Critics of religious exemptions view them as “exit rights” or euphemisms for discrimination, undermining our shared social commitment to civil rights and our aspiration to secure equal citizenship for everyone. This Comment responds by arguing that so-called “exit rights” are, in fact, an appropriate and necessary application of pluralism—itself one of our society’s shared aspirational commitments. America’s commitment to pluralism requires us to respect the dignity within each enclave of religious society.

Our policymakers undermine that respect if they adopt an inferior view of pluralism, which attempts to replicate the composition of society writ large within each religious enclave. This Comment connects these competing visions of pluralism to recent controversial applications of Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, and uses the competing visions as a lens to analyze high-profile state religious liberty bills in Georgia and Mississippi. Such debates inevitably raise questions about how states would respond to racial discrimination posed as religious belief, but racial slippery slopes are inapposite to modern religious liberty claims. Finally, well-crafted, pluralistic religious liberties laws can respect the autonomy of religious exercise while properly securing equal citizenship for all communities.

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INTRODUCTION

Religious liberty is a triumph of Western liberalism. For most of American history, freedom of religion as a concept evoked pride rather than controversy. In the years since the Supreme Court shifted the culture wars’ balance of power with United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, however, the phrase evolved into a hot-button political issue. To some audiences, “religious liberty” is now little more than a euphemism for discrimination. Exemptions

1 See Mary Ann Glendon, First of Freedoms? How Religious Liberty Could Become a Second-Class Right, AMERICA MAG., Mar. 5, 2012, http://americamagazine.org/issue/5131/article/first-freedoms (“Until recently the status of religious liberty as one of the most fundamental rights of Americans has seldom been seriously challenged.”).
4 See, e.g., Jonathan Merritt, Religious-Liberty Laws That Have No Meaning, ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/religious-liberty-laws-that-have-no-meaning/480297/ (providing a social liberal’s view of the general trend of social conservatives to utilize religious-liberty laws and warning that such laws promote even more resistance to religion and conservative values).
5 See, e.g., ACLU, End the Use of Religion to Discriminate (last visited May 6, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/feature/using-religion-discriminate (“With increasing frequency, we are seeing individuals and institutions claiming a right to discriminate – by refusing to provide services to women and LGBT people – based on religious objections . . . . [R]eligion is being used as an excuse to discriminate against and harm others.”).
from general laws to protect religious liberty now appear to clash against society’s shared commitments to nondiscrimination and equal citizenship.

Critiques of modern religious liberty claims come principally in two forms. First, critics like Professor Robin West decry the loss of social unity. Specifically, she argues that religious exemptions amount to “exit rights” that undermine our shared social commitment to civil rights, thus imposing a brutal cost on society. Second, scholars like Professors James Fleming and Linda McClain argue that, at least in some circumstances, religious exemptions could threaten our constitutional culture’s guarantee of equal citizenship to all people.

This Comment responds to the first group of critics by arguing that so-called “exit rights” are, in fact, an appropriate and necessary entailment of pluralism—itself one of our society’s shared aspirational commitments. In response to the concerns of the second group, this Comment sketches out specific ways to craft religious exemptions to generally applicable laws to minimize the cost of liberty against equality. These suggestions are humble, fully acknowledging that difficult tradeoffs will always remain, so no compromise can satisfy every concern. But in a world where religious exemptions do indeed exist, exemptions are not all created equally. Even the harshest critic can acknowledge that some formulations pose less risk to our shared civil rights commitment than others.

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7 West, supra note 6, at 9-23.

Exit rights generally give their holders rights to exit from societal and civic obligations that would be otherwise imposed upon them by the state and to retreat instead into miniaturized sub-cultural worlds, in which the authority of the federal or state governments is set aside, so as to permit the flowering of a different and more private sovereign authority.

Id. at 9.


9 Traditional RFRA laws are far more restrained than more recent state legislation, and specific provisions differ greatly state-by-state. See infra Part VI (providing a more extensive analysis of relevant new state legislation on religious freedom).
Past commentators, especially Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson, proposed exemption regimes framed as compromises. In fact, Utah lawmakers sought out her insight and help in drafting state law that incorporated such exemption regimes. Such “compromises” warrant fresh examination in light of recent controversy over state religious liberty bills, including the heated debates in Mississippi and Georgia. This Comment will specifically examine these state proposals, highlighting what religious exercise they properly protected, where they went astray, and how other states should approach similar conflicts. As with any discussion of religious exemptions, we must acknowledge the looming counter-example of race. Ultimately, that means considering how states would respond to a request for religious exemptions to racial nondiscrimination laws. Finally, this Comment concludes on a positive note by considering a potential solution for states that want to protect religious liberties while expressing appropriate commitment to civil rights and equal citizenship.

I. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS: PLURALISM OR SOCIETAL FRAC TURE

A. The Societal Critique

Professor Robin West presents her critique of religious liberty exemptions in a societal context. Religious organizations make internal decisions about their own composition and behavior, but these decisions do not exist in a vacuum. All participants in civil society feel the repercussions of religious practices, and some people suffer at the hands of religiously-motivated behavior that receives state protection. She posits:

The core of my objection that freedom, then, is just this: we should remember that what is jettisoned when we enshrine the “Freedom of the Church” in the constitutional canon is not . . . just the occasional right of employees in ministerial positions in church-affiliated places of employment to a remedy for their wrongful discharge. What is jettisoned, rather, is the aspiration of a civil rights society in a much larger sense. It is the aspiration for an understanding of rights as being rights to enter rather than rights to exit—rights to be included, and to participate in all aspects of our social, civic, and constitutional identity. When we set aside our civil rights to enter in order to make room for a Church’s freedom to exit, we are setting aside not only a particular litigant’s right to relief for a wrongful discharge, but also a particular conception of our rights trade-off. We are setting aside an understanding of rights and a history of rights that seeks to secure, on behalf of every one of us, entry into the socially and legally constructed civic worlds of work, school, commerce, family, the public square, the courthouse, and neighborhood.\(^{13}\)

Professor West couches her social goals in policy language with a presupposition that the state is the proper actor to secure entry into these civic worlds. Her language allows virtually no room for religious practice that is free from government supervision if the practice in question denies access to some people. But our history of protecting individual rights is not so state-centric, and therefore does not offer the state such a powerful entrée into private religious relationships.\(^{14}\) In dealing with a sphere of private actors assembling for religious purposes (as in Hosanna-Tabor, Professor West’s foil for her argument), her policy prescription amounts to state-licensed religious beliefs.\(^{15}\) To

\(^{13}\) West, supra note 6, at 30.

\(^{14}\) See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Our Republican Constitution 23 (2016) (“A Republican Constitution views the natural and inalienable rights of these joint and equal sovereign individuals as preceding the formation of governments, so first come rights and then comes government. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence tells us, it is to ‘secure these rights’ that ‘Governments are instituted among Men.’”) (emphasis in original).

\(^{15}\) See West, supra note 6. Well-meaning egalitarians would balk at the language of state-licensed religious beliefs, but that is the natural consequence of crowding out private religious beliefs as a protected sphere. Because all private religious beliefs create public externalities, Professor West’s worldview effectively makes all private religious behavior public. It could therefore be ripe for regulation on preferential policy grounds, as we see in Professor West’s egalitarian policy argument against religious freedom in church hiring decisions.
adopt her vision would be essentially statist. Rights function as trump cards to preserve individual interests against majoritarian preferences. The individual thus thwarts collective interest, preventing further engagement even when collective welfare could be advanced. The church whose rights Professor West disparages did not step outside of its sphere; it did not act as a for-profit corporation engaging in commercial enterprise, but rather as a non-profit religious organization. Churches are not public transportation buses. Religious charities are not public corporations. Such groups reflect a necessary outflow of what John Stuart Mill labeled the “inward domain of consciousness.” The state may validly respect the autonomy of religious organizations, and doing so entails protecting their societal sphere from some external controls and coercion.

Ultimately, Professor West advances a normative goal about social order. By using the power of government to foist particular hiring practices upon a congregation, or dictate any other practice of any other religious organization, the government could indeed ensure equal rights to enter. It would also ensure the loss of vibrant pluralism. Our civil society functions with diverse religious enclaves, from horseback transportation in Amish Country to Islamic schools in Dearborn, Michigan. James Madison called this diversity the “multiplicity of sects.” To preserve that diversity, policymakers must not reflexively use the power of government to establish a preferred social order within religious organizations.

Because of our longstanding respect for the autonomy of worshippers to observe their own practices and religious behavior, we do not seek to impose certain criteria for entry or practice unless it violates the rights of

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16 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 205 (1977) (“The bulk of the law—that part which defines and implements social, economic, and foreign policy—cannot be neutral. It must state, in its greatest part, the majority’s view of the common good. The institution of rights is therefore crucial, because it represents the majority’s promise to the minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected. . . . If the government does not take rights seriously, then it does not take law seriously either.”) (emphasis added).
17 Id.
18 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 26 (1859) (“This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.”).
19 E.g., id. at 13 (“Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them[].”).
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.”).
others.\textsuperscript{21} If a religious cult demanded ritual abduction as part of its religious practice, the state would not defer to the cult’s autonomy, prioritizing instead the state’s responsibility to protect rights.\textsuperscript{22} In Professor West’s conception, the same rule holds for protecting the right of equal access. All decisions by a religious organization, or by a religious family with a business, inevitably affect other people. No religious practice is therefore truly private. Social conservatives made similar arguments about morality, suggesting that private moral acts undermine a shared moral ecosystem such that no moral acts are truly private.\textsuperscript{23} Here, no religious exercise is truly private, because they affect our ecosystem of shared civic aspirations.\textsuperscript{24}

But any religious organization must have more autonomy in determining entry into its own assembly than West’s conception contemplates. Simply because someone is part of a society, and thus enjoys some societal benefits, does not grant the state authority to micromanage it. A pastor declining to officiate a same sex marriage or a church denying access to its multipurpose outdoor facility for the same marriage must be treated differently than if the church blocked access to another facility the congregation did not own. Our aspiration to pluralism demands that much respect.

\textbf{B. The Equal Citizenship Critique}

When religious groups seek exemptions from civil rights laws, their accommodations often “collide[] not only with general public policies . . . but also clash[] with antidiscrimination norms that are as normatively supported as

\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, \textit{Religious Liberty as Liberty}, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 319 (2013) (“The coercive powers of government include its powers to allocate money, licenses, privileges, and the like in discriminatory ways. The principle that government should not coerce religious beliefs or behaviors necessarily entails the proposition that government should not create incentives to change religious beliefs or behaviors — that government should be neutral with respect to religion in all its regulation, taxation, and spending.”).

\textsuperscript{22} See, e.g., MILL, supra note 18, at 140 (“Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights [or] infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights . . . are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment.”).


\textsuperscript{24} See West, supra note 6, at 3 (“To discriminate in employment in violation of those laws, then, is not simply an act that may give rise to a cause of action for reinstatement or damages, as per Justice Roberts’s suggestion. It is also to break faith with and to undermine the shared national project of creating a world of equal opportunity and full participation that is free of racism and sexism and their related effects, and it is to perform an individual moral wrong in one’s personal contractual relations with one’s employees or with those who seek one’s employment.”).
religious freedom.” Churches and religious institutions are among the nongovernmental associations that offer “seedbeds of virtue” that “guard against governmental orthodoxy by generating their own distinctive virtues and values.” Professors James Fleming and Linda McClain explain that these associations are sometimes congruent with the goals of public policy, but other times they stand athwart the values promoted by civil government. Fleming and McClain draw a common distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity.

Religi­ously-motivated individuals thus forfeit at least some of their free association rights when they choose to enter a commercial market with its embedded nondiscrimination rules. This framework follows a stated goal of avoiding absolutism “of one liberty to the exclusion of other constitutional commitments.” Toward that end, it protects some religious practices of individual clergy and church teachings, but in other contexts, a “head-on clash of civil rights—between freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination” must come down in favor of nondiscrimination to “secure the status of equal citizenship for everyone.” With this priority in mind, religious exemptions are best characterized as a “prudential mutual adjustment” or “interim remedy” rather than an intrinsically valuable protection of individual liberty in its own right.

Some aspects of equal citizenship will always lie in a tradeoff with liberty of conscience. If a minister declines to officiate a same-sex ceremony, the wedding couple is thereby denied equal treatment. But few people would be despotic enough to force the minister to officiate the wedding, so we are left with a line-drawing problem on the spectrum of conscience. Professors Fleming and McClain urge a mutual adjustment of values by which both sides yield. The question still turns, however, on the point at which someone’s liberty of conscience must yield. Because that question lacks an easy answer, statutory liberty of conscience protections typically rely on a “least restrictive means” requirement.

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26 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 146.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 173-74.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 148.
31 Id. at 173 (internal quotations omitted).
32 Id. at 174.
33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (“Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”).
the exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate a compelling government interest for doing so, and uses the least restrictive means to achieve that compelling interest.\(^{34}\) As a general rule, requiring the government to use least restrictive means imposes a burden on the appropriate party. If the state must interfere with religious practice, it should bear some obligation to use that power reluctantly out of respect for our shared constitutional commitment to liberty of conscience and pluralism.

The commercial/non-commercial distinction offers help in many situations, but sometimes it does not answer questions of responsibility. A wedding photographer is a member of the commercial market, and enjoys benefits of the legal system given to companies. Nonetheless, incorporation documents do not shield the photographer from moral culpability for every decision he or she makes. A photographer does not share decision-making power with a board of directors or managers. If the government requires him or her to participate in someone else’s religious ceremony by serving a marriage, that may involve compelled practice against his or her religion while still being commercial.

Professor John Inazu, himself a supporter of religious exemptions, suggests that the commercial/non-commercial distinction is purely pragmatic.\(^{35}\) To a large degree, it probably is just that. However, it also reflects the unique role that churches and religious institutions play as seedbeds of virtue in American culture and history. Religious institutions can rationally receive more deference, or at least, demand a closer review of state action when it encroaches on their religious exercise. Companies, by contrast, lack that historic purpose and institutional role as seedbeds of virtue, so corporations can warrant more scrutiny in a religious claim, with a policy basis deeper than simple pragmatism.

The least restrictive means requirement may be instructive here too. Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson makes the case for protecting the religious practice of wedding cake bakers and photographers when the victims of such practices—the couples denied equal citizenship—have readily available alternatives.\(^{36}\) If the burden on religious exercise is not necessary, then the government should not force the issue. Why sue the one photographer who opposes same-sex marriage, compelling him or her to facilitate a wedding, when many others would happily accept the business?

Of course, critics could pose a similar question the other way, highlighting the burden on a couple seeking marriage: Why must an LGBT couple suffer the embarrassment, stigma, and hassle of finding another

\(^{34}\) Id.


\(^{36}\) Wilson, supra note 10, at 1485-89.
provider simply to placate someone else’s religion? Professor Mary Anne Case considers this the only noteworthy burden, waving away any burden on religious beliefs as paling under the “troubling asymmetry” of cost to the person seeking to compel service. An important difference remains, however, between harm and aggression. Someone suffers a dignitary harm in both instances, but only the harm against liberty of conscience is compelled by the government. Unlike religious exemptions that consider whether alternatives are available, when governments mandate individuals to participate in a religious ordinance (such as a wedding) with which they disagree, the state action constitutes a form of aggression without recourse to any alternatives.

If no one else is available to fill the religious objector’s role, then the state might compel the photographer’s participation to ensure the couple’s equal citizenship. Professor Wilson also applies this logic to public officials providing marriage licenses. She would protect the conscience of a county clerk to avoid participation as long as someone in the office was available to sign a same-sex marriage license. This exercise of religious expression, however, cannot fall under the same justification as religious individuals and organizations. No live-and-let-live solution is available when a public official refuses to follow public policy. Unlike a minister or wedding photographer, county clerks and similar officials choose to inject themselves into the administration of public laws, and thus lose the right to evaluate the administration of each law against their personal religious convictions. We apply this logic, for example, when we extend an opportunity for conscientious objection to those drafted by the military, but not to a services member who volunteers to join the special forces, then declines a mission because of personal moral qualms.

In short, someone will assume a dignitary burden in these clashes between the law and religious practice. But only one party seeks to coerce the other into submission. The photographer is willing to embrace a live-and-let-live arrangement, in Professor Doug Laycock’s parlance. In an era of legalized

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37 The other obvious counterexample is that we would never permit racial discrimination on the basis that other businesses would want the business. Race is addressed separately in this Comment. See infra Part VII (discussing the differences and similarities between race discrimination and discrimination based on sexual orientation).
38 Case, supra note 6, at 480.
40 Wilson, supra note 10, at 1479-81.
41 See Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 429-30 (2011) (“[T]he conflicts between believers and nonbelievers, and
gay marriage and rapidly solidifying popular support for LGBT rights, the indignities a photographer can inflict upon a wedding he or she does not attend are limited. If the state forces action by the photographer, however, the live-and-let-live arrangement is upended, ignoring all dignitary interests of someone’s religious expression, as well as the pluralistic respect for their own practice. Live-and-let-live is little more than a euphemism for liberty. To understand this liberty in context, it’s worth asking whether religious exemptions comport with the spirit of free exercise claims at all.

II. MODERN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS VERSUS FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Do modern religious liberty debates bear any relationship to the historic roots of religious liberty? At first glance, questioning whether religious organizations should be bound by nondiscrimination laws may not seem analogous to citizens’ right to practice the religion of their choice. In at least one sense, however, they share a common moral basis of pluralism. Just as exit rights today undermine the social unity of our aspirational values, exit rights for religious minorities in confessional states diluted the shared national commitment to which those nations aspired. That shared national commitment was misplaced, no doubt, but it was a shared social project and religious exit rights weakened it.

In the eighteenth century, the American constitutional project sought to replace the social unity of a confessional state with a republican society that respected liberty of conscience. Their predecessors in Europe still compelled their subjects to embrace particular religious confessions in order to be a citizen in good standing of a nation. These confessional states begat the Book of Common Prayer, compulsory church attendance, and publicly-financed churches. More important than any particular religious practice, these societal expectations demonstrated a shared social commitment to certain ideas.

between religious conservatives and the gay rights movement, have live-and-let-live solutions in the tradition of American liberty.”).

42 See generally id.
44 See generally Philip S. Gorski, Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, CA. 1300 to 1700, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 138, 157 (“During the Confessional Age, the lines between temporal and religious authority became increasingly blurred, both in principle and in fact.”).  
Dissenters—be they Muslim, Jewish, atheist, Roman Catholic, or protestant—needed exit rights from the existing social contract.46 The aspirations of civic identity in Elizabethan England simply did not comport with the individual religious identity of Roman Catholics, nor was the French constitutional identity under Louis XIV compatible with the personal religious identity of Anabaptists.47 Religious minorities sought, in a sense, an exit right. They wanted to freely exercise their religion, to freely assemble with fellow believers, to secure a liberty of conscience that undercut their society’s shared social commitments. The First Amendment provides just such a space.48

The American constitutional project expresses a commitment to religious exercise, facilitated by liberty of conscience.49 Historically, the United States emerged from a European civic culture that preferred social unity in the form of a confessional state over personal liberty of conscience. The First Amendment inverts that hierarchy, explicitly protecting religious exercise rather than articulating a vision of social unity.50 That does not mean the founders saw no social value in religion, such as fostering public virtue, but the right to free exercise of religion is not explicitly predicated on such aims. By opting for liberty of conscience, the framers expressed a values preference that is transferable to modern contexts. In today’s debates, religious liberties are not pitted against state religion. Instead, they increasingly stand athwart nondiscrimination ordinances that reflect our shared social commitment to civil rights and equal citizenship. Depending on the social norms and shared societal commitments of any generation, liberty of conscience may entail the right of believers to exit those shared commitments.

Following the American model, governments across the world shifted their religious paradigms. Hundreds of statutes and constitutional measures across the world enacted in recent decades afford new protections to religious

46 See Gorski, supra note 44, at 158 (“Thus, in the Confessional Age, one’s access to the public sphere, and even one’s membership in the community, were largely dependent upon one’s (professed) religious views — a de-differentiation of the religious and the secular.”).
47 See id. at 158-59 (“The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed mass movements of religious refugees, a sort of confessionally driven Volkerwanderung in which Protestants drove out Catholics, Catholics drove out Protestants, and everybody drove out the Baptists and other ‘sectarians.’”).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1990) (arguing that American history demonstrates a longstanding commitment to religious exemptions); but see Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) (countering McConnell’s historical evidence to argue that most eighteenth century Americans recognized no right to religious exemption from generally applicable laws).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
rights, including “generous protections for liberty of conscience and freedom of religious exercise,” along with “guarantees of religious pluralism” and “other special protections and entitlements for religious individuals and religious groups.”

Protecting religious exercise incongruent with the government’s preferred social orthodoxy thus comports with our First Amendment constitutional culture. Dissenting in Dennis v. United States, Justice Hugo Black argued that the First Amendment is a keystone of our government because it protects all viewpoints, not merely those consistent with Congressional majorities. Such an approach is “not likely to protect any but those ‘safe’ or orthodox views which rarely need [First Amendment] protection.”

Today, our shared national commitment to civil rights is noble and accepted, while confessional states are mostly confined to a few pockets in the Middle East. But the impulse for societal unity and shared commitments transcends generations, and the value of vibrant religious pluralism stands the test of time.

III. COMPETING VISIONS OF PLURALISM

Given our society’s shared commitment to civil rights, how should we handle dissenters? For those who embrace a total win approach on both the left or the right, a confident pluralism that embraces intellectual diversity falls flat. Prominent Harvard Law School Professor Mark Tushnet embodies the “they lost, we won” approach. In dealing with “losers,” Professor Tushnet rejects any accommodations for cultural conservatives, a group whose perspective he judges to lack any “normative pull.”

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52 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 'reasonableness.' Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress. The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those 'safe’ or orthodox views which rarely need its protection.”).
53 Id.
54 Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html (“The culture wars are over; they lost, we won.”).
55 Id. (“For liberals, the question now is how to deal with the losers in the culture wars. That’s mostly a question of tactics. My own judgment is that taking a hard line (“You lost, live with it”) is better than trying to accommodate the losers, who – remember – defended, and are defending, positions that liberals regard as having no normative pull at all.”).
Rather than carving out a space in pluralistic society for religious minorities to exercise their own autonomy within limited contexts, Professor Tushnet’s call to suppress minority religious views stems from a moral imperative to thwart opinions that he deems not only unsavory, but akin to historically epic evil, suggesting that “taking a hard line seemed to work reasonably well in Germany and Japan after 1945.”\(^{56}\) The rapid emergence of such a hard line attitude among some progressives is drawing a sharp rebuke from more pragmatic liberals. Fifty-eight gay marriage supporters recently wrote an open letter chiding gay marriage advocates who refuse to provide space for dissenting thinkers.\(^{57}\)

The highest vision of pluralism opts for protecting the liberty of each individual over the social value of protected equality in equal citizenship, or in the words of Professor West, our shared commitment to civil rights. Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman famously summed up his preference for liberty by suggesting that societies valuing freedom over equality would achieve both, while those valuing equality over freedom would achieve neither.\(^{58}\)

In the context of religious organizations and their clash with our shared commitment to civil rights, Justice Samuel Alito articulated this robust vision of pluralism as protecting individual liberty in his Christian Legal Society v. Martinez dissenting opinion.\(^{59}\) The Christian Legal Society (CLS) chapter at Hastings College of Law required its leaders to be Christians themselves, and espouse the organization’s statement of faith. CLS also espoused a religious view that human sexuality is created for and properly limited to conjugal marriage between a man and woman, thus precluding a large number of sexually active students from leadership, including all LGBT students.

Nothing in the trial or appellate records claim any particular student complained about the policy. The case presented no plaintiff who felt harassed or discriminated against, nor even a student who bothered to seek leadership in a religious group for a religion to which he or she did not belong. Nonetheless,

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\(^{56}\) Id.


\(^{58}\) MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 148 (1980). The freedom-equality debate extends well beyond the scope of this Comment, but Friedman’s argument stems largely from the success and opportunity of societies that protect liberty and property rights — such as modern western economies — as compared to societies that fixate on egalitarian outcomes, which is the ostensible goal of communist states.

Hastings Law maintained an “all-comers” policy requiring student groups to allow any student to pursue leadership positions, regardless of whether their own beliefs comport with the organization’s beliefs. The law school thus denied registration to a CLS chapter on campus, consequently withholding resources available to student organization. These resources included the ability to book campus facilities, receive institutional support, and request student fee money for events. The Ninth Circuit, and later the Supreme Court, upheld the law school’s decision as viewpoint-neutral and reasonable.60

Justice Alito highlighted past inconsistencies in Hastings’s application of its “accept all-comers” policy, shedding light on the school’s potentially pretextual motives for citing the policy to deny CLS registration.61 But more importantly, he also painted a moral vision of pluralism as an alternative to the accept-all-comers approach. Justice Alito cited the record to argue that intellectual diversity should thrive organically among student organizations, not diversity within student organizations, artificially foisted upon them.62 Justice Alito supported the “creation of a forum within which Hastings students are free to form and obtain registration of essentially the same broad range of private groups that nonstudents may form off campus.”63 In essence, Justice Alito believed that allowing a diverse collection of campus groups best reflected society’s diversity, rather than forcing each group to be a microcosm of societal diversity reflected within each group.

His live-and-let-live view of pluralism acknowledges that people naturally seek association with others who share their moral and religious beliefs. Rather than fighting such voluntary associations, pluralism protects the rights of each one to operate freely by recognizing their right to exclude, or not associate with, those who disagree with them. Christian, Jewish, and Islamic organizations should then exist alongside LGBTQ organizations, each enjoying the freedom to select leaders holding certain religious or moral values. The live-and-let-live view also holds the unique advantage of being the non-coercive conception of pluralism, as discussed later in this Comment.

Professor John Inazu labels this thriving intellectual ecosystem as “confident pluralism.”64 Building on John Rawls’s “fact of pluralism,” Inazu

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60 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645, 645 (9th Cir. 2009); Martinez, 561 U.S. at 662-63 (2010).
61 Martinez, 561 U.S. at 713 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that the Hastings Democratic Caucus, Association of Trial Lawyers of America at Hastings, La Raza, and Vietnamese American Law Society all maintained viewpoint-discriminatory rules for leadership, only being subjected to enforcement after litigation began against the CLS).
62 Id. at 732-735.
63 Id. at 729.
64 Inazu, supra note 35, at 561-602.
believes we must “embrace a right to differ from state and majoritarian norms.”

He roots this argument in two premises. First, confident pluralism reflects suspicion of state power, or what I previously called the non-coercive value. These independent communities should be able to, in the words of William Eskridge, “flourish and wither as they may, and the state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the triumph of one community over all others.”

Second, Professor Inazu suggests that confident pluralism advances the aspiration of tolerance, humility, and patience better than government-mandated orthodoxy. Denying religious student groups the opportunity to select leaders by their own religious criteria may not feel like tolerance when it manifests exclusion, but we do not practice tolerance by imposing our own majoritarian values on their religious enclave without respect or tolerance for their faith.

By supporting tolerance, humility, and patience, confident pluralism fosters “fruits of persuasion” between individuals on a personal level. Students who do not accept the religious convictions of a religious group need not be in positions of leadership within that group to engage with the group’s ideas and develop personal relationships. In the case of LGBT rights, public opinion is shifting away from discrimination, even with the widespread presence of RFRA laws. This confidant pluralism maintains the authenticity of each autonomous community within the diverse society. Accordingly, it is the only vision of pluralism that respects the full dignitary interests of each group’s members, and the only vision that avoids using coercion to meet majoritarian norms.

**IV. THE BACKGROUND OF MODERN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION CLAIMS**

Scholars attribute the spectrum of religious exemptions to modern social movements more than a unified legal theory. Those movements explain why religious organizations historically receive historically generous

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65 Id. at 591-92.
66 In framing my preference for non-state power over state power in terms of coercion, I draw heavily from F.A. Hayek and somewhat from John Stuart Mill. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); MILL, supra note 18.
68 Inazu, supra note 35, at 592.
69 Id.
71 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 25, at 782.
exemptions for sexual orientation but virtually no slack regarding racial nondiscrimination requirements. They also receive more exemptions than secular nonprofits. Religious convictions are not constitutionally entitled to exemptions from generally applicable laws. Instead, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) provides a federal statutory remedy to religious adherents. Under RFRA, the federal government may only substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if it can 1) establish a compelling governmental interest, and 2) demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Twenty-one states followed Congress by enacting their own RFRA laws to protect religious exercise from state law.

The 1993 federal law passed the Senate by a 97-3 vote majority with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union at the time. In the following decades, most litigation invoking RFRA flew under the radar of public opinion. The statute cropped up, for example, to protect a Sikh woman’s right to carry religious objects in federal buildings and to ensure a Muslim prisoner could maintain a beard for religious reasons. But in the midst of these

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72 See id., at 815-21 (teasing out the differences in doctrine surrounding religious exemptions and discrimination based on race, gender, and sexual orientation).
73 See generally id. at 785 (citing Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals? Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1084 (2000)).
76 RFRA originally applied to state and local governments as well, but the Supreme Court struck down its application against them on federalism grounds. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (reversing the trial court’s application of RFRA against a local zoning ordinance because it exceeded Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
77 Id.
80 In the aftermath of Hobby Lobby decision, the ACLU withdrew its support for RFRA legislation, concluding that its policy implications were no longer palatable for the organization’s political and ideological goals. See Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST, June 25, 2015, http://wpo.st/SSa_1 (“It’s time for Congress to amend the RFRA so that it cannot be used as a defense for discrimination.”).
81 Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2013) (remanding the case for RFRA analysis on an IRS employee’s claim that security personnel discriminated against her by denying her the right to carry a symbolic ceremonial blade).
low-profile legal skirmishes, one case catapulted RFRA claims into a national debate about religious liberty — *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*

In *Hobby Lobby*, the Supreme Court considered claims by two families, the Greens and the Hahns, each of whom owned large family businesses that functioned as closely-held corporations. The decision’s critics balk at such personalized language — can a retail chain with over $1 billion in revenue be fairly considered a “family business”? I argue explicitly what Justice Alito implies in the majority opinion, namely, that a family’s moral duties do not bear an inverse relationship to profitability. When the state mandates behavior substantially burdening the family’s deeply-held religious beliefs, their culpability cannot rationally dissipate at any particular profit margin or workforce size. Instead, the dispositive factors as to RFRA’s applicability should be corporate structure and decision making. The Greens and Hahns had full power to set corporate policy and moral guidelines themselves, which would simply not be true in a publicly-held company of comparable size. Responsibility in a public company is distributed among public shareholders, each of whom lack the power to personally set policy. With regard to *Hobby Lobby*, the decision’s critics counter that even closely-held corporations receive tangible government benefits (tax incentives, access to marketplace protections, insulation from liability), and these benefits must only come in exchange for adherence to social responsibilities as expressed in generally applicable laws. That argument is a recurring narrative in religious exemption debates, but is not itself related to the size of any party in a RFRA claim.

Although popular press coverage continues to portray their claim as seeking to deny access to contraceptives, the Greens in fact provided health care coverage to their employees at Hobby Lobby stores, including sixteen different methods of FDA-approved birth control. The Greens declined, however, to provide four types of birth control, including ulipristal, which they argued could affect an embryo after fertilization, thus violating their religious

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84 *Hobby Lobby*, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-65.
87 *Hobby Lobby*, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
beliefs. The government did not challenge the validity of the Greens’ understanding of the drugs or their operation. Justice Alito’s opinion acknowledged that providing birth control was a compelling government interest, but faulted the government for failing to exercise the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

Hobby Lobby generated extensive media coverage, and with it, passionate public debate about RFRA laws generally. Their steady proliferation on the state level could no longer escape notice in the press. When Indiana introduced RFRA legislation modeled after the federal law, expanding it to provide a defense against private suits, the blowback was swift. Businesses condemned the bill and revoked tens of millions of dollars from corporate investment in Indiana. Republican Governor Mike Pence even signed a subsequent clarification that the law did not protect businesses to deny services on the basis of sexual orientation. In the following weeks, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson faced a similar dilemma. He ultimately signed the state’s RFRA law with a similar clarification.

Two recent state laws offer an opportunity to contrast post-Hobby Lobby approaches to religious liberties legislation. Georgia and Mississippi

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88 Id.
89 Brief for the Petitioners at 9 n.4, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *9; see also Jonathan H. Adler, No, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Decision is Not Based Upon a Scientific Mistake, WASH. POST, Jul. 6, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/06/no-the-supreme-courts-hobby-lobby-decision-is-not-based-upon-a-scientific-mistake/ (rejecting arguments that the opinion was based on “bunk science.”). “[T]he federal government accepted the plaintiffs’ characterization of the scientific evidence if not their conclusion that preventing implantation of an egg is the equivalent of an abortion.” Id.
90 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-83.
92 Id.
93 See Tony Cook & Brian Eason, Gov. Mike Pence Signs RFRA Fix, INDYSTAR, Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limited-protctions-for-lgbt/70766920/ (providing Indiana Governor Mike Pence’s full statement after he “signed into law a measure aimed at removing fears that the state’s new ‘religious freedom’ law would allow businesses to discriminate against gays and lesbians.”).
94 See Eric Bradner, Arkansas Governor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’ Measure, CNN, Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/31/politics/arkansas-religious-freedom-anti-lgbt-bill/ (“[Hutchinson] asked lawmakers to recall the law that the Arkansas House had given final approval . . . or to send him follow-up legislation that makes the changes he requested.”).
95 While North Carolina also earned media attention alongside Georgia and Mississippi, its legislation actually approached different issues with a different scope. While the other states
both passed religious liberties protections. Governor Nathan Deal vetoed the Georgia bill, while Governor Phil Bryant signed the Mississippi measure into law. Rather than simply accepting or rejecting religious exemptions across the board, these state examples offer an opportunity to contrast approaches. Their contrast underscores how drastically the scope of religious liberties legislation can vary state-by-state.

V. PLURALISM IN STATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY LAW

A. Georgia

In Georgia, social conservatives passed legislation to strengthen the religious exit rights of ministers, religious organizations, and private individuals.96 Critics quickly labeled it a license to discriminate, going beyond innocuous religious liberties protection and permitting businesses to deny service to LGBT customers.97 As purported compromises, supporters removed explicit protection for businesses and clarified that the bill would “not be used to allow discrimination banned by federal or state law.”98

These attempts at conciliation, however, did little to stem the growing tide of criticism directed at the bill.99 Local institutions ranging from professional sports franchises to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce balked, major companies threatened to divert investment away from Georgia, and the

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96 See H.B. 757, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016) [hereinafter Georgia Bill] (To protect religious freedoms . . . to provide that religious officials shall not be required to perform marriage ceremonies, perform rites, or administer sacraments in violation of their legal right to free exercise of religion . . . to protect property owners which are faith based organizations against infringement of religious freedom; to protect certain providers of services against infringement of religious freedom . . . .”).
97 Greg Bluestein, Breaking: Nathan Deal Vetoes Georgia’s ‘Religious Liberty’ Bill, ATL. J.-CONST., Apr. 19, 2016, http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2016/03/28/breaking-nathan-deal-will-veto-georgias-religious-liberty-bill/ (“[Corporate executives] joined with gay rights groups who warned that the measure amounts to legalized discrimination and pointed to the corporate outrage that rocked Indiana after a similar measure was signed into law there.”).
98 Id.
99 See id. (“Seen by supporters as a ‘compromise’ effort, the measure was swiftly condemned by the Metro Atlanta Chamber, the state’s most influential business group, and by leaders of major international tech corporations.”).
state’s business-friendly Republican governor grew nervous.\textsuperscript{100} Eventually, Governor Nathan Deal vetoed the bill, thus triggering threats from the legislature to introduce a similar measure again the following year.\textsuperscript{101}

Amid all the controversy, how much did the Georgia bill actually differ from longstanding federal law? As discussed above, the federal RFRA law simply established a two-prong process for reviewing religious liberty challenges: compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means.\textsuperscript{102} The Georgia bill, by contrast, waded deeper into specific hot-button issues.

It first provides religious ministers with a general right to decline participation in any marriage ceremony for religious reasons.\textsuperscript{103} This provision is hardly novel, and exists in other states without such heated controversy.\textsuperscript{104}

Second, the bill pivoted to the commercial sector to insulate business and industry from any legal requirement to work on religious days of rest, specifically the Judeo-Christian Saturday or Sunday.\textsuperscript{105} It seems at least plausible that this provision would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge on the grounds that it favors Christianity and Judaism over other religions by singling out Saturday and Sunday as days of rest. Such a claim is, however, outside the scope of this Comment.\textsuperscript{106}

Third, the bill reinforced the autonomy of churches and faith-based organizations to exercise discretionary control of their facilities, protecting them against liability if they deny access to some people on the basis of religious convictions.\textsuperscript{107} Religious conservatives are concerned that growing acceptance of gay marriage will lead to civil pressure to use the facilities of faith-based

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{100} Id.
\textsuperscript{101} Id.
\textsuperscript{102} 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) ("Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
\textsuperscript{103} Georgia Bill, supra note 96 ("All individuals who are ministers of the gospel or clerics or religious practitioners . . . shall be free to solemnize any marriage . . . or to decline to do the same, in their discretion, in the exercise of their rights to free exercise of religion . . . ").
\textsuperscript{104} See, e.g., FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 174 ("Religious clergy [in New York] continue to enjoy constitutional freedom not to perform marriages that offend their religious beliefs.").
\textsuperscript{105} Georgia Bill, supra note 96 ("No business or industry shall be required by ordinance or resolution of any county, municipality, or consolidated government to operate on either of the two rest days (Saturday or Sunday). ").
\textsuperscript{106} See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) ("Government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.").
\textsuperscript{107} Georgia Bill, supra note 96 ("No faith based organization shall be required to rent, lease, or otherwise grant permission for property to be used by another person for an event which is objectionable to such faith based organization.").
\end{footnotesize}
organizations, if not churches themselves, in ceremonies they find morally objectionable on religious grounds.\(^{108}\)

Fourth, the Georgia bill introduced general RFRA language requiring a compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means in order to substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion. The bill did not extend any protection to public employees, such as county clerks or other local magistrates to deny marriage licenses on a religious basis.\(^{109}\)

On the whole, the Georgia bill text itself did not amount to “legalized discrimination” about which the critics and alarmists warned.\(^{110}\) The Georgia legislature confined the bill’s scope to focus on religious organizations and individuals, not public officials or corporations.\(^{111}\) One exception is the weekend holiday provision, which seems to be the most disjointed of the bill’s sections. Aside from that requirement, the bill protects the sovereignty of religious individuals and organizations within their own spheres. Can religious liberty have any meaningful application if it does not include permitting religious groups to associate among themselves freely by hiring under their own criteria, or have facilities that may be used according to their religious beliefs?

These are exit rights, to be sure. But they provide an exit from majoritarian social norms to preserve distinct religious expression. Far from undermining our social fabric, these rights foster authentic religious communities. Freed from state coercion in hiring decisions and imposition of majoritarian rules about which religious ceremonies they must officiate, individuals can instead contribute to a diverse tapestry of religious communities. This pluralism of diverse groups allows each to thrive, as opposed to top-down imposition of pluralism within each group.

\(^{108}\) See Robert George, Timothy George & Chuck Colson, Manhattan Declaration Inc., Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience 4-7 (2009), http://manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration_full_text.pdf (“In New Jersey, after the establishment of a quasi-marital “civil unions” scheme, a Methodist institution was stripped of its tax exempt status when it declined, as a matter of religious conscience, to permit a facility it owned and operated to be used for ceremonies blessing homosexual unions.”).

\(^{109}\) Georgia Bill, supra note 96 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to . . . [a]fford any protection or relief to a public officer or employee who fails or refuses to perform his or her official duties. . . .”).

\(^{110}\) See, e.g., Bluestein, supra note 97.

\(^{111}\) Critics could argue that, because Hobby Lobby applied RFRA to a company, state RFRA laws always grant license to companies, and that comes at the risk of new discrimination. However, Hobby Lobby only considered a closely-held firm, not a public corporation, and the Court only ruled in light of a particularly onerous mandate. It strains credulity to say this means that any state law applying the RFRA test to religious claims opens the door to legalized discrimination. The unique case of racial discrimination is considered separately below.
B. Mississippi

Mississippi upped the ante, enacting H.B. 1523, titled the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act.”112 The law protects not religious views in general, but rather those religious or moral views specifically related to sexuality and marriage.113 Inclusion of moral rather than strictly religious views is significant, because the First Amendment may protect religious liberty more strongly than other moral convictions.114

Moving past the standard RFRA language of compelling governmental interests and least restrictive means (which Mississippi adopted in 2014),115 the new law reframed debate by prohibiting the government from “tak[ing] any discriminatory action against a religious organization” in a variety of ways.116 By focusing on religious organizations as sympathetic characters, thus casting them as victims rather than perpetrators of discrimination, the legislature mirrors the rhetorical strategy of social conservatives in the gay marriage debates.117 Governor Phil Bryant signed the bill into law under that justification. Critics, by contrast, lambasted state lawmakers for enabling “open discrimination” against gay citizens.118 In June 2016, a federal judge struck down the law for violating the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause.119

112 H.B. 1523, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) [hereinafter Mississippi Bill] (“The sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions protected by this act are the belief or conviction that: (a) Marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman; (b) Sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and (c) Male (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.”).
113 Id.
114 See generally Minow, supra note 25, at 782 (“The special treatment of religious groups is striking especially given the denial of comparable exemptions to secular nonprofit organizations, although the constitutional roots of religious free exercise offer a rationale for this different treatment.”).
116 Mississippi Bill, supra note 112 (“The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a religious organization wholly or partially on the basis that such organization . . . .”).
117 See, e.g., GEORGE, GEORGE & COLSON, supra note 108, at 8 (“We see it in the use of anti-discrimination statutes to force religious institutions, businesses, and service providers of various sorts to comply with activities they judge to be deeply immoral or go out of business.”).
118 Domonoske, supra note 12.
As for specific provisions, the law first builds on its marriage focus by specifically protecting those who provide “services, accommodations, facilities, goods or privileges” related to marriage against government action for declining involvement in that marriage. ¹²⁰ It later grants specific legal protection for goods and services such as wedding florists, photographers, and bakers — ancillary marriage services in the battleground of current litigation. ¹²¹

Second, the law provides a liability shield for religious organizations in their hiring decisions. ¹²² Religious organizations already enjoy a First Amendment ministerial protection against employment litigation, but the exception is limited to ministers—not necessarily all employees of a religious organization. ¹²³ Nor does a blanket protection for moral convictions necessarily equate to RFRA’s requirement of religious exercise. In *Hosanna-Tabor*, Chief Justice John Roberts rooted part of the majority opinion in the relationship of ministers to their congregation, a distinctly religious structure. ¹²⁴

Third, the law explicitly protects the rights of adoptive parents to teach their children consistent with the parents’ sincerely held religious or moral beliefs, presumably even if some people find those beliefs discriminatory. ¹²⁵

Fourth, the law prohibits state action against adoptive and foster parents on the basis that they refuse on a religious or moral basis to facilitate their child’s gender transition or sex reassignment. ¹²⁶

¹²⁰ *Id.* at *7.
¹²² H.B. 1523, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (“Makes any employment-related decision including, but not limited to, the decision whether or not to hire, terminate or discipline an individual whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of the religious organization, based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction described in Section 2 of this act. . . .”)
¹²³ *See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.*, 132 S. Ct. 694, 708 (2012) (evaluating a minister’s formal title given by a church, the substance reflected in that title, the minister’s own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed to conclude the ministerial exception covered the plaintiff).
¹²⁴ *Id.* at 706 (“The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.”).
¹²⁵ Mississippi Bill, *supra* note 112 (“The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a person who the state grants custody . . . wholly or partially on the basis that the person guides, instructs or raises a child . . . in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction. . . .”)
¹²⁶ *Id.*
Fifth, the law codifies the rights of individuals to reject access of transgender individuals to locker rooms and bathrooms of the non-birth gender with which they identify.\(^{127}\)

Sixth, the law sides with state employees who engage in “expressive conduct” based on their religious beliefs, with some time, place, and manner restriction allowed.\(^{128}\) The full scope of what “expressive conduct” encompasses remains unclear.

Seventh, the law allows for recusal by public officials with religious or moral convictions against issuing a marriage license.\(^{129}\) While the law attempts to avoid a Kim Davis-style conflict by requiring public offices to “take all necessary steps” to ensure the marriage is solemnized without delay, it remains unclear which side would win in a head-on conflict.\(^{130}\) If all clerks in an office refuse to sign a marriage license for a gay couple, can the entire office claim an exemption, or does the “all necessary steps” provision require one of them to set aside their religious objection?

The sweeping provisions of H.B. 1523 stand in marked contrast to Georgia, and bear almost no resemblance to RFRA laws in Arkansas and Indiana.\(^{131}\) Conceivably, we have lost sensitivity to the nuances of each bill because the critics are just as loud every time, and the supporters’ justifications sound remarkably the same every time.\(^{132}\) The protestors and sensationalists in

\(^{127}\) Id. (The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a person wholly or partially on the basis that the person establishes sex-specific standards or policies concerning . . . access to restrooms . . . or other intimate facilities or settings, based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction. . . .”).

\(^{128}\) Id.

\(^{129}\) Id.

\(^{130}\) Id. (“The Administrative Office of Courts shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the performance or solemnization of any legally valid marriage is not impeded or delayed as a result of any recusal.”).

\(^{131}\) The Arkansas and Indiana laws implemented the same two-prong test found in the Federal RFRA — the compelling government interest and least restrictive means tests. See generally Howard M. Friedman, 10 Things You Need to Know to Really Understand RFRA in Indiana and Arkansas, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/04/01/10-things-you-need-to-know-to-really-understand-rfra-in-indiana-and-arkansas/ (“If a person’s religious exercise is “substantially burdened,” the government must excuse the person from complying with the law unless the government can show that it has a ‘compelling interest’ and that there is not a less restrictive alternative that would carry out its interest with less of a burden on religious exercise.”).  

\(^{132}\) Slate pundit Mark Joseph Stern serves as one prominent example of an irascible critic of any religious liberty measure. Compare Mark Joseph Stern, Mike Pence Is Either Lying or Deluded About Indiana’s “Religious Freedom” Law, SLATE, Mar. 31, 2015, http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/31/mike_pence_is_either_lying_or_deluded_about_indiana_s_religious_freedom.html (“Here’s the easily substantiated truth behind the bill. Its supporters
Indiana and Arkansas may have inoculated the press and the public against their warnings. By labeling fairly tepid bills as “legalized discrimination” — even measures formerly supported by the ACLU — critics who truly understood the Mississippi bill’s ramifications could no longer turn the volume up any higher. They lacked rhetorical space to escalate their warnings for bills that actually did pose a greater threat to their interests.

Mississippi exceeded the scope of Georgia, Indiana, and Arkansas by providing explicit protection to government workers who refuse to perform their duties if they conflict with religious beliefs. This alters the relationship of religious exemptions to the state, and exceeds the bounds of any potential live-and-let-live compromise. The open-ended protection of religious “expressive conduct” by state employees is even more concerning. We have no reference point to understand what that means. Time, place, and manner restrictions are malleable concepts, open to recurring litigation, and state court judges in Mississippi may not be prone to rule against the time, place, and manner of religious expression. Consequently, this provision alone could open the most far-reaching Pandora’s box of dignitary harms to LGBT residents, sanctioning state employees in an undefined set of actions that could deny equal citizenship to the very taxpayers they are commissioned to serve.

Further, the state created another potentially broad cause of action by adoptive parents. By barring state action against adoptive parents on the basis of the parents’ beliefs about gender, the state could invite lawsuits if it declines to place a child with gender dysphoria in a family whose parents reject the existence of such a condition. Parents could then potentially sue to have a child placed in their home, and the state could not legally consider the family’s attitude toward gender when determining the suitability of their home.

Challengers succeeded at the trial court level by winning an injunction against the enforcement of HB 1523. U.S. District Court Judge Carlton Reeves ruled that HB 1523 violated the Establishment Clause because “the State has put its thumb on the scale to favor some religious beliefs over explicitly intended it to legalize discrimination against gay people — especially gay couples, who, lately, have faced discrimination from florists, bakers, and photographers who refuse to serve them.)” with Mark Joseph Stern, The Revival of Segregation in Mississippi, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/04/01/mississippi_s_new_anti_lgbtq_law_revives_segregation.html (“[Mississippi’s HB 1523] is an outward attempt to revive segregation, to demean sexual and gender minorities by depriving them of equal dignity under the law.”).

133 Id.
others. The Court also found animus against LGBT residents motivating the law, which could not comport with the Equal Protection Clause in light of Romer v. Evans and United States v. Windsor. Judge Reeves also noted that the law did “not place any duty on the recusing individual to ensure that LGBT citizens receive services.”

The Mississippi law’s provisions underscore how each state’s approach to religious exemptions can be wholly different when assessing these laws. Critics should carefully weigh their language to evaluate whether their dire warnings are overstated. Supporters should resist the urge to go for a “total win” in conservative states like Mississippi, and instead recognize that they would not take kindly to Professor Tushnut adopting their tactics to implement the opposing policy preferences.

VI. THE PROBLEM OF RACE

Most discussions of religious liberties exemptions arrive at the same sticky wicket: what would an exemption advocate say to a white supremacist group that seeks a religious exemption from the Civil Rights Act? How can the advocate of religious liberties reconcile the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bob Jones with its decision in Hobby Lobby? In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS did not violate the religious liberty of a hyper-conservative Christian college when it denied tax exempt status because the school maintained racially discriminatory policies, including a policy against interracial dating. By the time Bob Jones reached the Supreme Court, it focused on favorable tax treatment as a subsidy rather than behavior compelled by threat of punishment. Many religious exemption claims do not stem from such tax issues, although tax-exempt churches could conceivably be a focus of litigation.

136 Id. at *16.
139 Barber, 2016 WL 3562647, at *34. On this note, Judge Reeves contrasted the Mississippi Bill with Hobby Lobby, a case in which female employees would receive contraceptives regardless of the outcome of that case. Barber, 2016 WL 3562647, at *32.
141 See Minow, supra note 25, at 796 (2007) (“As presented to the Supreme Court, the clash between religious exercise and protection against racial discrimination concerned entirely the availability of favorable tax treatment.”).
All Americans analyzing the law must wrestle carefully with race. As Professor Inazu points out, race is unique as an institution in American history. Its unparalleled influence in America, along with its interplay with centuries of systematic and open discrimination in the Jim Crow South, warrant its own category of analysis. Without a doubt, LGBT Americans have suffered at the hand of discrimination since the earliest days of the republic. Despite the legacy of that injustice, it cannot be compared to methodical abduction, sale, and trafficking of millions of people across continents. Lack of social respect and workplace discrimination influence opportunities and underscore the need for equal citizenship. They do not, however, constitute an analog to centuries of open violence, a Constitutionally-established inferiority for over 50 years, and open, unmistakable identification with a marginalized group. That is certainly different from any “new majority” today, against whom religious claimants often seek relief.

These factors make the LGBT movement distinct from race among discreet and insular minorities. They do not, under any circumstance, mitigate or denigrate the real struggle facing LGBT communities in a post-Obergefell world—particularly for LGBT youth, who suffer from social ostracizing and higher suicide rates than other students. As a result, simply saying “race is different” may be an emotionally unfulfilling answer. But it is inescapably consistent with our institutional history and constitutional culture. This a reason similar to why courts evaluate racial equal protection claims differently than other equal protection claims, not even applying the same standard of review. Of course, simply acknowledging America’s distinct racial history does not automatically answer how potential religious claims about race should be analyzed. Nor does that acknowledgment necessitate any standard about religious claims regarding sexual orientation or same-sex marriages. But our racial history may inform just how compelling an interest the state has in racial nondiscrimination protections, and their extended political history may indicate how difficult it would be for lawmakers to tailor them more narrowly.

The special need for racial nondiscrimination protections is also corroborated by even the arch-libertarian himself, Professor Richard Epstein, who emphasizes the Civil Rights Act confronted an unprecedented system of

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142 See Inazu, supra note 35, at 603 (“The pervasive impediments to equal citizenship for African Americans have not been matched by any other recent episode in American history.”).

143 See generally Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/youth.htm (“A nationally representative study of adolescents in grades 7 to 12 found that lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth were more than twice as likely to have attempted suicide as their heterosexual peers.”).
private discrimination matched with violence, a systematically unfair legal systems, state-sanctioned discrimination and cronyism, along with a host of other threats not analogous to any factor other than race.\textsuperscript{144}

The other potential answer appeals to the nature of religious beliefs. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, among other religious traditions propagate sexual morality in some fashion. Under most traditional Christian creeds, churches interpreted the Bible to restrict sexual conduct to marriage. They also taught marriage as a conjugal institution between men and women. These teachings received, at various times, widespread support among clergy, theologians, and practicing Christians. Racial discrimination received a safe harbor in some southern churches, but may not have been a globally dominant religious tenant akin to sexual morality. The absolute lack of racist organizations currently seeking religious exemptions may offer some evidence of this position.

This second answer seems plausible, but legally weak as a distinguishing factor between race and gender identity. Courts consistently avoid ruling on the validity of religious beliefs, and for good reason — it’s hard to embrace pluralism and preach religious liberty if the state effectively exercises veto power over what is and what is not truly a religious belief.\textsuperscript{145} Trial courts might be able to find evidence of pretext to say that racist beliefs are not sincerely held, but in a close case, a court might struggle to articulate why it’s an inferior religious belief.

In general, such line-drawing problems rarely arise because most people without a religious exemption don’t seek one. In the event they did, the entirely one-of-a-kind nature of racial discrimination sets it apart as entailing separate nondiscrimination policies with independent justifications for their measures. The compelling governmental interest is so strong and unique that there is no way to sufficiently tailor means around objections, religious or otherwise.

\textbf{VII. THE WAY FORWARD}

In the spirit of liberty, the live-and-let-live solution is the only one that adopts a robust view of vibrant pluralism and properly embraces mutual adjustment. One promising example of such a compromise originated in Utah, where socially conservative Mormon leaders coalesced around a bill to ban


\textsuperscript{145} See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution.”).
discrimination against LGBT citizens. The law added sexual orientation and gender identity to protected classes such as race and gender. In exchange, the bill exempted religious organizations and their auxiliary bodies.

Even so, not everyone is happy. Religious leaders fear the protections are insufficiently strong because the law does not protect the wedding photographers and cake bakers protected by Mississippi and Georgia. Russell Moore, a prominent social conservative who heads the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberties Commission, warns that antidiscrimination ordinances are “not the right tactic” for Christians, preferring to assert a positive freedom of conscience. Nor does the law placate ardent progressive advocates, who see such compromise ordinances as a Trojan horse for religious conservative values. Crucially, the bill’s final version omitted public accommodations protections. LGBT citizens are therefore protected in employment and other settings, but not interactions with businesses, restaurants, and other public accommodations. Many states currently have no protections against public accommodation discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and contra warnings about state RFRA laws ushering in a new era of Jim Crow, public accommodations are not generally the hotbed of LGBT discrimination. Instead, in states like Washington with strong antidiscrimination protections for LGBT citizens, litigated cases center on narrow and discrete jobs that participate in same-sex weddings, like bakers and photographers, not restaurants or hotels refusing to serve LGBT customers. Naturally this does not disprove the need for nondiscrimination legislation, and certainly does not support a claim that it

147 Id. (“The bill would ban employers and landlords or property owners from discriminating against people on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, adding those categories to Utah’s laws that already protect against discrimination on the basis of race, sex and age.”).
148 Id. (“Religious organizations and their affiliates, such as colleges and charities, would be exempted.”).
149 Id. (“The bill, however, does not address what has become one of the most divisive questions on gay rights nationwide: whether individual business owners, based on their religious beliefs, can refuse service to gay people or gay couples — for example, a baker who refuses to make a cake for a gay wedding.”).
150 Id.
151 See generally Zack Ford, The ‘Utah Compromise’ Is A Dangerous LGBT Trojan Horse, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2016), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2016/01/29/3743944/utah-compromise-lgbt-nondiscrimination-protections/ (“[Bill supporter Robin Fretwell] Wilson’s past advocacy reinforces the notion that her latest support for LGBT protections are actually a Trojan-horse tactic.”).
152 See, e.g., Anna King, Washington High Court Hea... anti-discrimination.
is unwise policy. The consideration is only relevant to consider that equality advocates should consider praising Utah’s incremental progress, and recognize that the civil rights threat may be overstated.

Sometimes the best compromises fail to satisfy everyone. If we could set the clock back ten years, it’s difficult to envisage a world where LGBT advocates would not be thrilled to learn that the Mormon church in 2016 would embrace nondiscrimination protections in a state where gay marriage is legal. We should not, however, let the good serve as the enemy of the best, so it is important to understand that this framework (if not every aspect of the Utah compromise negotiation) has intrinsic value. Live-and-let-live solutions can follow the Utah model to embrace three key elements: 1) general nondiscrimination protections for LGBT citizens; 2) adequate protections for religious individuals and organizations in the form of a RFRA analysis; and 3) protection for equal citizenship that only uses governmental coercion as a last resort, after exhausting a proper statutory requirement of using least restrictive means.

**Conclusion**

Religious liberty claims enjoy a rich history that extends far beyond political compromises and pragmatism. America’s shared commitment to pluralism requires us to respect the dignity within each enclave of religious society. Our policymakers cannot offer that respect if they adopt the alternative view of pluralism, which tries to replicate the composition of society writ large within each religious enclave. Nor can they respect a vibrant pluralism if the government’s interest in protecting a shared social commitment to entry rights overrides liberty of conscience for each religious group. Instead, policymakers should acknowledge the dignitary interests undermined by state intervention. Governments must respect the autonomy of religious practice for individuals and religious organizations.

Such a vibrant pluralism creates space for a live-and-let-live provision of equal citizenship as well. Before coercing religious believers to participate in activity against their religious convictions, the government should be obligated to explore less restrictive means of accomplishing its objective. Harassing the lone photographer whose religion objects to same-sex marriage may advance goals of a shared social commitment to equal rights — or not, it might only provoke blowback. Either way, it certainly does not advance vibrant pluralism. Nor does it acknowledge that both parties have dignitary interests, but only one seeks to enforce theirs with the power of government force.

Keeping with these commitments, states can learn from the dangers of Mississippi and the strengths of Utah to craft new live-and-let-live solutions. These solutions need not implicate concerns about racial discrimination or
defining sincere religious beliefs. Instead, they can boldly assert a moral high ground of liberty. It may not be a universally popular solution, but from the earliest Madisonian experiments, liberty of conscience has proven to be a durable brand. When religious liberty can protect both personal conscience and equal citizenship, we’re reminded what a triumph of liberalism it remains.