring multistate class actions into the federal courts. The simple fact was that they strongly preferred federal forums for compelling practical reasons that had nothing to do with state court bias. Based on more than 700 ques-

removal or suggested other similar "discretionary" removal provisions. See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 81, at 20-21.

John Beisner argued that the reason plaintiffs' attorneys would file in a "magnet court" was "a simple one." There, he explained, they were able "to get a class certified quickly, scare defendants into a settlement, and take home a lot of money—even if they ha[d] very weak legal theories and d[id] very little legal work." 2003 House Hearing, supra note 218, at 20. For examples of such cases, see S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 21-22, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 22 (criticizing "drive-by class certification," which occurs before defendants can respond to the complaint). To the extent that such hasty certifications occurred, an expedited interlocutory appeal process in the state courts would constitute the most effective and carefully targeted reform available. Between 1997 and 2004, largely at the behest of defendants, at least eleven states changed their procedures for dealing with class actions. See Empirical Evidence, supra note 247, at 6-8.

Such reasons included the federal courts' liberalized approach to summary judgment, more stringent rules on the admissibility of evidence, and a stricter approach to case management under Rule 16. See Lind, supra note 158, at 766-76; Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (examining the increase in pretrial resolution of federal cases); cf. Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) (arguing that the use of summary judgment has expanded). Further, much, if not most, of the battle for forum control between parties involved various types of perceived "nonlegal" advantages, such as differences between state and federal courts with respect to jury pools, docket backlogs, pace of litigation, geographical location, ability to select individual judges, time to final judgment on appeal, and a variety of practical convenience factors for oneself and inconvenience factors for the adversary.
tionnaire responses from class action attorneys, the Federal Judicial Center found that defendants' attorneys overwhelmingly favored the federal courts because they saw them as offering "an almost totally favorable legal environment for their clients"—a legal environment marked by "a convergence of judicial receptivity, predispositions, and favorable substantive and procedural rules." Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, had notably enhanced defendants' position by allowing interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions, granting judges broader power to select class counsel, mandating more rigorous standards for awarding attorneys' fees, and adding additional safeguards against unfair settlements. Thus, CAFA did not so much save defendants from biased state courts as reward them with access to an alternate forum that they regarded as more favorable to their interests.

The fact that defense attorneys believed that the federal courts showed "receptivity" and "predispositions" in their favor suggests, moreover, that a broad institutional change also helped fire the determination of CAFA's supporters. Class action plaintiffs largely had turned to state forums in the 1990s for the same reason that plaintiffs in civil rights actions and other similar types of cases had previously. In the decades after 1969, and especially since 1981, the federal courts—particularly the Supreme Court—had increasingly fallen under the domination of Republican appointees and conservative political values, and the federal courts consequently grew ever more suspicious of plaintiffs who sued government and business and ever more sympathetic to large institutional defendants, both public and private. The change reversed the assumptions that had marked the

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251 Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum, supra note 221, at 53 (emphasis added); see also Willging & Wheatman, supra note 152, at 4 (reporting similar findings).
252 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (effective Dec. 1, 1998). What seemed a facially neutral rule gave additional leverage to defendants as a practical matter. See Developments in the Law—The Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 100, at 1819 ("[T]he practical effect of this amendment may be to mitigate only those process problems affecting defendants.").
256 On the manifestation of this phenomenon in the Rehnquist Court, see Purcell, supra note 208, at 508 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court "tended to burden individual
long period from 1933 to 1969 and restored the institutional assumptions that had existed during the half century prior to the New Deal. The "general perceptions about state and federal judges are now quite the opposite of what they once were," summarized one public interest attorney in 1999: "[f]ederal judges are no longer seen as friends of plaintiffs." Empirical evidence supported that claim. Whatever the role of "bias" and "local prejudice," then, CAFA (like most of the contested jurisdictional reforms over the previous century) is explained in large part by the perceived political and social orientation of the federal courts themselves.

III. CAFA: NEW FACTORS IN FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REFORM

While CAFA, with two notable exceptions, fits the classic mold of federal jurisdictional reform, it also involved important new factors. If continuity with the past was apparent, so was the influence of those new factors. CAFA was to a large extent the product of three sweeping, interrelated, and relatively recent developments: the institutionalization of a powerful business-oriented "tort reform" movement, a broad shift in the ideological assumptions that underlay American so-
cial and political thought, and the galloping processes of globalization that were transforming the world.

A. The Modern "Tort Reform" Movement

Organized efforts to protect business from lawsuits have a long history in the United States. In the late nineteenth century, an explosion of industrial injuries and the rise of a plaintiffs' personal injury bar led to corporate campaigns against "ambulance chasing," contingent fee agreements, and a variety of other alleged ethical abuses.\(^{260}\) In the early twentieth century, for example, a group of companies, led by insurance and railroad corporations, established the Alliance Against Accident Fraud to prosecute the "professional litigants, 'fakirs,' false witnesses, shyster lawyers, tricky doctors, ambulance-chasers, and runners" who were allegedly cheating honest businesses.\(^{261}\) Such abuses surely existed, but the corporate campaigns against them tended to be wholly one-sided, seeking to negate a variety of plaintiffs' tactics while ignoring pervasive and unfair tactics—legal and otherwise—that the companies themselves employed regularly and methodically.\(^{262}\) Although such efforts enjoyed occasional successes at both federal and state levels, they tended to be sporadic, short-term, narrowly focused, and poorly organized.

Beginning in the 1970s, however, reacting against the broad expansion of corporate liability that had occurred during the preceding decades,\(^{263}\) insurance companies and growing numbers of business interests launched what became a concerted, long-range, and seemingly permanent campaign to transform the nation's understanding of its civil justice system. Grandly, they seized the benevolent-sounding la-

\(^{260}\) See Ken Dornstein, Accidentally, on Purpose: The Making of a Personal Injury Underworld in America (1996) (tracing the evolution of insurance fraud); Purcell, supra note 16, at 150-54 (describing efforts to counter the rise of a plaintiffs' personal injury bar); Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor To Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 231 (1998) (describing the rise of the contingency fee and the efforts of the bar to restrict or eliminate it).

\(^{261}\) See Purcell, supra note 16, at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).


bel "tort reform" and began vigorously and systematically to blame most of America's woes on a frightening, unjustified, and greed-inspired "litigation explosion." They methodically demonized plaintiffs' attorneys, sensationalized and distorted unrepresentative cases, submerged issues of corporate wrongdoing, and ignored the need of the injured and defrauded for just compensation. Incessantly, they hammered on their dramatic unifying themes: first, that litigation in the United States involved little but "frivolous" lawsuits brought by rapacious lawyer-pirates and intended only to cheat honest businesses; second, that allowing such litigation was wasteful, destructive, and virtually insane. To cure the madness and restore "common sense" to American life and law, they urged a broad range of legislative and judicial reform measures designed to drive plaintiffs from the courts by extinguishing claims, limiting damages, tightening evidentiary rules, adding procedural complexities, imposing heavier burdens of proof, and making claimants liable for defendants' legal costs. Most fundamentally and ambitiously, they sought to alter general cultural attitudes about the American legal system itself and thereby poison the minds of judges, jurors, and the general public against anyone who dared blame business for any loss or injury.


For general discussions, see Halton & McCann, supra note 216, decrying the inaccuracies of "tort reform" anecdotes; Koenig & Rustad, supra note 263, countering popular anti-tort arguments; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact That It Has Had Is Between People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 453 (2000), expressing concern about the impact of "tort reform" on access to counsel; Marc Galanter, Essay, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (2002), tracing the rise of the "too-much-law view" in response to the growing role of litigation; and John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1021 (2005), discussing the institutional assault on tort law. Some two decades ago, Marc Galanter wrote,

[L]itigation implies accountability to public standards. The heightening of public accountability is in many quarters an unwelcome counter to deregulation or self-regulation. . . . The predominance of cases enforcing market relations has given way to tort, civil rights, and public law cases "correcting" the market. It is such litigation "up"—by outsiders and clients and dependents against authorities and managers of established institutions—that excites most of the reproach of our litigious society.

assaulted the civil justice system broadly, its focus and its principal successes lay in what Robert L. Rabin simply but accurately termed "victim take-away programs."\(^{266}\)

The movement was well organized and well financed, and its shrill and relentless campaign drew together libertarians, economic conservatives, business interests, and the Republican party on a common platform.\(^{267}\) Funding gushed from corporations, business associations, wealthy individual donors, and right-wing foundations to support literally dozens of think tanks, litigation centers, and university programs while underwriting a proliferating range of publications, conferences, and individual fellowships and grants.\(^{268}\) Between 1985 and 2002, right-wing foundations contributed at least $36 million to support the development and spread of law and economics programs, while Richard Mellon Scaife and other Scaife family foundations contributed more than $19 million to the Pacific Legal Foundation, George Mason University, and the Heritage Foundation.\(^{269}\) Similarly, right-wing organizations such as the Manhattan Institute—one of whose studies the House Judiciary Committee cited in support of


CAFA— and the Mountain States Legal Foundation received millions upon millions of dollars from Scaife foundations and other right-wing supporters, including the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, and various Coors family foundations. By 1996, the ten largest right-wing think tanks had a combined budget of more than $126 million, and it was estimated that during the 1990s the top twenty would spend more than $1 billion disseminating their policy ideas. Between 1985 and 1995, the Heritage Foundation was able to increase its operating budget from $10 million to $30 million per year, and a special campaign celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary in 1997 brought in $85 million. In order to curb "lawsuit abuse," the U.S. Chamber of Commerce vowed in 2000 to contribute $10 million to George W. Bush's presidential campaign, and by 2004 it had spent $100 million on anti-litigation lobbying and publicity. The availability of massive funding was particularly critical, for the "tort reform" movement shifted the source of tort law from courts to legislatures, a change that made it likely that the future of American tort law would be determined largely by "legislation, politics, money, and rhetoric."

The "tort reform" movement also drew strength from the changing structure of the legal profession, in particular its increase in size and its growing concentration on corporate legal services, especially among elite lawyers and large firms. An elaborate study of changes

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270 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 12 (2003) (citing the Manhattan Institute in support of the finding that the number of class actions is growing rapidly).

271 See FEINMAN, supra note 269, at 183-85; see also STEFANCIĆ & DELGADO, supra note 268, at 142-44 (explaining how the conservative campaign used public relations and the media to promote its cause).

272 David Callahan, $1 Billion for Conservative Ideas, NATION, Apr. 26, 1999, at 21, 23. For listings of grants for individual right-wing projects and institutions, see generally STEFANCIĆ & DELGADO, supra note 268 (discussing seven major campaigns that right-wing think tanks undertook to spread their messages and influence the U.S. social agenda).

273 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 216, at 91.


276 Corporate in-house counsel also grew in numbers and influence, and corporate clients placed increasing demands on outside counsel for services and results. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 295-99. The number of lawyers in the United States jumped
among Chicago lawyers between 1975 and 1995 showed declining support for government assistance to the poor, more negative attitudes toward labor unions, and a large increase in the numbers who served corporate clients. By 1995 the bar’s corporate sector had grown to more than double the size of its individual client sector, and corporate matters took up a far more substantial share of overall lawyers’ time, jumping from fifty-three to sixty-four percent. Even more important, the study showed that “the political views of lawyers appear to be importantly influenced by their work context,” and divisions in attitudes about the relative advantages of government regulation and market mechanisms “reflected the interests of their clients.” Lawyers “may be more consistently sympathetic to big business” than the general public, the study concluded, and when “their clients’ interests are at stake,” lawyers “can usually be counted upon to identify with those interests.” Another study, focused on large-firm lawyers, reached similar conclusions. It observed that

from 355,242 in 1971 to 857,931 in 1995, and “by the close of the century, the proportionate differences in client demand and, in turn, income inequality were even greater.” Carroll Seron, The Status of Legal Professionalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Chicago Lawyers and Urban Lawyers, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 581, 583-84 (2007). For the corporate orientation of elite law firms, see, for example, Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 353 (1994), which presents evidence of “increasing demand for corporate legal services.” Between 1967 and 1982, law firm revenues from business clients jumped from $5 billion to $34 billion, thus rising in percentage terms from thirty-nine to forty-nine percent of total law firm revenues. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 112-13 (1991). The largest share of that swelling revenue stream, moreover, went to the large and most prestigious firms. See id. (hypothesizing that corporations “not only required more services,” but also required more “services per legal matter”).

277 HIE NZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 181-83 (stating that between 1975 and 1995 “there was clear movement in a more conservative direction” on whether it was important for the government to help the poor and disadvantaged). During this period, lawyers’ views also shifted to “a more negative view of unions.” Id. at 185. The earlier study is presented in JOHN P. HIE NZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1994).

278 HIE NZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 316.

279 Id. “The lawyers’ views, sharply divided even on fundamental issues concerning the virtues of the free market, appear to be generally congruent with those of their clients.” Id. at 200-01.

280 Id. at 200. Lawyers were “more conservative than the general population on issues concerning free markets and support for large companies.” Id. at 201.

281 Id. at 202. For a series of analyses of the structure and ideology of the legal profession, see generally LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992), which compiles viewpoints on lawyers’ and the legal profession’s changing ideologies and ethics.
members of large firms "cannot take the posture of neutral experts seeking to achieve a just resolution of conflicting positions; they must present themselves as zealous advocates." Thus, the large law firm "is not an agent of rationality and justice in the law" but, rather, "the agent of private corporate power." Thus, as the legal profession evolved and the influence of corporate business grew ever greater, lawyers—especially elite lawyers and large, prestigious urban firms—grew ever more committed to corporate interests and ever more wary of those who found fault with them. Among such practitioners, "tort reform" often found both a warm welcome and a helping hand.

"Tort reform," of course, provoked strong opposition, and studies repeatedly demonstrated that most of the charges its advocates launched were, at best, exaggerated or misleading and, at worst, simply false. Punitive damages, for example, were hardly the problem

282 NELSON, supra note 61, at 271-72; see also id. at 278, 287-89 (describing the ideology of professionalism in law firms today, and how firm and client dynamics affect this ideology).

283 Id. at 281. "[W]hen it comes to questions of legal policy that pertain to their practice[, large-firm lawyers] strongly identify with their clients' positions and interests. Practice thus determines lawyers' specific conceptions of law and justice." Id. at 282.

284 Researchers repeatedly demonstrated excesses and inaccuracies. Contrary to claims of a tort litigation "explosion," for example, evidence showed that there was a decrease in tort filings in the state courts during the 1990s. See Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 Rutgers L.J. 835, 846-50 (2002) (reporting a ten percent decline in tort filings between 1991 and 2000). More generally, the "available empirical evidence contradict[ed tort reformers'] claims." Id. at 836. Those claims, concluded another scholar, are often "built of little more than imagination." Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1155-56 (1992). For similar critiques and conclusions, see Daniel J. Capra, Essay, "An Accident and a Dream: Problems with the Latest Attack on the Civil Justice System, 20 Pace L. Rev. 339, 341 (2000) (critiquing the Public Policy Institute's methodology and its conclusion that a "litigation explosion" has occurred); Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269, 310 (concluding that attacks on the jury system resulted in policy formations that do not accurately "reflect what actually happens in the system"); Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1049, 1058 (2000) (collecting data from state court filings and determining that, despite the high number of claims filed, "[t]here have not been any large increases in the number of tort filings between 1994 and 1997"); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 717, 722 (1998) (arguing that a "jaundiced view" of litigation has been sustained despite a wealth of countervailing empirical data); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1093, 1097 (1996) (arguing that the "most prominent common-sense assertions" regarding the need for tort reform are actually misleading); Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 315, 319 (1999) (analyzing empirical evidence from Franklin
that “tort reformers” claimed. They were awarded relatively rarely and, when given, were usually small.285 The most recent survey of the available evidence concluded that “tort reform” claims about punitive damages were, in fact, “groundless.”286 The picture of American civil litigation promoted by groups like the American Tort Reform Foundation, concluded another study, “appears generally to be wrong.”287

As a general matter, “tort reformers” failed to consider the full picture. They refused to weigh the fact that most potential tort claimants never brought suit, that large numbers of them never sought compensation from those who injured them, and that many of those who did try to obtain relief were practically unable—for reasons apart from the merits of their claims—even to secure attorneys to handle their cases.288 “Large numbers of potential plaintiffs in personal injury cases,” a typical study found, “are told, in effect, that their cases are...
not worth the lawyers' time." Indeed, "tort reform" sought to make contingency-fee plaintiff representation riskier and less profitable, thereby depriving many more claimants of access to attorneys and, thus, to the courts. Similarly, "tort reformers" seldom mentioned defendants' abuses—unjustified stonewalling, frivolous defenses, costly motions, groundless counterclaims, threats of ethical sanctions, refusal to provide proper discovery, and abusive and demeaning deposition behavior. Nor did they mention out-of-court tactics designed to pressure or intimidate those who had assertable claims. While litigation excesses existed, they were hardly limited to the plaintiffs' side. "Tort reformers," however, issued no denunciations of defendants' tactics and offered no serious proposals designed to remedy their abuses.

Most broadly, "tort reformers" ignored the fact that tort liability made major contributions to American life—compensating victims, making products safer, improving work conditions, helping to eliminate unlawful discrimination, and disciplining and correcting corporate misbehavior. Similarly, they ignored the fact that litigation was

289 HEINZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 278. Lower-end practitioners took less than half of the personal injury cases that came to them, and those at the higher end took only twenty-four percent. Id. at 278-79. The practice of turning clients away is, of course, "less likely to affect major corporations than abused spouses, petty criminals, defrauded homeowners, or injured drivers." Id. at 279; see also JOHN A. JENKINS, THE LITIGATORS: INSIDE THE POWERFUL WORLD OF AMERICA'S HIGH-STAKES TRIAL LAWYERS, at x (1989) (noting that plaintiffs' lawyers avoid cases they are unlikely to win).


291 See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 289, at 148-241 (discussing the use of such tactics in tobacco litigation).

292 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability, Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical Industry, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 367, 367-68 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (arguing that tort liability improves safety); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 51 (1991) (outlining the benefits of punitive damages); Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 266, at 1036 (arguing that the tort system, by regulating safety and economic power, prevents distribution of dangerous products); Schwartz, supra note 175, at 382 (arguing that tort law reinforces a sense of moral duty). See generally KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 263, at 1-5 (defending tort law as a means of promoting justice). While "tort reformers" compare the American liability system unfavorably to that of civil law jurisdictions, there is evidence that the common law system spurs economic growth more effectively than the civil law system. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2001) (attributing stronger economic growth to better protection for property and contract rights).
the instrument through which the law clarified and adapted its standards, created precedents that aided in facilitating future social arrangements and dispute settlements, and discouraged highly undesirable self-help efforts by injured or wronged persons. "No list of consequences, however, can capture fully the reasons for the public provision of adjudication," Albert Alschuler explained further. "In the end, some rights are sensed as rights, not merely as economically efficient arrangements." The ultimate problem with the "tort reform" movement, then, was that it offered little but slashing polemics against evil-sounding categories—"frivolous" lawsuits, "extortionist" plaintiffs, "buccaneering" lawyers, "junk" claims and "junk" science—and failed to present careful, empirically justified, and fair-minded considerations of all the objectives of tort law, all the workings of the civil justice system, and all the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches that were available.

Regardless of criticisms, however, "tort reform" found a warm welcome in many segments of the legal profession and an enthusiastic national home in the Republican party. The Reagan administration confirmed the alliance, establishing a "Tort Policy Working Group" that deplored "the dislocations and problems generated by a malfunctioning tort system" and embraced a business-sponsored proposal to enact a national product liability law that would have severely limited

293 Alschuler, supra note 170, at 1816.
294 See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 143, at 35-41 (assessing alternatives to litigation). Compare, for example, the "tort reform" rhetoric of the American Tort Reform Foundation, see AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 187, at 33 (suggesting that the way to address the "hellholes" is by punishing "litigation tourism" and frivolous lawsuits), with the careful and nuanced studies of tort law and its alternatives conducted by the ALI and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice. See ALI, supra note 206, at 3-29; STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, NO-FAULT APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 224 (1991), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4019.pdf (finding that, at least in some contexts, a no-fault system for auto insurance would lead to smaller economic losses); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 288, at 175 (noting that the deterrence value of tort liability differs between behaviors). But see Thomas J. Campbell et al., The Link Between Liability Reforms and Productivity: Some Empirical Evidence, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 107, 131 tbl.5, 132 (finding a correlation of liability restrictions with increased productivity and employment levels).
295 TPWG, REPORT, supra note 172, at 30. The Group's analysis and recommendations seemed sharply slanted toward the insurance industry and designed to limit corporate liability and promote certain business-sponsored tort reforms. For a more balanced assessment of the "insurance crisis" of the 1980s, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 399 (1987), which argues that simplistic explanations account for only a portion of the tort crisis, and that a full explanation is necessarily complex.
consumer rights and preempted state law in a core area of traditional state control.296 His successor, President George H.W. Bush, stayed the course, sponsoring a President's Council on Competitiveness led by Vice President Dan Quayle, which issued an Agenda for Civil Justice Reform that proposed fifty law-reform measures designed to protect American business from tort suits.297 In 1994, Congressman Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America" continued the campaign.298 Tenet Nine of the Contract called for limits on punitive damages, substantial product liability reform, and the adoption of a rule requiring that losing parties pay the winner's attorneys' fees.299 The second President George Bush remained on message, repeatedly praising "tort reform" and urging Congress to pass a number of measures, including CAFA.300 In his State of the Union Address in 2005, he urged Congress to "protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits" and declared that "[j]ustice is distorted, and our economy is held back by irresponsible class actions and frivolous asbestos claims."301 The destruction wrought by lawsuits against business, Republicans charged, was growing worse every year. In 2000, they announced that the tort system "costs American companies and consumers more than $150 billion a

297 "Unrestrained litigation," the Agenda proclaimed on its first page, "necessarily exacts a terrible toll on the U.S. economy." PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1 (1991); see also Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 560-61 (1992) (detailing the economic impact of tort lawsuits). For critiques, see Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 247 (1992), which theorizes that "the explanation for these costs may lie less with the liability system... than with American businesses' penchant for using lawyers"; and Purcell, supra note 203, at 499-507, which criticizes the report for relying on inadequate and biased evidence.
301 George W. Bush, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html. President Bush repeatedly returned to the same theme. See Remarks in a Discussion on Class-Action Lawsuit Abuse, supra note 126, at 201 ("[Class action] reform is part of a larger agenda to make sure this economy of ours continues to grow.").
year,302 and barely five years later they warned that those costs had jumped to more than $240 billion a year.303

During Reagan’s presidency, Republicans introduced “tort reform” bills in Congress with increasing frequency,304 and after taking control of the House in 1994, they enacted a series of such measures. Over President Clinton’s veto the Republican Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)305 and three years later the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.306

302 AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, supra note 201 (promising to reform the legal profession by requiring higher standards for trial lawyers).

303 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President’s Statement on House Passing Class Action Reform Bill, Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050217-5.html (commending the House for taking measures to reduce frivolous lawsuits); Richard Cheney, Vice President of the United States, Vice President’s Remarks at Annual Conservative PAC Conference (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/print/20050218-1.html (asserting that the reduction of frivolous lawsuits will help to keep the economy strong).

304 Since 1981 numerous bills related to “tort reform” have been introduced in Congress, many of them repeatedly. They included bills to limit punitive damages, “non-economic loss” damages, and contingency-fee awards, as well as bills designed to adopt the “English rule” of “loser pays,” alter the collateral sources rule to limit damages, eliminate the election of judges, and limit plaintiffs’ choice of venue. See, e.g., The Library of Congress, Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html (enter term “tort+reform”; then select “CHECK ALL”) (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).

305 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The statute placed heavier pleading burdens on plaintiffs and gave defendants a variety of procedural advantages. Revealingly, Congress failed to make other changes in securities litigation that would likely have been more effective and would have provided greater protection for shareholders, such as imposing penalties on corporate insiders responsible for wrongful corporate acts. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1538 (2006) (“[T]he goal of deterrence requires the imposition of significant financial damages . . . [that] should be shifted so that they fall more on the culpable (and less on the innocent).”).

Both heavily favored defendants. The next year Congress enacted the so-called Y2K Act to protect the information technology industry. Further handicapping plaintiffs, Congress limited civil rights suits by prisoners in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and restricted the authority of the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, especially in cases involving the death penalty, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. In a near success, it passed the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act—a classic "tort reform" title for a classic "tort reform" measure—which limited claims in product liability cases. In that instance, however, President Clinton vetoed the bill, and the Republican majority failed to marshal the two-thirds vote necessary to override it.

_Met Their Burden?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 239 (1997), which discusses preemption in this statutory context; and Walker, Levine & Pritchard, supra note 100, at 644, which analyzes "the incentives that have drawn plaintiffs' attorneys to turn to state courts in filing securities class actions."

_See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 995 (1996) ("[T]he Reform Act seeks to tilt the balance in securities litigation in favor of the defendant at virtually every juncture."); Walker, Levine, & Pritchard, supra note 100, at 642 ("Congress did take sides, crediting the arguments of critics who asserted that plaintiffs' lawyers were the central problem. . . .").

_Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2000)). The statute imposed strict pleading requirements on plaintiffs, limited punitive damages, and extended federal jurisdiction to certain types of class actions, including those asserting state law claims. See also Vairo, supra note 209, at 1607-08 & n.257 ("The importance of this statute is that it provides federal jurisdiction in class actions that otherwise would be beyond its jurisdictional reach.").

_Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). This statute limited the ability of prisoners to sue in forma pauperis, imposed exhaustion requirements on suits, restricted the award of attorneys' fees, prohibited damages for mental or emotional injury without a showing of physical injury, and severely constrained the power of the federal courts to issue injunctive relief. The Act was not passed because prison conditions no longer warranted such prisoner suits. Indeed, most prisons continue to have serious problems. See generally JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, COMM'N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AM.'S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT (2006) (detailing the problematic conditions in prisons related to violence and inadequate health care); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3-4 (2006) (discussing the societal impact of the massive increase in imprisonment in the United States).


_See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996) ("An act [t]o establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for other purposes.").

_In doing so, President Clinton declared that the bill would "hurt families," "mean more unsafe products in our homes," and "let wrongdoers off the hook." Remarks on Returning Without Approval to the House the Common Sense Product Li-
In the states, victories for "tort reform" were even more numerous.313 During the 1970s dozens of states began screening lawsuits, encouraging arbitration, imposing damages caps, limiting the reach of the collateral source rule, restricting medical malpractice suits, and adopting no-fault insurance systems. In the following decade states moved to cap pain-and-suffering awards, limit punitive damages, and modify or eliminate joint and several liability. "In 1986 alone," two researchers concluded, "forty-one of forty-six state legislatures enacted some type of tort reform measure."314

The courts, too, moved in the same direction. State judges increasingly rejected efforts to expand corporate liability and, in many areas, began restricting it sharply.315 "Tort reformers" reshaped the membership of the Texas Supreme Court, for example, substantially strengthening the position of defendants in personal injury actions.316 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly increased the burdens that plaintiffs faced in securities cases317 and imposed new constitutional limits on punitive damages.318 The dominant characteristic of

ability Legal Reform Act of 1996 and an Exchange with Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 776 (May 2, 1996).

313 The "last two decades of tort 'crisis' have altered the lawmaking landscape for tort litigation itself. State legislators have intervened more and more often .... " ALI, supra note 206, at 581.

314 Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 265, at 1031.

315 See id. ("The 1980s also marked a turning point in the judicial arena as state court judges recoiled from attempts further to expand tort rights.").

316 See Harry L. Reed, Texas Oil and Gas Law in a World of Tort Reform, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 259, 260 (2006) ("[N]early every justice who has sat on the Supreme Court of Texas has had his or her selection ... influenced in some degree by their potential position on tort law matters.").


318 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (requiring a more stringent de novo standard of review for determinations of punitive damages); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (overturning a $2 million damages award as unconstitutionally excessive). For statistics on punitive damages, see generally the evidence surveyed in Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 746 (2002), which examined data on judge and jury trial outcomes and concluded that "our primary claim is a negative one—the absence of evidence that judges and juries
the Rehnquist Court, in fact, was its persistent and broad-gauged efforts to restrict court access and limit the judicial remedies available to individual litigants. Justice Scalia sounded the authentic voice of “tort reform” when he supported a narrow interpretation of the civil rights attorneys’ fees statute. According to him, plaintiffs frequently asserted “phony claims,” and their actions were often simply “extortionist.” Thus, improperly awarding them fees, he declared, would be “evil.” The relatively consistent prodding of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and the dominance of Republican appointees on the federal bench, made the national courts increasingly sympathetic to the goals, values, and assumptions of the “tort reform” movement.

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322 By the end of 1992, “Republican presidential appointees outnumbered Democrats by more than three to one” on the federal bench, a disproportion unmatched since 1952, when the judiciary’s composition reflected the legacy of twenty years of Democratic appointments. Goldman, Bush’s Judicial Legacy, supra note 94, at 297. President Clinton’s appointees rectified the imbalance in terms of numbers. At the beginning of the 109th Congress, however, Republican appointees in the lower courts still accounted for “52.5 percent of active judges” and almost 70 percent of senior judges. Goldman et al., Picking Judges, supra note 94, at 278. The increased sympathy in the federal courts for “tort reform” ideas exemplified what political scientists call “regime politics,” the impact of relatively consistent and long-term appointments made and approved by representatives of the same political party. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 314-18 (2005) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s decisions limiting the availability of punitive damages in tort cases). For a discussion of the “regime” concept, see generally Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511 (2007). In cases decided in the federal courts during the first two and a half years after CAFA’s passage, Republican male judges proved themselves substantially more receptive to an expansive reading of CAFA than did Democratic or female Republican judges. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1585 (2008) (noting that with respect to plaintiffs, “male Republicans . . . are the distinctive group, to a statistically significant degree”).
When Congress first considered a class action jurisdiction bill in 1998, the "tort reform" movement embraced the idea enthusiastically. When Congress first considered a class action jurisdiction bill in 1998, the "tort reform" movement embraced the idea enthusiastically. Consumers are being taken for a ride by a renegade legal practice," three supporters claimed, shaping the rhetoric of "tort reform" for a new target. Class actions served only as "a cash cow for plaintiffs' attorneys" who sought "state courts willing to sanction sweetheart settlements that enrich the lawyers" while providing "little or no actual benefit" to class members. The American Tort Reform Foundation joined the effort, publishing an annual report identifying certain state and county courts as "judicial hellholes" that "systematically" handicapped corporate defendants. Its listing circulated widely among right-wing and other "tort reform" groups and provided lively ammunition and partisan inspiration for CAFA's supporters, including President Bush. After CAFA's passage, the American Tort Reform Foundation boasted that it "reduces business for Judicial Hellholes." While CAFA was a direct product of the "tort reform" movement, it was revealing that the Senate Judiciary Committee sought to give its product a nonpartisan sheen by belatedly denying its origin. CAFA, it announced, was "court reform—not tort reform." The denial con-


325 Id.

326 AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 187, at ii. The charges, based on business sources, were massively overblown and highly misleading. See Empirical Evidence, supra note 247, at 2.


stituted an unintended homage to Bill Clinton—a dissembling public plea that “we did not have tort reform with that statute.”

B. Ideological Transformation

On a broader level, the past four decades witnessed a tectonic shift across the world in basic assumptions about law, politics, economics, and social organization. A series of tumultuous events—the subjectivist cultural revolution of the 1960s, severe and repeated economic crises during the 1970s, the increasing economic and political unification of Europe, the vigorous revival of neoclassical economic theory, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of world Communism, and the hyperinternationalization of trade, travel, and communications—revolutionized popular and professional attitudes. These developments discredited theories of centralized national planning, undermined confidence in government regulation and the welfare state, and inspired a boisterous faith in market mechanisms, economic privatization, and the advantages of free trade. The shift altered thinking across the political spectrum from left to right. In varying degrees, both the advanced and developing nations of the world moved away from commitments to governmental

The hand of the “tort reform” movement was visible throughout CAFA’s course through Congress; notably, the drafters changed its name from the original and descriptive title “Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998” to the final and polemicized label of “Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.” Similarly, its supporters’ use of dramatized and outrageous cases alleged to be representative was equally typical of “tort reform” tactics. Cf. McCann et al., supra note 216, at 117.

For the decline of “progressive” thought and the rise of neoclassical economics in law and public policy, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805 (2000), and Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005).

regulation and public social programs and embraced the virtues of entrepreneurial freedom and market-based economic policies.

Those forces had a particularly powerful impact in the United States, altering the way Americans thought about economic and social policy. 333 Combining with traditional national commitments to individualism, private property, business enterprise, and economic expansionism, they generated an extreme new ideological variation that heralded "the market" as *grundnorm*, master metaphor, and faultless all-purpose social savior. 334 This absolutist ideology of "panmarketry" taught explicitly or implicitly that government was not merely inefficient and flawed, but essentially incompetent or evil. It taught that individuals were to be understood solely as self-seeking profit maximizers, that government regulation led only to inefficiencies and "rent" collection by special interests, and that free-market capitalism was inherently good, automatically self-correcting, and universally benevolent. As a result, panmarketry preached that all social relations should be consensual and contractual, and that taxation was ultimately confiscation or outright thievery.

The assumptions that shaped panmarketry were all-embracing and uncompromising. They left no room for careful and qualified analyses of both the virtues and failings of market processes, 335 and they left

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334 See sources cited supra notes 331-332.

335 For examples of forceful statements of pro-market principles that nonetheless recognize the need for careful qualifications, detailed analyses of specific issues, and recognition of the general importance of social, cultural, and moral factors in shaping
no room for careful and qualified analyses of the cultural, religious, historical, institutional, and technological forces that conditioned economic life, shaped incentive structures, and undergirded social orders. Instead, they conceived of "markets" and "market forces" as somehow existing apart from, and independent of, human beings and their social institutions and cultural inheritances. They helped inspire the rigid neoclassical economic prescriptions of the "Washington consensus" that Joseph E. Stiglitz termed "market fundamentalism." Most importantly, they provided an automatic and all-purpose politi-


Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize–winning economist who served on President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors and as Chief Economist at the World Bank, identified market fundamentalism as a rigid and uncompromising commitment to free trade, privatization, market liberalization, and minimal government, a commitment that embraced, among other things, "an oversimplified version of market economics which paid scant attention to the dynamics of change." JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 138 (2002).
cal rationale that could be used to justify any "market" phenomenon, condemn any regulatory proposal, and negate any appeal to the concepts of distributive justice and a substantive "common good." At their most extreme, they inspired the kind of ideological fanaticism that led some to believe that Social Security should be abolished, that global warming was a leftist hoax, and that the introduction of free markets and popular elections would automatically bring peace, freedom, prosperity, and democracy to the entire Middle East.

Panmarketry not only rejected the possibility that governments could effectively regulate "markets," but also undermined the fundamental social insurance premises that had shaped much of American public policy over the preceding century. Its extreme individualism and anti-government assumptions renounced enterprise liability as an appropriate norm, scorned the idea that public risk- and cost-spreading were efficient and desirable, and denied that government-sponsored social programs could effectively provide support for the disabled, aged, unemployed, and victims of other such human misfortunes. Indeed, President Reagan's Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, captured those rejections nicely when he declared that the

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338 A central text for this position is MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). Important early statements include BRUCE R. BARTLETT, REAGANOMICS: SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMICS IN ACTION (1981); GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 259 (1981), which identifies a conflict between economic growth and regulatory intervention; CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 9 (1984), which argues that poverty was propagated by policies intended to fight it; and JUDE WANNISKI, THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS: HOW ECONOMIES FAIL—AND SUCCEED, at xii (1978), which posits that political and economic development are explained by the tension between income growth and income distribution. A more recent formulation is presented in BRINK LINDSEY, AGAINST THE DEAD HAND: THE UNCERTAIN STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2002).

339 See, e.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 231 (2003) (emphasizing the role of ethnicity and hostility toward "market-dominant" minorities in fostering anti-Americanism and opposition to market mechanisms). For a revealing comment on the last point in the text, see JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, MAKING WAR TO KEEP PEACE 273 (2007) (noting, apparently without ironic intent, that before 2001 "our attention to national security was subsumed by a desire to promote democracy, as if democracy alone could imbue chaotic societies and unstable governments with a respect for what we respected: the rule of law, basic human rights, and a peaceful world order").

administration wanted "to go back to many of the financial methods and economic incentives that brought about the prosperity of the Coolidge period." On the state level, the California Supreme Court reflected the impact of those same assumptions. In earlier decades, it had adopted rules that imposed liability on defendants who were in a position either to spread the costs of accidents or adopt effective accident-avoiding measures. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, however, it largely abandoned those approaches and revived strict fault requirements and other similar methods of limiting corporate liability.

Less obvious but equally important, panmarketry transformed the meaning and significance of the concept of "consumers." This term came into common usage in the nineteenth century, referring to purchasers of mass-produced and mass-distributed goods that Americans no longer grew or made for themselves. In part, the term carried a relatively passive meaning, merely describing those who shopped for and bought such goods. Gradually it became infused with pleasant connotations of material abundance, personal well-being, and national achievement. At the same time, it was consistently molded by business interests seeking to glamorize their products and expand their markets. On the other hand, however, the term also carried broader social and prescriptive meanings. It suggested ideals of republican independence, participatory citizenship, public control over private enterprise, and the propriety of using scientific standards to evaluate product quality and to ensure that business was serving the common good. "The Progressives identified consumers as a new category of the American citizenry," wrote Lizabeth Cohen, "an ideal broad-based constituency desirous and deserving of political and social reforms to limit the dangers of an industrializing, urbanizing, and politically corruptible twentieth-century America." In 1933, sociolo-

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344 LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 21 (2003). For an example, see WALTER WEYL, THE NEW DEMOCRACY: AN ESSAY ON CERTAIN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1912), which recounts concerns about development in American so-
gist Robert S. Lynd echoed those views and spoke for many liberals and New Dealers when he noted that "standards of consumption [were] . . . largely social rather than private in character." He reasoned that "the growing variety and technical complexity of things that may be bought suggest the need for far more reliable techniques for the handling of many consumption choices," rather than leaving them to "an area of private chaos." Again, during the 1960s and early 1970s, substantive and prescriptive conceptions of "consumers" were revived and used to push a substantive agenda designed to discipline businesses and improve product quality. The movement secured passage of more than thirty federal statutes designed to protect consumers in the marketplace and helped to establish or reinvigorate a dozen government agencies charged with enforcing their rights and interests.

While such substantive concepts of "consumers" continued to attract adherents, their influence had been fading in both political resonance and substantive content since the New Deal. In the 1980s panmarketry dealt them a lethal blow. Its assumptions defined the concept of "consumer" in the barest and most politically inconsequential terms. It stripped the idea of "consumers" of all substantive content and reduced those who purchased products to abstract economic atoms that counted for nothing beyond their "revealed preferences," that is, public manifestations of their otherwise unknowable subjective

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345 Robert S. Lynd with the assistance of Alice C. Hanson, *The People as Consumers*, in *2 Recent Social Trends in the United States* 857, 868 (1933). On the importance of consumer interests in the later part of the New Deal, see Alan Brinkley, *The New Deal and the Idea of the State*, in *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980*, at 85, 87-100 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).

346 Lynd, *supra* note 345, at 910, 911.

347 See Cohen, *supra* note 344, at 360 tbl.7 (listing the regulatory "achievements of the consumer movement").

desires revealed by exchanges of money for products at given prices. Panmarketry pared the legitimate "interests" of "consumers"—as well as the legitimate economic interests of the American people generally—to nothing but the desire for lower prices and wider product choices. Beyond their bare function as shopper atoms in the world marketplace, they had no role to play in the economy and, most certainly, had no valid reason to touch the market through political processes.\footnote{Public choice theory, an approach to welfare economics that shared some of the assumptions of panmarketry, argued that it was impossible for collectives of any kind to make judgments that were fair, rational, and consistent. Thus, the only unit of meaningful analysis was individual preference: the individual's only motive was self-seeking and all group decision making was irrational and unstable. For critical evaluations, see generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice To Improve Public Law (1997); and Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121 (1990). For a review of the literature on "consumers" and modern capitalism, see David Steigerwald, All Hail the Republic of Choice: Consumer History as Contemporary Thought, 93 J. Am. Hist. 385 (2006).}

The ideology of panmarketry came to undergird the thinking of many libertarians, economic conservatives, and right-wing Republicans, and it provided the political rhetoric that enabled them to convince many American voters that their interests were invariably identical to those of corporate producers. It transformed any proposal designed to regulate business into a proposal that automatically harmed all Americans, and any proposal designed to assist business into a proposal that automatically benefited all Americans. The American Tort Reform Association repeatedly insisted that lawsuits were not only "bad for business" but also "bad for society."\footnote{Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, About ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).} They imposed "a drag on our economy" and, more particularly, would inevitably "punish consumers by raising the cost of goods."\footnote{Id.} The rhetoric of panmarketry could, in fact, serve any pro-business purpose. Conservative attorney Theodore B. Olson deployed it to attack court judgments that granted punitive damages. "The ultimate victims, of course," Olson announced, "are policyholders and consumers who pay these judgments through higher prices [and] narrower product choices."\footnote{Theodore B. Olson, The Dangerous National Sport of Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at A17.} George W. Bush's Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, used it to attack efforts to expand liability for securities fraud. Any
such expansion, he warned, would pose dangers "to our economy, to our competitiveness, to jobs"—in short, to all Americans.\(^3\)

Then-Professor Richard Posner relied on the same claim in his torts casebook, claiming that rules imposing narrow liability on employers for industrial injuries were, in fact, a boon to working-class families because they allowed them to buy more goods at lower prices.\(^4\)

Corporate theorists adopted the same view, urging restrictive rules of liability in shareholder suits on the ground that shareholders were simply consumers who bought a special kind of product, one that was supposed to grow in value. The corporate managers who served as their agents had only one duty, to maximize consumer-shareholder value, and consumer-shareholders had no legitimate interest beyond the expectation that the value of their investments would grow.\(^5\)

From that perspective, consumer-shareholders could have no legitimate interest in subjecting their corporations to cost-raising and value-destroying litigation supposedly designed to protect their rights, nor could they wish for anyone else to so injure them and their investments by such litigation, regardless of its actual or ostensible purpose.

For CAFA, then, panmarketry provided a perfect rationale. It taught that the only valid consumer interests were lower prices and wider choices, that government compensation schemes led only to rents and other inefficiencies, and that the market was fully self-correcting and provided consumers their only effective remedy for producer fault. It explained why there was no hope in governmental regulation, no social utility in private tort suits, and, most certainly, no need for class actions. It justified both CAFA's de facto restriction on class actions and its failure to replace the form with some more effective and efficient remedial scheme.\(^6\)

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\(^3\) Kara Scannell, Big-Money Battle Pits Business vs. Trial Bar, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2007, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Secretary Paulson).


\(^5\) Tsuk, supra note 331, at 212-15. A key early statement was Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 290-91 (1977); other statements include Kahn, supra note 306, at 1635-37, which argues that greater regulation of companies is justified because of the harm to shareholder value caused by financial fraud; and Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503 (2006), which describes debates over the value of shareholder activism.

\(^6\) Ironically, as fiduciary obligations were lowered in a variety of legal areas in the name of market freedom and economic efficiency, the "balance between the opportunities for illegal gains rose, and barriers to these gains were removed." TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 151 (2006).
Thus, the assumptions behind panmarketry made CAFA an authentic "consumer" measure. Its avowed purpose, the statute proudly announced, was to "benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices." The statute was necessary, the Senate Judiciary Committee declared, because every abusive class action "drives up prices for all consumers," making consumers "the big losers." Judged by the assumptions of panmarketry, there could be no doubt that CAFA was in everyone's best interest.

C. Globalization

On the broadest level, the last four decades were also marked by the stunning and revolutionary changes wrought by globalization. From one point of view, those changes arguably made the availability of class actions even more necessary. The emerging international economy made ever-larger parts of life dependent on ever-larger entities that were ever-further removed from the individuals they injured or defrauded. Those entities, moreover, were ever more difficult for wronged individuals to identify and reach. Many of their products, finally, were ever more complex and sophisticated and hence ever further beyond the competence of individuals to test and evaluate on their own. China alone proved the point. Poisoned drugs, lethal toothpaste, deadly automobile tires, and food products fatal to both humans and their pets flooded world markets while governments made inadequate efforts to police the channels of trade and guarantee the safety of the goods flowing through them. The spread of

class action litigation, like other large-scale litigation, "is the consequence of socio-economic trends, not the cause of those trends," Deborah Hensler noted.362 "If there is a new 'monster' at large, it is the rise of multi-national corporations and the development of a global economy that bring with them the potential for large-scale injuries resulting from worldwide product consumption."363

At the same time, however, globalization presents a number of difficult challenges to class actions, some legal and some practical. Questions of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants and the extra-territorial reach of American law posed numerous difficulties for plaintiffs,364 while choice of law issues and the defense of "regulatory compliance" created troublesome questions about controlling substantive law.365 Furthermore, treaty provisions and the workings of the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement system generated additional uncertainties or potential barriers.366 Finally, globalization added a new twist to class action litigation because many such actions involved, actually or potentially, class members who resided in foreign countries.367

Perhaps most obviously, globalization magnified plaintiffs' problems of proving fault and causation.368 From initial product design to final consumer sale, the number of entities in standard commercial

362 Hensler, supra note 74, at 212.
363 Id. For a discussion of the challenges globalization presents to consumer advocates and human rights attorneys, see PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY (Clare Dalton ed., 2007).
365 The New York Times reported that China's commerce minister, Bo Xilai, defended his country's products by explaining that "50 percent of products manufactured in China were made by foreign enterprises, and that more than 60 percent of exports were made and inspected according to standards set by foreign importers and buyers." Associated Press, China Agrees To Raise Its Product Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, at A9.
367 See Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 42 (2003) (addressing the "special problem of non-U.S. class members' participation in U.S.-situated class litigation").
368 For a recent attempt to address the causation problem under contemporary conditions, see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2001).
chains multiplied, and their locations were increasingly scattered across the globe. In addition, they were more frequently subject to shuffling or replacement. Every large multinational corporation, Thomas L. Friedman explained, “needs to try to produce globally—by slicing up its production chain and outsourcing each segment to the country that can do it the cheapest and most efficiently.” Consequently, such companies continually shifted their production segments “from country to country faster than many people realize,” and they increasingly did it by “developing alliances with locally owned factories, which serve as affiliates, subcontractors and partners of the multinational firms.” Those “production relationships,” moreover, “can be and are moved around from country to country, producer to producer, with increasing velocity in search of the best tax deals and most efficient and low-cost labor forces.”

A variety of commercial abuses, both systemic and random, exacerbated the problem. Mislabeled, tainted, and counterfeit pharmaceutical products, for example, caused thousands of deaths throughout the world, and even strenuous efforts by the U.S. government and other nations failed to identify the ultimate source of many of the lethal chemicals involved. This failure was due in part to the lack of cooperation from some countries and in part to certain particularly dubious practices in the international pharmaceutical markets. Products pass through many hands before reaching consumers, and intermediaries who bought, processed, blended, or transported the materials often altered or eliminated essential information on documents of sale or certificates of origin and quality. “One trader referred to this practice as ‘neutralization,’” an investigator for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration reported after an extended inquiry. “I was ad-
vised that neutralization is a common practice among traders in order to protect their business interests.  

The complexities and volatilities of international trade, together with such insulating techniques as "neutralization," suggested the potentially devastating impact that one of the principal goals of the "tort reform" movement would have on consumer class actions involving products of international commerce. President Reagan's Tort Policy Working Group urged the elimination of joint and several liability in all cases "except in the limited circumstances where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendants have actually acted in concert to cause [the] plaintiff's injury." Such a standard would, as a practical matter, create an insurmountable obstacle to relief in many or most cases. The "tort reform" campaign, however, did enjoy considerable success in attacking the doctrine. Between 1985 and 1988, thirty states modified their rules regarding joint and several liability, adopting a variety of standards that generally limited plaintiffs' ability to hold joint tortfeasors accountable.

While globalization generated severe new problems for plaintiffs, however, it raised even more serious questions about the ability of the United States and other nations to impose significant tort liability on other consumer protective measures on their own domestic corporations. In an ever more competitive global environment, companies assiduously sought to minimize their costs, and heavy liability standards threatened to increase their costs and weaken their international competitive positions. In 1906, when Congress passed the first federal statutes regulating food and drugs and requiring federal inspection of meat, the United States was in a position to impose whatever standards of liability it chose on domestic manufacturers. A century later, however, globalization has sharply circumscribed that freedom. The United States remains a dominant world power, but its economic role in the world trade system has "waned" in recent years,

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372 Bogdanich, Poisoned Drugs, supra note 361, ¶ 1, at 1. Insulation techniques to protect against liability are in common use. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes, More Profit and Less Nursing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at A1 (describing techniques the nursing home industry uses to insulate itself from litigation).

373 TPWG, REPORT, supra note 172, at 65.

374 BURKE, supra note 143, at 32.

375 Hubbard, supra note 275, at 488-92 (describing the impact of tort reform on joint and several liability).

and "increasingly it has needed to cooperate with other great powers in order to govern the system."\(^{577}\)

More directly to the point, if students of the international economy agreed on anything, it was the fact that globalization imposed tightly constraining limits on the ability of nation-states to enforce domestic policies that raised costs for domestic producers.\(^{378}\) While Vice President Dan Quayle spoke for the "tort reform" movement when he derided American tort law as a "self-inflicted competitive disadvantage,"\(^{379}\) Robert Kuttner reflected the views of many liberals when he acknowledged the same truth. "Just as Keynes feared," Kuttner remarked, "a globalized market economy leaves less room for national policy."\(^{380}\) John H. Jackson, a prominent student of international law and trade, put the point simply. "More and more frequently, government leaders find their freedom of action circumscribed because of the impact of external economic factors on their national economies."\(^{381}\) Globalization of the market challenged "the stringency, enforcement, and style of national regulatory systems."\(^{382}\)

Milton Friedman attributed the recent dominance of the "Chicago school" to the economic crises of the 1970s and early 1980s and to the subsequent collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union. "It wasn't my talking that caused people to embrace these ideas, just as

\(^{577}\) Barton et al., supra note 366, at 11. As globalization proceeds, it becomes more important for the United States "to retain its credibility as it urges other nations to adopt the rule of law and accountable legal systems," one scholar warned, bringing a principal theme of "tort reform" into the picture. "Even a few extreme verdicts against foreign corporations or individuals damages the foreign perception of the United States' commitment to justice." Renée Lettow Lerner, *International Pressure To Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 229, 303-04.

\(^{378}\) Participation in the global economy "narrows the political and economic policy choices of those in power to relatively tight parameters." Friedman, supra note 369, at 103. Even scholars who offer more qualified views seem to agree on the basic point. "The compromise of embedded liberalism that created a social safety net in return for openness was successful in the second half of the twentieth century but is under new pressure." Keohane & Nye, supra note 332, at 36.


\(^{381}\) Jackson, supra note 366, at 137.

\(^{382}\) Barton et al., supra note 366, at 144. The ALI issued a similar warning some fifteen years ago. Heavy tort liability could create serious dangers "in an increasingly competitive international economy," especially "in a world in which no other nation has a liability regime of anywhere near the magnitude of our own." ALI, supra note 206, at 5-6.
the rooster doesn't make the sun rise," he explained. "Collectivism was an impossible way to run an economy. What has brought about the change is reality, fact—and what Marx called the inevitable forces of history." If Friedman and Marx were right, the increasingly integrated global economy—absent either comprehensive and enforceable international agreements or disastrous and shattering world developments—may make it increasingly costly, and perhaps unacceptable to a political majority, for the United States even to try to impose significant legal liabilities on its own domestic corporations.

Thus, the growing and relentless pressures of economic globalization combined with the well-organized campaign for "tort reform" and the ideological influence of panmarkety to help drive CAFA to passage. These forces seem likely to continue shaping national policy in the future in many areas, including jurisdictional reform. It seems unlikely that the United States would adopt some truly effective new governmental remedial scheme in the foreseeable future, and it seems almost certain that consumer interests would remain passive, diffuse, disorganized, and easily manipulable. Thus, absent a major structural realignment in American politics or drastic changes in world affairs, it seems likely that pressures would mount for further movement along the path that CAFA marked out for additional "reforms" to limit corporate liability and weaken or deny judicial remedies to those harmed by corporate business.

CONCLUSION

Considered in historical context, CAFA suggests several general conclusions. One is that the statute was—for the most part—the result of a relatively typical jurisdictional reform effort that shared all five of the basic characteristics of prior reform campaigns. It re-
responded to pressing practical concerns, adapted diversity jurisdiction to new challenges, reflected the dual nature of jurisdictional reform, rested on partial and inadequate evidence, and centered on the issue of state-federal judicial parity. In only two respects was it unusual: its innovative exploitation of diversity's elastic potential and its reliance on unusually blunt congressional attacks on the state courts.

A second conclusion is that CAFA illustrated the classic forum-shopping dynamic that drives American law and government. Although CAFA's supporters condemned plaintiffs' "forum shopping" and insisted that class action reform was necessary to limit the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to "game the system," they naturally played the same institutional game themselves. The overarching strategy that has guided political tactics in the complex system of American government for more than two centuries is, after all, both simple and well understood: lose in one level or branch, turn to another. CAFA's supporters did just that, trumping plaintiffs' forum shopping between judicial levels with their own forum shopping between branches. Losing in the courts, they turned to the legislature. Indeed, their institutional forum shopping was entirely typical, for they sought not general reform but specific advantage. They sought neither to limit judicial forum shopping generally nor to address class action problems broadly, but only to alter the law in a way that would advantage one specific category of litigants.

A third conclusion is that CAFA points to one of the distinctive new challenges that confronts the American legal system in the twenty-first century. The interlocked pressures of "tort reform," pan-marketry, and globalization seem likely to generate continuing support for further restrictions on class actions, as well as new restrictions on corporate liability and popular access to the courts. CAFA, in

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388 Supporting the political science concept of "regime" politics, CAFA's supporters won a simultaneous victory before the Rehnquist Court on an overlapping class action issue. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (holding that only one named plaintiff must meet 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)'s amount in controversy requirement for a class action to proceed, provided that the other requirements of jurisdiction are satisfied). See generally Brian E. Foster, Note, Serious Mischief: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., Supplemental Jurisdiction, and Breaking the Promise of Finley, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013, 2015 (2006) (discussing the "serious mischief" wrought by Congress via the 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction statute and by Allapattah itself).
389 In principle, of course, the class action form retains widespread support in Congress and the legal community, and the focus of public debate remains, at least
other words, may represent not just a single jurisdictional reform but a significant turning point in the history of the American legal system.

CAFA, then, as a response to the pressures of the world economy and an effort to strengthen the competitive position of American corporations, forces a deeply troublesome—but persistently obscured—question to the fore: what, exactly, is an "American" corporation? More importantly, to what extent does the welfare of such "American" corporations—and their improved competitive positions in the world economy—truly redound to the benefit of the nation and the American people as a whole? The mere fact that a corporation is chartered domestically, or that it has some of the standard insignia of a "domestic" corporation, does not necessarily mean that its interests, successes, profits, and jobs are shared with most or even many Americans. For many domestically chartered corporations, a large percentage of their facilities, operations, employees, and sales are abroad; many of their top managers and, with the rise of foreign direct investment, substantial numbers of their shareholders are also abroad. Their welfare, moreover, frequently is tied closely not to the interests of the United States and its citizens but to the interests of one or more foreign countries, corporations, or groups.

If the question "who are we as an American people?" has become pivotal in a globalizing world, so too has the question "what is an
'American' corporation?" If the United States seeks to adopt national policies designed to protect the competitive position of "American" corporations, as it has done in CAFA, then those corporations should be "American" in some truly substantial and widely shared sense. Their welfare, that is, should bring real and identifiable benefits to the nation as a whole and to all of its citizens, benefits that should provide far more than merely lower consumer prices and wider consumer choices for those with steady and ample incomes.\textsuperscript{394}
Fourth, CAFA accelerated the growing centralization of American law. As Wendy Parmet has pointed out, tort and other civil justice reforms increasingly have intruded into the operations of state courts by federalizing many of their procedures. CAFA contributed to that trend by taking state law cases from the state courts and creating, in effect, a national standard for class certification. Even more striking, CAFA spotlighted that seemingly unstoppable trend toward centralization because it was the product not of Democrats and liberals, who ostensibly favor the federal government over the states, but of Republicans and conservatives who have habitually proclaimed their fervent allegiance to state government and their deep respect for state courts. However, CAFA—like the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1995, the USA PATRIOT Act, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and the 2007 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—demonstrated that Republicans and conservatives were active centralizers and nationalizers, and that the meaning of their rhetoric depended not on the abstract principles they intoned but on the practical political and social results they sought.

Fifth, CAFA demonstrated, once again, the indeterminate nature of the “principles of federalism.” On one side, the Judiciary Committees of both the House and the Senate defended CAFA vigorously on

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AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 335, at 111, 111-18; see also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 233 (2004) (“[I]t is surely more sensible, generally speaking, to go for more general and comprehensive schemes such as unemployment insurance and retraining programs for all workers who are laid off . . . .”).

Parmet, supra note 123, at 1.


The point is beginning to be widely recognized even among conservatives. See, e.g., Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of American Conservatism, 37 PUBLIUS 279, 280 (2007) (“[President] Bush has been notably inattentive to federalism and supportive of centralization, as seen most clearly in his advocacy of legislation to extend the federal role in numerous policy areas . . . [including] in areas where Republicans had traditionally opposed expansion of federal power.”).
federalism grounds and charged that the status quo created what they described as "false federalism." Under the "current system," they maintained, state court class actions often "trampled on the rights of states to manage their legal systems by allowing state court judges to interpret and apply the laws of multiple jurisdictions." That practice, CAFA's advocates maintained, led state courts to "dictate the substantive laws of other states" or, "even worse, to impose [their] own state law[s] on a nationwide case." The "real harm to federalism [was] the status quo," both Committees agreed, and CAFA restores the "proper balance" and was thus "[t]rue to the concept of federalism." On the opposing side, the Democratic minority equally took its stand on federalism grounds. They argued that CAFA "unilaterally strips the state courts of their ability to use the class action procedural device to resolve state law disputes" and "will undermine state courts' independent authority." CAFA "challeng[ed] the vision of our founders and the intent of the Constitution" and discarded the fundamental federalism principle that the national government was one of enumerated powers. Indeed, the Democrats—hardly sounding like Democrats—warned that the statute violated, of all things, the Tenth Amendment.

These stridently opposed positions presented the normative question directly. Is CAFA, in fact, consistent with the principles of federalism? Or, conversely, does it transgress those principles? History

404 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 60, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 56-61; see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 13 (stating that the status quo was "an affront to federalism, because it results in one State court judge effectively making the law of that State applicable nationwide").
406 Id. at 61, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 56.
407 Id.
411 Id.
provides the definitive answer: yes. The debate over CAFA, in other words, exemplified the ultimate truth, that the "principles of federalism" have proven so amorphous and elastic that they can readily be shaped to support almost any position on almost any issue.\textsuperscript{413}

Holding aside abstract principles and partisan lawyering, however, CAFA's centralizing impact on American law and government seems undeniable. The statute shifted substantial power to the federal courts and constrained both the jurisdiction and authority of the state courts. Thus, however wise or desirable it might seem, CAFA represents a distinctly centralizing and nationalizing move. Indeed, combined with the "minimum diversity" rule, CAFA's elastic "originalist" rationale could justify the farthest-reaching extensions of federal jurisdiction that are imaginable.

In addition, and of even greater long-run importance, CAFA may well develop a synergy with three other factors—globalization, the commerce power, and expanding executive powers in international matters—that will generate powerful pressures for the creation of a substantive federal law to govern multistate class actions and suits involving foreign producers. The Supreme Court has already approved broad preemption of state law in many areas, and it has also allowed federal agencies to preempt state law on their own.\textsuperscript{414} A drastically expanded federal common law or new preemptive federal statutes to govern class actions and international trade may increasingly appear to be the next logical step.\textsuperscript{415} Regardless of abstract arguments about

\textsuperscript{413} See Edward A. Purcell Jr., Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical Inquiry \textit{6} (2007) (arguing that the federal structure was "intrinsically elastic, dynamic, and underdetermined"); see also Andreeva, \textit{supra} note 2, at 411 (arguing that CAFA is hostile to "notions of federalism"); Danas, \textit{supra} note 100, at 1307-08 (considering CAFA in light of two models of federalism).

\textsuperscript{414} For a discussion of agency preemption, see Issacharoff & Sharkey, \textit{supra} note 123, at 1380-82, which discusses preemption of state and common law by EPA and OSHA regulations; and Sharkey, \textit{supra} note 123, at 227-28, which describes agency preemption preambles as "a harbinger of a future where federal agency regulations come armed with directives that displace competing or conflicting state regulations or common law as a matter of course."

the "principles of federalism," then, CAFA represents a significant centralizing step and, potentially, a powerful catalyst for even broader centralizing developments in the future. Thus, to call CAFA a "modest" measure seems almost as misleading as calling it "court reform—not tort reform."416

Sixth, in terms of its long-term litigation results, CAFA's impact seems highly uncertain, for jurisdictional reform has often proved a rich source of irony.417 In the short run, successful reforms usually have produced identifiable winners and losers, as CAFA did. Partisan reformers and their adversaries understood what they were doing and why they were doing it, and they had important practical reasons for the strenuous efforts they made. In the longer run, however, the practical litigation results of jurisdictional reform tend to shift. Any such reform, Frankfurter noted some eighty years ago, "discloses in practice aptitudes or consequences not contemplated by its framers and wholly absent from the intention of law-makers."418 As time passed and society changed, so did both litigation patterns and the attitudes of the courts, and the social consequences of jurisdictional rules changed along with them.419 Raising the jurisdictional amount in 1887 and 1911 was intended to keep large numbers of claims out of the federal courts, not only because many of those claims were small but also because plaintiffs' attorneys commonly discounted more sub-


417 Several of the articles in this Symposium illustrate this truth about CAFA. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 322, at 1579-81 (finding that judges have adopted a very narrow reading of CAFA); Erichson, supra note 323, at 1596 (arguing that CAFA will not restrict class actions or constrain the plaintiffs' class action bar but rather "will strengthen the upper tier of the plaintiff class action bar").

418 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6, at 103; see also id. at 281 ("Jurisdictional problems are too technical and intricate to permit even the most skilled authorship to foresee all possibilities."); cf. Burbank, supra note 195, at 1952 n.179 (acknowledging the "opportunities for manipulation that CAFA presents").

419 See generally PURCELL, supra note 16, at 4-9 (examining changing patterns of litigation and out-of-court settlements in corporate diversity litigation from the 1870s to the 1950s); Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 924 (discussing the differential rise and fall of civil rights, prisoner petition, social security, recovery, contracts, and torts cases in the federal courts from 1960 to 1986).
stantial claims in order to avoid removal. When the social and political context changed after World War II and the federal courts came to seem attractive forums for individual claimants, the higher jurisdictional amount no longer served as an incentive for claim discounting. Rather, it became an incentive for its opposite—claim inflation, the tactic of pleading large damages for smaller claims in order to bring those claims into the federal courts.

Indeed, the development of the modern class action illustrated the prevalence of such ironies, for its appearance transformed the practical significance of *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*. Originally a Progressive and pro-plaintiff decision, *Erie* came in the late twentieth century to serve as a powerful pro-defendant tool in state law class actions. Requiring federal courts to apply state law when adjudicating state-created rights, *Erie* forced daunting choice of law problems to the forefront in those actions and thereby became a major obstacle to class certification. It was precisely the obstacle that *Erie* created, of course, that made CAFA such an effective pro-defendant statute.

420 See Purcell, supra note 16, at 91-97, 242-43. Another more familiar irony involved the doctrine of *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which shifted from a powerful tool used by conservatives and business to check government regulation, to a powerful tool used by African Americans and their liberal allies to combat racial discrimination. See Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 4 (1978) (arguing that *Brown v. Board of Education* gave the civil rights injunction a prominence that *Ex parte Young* had once given to the “anti-Progressivism injunction”).

421 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

422 See Marcus, supra note 158, at 1306-07. The broader “*Erie* doctrine” came to hold that *Erie* required federal courts adjudicating state-created rights to follow the choice of law rules of the states within which they sat. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in [*Erie*] against such independent determinations by the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws.”).

423 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (echoing the language of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in *Erie* in denying class certification on choice of law grounds). Both the House and Senate insisted that CAFA “does not change the application of the *Erie* Doctrine.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46; accord H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 41 (2003). Further, it “does not change substantive law—it is, in effect, a procedural provision only. As such, class action decisions rendered in federal court should be the same as if they were decided in state court—under the *Erie* doctrine, federal courts must apply substantive law in diversity cases.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 61, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57; accord H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 26. The committee’s statement that CAFA is “a procedural provision only” is, of course, misleading and unhelpful. Provisions that are “procedural only”—one thinks of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000)—often bring far-reaching changes in litigation dynamics. See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 43, at 124-32, 154-55 (discussing the impact of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act on litigation practice). Another potential irony
Finally, CAFA marks another step in a relatively recent but broad-fronted effort to constrict meaningful legal remedies against corporate wrongdoing, and it highlights the all-encompassing goal of those who advocate "tort reform" and embrace the assumptions of panmarketry, the goal of sweeping the legal decks clear of "nonmarket" remedies wherever possible. Those forces oppose government programs to compensate and care for injured persons; they condemn government efforts to regulate corporate activities; they seek to capture or otherwise neutralize agencies charged with supervising corporate activities; they strive to enfeeble public supervision generally by cutting taxes and "starving" government of nonmilitary funding; they support proposals designed to deny ordinary Americans access to legal representation and judicial forums; and they seek to change the substantive rules of tort law to constrict or eliminate corporate liability.

With CAFA they advanced on yet another front, successfully reshaping the rules of federal jurisdiction to limit even further the ability of ordinary Americans to secure judicial relief from corporate wrongdoing. Those last two goals, narrowing corporate tort liability and curbing the use of class actions, are particularly revealing, for they show the absolutist fervor that drives the adherents of panmarketry. Only some forty years ago, those who opposed government regulatory and compensatory programs did so on the ground that common law adjudication offered a preferable and more efficient method of remedying economic wrongdoing of all kinds. Now those groups are working to deny Americans even that last, common law remedial opportunity, and CAFA is their latest success.

In a society purporting to be democratic, and purporting as well to honor the rule of law, fair and meaningful opportunities for all Americans to seek and obtain legal redress are essential. The na-

looms in the so-called *Erie* doctrine. In the longer term, CAFA may make *Erie* an inviting target for narrowing or even overruling by the Court—or for preemption by Congress—if pressures for a uniform federal law for interstate class actions, or for interstate commercial law generally, become sufficiently great. For a discussion of the choice of law issue, see generally Linda Silberman, *The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions*, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008).

Thus, it was not surprising that the Senate Judiciary Committee went out of its way to declare that, in its view, "the concept of class actions serving a "private attorney general" or other enforcement purpose is illegal." S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 59, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 55.

As a general matter, private enforcement of private wrongs may be a preferable method of providing remedies. Samuel Issacharoff, *Regulating After the Fact*, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 381-82 (2007) (indicating that private enforcement may be preferable to public enforcement for several reasons, including avoidance of bureaucracy and an
tional and international economies have created massive concentra-
tions of private power, and American law has recently moved toward
shackling all of the available methods of controlling those who exer-
cise and profit from that power, and toward restricting every method
of providing protection for its citizens and compensation for those in-
jured and defrauded. CAFA, at least in the current climate and con-
text, narrows those remedies even further. As such, it is a short-
sighted, highly partisan, and broadly unfortunate piece of legislation.

increased likelihood of redress); see also Walker, supra note 189, at 863-64 (concluding
that private enforcement is generally superior to public enforcement). Support from
government agencies also seems essential, but agencies are often inadequate for a
number of reasons, including lack of funding and political "capture." See, e.g., Steven
(reporting that the Mine Safety and Health Administration failed to conduct required
inspections, including an inspection of the Crandall Canyon mine, where six miners
died in 2007); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Advisers Say Agency Puts Lives at Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2007, at A12 (indicating that several outsider assessments "concluded that the
F.D.A. is poorly equipped to protect the public health"); Eric Lipton, Dangerous Sealer
Stayed on Shelves After Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the Con-
sumer Products Safety Commission failed to recall a dangerous product promptly);
(suggesting that the Consumer Products Safety Commission has been weakened by
pro-business appointments and inadequate resources).

426 "A politically free society," explained Alfred E. Kahn, the original federal de-
regulator, "will insist on exercising some control over its economic destiny." 2 ALFRED
Both competition and regulation are "imperfect" and, if the former is generally more
desirable, the latter is always necessary. Id. at 329. The "preferred remedy" for the
imperfections of both is to make both work better. Id.