RESPONSE

FEES, INCENTIVES, AND DETERRENCE

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Undaunted by the common refrain accusing class action lawyers of collecting astronomical fees while class members walk away with almost nothing, Professor Brian Fitzpatrick serves as provocateur in asserting that lawyers should receive higher fees and that class members should receive less compensation in small-stakes class actions. Although the proposal is seemingly outrageous in light of public opinion, it is theoretically appealing for several reasons. First, to the extent that the proposal prioritizes deterrence, it is consistent with the enhancement of individual welfare. A system that deploys

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1 Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. I thank Matthew Howard for valuable research assistance.

2 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2047 (2010) (proposing that “the optimal award of fees to class action lawyers in small-stakes actions is 100% of judgments”). The phrase “small-stakes class action” typically refers to a class action that joins together claims that cannot be economically litigated on an individual basis. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2088 (2008) (using the phrase “small-stakes class action” for this type of action). Damages for the individual claims can range from almost nothing to several thousand dollars.

2 Class action litigation serves dual functions: minimization of accident costs through prevention of unreasonable risk (deterrence) and compensation for injuries caused by reasonable risk (insurance). See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871,
scarce resources to prevent, rather than insure, wrongful conduct is better for everyone. Second, Fitzpatrick’s proposal significantly reduces agency costs associated with the relationship between the attorney and the class, thus increasing the efficiency of adjudicatory regulation. Indeed, if the entire judgment is awarded as fees, agency costs are all but eliminated. Third, Fitzpatrick’s proposal streamlines the process for class certification because typicality and adequacy of representation become irrelevant when class members have no skin in the game. Finally, the proposal is appealing because it offers a normative justification for the award of fees, something that is often absent under the existing fee-setting regime. Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal raises some serious questions.

Professor David Marcus identifies a number of problems that hinder any serious consideration of the proposal. Specifically, Marcus questions whether the proposal would pass muster under existing doctrinal constraints imposed by the Rules Enabling Act and the law of unjust enrichment. He also takes issue with Fitzpatrick’s premise that full enforcement of substantive law necessarily increases social welfare, instead suggesting that procedural law may be an effective vehicle for fine tuning the regulatory force of substantive law. Overall, Marcus believes that the social legitimacy of the class action device will decline sharply if Fitzpatrick’s proposal is adopted.

1873-74 (2002) (discussing the two goals of “tort deterrence and insurance” in the context of class actions). Fitzpatrick asserts that the insurance function is not relevant in small-stakes class actions and that therefore we should seek to maximize deterrence. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2047.

See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1891 (arguing that the costs of preventing unreasonable risk are lower than the costs of compensating for the loss that otherwise would arise from such risk).

Agency costs arise in the context of class action litigation when class members lack the ability and incentive to monitor the lawyer’s actions, thus creating a risk that class action attorneys will serve their own interests at the expense of the class. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1991) (“The named plaintiff does little—indeed, usually does nothing—to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is competent and zealous, or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or corporation.”).

See id. at 5-6 (arguing that when class action attorneys purchase class members’ claims, typicality and adequacy of representation become irrelevant).


Id. at 158-60.

Id. at 161-63.

Id. at 163-66.
While Professor Marcus persuasively presents each of his arguments, two fundamental questions remain unanswered: (1) how much more deterrence can we expect to derive from an increase in fees to class action lawyers?, and (2) what are the costs associated with a significant increase in small-stakes class actions? The following analysis suggests that the increase in deterrence may be far outweighed by the increase in costs associated with the proposal.

Fitzpatrick’s proposal rests upon an assertion that deterrence is the sole purpose of small-stakes class actions, at least from a social-welfare utilitarian perspective. To maximize deterrence, Fitzpatrick assert that we should incentivize lawyers to file more small-stakes class actions by allocating a greater proportion of class awards to fees. The increase in filings will, in turn, result in more class awards and more deterrence.

To test the logic of this proposal, we must begin with the basic theory of deterrence: when an actor is threatened with liability for its harmful conduct in an amount that correlates to the extent of injury caused by the conduct, the actor will have an incentive to take precautions to avoid the injury.

Thus, if an actor must choose

10 See id. at 161 (touching the issue only lightly by raising the possibility that a risk-averse plaintiffs’ lawyer might accept a settlement offer that is well below the amount of injury caused to the class, thus reducing the overall payout by the defendant and the deterrent effect of the litigation).

11 Fitzpatrick states:

Small-stakes class actions serve no insurance function because individuals are not risk averse with respect to small losses. . . . In fact, when the administrative costs and profit margins of providing insurance are added to the equation, it is actually irrational for individuals to buy insurance against losses for which they are not risk averse.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2067-68.

12 Professor Fitzpatrick suggests that “every additional dollar given to plaintiffs instead of their attorneys will decrease the level of deterrence even further from the optimum.” Id. at 2062.

13 Under this theory, the actor aggregates all possible accident scenarios and all possible marginal investments in precautions. If appropriately motivated, the [actor] will take precautions to the point that maximizes aggregate welfare, that is, the point at which the aggregate cost of making an additional aggregate unit of investment in precautions would exceed the aggregate benefit from avoiding the corresponding aggregate unit of accident risk. The [actor] cannot know or predict how or to what degree contemplated conduct will benefit or harm any particular individual in the potentially affected population. The possibilities are infinite and are “knowable” only as statistically weighted probabilities.

Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1914.
between two actions, one that is socially optimal (such as investing in precautions to reduce the risk of injury) and another that is socially suboptimal (failing to take precautions), then the actor will have an incentive to take the optimal action if the expected liability from taking the suboptimal action exceeds the cost of the optimal action. The deterrent value of threatened litigation, therefore, is equal to the expected loss from the litigation. Whether litigation is actually filed or not, the actor will be motivated to invest in precautions if she believes that a credible threat of litigation exists.

The motivation to invest in precautions hinges upon the credibility of the threat of litigation. If an actor believes that litigation is not likely to be filed or that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits, then the actor is less likely to invest in precautions than if he believes otherwise. To the extent that small-stakes litigation is not economically viable on an individual basis, these claims create no credible threat of litigation and no incentive to invest in precautions. When a lawyer takes on a group of small-stakes claims and a court certifies a class action, however, these claims create a credible threat of litigation and a corresponding incentive to invest in precautions. Thus, an actor choosing between socially optimal or socially suboptimal conduct will anticipate a lawyer’s incentive to file a class action suit by calculating whether the expected return to the attorney will equal or exceed the expected costs of bringing suit.

For example, an actor may expect an aggregate injury of $5,000,000 if it fails to invest in precautions, or zero if it invests in precautions. Assuming a class action will have an 80% chance of success for the plaintiff class, the actor will expect a loss of $4,000,000 if it fails to invest in precautions and zero if it invests in precautions. Thus, if the cost of the precaution is less than $4,000,000, then a rational actor would choose to invest in precautions to avoid the threat of litigation. As the probability of success by the class decreases, both the actor’s expected loss and the deterrent value of the threatened litigation will decrease.

The deterrent value of threatened litigation is dependent upon the ex ante calculation of expected loss, not the actual loss incurred when litigation is filed. Of course, if the actor finds that its estimates are materially wrong, subjecting it to a loss that is greater or less than expected, then the actor may be motivated to refine its methods of calculation for future decisions regarding potential injury.

Assuming the attorney’s fee is calculated as a percent of the fund, the incentive to file can be represented by the following formula:

\[ c < f \times p \times l \]

where:
- \( c \) = total costs (including opportunity costs to the attorney as measured by the value the attorney places on his or her time)
- \( f \) = fee percentage awarded to attorney’s fees
- \( p \) = probability of success by the class

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Under the existing fee regime, a credible threat of litigation exists for all class actions that offer an expected fee equal to or exceeding expected costs. As a general rule, economic viability is dependent upon the probability of success on the merits and the amount in controversy. Consider a lawsuit where the fee award is 25% of a judgment or settlement and costs are in the range of $500,000. A class action seeking less than $2,000,000 is unlikely to be economically viable; a class action seeking $2,500,000 will be viable if the probability of success is 80% or higher; and a class action seeking $4,500,000 will be viable if the probability of success is 45% or higher. Class actions that offer a positive return under the existing fee regime pose a credible threat of litigation and a corresponding incentive for actors to invest in precautions to avoid suit. Increasing the fee awarded to attorneys in these actions, and decreasing compensation to class members, will not increase the investment in precautions—it will merely increase the amount of excess profit to attorneys.

To the extent that the Fitzpatrick proposal seeks to increase prevention by increasing the number of small-stakes class actions filed, we must consider the deterrence value derived from “new” class actions—those that are not economically viable to a lawyer under the existing fee regime but will become economically viable with the added benefit of a larger fee. If we assume a fee award of 100% of a

\[ \text{aggregate recovery}. \]

In an efficient market, the attorney’s expected return should equal the expected costs; when the expected return exceeds the attorney’s expected costs, the attorney receives excess profits. See Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 24 (explaining that in an efficient market, a downward adjustment of the fee percentage would occur if lawyers received excess profits).

\[ \text{See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2045-46 (noting that under the existing regime, fees have coalesced around 25%).} \]

\[ \text{See Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 59 (“[T]he percentage method [for calculating attorneys’ fees] results in systematic excess profits for plaintiffs’ attorneys—returns beyond what the attorney would earn in an efficiently functioning market.”).} \]

\[ \text{This group of “new” class actions can be defined as class actions that offer: (1) an expected return under the existing fee regime that is less than the attorney’s expected costs; and (2) an expected return under the proposed regime that exceeds the attorney’s expected costs. This can be represented by the formula:} \]

\[ f_e \times p \times 1 < c < f_p \times p \times l \]

where:

\[ f_e = \text{fee percentage awarded to attorney’s fees under the existing fee regime} \]
\[ p = \text{probability of success by class} \]
\[ l = \text{aggregate recovery} \]
\[ c = \text{total costs} \]
\[ f_p = \text{fee percentage awarded to attorney’s fees under the Fitzpatrick proposal}. \]
judgment or settlement and costs in the range of $500,000, the range of class actions that would be viable under the Fitzpatrick regime but not the existing system would include a class action seeking $2,000,000 when the probability of success is between 25% and 99%, a class action seeking $2,500,000 when the probability of success is between 20% and 79%; and a class action seeking $4,500,000 when the probability of success is between 12% and 44%. Overall, the Fitzpatrick proposal will create an incentive for lawyers to file new class actions, many of which will offer a lower probability of success than the class actions that are economically viable under the existing fee regime.

As the probability of success by the plaintiff class decreases, both the expected loss from the threatened litigation and the ex ante deterrent value decrease. To the extent that the Fitzpatrick proposal encourages lawyers to file new class actions that offer a relatively high probability of success to the class, we are likely to derive a correspondingly healthy increase in deterrence value from the threat of these suits. To the extent that the proposal encourages lawyers to file weak, small-stakes class actions, however, we are likely to derive a correspondingly weak deterrent value from the threat of these suits. While it is impossible to determine the precise increase in deterrence that will be derived from the threat of new class actions, it is clear that we will derive diminishing returns on deterrence as weaker class actions are filed.

Assuming that some increase in deterrence will arise from the proposed increase in fees, we must weigh the value of this increase against the costs associated with the proposal. On a systemic level, the

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20 In this example, claims seeking $2,000,000 are only economically viable under the existing regime if the likelihood of success is 100%.
21 In this example, claims seeking $2,500,000 are viable under the existing fee regime if the probability of success is 80% or higher. Under these conditions, they already pose a credible threat of litigation without the added adjustment of an increase in fees.
22 In this example, claims seeking $4,500,000 are viable under the existing fee regime if the probability of success is 45% or higher. Under these conditions, they already pose a credible threat of litigation.
23 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24 For example, the Fitzpatrick proposal may encourage new class actions seeking between $1,000,000 and $2,000,000 that offer a 50% or greater probability of success, assuming costs of approximately $500,000.
25 Likewise, the Fitzpatrick proposal may encourage new class actions seeking $5,000,000 and offering a probability of success to the class of 10 to 20%, assuming costs of approximately $500,000.
increased return to plaintiffs’ lawyers in small-stakes class actions will result in a redistribution of legal services. Lawyers seeking to maximize the return on the investment of their time will divert legal services away from other types of cases in order to pursue small-stakes class actions. Indeed, in light of the dramatic disparity that will exist between small-stakes class actions and other types of legal services, the “litigation explosion” cliché may become a reality. There is no evidence that our judicial system is prepared to absorb these extra demands.

Moreover, class action lawyers motivated by the possibility of collecting 100% of a large award are likely to pursue victory with intensity. In an effort to increase the probability of a successful outcome, lawyers are likely to invest extra time, depose more witnesses, hire more experts or investigators, serve more discovery, or engage in some combination of these actions. This increased intensity is likely to be most pronounced in the weakest cases. Defendants, faced with a formidable opponent, may dig their heels in and further intensify the battle, creating a cross current of effects. Alternatively, defendants may choose to avoid the battle entirely by buying out the plaintiff-class lawyer. Even very weak claims may offer a sizable return to the plaintiff-class lawyer if the downside risk to the defendant could be catastrophic.

The Fitzpatrick proposal is theoretically enticing because it is easy to apply, it reduces concerns about adequacy of representation, and it provides a normative rationale for the award of class action fees. Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal has serious drawbacks. Although the threat of a large increase in the number of small-stakes class actions is likely to increase the investment in precautions, the

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28 Id. at 327.

29 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (expressing concern that defendants may “be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability”).
magnitude of this increase will depend upon the estimated strength of the cases that are likely to be filed. If the proposal allows weak class actions to become economically viable, then the increase in deterrence may be much smaller than we hope. Indeed, the increase in deterrence may be dwarfed by the systemic costs associated with the proposal. Moreover, this proposal incentivizes lawyers to invest in small-stakes class actions over alternative demands for legal services. Even if this proposal will increase deterrence to some degree, we must consider whether the redress of small-stakes injuries deserves such a tremendous investment of society’s legal resources.