Abstract
In the era of great power competition between China and the United States, one assumption is that China is unencumbered by the same constraints as the United States’ acquisition system, which includes considerations such as veterans’ preference and open competition. A closer look at China’s laws and regulations for military procurement, analyzed under the modernization theory of economic growth, suggests that existing legal incentives may not set conditions for a sufficiently innovative defense industrial base for technological procurement, though massive state investment and market forces can explain its successes in the area. To address the demands of great power competition, the United States has already undertaken measures to enhance its procurement processes. However, it is equally crucial to perform alternatives analysis to assess whether less sophisticated technologies can yield comparable outcomes as advanced technologies, especially in situations where cost-effectiveness is paramount.
First Page
233
Repository Citation
Christopher
J.
Lin,
Dollars at War: Unraveling the Paradox of China's Military Procurement,
20
U. Pa. Asian L. Rev.
233
(2025).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol20/iss2/1