Open for Business: Illinois Courts and Party Politics

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Illinois suffers from the most partisan system in the nation for electing judges—a system that erodes the independence of courts from politics.

Politics, Not Merit, Is the Crux of Selection for Illinois Judges: Judges at every court level must declare as a Democrat or Republican when they first run for office. This makes it easy for special interest groups, businesses, labor unions, trial lawyers, and political parties to donate heavily to judicial candidates. Illinois is among the few states with no formal merit process at any point in selecting judges.

Elections for Illinois Judges Are Giant Magnets for Out-of-State Campaign Contributions: Justice Lloyd Karmeier, a Republican with strong backing from big business, and his Democratic opponent spent $9.3 million on a supreme court seat for a sparsely populated rural district. Democrats play the money game, too. Up for a retention vote, Justice Thomas Kilbride received more than $2 million from the state Democratic Party and labor unions.

Illinois’ Partisan Elections Mimic Influence Peddling in Legislative Elections: Partisan judicial campaigns produce court rulings that set major public policies in Illinois. Behind these decisions, large corporations, powerful labor unions, wealthy trial lawyers, and entrenched political parties exploit the state’s partisan elections. This study identifies four major Illinois supreme court rulings that bear earmarks of campaign influence from big donors.

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The General Assembly Overpays Illinois Judges: Since 1983, the General Assembly has implemented an opaque process that overpays judges. Illinois’ appellate judges rank second in the nation for pay. Supreme Court justices are paid $220,873; and intermediate appellate justices are paid $207,882. Trial judges in Illinois rank third in the U.S. with pay of $190,758. This pay arrangement raises questions about the independence of the judiciary from the General Assembly in lawsuits over pension reforms and legislative redistricting.

Some Illinois Judges Game the Election System: Illinois’ system of electing judges greases the way for unethical conduct. Judges who are up for retention elections have “retired” and filed as “new” candidates in the general election. By doing so, they avoid the 60% retention requirement and need only 50% plus one vote for a new term. No rule prohibits this subterfuge.

Illinois Lacks an Effective Discipline Board for Judges: Unlike many states, Illinois has an outdated code of judicial conduct that fails to address the growing influence of money in judicial campaigns. This problem is magnified by Illinois’ highly ineffective judicial ethics board. A recent audit reported that the public had over 300 unanswered complaints against judges, some alleging misconduct and mental incapacity. When the public complains about a judge, the board issues discipline in less than one percent of these cases.

Illinois should follow other states by adopting more stringent campaign regulations, patterned after the revised ABA Model Code, for judges and judicial candidates. More broadly, Illinois should abolish partisan elections and replace them with a non-partisan commission of non-lawyer citizens, lawyers, and judges to select and retain judges on merit.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Context for Partisan Elections and Judicial Ethics

The Illinois General Assembly and governor are ridiculed for partisan politics—Illinois courts are not seen, however, as part of this problem. But my study shows that Illinois courts are similarly mired in legalized influence peddling. The state’s partisan elections for judges produce court rulings that set major public policies and nullify jury awards of billions of dollars. Leading up to these supreme court cases, large campaign donations to justices have left footprints of influence from corporations, labor unions, trial lawyers, and political parties.

My study adds to a literature that examines partisan elections for judges.1 I demonstrate how structural influences impinge on the independence of

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1 For an insightful essay published a century ago on this matter, see generally Samuel Rosenbaum, Election of Judges, or Selection?, 9 ILL. L. REV. 489 (1915). In his piece, Rosenbaum establishes that:

The candidates for the bench usually occupy minor places far down on the ballot, and are swept into office by the success of their party ticket . . . . Furthermore, the final choice is left to a body of voters who, as a class, have little conception of the duties and technical requirements of the office, and have not the training necessary to a right understanding of them. Yet in every state in the Union but thirteen, the entire judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the justices of the peace, are elected by popular vote.

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Illinois courts. These courts are shaped by the Democratic and Republican parties and General Assembly. Illinois does not use merit selection for judges. Illinois simply labels judges by their political party. The General Assembly sets judicial salaries at near-record levels. This pay practice raises additional questions about the independence of Illinois courts.

Illinois judges engage in political campaigning that other states strictly prohibit. Meanwhile, Illinois’ outdated Code of Judicial Conduct fails to deal with millions of dollars that fuel these elections. In sum, Illinois courts mimic the state’s corruption-prone political branches. Its judges are not corrupt, so far as the evidence shows—but by campaigning so much like elected politicians, some judges exercise influence-tinged power that makes them campaign like legislators, and colors their rulings as usurpations of legislative power.

B. Overview of Article

Section II.A of this article explains how Illinois’ method for selecting judges is seriously flawed.\(^2\) Elections align judges with political parties, and strategically labels them for wealthy donors who influence public policies. Constitutional theory from the *Federalist Papers* also suggests that this method fails to attract the brightest and most principled lawyers to the bench.\(^3\) On the other hand, this system tends to attract judicial candidates who are able to campaign like politicians. The result is that this highly partisan process hinders the judiciary’s fulfillment of its apolitical role.

Section II.B examines how Illinois overpays judges.\(^4\) This is worrisome because the pay system has been controlled by an obscure board whose members are named by the General Assembly.\(^5\) The scheme shields lawmakers from direct scrutiny because the board’s recommendations become law by default if the General Assembly fails within thirty days to reject them.\(^6\) Compounding the pay problem, judicial productivity in Illinois is declining.\(^7\) Considered as a whole, the system aligns the monetary interests of overpaid judges with their legislative benefactors—and while there is no evidence that the pay process compromises judicial integrity, it deprives taxpayers of accountability and transparency.

\(^2\) *Infra* notes 20–39.
\(^3\) *Infra* notes 30–35.
\(^4\) *Infra* notes 40–69.
\(^5\) *Infra* notes 40–41.
\(^6\) *Infra* notes 42–45.
\(^7\) *Infra* notes 58–59.
Section II.C exposes judicial misconduct related to partisan elections. Some Illinois judges who have barely survived retention elections (contests with no opponent) “game” their next election by retiring from office and declaring themselves as new candidates in a general election. This lowers the threshold for winning election from sixty percent to fifty percent plus one vote. The retire-to-run ruse conflicts with the intent of the Illinois Constitution, and it reveals character flaws in some judges.

Section III.A explores how partisan judicial elections compromise the independence of Illinois courts. Multi-million dollar support from business groups for a Republican supreme court justice enabled him to vote to reverse multi-billion dollar judgments against State Farm Insurance and Phillip Morris. Likewise, large campaign donations to two Democratic justices by their party, as well as by unions and trial lawyers, enabled them to vote in major cases to broaden tort liability for medical providers.

Section III.B explains how the Illinois Judicial Code of Conduct is toothless and outdated. Illinois waited more than a decade after the American Bar Association passed its Model Code of Judicial Conduct before it adopted the new rules. Even then, Illinois adopted only parts of the Model Code, and it avoided stringent standards for political campaigning. I compare how other states aggressively regulate campaign activities for judicial candidates.

Section III.C compares the inactivity in code enforcement in Illinois to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that deal with similar problems in other states. In two cases involving partisan elections, the Court has ruled that judicial campaigning violated the constitutional rights of citizens. In a third case involving non-partisan judicial elections, the Court upheld a state bar’s sanction of a candidate who wrote a letter to solicit donations. When these cases are compared to controversial Illinois judicial campaigns, the implication is that Illinois judges are not held accountable for compromising judicial independence.

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8 Infra notes 70–90.
9 Infra notes 76–79, 81–82.
11 Infra notes 94–95, 98–102.
12 Infra notes 103–07.
13 Infra notes 110–33.
14 Infra note 120.
15 Infra note 131.
16 Infra notes 132–33.
17 Infra notes 134–39.
18 Infra notes 137, 139.
19 Infra note 138.
In Section IV, I offer several recommendations. Illinois should (1) abolish partisan elections for judges, (2) update and strengthen its judicial code to restrain influence peddling by donors, and (3) increase funding and staffing for currently ineffective judicial ethics board.

II. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES OF POLITICS ON ILLINOIS JUDGES

A. Selection Processes

The Illinois Constitution establishes a supreme court, appellate courts, and circuit courts. Illinois citizens elect judges. Circuit judges serve terms of six or four years; appellate judges serve ten-year terms. A judge must run in a general election, sometimes against an opponent, for a first term. In these situations, state law mandates partisan elections at the three levels. Thereafter, judges who run for another term must win at least sixty percent of the votes cast in a non-partisan retention election. By this time, their party affiliation is known to groups that donate heavily in these elections.

These selection methods are the result of a statewide vote for a new constitution in 1970. The Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association advocated merit selection of judges and put this idea on the ballot. Voters favored Proposition 2A, providing for partisan election of judges, thus defeating merit selection in Proposition 2B.

This vote kept Illinois in a tiny minority of states that run judicial elections like elections for legislators and executive branch officers. Only eight states have partisan elections for their court of last resort. In addition, Illinois

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20 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
21 See id. § 12(a) (“Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at primary elections or by petition.”).
22 Id. § 10; see also About the Courts in Illinois, ILLINOIS COURTS, http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/General/CourtsInIL.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (“Circuit Judges are elected for a term of six years; Associate Judges are appointed . . . for a four-year term.”).
23 46 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7(1) (West 2010).
24 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
25 History of Reform Efforts: Illinois, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts.cfm?state=IL (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (establishing that the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association worked for two decades to put merit selection on the ballot leading up to the 1970 referendum and that, even after the merit option was voted down, these groups continued to advocate for this selection method).
26 Id. (confirming that Proposition 2A prevailed by 146,000 votes).
27 Bill Raftery, 8 States Continue to Have Partisan Elections for Their Top Courts; A Look at Legislative Efforts to Move to Nonpartisan, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Mar. 9, 2015), http://gavelto
is among only thirteen states with no merit commission for judges, and only
eleven states with partisan election of general jurisdiction judges.\textsuperscript{28}

Why is this a problem? To begin, when donors and voters see a political
label next to a judge’s name, this signals that the candidate shares the party’s
values. Thus, a judge is forever identified as Republican or Democratic even
when these labels are not used in a retention election. Campaign donors—
especially business groups, labor unions, trial lawyers, and political parties—
are able to make calculated decisions about investing in judicial candidates.\textsuperscript{29}
The fact that these donors give millions of dollars to high-level candidates
signifies their confidence that party affiliation reliably predicts a judge’s key
votes in future cases.

\textsuperscript{28} U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 242850, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION (2013), Map 3 at 6 (depicting Illinois among twelve other states with no
judicial commission), Map 4 at 6 (depicting Illinois among ten other states with partisan
election of general jurisdiction judges).

\textsuperscript{29} See generally BILLY CORRIHER, PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE DISTORTING
INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CASH, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (2012), https://www.ameri
canprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2012/10/25/42895/partisan-judicial-elections-
and-the-distorting-influence-of-campaign-cash/, for a discussion on the increase in judicial
campaign contributions and overall divisiveness in those states that elect or nominate judicial
candidates in partisan races.

Why are partisan judicial races so much more expensive than nonpartisan
contests? One answer could be that potential campaign donors find it easier
to donate money in these races. In states with partisan judicial elections,
there is a ready-built infrastructure for “bundling” donations in place, with
state parties acting as conduits for special interests.

\textsuperscript{Id.} at 2. For a specific illustration, see ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS
LIST, https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/ContributionsSearchByAllContribu
tions.aspx (search with “The Illinois Chamber PAC” as “Last or Only Name” and “10/29/2004”
as “Received Date”) (reporting on a contribution made by the Illinois Chamber PAC to Justice
Lloyd A. Karmeier in the amount of $20,000 on October 29, 2004).
The nation’s constitutional founders envisioned independence for courts, framed in a theory of separation of powers. While they saw the judiciary as the weakest branch, they conferred special legitimacy to courts by conceiving them as an intermediate body to protect citizens from the stronger branches. Illinois’ constitution enacts this theoretical foundation by expressly defining judicial power as distinct from others.

The state’s partisan election system works against this core principle, however, by encouraging judges to campaign like everyday politicians. As a result, judicial independence is compromised. Judges are open game for political factions that compete to control the other branches. Thus, the people lose an important constitutional check against a partisan faction that can marginalize minority groups.

Illinois’ method for selecting judges also affects the quality of judging. Alexander Hamilton theorized that judges need years to understand precedents on which they base their decisions. Judges should have high intellect and sound character, an unusual combination; and to attract these people, judges should be shielded from political pressure. Illinois is heedless to these

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30 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 401-08 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (stating the theory that the judiciary is independent of the political branches). “[T]he judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment . . . .” Id. at 402.

31 Id. (“[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every-thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . . that as, from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches . . . .”).

32 Id. (“It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”).

33 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”).

34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 30, at 407 (voicing concerns that judges should not exercise arbitrary discretion). To counteract this possibility, Hamilton urged that judges “should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . . .” Id. He understood that “it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.” Id.

35 Hamilton understood that “few men in the society . . . will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.” Id. Furthermore, Hamilton remarked that “making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.” Id. Finding
concerns. The state runs partisan judicial elections—on the same ballot, at the same time, and with the same background issues—as for politicians. Politics, not merit, is the crux of selection for Illinois judges.

Compounding this problem, Illinois differs from most states by failing to use commissions to screen candidates for judicial office. While maintaining this standard-less system, Illinois has ignored legal experts who advocate merit selection.

This partisan system allows money to shake hands with Illinois candidates for judicial office. By anchoring judicial office to the Democratic and Republican parties, Illinois is the nation’s leading money magnet for out-of-state campaign donations. And ironically, Illinois’ partisan system has led to its entrenched supreme court—ironic because elections are meant to give voters more influence than merit commissions, and should therefore expose candidates to more turnover. If justices fully serve their current terms, they will average 19.2 years of unbroken tenure.

judges with high intellect and character would therefore require unusual independence from political influences and long tenure. In particular, Hamilton concluded:

[T]he government can have no great option between fit character; and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity.

Id.


37 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 25.

38 REPORT: ILLINOIS HAD HIGHEST SHARE OF OUTSIDE SPENDING IN 2014 STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, PROGRESS ILLINOIS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.progressillinois.com/posts/content/2015/11/05/report-illinois-had-highest-share-outside-spending-2014-state-supreme-court. For a specific illustration, see ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS LIST, https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/ContributionsSearchByAllContributions.aspx (search with “Morgan Stanley” as “Last or Only Name” and “10/7/2004” as “Received Date”) (reporting on a contribution made by Morgan Stanley to Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier in the amount of $25,000 on October 7, 2004). See also SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 13 (2015), http://newpoliticsreport.org/app/uploads/JAS-NPJE-2013-14.pdf (reporting that Illinois and Tennessee had the most expensive retention elections of the 2013–14 campaign season). Illinois state supreme court Justice Karmeier’s election was ranked first in the nation for “Non-Candidate Spending Total,” at $3,043,620.45, and for percent of “Non-Candidate Spending,” at 90.8%. Id. at 68.

39 This information was compiled from Meet the Illinois Supreme Court Justices, ILLINOIS COURTS, http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/supremecourt/meetsupremecourt.asp, which lists Thomas
B. Judicial Salaries and the General Assembly

Illinois’ method for determining pay for judges strips another layer of separation from party politics. A 1982 law created a continuous process for raising pay for judges. The General Assembly formed the Compensation Review Board, an obscure public body, to adjust salaries for all state officers, including judges. This 12-person board is appointed by Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, Senate President, and Senate Minority Leader, underscoring the General Assembly’s control over the livelihoods of judges. The board determines pay for public offices and reports its recommendations to the General Assembly. Because the constitution forbids reduction of judicial salaries, the board can only recommend no change or a pay raise. The law frustrates public airing of judicial pay. Instead, it automatically executes the pay recommendation if the General Assembly does not vote to reject it within 30 session days.

Quinn v. Donnewald challenged this process, arguing that pay raises could not be made constitutionally by the inaction of the General Assembly. Justices on the Illinois supreme court—who stood to benefit from this back-door process—upheld the pay plan. The court weakly rationalized the pay practice on grounds that fifteen other states set pay similarly.


See 53 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 290/1 (establishing salaries for state officials, including judges). The Act increased judicial salaries beginning in 1983, when the state was directed to pay the higher amount of the increased rate set forth in the statute or the amount set by the Compensation Review Board. Id. This pay salary applied to all judicial offices. 53 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 290/3.1-3.3 (West 2010).


Id.

See ILL. CONST., art. VI, § 14 (forbidding reduction in pay for judges).

63 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/5 (West 2010). If the General Assembly fails to adopt a resolution regarding the Board’s in 30 session days, the Board’s recommended salaries take effect and the General Assembly is required to appropriate funds to pay those salaries. 63 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/6 (West 2010).

483 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. 1985).

Id. at 223.

Id. at 219.
in *Jorgensen v. Blagojevich*, the Illinois supreme court protected their own pay, holding that a governor’s veto of a cost of living adjustment for judges was unconstitutional.49

The annual cost of living adjustment has been repealed since 2009.50 But these laws do not necessarily prohibit other ways to increase judicial salaries, nor do they abolish the Compensation Review Board. This leaves an unclear picture of how judges’ salaries are now set. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) currently says that pay recommendations are set by the board.51 My inquiry did not reveal, however, membership on this board, nor was I able to verify its existence.52

This long running pay system shows that the General Assembly and Governor fight over who sets pay for judges. NCSC’s current national survey of judicial pay shows that the General Assembly has won this battle, leading to exceptionally high salaries for their robed colleagues. Pay for Illinois’ appellate judges ranks second in the nation.53 The state’s supreme court justices are paid $220,873; and intermediate appellate justices are paid $207,882.54 Trial judges rank third in the nation with pay of $190,758.55

These lofty salaries are made without regard to judicial productivity. From 2004 to 2012, pay for Illinois judges rose 29% due to raises and hiring of more judges.56 Meantime, felony caseloads dropped 13%.57 Illinois judges averaged 4,553 total cases (criminal and civil) in 2009. Busier judges in

49 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2005).
50 63 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/5.6-5.9, 6.1-6.4 (West 2010).
51 *Judicial Salary Tracker, Illinois*, supra note 42.
55 Id.
57 Id.
Wisconsin (6,611 total cases) and Indiana (4,983 total cases) earned about $50,000 less. The Illinois supreme court also noted declining productivity.

The co-mingling of monetary interests of Illinois judges and legislators is also suggested by their gold plated pension plans. A recent analysis shows that nearly 40 percent of the state’s 789 retired judges make more money in pensions than when they sat on the bench. The average annual judicial pension in 2015 was $132,426, about $25,304 more in retirement than they were paid in their final salaries. Similarly, 104 of 310 former elected state officials receive state pensions in amounts higher than their final salaries.

In two recent cases, the Illinois supreme court struck down laws that tried to repair massively underfunded public pensions. Its opinion in In re Pension Reform Litigation mentioned that lawmakers excluded the Judges’ Retirement System of Illinois from pension cutting legislation. This was the court’s tacit admission that lawmakers curried favor with judges by protecting only judicial pensions. The court’s opinion did not discuss, however, that the judicial pension system is distressed and needs cuts, too. While this decision is legally sound, it also set a powerful precedent for preserving pensions of the judges who joined in this ruling.

Currently, the issue of separation of powers between Illinois courts and the General Assembly lurks in a major legal controversy over drawing a map for legislative districts. In Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, a Demo-

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58 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Jones v. Mun. Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 50 N.E.3d 596, 596 (Ill. 2016); In re Pension Reform Litigation, 32 N.E.3d 1, 1 (Ill. 2015).
64 In re Pension Reform Litigation, supra note 63, at 11.
65 Id. at 1-30. See JUDGES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS 12 (2015), https://www.srs.illinois.gov/PDFILES/oldAnnuals/jrs2015.pdf (indicating that the Judges’ Retirement System of Illinois had a funding ratio of 35.4% for its pension plan in 2015).
cratic judge blocked a petition with 570,000 signatures to allow voters in the 2016 general election to authorize an independent commission to redraw legislative maps. The opinion has strong political overtones, even though Circuit Judge Diane Larsen is widely respected. But according to Governor Bruce Rauner, a Republican who supports the voter petition, “If this decision remains in place, it will prove that we need to put political reform at the top of our legislative agenda.” The map case is unavoidably political; but the Illinois constitution and judiciary would be better served if judges were elected as non-partisan candidates or appointed by a merit commission. This would minimize the appearance of political influence in matters of great importance to Illinois voters.

C. Judicial Conduct Related to Partisan Elections

A recent judicial election in Florida offers a benchmark for measuring the low ethics of some Illinois judges. When Lanell Williams-Yulee ran for an elected judgeship, she wrote that would she “bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the judicial bench.” In the same letter, she added that a “contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to ‘Lanell Williams–Yulee Campaign for County Judge,’ will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get our message out to the public.” The Florida Bar charged her with violating its Code of Judicial Conduct, which bans personal solicitations for campaign funds. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Florida did not violate the candidate’s First Amendment rights.

Illinois greased the way for judges to make unethical campaign statements by misleading the public. For context, 112 judges have filed petitions

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68 See Williams, infra note 141, at 1909 (“A multimember court must not have its guarantee of neutrality undermined, for the appearance of bias demeans the reputation and integrity not just of one jurist, but of the larger institution of which he or she is a part.”).


71 Id.

72 Id.

73 Id.

74 People ex rel. Francis X. Golniewicz v. Ill. Court’s Comm’n, No. 05 CH 11679, 2006 WL 4660087 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006). The petitioner was removed as a Cook County judge.
for retention elections in November 2016.\textsuperscript{75} Three judges in St. Clair County who are up for retention elections “retired” to refile as new candidates in the general election.\textsuperscript{76} By doing so, they will avoid the sixty percent retention requirement and will need to garner only one more vote than their opponents to serve again.\textsuperscript{77}

Sounding like a smooth talking politician, Judge John Baricevic said that running in the general election would “allow[] him to speak out more about issues that affect the judiciary,”\textsuperscript{78} a phrase that is similar to Yulee’s statement that had led to her discipline.\textsuperscript{79} Judge Baricevic failed to mention, however, that his devious strategy violated the spirit of the Illinois Constitution, which regulates retention elections.\textsuperscript{80} His less noble intention—not mentioned in his appeal to voters—was to game the system in order to survive the next election. In his 2010 retention election, Judge Baricevic squeaked by with 62.49% “yes” votes—a margin of about two percentage points.\textsuperscript{81} In the 2016 election, he could have polled twelve percentage points less than he did in 2010, and won another term on the bench. St. Clair County Judge Lloyd Cueto retired to run in the 2006 general election, which he won.\textsuperscript{82}

These retiring judges might also be angling to double dip—that is, receive retirement income while earning income in their “new” job. This recently happened in New York, where State Supreme Court Justice Brian DeJoseph retired on December 31, 2014 and began a new term of office the next day.\textsuperscript{83} His election to a new term exploited a loophole in New York’s after he falsely claimed that he was a lifelong resident of the sub-circuit. \textit{Id}. The Illinois Courts Commission found this to be “a misrepresentation and a violation of Rule 62 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to conduct themselves ‘in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity . . . of the judiciary.’” \textit{Id}.\textsuperscript{75} \textsc{State of Ill. Exec. Dept’}, \textsc{List of Judges Seeking Retention in the November 8, 2016 General Election} (2016).

\textsc{George Pawlaczyk}, \textsc{Who Will Appeals Court Side with in St. Clair County Judges Case? Bellevue News-Democrat} (June 7, 2016), \url{http://www.bnd.com/news/local/article82338447.html} (reporting that three Democratic judges—John Baricevic, Robert Haida and Robert LeChièn—prevailed in a challenge before the state election board and lower court).\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Id}.\textsuperscript{77}\textit{Id}.\textsuperscript{78}\textsc{Id}; \textsc{Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015)} (“[Yulee’s] stated purpose for the solicitation was to get her ‘message out to the public.’”).\textsuperscript{79} \textsc{Ill. Const.} art. VI, § 12.

\textsc{George Pawlaczyk}, \textsc{Baricevic, Haida and LeChien Spurn Retention Vote, Will Run in General Election, Bellevue News-Democrat} (Aug. 26, 2015), \url{http://www.bnd.com/news/local/article32427582.html}.\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Id}.\textsuperscript{81}\textsc{Id}.\textsuperscript{82}\textsc{Id}.\textsuperscript{83}\textsc{Michelle Breidenbach}, \textsc{Judge DeJoseph to Double Dip with Pension and Salary in New Term, Syracuse.com} (Jan. 14, 2015), \url{http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01/judge_dejoseph_double_dips_with_pension_and_salary_in_new_term.html}.\textsuperscript{84}
retirement law, enabling him to bank an estimated $112,000 a year in pension benefits while concurrently earning $183,300 as salary.\textsuperscript{84} In Pennsylvania, eighty-six judges similarly double-dip, having received in 2012, for instance, nearly $11 million in combined pension and salary payments.\textsuperscript{85}

Illinois has a similar problem. Judge Michael McCuskey, now an Illinois circuit court judge, took his current post after he retired from his federal judgeship.\textsuperscript{86} Upon retirement, he became eligible by federal law for a full-salary pension of $199,100 per year.\textsuperscript{87} He quickly returned to the bench—simply by changing a federal robe for a state robe.\textsuperscript{88} In Illinois, he earns $190,758.\textsuperscript{89}

Thus, Judge McCuskey appears to be paid about $389,858 annually from his federal pension and state salary. Nothing in the Judicial Code addresses this

\textsuperscript{84} Id.


\textsuperscript{87} \textit{See} 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)(2) (“In a case in which a justice or judge retires . . . the justice or judge shall continue to receive the salary that he or she was receiving when he or she was last in active service . . . .”), \textit{see also} \textsc{United States Courts, Judicial Compensation}, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation. Upon reaching age 65, a federal judge may retire at his or her current salary, or take senior status, after performing 15 years of active service as an Article III judge. \textit{Id.} According to Judge McCuskey’s biographical information, he was born in 1948 and served as a federal district court judge from 1998 until he assumed senior status on June 30, 2013. \textsc{Fed. Judicial Ctr., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: McCuskey, Michael Patrick}, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2765. On May 31, 2014, he retired from senior status. \textit{Id.} In 2013, Judge McCuskey would have qualified for $174,000—but by staying one additional year on senior status, his pay increased to $199,100. \textsc{United States Courts, Judicial Compensation}, \textit{supra} note 87.

\textsuperscript{88} To obtain a copy of Judge McCuskey’s annual filing of economic interests under Rule 68, I traveled to the Illinois supreme court in Springfield on July 20, 2016—a distance of about 80 miles. Per Rule 68, I was required to identify myself, list my address and occupation, and state my reason for obtaining this information. After paying 25 cents per page for a copy of the report, I verified that he retired as a federal judge and listed this pension on his report (copy available upon request from the author). By rule, the Judge was provided a copy of my request. Judge McCuskey ran unopposed in the March 2016 primary election for circuit judge. \textsc{Michael McCuskey}, \textsc{Ballotpedia}, https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_Mcuskey (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). For a more general discussion on judicial retirement, \textit{see generally} Stephen B. Burbank et al., \textit{Leaving the Bench, 1970 –2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those- se Choices, and Their Consequences}, 161 \textsc{U. Penn. L. Rev.} 1 (2012).

\textsuperscript{89} \textsc{Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra} note 54.
problem, perhaps because drafters never thought that a judge would stoop so low. Aggravating this problem, Rule 68 of the Illinois Code creates an informational obstacle course for anyone who wants to discover if a judge is double dipping with a public pension. Judge McCuskey’s money grab, facilitated and obscured by unnecessary barriers in Rule 68, reduces public confidence in Illinois courts.

III. THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ON JUDGES

A. Partisan Fundraising and Erosion of Judicial Independence

Illinois has experienced an alarming growth in political fundraising for judges, and these campaigns increasingly attract huge donations by anonymous, out-of-state donors. This spending is out of control for Democratic and Republican candidates. On the Republican side, Justice Lloyd Karmeier’s epic election in 2004 raised more money than eighteen U.S. Senate elections. He and his Democratic opponent spent $9.3 million on a supreme court seat for a sparsely populated rural district.

Why did this race attract so much money? State Farm Insurance Co. donated heavily to Justice Karmeier at the time it was pursuing an appeal in Avery

90 Rule 68 requires judges to make a declaration of economic interests. See ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES, Rule 68 ¶ 4. By administrative order, current economic interests specifically include a “pension plan.” Id., at Rule 68, Administrative Order. But the information is not available online—indeed, one must personally travel to Springfield or Chicago to inspect the filing, and further: “Each person requesting examination of a statement or portion thereof must first fill out a form prepared by the Director specifying the statement requested, identifying the examiner by name, occupation, address and telephone number, and listing the date of the request and the reason for such request.” Id., at Rule 68 ¶ 4; see also supra note 88 (noting that my trip to Springfield was necessary to verify Judge McCuskey’s federal judicial pension).

91 See National Center for State Courts, JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_financing.cfm?state (“Between 1990 and 2000, combined spending by supreme court candidates in Illinois increased 37%, and primary election spending grew by 132.”); see, e.g., ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS LIST, https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/ContributionsSearchByAllContributions.aspx (search with “JUSTPAC” as “Last Name or Only Name” and “10/12/2004 Thru 10/13/2004” as “Received Date”) (reporting on contributions made by JUSTPAC to Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier in the amount of $150,000 on October 12, 2004 and $186,125 on October 13, 2004).


The trial court awarded policyholders $1 billion in damages for the insurer’s fraudulent use of inferior parts to repair cars. After Justice Karmeier was elected, he voted to overturn this ruling.

The 2004 election hounds him today. Recently, a federal judge ordered him to sit for a deposition in a RICO lawsuit against State Farm that stems from the insurer’s campaign donations. In 2014, Justice Karmeier barely survived a bitterly contested retention election that attracted more than $2 million to attack his record.

Justice Karmeier also voted in 2005 to overturn a $10.1 billion judgment in Price v. Philip Morris Inc. The trial court ruled that the tobacco firm fraudulently marketed light cigarettes as a less harmful smoking alternative. The tobacco industry and other business groups donated heavily to Justice Karmeier. Plaintiffs asked for his recusal but he declined. A short time later, he voted in the majority to reverse the judgment against Phillip Morris.

On the Democratic side, Justice Charles Freeman has been on the Illinois supreme court since 1990. In 2002, after his best year for campaign donations in 2000, Justice Freeman wrote the court’s opinion in Dillon v.
Evanston Hospital. 103 The opinion changed 80 years of precedent by allowing Illinois courts to recognize damages for the increased risk of future injury— in other words, damages for speculative injuries. 104

In November 2010, Thomas Kilbride, another Democratic justice, was at the center of an intense campaign controversy over his then-recent vote with the majority in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hosp. 105 By a 4-2 vote, the Illinois supreme court struck down a state statute that capped certain non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases. 106 Up for a retention vote, Justice Kilbride received more than $2 million from the state Democratic Party and labor unions, while business groups spent $600,000 to oppose him. 107 At the time, the money spent on this campaign made it the second highest judicial retention campaign. 108 Justice Kilbride prevailed in a close contest, receiving 65.88% of his district’s votes— a victory margin of less than six percentage points in a race with only one candidate. 109

B. State Regulation of Judicial Campaigns

Some judges become entangled in ethics probes over their legal problems. 110 Putting those examples of character flaws aside, I ask here how Illinois compares to other states in regulating judicial campaign ethics. There is no easy way to quantify an answer, but no Illinois judge has been disciplined in the past decade for campaign violations. 111

104 Id. at 503.
106 Id.
107 Johnson, supra note 105.
108 Id.
110 See Erica Orden & Mike Vilensky, New York Justice Resigns, Pleads Guilty to Receiving Bribe, WALL STREET J. (June 29, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/n-y-supreme-court-judge-pleads-guilty-to-bribery-1467239239 (reporting that New York State Supreme Court Justice John Michalek was charged with receiving gifts from a political operative who had an interest in civil cases before the judge); Claudia Lauer, Judge Resigns After Accused of Sexual Abuse Over 3 Decades, CSL.COM (May 9, 2016), https://www.ksl.com/?nid=157&sid=39702533&title=arkansas-judge-resigns-amid-sexual-misconduct-investigation (reporting that Arkansas Cross County District Judge Joseph Boeckmann, Jr. resigned amid allegations that he traded sex for reduced sentences for defendants).
111 Some have attempted to measure the impact of campaigns on court rulings. See, e.g., Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, State Supreme Court Ideology And 'New Style' Judicial, SSRN
The original source for state judicial codes is the Canons of Judicial Ethics, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1924. The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct was established in 1964 by the Illinois Judicial Conference, which used the Canons as its main source. A major scandal in 1969 involving two supreme court justices led to a constitutional overhaul of the judiciary. As a result, the high court adopted a commission’s recommendations for new conduct rules for judges.

In 1972, the American Bar Association replaced its Canons with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The new code provided a more detailed set of substantive rules for judicial ethics. But Illinois never fully embraced the Model Code. This helps to explain why the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board rarely deals with complaints about fundraising and campaigning— the state lacks appropriate ethics rules.


115 See Rubin Cohn, The Illinois Judicial Department— Changes Effected by the Constitution of 1970, 1971 ILL. L. F. 355, 380-82 (1971) (detailing Sherman Skolnik’s successful efforts to force two Illinois supreme court justices to resign after they accepted stock in a Chicago bank from a defendant whose case they were to decide— and for whom they ruled favorably). For more details, see THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, IN THE MATTER OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION IN RELATION TO NO. 39797 (PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, APPELLANT V. THEODORE J. ISAACS ET AL.), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/manast/commission report.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“The Commission finds that [this Judge] has consistently engaged in a pattern of behavior that violated the judicial canons, demeaned the integrity of the judiciary, and brought the judicial office into disrepute . . . The Commission finds that the only appropriate remedy in this case is to remove and dismiss respondent from the office of Circuit Court Judge . . .”)


117 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 112, at *8.

118 Id.

119 STATE OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, SUMMARIES OF COMPLAINTS FILED WITH THE COURTS COMMISSION (2016), http://www.illinois.gov/jib/Pages/summariescomplain
In particular, the Illinois Code is not equipped to deal with millions of dollars that fuel partisan elections. This problem traces to 1986, when Illinois belatedly updated its Code by using the ABA Code. Even then, the Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee accepted only parts of the Model Code.\(^{120}\) By 1994, a study of Illinois courts voiced concern about the rapid growth in campaign funding for some elections and suggested monitoring for future funding practices.\(^{121}\) But no revisions address this concern—indeed, 1994 was the last time Illinois revised its Canon for “Inappropriate Political Activity.”\(^{122}\) Since then, campaign donations to judicial candidates have exploded exponentially.

\(^{ts.aspx.}\) These cases include 15 CC-1 Filed February 6, 2015, Beatriz Santiago, Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County (related to refinancing of her mortgage); 14 CC-2, Filed July 24, 2014, Scott D. Drazewski, Circuit Judge, 11th Circuit, McLean County and Rebecca S. Foley, Circuit Judge, 11th Circuit, McLean County (related to their extramarital affair); 14 CC-1 Filed June 20, 2014, Joseph P. Hettel, Circuit Judge, 13th Circuit, LaSalle County (based on driving under the influence of alcohol); 13 CC-1 Filed August 13, 2013, Cynthia Y. Brim, Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County (based on inappropriate comments and battery in court); 12 CC-1 Filed July 13, 2012, Joseph C. Polito, Associate Judge, 12th Circuit, Will County (based on use of work computer to access pornographic websites during work hours in chambers); 11 CC-1 Filed February 18, 2011, Douglas J. Simpson, Associate Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County (based on improper influence of another judge in a matter involving auto shop where his car was being serviced); 10 CC-2 Filed November 8, 2010, Christopher G. Perrin, Associate Judge, 7th Circuit, Sangamon County (based on improper influence of another judge in a case involving daughter’s traffic citation); and 2010 CC-1 Filed September 24, 2010, Kenneth L. Popejoy, Circuit Judge, 18th Circuit, DuPage County (related to car accident and unsafe driving). \(\text{Id.}\)


It was . . . not feasible to recommend that the ABA canons be adopted verbatim. Specific provisions of the Illinois Constitution and statutes as well as circumstances unique to Illinois required that the canons be modified in accord with any superseding legal requirements and extraordinary circumstances. The committee commentary is primarily concerned with these modifications; however, wherever appropriate, the ABA commentary has been incorporated into the committee commentary.


\(^{122}\) CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 113. Rule 67- Canon 7, titled “A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity,” was adopted Dec. 2, 1986 (eff. Jan. 1, 1987); amended April 20, 1987 (eff. Aug. 1, 1987); and amended Aug. 6, 1993 (eff. Mar. 24, 1994). Id. The Illinois Code has not changed over the past 22 years while judicial elections have exploded with multi-million dollar, nationally-financed campaigns. \(\text{Id.}\)
Serious problems with the state’s Judicial Inquiry Board magnify the Code’s deficiencies. A recent audit of that agency’s disciplinary system found the board operated for 811 days and 1,360 days without filling two constitutionally required positions for non-lawyers. Overall, it had four vacancies in thirteen positions. The board had 311 pending complaints, some for judicial misconduct and mental incapacity. From 2012-2014, the board operated with two investigators, and one person who doubled as its executive director and general counsel. Another analysis showed that the board’s budget fell 15%, from $785,000 in 2009 to $680,000 in 2015. Before its budget was cut, this tiny agency had six or seven employees to investigate complaints against judges. Now, it imposes discipline in less than one percent of complaints.

This means that Illinois judges are not subject to increased scrutiny provided by the revised Model Code — and they are also immune from discipline due to a grossly ineffectual investigatory board. A direct comparison shows that the ABA Code is much more stringent than the Illinois Code in promoting public confidence in judges. States with stricter codes have won

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124 Id.

125 Id. at 1.

126 Id. at 10.

127 Id. at 27.


129 See STATE OF ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION, supra note 123 (exposing serious problems in enforcing judicial ethics). Due to board vacancies and underfunding, the Judicial Inquiry Board had “an inventory of 311 pending complaints,” including “a growing inventory level of pending complaints concerning alleged misconduct or physical or mental incapacity of judicial officers.” Id. at 10. The Board operated for 811 days and 1,360 days without filling constitutionally mandated board positions for non-lawyers. Id. at 13. From 2012-2014, the board operated with two investigators, and one person who served as its executive director and general counsel. Id. at 27.

130 Hoerner & Rosenbaum, supra note 128.

131 Compare American Bar Ass’n, SIDE-BY-SIDE TEXT COMPARISON: 2007 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT WITH COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF 1990 CODE, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/new_old.authcheckdam.pdf (“Rule 1.2, Canon 2, Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary: A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of Impropriety.”) with CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 113, Rule 62, Canon 2 (“A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities . . . A judge should respect and
numerous federal court rulings that uphold judicial boards that enforce tight controls on judicial campaigning. In state court rulings, too, ethics boards have won enforcement cases involving limits on judicial campaigning. During this recent period, however, Illinois’ ethics board has been mute in these matters.

comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The ABA Code uses the mandatory “shall” while Illinois, by stating “should,” deprives its Code of sharp teeth for enforcement. Id. Nothing in the Illinois Code mentions the need for independence of the courts—a serious omission in a climate of campaigns financed by special interest groups. Id. The ABA Code, in contrast, strictly enjoins judges to maintain their independence. Id.

See, e.g., Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Arizona’s code restrictions on judicial endorsement and campaigning were narrowly tailored to achieve Arizona’s compelling interest); Platt v. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievs. & Discipline of Ohio Supreme Court, 769 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct restrictions on personal and direct solicitation of campaign funds); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding campaign restrictions imposed on judges and judicial candidates by the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983-88 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding regulations by Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (ICJQ) and the Indiana Disciplinary Commission (IDC) that limit the political activities of judges). But see, e.g., Sanders County Republican Cent. Committee v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2012) (striking down a Montana law that criminalized a political party’s endorsement of judicial candidates as a violation of the First Amendment).

See, e.g., Winter v. Wolnitzek, 482 S.W.3d 768, 770-76 (Ky. 2016) (ruling that judicial candidate violated state ethics law based on his dishonest campaign statement); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Clinkscales, 192 So.3d 997, 998 (Miss. 2016) (upholding fine and admonishment of a judge for ethical breaches, including posting a campaign endorsement on social media); In re Belk, 691 S.E.2d 685, 686 (N.C. 2010) (removing judge from office for refusing to resign from board of private corporation); In re Krause, 141 So.3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2014) (upholding $25,000 fine for judge who purchased a table at a Republican Party fundraiser with funds from her campaign); In re Judicial Complaint Against Stormer, 980 N.E.2d 1045 (upholding $1,000 fine against judicial candidate for participating in, or receiving campaign contributions, during a judicial campaign fundraising event that identified donors by the amount of their contributions); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Moll, 935 N.E.2d 436, 437 (2012) (upholding $1,000 fine against judge whose campaign flyer made knowingly and recklessly misleading statements); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Lilly, 965 N.E.2d 315, 315 (upholding fine against non-judge candidate for judicial office whose campaign literature misrepresented her identity by portraying her in judicial robe and bearing the word, “re-elect”). But see In re Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. 2015) (overruling a sanction applied to a judge for her Facebook posts on criminal cases in her court).
C. U.S. Supreme Court Regulation of Judicial Campaigns

The recent growth in ethics cases involving judicial campaigning signifies a larger problem: more judges feel free to make political statements in ways that compromise their impartiality. The problem starts at the top, where Justice Scalia, Justice Alito, and Justice Ginsburg have tarnished the Supreme Court’s reputation by engaging in openly partisan politics. In state courts—where 90 percent of all cases are filed—the problem has more potential to undermine justice.\(^{134}\)

134 See Jillian Fama & Meghan Kiesel, Scalia’s Two Cents: Justice Draws Criticism for Political Views in Decisions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=16694778 (reporting on Justice Scalia’s publicly stated opposition to President Obama’s immigration policies); Aliyah Frumin, 6 Other Times Justices Came Under Fire for Being too Political, NBC NEWS (June 14, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/6-other-times-justices-came-under-fire-being-too-political-n609416 (reporting that Justice Alito shook his head and mouthed “not true” when President Obama criticized the Court’s ruling that removed spending caps on corporate campaigns); Michael D. Shear, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Expresses Regret for Criticizing Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ltcdhe (reporting on Justice Ginsburg’s strong views that Republican candidate Donald Trump was not fit to be president).


Politically active state judges undercut the foundational idea that courts must be independent of the political branches. The U.S. Supreme Court has begun to address political influence in the judicial system. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co. ruled that the West Virginia supreme court denied a plaintiff due process when a newly elected justice refused to recuse himself after receiving $3 million in campaign donations from the defendant.\textsuperscript{137} In 2015, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar held that the state did not violate a judicial candidate’s First Amendment speech rights after disciplining her for campaign solicitations.\textsuperscript{138} In the most recent term, Williams v. Pennsylvania again confronted a case where a judge’s appearance of bias was manifested in his campaigning.\textsuperscript{139} These cases tension with Illinois Judicial Code: “A judge shall not engage in any political activity except (i) as authorized under any other provision of this Code, (ii) on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, or (iii) as expressly authorized by law.” CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 113, at Rule 67, Canon 7, Point C. The fact that no provision in the Illinois judicial code expressly prohibits this type of donation—that is, a campaign preference by a sitting judge for a candidate for prosecutor (who is part of the executive branch)—undermines the state constitution’s requirement that judicial power is independent of the political branches.

\textsuperscript{137} Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co., 556 U.S. 868, 868-70 (2009). A small coal operator won a $50 million civil judgment against Massey, a larger company. \textit{Id.} at 872. Massey’s president spent more than $3 million to help elect Brent Benjamin as a new justice to West Virginia’s highest court. \textit{Id.} at 884. Justice Benjamin arrived on the court in time to vote to reverse the entire $50 million judgment. \textit{Id.} at 886. Caperton appealed to the nation’s high court, arguing that he was denied due process. \textit{Id.} at 873. The Supreme Court ruled for Caperton, concluding that Justice Benjamin’s participation presented a “serious risk of actual bias.” \textit{Id.} at 884. The Court elaborated: “Blankenship’s campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case . . . Blankenship’s campaign contributions—in comparison to the total amount contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the election—had a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{138} Williams-Yulee, supra note 70. Chief Justice John Roberts explained that “the role of judges differs from the role of politicians.” \textit{Id.} at 1667. He said that judges must strive “to be perfectly and completely independent.” \textit{Id.} at 1666. While subject to intense scrutiny because of the First Amendment, Florida’s Judicial Canon outweighed Yulee’s speech rights: “Judges, charged with exercising strict neutrality and independence, cannot supplicate campaign donors without diminishing public confidence in judicial integrity.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{139} Williams v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 (2016). Ronald Castile, a district attorney in Philadelphia, approved a prosecutor’s request in 1984 to seek the death penalty against Terrance Williams. \textit{Id.} at 1903. Thirty years later, after a lower court stayed Williams’ execution due to improper conduct by prosecutors, the state appealed to reinstate the execution. \textit{Id.} at 1904. By this time, Castille had been elected as a justice on the Pennsylvania supreme court. \textit{Id.} at 1904-05. After he declined a motion by Williams for recusal on grounds of bias, the case went before the U.S. Supreme Court. \textit{See generally id.} Ruling that Castille’s refusal to recuse himself violated Williams’ due process rights, Justice Kennedy’s opinion detailed how Castille’s campaign emphasized his role in securing death penalty convictions. \textit{Id.} at 1907-08. The Court dismissed Chief Justice Castille’s defense that he had played only a
have the salutary effect of policing against judicial misconduct, but they only address a few examples of improper politicking.

IV. CONCLUSION

Political influence in Illinois courts will not subside as long as the state’s judicial code aids and abets record levels of campaign spending on judicial elections. The following recommendations address the problems identified in this study.

1. Illinois should abolish partisan elections for judges.\textsuperscript{140} The state should select and retain judges with a commission of non-lawyer citizens, lawyers, and judges who use merit criteria. This change is needed because political influence pervades Illinois courts.

2. Illinois courts will not deserve the confidence of its citizens until it updates its judicial code with current provisions of the ABA’s Model Code. Judges are currently bound to an ethics code that is a relic from the 1970s through early 1990s—a period when little money was spent on judicial elections. While I find no evidence that judges are corrupt like recent

\textsuperscript{140} My recommendation ignores the compelling points in the “Axiom of 80,” as explained by Geyh in supra note 1.

Efforts to address threats to independence that arise in the context of selecting judges must take into account four political realities, that together constitute what I am calling the “Axiom of 80”: (1) Roughly 80% of the public prefers to select its judges by election and does so; (2) Roughly 80% of the electorate does not vote in judicial elections; (3) Roughly 80% of the electorate cannot identify the candidates for judicial office; and (4) Roughly 80% of the public believes that when judges are elected, their decisions are influenced by the campaign contributions they receive.

\textit{Id.} at 47. Prof. Geyh discouragingly concludes that “reformers conceded to the political necessity of judicial elections long ago, and now many appear poised to raise the white flag on merit selection systems that split the difference between purely appointive models and contested elections.” \textit{Id.} at 49.
governors, I find substantial evidence of influence peddling in judicial elections. Illinois judges should be held to stringent campaign standards that are common in other states.

3. Illinois needs a robust board to enforce judicial ethics. Judges should be disciplined for donating to candidates who run for prosecutor, engaging in retire-to-run shams, and double-dipping at the expense of taxpayers. Illinois should be more like states that discipline judicial candidates for campaign messages that degrade the impartiality of the judiciary. These reforms cannot be accomplished unless and until Illinois endows its judicial ethics board with enhanced powers, provides more funding for a proactive enforcement staff, and creates transparent methods to audit and disclose the financial interests of judges to the taxpaying public.

For now, Illinois courts are open for business—and open for labor unions, open for trial lawyers, open for political parties, and open for special interest groups that dole out money from deep campaign chests.

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