WHEN ANIMUS MATTERS AND SEX CRIME UNDERREPORTING DOES NOT: THE PROBLEMATIC SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY

Ira Mark Ellman

In Romer v. Evans the Court drew a constitutional distinction between civil laws enacted for a broad public purpose that justifies “the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons,” and laws that have “the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group.” 1 Laws of the second kind “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.” 2 The difficulty lies in deciding when the inference properly becomes a conclusion that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause. The more sweeping and unusual the burdens imposed on the targeted group, the more difficult it may be to discern a common policy explaining them other than the forbidden purpose of harming their targets. At some point the animus inference becomes strong enough to require scrutiny of the laws’ purported rationale, including whether it has any actual basis in fact. An astonishingly broad array of burdens are imposed today on anyone ever convicted of almost any sexual offense of any kind or seriousness, including but extending far beyond inclusion in publicized websites listing “sex offenders.” No similar regime has ever been imposed on any other group of law-abiding former felons who have fully served the sentence for the crime

* Distinguished Affiliated Scholar, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley and Merriam Distinguished Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of Psychology (Emeritus), Arizona State University. Special thanks are due David Goldberg and Tara Ellman, whose careful review led to my destruction of this paper’s primitive ancestors, to Joe Grodin for telling me to carry on anyway, to Hal Cohen for challenging me to persuade him, and to Eric Janus, J.J. Prescott, and Tamara Lave for both their suggestions and their own important work on these issues, from which I’ve greatly benefitted.

2 Id. at 633.
they committed years earlier. This “registry regime” raises an inference of animus at least as strong as in any of the four cases in which the Court sustained such claims, and the explanation that the laws are justified by the clearly valid purpose of reducing the incidence of sexual offending does not survive the scrutiny of scientific studies which find the registry ineffective and often counterproductive. Nor does the fact that many sexual offenses are never reported to law enforcement authorities cast doubt on the validity of those studies or on the legal or policy analyses that employ them. Much of the registry regime must therefore fall under an Anti-Animus principle.

INTRODUCTION

For the past three decades public policies aimed at suppressing criminal sexual conduct have focused particularly on preventing re-offending by those released from custody after having already been convicted and punished for a sexual offense. Its central feature is the sex offender registry. The registration requirement applies to a broad range of offenses: rape, of course, but also non-penetrative sexual contact in various forms, including unconsented touchings, a host of non-contact offenses (such as voyeurism, indecent exposure, and possession of sexualized pictures of minors) and sometimes nonsexual offenses that a court concludes were committed with a

sexual motive. All states, encouraged by federal law, require those convicted of the covered offenses to register in person at least annually but as often as monthly. In some states the registration obligation continues for life; in other states it may end after ten or 20 years, but only for some registrants. As of December, 2018, there were nearly a million Americans covered by the registration system. As detailed below in Part I, the registration requirement generally triggers other consequences imposing serious burdens on those reached by it, including restrictions on where they may live, go, or work.

---

4 Alissa R. Ackerman, Andrew J. Harris, Jill S. Levenson & Kristen Zgoba, *Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? A Descriptive Analysis of Individuals on Public Sex Offender Registries*, 34 INT. J. PSYCHIATRY 149, 156 (2011); Andrew J. Harris, Jill S. Levenson & Alissa R. Ackerman, *Registered Sex Offenders in the United States: Behind the Numbers*, 60 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 28 (2014).

5 Federal law requires registrants to appear in person to confirm the continued accuracy of registration information annually, semi-annually, or quarterly, depending on the offense triggering the registration obligation. 34 U.S.C. § 20918. Homeless registrants may be required to reregister much more often. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.011 (2011), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&sectionNum=290.011 [perma.cc/GYY8-9E7H] (requiring “transients” to reregister every 30 days). Registration obligations arise from a combination of federal and state laws. Federal law requires states to enact sex offender registration laws that meet specified minimum federal standards to avoid penalties in federal funding for law enforcement activities, but most states have chosen to adopt non-compliant registry laws, either to save money or because they do not agree with the required federal policy. Lisa N. Sacco, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43954, *Federal Involvement in Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Overview and Issues for Congress, in Brief* 6; Jennifer N. Wang, *Paying the Piper: The Cost of Compliance with the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act*, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 681, 694-95 (2014). Federal law also imposes registration requirements directly on registrants but provides no federal registration system. Compliance therefore requires registration in the relevant state, which can present difficulties for registrants when federal rules require registrations that their state law does not. See, e.g., Willman v. United States, 972 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding that a sex offender’s obligations under federal law are independent of duties under state law); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 94 A.3d 791, 802 (Md. 2014) (addressing whether Maryland may remove sex offender registration information from its registry when there is a federal obligation to register in one’s home state).


Most of those additional burdens did not yet exist (or were not part of the record) when *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) rejected a claim that Alaska violated the Constitution’s ex post facto clause by applying its newly enacted registry law to those convicted before its enactment. The Court concluded the ex post facto clause did not apply because the registry was a civil regulation reasonably designed to reduce sexual offending in light of the “frightening and high” re-offense rates of those convicted of sexual crimes. The Court’s dramatic but erroneous characterization of this re-offense risk reverberated through the cases that followed over the next decade, underpinning a series of decisions in state and federal courts turning back constitutional objections to the registry. But later, and especially after social science scholarship increasingly established both the Court’s error, and the very limited or nonexistent contribution to public safety provided by the registry and the additional restrictions triggered by it (the “registry regime”), the tide began to turn. Several state and federal courts concluded that at least parts of the registry regime do constitute punishment, thus barring their retroactive application. These decisions have typically relied in part on social science evidence that the registry regime does not advance public safety, leading to the conclusion that it therefore serves no non-punitive purpose and therefore constitutes punishment.

Part I of this article capsules the harsh and sweeping nature of the restrictions the registry regime imposes on people who have already fully served the criminal sentence imposed on them for their offense, and shows why, under a line of cases that stretch from *Department of Agriculture v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) to *United States v. Windsor*, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), they give rise to the inference they are based on unconstitutional animus toward those affected by them and are therefore barred as civil regulations if that inference cannot be overcome. Part II reviews the social science that shows why the existing registry regime does not in fact further the important policy purpose (public safety) offered to justify it, leading to the conclusion that the inference of animus cannot be overcome. Finally, Part III examines a recent reply to that social science evidence advanced by two scholars and a distinguished judge, that the studies are flawed because they rely on official crime statistics which necessarily omit the large proportion of sexual offenses that are not reported to law enforcement authorities.

---

9 See cases cited infra notes 44 and 45.
10 See Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, 37 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 158, 160 (2019) (arguing that it should not be assumed that released sexual offenders did not commit new sexual offenses just because they were not charged); Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) (arguing that arrest rates are not necessarily linked to the rate of occurrence for underlying offenses because sexual offenses are systematically underreported).
shows that their argument is grounded on a mistaken understanding of the policy question put by the challenge to the registry regime, as well as of the social science evidence its challengers rely upon. It shows why, when the policy question and the social science evidence are properly understood, the case against the registry regime is almost certainly strengthened, not weakened, by the underreporting phenomenon.

I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF REGISTRY REGIME GIVES RISE TO THE INERENCE THAT IT IS BASED ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS

Registration, or conviction for a registrable offense, triggers a host of additional consequences. Most registrants are publicly identified as “sex offenders” on official state websites, which are in turn linked to a national system maintained by the federal government intended to allow national searches by anyone. These public listings may include the registrants’ address and place of employment. State and local laws often restrict where registrants may live, frequently resulting in their becoming homeless and even causing their forced evictions from nursing homes or hospices. In some states registrants who have completed their sentence may nonetheless be kept in prison because they cannot find a place to live that complies with the state’s residency restrictions. They may be forced to move on 30 days’ notice, requiring their children to change schools mid-year, because a new park or child care facility opened that is closer to their home than the minimum distance specified by statute. Separate presence restrictions limit where they may go, with the result that a registrant may be unable to enter a

12 Id. at 63-64.
17 Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2018); Vasquez v. Foxx: Seventh Circuit Holds Sex Offender Residency Restriction Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2352, 2353 (2019). The plaintiff’s claim that the forced move would disrupt his daughter’s schooling did not avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim on any of the constitutional grounds alleged. Id.
public school to meet his child’s teacher or watch his child’s performance in a play or athletic event. Indeed, in some states a registrant can commit a crime by entering a public park to fetch his own child.18 State laws bar registrants from a broad range of occupations, including haircutting, plumbing, selling hearing aids, land surveying, and working in a dialysis facility.19 Federal law bars registrants from housing programs permanently.20 Their access to computers or smartphones are limited or barred altogether for years after their release, and sometimes indefinitely,21 which further burdens their ability to find employment or maintain social connections.

When a registrant in one state travels to another state, he must register in that state—within a time period that varies from state to state and is often short enough that weekend visits can trigger the registration obligation.22 Simple vacation trips, or even commutes across state lines, can thus become traps for the unwary who inadvertently commit registration offenses that carry the potential for significant prison sentences. Some states routinely require registrants to wear ankle bracelets enabling round-the-clock location monitoring, sometimes for life.23 Others require the driver’s license of...
registrants to contain a stamp identifying them as sex offenders. The passport of any registrant convicted of an offense involving a minor (including non-contact offenses such as viewing explicit pictures of anyone under eighteen) must contain a notation identifying him as a sex offender, part of a broader federal program to restrict the international travel of all registrants. Because registrants are denied the right given other citizens to obtain permanent residency status for their family members, their spouses and children who are foreign nationals cannot remain in the United States. One common result is forced separation when registrants cannot follow their evicted family to their foreign home because of the other laws restricting registrants’ international travel.

These examples of burdens imposed by law are predictably supplemented by private actions triggered by the identification of registrants on publicized websites as “sex offenders.” As noted by the Alaska Supreme Court, “[i]nternet publication of sex offender registration information potentially inflicts grievous harms on sex offenders ranging from public scorn and ostracism to harassment, to difficulty in finding and maintaining

---


25 In addition to the passport stamps, the same laws establish the “Angel Watch” program under which the State Department notifies the destination countries of any planned international travel by any registrants, no matter their offense. The interlocking statutory provisions that combine to produce these results, part of the International Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 114-119, § 8, 130 Stat. 24 (2016), are codified in various locations as described in Daniel Cull, International Megan’s Law and the Identifier Provision—An Efficacy Analysis, 17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 181, 185 (2018). See also Jacob Sullum, Scarlet-Letter Passports Are Unjust and Irrational, REASON.COM, (Nov. 11, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/11/01/scarlet-letter-passports-are-unjust-and/ [perma.cc/2ABW-DU3R] (describing the unjust and irrational system of restricting international travel for people on the sex offender registry).

26 The Adam Walsh Act precludes citizens from petitioning for immediate relative status if they were convicted of a “specified offense against a minor.” 8 US C § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). An offense against a minor is broadly defined to include “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I).

27 Many countries outside of continental Europe refuse admission to anyone with a sex offender passport stamp or when the U.S. has notified the country of the traveler’s sex offense conviction under the Angel Watch program. Registrant International Travel Matrix, Registrant Travel Action Group, http://registranttag.org/resources/travel-matrix/ [perma.cc/NQ63-L5R9] (last updated Aug. 2021). For accounts of registrants forced to separate from their families because of these laws, see True Stories, WELCOME TO FIGHTAWA, https://fightawa.org/awatruestories/ [perma.cc/PK6Q-CYVC] (last updated Feb. 4, 2021) (showcasing stories of families separated because of the Adam Walsh Act).

28 LOGAN, supra note 12, at 64.
employment, to threats of violence and actual violence.”\textsuperscript{29} Their spouses and
children are often ostracized.\textsuperscript{30} Their families are more likely to disintegrate,
denying sex offenders the support important to rehabilitation. Those who try
to help them may become targets themselves.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, programs to help
released offenders re-integrate into society often exclude those with a sexual
offense conviction.\textsuperscript{32} New crimes become more likely when reintegration into
civil society as productive citizens becomes more difficult.

The package of burdens, imposed by these laws and the private
actions they encourage, is extraordinary in at least two ways. First, no other
category of individuals who have completed their criminal sentence,
including any term of parole or supervised release, is subject to anything
remotely similar. Those who have completed their sentence for crimes like
murder or drug dealing need not usually worry about their registration
obligations in every state they enter, or locational bars on where they may go
or live, or a stamp on their driver license or passport. And this disparity gets
worse as recent criminal justice reforms intended to soften the much smaller
group of collateral consequences routinely imposed on former felons
typically exclude registrants from their grace. Recent examples include their
exclusion from reforms that allow other ex-felons to vote\textsuperscript{33} or to serve on a
jury,\textsuperscript{34} but there are others.\textsuperscript{35} Second, the American registry regime is an
international outlier. Even though many countries maintain sex-offense
registries available to law enforcement personnel, virtually none “permit[s] the
prevalent U.S. practice of proactive notification of sex-offense registry

\textsuperscript{29} Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 130 (Alaska 2019); see also Jill Levenson &
Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 49, 61-63 (2005) (explaining how the ostracization of individuals on the sex
offender registry creates a host of bad outcomes, including job loss and threats or
harassment).

\textsuperscript{30} Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family Members of Registered
Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 57 (2009).

\textsuperscript{31} Brandon Stahl, Well-Meaning Family Takes in Sex Offender, Inciting Fear and Outrage
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.startribune.com/well-meaning-
family-takes-in-sex-offender-inciting-fear-and-outrage/395526731/ [perma.cc/6V9X-
PS33].

\textsuperscript{32} See, e.g., To Seek Admission, DELANCEY STREET FOUND., (2020), http://www.delancey
streetfoundation.org/admission.php [perma.cc/SM29-9N2S] (stating that the organization
does not accept sex offenders because they need professional counseling).

\textsuperscript{33} FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2021).

\textsuperscript{34} For instance, the California Code of Civil Procedure excludes registrants, but not others
convicted of a felony, who have completed their term of parole or probation from jury
service. CAL. CIV. PROC. 203(a)(11), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ codes_display
Section.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&sectionNum=203 [perma.cc/HTM5-YGG9].

\textsuperscript{35} See Catherine L. Carpenter, All Except for: Animus that Drives Exclusions in Criminal
Justice Reform, 50 SW. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (2020) (describing ways that states implemented
changes like sentence reclassification and increased eligibility for parole, among other
initiatives, to reform the criminal justice system).
information to unlimited community organizations and the general public.”

After reviewing the practices of other countries, as well as the social science evidence, the American Law Institute approved a revision to the Model Penal Code that eliminates entirely all publicly accessible websites listing “sex offenders”, as well as any other forms of general public notification concerning them, and prohibit or limit other collateral consequences currently applied to them alone.

I here refer to those burdened by this registry regime as registrants, although sometimes the burden in question is triggered directly by their prior conviction rather than by their inclusion on the registry. In either case, finite public resources that could be available for other crime control strategies are devoted instead to imposing these unprecedented burdens on them. In 2008 the cost of complying with the then newly enacted federal standards for sex offender registration laws was alone estimated at $59 million in California, $30 million in Florida, and $39 million in Texas, equivalent to $74 million, $37 million, and $49 million in today’s dollars. This is above and beyond the baseline costs these states already incurred implementing the registry laws they already had in effect. Both the public costs and the private burdens are justified by the premise that registrants pose a distinctively greater threat of sexual offending than do others: if prior offenders commit a large share of sexual offenses, then this regulatory focus on their lives is a more effective strategy for suppressing criminal sexual conduct than other programs government might fund instead. A policy justification for this selective imposition of serious burdens is necessary because the registry regime is a constellation of civil regulations and not punishment. The registration regime cannot be justified as punishment for the registrant’s sexual offense because its rules do not meet constitutional requirements for imposing punishment, in at least three ways.

First, registry regime rules are often applied to persons whose crimes predate their adoption. This was the case in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2002), in which the Supreme Court upheld this retroactive application of Alaska’s newly adopted sex offender registry. But to reach this result Smith had to first reject the claim that registration itself constituted punishment, because if it


was punishment its retroactive application would violate the ex post facto clause. Alaska prevailed only because Smith held its registry was a civil regulation, to which the ex post facto clause had long been held inapplicable. 38 Second, states and the federal government routinely impose registry regime burdens on individuals because of conviction in another jurisdiction, which they could not do if registration was punishment. If states could punish for convictions in another state, they could also put new arrivals back in prison if they believed the sentence they served in their former state was too short. That is obviously not allowed. And finally, and most fundamentally, punishment is necessarily imposed case by case, following procedures that comply with constitutional Due Process requirements necessary to justify its imposition on the particular individual. The legislature may of course set the range of punishments available to a court to impose on a person duly convicted, as part of each individual adjudication, 39 but it cannot, independently of any judicial process, impose punishment by statute on specified individuals or groups it simply does not like, even if the dislike is understandable. 40

A state cannot evade the constitutional requirements for imposing punishment by labeling the punishing regulation “civil”. Courts can look beyond the label. The test is multi-factor, but the key is whether the legislature in fact intended to punish, or, if not, whether the statutory scheme is nonetheless “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it ‘civil’”. 41 A law’s failure to advance any permissible public policy is one indicator of its punitive purpose. 42 And so recently, two federal courts of appeal held that Smith does not bar challenges to current registry regime rules that now include burdens going beyond annual registration, because the burdens’ cumulative impact constitutes punishment that cannot be imposed retroactively. 43 A number of state high courts have reached the same result. 44 Other courts, however, continue to rely on Smith

42 Id. at 704.
43 Doe v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing trial court dismissal of claims that Idaho registry was punitive and violated ex post facto clause); Snyder, 834 F.3d at 706 (holding that provisions of the Michigan registry law imposed punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause).
In order to reject challenges to the registry regime, finding them civil regulations not limited by the ex post facto clause.\textsuperscript{45}

The challengers’ focus on \textit{ex post facto} claims requires them to argue that the registry regime is punishment, because the Ex Post Facto Clause does not otherwise apply. But a different way to frame their objection would challenge its validity as a set of \textit{civil} regulations. Success would then bar their application prospectively as well as retroactively. When a civil regulation targets and burdens just a small group of individuals, one ought to be able to explain why that targeting furthers the public policy offered to explain its adoption. This contrasts with the burden imposed by punishment following conviction of a crime, which requires no such public policy rationale to explain it. Although punishment may serve utilitarian considerations such as general deterrence, the desire to make the convicted criminal suffer (within the wide boundaries set by the Eighth Amendment’s bar on punishment that is “cruel and unusual”) is entirely adequate as a constitutional matter. That is, after all, what punishment means. But the state cannot target a small group with \textit{civil} regulations imposing punishing burdens just because it wants that group’s members to suffer. As the Supreme Court explained years ago in \textit{United States v. Moreno}, if “‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”\textsuperscript{46} Targeting a particular group for special burdens requires a rationale that is plausibly connected to a permissible policy purpose.\textsuperscript{47}

The \textit{Moreno} principle has not often been invoked. We are far more accustomed to the usual rule that successful Equal Protection or substantive

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{E.g.}, Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 559-61, 577 (10th Cir. 2016); State v. Yeoman, 236 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Idaho 2010); Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146, 151 (Va. 2013); Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 839–40 (Wyo. 2014). In addition, one federal circuit concluded that retroactive application of registration amendments to an offender did not violate the ex post facto clause. Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 109–12 (2d Cir. 2014).

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno}, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973).

\textsuperscript{47} At the limit, a purportedly civil enactment targeting small groups of people for punishment amounts to a forbidden Bill of Attainder. Some burdens the registry regime places on registrants, such as exclusion from specified vocations, fall squarely within the understood meaning of “punishment” for this purpose. See \textit{Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.}, 433 U.S. 425, 474 (1977) (explaining that an impermissible legislative punishment includes a “legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations . . . .”). The key question then becomes whether punishment was the legislative purpose. \textit{Fleming v. Nestor}, 363 U.S. 603, 613 (1960). While the indicators of animus combined with the refusal to take account of evidence that the registry regime does not advance its stated purpose certainly suggests a punitive purpose, the Court has at times applied a demanding standard of proof. \textit{Id.} at 619 (stating that “unmistakable evidence of punitive intent” is required to strike down a Congressional enactment). Especially as some important burdens created by the registry regime, such as listing on the public website, may not constitute punishment for Bill of Attainder purposes, claims based on the \textit{Moreno-Romer} line of cases described in the text may be more apt.
Due Process challenges require a showing that the challenged rule burdens a suspect class or a fundamental (or very important) constitutional right. *Moreno* stands out because neither prerequisite was present there: the decision struck down a regulation limiting hippies’ access to food stamps. But *Moreno* is not a complete outlier. It has had echoes. *City of Cleburne* later made clear that in applying the *Moreno* principle, courts may scrutinize the government’s justifications to distinguish real explanations for the challenged rule from pretextual ones. And so *Cleburne* struck down a local zoning ordinance that required special permits for group homes for the intellectually disabled, but not for fraternity houses or hospitals. Because the city’s stated concerns about “crowded conditions” and the like could not explain this differing treatment, the Court concluded the real reason was “an irrational prejudice” against the intellectually disabled.48

Another label for “irrational prejudice” is “animus,” which is the word the Court used in the third case in this line, in which it struck down a state constitutional amendment that barred enactment of anti-discrimination laws protecting gay men and lesbians. No one claimed the state was required to enact such anti-discrimination laws, of course. Indeed, at the time of this 1996 decision, both private and governmental discrimination against homosexuals was common and lawful. But because the “sheer breadth” of the state’s constitutional bar on enacting anti-discrimination rules protecting them could not be explained by any legitimate state interests, the Court concluded the initiative was “inexplicable by anything but animus.”49 And animus, at least with respect to civil regulations, is a forbidden legislative purpose. The *Moreno* principle can thus be described as an Anti-Animus principle, as one leading scholar has done.50

There’s no doubt, as Professor Carpenter has observed, that the Anti-Animus principle is undertheorized.51 But he makes a persuasive case that it is nonetheless the best explanation not only for *Moreno*, *Cleburne*, and *Romer*, but for also the Court’s later decision in *U.S. v. Windsor*.52 *Windsor* held the federal government could not refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage that New York, the couple’s home state, treated as valid.53 The Court reached that result without holding sexual orientation to be a suspect class, nor by relying on a claim that the federal rule unjustifiably burdened a fundamental right to marry.54 Nor did it say the federal government may

---

51 See id. at 204 (arguing that decisions like *Windsor*, *Moreno*, *Cleburne*, and *Romer* can be understood as animus decisions but must be “more fully linked and theorized”).
53 Id. at 749-53.
54 See id. at 769-75.
never decline to recognize as valid for federal law purposes a marriage concededly valid under the law of the spouses’ home state. It sometimes can. The opinion’s avoidance of these more familiar doctrines has led some critics to see it as a muddle. But as Carpenter explains, one thing all the *Windsor* justices agreed upon was that a law driven by animus denies Equal Protection to those it targets. Where they differed was on whether such animus was in fact shown in *Windsor*. A majority concluded it was, relying especially on *Romer*. We can also look to *Romer* along with *Windsor* for guidance in identifying laws motivated by forbidden animus.

The laws in both *Windsor* and *Romer* had two features the Court found important. The first was the imposition of “discriminations of an unusual character” on an unpopular group. Such unusual tactics invite suspicion. The unusual feature of *Romer* was its erecting a barrier to legislative relief applicable only to one group. In *Windsor* it was the law’s singular departure from the strong tradition of federal deference to state policies in domestic matters. The second important feature is the broad scope of the questioned law. *Romer* involved a state constitutional amendment that worked a “sweeping and comprehensive . . . change in the legal status” of the narrow group affected by it. The Court detailed dozens of state laws, local ordinances, regulations, and executive actions revoked by the challenged amendment. The law at issue in *Windsor* excised same-sex couples in one fell-swoop from more than a thousand federal statutes and regulations that made marital status relevant to the widely varying questions with which they dealt. It becomes difficult to discern a common thread of public policy tying together the broad swath of issues addressed by such sweeping enactments, other than the intent to harm the small group it burdens. The registry regime of course presents both features. The sweep of rules is breathtakingly broad, and includes numerous burdens never before imposed on any other group of people not currently under the supervision of the criminal justice system.

---

55 E.g., as *Windsor* itself observed, federal immigration law does not recognize marriages “entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the United States] as an immigrant” despite the fact that the marriage is valid under state law, which does not ordinarily consider the spouses’ reason for marrying relevant to recognizing their marriage’s validity. *Id.* at 765; 8 U.S.C. §1186a(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2006).
56 See articles collected by Carpenter, supra note 51, at 190-91, n. 28. I freely borrow from Professor Carpenter’s analysis of the anti-animus principle in these paragraphs.
57 *Id.* at 189.
58 *Windsor*, 570 U.S. at 768, 770–77.
59 *Id.* at 744, 768 (quoting *Romer*, 517 U.S. at 633).
60 As Carpenter observes, an “extraordinary and unprecedented act requires an extraordinary and unprecedented justification apart from the self-justifying desire to demean or injure a stigmatized class of people.” Carpenter, supra note 51, at 217.
61 517 U.S. at 627.
62 *Id.* at 628.
63 570 U.S. at 765.
Sweeping measures imposing an unusually broad array of burdens exclusively on a small and unpopular group ought to raise an inference of animus. Perhaps one could explain away the inference by reference to a permissible public purpose. But explanation is needed. The point is to distinguish laws enacted for a broad public purpose that justifies “the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons,” and laws that have “the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group.” As Romer concludes, laws of the second kind “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.” The more sweeping the burdens imposed, and the narrower the targeted group, the more closely one should examine the state’s asserted purpose for the law. In both Romer and Windsor a single law burdened the targeted group across a broad range of contexts. For registrants, the burden comes from the cumulative impact of many laws—federal, state, and local—that together impose a startlingly broad set of harms on their common target. There is no reason why the inference of animus should be less in that case. To the contrary, it is strengthened by this piling on, as new restrictions, new methods of public shaming, and new harms are added year after year, jurisdiction after jurisdiction.

The history of these laws is also suggestive. As construction of the registry regime began in the 1990’s, the narrative surrounding the adoption of laws about sexual offending changed. It became personal, as Logan has noted. Many of the new laws, both federal and state, were named after a victim in one or another well-publicized case, typically involving a particularly disturbing fact pattern—abduction and sexual abuse of a child by a stranger (Megan’s Law, Jacob Wetterling Act, Adam Walsh Act are perhaps the best-known examples). Though such cases are atypical (just 2% of reported sexual offenses against children under twelve are committed by strangers, much less strangers who abduct a child) they nevertheless

---

64 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635.
65 Id. at 634.
66 LOGAN, supra note 12, at 49.
67 Id.; see also Irina Fanarraga, What’s in a Name? An Empirical Analysis of Apostrophe Laws, 21 CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2020) (explaining that sexual abuse laws are often named after victims in highly publicized cases).
68 For minors twelve to seventeen years old, the comparable figure is 4%. These figures, and all others referenced here, are derived from the online data extractor provided by National Incident Based Reporting System maintained by National Center for Juvenile Justice, available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/selection_vov.asp[perma.cc/E9Y3-4CE8]. This system collects incidents known to local law enforcement agencies in thirty-eight cooperating states and the District of Columbia and reported by them to the FBI. Methods, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/methods.asp[perma.cc/8UCP-K9AY]. The most recent available data available through this tool on August 5, 2020, when the statistics provided here were obtained, was for
became the understood context in any discussion of registry laws. So strangers committing sexual assaults on children became the image of the laws’ intended target even though hardly anyone affected by these laws had ever committed such a crime. It is therefore not surprising that discussions of the new registry regime laws took on a personal tone not seen in earlier debates over sexual offense laws adopted in prior decades. Registrants were now described as “beasts”, “monsters”, “animals”, and the “human equivalent of toxic waste”.69 The mayor of one city explained it had adopted residency restrictions for registrants that went beyond any imposed by state law in order “to do anything we could to make sex offenders uncomfortable”, and a key figure behind Florida’s adoption of harsh registry laws expressed the same sentiment.70 In these examples the animus motivating the laws is not hidden. The popular belief, adopted by legislators, is that all those reached by the registry are threats to commit the horrific stranger attacks against

incidents occurring in 2016. The sexual offense data reported in this article were obtained by using the tool to compile all incidents of “rape, sodomy, sexual assault with object, and fondling” broken down by age and the relationship of victim and perpetrator. (These four are the only sexual offense categories separately tabulated; other registerable offenses, such as possession of sexualized pictures of minors or indecent exposure, are aggregated in other categories such as “public order” offenses). The percentages are calculated excluding from the denominator incidents in which the relationship was unknown. Id.

Murder victims are tabulated under murder, as the most serious charge, and are thus omitted in the count of sexual offenses supplied by this tool even if there was also a sexual offense. But this group’s omission from the sexual offense category is unlikely to affect the overall percentages noted here because the total number of murders is very small. There were 211 murders of victims under twelve for the entire year, compared to 22,959 sexual offenses. There were 174 murders of victims aged twelve to seventeen compared to 28,430 sexual offenses. Easy Access to NIBRS Victims, 2016: Victims of Violence, Row Variable: Most serious offense against victim, Column Variable: Age of victim, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. (2018), https://www.ojpfd.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/selection_vov.asp [perma.cc/VMV3-MM6E].

Seven percent of the murders were known to have been committed by strangers, but the victim-perpetrator relationship was unknown in 78 of the 174 cases. Id. showing Row Variable: Most Serious Offense Against Victim, Column Variable: Victim Offender Relationship, Selected for: victims aged 12 to 17 [perma.cc/8N6D-QQFB].

The victim was a male in 130 of the 174 murders, perhaps suggesting that many were related to gang violence or drugs rather than sexual offending. For murder victims under twelve years old, 109 of the 211 were males. Id. showing Row Variable: Age of Victim, Column Variable Sex of Victim, Selected for: Murder [perma.cc/9AA8-3L5M].

69 LOGAN, supra note 12, at 95.

70 Dan Boyd, Two Sex Offender Bills Supported by Keller Contained Differences, ALBUQUERQUE J., (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/1087241/two-sex-offender-bills-supported-by-keller-contained-differences.html [perma.cc/7LVH-BLVU]. The documentary film Untouchables includes interviews with the figure behind Florida’s very harsh registry regime laws, who also suggests his goal was to make life for Florida registrants so difficult that they would leave. UNTOUCHABLES (Blue Lawn Productions 2016).
children memorialized by the laws’ names, even if some had not yet been caught at it, and so are malevolent people who deserve such treatment.71

There is animus when registrants are not considered as individuals but as members of a group all damned by fundamental and probably permanent character flaws making them likely to engage in evil conduct. The very label “sex offender” applied to registrants encourages that understanding. People are often disinclined to support treatment for those convicted of sex crimes in the belief that it won’t work because they cannot be reformed.72 But providing people with accurate information is not necessarily enough to eliminate animus. For example, one study found potential jurors were twice as likely to commit a felon labelled “sexually violent predator” to an indefinite term of confinement, as compared to others with the identical criminal records and risk assessment reports who were not so labeled. Their harsher treatment of those labelled “sexual predators” was not explained by a refusal to believe the risk assessment reports: they did believe them, as they agreed that the labelled offenders were no more dangerous or likely to reoffend than the unlabeled ones. What mattered was that for the labeled offenders, jurors reported a greater desire to “get revenge” and to “make the offender pay”.73

Such studies suggest the public is not very concerned about the practical usefulness or efficacy of sexual offender crime control measures because it believes these laws’ burdens fall only on evil people who deserve them. The official sex offender label is easily seen as certifying their evil status, thus justifying such attitudes. It’s thus not surprising that surveys find most people support websites publicizing registrants’ “sexual offender” status, restrictions on where registrants can live or go, and even their castration, without regard to whether there is any evidence such policies reduce sexual offending.74 But adopting laws because they burden people seen as evil, without regard to whether they serve any public policy, is of course the very definition of acting from animus.

The label “sex offender” is not a psychological diagnosis. It is a legal classification triggered by a single conviction for any crime on a long list that

72 Christina Mancini & Kristen Budd, Is the Public Convinced That “Nothing Works?”: Predictors of Treatment Support for Sex Offenders Among Americans, 62 CRIME DELINQUENCY 777, 780 (2016).
ranges in both nature and seriousness. The evidence that animus toward registrants lies behind the laws that burden them should require scrutiny of whether the burdens in fact further the valid policy purpose offered to explain them. That scrutiny requires a look behind the “sex offender” label, to ask both if most so labeled in fact present a special risk of harm to others, and whether the burdens selectively imposed on them actually suppress sexual offending. Nor, as Carpenter points out,\(^\text{75}\) can that inquiry ignore advances in our understanding of the burdened group. The forced expulsion of lepers to separate colonies was once thought necessary to protect the public from a disfiguring disease that evoked fear and disgust, but today that explanation would not work. Given what we now know about the disease’s transmission and treatment with antibiotics,\(^\text{76}\) exiling lepers from civil society could today be explained only by “irrational prejudice”—animus.

Registrants are today’s lepers. The intuition that they threaten grave harm which the registry regime can prevent might have once been plausible, but no longer. It must now yield to the facts established by several decades of studies. Part II capsules that work.

II. STUDIES SHOW THAT MOST REGISTRANTS ARE UNLIKELY TO REOFFEND, AND THAT THE REGISTRY REGIME CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO REDUCING RE-OFFENSE RISK ANYWAY

Three groups of studies establish the registry regime’s limited value as a strategy for reducing sexual offending. One group focuses on two particular burdens imposed by these laws: the public identification of registrants as “sex offenders” through tools like websites and mailings to neighbors, and locational restrictions on where registrants may live or be present. Despite the contrary intuitions of some public officials, the studies find these measures contribute little or nothing to reducing the prevalence of sexual offending.\(^\text{77}\) Their findings do not depend on any assumptions

\(^{75}\) Carpenter, supra note 51, at 225.
concerning the rate at which registrants commit a new sexual offense after release. Most show simply that the offense rate, whatever it is, is no different with these laws than without them. One study, by the Minnesota Department of Corrections,\textsuperscript{78} adopted a different methodology. Minnesota had no statewide law imposing locational residency restrictions on registrants; the study’s purpose was to assess whether it should. It reviewed the records for every one of the 224 individuals convicted of a sex offense who was released from a Minnesota prison between 1990 and 2002 and then incarcerated again by 2006 for a new sex offense. It examined the facts of each of the 224 re-offenses to determine how many might have been prevented had Minnesota barred registrants from living within a mile of a school, park, playground, daycare center, or “other location where children are known to congregate.” The conclusion: there was not even a single case in which such locational restrictions would have prevented the perpetrator’s contact with the juvenile victim.\textsuperscript{79}

A second group of studies tells us that even if laws targeting released registrants did have some effect on their re-offense rates, they would not have much effect of sexual offending generally. That’s because 95% or more of all those arrested for sexual offenses are first offenders necessarily unaffected by the registry regime rules (and this was the case before there was any registry regime).\textsuperscript{80} The registry regime’s apparent premise—that a large share of sexual offenses are committed by a small group who offend again after completing a sentence for an earlier sexual conviction—is thus mistaken.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} MINN. DEPT. OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 8 (2007).

\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 23–24.

\textsuperscript{80} Sarah W. Craun, Catherine A. Simmons & Kristen Reeves, Percentage of Named Offenders on the Registry at the Time of the Assault: Reports From Sexual Assault Survivors, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1374, 1379 (2011); Jeffrey C. Sandler, Naomi J. Freeman & Kelly M. Socia, Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB’L. POL’Y L. 284, 298 (2008).

\textsuperscript{81} ANDRA TENET THARP, KEY FINDINGS: RETHINKING SERIAL PERPETRATION 2 (2015). One arena in which this debate has taken place is the college campus. An analysis of the two largest longitudinal studies of college men’s sexual violence, based on interviews with them upon arrival in college and during the four subsequent spring semesters, found that 10.8% of the men reported behavior that met the FBI definition of rape, before or during their college years, but that relatively few repeated the offense in a later year. Kevin M. Swartout, Mary P. Koss, Jacquelyn W. White, Martie P. Thompson, Antonia Abbey & Alexandra L. Bellis, Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1148, 1150-52 (2015). In other words, the campus problem is not so much that a few college men are repeat sexual offenders, as that a disturbingly large percentage have offended at least once. (It is also worth noting that women of college age who are not in college are more likely than college women to suffer sexual assault). AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 154–69 (2020); SORI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RAPE
One can’t have much impact on the overall incidence of sexual offenses by concentrating efforts on a group that accounts for less than 5% of them. The law’s focus on registrants recalls the classic story of the fellow who tries to help a drunk searching for his keys under a streetlamp. After a while he asks the drunk if he’s sure this is where he lost them. “Oh no”, is the reply. “I lost them in the park. But this where the light is.” If we want to make a real dent in sexual offending rates, we must bring light to the park. Searching harder under the streetlamp won’t help. And that is true no matter the overall rate of sexual offending if most offenses are in the park.

And finally, a third group of studies helps explain why prior offenders constitute such a small proportion of those arrested for sexual offenses: their overall re-offense rates are far lower than the Supreme Court, as well as other courts and public officials, have often assumed. There’s no doubt that some registrants are more likely than other felons to commit a sexual offense, but in fact most of them never do. This is true whether “re-offense” is defined as a new arrest for a sexual offense, or a new conviction for one. A study by the Criminal Justice Planning and Policy Division of the State of Connecticut reports results typical of such state-conducted studies. The authors tracked all 14,398 men released from Connecticut prisons in 2005, and broke out the 746 among them who had ever served a sentence for a sexual offense (whether or not it was the offense that led to their most recent incarceration). Twenty-seven of these 746 (3.6%) were arrested and charged with a new sexual offense during the five-year follow-up period, of whom twenty (2.7% of 746) were convicted of a new sexual offense. Of the 13,652 released prisoners with no sexual offense history, 259 (1.9%) were arrested for a sexual offense within five years of release, and 114 (0.8%) were convicted of one.

Similar results were found in a federal study that followed for nine years a sample of men released in 2004 from state prisons in thirty states (accounting for 77% of all those released from state prisons). It found that

---


83 Ellman & Ellman, supra note 9, at 508.


85 Id. at 29.

86 Id.

87 Id.

7.7% of those who had been incarcerated for rape or sexual assault were arrested for new rape or sexual assault by the end of the nine year period, as compared to the 3.4% rape and sexual assault arrest rate for those whose most serious prior offense was robbery, a 2.5% rate for those whose most serious prior offense was a property crime, and a 2.3% rate for all categories of released prisoners combined, excluding any with a sexual offense convictions before the new arrest. Other studies also find a sexual offense rate around 2% for released felons with no prior sexual offense history.

So while, not surprisingly, those once convicted of a sexual offense are on average more likely to be arrested for one than those convicted of only nonssexual offenses, the difference is not as great as many expect. If more than 90% of those burdened by the rules would not reoffend in any event, policymakers ought to reconsider whether the funds spent on their implementation might be better redirected to other strategies. Such redirection is also suggested by the companion finding of the federal study: released felons with no sexual offense history accounted for 84.4% of all the rape or sexual assault arrests of released prisoners over the nine-year follow-up period it considered (because, of course, there were so many more of them).

It is also important to note a feature common to these and many other re-offense rate studies: they survey new sexual offenses committed by individuals released from prison. That means they almost certainly overestimate the re-offense rate of all those convicted of sexual offense.

---

89 Id. at 4, tbl. Table 2.
90 Rachel E. Kahn, Gina Ambroziak, R. Karl Hanson, David Thornton, Release from the Sex Offender Label, 46 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 861, 862 (2017).
91 ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 89 at 11 tbl. 9. There are, of course, many more released felons with no conviction for a sexual offense than those with one.
92 Many arrested for a sexual offense will have had no prior convictions of any kind, much less prison sentences for a sexual offense. There is thus no inconsistency between studies that find 95% of all those arrested for a sexual offense have no prior sexual offense conviction, and this study’s finding that 84% of released prisoners arrested for a sexual offense had no prior sexual offense conviction. One may also note that the five-year sexual offense re-arrest rate reported in the federal 30-state study was 5.9% (this figure is derived by adding the percentages in years one through five shown in Table 5 of ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 89, at 7), higher than the 3.6% rate found in the Connecticut study. A likely reason is that the samples are different: The Connecticut study reports the rate across all persons released from prison after any sexual offense, while the federal study is reporting on persons released from prison who had convictions for rape or sexual assault. We can also compare these data to those in a frequently cited study of adult males convicted of “violent” sexual offenses and released in 1994 from a different sample of prisons in fifteen states. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEPT OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 25–26 (2003). The study found that after three years 5.3% had been arrested for a new sexual offense, which compares to 4.4% after three years in the 30-state study. Id. at 26, n.51. Here again, the likely explanation for the different rates is differences in the samples.
because those released from prison are a higher-risk subset of all those convicted of a registerable sex offense. Not everyone convicted of a sexual offense is sent to prison. Some are sent to a county jail (because they are given short sentences), or are placed on probation. But repeat offenders, or those regarded by prosecutors or judges as higher risk, are more likely to be sent to prison. This is true for felons generally, not just sexual offenders. That means those with prior offenses, as compared to first offenders, are over-represented in samples of released prisoners. And we know repeat offenders are more likely to offend again, than are those with only one offense. That point is illustrated by the federal study itself, which reports that the smaller group of first offenders (those with only one sexual offense) among those in the study had a three-year sexual re-offense rate of 3.3%, much lower than the 5.3% overall rate the study found.

The distinction between first offenders and repeat offenders is an example of a difficulty that plagues many discussions of “sex offender” re-offense rates. The focus on an overall “sex offender” re-offense rate ignores the heterogeneity of the population reached by the registry regime, an oversight that also explains inattention to the characteristics of the particular population for which a re-offense rate is reported in any given study. Their implicit assumption is that the sample’s characteristics do not matter very much because all those reached by the registry regime share a common heightened re-offense risk. But they do not. Two easy examples of low-risk registrant populations are female offenders and males whose only known sexual offense is possession of illicit images of minors. Because there are so few repeat offenders in both groups, it is a difficult challenge for risk assessment experts to sample them in sufficient numbers to identify distinctive traits necessary to develop statistically valid tools for predicting those in either group most likely to offend again. Re-offense risk also varies among men released after conviction for ordinary contact sexual offenses, and widely used and easily administered actuarial tools can measure

94 LANGAN, SCHMITT, ERICA L., AND DUROSE, MATTHEW R., supra note 93 at 26.
There is, in other words, no basis for treating all registrants as a high risk when most are not and we can tell who is.

There’s also a second important source of variation in registrant re-offense risk that’s missed by studies that look only at overall rates for all registrants: the re-offense risk for anyone convicted of a crime declines rapidly over time at liberty, after release from custody, without re-offending. That includes those convicted of sexual offenses: The likelihood they will be arrested for another sexual offense is approximately halved for every five years at liberty without a new sexual offense arrest. It is not possible to formulate a sensible policy concerning the post-release treatment of sexual offenders, like other offenders, without taking this critical fact into account.

So those convicted of sexual offenses vary considerably in the re-offense risk they present at the time of their release from custody, and then again during the years that follow. These two phenomena—varying risk at the time of release, and reduction in risk with time arrest-free in the community—interact. The lower the initial risk posed by a group of offenders, the sooner after release the risk approaches zero for those who remain arrest-free. That pattern is shown by studies employing the most widely used and validated actuarial tool measuring the re-offense risk for most adult male sexual offenders, the Static-99R.

The importance of these findings is illustrated by a recent California study reporting the distribution of measured risk in a random sample of 371 adult male California registrants released from prison during 2006–2007.
Based on their Static-99R scores, the study divided the released registrants into five risk categories, from “Well Above Average” to “Very Low”. Only 33 of the 371 (8.8%) were in the “Well Above Average” category, with another 74 (20%) classified above average in re-offense risk. More than 70% of registrants were in the three lowest categories, “Average,” “Below Average,” and “Very Low.” The “Average” group reaches a 2% re-offense risk before their tenth year at liberty. That means that by then, only 2% of those still offense-free after ten years will be arrested for a sexual offense in the future. 98% will not. Their 2% re-offense rate is much lower than the 3.4% of robbers in the Connecticut study arrested for rape or sexual assault within nine years of release, and less than the 2.3% rate for all released offenders with no prior sexual offense convictions. The Below Average group reaches this 2% benchmark before the fifth year after their release, while the lowest risk group is at 2% lifetime risk at the time of their release.

Even if we look only at the riskiest 10% of these California registrants who had been sentenced to prison, we find that about two-thirds are never again arrested for a sexual offense. More importantly, by the fifteenth year after their release we pretty much know who the law-abiding two-thirds are, because nearly all those who offend again already have. This is important because the burdens imposed by registry regimes typically continue for life for higher risk registrants, and certainly past fifteen years, despite the decline in re-offense risk over time at liberty without re-offending. And while most registry regimes separate registrants into risk levels, their sorting criteria are usually inconsistent with the applicable social science learning, subjecting registrants to the registry regime for periods unjustified by their risk levels.

These studies explain the scholarly consensus that emerges from the dozens of peer-reviewed articles published over the last two decades: the registry regime is not sensible policy because so many registrants do not present the heightened offense risk assumed by many policymakers, because registrants account for less than 5% of known offenses, and because the regime’s common strategies, public identification of registrants as “sex offenders” and restrictions on where they may live and go, are ineffective in achieving their goal of reducing sexual offending, and may even risk increasing it. At the same time, there’s evidence that broader-focused...
preventative and rehabilitative strategies would be more effective, and these preventative strategies could be expanded if funds spent on the registry were spent instead on them.

It has thus seemed clear for some time that the burdens the registry regime imposes on those reached by it do not serve the policy purposes offered to justify them, while there are other little-used strategies that may. Yet legislatures continue to enact measures imposing and increasing these burdens. Their adoption arises from the same kind of animus that motivated

---

Checks and Recidivism, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174, 196 (2017), as well as housing and social and family support, Grant Duwe, Can Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) Significantly Reduce Sexual Recidivism? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Minnesota, 14 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 463,481 (2018). The registry regime makes them all more difficult to achieve. It is thus not surprising that some studies find the registry regime actually increases rather than reduces re-offending. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 164–65 (2011).

the laws targeting hippies and gay people—animus that led the Court, in Moreno, Romer, and Windsor, to find the laws constitutionally defective.

III. LOW REPORTING RATES FOR SEXUAL CRIMES PROBABLY STRENGTHEN THE CONCLUSION THAT THE REGISTRY REGIME CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO PREVENTING SEXUAL OFFENDING

Victims of crimes do not always report them. Getting an accurate count of unreported crimes is obviously difficult. The most common method relies on the National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by the Department of Justice. This survey of a nationally representative sample of households asks individuals aged twelve or over about the details of each victimization they experienced over the prior six months, including whether they reported it to the police. The percentage of victimizations that respondents say they reported is calculated for each crime category. This is the reporting rate most commonly referenced. The most recent available report, tabulating the results of the 2018 survey, found that only 42.6% of all violent crimes were reported to the police, essentially unchanged from the levels found in the 2016 and 2017 surveys. The reporting rate for rape and sexual assault bounces around more, almost certainly because of the smaller sample size for this narrower crime category. It was 23% in 2016, then 40% in 2017, and then back to 25% in 2018.

While it’s thus difficult to get a firm figure for the proportion of sexual offenses victims never report, it seems certain that it’s substantial. Nor do we have a firm idea of why victims do not report, although there are many plausible possibilities. These include embarrassment, fear of retaliation, or fear that one’s account won’t be believed. Surveys that ask victims why they do not report sometimes yield surprising results: one common response in

A study jointly supported by the National Academy of Sciences and the Bureau of Justice Statistics provides a comprehensive overview of the sources of data on sexual crimes. See generally Candace Kruttschnitt, William D Kalsbeek & Carol C. House, Estimating the Incidence of Rape and Sexual Assault (Nat’l Rsch. Council ed. 2014).

Eligible household members are interviewed every six months for three and a half years, initially in person and later in person or by phone. Crimes that occur with such frequency that a victim cannot distinguish details of individual incidents are called series crimes; the victim is asked about details of the most recent incident. Id. at 59-63.


Morgan 2018, supra note 108, at 1; Morgan 2017, supra note 109, at 8.
some surveys is a version of “I didn’t think it was important enough.”¹¹¹ The bottom line is that we know many victims of sexual crimes do not report them, but we are less certain of the precise percentage, or of the relative importance of the various possible reasons why they do not report.

Does the reporting rate matter? Appreciating that sexual crimes occur more often than indicated by arrest statistics may heighten our desire to combat them, or pursue reforms that might encourage victims to report, on the plausible assumption that more reporting would lead to more arrests and thus more deterrence. But it does not say much about how to deal with those who are arrested. It’s hard to see, for example, why the sentence imposed on an individual convicted of a sexual crime should be affected by sexual crime reporting rates rather than by the facts of that particular defendant’s crime.

The question we address here is whether reporting rates matter in evaluating either the constitutionality or the advisability of the registry regime. At least one federal appeals court has suggested they might.¹¹² The court considered whether requiring those convicted of most sexual crimes to wear location monitoring ankle bracelets the rest of their life was an unreasonable search barred by the Fourth Amendment. The court thought a

¹¹¹ In a 2015 survey of college students conducted for the Association of American Universities, 59% of the “victims of nonconsensual sexual contact by physical force or incapacitation” who had not reported the incident, offered this explanation. DAVID CANTOR, HYUNSHIK LEE, BONNIE FISHER, CAROL BRUCE, SUSAN CHIBNALL, GAIL THOMAS & REANNE TOWNSEND, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 110 tbl. 6–1 (2015), https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aau-climate-survey-sexual-assault-and-sexual-misconduct-2015?id=16525 [perma.cc/5FH9-LQBE]. An equivalent explanation (“not important enough to report”) was the common reason given for not reporting sexual assaults in a victimization survey of the Canadian population conducted 16 years earlier. That was equally true, however, for most other categories of crime considered in that survey. SANDRA BESSERER & CATHERINE TRAINER, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN CANADA, 1999 11–12 (2000), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/85-002-x2000010-eng.pdf?st=3vyWcQ4h [perma.cc/3UC4-V7YY].

¹¹² See, e.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Although non-sex offenders had a higher rearrest rate (68%) than sex offenders and only 3% of child molesters were rearrested for a child-molestation offense, these numbers don’t take account of the very high rate of underreporting of sex offenses.”). The opinion was written by Posner.
low reporting rate for sexual offenses supported its conclusion that the search was reasonable, because it meant the sexual re-offending was more common than official crime statistics indicated, and so also then was the threat to public safety the rule meant to address. The greater threat was thought to add justification for rules burdening registrants subject to them.113

A recent article, *The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism*, goes further.114 It argues the social science studies often cited in legal challenges to the registry regime are flawed because they employ official crime statistics that necessarily miss unreported offenses. The article has been cited in litigation in response to parties citing those social science studies.115 *Dark Figure* focuses on constructing a mathematical model meant to estimate the magnitude of the “missed” offenses.116 The article concludes the proportion of sexual offenses not reported is much higher than the Crime Victimization surveys suggest. It argues that the scholarly consensus about re-offense rates is therefore wrong.117 While the authors “take no position” on the “propriety” of the registration regime,118 they conclude it is “untenable” for researchers to rely on “official crime statistics” and inappropriate for policymakers to employ well-validated actuarial risk assessment instruments that predict only “observed” re-offending.119

But what facts about crime rates should policymakers, judges, and scholars rely upon if not the known facts about reported sexual crimes? The authors’ implicit answer is that they should instead rely on the estimates of unknown facts offered by their model. That is a bad idea for two reasons. The first is that their model is flawed, so there is no reason to credit their heightened estimates of the number of unreported sexual offenses. That point is well-made in critiques by others120 which I briefly capsule below. My primary focus, however, is on a threshold question to which neither judges

113 Id. at 933–34.
114 Scurich & John, *supra* note 11.
115 E.g., Reply Brief For Intervenor Office of Attorney General at 4–6, Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (2020) (No. 2148 EDA 2019) (citing Scurich and John’s article, *The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism*, to challenge the assumptions that recidivism rates among sex offenders are low).
117 Id. at 172.
118 Id. at 160.
119 Id. at 172.
120 Tamara Rice Lave, J.J. Prescott & Grady Bridges, *The Problem with Assumptions: Revisiting “The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism,”* 39 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 279 (2020). A second piece making many of the same observations was written concurrently although published earlier; it is consistent with the analysis of Lave, Prescott, and Bridges. Brian R. Abbott, *Illuminating the Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism*, 38 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 543, 546 (2020).
nor Dark Figure gives attention: does the sexual offense reporting rate even matter in any legal or policy analysis of the registry regime? I conclude it does not matter, which is the second reason to ignore the Dark Figure estimates. We now consider these two reasons in turn.

A. Flaws in the Dark Figure Model Make Its Estimates Misleading

The recent critique by Lave, Prescott and Bridges identifies several critical defects in the Dark Figure model. The model assumes the likelihood of a registrant re-offending does not change over the years following release from custody\cite{121} despite ample data showing it does (because the probability of reoffending declines for each arrest-free year following release from custody\cite{122}). It assumes victims who know the perpetrator was previously convicted of a sexual crime are no more likely to report the crime against them,\cite{123} an implausible assumption for reasons I explore below. It does not take account of the fact that those convicted of a sexual offense vary in their propensity to re-offend, even though it purports to.\cite{124} And fourth, the model’s estimates of the number of missed offenses are based on data from a skewed sample of re-offense studies, some of which are misread.\cite{125}

The model also assumes the likelihood of the police knowing of a crime is unaffected by whether the perpetrator is a repeat or one-time offender.\cite{126} But it’s more plausible to assume that those who commit multiple sexual crimes are more likely to be caught and convicted, at least once, than are one-time offenders, and that once police identify the perpetrator of one sex crime, the chance rises that they will identify others he or she committed. In that case the missed offenses Dark Figure attempts to estimate consist disproportionately of those committed by one-time offenders whose apprehension is less important, for preventing future offenses, than is catching repeat offenders (although of course one-time offenders also deserve punishment for their crime).

\begin{footnotes}
\item[121] Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 167; Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 11.
\item[122] E.g., Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97.
\item[123] Scurich & John, supra note 11 at 167; Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121 at 14–17.
\item[124] Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121 at 17–20.
\item[125] The study looks primarily at a skewed sample of older studies with small sample sizes while ignoring more recent ones with larger sample sizes. Id. at 286. Additionally, the study assumes the reported re-offense rates use only convictions and must therefore be adjusted upward—because convictions do not always follow from arrest for actual offenses, when in fact, some studies measured re-offending by counting arrests instead. Id. at 6.
\item[126] Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 171.
\end{footnotes}
B. The Overall Sex Crime Reporting Rate Does Not Affect the Legal or Policy Analysis of the Registry Regime

1. Reporting rates matter only if they are different for different groups

The standard estimates of unreported offenses provided by the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) cannot distinguish reporting rates for sexual offenses committed by registrants from reporting rates for sexual offenses committed by others because victims are not asked whether the perpetrator of the offense they identify in the survey was a registrant. Nor would respondents necessarily know the answer if asked. The estimates of unreported offenses provided by the Dark Figure model reflect that same limitation. The model estimates only overall reporting rates; it cannot and does not estimate reporting rates for offenses committed by registrants separately from those committed by others. Indeed, the paper never considers whether the reporting rate for crimes committed by registrants might differ from the reporting rate for crimes committed by others; its analysis silently assumes they are the same. But that same-reporting-rate assumption renders their model irrelevant to the legal or policy analysis of the registry regime. That is because the regime’s premise is that registrants pose a much greater threat of sexual offending than does everyone else, thus justifying our focus on them. But if reporting rates for crimes committed by registrants and non-registrants are the same, then we need look only at reported offenses to test that premise. Thus, the same-reporting-rate assumption underlying the Dark Figure model renders its results irrelevant to questions addressed by the social science studies it purports to cast doubt on.

For example, consider the studies showing that about 95% of all reported sexual offenses are committed by those with no prior sexual crime conviction. If we assume reporting and conviction rates for offenses committed by those with prior sex crime convictions are no different than for offenses committed by those without them, simple arithmetic tells us that we would get the same 95% result if we could somehow count unreported offenses too. Or consider the studies that show that re-offense rates for registrants are lower than were historically assumed, such as the federal study of released state prisoners described above.\footnote{See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.} Counting unreported offenses could have no effect on the finding that those with no sexual crime history commit 84% of all rapes and sexual assaults committed by released prisoners, or that released robbers commit such crimes at nearly half the rate of released rapists. Including unreported crimes in the count would raise the total number, but the proportion accounted for by each group remains the same if the reporting rate for the groups are the same.
Finally, consider the various studies that assess whether public websites listing registrants, or rules controlling where they may live or go, reduce the rate of sexual offending. Because controlled experimentation is not possible, these studies must rely on naturally arising differences. This typically means comparing outcomes before and after the imposition of a law, or comparing outcomes between otherwise similar jurisdictions with different laws.\textsuperscript{128} What’s compared is the rate of known sexual offenses with and without the registry regime rule under study. Assume the study finds no difference in the rate of reported offenses with and without the rule. Would it matter if the study also included estimates of unreported offenses in its calculation of rates? Not if the proportion of all sexual offenses that are reported is the same for both groups. The offense rates would still be the same with and without the rule. And that’s true whether the reporting rate is 75\%, 50\%, or 25\%, so long as it is the same for both.

The key point is that any evaluation of the efficacy of the registry regime necessarily depends upon the relative crime rates between groups, not their absolute level of overall offending. That’s not to say the absolute level of offending across all groups does not matter for any purpose. Of course it does. The more often a bad thing happens, the more reason we have to combat it. But the question here is whether the registry regime is an effective combat strategy, and the underreporting phenomenon cannot affect our assessment of its efficacy unless the reporting rate differs depending upon registry status.

2. Registrant offense rates must be assessed by comparing them to the offense rates of other apt population groups, not to zero

To consider whether a sexual offense rate is high or low one must have a benchmark to which to compare it, because nothing is high or low except in comparison to something else. That’s true whether one’s talking about blood pressure, interest rates, batting averages, or crime rates. Is an air temperature of fifty degrees high or low? The answer depends on whether the benchmark is the average temperature in January or July. Of course, in casual conversation people often say something is high or low without explicitly identifying a benchmark, but the benchmark is usually implied. Someone who says “public school teacher salaries are low” doesn’t mean they’re low because brain surgeons earn more, but because they are lower than other occupations the speaker believes comparable. Any debate over teacher salaries necessarily becomes a debate about the apt comparison group.

The silent assumption that often lies behind claims that the sexual offense rate of registrants is high is that the appropriate benchmark against

\textsuperscript{128} E.g., Agan, supra note 78; NAPIER ET AL., supra note 78; Zgoba, Veysey & Dalessandro, supra note 78; Bouffard & Askew, supra note 78.
which to compare their offense rate is zero. But zero cannot be an appropriate benchmark because there is no apt comparison group of non-registrants with a zero sexual offense rate. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently concluded when offered the analysis in *Dark Figure*, “the relevant question should not be whether convicted sexual offenders are committing unreported sexual crimes, but rather whether sexual offenders commit more sexual crimes than other groups not subject to similar registration laws.”

That is a key insight. Registrant sexual offense rates must be compared to the sexual offense rate of an apt comparison group that is similarly situated but not subjected to the registry regime.

The comparison group employed by leading scholars in this area is released felons with no history of sexual offending (to whom the registry regime is not applied). Useful comparisons must also take account of the fact that registrants are not a homogenous group. Some sexual offenses have lower re-offense rates than others, and within offense categories, individual re-offense likelihood varies in measurable ways. Good empirical studies allow one to separate registrants into groups based on re-offense risk. Nor is the composition of these risk groups static. As we have seen, the re-offense risk of registrants, like that of other released felons, declines rapidly over time at liberty without having re-offended. That means the offense risk of most registrants (all but those who start out with a higher risk than most other registrants) will fall below the benchmark comparison rate within five or ten years after release. Even if some registry regime rules were effective, there is no explanation for applying them to subgroups of registrants who pose no more risk than does the comparison group not subject to those rules.

In sum, both legal and policy analysis of the registry regime must compare the sexual offense rates of particular groups of registrants to the rate of an apt comparison group of non-registrants, not to zero. The proportion of sexual offenses that are reported can have no effect on such comparisons unless the proportions of offenses that are reported differ among the groups being compared. While *Dark Figure* assumes they do not (thus rendering its analysis irrelevant) we now consider the possibility that they do.

3. The rate of unreported sexual offenses may vary with the characteristics of the offense

Because unreported crimes will not lead to arrest, comparing the arrest rates of two groups is misleading if offenses by one group are reported less often than the other’s. If registrants’ offenses were reported at a lower

---

130 Hanson et al., *Reductions in Risk*, supra note 97, at 49.
131 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
rate than those committed by others, then registrant arrest rates would understate their offense risk, relative to the risk posed by others. On the other hand, if registrants’ offenses are reported at a higher rate than offenses committed by others, then comparing the two groups’ arrest rates would overstate the registrants’ relative sexual offense risk. The problem is potentially worse if one compares sexual crime convictions rather than arrests. The additional steps necessary to get from arrest to conviction can also differ across comparison groups. If arrested registrants are less likely to be convicted than are others arrested for a sexual offense, then comparing the two groups’ sexual offense convictions will understate registrants’ relative risk (assuming no difference between groups in the percentage of arrestees who in fact committed the charged crime). But if arrested registrants are more likely to be convicted than are others arrested, such comparisons overstate their relative risk. They might be convicted at higher rates even though they do not actually offend at higher rates, because their offenses more often lead to conviction. The Dark Figure model attempts to estimate actual offense rates by correcting both arrest and conviction rates to include not only offenses committed but unreported, but also reported offenses that really happened but did not lead to conviction. But as previously noted, its estimates are for sexual offenses overall, not sexual offenses broken down by offender groups.

The model thus implicitly assumes (as Lave, Prescott and Bridges observe) that a perpetrator’s previous conviction for a sexual offense has no effect on either the likelihood that a victim will report the offense, or that the perpetrator will be arrested, prosecuted, or convicted for it.\(^\text{133}\) It assumes the gap between offenses actually committed and offenses resulting in an arrest and conviction is the same for both groups. Is this same-gap assumption correct? Because there is no data on the number of unreported offenses broken down by whether the perpetrator has a prior offense, we cannot answer that question definitively. But we can make an informed guess. Shortly after Dark Figure was released this author commented that reasonable inferences about police conduct suggest registrant offenses are more likely to lead to arrest than offenses committed by others.\(^\text{134}\) And Lave, Prescott, and Bridges have since explained more fully why the same-gap assumption is almost certainly wrong.\(^\text{135}\)

\(^{133}\) Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 282.

\(^{134}\) Dark Figure was noted in the widely followed Sentencing Law and Policy Blog shortly after it became publicly accessible on SSRN. The author’s observation was part of his comment to that initial blogpost. Ira Ellman, Comment to The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y (Feb. 18, 2019), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2019/02/the-dark-figure-of-sexual-recidivism.html#comments [perma.cc/6M6C-GKNU].

\(^{135}\) Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 120, at 287–88.
A victim’s decision to report a sexual offense cannot be affected by the perpetrator’s prior conviction unless the victim knows if the perpetrator has a prior conviction. Where perpetrator and victim are strangers, the victim is unlikely to know. But strangers accounted for only 15.5% of sexual assaults on adult women known to law enforcement authorities in 2016.136 Most perpetrators are known to their victims because they are current or previous intimate partners, or acquaintances, friends, co-workers, or family members.137 Victims won’t always know about the prior conviction of these groups either, but sometimes they will. There’s reason to think such knowledge makes reporting more likely. Two common explanations victims give for not reporting are fear they won’t be believed or fear they will be blamed themselves for the assault.138 Knowledge that the perpetrator has a prior sexual offense conviction may reduce those fears.

Consider next reported offenses that lead to no arrest because no perpetrator is identified. That’s obviously more likely when the perpetrator is a stranger whose identification depends upon police investigation. The police effort to identify a perpetrator will surely include looking at lists of local sexual offenders taken from the registry or from police records. Either source will include fingerprints, so that where the perpetrator left a print, those with prior sexual offenses will be identified. Indeed, the increasingly routine collection of DNA samples from those convicted of a crime139 may allow the police to quickly identify and thus pursue perpetrators in any current case in which DNA evidence is available, again increasing the likelihood that those with prior convictions, but not first offenders, are eventually prosecuted. And finally, successful prosecutions are also more likely where the defendant has a prior sex crime conviction.140 Knowing that, prosecutors are of course more likely to prosecute these cases in the first place.

In sum, it seems reasonable to infer that a) victims are more likely to report sexual offenses committed by perpetrators whom they know have a prior sexual offense conviction; b) police are more likely to follow up on reports by victims who identify the perpetrator as someone with a prior; c) police are more likely to identify and thus arrest perpetrators with prior sexual offenses; d) prosecutors are more likely to file charges and win convictions in cases in which the alleged perpetrator has a prior sexual offense conviction.

---

137 Katrin Hohl & Elisabeth A. Stanko, Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: Fresh Evidence on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales, 12 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 324, 328 (2015).
138 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 106, at 38 (citing a Bureau of Justice Statistics report that found some victims did not report to the police out of a belief that the police would not help them).
139 See People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1155 (Cal. 2018) (approving the use of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA specimen as part of a routine booking procedure).
140 Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 293–94.
I know of no data that would allow one to test these inferences, but they certainly seem more plausible than the same-gap assumption silently made by the *Dark Figure* model. And if that implausible same-gap assumption is indeed wrong, then registrants’ sexual offense rates, relative to the rate of comparison groups, are probably lower than the studies report.

**CONCLUSION**

The registry regime regulates the lives of nearly a million Americans who are not in custody, not on parole or post-release supervision of any kind, who have committed no crimes since completing whatever sentence was once imposed on them for a crime that may have been committed decades earlier. The collection of rules, federal, state, and local, combine to make it difficult or impossible for registrants to find housing or employment, to travel, to maintain family connections, or to rejoin and contribute to their community. The burdens often extend to the registrants’ spouses and children. The regime’s debilitating rules are typically imposed for decades, and sometimes for life, without regard to anything a registrant may do to redeem himself.

No remotely similar system of civic exclusion applies to people once convicted of any other crime, be it murder, or arson, or violent assault, or drug-dealing. Nor has any other western democracy adopted any similar regime. None of them employ the central feature of the American registry system, a publicly accessible database, searchable by name or locale, allowing anyone to obtain, for any reason or no reason, personal information about those with sexual offense convictions.

Nor does it seem the registry regime can contribute to the broader battle against sexual abuse represented by today’s #MeToo movement. A key goal of that movement is recognition that sexual offending is pervasive because it is encouraged by an enabling culture. The solution it seeks requires broader cultural shifts.\(^{141}\) By contrast, the message of the registry regime, as Eric Janus points out, is that the problem is not us but “them,” a small group of deviant men who must be identified, contained, isolated, and ostracized because they have uncontrolled urges that may erupt at any time and account for most sexual offending.\(^{142}\) Shifting the onus from *us* to *them* means we can return to business as usual once we take care of *them*. The animus toward

---


\(^{142}\) Eric Janus, *Preventing Sexual Violence: Alternatives to Worrying About Recidivism*, 103 Marq. L. Rev. 819, 839–40 (2020) (“[T]he regulatory regime is premised on the serial predator model, and this empirically inaccurate portrayal of sexual violence makes invisible the pain of the victims who have been harmed by people who do not fit the serial predator paradigm, and the victims whose harm could have been prevented by policies framed to address the real problem, rather than the mythical serial predator.”).
them, born of understandable if nonrational fears, may also be a convenient strategy for those resistant to the cultural changes the #MeToo movement seeks. It enlists the disgust and anger that is easily aroused against individuals associated with a small group of particularly heinous offenses to divert attention from discussion of the larger cultural changes that would affect many more of us. So, registry reform is not inconsistent with the goals of the #MeToo movement. Indeed, shifting resources from the ineffective registry regime to sexual abuse preventative strategies that have been found promising, would advance the movement’s goals.

Registry rules were born of understandable fears, the laws establishing them named for the victims of terrible crimes. But laws that focus such harms on a discrete and widely despised group must be justified by facts, not fears. We have seen that justifying facts are hard to find. Why then does the registry regime persist? As Eula Biss observed, in her study of those who refuse vaccinations, our “fears are dear to us. When we encounter information that contradicts our beliefs, we tend to doubt the information, not ourselves.”143 But as understandable as that is as a matter of human psychology, the law must demand more than fears before inflicting deep harms on the group that elicits them.
