
I. CONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL HISTORY

Connectedness is actually a quandary. Often assumed to be a better state of affairs than being disconnected, the state of connectedness, upon closer examination, is not necessarily voluntary or desirable. Indeed, when E. M. Forster chose “Only connect...” as an epigraph to his novel *Howards End*,¹ he surely wasn’t thinking—it is safe to say—of the kind of connectedness among polities that Professor Wayne Logan describes in his rich, measured, and illuminating article.² This should come as no surprise. Forster was exalting the weightless energy of passionate encounter. Logan’s research, by contrast, reveals the potential gloominess of connectedness.

By focusing on the legal implications of the migratory patterns of criminal offenders, Logan’s article asks two important questions that have been given spare and insufficient attention. The first focuses on how states construct the criminal histories of the offenders who are now in their midst. The second asks what tradeoffs are implicated as states make their choices regarding how to interpret the pasts of these itinerant offenders as they relate to registration requirements or sentence enhancements for recidivism.

Answering the first question, Logan observes the existence of two archetypal approaches a state might adopt when assessing an of-

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² E. M. FORSTER, HOWARDS END (1910).

fender’s prior record: an internal one and an external one.\(^3\) Under the \textit{internal} approach, the use of “out-of-state convictions, and any punishment resulting from those convictions, [must] satisfy the eligibility requirements of the forum state’s registration or recidivist enhancement law.”\(^4\) On this view, for example, a state would not apply a recidivist sentencing enhancement to an offender on the basis of a conviction in another state for conduct that would not be illegal in the forum state.\(^5\) By contrast, under the \textit{external} approach, a forum state faithfully implements the consequences of the legal judgments of its fellow sovereign states, rather than re-examining those determinations to see if the underlying circumstances (or length of sentence) would have initiated the same legal consequences in the forum state.\(^6\) Consequently, with the external approach, an offender’s former actions potentially trigger a “marked trail” effect in the new forum state. Of course, jurisdictions need not be consistent between recidivism and registration requirements: some states might adopt, for instance, an internal approach with respect to recidivist sentencing enhancements but an external approach to sex offender registration laws.\(^7\)

With respect to the second question regarding tradeoffs between the approaches, Logan capably shows how both approaches raise difficult policy questions.\(^8\) Indeed, simply by ventilating the various issues as he does, Logan helpfully foregrounds many otherwise easily

\(^3\) Here I follow Logan’s practice of collapsing the distinction between the “strict internal” and the “modified internal” approaches. \textit{Id.} at 267-68. The basis for this elision is practical: theoretically, states might decide to take a “strict internal” approach, by which they refuse to consider altogether a person’s conduct or convictions that occurred out of state. \textit{See id.} (noting that, by the mid 1970s, only Virginia had taken this approach). The distinction between modified and strict internal approaches is purely academic now, since, according to Logan’s research, no jurisdiction employs the “inviting” strategy of a strict internal approach. \textit{See id.} at 260 (noting that the strict internal approach incentivizes prior offenders to emigrate); \textit{id.} at 269 n.54, 276 n.92 (classifying every state’s approach as either “modified internal” or “external”). Hence the “internal” approach described in the text’s next sentence is actually a “modified internal approach,” but for shorthand’s sake, I refer to it simply as the “internal” approach hereinafter, unless otherwise specified.

\(^4\) \textit{Id.} at 261.

\(^5\) The “forum state,” on Logan’s account, is the state currently assessing whether to impose a sentence enhancement or registration requirement; the forum state can be contrasted with the “foreign state,” which is the prior state of residence and/or conviction. \textit{See id.} at 266 n.41 (defining “foreign” jurisdictions as domestic jurisdictions other than the forum jurisdiction).

\(^6\) \textit{Id.} at 261.

\(^7\) \textit{Id.} at 290 n.167 (discussing New York’s use of the internal approach in some contexts and the external approach in others).

\(^8\) \textit{See id.} at 292-329.
obscured value trade-offs, and thus makes a profound contribution to the study of federalism and American criminal law.\(^9\)

This essay registers no real quarrel with Logan’s analysis of the scope and nature of criminal justice connectedness. My focus, instead, is on the normative argument in Logan’s apparent preference for the internal approach.\(^10\) I choose this focus not because I am convinced that the external approach is the obviously superior one. Rather, I think Logan overestimates its deficiencies. The goal here, then, is simply to adumbrate a few of the rejoinders available in defense of the external approach against Logan’s criticisms. To the extent these responsive arguments are persuasive, then state courts and/or legislatures will be in a better-informed position to select an approach more consonant with their particular concerns and objectives.\(^11\)

II. THE EXTERNAL APPROACH’S HIDDEN VIRTUES

As alluded to above, Logan ultimately sides with the internal approach. This might seem odd as Logan himself recognizes several distinct advantages to the external approach. First, at least as compared to the internal approach, the external approach advances judicial economy, sparing courts the task and expense of comparing whether the predicate conduct would satisfy the forum state’s eligibility requirements for offender registration laws or sentence enhancements.\(^12\) Second, by serving judicial economy, the external approach

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\(9\) In addition to analyzing the curlicues of horizontal federalism, Logan has recently explored how the federal government, by adopting a largely “external” approach, “infuses federal law with the normative judgments of the respective states.” Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2006).

\(10\) I say “apparent” because Logan plays his (normative) cards close to his vest in this piece, at least until the end, where his antipathy for the external approach appears more pronounced. See Logan, supra note 2, at 320-29.

\(11\) At least until a coordination rule emerges that would mandate that all states pick either the internal or the external approach. I leave for another day whether such a hypothetical rule would, absent constitutional amendment, survive litigation challenges. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 & n.3 (1995) (noting traditional role of states in regulating criminal justice matters).

\(12\) Bear in mind that what I am calling the internal approach is really the “modified” internal approach. See supra note 3. The distinction is critical here because it would be just as economical, indeed perhaps more so, to adopt the strict internal approach, since no inquiry into extraterritorial wrongdoing would be necessary at all.
is capable of serving distributive justice goals as well, since a dollar saved in administrative costs is a dollar available for helping other social projects.\textsuperscript{13} Third, by giving effect to the prior judicial decisions and legislative determinations of foreign states, the external approach instantiates comity among the several states, evidencing respect for the equal dignity of the states.\textsuperscript{11} Fourth, the external approach is often the better vehicle for providing notice to a migrating offender. Under the external approach, for example, the offender need only know one set of laws regarding registration requirements—those of the state in which she committed the offense. If states employ an internal approach, then migrant offenders will have greater difficulty in keeping abreast of whether they are expected to register or not. Finally, the external approach is more likely to reinforce norms of individual responsibility and accountability, since it signals, as President Clinton said, that if you break the law, “the law will follow you wherever you go—state to state, town to town.”\textsuperscript{15} In other words, if an offender must register in Alabama as a consequence of some crime she committed there, she would not be able to escape those registration requirements simply by moving to a different state, where the same underlying conduct would have been perfectly legal.

Despite the variegated benefits of the external approach, Logan condemns the external approach for four reasons: its harshness, its creation of inequalities, its denigration of state autonomy, and, relatively, its discouragement of jurisdictional competition for citizen mi-

\textsuperscript{13} On this point, Logan, \textit{supra} note 2, at 294 n.183, refers us to \textit{Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co.}, 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9,662), a case where Justice Story denied the filing of federal suits in state court because such practices “may most materially interfere with the convenience of their own courts, and the rights of their own citizens, and be attended with great expense to the state, as well as great delays in the administration of justice.” Of course, the distributive justice gains in judicial economy are likely offset by the expenses associated with incarcerating offenders for longer periods of time for sentence enhancements; but the costs of these longer sentences may, in turn, generate some benefits such as crime reduction through incapacitation or general or specific deterrence.

\textsuperscript{14} Michael O’Hear has suggested to me that the value of comity is oversold here so long as these registration requirements or recidivism enhancements are justified as preventive measures. That is because, to the extent these provisions are imposed for future social self-protection, only the legislated values of the (forum) state in which the offender is currently living (or more likely to be committing an offense) should have significance, and not the values embraced, potentially years ago, by another state. This point is surely correct, but only so far as it goes. My sense is that these enhancements or registration requirements are often added precisely to further punish (on the basis of desert) the affected classes of offenders. When that’s the case, comity could make sense again.

\textsuperscript{15} Logan, \textit{supra} note 2, at 261.
igration. In what follows, I explain why these charges are overstated or misplaced.

A. Is the External Approach Unduly Harsh?

To begin with, Logan notes that an embrace of the external approach can lead to the imposition of evermore onerous registration requirements or sentence enhancements based on weird predicate crimes or harsh procedural sorting rules that are extant in the several states.\(^1\) It may be true that, on the margins, the external approach leads to more harm to defendants,\(^\text{7} \) but Logan’s article does not furnish us with enough evidence to believe that is conclusively the case, as there are a variety of circumstances in which the internal approach may lead to worse outcomes for migrant offenders. For example, forum states may have a lower bar for registration requirements than foreign states; thus, out-of-state conduct that may be deemed relatively benign in the foreign state may prompt severe consequences once the migrant offender moves to the forum state.\(^\text{8} \) Indeed, as Logan himself notes, the external approach would lead to better circumstances for offenders on those occasions where “a crime classified as a misdemeanor in a foreign state can be treated by the forum as a felony for purposes of assessing recidivism, or the foreign state would not count

\(^{16} \) See, e.g., People v. Mazzie, 358 N.Y.S.2d 307, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (noting that under an external approach, New York would have to extend felony enhancements for those “convicted of fornication in Alabama, seduction in Texas, blasphemy in New Jersey, vagrancy in Rhode Island, or of stealing a library book in North Carolina or a turkey in Arkansas” (citations omitted)); Mitchell v. State, 467 A.2d 522, 533 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (noting that the legislature did not intend to impose a mandatory sentence because of a prior conviction for “[c]utting cacti in California, uprooting the state flower (rhododendron) in West Virginia, or desecrating a confederate cemetery in Mississippi”). Logan appears to share these concerns. See Logan, supra note 2, at 303 (“[T]he notable idiosyncrasies of state laws are permitted to affect outcomes in other states. For instance, if an individual moves from South Carolina to one of the fifteen other states using an external test for registration, the Palmetto State’s unusually broad gamut of registerable offenses will come into play . . . .”).

\(^{17} \) The empirical determination would ultimately depend not only on the number of states adopting the internal approach, but also on the number of cases heard by each state.

\(^{18} \) Logan, supra note 2, at 301; see also id. at 305 n.256 (discussing Hendrix v. Taylor, 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (S.C. 2003), in which the forum state required an immigrant, under the internal approach, to register for life, even though the foreign state’s registration requirements would have ended after five years).
deferred or probated adjudications, or a nolo contendere plea, or a prior juvenile disposition."

Even if it could be shown that the external approach is a net detriment to defendants because it tends to widen the scope of penalty, this is not always bad. For one thing, take note that the democratic weirdness of federalism’s fifty labs approach may cut in many directions. One need only imagine that the forum state adopts the internal approach and also fails to recognize the crime of marital rape, or refuses to impose higher penalties for racially-motivated assaults or driving under the influence. Shorter criminal codes (and sentences) are not inexorably better criminal codes (and sentences). Consequently, when offenders move to an internal approach jurisdiction, there is a decent chance that the resulting outcomes will offend, rather than reflect, progressive political sensibilities in the forum state because the criminal codes of foreign states may actually serve retributive (or other) ends more effectively than those of the forum state.

In this regard, by giving effect to the “marked trail” of an offender’s conduct through the external approach, a forum state may in fact be able to better conduct comparative experiments in crime policy than they otherwise would be able to perform. Of course, this would raise, albeit in a different way, Logan’s pronounced concern that the external approach entails a basic unfairness by treating similarly situated offenders differently. This concern warrants careful scrutiny.

**B. Does the External Approach Promote Inequality?**

Logan’s basic point about unequal treatment resulting from the external approach is that “[w]hen forum states defer to outcomes reached in foreign states with significant variations in substantive laws, punishments, and procedural rights, otherwise similarly situated individuals can be treated unequally.” To see how this works, consider two types of inequality under the external approach that Logan espies:

The first [unequal treatment] involves immigrants from states with narrower registration eligibility criteria; they, unlike the immigrant from, say, South Carolina, will not be subject to registration because it was not

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19 Logan, supra note 2, at 301 (citations omitted).
20 For example, states could track recidivism rates of offenders with similar offenses but different penalties that result from application of the external approach.
21 Id. at 303.
22 Id.
required by the foreign state from which they migrated. The second arises when an offender in the forum state is not required to register as a result of being convicted of an offense (e.g., peeping), yet the newcomer is so required, again because of the idiosyncratic nature of the foreign state’s registration law. Alternatively, the duration of registration can be made lengthier for newcomers if the forum state ties the newcomer’s period of registration to the duration imposed by the state left behind. In each such situation, registration, with its direct and collateral burdens (including possibly community notification, with its litany of negative consequences), is driven by the geographic happenstance of where the foreign conviction occurred, leading to unequal outcomes in the forum state.

To be sure, unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders should give us pause—as a normative and constitutional matter. But the unequal treatment resulting from adoption of the external approach is not necessarily “unwarranted” or “unfair” if it doesn’t involve offenders who are actually similarly situated. Logan’s first scenario compares immigrants from different states who arrive in the same new forum state; one is susceptible to more onerous registration requirements while another is not, merely because of where the foreign conviction occurred. According to Logan, this disparity is troublesome, as is the resulting disparity between the immigrant offender and the native offender in the second scenario.

Both scenarios, however, present only the veneer of unfairness. Upon scrutiny, the unequal treatment dissolves simply by recourse to the very point about notice that Logan acknowledges elsewhere. In the case of the two immigrant offenders now in the forum state, it makes little sense to think that they are similarly situated if they committed their offenses in different states against different sovereigns. The same holds for the comparison of the perpetrator of an offense in jurisdiction X to the perpetrator of the same offense in jurisdiction Y. These offenders are not similarly situated precisely because the predicate conduct was perpetrated against different sovereigns whose democratic institutions may legitimately issue different rules with different

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25 Id. at 304-05.
consequences.\textsuperscript{25} This matters because, in a federal scheme of decentralized democracy, an offense of drug possession in state X may reasonably be regarded as having a different valence than those schemes criminalizing drug possession in state Y.\textsuperscript{26} (Of course, we might not like all the laws resulting from the plural nature of the states, but this calls, perhaps, for increased constitutional regulation of criminal law legislation, not an abandonment of federalism as such.) Moreover, given the variety of ways in which similar acts committed in different states may reveal different attitudes about criminal propensities, there is further reason for thinking that the offenders in Logan’s two scenarios are not similarly situated—though of course, this would depend on the assumption that the offenders had knowledge of these varying penalties.

In short, to generate a legitimate inference of unwarranted disparity, one has to treat differently two similarly situated perpetrators of the same offense in the same jurisdiction. Both of Logan’s two scenarios don’t present that prerequisite. Indeed, when a forum state effectuates the consequences that would be visited upon an offender had she remained in the foreign state—by adoption of the external approach—the forum state is actually serving the cause of equality because it ensures that similarly situated defendants convicted in the same jurisdiction endure the same kind of consequences, regardless if one of the offenders decides to go to another jurisdiction. More importantly, no unfairness or surprise to the offender can be claimed because she is (presumptively) on notice from the outset; she is simply receiving under the external approach what she would otherwise have received had she stayed in the foreign state.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} One might still venture that Logan’s hypothetical scenarios present the appearance of inequality, which could undermine popular support for the criminal law. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 476 (1997) (explaining that social groups more likely flout a particular prohibition if the overall legal system has a bad reputation). But in the context of the choice between the external and internal approach, I doubt the “appearances of inequality” here will mobilize massive resentment of the system at large.

\textsuperscript{26} See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) (emphasizing the tradition of judicial deference to legislative crime-control strategies).

\textsuperscript{27} For these reasons, states adopting the external approach would have little difficulty in justifying these “disparate treatments” under the Equal Protection Clause’s rational basis test. And the constitutional challenges brought so far have failed for these or other reasons. See Logan, supra note 2, at 311 & n.287 (discussing failure of challenges to West Virginia and New York laws).
C. Does the External Approach Undermine State Autonomy?

In addition to his concerns about widening penalty and inequality, Logan also fears the external approach leads to the erosion of autonomy in individual states. This erosion of self-government occurs on account of the ossification effects resulting when states, through the external approach, “replicate temporally and geographically contingent aspects of substantive criminal law, punishment, and procedure.”\(^{28}\) Logan thinks these “frozen-in-amber” effects are more pronounced in jurisdictions employing the external approach because, under the internal approach, such “intergenerational drift” might be checked by the forum state’s own substantive rules and procedural requirements.\(^{29}\) There are two reasons to hesitate before condemning these replication and ossification effects. First, as shown earlier, because the internal approach is not always less harsh and because criminal codes in the foreign state may be more “progressive,”\(^{30}\) the replication and ossification created by the external approach might not be bad for defendants or society.

Second, and more relevant to the autonomy erosion claim, there are two reasons states may see their choice of the external approach as an expression of their autonomy, rather than as a denigration of it. First, a state may view its choice of the external approach as saying to an offender something like: “if you made the choice to violate the criminal law of another state, we have a concern you might do so here as well, even though what you did there would not have been a violation here.” Thus, a state might self-consciously try to enhance its crime reduction strategy against specific threats by adopting the external approach.\(^{31}\) Second, notwithstanding its “right to act autonomously and independently, free of the constraining authority of other governmental units,”\(^{32}\) a state might adopt the external approach because it wants to see its norms adhered to when its offenders migrate to other states. If the state sees itself in an iterative process by which it believes that other states will reciprocate with adoption of the external approach, then its choice to embrace the external approach will make sense. To illustrate: State X might be willing to give effect to State Y’s laws to offenders whose crimes were prosecuted in State Y if State X

\(^{28}\) Id. at 307.
\(^{29}\) Id. at 308.
\(^{30}\) See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
\(^{31}\) Thanks to J.B. Ruhl for this point.
\(^{32}\) Logan, supra note 2, at 324.
thinks that State Y (or States A through W) will adopt and abide by the external approach. That’s because State X believes that in subsequent cases, those states will give effect to State X’s laws to former X-convicted offenders who migrate to these other states.

Indeed, State X might try to persuade other states to adopt an external approach so that they give effect to State X’s legislative views on offenders previously convicted in State X. Though they have no power to mandate the extraterritorial application of their laws, the states employing the external approach might try to convince the “internal approach” states that they are acting as “free-riders.” They are free-riders because internal approach states have their laws apply in their own jurisdiction to indigenous and immigrant offenders and they also have their laws apply to their own former citizens who migrate to external approach states. Without a rule mandating one approach or another, internal approach states are able to enjoy a kind of law-hoarding, thereby undermining norms of reciprocity.

There is a solution available to bring this “game” to equilibrium: states that care about this problem could use a bifurcated strategy. The courts in the forum state could apply the external approach to offenders from other external approach states while using the internal approach against offenders migrating from internal approach states. But the fact that such a strategy is not used indicates that this unfairness is either deemed relatively insignificant or that the unfairness has not been made obvious to relevant policymakers.

D. Does the External Approach Discourage Democratic Experimentalism and Jurisdictional Competition?

Logan concludes his critique of the external approach by contending that states that adopt the internal approach are better able to serve as “stalwarts of ‘fifty-labs’ federalism.” I find this claim puzzling. To begin with, a state adopting the external approach is at least equally able to convey its respect for fifty-labs federalism precisely because it may doggedly apply its own laws to offenders who commit crimes in that state while at the same time demonstrating equal respect for the dignity of its sister states by implementing the laws of its sister states on their migrant offenders. Pace Logan, the external approach poses no real jeopardy to the spirit of democratic experimentalism—after all, the proportion of migrant offenders is likely to be

55 Id. at 318.
small compared to the number of indigenous offenders, so lawmakers
will not likely be deterred from trying to undertake criminal law inno-
vations to see how they work.

Indeed, for the same reason, the risk attending Logan’s fear that
the external approach prompts a slippage in democratic accountabil-
ity seems remote. How many instances are there where someone
convicted of a weird crime in another state—Logan’s examples are
adultery and peeping—has that offense later serve as a predicate to
enhanced sentences or registration requirements in a forum state
adopting the external approach? My guess is not that many. Unfor-
nately, Logan’s article (quite reasonably) does not provide the em-
pirics. But even if it were a non-trivial number, calling that result, as
Logan does, “stealth legislation” is inapposite. After all, no citizens
of the forum state will face penalty enhancements for such conduct if
that conduct is committed in the forum state.

As long as the forum state’s citizens are free to engage in that
predicate conduct, then virtually no risk to Alexander Hamilton’s vi-
sion of the states competing for the “people’s ‘affection’” material-
izes—because people are still able to make informed choices about
where to live ex ante—that is, before any crime is committed. If I
want to move away from a state that makes peeping a felony, I can do
so at no penalty if I have not committed an offense. But Logan thinks
people should be able to commit an offense and then escape (some
of) the consequences of that conduct by moving to an “easier” place
to live. Certainly, offenders who serve their sentence and complete all
their conditions of release should enjoy the fruits of mobility associ-
ated with the American religion of self-reinvention. But by what
moral rights do they merit a free roaming pass prior to their release
from the criminal justice system? It is unlikely this is the kind of ju-

54 See id. at 322-23.
55 Id. at 322.
56 Id. at 323.
57 See id. at 325 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clint Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice:
Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1835
(2005) (discussing the incentives for local communities to harshen their criminal jus-
tice systems in order to encourage offenders to migrate to other jurisdictions).
58 Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (“We have expressly iden-
tified this ‘right to move from one place to another according to inclination’ as ‘an
attribute of personal liberty’ protected by the Constitution.” (quoting Williams v. Fears,
179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
risdictional competition Hamilton or other federalists had in mind. Moreover, to the extent that internal approach states end up being harsher on defendants, then that too will deter migration on the margins, thereby depriving "prospective state[s]" of "such persons' talents and resources." At the level of abstraction Logan has pitched this inquiry, the selection of the internal approach over the external approach can often cut both ways.

Finally, to the extent anyone in an external approach state is troubled by the introduction of what Logan calls "stealth legislation," she might take comfort in knowing that her own state's weird legislation is being given effect in other external approach states. Logan correctly worries that the external approach might give extended effect to laws like the ones invalidated in *Lawrence v. Texas.* But that is just one side of the coin. The flip side is that progressive states might be criminalizing marital rape, or making it easier to prosecute date rape, and, through the external approach, they are seeing norms shift in "better directions." And in both situations, criminal legislation is policed, albeit too weakly, by the Constitution. In the end, there is a perversion are not "free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens"). Of course, this point is compatible with a belief that the criminal justice systems across the states have gone too far in intruding upon ex-offenders' lives. The proper response to that problem, however, is broad-based democratic reforms of the criminal justice system in the foreign state, not application of the internal approach to those few migrant offenders affected in the forum state.

40 See *supra* notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

41 Logan, *supra* note 2, at 326. One might wonder whether use of the external approach implicates values such as an offender's fundamental right to travel. Although this topic is well beyond the scope of this essay, it bears mention that the external approach hardly interferes with that right as such. It simply ensures that the migrant offender receives no particular benefit from leaving the "foreign jurisdiction."

12 *Id.* at 323. Logan seems worried that use of the external approach will mean that a state can "effectively codify 'peeping' (South Carolina) or adultery (Kansas) as convictions requiring registration" if it is fearful of legislating such requirements through "the formal legislative process." *Id.* at 322. It seems just as plausible that, to the extent that legislators are paying attention to these applications of the external approach in their jurisdiction, they would be spurred to repeal antiquated legislation that might still exist on their books. More likely still is that all such signals from the occasional case of the migrant offender from the "weird" state are far from the attention of state legislators in external approach states. Finally, Logan's awareness of the costs of such "stealth legislation," *id.* at 322 n.343, would countervail against these concerns about democratic accountability.

quid pro quo among the external approach states—one that Logan appears reluctant to acknowledge. And for those states that are still worried about the injustices potentially worked by replicating weird laws of other states, they have yet another strategy available to them: employ the external approach generally while simultaneously carving out specific safe harbors for particular conduct the legislature deems worthy of protection. On this view, a legislature could cleanly direct its courts to exclude from consideration those out-of-state convictions arising from, say, consensual sodomy or growing marijuana for medicinal use.

III. FEARING DEMOCRACY?

In reviewing Logan’s multiple concerns about the external approach, one might be tempted to view them as fragments of a larger skittishness toward the work of democracies in the realm of criminal law politics, and the purported crisis of overcriminalization produced therefrom. To be sure, there is a basis for fearing incessant overcriminalization. But the claims of pernicious democratic pathologies in criminal law politics are also prone to exaggeration, as Professor Darryl Brown has recently demonstrated convincingly. And to the extent the crisis of overcriminalization is real, it probably does not make much sense to seek its amelioration through choosing between

45 I am grateful to Ron Wright for this suggestion.
46 Professor Brown summarized his findings:
Legislatures routinely decline to enact bills proposing new crimes or increased punishments, for reasons familiar to students of legislative process. . . . Legislators also repeal longstanding criminal statutes, reduce punishments, reduce offense severity, and occasionally convert low-level crimes to civil infractions. . . . Moreover, interest groups and popular opinion often support and sometimes drive de-criminalization reforms, which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of ever-increasing harshness and that democratic processes can accurately respond to that sentiment—even when, as in the case of consensual sex crimes, popular sentiment is not uniform. Legislatures in fact criminalize relatively little conduct that most people think should be completely unregulated, and they sometimes reduce punishments even for widely supported offenses. . . . Further, when legislatures leave outdated crimes on the books, other components of democratic process compensate: politically accountable prosecutors rarely prosecute (and thus effectively nullify) many of the crimes scholars complain about.
the internal or external approach—simply because there are far more direct measures available.

In any event, whether one supports the external approach or not, one can’t help but be impressed by the tremendous service performed by Logan’s research and arguments. My dim hope is that this essay has both shed some further light on the topic of conversation invaluably provoked by Professor Logan and shown that the case against the external approach is not quite as forceful as it might seem at first blush.