that a common carrier cannot limit his liability so as to cover his own or his servants' negligence. Nor do I suppose this possible of any bailee. But it is clear that by contract he may be placed in the position of a limited insurer, excepting negligence, instead of an insurer against everything but the act of God or public enemies. If he be compensated only for the former risk instead of the latter, at the choice of the consignor, it would be contrary to common honesty to compel him to make good a risk he is not paid for assuming. We think this case was well decided at Nisi Prius, and the Judgment is affirmed.

WOODWARD, C. J., dissented as to, the onus probandi.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXEMPTION CLAUSE OF THE BANKRUPT ACT.

[An article having appeared in a previous number of this Journal (October 1867), on the constitutionality of the concluding exemption clause in the Bankrupt Act, we give, by request of the framer of the bill, the remarks of Senator POLAND in the course of the earnest and very able debate on this portion of the act in the Senate. See Congressional Globe, February 2d 1867, page 962, &c.—Eds. Am. Law Reg.]

Mr. POLAND.—Mr. President: I confess that were it not for the very confident manner in which members of the Senate, whose opinions are entitled to very great respect, especially upon legal subjects, have declared their opinion that this adoption of the Homestead Exemption Laws of the different states renders this law open to the objection that it is not uniform, I should have felt that the objection was entirely frivolous.

I think, if it were in our power, if it were possible for us to adopt the systems of the different states in relation to the exemptions in favor of poor debtors, every member of the Senate would say that as a matter of discretion, as a matter of judgment, as a matter of prudence, as a matter of safe and proper legislation, it was better to leave that subject to be regulated by the state legislatures, who know the circumstances, the wants, the condition of all their inhabitants, rich and poor, better than we can. All would agree that it had better be left to them to say what mercy
should be shown to the poor debtor, how the balance should be
struck between the creditor and the debtor in their respective
localities, than we can determine here in this Senate Chamber.

This is not the objection; it is that under the Constitution we
have not the power; that if we leave any exemptions at all in
favor of the debtors who either voluntarily go into this system for
the purpose of becoming relieved of their debts, or are driven
into it by their creditors, if anything is to be left to them that
does not go into their assets for division among their creditors,
if anything is to be doled out to them or retained to them out of
their property, if anything is to be doled out to them or retained to them out of
their property, it must be by some uniform rule that must be
written down in the law itself.

Mr. President, it seems to me that this is not necessary in
order to make this a uniform system of bankruptcy. All the
states have exemption laws, and they are different in their terms.
Some exempt a greater amount of real estate than others; a
greater amount of personal property is exempted in some states
than in others; but all the states have laws on the subject. They
have regulated it according to their own judgment. They say
that a debtor may, for his own subsistence and for his family,
retain a certain amount of property that shall not be liable to be
taken by any legal process for payment of his debts. No ques-
tion is raised here, none ever has been raised, but that those state
laws are entirely constitutional. It has been decided over and
over again that the states may make additional exemptions of
property as against debts that were already in existence at the
time. So no question arises but that the state laws, providing
that certain property may be retained by debtors against their
creditors, are valid and constitutional and binding.

Now, what does this bill propose to do, as the House passed it?
We propose simply to get up a law and adapt legal machinery to
it, by which all the property of every bankrupt throughout the
United States that is liable for the payment of his debts may be
taken and administered and distributed equally among the cre-
ditors. This is all this amounts to. If there were no exemp-
tions by state laws and we were to make an exemption; if by
existing laws all the property of every debtor throughout the
country was liable for the payment of his debts and we were to
undertake to establish a system of administration throughout the
entire country, I should agree, I think, that we must make an
exemption that should be uniform in all the states; but that is
not what we attempt to do. By this bill we lay hold of, we seize
all the property of every bankrupt that is liable for the payment
of his debts by law, against which the creditors have any right
to proceed by any process in the state courts, or in the United
States courts; and we say that all that property shall be taken
and be distributed in a particular way equally among all the
creditors.

Is not that uniform? In order to comply with this requirement
of the Constitution, to have the system of bankruptcy uniform, is
it necessary that it must operate in every state precisely alike?
Are there not a great variety of contracts that are binding and
legal and valid and hold a man's property in one state that would
be entirely invalid and inoperative to hold his property in another
state?

But it may be said that this proves nothing, because a contract
valid by the laws of the state where made must be valid every-
where. But under the Bankrupt Law of 1841 the question arose
in relation to statute liens. I mentioned the other day the con-
troversy that arose in New England, beginning between Judge
Story and Judge Parker, who was then Chief Justice of New
Hampshire, in relation to our New England attachment liens; I
believe they are not known, out of New England, in any part of
the United States as an ordinary process. With us in New
England, when a man brings an action for the collection of a debt,
if he can find property of the debtor, he sends out the sheriff and
seizes it upon the writ in advance of any judgment, without filing
any affidavit that the party is going to abscond or has property
concealed. It is a matter of right with him. The Bankrupt
Law of 1841 provided that liens upon property should be saved
from the operation of the Bankrupt Law. The question arose
whether these statute liens in New England came within the
meaning of the Bankrupt Law, and it was eventually settled that
they did; they were sustained.

It was utterly impossible that any such lien could exist in any
state out of New England under any state law; there were no
such liens on property elsewhere. If the Bankrupt Law of 1841
protected those liens upon property in New England, it estab-
lished a rule for New England that was different from that estab-
lished in any other state, and saved a kind of claims upon pro