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Property Lost in Translation

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The world is full of localized, nonstandard property regimes that coexist alongside state property laws. This Article provides the first comprehensive look at the phenomenon of localized property systems and the difficulties that necessarily attend the translation of localized property rights.

Rather than survey the numerous localized property systems in the world, this Article explores the common features of the interaction between localized and state property systems. All localized property systems entail translation costs with the wider state property systems around them. Translation costs result from incompatibilities, as well as information and enforcement costs. Focusing on translation costs, the Article examines the pressures for localized systems to converge into larger state systems, as well as the features of localized property that may keep it
distinct. Additionally, it shows that state protection of localized property systems (such as Norwegian protection of the property rights of the indigenous Sámi people) may sometimes lower translation costs but may also lower the utility of the localized systems through poor incorporation into state law.

Understanding localized property systems has important implications for understanding the nature of property. Property law systems, like other legal systems, have greater utility with greater numbers of adherents. Thus, using the insights of the economics of network effects is crucial to understanding property. Another potential insight stemming from our analysis is in the theory of commons property: translation costs must be taken into account when examining collective action solutions to tragedies of the commons.

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INTRODUCTION

Property, we are told, is a matter of state law.1 But the world is full of localized, nonstandard property regimes that
coexist alongside state property laws. For instance, anthropologists, economists, and legal scholars have eagerly analyzed property and quasi-property arrangements such as Native American tribal property, informal property rights in favelas in Brazil, the rights of the nomad Sámi in Scandinavia, Bedouin rights in the Middle East, and collective property in kibbutzim in Israel.

interests.


Localized property arrangements are not restricted to culturally distinct groups. They can be found in certain industries—think, for example, of the quasi-property rights in landing slots in airports\(^7\)—or certain activities, such as the virtual property of gamers.\(^8\) Indeed, they can be found in nearly all situations. Consider, for instance, the informal “ownership” arrangements that characterize the typical household.\(^9\)

In one sense, this potpourri of localized property and quasi-property regimes shares nothing in common. Some emerged from longstanding and venerable traditions, others were shaped by ideology, and others still were born of necessity or convenience. Some are held together by contract or other legal tools, and others by custom or social convention. Unsurprisingly, while each of these regimes has been studied on a stand-alone basis, no one has ever thought to link them all. Seemingly, there is nothing so local as localized property arrangements.

But, as we show in this Article, the very diversity of dissimilar-property and quasi-property systems gives rise to an important and ubiquitous aspect of property laws. In this Article, we argue that examining localized property regimes as a phenomenon, together with the problems encountered by property-holders in such regimes, shows us that property rules—in every environment—are highly contingent on the networks in which they operate. Property rules of one network must frequently interact with different and sometimes inconsistent rules of another network.

In other words, property rules are always limited to a social context, and they are always vulnerable to incompatibility with other property rules. In order for alternative localized property arrangements to be incorporated effectively into the property system of the jurisdiction in which they exist, they must be deciphered and translated. The need for deciphering and translating dramatically increases the cost of maintaining alternative


property regimes and correspondingly diminishes the value of assets and resources held under such regimes. Naturally, the more complex or idiosyncratic these regimes are the greater the cost incurred by the group adopting them.

The core insight may be explained by reference to the economic term “network effects.” Essentially, we argue that all legal property arrangements are characterized by network effects. The value of legal regimes increases with the number of people (or assets) subject to them. In that sense, the law is akin to a technological standard. Adaptors of the legal standards increase the value of their assets; those who opt out can only do so at the cost of lowering the value of their assets. Like technology, property needs to develop over time, requiring the development of new standards and the abandonment of old ones. Transitioning between standards is costly and difficult. Sometimes,

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pockets of holdouts remain with the old standard, even as the new standard conquers the market. 12

Our core insight also suggests an important refinement to the study of the evolution of property institutions. It suggests that once a society-wide property standard emerges, it becomes increasingly difficult to preserve alternative localized regimes. This is because the cost of deviating from the societal standard will tend to increase over time. Consider the example of the kibbutzim in Israel. The kibbutzim were founded on the basis of a shared, strong socialist ideology that shunned private property. 13 Originally, kibbutzim absolutely prohibited private property; members who sought to acquire private property were banished from the community. However, over time, socialism declined in popularity in Israel, and private property arrangements became more popular in the society at large. As private property became the norm in Israel, two things happened in the kibbutzim: First, the cost of adhering to collective property arrangements within the kibbutz increased, and second, the socialist ideology that was once the hallmark of the kibbutzim declined in popularity. As a result, kibbutzim gradually transitioned from collective property to private property; that is, they gradually swapped their idiosyncratic, localized socialist property system for one that was closer to the free market, private property system used by the surrounding society. Nowadays, only a few kibbutzim retain a collective property system; all the rest—several hundred of them—have succumbed to the pressure and opted for some version of private property. 14

The general lesson is simple. Once a certain property arrangement becomes the standard in any given jurisdiction, chances increase that alternative localized property regimes will have to adjust over time to the norm. Of course, we are not suggesting that over time there will be perfect convergence. Alternative property regimes may survive in the long run for a variety of reasons. First, the cost of bringing them into conformity with the standard may be too high. This may be the case with the informal property arrangements in the favelas in Rio de

12 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 106 (cited in note 11). See also Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am L & Econ Rev 1, 6–7 (2006) (describing the possibility of network effects discouraging innovation in corporate charters).

13 See Part I.A.2.

14 See Part I.A.2.
Janeiro and elsewhere in Brazil. Second, sometimes localized gains may create an interest group strong enough to prevent convergence even at a cost to general welfare. This can be most easily seen in certain kinds of political resistance to change. Third, the general population may have a preference for preserving an alternative regime and may even be willing to subsidize it, as may be the case with the attitude of the Norwegians to the Sámi.

The remainder of this Article elaborates this central claim and unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we discuss the phenomenon of localized property and quasi-property regimes. We demonstrate the ubiquity of such regimes and analyze their roots. In Part II, we study the interaction between localized arrangements and the property systems that surround them. We show that to varying degrees all localized property forms give rise to the problem of translation—the process by which localized arrangements are operationalized within the external property framework. We also show that the need for translation diminishes the value of alternative property arrangements for rights holders. Furthermore, it creates an evolutionary pressure on such forms and presents them with the choice of “comply or die.”

In Part III, we explore the circumstances in which localized property systems will successfully resist convergence. We show that while these examples are numerous, this is not due to the absence of translation concerns but rather because other factors prevent full translation of localized property systems into the property systems of larger jurisdictions. Given this background, we show that we should expect to continue seeing partially incompatible property systems despite translation costs. In Part IV, we explore the implications of our analysis for ongoing property debates. These debates include the effectiveness of managing resources in the commons by tightly knit communities, the conditions under which semicommons prove a viable stage in the evolution of property rights, and the applicability of economist Hernando de Soto’s observations about the importance of formalized property rights. A short conclusion follows.

\[^{15}\text{See Part I.B.1.}\]
\[^{16}\text{See Part III.A.}\]
\[^{17}\text{See Part I.A.3.}\]
I. THE CREATION OF LOCALIZED PROPERTY

In this Part, we analyze the widespread phenomenon of localized property arrangements. Such arrangements may arise on a relatively large scale that encompasses ethnic, socioeconomic, or ideological groups, or on a more modest scale that is limited to certain neighborhoods or even households. We define “localized property rights” to mean in rem arrangements that govern the rights and duties of individuals with respect to resources that avail against all the individual members of a certain group or community. Accordingly, localized property rights are analogous but not identical to formal property rights. Formal property rights grant in rem protection that avails against all persons within a legal jurisdiction\(^\text{18}\) while localized property rights avail only against persons within the localized group.

Despite their more limited scope, from the vantage point of the relevant community or locality, localized property rights may be more important than formal property arrangements. Localized property norms may be better tailored to the local community’s economic needs or more consistent with the community’s ideological preferences or cultural heritage. Even where localized property rules lack formal legal backing, they may prove durable and enforceable. Localized property rules may be enforceable by extralegal measures. For instance, the group may impose social penalties such as ostracism or even extralegal penalties such as violence against group members that violate the rules of a localized property regime.\(^\text{19}\)

Localized property arrangements, on various scales, can be seen everywhere. In the Introduction, we mentioned the norms that evolved among various indigenous groups,\(^\text{20}\) but, in fact, localized property arrangements exist in many other settings that permeate our daily lives. Professor Richard Epstein, for example, described a relatively elaborate system of property rights that evolved in different localities in the United States with

\(^{18}\) See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, *The Property/Contract Interface*, 101 Colum L. Rev 773, 777 (2001) (“Property rights, on the other hand, are in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”).


\(^{20}\) See notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
respect to on-street parking spaces. Similar rights may be seen in the arrangements that attend reserving racquetball courts or other recreational areas. But perhaps an even more familiar example can be found in the rights and duties that arise among college roommates. Roommates typically co-own the lease rights to the realty in which they dwell. In addition, they may purchase various home appliances, electronic devices, and computer equipment together. As roommates acquire property, they develop a system of rules that govern exclusion, use, and transfer of the assets.

Naturally, an in-depth discussion of all localized property arrangements is beyond the scope of this Article. Each arrangement deserves its own article, if not book. We will confine ourselves, therefore, to a few chosen examples that represent the broader phenomenon. The examples we discuss at a greater length in this Article include the kibbutzim in Israel, the favelas in Brazil, and the property rights of the Sámi in Norway, and Native American tribe members in the United States. Even with this restricted list, we will only be able to provide a fleeting glimpse into those property arrangements. As should be clear, we do not presume to make an anthropological contribution. Rather, we hope to advance our understanding of property theory and the examples are offered strictly to this end. That said, our examples, or case studies, are varied and cover a wide array of property settings. In fact, it is precisely the diversity of property options that can be found in our case studies that assure us that the general theoretical conclusions are of general applicability and are not dependent on any particular design of localized property arrangements.

A. “Official” Localized Property Regimes

We begin our examples of localized property regimes by looking at several “official” ones. By describing these regimes as official, we mean that even though the localized regimes employ property rules distinct from those in the wider legal jurisdiction, they nevertheless enjoy some kinds of formal legal recognition.

Native American (or "Indian") property, for instance, is the subject of numerous federal laws and regulations. However, despite the official recognition, the localized regimes remain distinct. Different rules apply to Native American property, and the property rights within the Native American property regime are limited in transferability and in other ways.

1. Native American tribal property.

Native American property rights in the United States are a peculiar blend of state law and local customs. Native Americans were present on the land, and used it, long before the existence of the state or the state’s extension of sovereignty to the land. Most Native American tribes were popularly known to Europeans as American Indians, and the label continues to be used in many contexts today—particularly to distinguish the American Indians from Eskimos (a name considered pejorative in Canada)—the Native Americans found primarily in Alaska, Siberia, Canada, and Greenland. We use the terms Native American and American Indian interchangeably in this Article.

Native Americans’ customary property claims predate the state but are considered outside the chain of title of formal state-sanctioned property rights. Chief Justice John Marshall’s landmark ruling in *Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v M’Intosh* established the basic rules that have shaped Native American property rights for the past two centuries. Under *Johnson*, the root of title in the United States is property rights established by European conquerors. Any American Indian property rights are inferior rights of occupancy only; not only are they inalienable to private parties and ineligible for being upgraded into

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23 See, for example, Kathryn Walbert, *Teaching about American Indians in North Carolina: American Indian vs. Native American; A Note on Terminology* 1.1 (North Carolina Humanities Council 2009), online at http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nc-american-indians/5526 (visited May 9, 2013) (discussing the appropriate use of Native American and Indian).


27 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).

28 Id at 573.
proper title, they may be swept away by fiat of the US government. At the same time, Johnson preserves for Native American tribes a quasi-sovereign status. This quasi-sovereign status, too, is inferior. Native American tribes cannot claim the rights of independent states, and their sovereignty can be quashed by the United States at will. However, so long as and to the degree that the United States chooses to respect American Indian sovereignty, the tribes can regulate their internal affairs, including internal property rights.

As conventional wisdom notes, Native American conceptions of property differed greatly from those of the European settlers. The evidence suggests that the Native American tribes encountered by British colonists had a system of semicommons ownership similar to that used in England prior to the enclosure movement. This meant that large land tracts were owned by villages, and the village chiefs allocated use rights and possessory rights to individual tribe members for agricultural purposes. Other parts of the village land were preserved for nonfarming uses, such as gathering wood. However, these property rights were gradually swept away, sometimes by sales to encroaching colonists and sometimes by forcible dispossession.

As the United States conquered land to the Pacific, it progressively reserved Native American quasi-sovereignty to smaller and smaller areas. Native American land holdings outside these reservations practically disappeared. Theoretically, the reservations became pockets of land where Native American property rights held. However, repeated US efforts to regulate

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29 Id at 574.
31 See United States v Tsosie, 92 F3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir 1996) (denying a hearing in federal court until remedies in tribal court were exhausted); Gooding v Watkins, 142 F 112, 113 (8th Cir 1905) (applying Chickasaw law in rejecting an adverse possession claim).
32 For more on the English semicommons, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J Legal Stud 131, 160 (2000). See also Part IV.B.
34 See id at 37–38.
35 See id at 191–226 (describing removal of more than eighty thousand Native Americans to the west of the Mississippi from the late 1820s through the early 1840s).
36 See id at 235 (describing the US government’s adoption of the reservation approach in the early 1850s whereby “[v]irtually all Indian land cessions . . . resulted in the designation of a circumscribed area in which the selling tribe was to live”).
37 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 236–37 (cited in note 33).
Native American property, with mixed motives and less-than-perfect knowledge, created a system of property that was separate from the usual property law within the states but was not quite Native American either.38

Formally, the United States holds title to the reservation lands in trust for the tribes.39 Until the late nineteenth century, federal law viewed reservation land as being held in common by tribal members.40 However, in 1887, the United States adopted a policy of “allotment,” under which reservation land was partitioned into smaller plots that could eventually be individually owned by tribal members.41 The Dawes Act,42 which implemented the policy, remained in force until 1934.43 The law maintained title in the federal government and allocated interests in trust to individual Native Americans for a transitional period.44 During the transitional period, the law forbade alienation of the land outside the tribe while permitting the sale of leaseholds and other lesser interests. Finally, the government claimed for itself the right to purchase lands “not allotted.”45

As a result of the partial privatization, numerous Native Americans sold leases and eventually title to their lands, leading to a situation in which 86 million of the 138 million acres of reservation land were lost to Native Americans between 1887 and


40 See Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land* at 254 (cited in note 33).


42 Ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887).


44 Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat at 389.

45 Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat at 389. See also Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land* at 277–78 (cited in note 33).
1934. The consequence was a serious erosion of Native American communities’ ability to survive cohesively. At the same time, the restrictions on alienation of the land created highly fractionated land interests. As the Court explained in *Hodel v Irving*, 47 “40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, and many parcels having dozens, of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew over time.”

The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ended the allotment policy but could not reaggregate the fractional holdings. The US Congress attempted to force consolidation through escheat in the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, but the Supreme Court struck down the provision of the law as an unconstitutional uncompensated taking. Restrictions on alienation of reservation land remain part of US law. Today, some “allotted lands” remain in trust for Native American tribes alongside reservation lands. Other lands are held in trust by states for Native Americans or held in trust by individual persons or tribes.

The end result is a bubble of ethnically limited property rights for Native Americans, within a wider system of state law. However, the picture for Native Americans is considerably more complicated. Native American property is not limited to usage rights; Native Americans have actual, though limited title to the land. The sovereign rights of Native American tribes are limited, but they are considerably greater than those of the Sámi, as we shall see. This means, among other things, that Native American tribes have considerable authority over land use issues on

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48 Id at 707.
52 25 USC § 464 (“Except as provided in this Act, no sale, devise, gift, exchange, or other transfer of restricted Indian lands or of shares in the assets of any Indian tribe or corporation organized under this Act shall be made or approved.”).
53 See Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land* at 287–90 (cited in note 33).
55 See Part I.A.3.
reservations. Another complication results from the federal system that characterizes US but not Norwegian law. Property law is generally the province of state law, rather than federal law, in the United States. This means that understanding the full picture of Native American property law requires examining not only the federal law that supplants and controls Native American law but also the state law that applies to realty geographically surrounding Native American land.

2. Kibbutzim.

Kibbutzim (kibbutzim is plural for kibbutz) are agricultural communes that first developed in Israel a century ago. Traditionally, the kibbutz, as a collective, consisted of a small number of families.

Degania, the first kibbutz, was established in 1909 by several dozen Jewish residents of a part of the Ottoman Empire known as Israel or Palestine. Kibbutzim rapidly grew in popularity in the country, and today, there are roughly 270 kibbutzim in Israel, with a total population of approximately 120 thousand and land holdings of about 550 thousand acres.

Most of the founders of Degania were immigrants from Russia who had arrived in Ottoman Israel/Palestine in the late nineteenth century, and they were strongly influenced by the socialist political movements that were popular at the time in Russia and, in particular, the Russian Jewish community. They established the kibbutz as an agricultural commune. Members of the kibbutz were expected to transfer personal assets to the kibbutz upon joining it. Thus, the kibbutz itself owned not only the land but all personal property. Thereafter,

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60 See Ran Abramitzky, Lessons from the Kibbutz on the Equality–Incentives Trade-Off, 25 J Econ Persp 185, 192 (Winter 2011) (noting that a ban on private property was among the defining characteristics of the Kibbutz). In general the land “ownership” of the kibbutz actually consists of a long-term leasehold from the state of Israel or the Jewish National Fund. For more on land ownership in Israel, see Elia Werczberger and
members were to work the land and perform all other tasks necessary for maintenance of the kibbutz. All decisions were made by the entire membership of the kibbutz, which would gather in the dining hall and debate issues until resolution. The kibbutz was responsible for providing members with use rights to living quarters and living supplies, while maintaining full ownership for itself.

Traditional kibbutz life was austere. Kibbutz members were traditionally rotated through jobs so that members would move through all the jobs on the kibbutz, from accounting to dishwashing. Children were raised communally, spending relatively little time with their biological parents. Clothing was simple and provided by the kibbutz. Members were given a small allowance for basic needs, unconnected to the work they performed. Kibbutz life was animated by an ideology of radical equality, patriotism, Marxism, romantic attraction to “working the land,” and self-sacrifice. Societally, kibbutz members were viewed in Israeli society as both highly patriotic and as salt of the earth; they were traditionally overrepresented in the most demanding and dangerous army units. In the early years of the state, kibbutzim enjoyed rapid growth, growing to 67,550 members and 214 kibbutzim by 1950. However, by the 1960s, the rapid growth began to stall.
In the 1980s, changes in Israeli society began to be felt in the kibbutz. Parents were no longer willing to allow their children to be raised collectively; as a result kibbutzim permitted parents to raise their children in their own residential units within the kibbutz. Even so, kibbutzim came under pressure from the younger generation. Grown children would depart the kibbutz for studies or travel, never to return. Meanwhile, those who remained in the kibbutz would often be attracted to employment opportunities outside the kibbutz. Such members would either be frustrated at the duties they had to perform in the kibbutz or find themselves shirking kibbutz duties in favor of outside employment. Some aging members found their ideological preferences changing against communal living, and while they wished to continue to live on the kibbutz, they no longer shared its collectivist ideals. Many of these changes were reflective of larger changes in Israeli society away from a centrally controlled economy toward free enterprise.

Not coincidentally, during the 1980s, the kibbutzim experienced a severe financial crisis, leading most kibbutzim to the verge of bankruptcy. The financial crisis of the kibbutzim in the 1980s was partially attributed to labor problems—both shortages and misallocations of the existing laborers—and partially to other financial mismanagement. Ultimately, the kibbutzim were saved by a government bailout. The state forced creditor banks to forgive some outstanding loans while others’ debts were directly paid by the state. Kibbutzim were forced to relinquish some assets, including substantial land holdings.

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70 See Michal Palgi and Shulamit Reinhart, Introduction, in Michal Palgi and Shulamit Reinhart, eds, One Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Reinvention 1, 8 (Transaction 2011).

71 See Gavron, The Kibbutz at 6 (cited in note 69).

72 See Raymond Russell, Utopia in Zion: The Israeli Experience with Worker Cooperatives 169 (SUNY 1995).


74 See Simons and Ingram, 48 Admin Sci Q at 595 (cited in note 63).

75 See id at 614.

76 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 559 (cited in note 59) (attributing the “crisis in the kibbutz” to massive debt resulting from losses in the stock market, “inability to repay excessive bank loans, and a 400 percent inflation in the Israeli economy”); Yuval Dror, National Education through Mutually Supportive Devices: A Case Study of Zionist Education 292 (Peter Lang 2007).

77 See Jo-Ann Mort and Gary Brenner, Our Hearts Invented a Place: Can Kibbutzim Survive in Today’s Israel? 28 (Cornell 2003) (noting an arrangement by which kibbutzim
Lacking a sufficiently large labor force to sustain the kibbutzim, and given their financial difficulties, the kibbutzim started to diversify their economies and bring in temporary employees to fill their labor needs. Gradually, the kibbutzim began a process of “privatization,” in which membership in the kibbutz no longer entailed a complete relinquishment of private property or a thoroughly communal life. Members of the kibbutz were granted private property rights over their homes and other assets. Members today make their own employment arrangements and simply pay fees for kibbutz services. Kibbutz members receive payment for their work on the kibbutz, and such payments reflect the differing skill levels and demands of the employment tasks. Kibbutz-owned enterprises (not only agricultural businesses but also other kibbutz-owned ventures, such as small manufacturing plants) were also “privatized.” While the kibbutz continues to own the businesses, their management has been professionalized, and the membership at large can no longer make operational and other business decisions. In one particularly striking example, Kibbutz Shamir’s corporation, Shamir Optical Industry, is listed on NASDAQ. These changes have been adopted at different paces in different kibbutzim, but the overall trajectory is clear.

Today, privatization is almost complete in the kibbutzim. In nearly all kibbutzim, while the kibbutz retains formal title over realty in the kibbutz, members have recognized protected rights to individual units. Kibbutz members no longer yield all outside property rights to the collective, and members therefore own pieces of realty outside the kibbutzim. Kibbutz members can and do use their personal assets to acquire chattel and realty to which they then hold sole title.

relinquished up to 40 percent of their agricultural land to relieve their debts); Uriel Leviatan, Jack Quarter, and Hugh Oliver, Introduction: The Kibbutz in Crisis, in Uriel Leviatan, Hugh Oliver, and Jack Quarter, eds, Crisis in the Israeli Kibbutz: Meeting the Challenge of Changing Times vii, xv (Praeger 1998).

79 See id at 561.
82 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 561 (cited in note 59).
83 See id.
Kibbutzim are recognized legal entities under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, 1933. As cooperative societies, kibbutzim benefit from favorable tax treatment, as well as other specialized rules related to its status as a separate legal personality. Ultimately, this means that, as far as the state is concerned, kibbutzim own property rights that are similar to those owned by any other legal person in the state. However, within the kibbutz, the rights of members are established by the internal rules of the kibbutz, either by the governing documents or by ongoing decisions of the collective. Consequently, member property rights are only enforceable outside the kibbutz to the extent permitted by internal kibbutz rules, and as contractual rights only.


The Sámi (or Saami) are a people indigenous to the Arctic circle in an area called Sápmi—northern Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden and northern Finland) as well as the Kola Peninsula in Russia. In the past, the Sámi were often referred to as “Lapps” or “Laplanders” and their region “Lapland,” but these latter terms have fallen out of usage and are now considered pejorative. Physical remnants of Sámi inhabitation of the Sápmi area have been found from as far back as 10,000 BC.

The four states over which Sápmi territory is now spread extended their sovereignty into the area relatively recently. The
area of Sápmi incorporated into Norway is called Finnmark.91 While Norway traces its statehood to 872, Finnmark only gradually became part of Norway starting in 1613 (the coastal areas) and finishing in 1826, with the establishment of a border with Russia.92 Obviously, Sámi were living in and using the land long before Norway extended its sovereignty into the area.

A 1775 distribution of land by the state is considered the root of title in the Finnmark area of Norway.93 Large areas were excluded from this process of distributing private title and were reserved as state land. Starting in 1863, Norway established strict guidelines for transferring state land to private purchasers.94 While Sámi were eventually permitted to purchase land, this was often conditioned on “Norwegianization,” that is, adoption of a Norwegian name and demonstration of facility in the Norwegian language.95 While some Sámi assimilated and acquired land, others refused to do so and found their customary landholdings were owned by the state.96

Outside the formal Norwegian system, the Sámi have had longstanding customary reindeer pasture rights. These customary rights include defined fishing areas, hunting grounds, gathering places, trapping lines, and specific reindeer pastures. Boundaries were historically set by tradition and memorialized verbally.97 These customary rights were considered outside the chain of title in Norway, and thus had no legal expression.

The past three decades have seen a change in attitudes toward Sámi land claims. The Norwegianization policy has been...

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92 Id.
94 See Sally Jeanrenaud, Communities and Forest Management in Western Europe: A Regional Profile of the Working Group on Community Involvement in Forest Management 20 (IUCN 2001); G. Tandberg, Agriculture, in Sten Konow and Karl Fischer, eds, Norway: Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition 1900 307, 310 (Kristiania 1900).
95 See Monika Žagar, Knut Hamsun: The Dark Side of Literary Brilliance 165 (Washington 2009).
abandoned, and some powers have been devolved to a representative Sámi body. 98 As well, ownership over state lands has been transferred to a new governmental body that is expected to cooperate better with Sámi needs. 99 These changes have been driven both by changing perceptions of the justice of Sámi claims and the belief that some changes were required by changing international norms to which Norway had subjected itself. 100

The most important of these changes has resulted in Norway creating public easements over lands in Finnmark (both publicly and privately owned) for the benefit of Sámi. Reindeer pasture area is reserved for Sámi reindeer herding; Sámi also have herding rights in “concession areas,” but those rights are shared with other Norwegians. 101 The Reindeer Herding Act of 1978 102 reserves Sámi herding rights to those of a Sámi family, though the familial connection is not precisely defined. 103 Additionally, to enjoy the Sámi herding rights, the claimant must have had a parent or grandparent whose main occupation was reindeer herding. 104 The herding rights are formalized in operational permits, which may be passed inter vivos or upon death to close family relations. 105 Herding rights include not only reindeer grazing but also the right to dwell on the land, build necessary structures, trap and fish, gather wood, and other uses of the land. 106

The resulting property system is a curious blend of state law and local Sámi customs. Formal property rights depend upon the state titling system and usage rights created under state

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99 See id at 237.
100 See id.
101 See E. Carina H. Keskitalo, Climate Change and Globalization in the Arctic: An Integrated Approach to Vulnerability Assessment 99 (Earthscan 2008).
104 See id.
law. However, state law carves out ethnically limited property rights for Sámi, facilitating the preservation (or creation) of localized property rules within Sámi communities. Additionally, the formal rights are ethnically bound, creating a localized property system partially divorced from the wider property law within the jurisdiction.

B. “Unofficial” Localized Property Regimes

1. Favelas.

In sharp contrast to kibbutzim, favelas in Brazil were not conscious creations in expression of a romantic ideology. Favela is a Portuguese term for slum, and favelas are generally described as “shanty towns.” The favelas were created primarily during the twentieth century as a result of rural emigration to the cities. Favela dwellers were traditionally squatters. That is, favela dwellers had no formally recognized legal rights to the land on which they lived; rather, they generally took up residence on either private or public lands. In other cases, the favela residents did not trespass on private or public landholdings, but they still failed to acquire formal property rights. For instance, in many cases, favelas arose after the “purchase” of irregular lots of land, whose demarcation could not be recognized under existing law. In such cases, the seller wished to sell land and the buyer wished to buy, but state law would not recognize the sale because the lot size did not fit within titling rules. Whether arising due to squatting or unlawful subdivision of land, favelas developed socially respected property norms notwithstanding the lack of formal property rights. The favelas recognized dwellers’ informal property rights to their homes, as well as the authority of complex community institutions.

Favelas date back to a settlement on a hill in Rio de Janeiro called Morro da Providência, founded by soldiers returning from

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107 See Crawford, 80 Fordham L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 3).
109 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62 (cited in note 3).
110 Id.
a civil war (Guerra de Canudos, 1895–96). The soldiers had not yet been paid, and they did not purchase the land on which they built their new settlement, Morro da Favela. Subsequent urban squatting settlements earned the name “favela” in imitation of the soldiers’ community, both for the practice of squatting and for the low quality of land and housing. As the urban settlements became more popular, the term gained formal acceptance, even being used as a category in the Brazilian census in 1950. Favelas grew explosively from the 1940s to the 1970s due to increasing urbanization. Today, Rio de Janeiro is home to hundreds of favelas, and approximately 14.4 percent of its residents live in favelas and other “subnormal agglomerates.”

Favelas continue to grow at a faster pace than the population of the city as a whole. Strikingly, many favelas in Rio de Janeiro are located on hillsides, giving favelas scenic views—particularly when compared to the obstructed views of more affluent housing in the valleys below—but also exposing them to soil erosion, mudslides, and collapse. Favelas are better known for their high crime rates and substandard living conditions. While favelas are complete communities, with local businesses such as groceries, they have limited access to basic utility services such as plumbing or electricity. In most favelas, sewage runs through the

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118 O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 229 (cited in note 112) (“In Rio (as in Salvador) many favela sites on hillsides close to the city centre . . . are unsuitable for commercial development and therefore have not been cleared wholesale by the city authorities.”).

119 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62–63 (cited in note 3).
streets.\textsuperscript{120} The 1950 census criteria defined \textit{favelas} not only by the absence of legal title but also by low quality housing and in the absence of paved streets and public services such as plumbing, sanitation, water, electricity, and telephone.\textsuperscript{121}

Over the years, \textit{favelas} have been subject to numerous reform efforts. Controversial “slum clearance” projects, particularly in the 1970s, aimed at reclaiming the land for its private and public owners.\textsuperscript{122} These projects, in some cases accompanied by efforts to provide public housing for the slum dwellers, are widely viewed as failures.\textsuperscript{123} In some cases, after an area was cleared, new \textit{favelas} grew up on the site of the old ones.\textsuperscript{124} In many cases, expelled \textit{favela} dwellers soon found themselves living in different \textit{favelas}.\textsuperscript{125} Simply put, the demand for the \textit{favela}-style housing remained high while the supply in the formal market remained low, leading consumers to the low-cost alternative of squatting in a new location. Other reform efforts have focused on arrangements for legalizing land tenure for dwellers while upgrading the physical quality of neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{126} In recent years, both strategies have been tried by various municipalities in Brazil.\textsuperscript{127} To date, progress has been limited.\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Favelas} continue to grow.\textsuperscript{129}

The reason for \textit{favelas’} continued popularity remains a matter of controversy. Evidently \textit{favelas} provide migrants to the large cities with goods that are not available in the formal housing

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{120} Id at 71.
\textsuperscript{121} Morris and Pyle, 47 Econ Geography at 288 (cited in note 114).
\textsuperscript{122} O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 234 (cited in note 112):

With the help of funds from the US Alliance for Progress programme, between 1962 and 1974, 80 squatter settlements were compulsorily (sometimes violently) removed. . . . These processes gained in intensity after the 1964 military coup when squatter areas adjacent to upper-income neighbourhoods and areas scheduled for industrial development began to be eradicated.

\textsuperscript{123} See, for example, O’Hare, 86 Geography at 63 (cited in note 3).
\textsuperscript{124} Marshall C. Eakin, \textit{Brazil: The Once and Future Country} 107 (St Martin’s 1997) (“City planners tried to raze the \textit{favelas} and relocate the poor in government housing, which was often miles from the inner city. By the 1970s, it had become clear that this process was not working and that the tidal wave of poor migrants had overwhelmed any pretense of relocation.”).

\textsuperscript{126} See O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 238 (cited in note 112) (describing a reform program whereby \textit{favelados} are given title to their homes).
\textsuperscript{127} See id; Francis, \textit{Comparative Analysis} at *56–61 (cited in note 125).
\textsuperscript{128} O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62, 73 (cited in note 3).
\textsuperscript{129} Consider O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 238 (cited in note 112).
\end{flushleft}
market: cheap, conveniently located housing, even if of inferior quality and provided with inferior services. The reason for the lack of affordable housing might be excessive regulation of the quality and pricing of housing in the formal market.  

2. Other “unofficial” localized property regimes.

Although we have chosen to focus on a small number of large-scale localized property regimes, readers should be aware that there are many other examples of localized property regimes that affect our lives. Two of the best known regimes that have been the subject of academic study include the norms of cattle trespass in Shasta County, as described in Professor Robert Ellickson’s classic *Order without Law* and Professor Erving Goffman’s account of property arrangements in mental asylums.

Professor Ellickson’s famous book *Order without Law* contains, among other features, a fascinating account of the allocation of grazing grounds in Shasta County, California. Tellingly, Professor Ellickson discovered that the formal legal classification of land as either open or closed to free grazing is highly irrelevant in Shasta County, as it was largely replaced by a set of local norms and understandings that are modeled on principles of good “neighborliness.”

Professor Goffman’s account of property arrangements in mental asylums is one of the most moving property stories one can find. Professor Goffman reports that upon checking into an asylum, patients are stripped of all their personal belongings. Thereafter, they embark upon a long journey of property collection. Professor Goffman discusses in great detail the process by which different items are appropriated and stored. But, perhaps, the most interesting aspect of this property regime is that the staff largely respects the norms that arise among patients and under most circumstances cooperate with them.

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133 Ellickson, *Order without Law* at 40–64 (cited in note 131).

Other localized property regimes have not won such careful academic attention. Localized property arrangements are ubiquitous in urban life, but few have been examined systematically. As we noted, Professor Epstein famously researched the localized property regime covering parking places on public streets, but there are many other localized regimes to consider. Think, for example, of the rules that govern using playground facilities or ball fields. Some areas have formal rules requiring users to sign up for use in fixed time slots. Disputes often arise when users deviate from the expected time limits. Other areas allow allocation of the space but on a more informal basis. Persons may arrive early and “stake a claim” on the space until other users arrive. In yet other settings, there is no real principle of organization, and a combination of deference, aggressiveness, and priority in time govern. For examples of this last phenomenon, think of seating in subways or parking in shopping malls.

Localized property regimes also govern the allocation of space in public squares to street performers. Different cities have adopted different priority rules to determine how space on sidewalks, parks, and plazas is to be allocated among street performers. Some cities have registration systems that allow street performers to establish temporal priority. In others, no advance registration is possible and priority is established by first occupancy. In yet other cities the allocation may be based on seniority. Whatever the norm is, new artists who wish to perform must comply with it, even though they did not partake in the decision to adopt it.

Yet another localized property system strikes even closer to home—at least as far as the authors are concerned—as it governs the allocation of office space to law school faculty. This example is particularly interesting as it involves an informal property allocation among individuals who are trained in formal

138 See, for example, id at *57.
law, yet it gives rise to very few disputes (although it is not im-
possible that it generates discontent). Interestingly, there is var-
iance among schools both with respect to allocation rules and
termination rules. In some schools, office space is allocated
based on seniority. However, the definition of seniority may dif-
fer from school to school. In some schools, seniority is calculated
based on the year of one’s first law degree. In other schools, sen-
iority may be based on one’s tenure in the institution—that is,
the date on which the member joined the faculty. Still in other
institutions, office space may be allocated based on merit as
measured by scholarly productivity or teaching success. As for
termination, in almost all schools (as far as we know) once an of-
fice space has been allocated to a member it is hers until retire-
ment, unless she voluntarily decides to relinquish her rights to
the space. Yet, in a very small minority of schools, decline in per-
formance may cost one one’s office space.

C. The Attractions of Localized Property Systems

Why do localized property systems arise?

Simply put, communities or groups of individuals may need
or want acceptable arrangements for allocating entitlements to
assets that do not match the statewide arrangements. We offer
four reasons why such localized property rights might arise, al-
though we do not claim that the list is comprehensive. Addi-
tionally, we observe that in many cases, more than one reason may
apply.

First, the formal property system may be too rigid, or re-
strictive, for certain individuals. They may desire more flexible,
or adaptable, arrangements. Consider the case of family mem-
bers living in the same household, or of roommates. Given their
ongoing relationships, family members or roommates may find
the costs of negotiating rights for any individual item to be rela-
tively low. They may therefore prefer to avoid the strictures of
the formal legal system and opt, instead, into a less formal sys-
tem of norms and property arrangements. Indeed, they may con-
sider the reliance on state-ordered property rights to undermine
the network of negotiated arrangements governing the house-
hold. Stated otherwise, in many situations of ongoing relation-
ships, the transaction costs of the informal system will be lower
than the transaction costs entailed in formal definition of rights
through the legal system.
Second, the formal legal system may adopt a property regime that is inherently inconsistent with the needs of the group. In particular, this may happen when the ideology of a certain group rejects the standard allocation and definition of private property rights. This is what happened in the case of the kibbutzim in Israel. The state adopted a system of private property rights that was typical for Western states while the kibbutzim were founded on the basis of a radical collectivist ideology that rejected any private property.140 In economic terms, we might say that the local property regime gives its participants psychological and ideological utility that adequately compensates for the loss of utility entailed in having property rights that are unrecognized in the statewide property system.

Third, the closed list (\textit{numerus clausus}) of property rights may simply not contain certain property options desired by members of various groups. After all, the enumeration of property rights is finite, which means that certain arrangements will not be included in it.141 This reason perhaps best explains the rules that govern various common interest communities, such as subdivisions with condominium ownership.142 Property law has traditionally provided a very small list of rules for common owners and for neighbors. Persons buying condominium units will want to govern many other items left out of the default standard property rules. While condominiums can anchor some of their rules in standard property instruments, such as covenants, they may also find it advantageous to leave other rules to management from time to time. Property forms, in other words, may prove to have positive utility in local settings, even though the law may not recognize their utility across society.

Fourth, and finally, satellite rules that attend the property system may lead groups to avoid the property system in order to avoid the satellite rules. The clearest example of this is the system of satellite land use laws that circumscribe property rights

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140 See Part I.A.2.


over realty. While the legal system may offer a satisfactory menu of property choices in realty, would-be consumers may find that the ability to shape the property is so hampered by land use rules, construction regulations, or other limitations on owners’ ability to utilize their realty that the consumers will readily forego the benefits of state-recognized property ownership in order to avoid the limitations. As the case of the favelas shows, this need not be a conscious choice. The licit marketplace for realty may be sufficiently restricted by the satellite limitations in land use that a large secondary market develops for realty ownership that is recognized only by the illicit local property system.

II. TRANSLATING LOCALIZED PROPERTY

Our goal in this Part is to explore the interaction between localized property arrangements and the formal property system. As we show, all localized property arrangements give rise to the challenge of translation—the process by which localized rights are incorporated into the state system.

Although there are strong reasons for creating localized property regimes, these reasons do not eliminate the desire to use assets in interacting with the larger society. The need for translation arises whenever a person who possesses localized property rights seeks to make use of them outside the group or community in which they are recognized. To illustrate, consider a Native American individual who wishes to use her tribal property as collateral for a loan from a commercial bank. Can she do it? A similar question arises when a member of the Sámi seeks to continue to use traditional pasture lands after they have been subjected to state ownership or when a kibbutz member

143 See id at 1173.
145 See, for example, Marceau v Blackfeet Housing Authority, 540 F3d 916, 936 (9th Cir 2008) (explaining that Congress’s decision to hold tribal land in trust prevents Native Americans from using their land as security for loans). See also Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and People, 23 Okla City U L Rev 379, 399 (1998) (“Indian land, which is held in ‘trust’ for them by the United States, cannot be used as collateral to obtain loans. This is but one obstacle to Indian private entrepreneurship or initiative.”).
decides to start a new life in the city and wishes to take several personal articles with her.\footnote{In \textit{Rotem v Kibbutz Sdot Yam}, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that beneficiaries of a testamental gift of all the testatrix's possessions could claim no rights in her house in the kibbutz because the kibbutz owned all rights in the realty, and the procedure in which the kibbutz "allocated" the house to the testatrix merely granted her temporary use rights. \textit{Rotem v Kibbutz Sdot Yam}, CA 5747/08 ¶ 21 (2010), online at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/470/057/t04/08057470.t04.pdf (visited May 9, 2013).}

In this Part, we analyze the parameters that affect the desirability of localized property arrangements and their value to their subjects. We demonstrate that in the world of property, the sustainability of localized property rights critically depends on their translatability. Lower translatability of property rights lessens the value of those rights, and conversely, greater translatability increases the value of those rights.

Consider, for example, the unregistered rights of the dwellers in the \textit{favelas} in Rio de Janeiro. These rights are not formally recognized by the Brazilian legal system and are only recognized by fellow dwellers.\footnote{See Michael Geiger Donovan, \textit{At the Doors of Legality: Planners, Favelados, and the Titling of Urban Brazil} *322 (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California--Berkeley, 2007) (on file at University of California--Berkeley):

With high registration costs, a distrust of government intervention, and increasing segregation, there are signs that informal settlements are developing their own property registries independent of government authorities. . . . \textit{[In one informal settlement] [t]welve thousand homeowners have received this [unofficial] title for the equivalent of one dollar each although it has no official legal recognition.}} Consequently, rights holders can transfer their rights only to other dwellers, but not to outsiders. A rights holder in a \textit{favela} cannot borrow money from a bank on the security of her landholding, and she cannot sell her rights to someone outside the \textit{favela}.\footnote{See Hernando de Soto, \textit{The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else} 56 (Basic Books 2000):

The lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in developing and former communist nations cannot make profitable contracts with strangers, cannot get credit, insurance, or utilities services: They have no property to lose. . . . And commitment is better understood when backed up by a pledge of property, whether it be a mortgage, a lien, or any other form of security that protects the other contracting party.} These limitations on the property's use and transferability undermine the value of the property right and make the de facto rights of \textit{favela} dwellers more limited than comparable rights that are recognized formally.\footnote{For an extensive examination of this phenomenon, see id at 39--67.} In the case of kibbutz members, the result can be even more extreme. In a notable Israeli case, the daughter of a deceased
kibbutz member was left homeless because her late mother’s possessions all formally belonged to the kibbutz.  

A. The Costs of Translation

Translation problems arise when persons with localized property rights to an asset desire to use the asset outside the locality in which the localized property rights are recognized. This desire may be created by the decision of the asset owner to leave the community. Alternatively, the owner may wish to remain in the community but wish only to remove the asset from it. Or, perhaps, the asset owner may seek to keep the asset physically within the community but to use the asset in some way outside the locality (for example, by mortgaging or otherwise using the asset as security for a loan). At any rate, the moment the asset is used outside the locality, the localized rights have to be translated into rights in the wider jurisdiction.

As we will show presently, the ability to translate the localized property rights into rights recognized by the wider jurisdiction is extremely valuable. Translatable property rights are more readily transferred and used than localized rights, and it is easier to enjoy value (by use, transfer, exclusion, or otherwise) over broadly recognized property rights than narrowly recognized ones.

However, translation is not costless. Three kinds of costs generally accompany any translation of localized property rights.

Perhaps the most obvious type of costs are information costs. Professor Henry Smith has written about such costs in the context of community customs, but such costs attend all localized property systems. Information about the local rights,  

151 Rotem, CA 5747/08 at ¶ 29.
ownership, and the asset must be transmitted to the larger jurisdiction. Acquiring expertise in these matters requires gathering evidence and investing time. The more idiosyncratic the localized property system, the greater the informational costs will be in translating localized rights to the wider world.

Second, and more importantly, owners will encounter incompatibility costs. Generally, the precise rights created by the localized property system are not recognized by the wider jurisdiction. Alternatively, they can be enforced only if described in imprecise terms (for example, enforcing kibbutz property rights only as contractual rights or as a partnership agreement). Consequently, certain subtleties in the local property rights will be lost; to the degree that those subtleties accurately served local needs, this may result in a loss to net welfare. The most extreme case of incompatibility costs arises where there are open contradictions between the rights within the localized property system and those of the state system. For instance, while residents “own” land in favelas under the localized property system, in many cases that land already belongs to others under the state system.

Third, and finally, there are potential enforcement costs. Those rights that are compatible with the larger outside property system must be enforced in that outside system. This cost may be large or small, depending on the comparable costs of enforcement within the localized system. There may even be cases where outside enforcement proves cheaper than enforcement within the localized property system.

Both information costs and incompatibility costs grow as the similarity between the localized property rights and those of the wider jurisdiction’s property rights diminish. The more unfamiliar the local property rights, the greater the information costs will be in any translation. Likewise, the larger the gap between the localized property right and the rights recognized by the larger jurisdiction, the greater the likelihood of lost subtleties and the higher the incompatibility costs will be.

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153 See Rotem, CA 5747/08 at ¶¶ 13–19 (rejecting a claimed property right in residence on grounds that members are restricted to contractual rights as expressed in the kibbutz regulations).

One way of describing the problem of translation is through the prism of transaction costs. In a world with perfect information about rights, and infinitesimal costs of contracting, the gaps between localized property regimes and wider state property systems would be irrelevant. Any person who wanted to establish her localized property rights in the wider property system could costlessly let everyone know about the rights she wanted to protect and could contract costlessly with them to defend her rights.

As Professor R.H. Coase reminded us, however, we do not live in a world without transaction costs. In the real world, costs always attend transactions. Property rights in the Coasian world are the baselines from which negotiations are conducted, but where transaction costs are sufficiently high, parties will never depart from the baseline. In the locality within which the localized property regime prevails, local property is the baseline. But outside the locality, the baseline is the prevalent statewide property regime. An owner of a localized property right who wishes to transact with others who do not recognize her right will have to face the costs of information, incompatibility, and enforcement. For instance, she will have to educate others about the nature of her rights, their scope and their precise contours. The more idiosyncratic the localized rights are, the higher the cost of education. Of course, the holder of the localized right will have to repeat the process with every new individual with whom she wishes to transact. The more unfamiliar the right at issue is, the greater will be the expected number of interactions that the rights holder will have to go through to consummate a transaction.

In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.

156 Id at 15–16:
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.
Even more troubling than the problem of education will be those of incompatibilities between legal forms and enforcement. Owners of localized property rights will have to convince persons outside the locality of the merits and value of the localized property right. Outside the locality, only those who voluntarily subject themselves to the localized property regime can be held to it. This means that rights holders or potential rights holders will have to negotiate with a wide variety of potential parties for the rights to maintain the value of the localized property rights. Consider, for example, a localized property right in a house in a kibbutz. If the kibbutz member goes to a bank to get a loan secured by a mortgage on the house, the bank’s reluctance to issue the loan will not be assuaged simply by an explanation of the nature of the kibbutz member’s rights in the house. The bank will also be concerned about its ability to realize gains from a foreclosure sale of the house in the event of default. While fellow kibbutz members will understand and value the rights in the house, few persons outside the kibbutz will. This means that the bank’s ability to recover funds from selling the house will rely on its ability to persuade potential buyers outside the kibbutz of the value of holding kibbutz-defined rights in the house. If, as is likely, prohibitive transaction costs prevent the bank from creating a large pool of potential buyers of the rights in the house, the bank will attach a small value to the mortgage. The security value of the house will have been largely lost in the attempt to translate the kibbutz-centered property rights to the outside world.

In some cases, the contradictions between the rights recognized within the localized property system and those between the state’s property system will make the challenge even greater. Where a favela homeowner seeks a mortgage, the favela resident has to face all the challenges of the kibbutz resident, plus an additional one. Sometimes, the favela resident’s localized property right relates to realty to which title already belongs to another party. As long as there is a nontrivial chance that the true owner’s title may be asserted in the future, banks and other potential creditors must discount the value of the localized property interest. If the chances of a future assertion of title by the true owner are sufficiently high, the localized property right will be utterly unmarketable.

157 See, for example, De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 91 (cited in note 149).
Hence, from a transaction costs perspective localized property arrangements can serve as lock-in devices that make it harder for members of the relevant group to exit the group and move elsewhere. In that sense, they perform the same function as switching fees that are employed by cable and telephone companies to keep subscribers from switching to a different provider. In our case, however, the switching cost is not predetermined in advance by the provider as a price or penalty, but rather it is measured by the size of the incompatibility between the localized arrangement and the formal property system. The greater the incompatibility, the greater the cost of switching. The example of the kibbutz members in the early days of the movement provides the best illustration of this effect.\textsuperscript{158}

\section*{B. Law and Network Effects}

Another theoretical framework for understanding the challenges presented by translation may be found in the literature on network effects and technological standards.

Products and services that display network effects differ from other products and services in that their values tend to grow with the number of users.\textsuperscript{159} The classic example is telephony.\textsuperscript{160} A telephone apparatus is valueless for the first user as long as no one else has one. She cannot call anyone, nor can she receive calls. Once a second person purchases a phone, the phones have a modicum of value for both the subsequent purchaser and the first user. The two users can now converse by telephone, although the phone remains useless outside the network of two. As the number of telephone users grows, the value of the technology grows as well. Indeed, a telephone is most valuable when every person in the world has one (or several).\textsuperscript{161}

Prima facie, industries that are characterized by network effects maximize their value when technological standards are uniform. It is easy to see why. The adoption of a uniform standard potentially creates the greatest interoperability, and it

\textsuperscript{158} See Ran Abramitzky, \textit{The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz}, 123 Q J Econ 1111, 1151 (2008) ("This paper suggests . . . that lock-in devices are required to make exit costly.").

\textsuperscript{159} See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 94 (cited in note 11) (defining markets exhibiting "network effects" as ones where "the value of membership to one user is positively affected when another user joins and enlarges the network").

\textsuperscript{160} See id (describing the telecommunications market as a classic example of a market exhibiting "network effects").

\textsuperscript{161} See id.
therefore maximizes value for users. Consequently, over time industries that display network effects often tend to converge on a single standard.\textsuperscript{162} Obviously, standardization comes at a cost. Standardization may thwart competition and stifle dynamic efficiency.\textsuperscript{163} The converged-upon standard may not be the best technology. A technology’s initial market advantage (due to superior advertising, for instance) may be enough to compensate for its technological inferiority.\textsuperscript{164} The adoption of a single proprietary technology creates a barrier to entry for other firms and may yield a monopoly position for the standard’s provider.\textsuperscript{165}

A commonly cited example is the technological standard created in the 1990s personal computer market by IBM and Microsoft.\textsuperscript{166} When IBM entered the PC market in 1981, it was one of several personal computer manufacturers, along with Apple, Commodore, Atari, and Tandy.\textsuperscript{167} Each of the personal computers used different software for its operating system; IBM adopted Microsoft’s MS-DOS for its machines.\textsuperscript{168} As the IBM PC standard became more popular, Microsoft’s operating systems (MS-DOS and successor operating systems) became increasingly important, until they eventually became the dominant operating

\textsuperscript{162} See id at 105 (“In markets with network effects, there is natural tendency toward de facto standardization, which means everyone using the same system.”).

\textsuperscript{163} See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 105–08 (cited in note 11) (noting that while network effects tend to favor standardization, product differentiation and consumer heterogeneity may result in multiple products coexisting in a market exhibiting network effects).

\textsuperscript{164} See id at 107 (observing that a “small, initial advantage” by a competitor in a market with network effects may be enough “to parlay its advantage into a larger, lasting one”); Besen and Farrell, 6 J Econ Persp at 122 (cited in note 10).

\textsuperscript{165} See Katz and Shapiro, 6 J Econ Persp at 108 (cited in note 11) (stating that some models demonstrate that “users tend to stick with an established technology even when total surplus would be greater were they to adopt a new but incompatible technology”); Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 122 (cited in note 10) (explaining that because markets exhibiting network effects display inertia, “it is difficult for it to be displaced even by a technically superior and cheaper alternative”).


\textsuperscript{168} Id at 112–14. Although IBM machines were eventually sold with non-Microsoft operating systems, the need for software compatibility through several generations of hardware dictated that IBM systems and those with similar and compatible hardware architecture (IBM-compatibles) continue to use Microsoft software, through several generations of MS-DOS and later Microsoft Windows. See id at 127–28.
systems for personal computers. Consequently, it became more profitable for software companies to tailor their software (such as games, word processors, etc.) for Microsoft’s operating systems. This, in turn, made Microsoft’s operating systems more valuable to consumers, and increased Microsoft’s share of the operating system market. The more popular the operating system, the more software it gathered, and the more software it gathered, the more popular the operating system became.

The economic and legal literature on the subject suggests two possible solutions to the problem of monopolization: open standards and interoperability. Essentially, both solutions are the same. The core idea is to preserve the network effects without sacrificing competition. The first solution advocates forcing the adoption of standards that will remain open to all industry participants, so that each of them will be able to compete over complementary technologies. The second solution does not require technological standards to be completely open and settles instead for requiring a design that will enable different technological standards to interact with each other. A well-known example is the market for cellular communications. In this market, there are several service providers who operate

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169 See Werden, 69 Antitrust L J at 93–94 (cited in note 166).

170 Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP 'Interface': An Introductory Note, in Steven D. Anderman, ed, The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy 1, 11 (Cambridge 2007). It must be noted that all this occurred while several competing operating systems—such as Apple’s Mac-OS, Next’s NeXTSTEP OS, and IBM’s OS/2—were judged by industry experts to be technologically superior. See Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 118 (cited in note 10) (“[T]he initial success of MS-DOS is usually attributed not to any technical superiority, but to the fact that it was supported by IBM.”); John Sheesley, 5 of the Best Desktop Operating Systems You Never Used, TechRepublic (Mar 19, 2008), online at http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/classic-tech/5-of-the-best-desktop-operating-systems-you-never-used/107 (visited May 9, 2013).

171 See, for example, Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 103 (cited in note 11) (describing, as an example of an “open” system, IBM’s decision to allow independent software developers to write IBM-compatible software for the PC).

172 See, for example, Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at 516 (cited in note 10):

One possible solution to the standardization problem is to make the competing standards interoperable. If people can switch back and forth between competing versions of what is essentially the same standard, perhaps society can capture the benefits of competition without wasteful duplication of effort and without stranding consumers who make the wrong choice.

173 See, for example, id at 486–87 (“[C]ertain market conditions, such as a credible market commitment to open standards and compatibility, may ameliorate otherwise negative consequences of network effects.”).

174 See id at 552.
different technologies, yet the end users of all providers can seamlessly communicate with each other.

Laws are a code of human behavior that can act like codes of technological standards. The economic and social imperatives for law, therefore, are often the same. However, there are some important differences. As far as formal law is concerned, the state has monopoly power over the production of the code, especially in the field of property where the *numerus clausus* principle grants to the state exclusive power over the recognition of property rights. But the state cannot prevent private parties from creating their own private codes of conduct, and the *numerus clausus* principle does not and cannot bar the creation of informal localized property regimes. Indeed, by using contract law, private parties can create legally enforceable localized property regimes that closely resemble property law.

Nonetheless, the network effects of legal standards yield very strong pressure toward standardization. State recognized property rights are rights in rem that avail against all persons under the state’s authority. Hence, formal property rights are akin to a technological standard that has been adopted by the entire population of the jurisdiction. Owners of state-recognized property rights can transact with relative ease with any other person in the jurisdiction. Similarly, they can call on the state’s protection of their rights against transgressions by others in the jurisdiction. Localized property rights, by contrast, avail only against the members of the group that recognizes them. In the extreme, the number of members can be one. Similar to a single telephone user, a single adopter of a property arrangement will receive no value from the unique property form she devised. Indeed, it is meaningless to speak of a right that nobody else

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176 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 3–4 (cited in note 141) (explaining that the number of property rights are fixed in both common law and civil law property systems).
177 See, for example, id at 5:

A willing buyer and a willing seller can create an infinite variety of enforceable contracts for the exchange of recognized property rights, and can describe these property rights along a multitude of physical dimensions and prices. But common-law courts will not enforce an agreement to create a new type of property right.

See also id at 54–58 (considering and rejecting the argument that *numerus clausus* is irrelevant in today’s world where parties can contract in numerous ways to create “new forms of organizational ownership based on contract”).

178 Merrill and Smith, 101 Colum L Rev at 777 (cited in note 18) (“Property rights, on the other hand, are in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”).
recognizes and that avails against no one. As the number of community members increases, the potential value of their localized property arrangements increases as well. However, unless a localized arrangement is formally endorsed by the state, it will never encompass the entire population.

More generally, formal recognition of rights that is backed by state enforcement dramatically increases the value of the rights to their holders. Formally recognized rights are very similar to an official currency. The state imprimatur renders those rights more transferable (and consequently valuable) both by increasing the number of potential transferees and by reducing the transaction costs associated with their passage. But the advantages do not end there. The protection the state provides to formally recognized rights reduces protection costs for owners and, according to conventional wisdom, gives them an incentive to invest optimally in the development of their assets. De Soto estimated that in Peru alone the cost of localized property arrangements that have not been recognized by the state adds up to the staggering amount of $74 billion in what he calls “dead capital.” Even though this figure is subject to debate, there is no doubt that formal recognition of property rights yields substantial advantages. As de Soto observes, once property rights are formally recognized by the state, they can be “capitalized.” They can be used as security for debt, increasing liquidity. They can be more easily sold on the market, again increasing liquidity.

179 Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 26–34 (cited in note 141) (explaining that formally recognized rights are more valuable because they do not bear the measurement costs of rights that are not state recognized, such as informing parties of the rights resulting from such property regimes).

180 See, for example, Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 764–65 (1995) (arguing that corporate law should be analyzed in terms of network externalities). But see Hansmann, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 6–7 (cited in note 12) (considering and rejecting the idea that corporate charter drafters rely upon Delaware default corporate law rules due to network efficiencies).

181 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 33 (cited in note 149) (“The value of extralegally held rural and urban real estate in Peru amounts to some $74 billion.”).


183 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 49–51 (cited in note 149) (“Legal property thus gave the West the tools to produce surplus value over and above its physical assets.”).
None of these advantages accrue to holders of localized property rights.

C. Translation and the State System of Property

The state is under no obligation to accommodate localized property forms. Naturally, the state can voluntarily decide to design its property code in a way that will be friendly and welcoming to localized property arrangements. But there is no way to force it to do so. In short, the law is not an open standard; nor is there a way to force the state to make it “interoperable” with localized property regimes. The burden of achieving legal interoperability lies squarely with the local communities or groups that opt out of the formal legal system and prefer to design their unique property arrangements.

As we have seen, in some cases localized property systems are “official” and enjoy or rely on the state’s imprimatur. In other cases, the local property systems are “unofficial” and are unrecognized by or even in opposition to state law.

Where localized property systems are unofficial, translation costs will generally be significant. But even where state law recognizes localized property systems, translation costs may arise. The localized system, by virtue of its internal set of rules, does not automatically translate into alienable rights within the larger system. Indeed, in some cases, the state imposes restrictions on alienability as part of its recognition of the local system. Such is the case, for instance, with respect to Sámi property rights.

All things being equal, state recognition should lower translation costs. Well-designed state incorporation of localized property systems should not only lower the costs of informing outsiders about the nature of the localized rights, it should also lower the costs of enforcing such rights. However, state recognition may also have an adverse impact. Badly designed state incorporation (as was the case with Native American rights) can increase the incompatibility between localized and state systems without bringing offsetting benefits in enforceability or information. Additionally, state recognition may ossify the localized system, stripping away its ability to respond to community

184 See Part I.A.
185 See Part I.B.
186 See text accompanying notes 102–06.
187 See text accompanying notes 32–54.
needs. This can lead to lower utility from the localized system over time.

The dynamics leading to the state to recognize only some localized property systems are complex.

Some of the localized arrangements are essentially compatible with the general legal framework while others are not. As we have noted, the degree to which localized property rights are incompatible with those of the state constitutes one of the central costs of translation. These incompatibility costs are systemic as well as rights centered. The more a localized property right is incompatible with state rights, the greater will be the cost of translating it to the outside world. What is true of the individual right will also be true of the entire property system. The more incompatible a particular localized regime, the less likely it is to be recognized by the legal system. When the legal system refuses to recognize a particular localized arrangement, it means that the value of the arrangement is confined to the group and efforts to enforce the arrangement outside the group will be costly and often fail.

Our analysis gives rise to an important implication. The attitude of the legal system is an important determinant of a localized property regime’s sustainability or viability. As we noted, the state is free to determine its attitude towards localized property regimes. It can adopt a welcoming attitude or a hostile attitude. In this sense, the state is similarly situated to the proprietor of a dominant technological standard who has to decide how to approach an alternative technological solution.

A caveat is in order here. Our analysis does not imply that localized property regimes are necessarily inefficient for the groups or communities that adopt them, even where the entire regime is incompatible with the state property system. As we will explore in greater detail in the next Part, the benefits, including ideological rents, that group members derive from

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189 See text accompanying notes 153–54.
190 Indeed, there is a debate in the literature about the optimal level at which property law should be produced. In a recent article, Professor Christopher Serkin advanced a qualified argument for determining property protection at the local level (that is, by local government) as opposed to the state or national level. See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 892–904 (cited in note 144). It should be noted that Professor Serkin’s analysis focuses primarily on takings and land use issues. In other words, it is concerned with protecting property against government transgressions.
191 See Part III.
unique property arrangements may outweigh the cost. Localized property norms contribute to group cohesion and may be essential for the preservation of historical heritage.\footnote{See, for example, Svensson, \textit{The Attainment of Limited Self-Determination} at 271 (cited in note 97).} Hence from the internal point of view of the group members, opting out of the legal standard may be a prudent choice.

At the same time, it must be borne in mind that neither the cost of localized property regimes nor the benefits remain constant over time. The calculus is dynamic. Market value of resources may change, making exit options more or less valuable. Membership of the group within the localized property system will doubtless change over time, leading to changed preferences. As the preferences drift, it is likely that translation costs will increase over time, making convergence relatively more attractive.

D. Other Known Problems of Translation

In stating that localized property systems are subject to translation costs, we do not intend to imply that only localized property systems are subject to such costs. In fact, translation problems can arise in other contexts, and, to some degree, problems of translation have previously been recognized in the literature, albeit only in several discrete contexts.\footnote{Perhaps the most exotic context is “virtual” property. Virtual property rights are “property rights” owned by an imaginary character that exists in a game world. See, for example, Fairfield, 85 BU L Rev at 1058–64 (cited in note 8) (discussing property in “virtual environments”). Because game worlds are quite extensive, involving hundreds of thousands of players, and players are themselves sufficiently entertained to invest billions (in the aggregate) in the games, virtual property rights can prove quite valuable. In 2010, Jon Jacobs sold a virtual game “resort” in the Entropia Universe in a series of transactions for a total of $635,000. Oliver Chiang, \textit{Meet the Man Who Just Made a Half Million from the Sale of Virtual Property}, Forbes (Nov 13, 2010), online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverchiang/2010/11/13/meet-the-man-who-just-made-a-cool-half-million-from-the-sale-of-virtual-property (visited May 9, 2013). Obviously, translating virtual property rights into the real world poses significant challenges. See John William Nelson, \textit{The Virtual Property Problem: What Property Rights in Virtual Resources Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why They Are a Bad Idea}, 41 McGeorge L Rev 281, 307–08 (2010).}

Most obviously, property claims that cross state lines provide a familiar example of property translation problems. These translation issues arise where people seek to enforce property rights established and recognized by one jurisdiction in another. Translation issues in such instances are subsumed into the larger set of problems associated with the field of conflict of laws. Courts tackle translation problems by using conflict of laws
principles to determine which legal system’s substantive rules ought to apply. A particularly striking instance of such efforts can be found in state law treatment of community property. Community property is a form of joint ownership of property that applies to certain kinds of spousal property acquired during marriage. Only a handful of states today recognize community property; other states restrict spouses to the forms of common ownership recognized in the common law. Courts must therefore use conflict of law principles to resolve disputes where, for example, a couple creates community property while domiciled in a community property jurisdiction, and the couple subsequently establishes its domicile in a non-community-property state. In earlier writings, we have participated in the scholarly debate about whether property rights should be more generally made available for migration.

Even without crossing state lines, ordinary property rights can give rise to translation issues. Various ordinary forms of property—cotenancies, leaseholds, etc.—involve two-tiered property rights, in which one set of rules applies within the circle of owners (among cotenants, for example), while another set of rules applies outwards to the rest of the world. Internal arrangements among co-owners must be translated to the outside world, and are subject to the obvious costs of education, incompatibility, and enforcement.

194 See ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 22 (Matthew Bender 2002) (“Community-property law begins with the contrary presumption: all earnings from spousal labor during the marriage are the property of the marital ‘community’ in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest.”).

195 See id (stating that since there are only eight traditional community-property states and, of these, five instruct courts to divide property “equitably,” equitable distribution is the “dominant rule” in the United States today).

196 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 259 (1971). Comment (a) to § 259 adds, “Considerations of fairness and convenience require that the spouses’ marital property interests . . . are not affected by a change of domicil to another state by one or both of the spouses.” Comment (b) provides, “If one or both spouses sell the property in their domicile and reinvest the proceeds in another asset, the new asset purchased with the proceeds retains the character of the original.” This is a departure from the usual conflict of laws rules applying to property, under which the situs of the object or the domicile of the party establishes the relevant legal regime to apply. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 258(1).

197 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale L.J 72, 80 (2005).
III. WHY LOCALIZED PROPERTY DOES NOT ALWAYS CONVERGE

Similar to the trend in technological settings, in the world of property, too, there exists constant pressure on localized property regimes to conform to the dominant standard, namely, the formal legal system. The pressure toward convergence is a direct result of the translation problem. As we have explained, holders of localized property rights must incur translation costs when interacting with members of the public at large. The costs of translation therefore reduce the utility of localized property rights. Consequently, all things being equal, translation costs should drive larger state systems to incorporate and supplant localized property rights.

As long as the benefit they derive from having specialized local property arrangements is greater than the cost associated with translation, participants in the localized property system will choose to preserve the localized regime. However, as their losses mount due to increased translation costs, so will the pressure toward convergence—at least in most cases. As we will show, the two central variables—the benefits from localized property arrangements and translation costs—change over time. Hence, the analysis must be dynamic.

One variable that affects the likelihood of convergence is the cost of transitioning from the localized property system to the larger state one. Even if members of the group respecting the localized property rights believe that the benefits of their localized property rights no longer justify the payment of translation costs, they may still hold on to their localized system.

The reason for this is obvious. Transitioning to the state property system is potentially costly. If the state does not grant formal recognition or adequate tools for translating the localized property rights into state-recognized legal rights, property owners will find themselves permanently subject to the losses of imperfect translation. If the state does incorporate the localized property rights, this will not necessarily result in convergence or reduce the translation costs to zero. Politicians and potential opponents may have to be persuaded to agree to the incorporation, and the very act of incorporation may harm some of the beneficial qualities of the localized property system. Some members of society, both inside and outside the group, may feel that there is a benefit to maintaining the separate localized property

198 See Part II.A.
system alongside the regular state system. In some cases, the political result may be a formalized state recognition of the localized property system, granting the rights state enforcement without full incorporation or interoperability of the rights. This, for instance, is the way the United States has traditionally dealt with some aspects of Native American property rights. But in other cases, no such complete formalization will be possible. Indeed, in some cases, the very incompatibilities between the localized property rights and state property rights that raise translation costs also raise transition costs. In such cases, the price of convergence for participants in the localized property system may be substantial amounts of wealth stored in localized property rights that cannot be transitioned to the state property system.

In this Part, we examine some of the likely barriers to convergence of localized and state property systems. In particular, we note the potential influence of the political process. Importantly, we do not judge political outcomes against convergence as necessarily bad or necessarily good. Sometimes the outcomes will reflect the optimal result; other times, they will not. In any event, given this background, we show that we should expect to continue seeing partially incompatible property systems despite translation costs.

A. Community Preferences

Localized property regimes often reflect community preferences. Community preferences may reflect a shared ideology, or culture, or simply a common interest of the group. When community preferences diverge sufficiently from those anchored in the state property system, community members can derive a benefit from opting out of the formal property system and adopting their own rules. Therefore, localized property regimes are especially resistant to convergence when they embody community preferences that diverge from the norm, and such regimes may survive even in the face of increasing economic pressures to conform.

Assume, for example, that a localized property regime is consistent with a certain ideology that is shared by all group members. An example of this is the property system used in ear-

200 See Part III.C.
ly kibbutzim, based on the members’ shared commitment to communism as they understood it. In such cases, high costs of translation may not be sufficient to drive group members to adopt the state property system. The ideological benefits of separation from the state may be so high as to justify paying the high translation costs. Kibbutz members may so enjoy their communist ideological purity that they are more than willing to pay the price of losing the ability to utilize their localized property rights in the surrounding society.

Indeed, in some cases, members may view the translation costs as a valuable commitment mechanism. New members entering the kibbutz understand that the rights they will receive as members—for instance, the right to live in a particular house—will not generally be translatable into the wider society. Because the rights received by the member can only be fully utilized within the kibbutz, members lock themselves into high costs for economic transactions outside the community. These costs can serve as a penalty for defecting from community values and, therefore, as an important precommitment mechanism for members of the community.

Importantly, community preferences do not remain constant over time. They may change as a result of the entry or exit of new members with different preferences or because the original members changed the preferences they once had. External changes often serve as a catalyst in this process. Consider the effect of market prices on ideology (or culture), for example. Even if the internal benefits of the local property remain stable, opportunity costs for the local property system may grow as greater gains can be realized in the outside, statewide property system. Up to a certain point, the members of a community with localized property norms may adhere to their original preferences. At a certain point the opportunity cost will become so large that it will overcome the ideological counterweight. At this point, the process of convergence will start and simultaneously the countervailing ideology will begin to erode.

201 See David Barkin and John W. Bennett, Kibbutz and Colony: Collective Economies and the Outside World, 14 Comp Stud Socy & Hist 456, 460–61 (1972) (describing the kibbutz as a “living version of the socialist communitarian ideal”). See also Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 557 (cited in note 59).

202 See note 158 and accompanying text.

203 See Russell, Utopia in Zion at 169–70 (cited in note 72).
Once community preferences change, the translation costs that penalize defection can no longer effectively serve as a means for binding together the community. On the contrary, the changed preferences lead the community as a whole to change the form of localized property rights so that the community as a whole will no longer have to pay such high translation costs.

This is precisely what happened in the kibbutzim in Israel. The kibbutzim were founded on a collectivist ideology that shunned private property. For decades, members were not allowed to have any private property rights; all resources were held by the collective. Over time, however, as the Israeli economy developed and younger members of kibbutzim realized that they could get significant returns on their labor if they left the kibbutz and offered services on the open market, they begin to leave kibbutzim en masse. This factor was one of the chief causes of the financial collapse of kibbutzim in the 1980s. In response, an increasing number of kibbutzim relaxed the ban on private property and started recognizing private property rights in members. Today, private property rights are the norm in most kibbutzim. Only a small group of well-to-do kibbutzim still abide by the old property regime.

Notwithstanding the experience of the kibbutzim in Israel, in some instances community preferences may thwart convergence for long time periods. Even in Israel, it took decades until the forces of the market overcame the strong ideological commitment of kibbutz members to ban private property. Accordingly, community preferences are an important mitigating force against convergence.

B. Transition Costs

A second barrier to convergence is transition costs. Localized property regimes sometimes arise out of necessity or path dependence. In such cases, they are not optimal even from the vantage point of the actors that abide by them. The informal property rights of favela residents provide a useful example. One can reasonably assume that the residents would be more than happy to have their rights formalized. Yet, it does not happen.

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204 See Abramitzky, 25 J Econ Persp at 192 (cited in note 60).
205 See id at 191–92.
As is the case with any equilibrium, even an inefficient one, it is necessary to invest resources to effect a move to a more efficient state of affairs.

In this sense, our analysis parallels Professor Harold Demsetz's famous account of the transition of property regimes from open access to private property. Professor Demsetz pointed out that even when the transition to private property rights is efficient, it might nevertheless not occur on account of high transition costs. Formalizing property rights is costly. The introduction of property rights in new resources requires asset definition, recognition of rights in them, registration of the newly established rights, and then enforcement of the rights. The aggregate cost of these tasks may outweigh the gains from privatization.

The same can happen with respect to localized property rights. Informal property rights are prevalent in many countries in Latin America. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro represent a much broader phenomenon. Many economists, foremost among them de Soto, believe that there are enormous gains to be had from formalizing those rights. Currently, the informal rights cannot serve as collateral for securing financing. This, in turn, stunts economic growth. Formalizing those rights requires adopting expensive land reforms. Among other things, the state will have to clear away prior formalized titles to many of the real estate assets that have been claimed under the localized property systems. In other cases, the state will have to provide a formal mechanism for recognizing transfers that already took place in violation of the formal rules.

207 One example of an enduring, yet inefficient, equilibrium—according to Professors Gary Libecap and Ronald Johnson—is the practice of grazing on Navajo land. See Gary D. Libecap and Ronald N. Johnson, Legislating Commons: The Navajo Tribal Council and the Navajo Range, 18 Econ Inq 169, 79–84 (1980).


Some countries, like Peru, decided to bite the bullet and enact the necessary enabling legislation despite the price tag.\textsuperscript{212} Other Latin American countries have refrained from taking this step. There are two possible explanations for the decision not to formalize localized property rights. First, the cost of passing the reform may be thought to exceed the projected benefit. Second, the reform may be blocked for political reasons. The difference between the two explanations is that in the former case, converging the localized property system with the state system is welfare reducing, while in the latter case, the change might be welfare enhancing yet is not effected on account of narrow political considerations or because it is not high enough on the politicians’ priority list. We discuss these possibilities at greater length in the next Section.

C. Political Motivations

A third force that sometimes countervails the pressure toward convergence is political interests. As Professor Saul Levmore pointed out, the political processes—or more precisely, politicians—often thwart efficient changes in the world of property.\textsuperscript{213} Changes in property regimes, he reminded us, are a product of the political process. Politicians, as self-interest maximizing agents, would often choose to block welfare-enhancing transitions when doing so can help them politically.\textsuperscript{214}

As an illustration consider the case of the kibbutzim in Israel. Traditionally, the kibbutzim constituted the base of the Labor Party, which ruled Israel in the first few decades of its existence. It was clearly in the best interest of the Labor Party to do anything in its power to act in tandem with the leaders of the kibbutzim in order to preserve the dominant socialist ideology as well as the leadership. These narrow political interests enabled the kibbutzim to extract various political concessions and, more


\textsuperscript{214} Id at S426–27.
importantly for our purposes, stave off the economic pressures that ultimately forced privatization on many kibbutzim.215

The story of the Sámi in Norway (and other Scandinavian countries) is in many respects different from that of the kibbutzim in Israel, but it, too, highlights the significance of political considerations as an anticonvergence force. In order to preserve their traditional lifestyle, the Sámi and their reindeer herds need to cross over broad expanses of land.216 The migrating ways of the Sámi present a challenge to the Norwegian property system. Yet, for cultural and ideological reasons, the political system in Norway (as well as a big part of the population) is strongly predisposed to protect the Sámi lifestyle, notwithstanding its cost.217

One need not venture to far-off places to appreciate the effect of political motivations on localized property regimes. Localized property rights in parking spots in the United States provide a fascinating example of the interaction between localized property arrangements and local politics. In his study of property rights in parking spaces, Professor Epstein reports of the existence of a localized property norm in Chicago under which a person who cleared the snow off of a parking spot is entitled to it until the street is cleared of ice and snow by the municipality.218 Urban activists opposed the practice for being unfair and inefficient, but it was staunchly defended by Mayor Richard M. Daley, who said: “I tell people, if someone spends all that time digging their car out, do not drive in that spot. This is Chicago. Fair warning.”219 Clearly, local politicians are strongly disincentivized to overturn the norm for fear of the political price of doing so.220


218 Epstein, 31 J Legal Stud at S528–29 (cited in note 21).


220 Indeed, the mayor of Boston who decided to legally overturn a similar norm confronted a serious public outcry. See Jonathan Finer, *Boston Fights Winter Parking Tradition: Residents Given 48 Hours to Remove Markers from Shoveled-Out Spots*, Wash Post A2 (Jan 1, 2005).
Professor Mancur Olson has noted the ability of small, organized groups with a discrete interest in a goal that is very valuable to them to capture the political process.\textsuperscript{221} Such groups, on account of their superior organization, can prevail in the political arena over much larger yet disorganized groups and extract benefits at their expense.\textsuperscript{222} Communities and groups with localized property regimes often fit Professor Olson's description of small, organized groups.\textsuperscript{223} Consequently, they—or more precisely, their leaders—can extract sufficient concessions from the political system to enable them to preserve localized property arrangements.

Political opposition to transition can therefore arise in a variety of circumstances. Politicians may oppose transition because they view the localized property systems as sufficiently important or valuable to the society at large to warrant the continued payment of translation costs. Alternatively, politicians may oppose transition because the systems are sufficiently valuable to a particularly powerful group that the political losses entailed in convergence are greater than the political gains, even though convergence might be advantageous to society as a whole.

\section*{IV. Translation and Property, Generally}

Thus far, we have examined the popularity of localized property systems, described the translation costs they create when interacting with the statewide property system, and examined the reasons why localized property systems may resist incorporation and replacement by the state property system. We now turn to several broader issues of property theory illuminated by the phenomenon of localized property systems.

\subsection*{A. Commons}

Very few topics in property theory have attracted as much attention as the choice between private property and commons property.\textsuperscript{224} The opening salvo in the ongoing debate between the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{221} Mancur Olson, \textit{The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups} 53 (Harvard 1965).
\item \textsuperscript{222} Id at 22–35.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Id at 48–50.
\item \textsuperscript{224} For some important contributions to the literature, see Carol Rose, \textit{The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property}, 53 U Chi L Rev 711, 711–23 (1986); Gary D. Libecap, \textit{Contracting for Property Rights} 1–9 (Cambridge
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champions of private property and the proponents of commons property can be traced back to Professor Demsetz’s seminal *Toward a Theory of Property*, in which he laid out a prima facie case for the superiority of private property regimes, at least from the perspective of efficiency. In a nutshell, Professor Demsetz argued that formalizing private property rights in resources eliminates a severe problem of negative externalities inimical to commons property. He showed that when a resource is held in common, actors have a tendency to overuse it since each of them derives the full marginal benefit of her use while paying only a small fraction of the marginal cost. This insight has commonly been associated with Professor Garrett Hardin’s gloomy prediction that “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”

Subsequent contributions, among them the path-breaking work of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, have challenged Professor Demsetz’s conclusion. Professor Ostrom, for one, has demonstrated that close-knit groups can come up with governance rules that can reduce the externalities problem to a manageable level and solve the overuse problem. Others, foremost among them Professor Michael Heller, pointed out that the proliferation of private property rights in resources may lead to serious holdout problems, which result in underutilization of resources. Professor Heller, following a lead from Professor Frank Michelman, labeled the latter phenomenon “anticommons.”

In this Section, we highlight a different, hitherto overlooked aspect of the debate concerning the choice between private property and commons property. Earlier discussions have focused on the resource-by-resource transaction costs entailed in management through private property or commons. We look at the

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226 Id at 354.


229 Id at 15–18.


potential transaction costs created by interactions with the property systems. As we will show, including such costs in our analysis dramatically changes the analysis of commons problems.

Debates to date have focused on the resource-by-resource transaction costs entailed in management through private property or commons. On the one hand, scholars agree that, in high transaction cost environments, users may be expected to overconsume resources in the commons since users may partially externalize the costs of their use of any given resource while internalizing the full benefits. Thus, for instance, users of a fishery held in the commons know that they can enjoy the full benefit of any fish caught while suffering only a small portion of the costs of depleting the fishery. This phenomenon is commonly known as the “tragedy of the commons,” thanks to Professor Hardin’s famous article on the subject. On the other hand, where the transaction costs of governing strategies are sufficiently low, close-knit communities may adopt governance rules and monitoring mechanisms, as well as social sanctions, to combat effectively the tendency of individual members to overuse a common resource. Thus, Professor Ostrom showed that close-knit communities, such as Eskimos, have been able to craft rules preventing the depletion of fisheries held in the commons.

Resource-by-resource transaction costs are also responsible for the expected underconsumption of resources held by an excessive number of private owners. In such anticommons—as Professor Heller labels them—managing any given resource requires aggregating the consent of numerous private property owners. Where transaction costs are too high, the vetoes cast by one or more of the owners will be final, and the resource will

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233 See, for example, Smith, 31 J Legal Stud at S478–86 (cited in note 224).
234 See, for example, Baylor L. Johnson, Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons, 12 Envir Values 271, 273–74 (2003). See also Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 Mich L Rev 1, 11–12 (2003) (discussing Professor Hardin’s formulation of the tragedy of the commons).
235 See Hardin, 162 Science at 1244–45 (cited in note 227).
236 See Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 58–102 (cited in note 228).
remain unused to its best potential. Thus, Professor Heller cites, among others, the example of private Native American property rights in reservation land. In many cases, says Professor Heller, fractional shares have descended through several generations, creating a multiplicity of owners over the land, each with a tiny share of ownership in the whole. This has led to a collection of owners whose costs of coordination far exceed any reasonable prospect of earning utility from the land. Professor Heller offers the example of Tract 1305, valued at $8,000 but owned by 439 owners, thus requiring $17,560 per year to coordinate payments of annual rent that aggregated to only $1,080 per year. The result, says Professor Heller, is a form of property that cannot possibly be cost-effectively managed, and is doomed to nonuse or nonproductive use.

Our contribution to this debate is in the observation that transaction costs also come in the form of translation costs. At core, our insight is very simple: once a given resource is managed by a regime separate from the legal standard in a certain jurisdiction, it makes translating between the regime and the wider legal standard increasingly cumbersome. Accordingly, in a jurisdiction that generally recognizes private property as the dominant regime for resource management, communities that wish to adopt common property regimes for their own tight-knit group will incur much greater costs. Correlatively, the greater the deviation of the property regime from the default regime, the costlier it will be for the members of the community adhering to it.

Our claim is based on the phenomenon of translation. Simply put, transaction-cost analyses not only must take account of the costs of bargaining for optimal use of any given resource, but they also must take into account the costs of bargaining across different property systems.

Consider, for instance, Eskimo rights in a fishery. As Professor Ostrom observes, the internal rules of the Eskimo community may prevent overfishing and thereby avoid the tragedy of the commons. However, the fact that the Eskimo rights are internal to the community means they cannot easily be translated

240 Id at 685–87.
241 Id at 686 ("Two-thirds of the owners received less than $1 in annual rents, one third received less than a nickel, and one owner was to receive a penny once in 177 years.").
242 Id at 686–87.
243 Consider Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 173–77 (cited in note 228).
to outsiders. An Eskimo fisherman cannot trade rights in the fishery with outsiders, or use the rights as security for a loan.

An interesting implication of our insight is that common resources may sometimes be subject to *under-* rather than over-, utilization. We submit that owing to translation costs, common resources might be left underdeveloped because the rights holders will be unable to achieve general recognition for any private rights they may obtain in objects they remove from the commons. Importantly, the translation costs associated with commons property cannot be lowered by the adoption of effective internal governance rules. Collective action mechanisms by close-knit communities may successfully block members’ overuse of the common resource. However, these are intragroup measures whose effect is confined to members of the group and their relationships with one another. Hence, Professor Ostrom’s research offers no solution to the translation problem. In the situations described by Professor Ostrom, group governance can prevent overuse, but not underuse.

Another implication of our analysis is that some kinds of anticommons suffer even greater problems of underconsumption than realized by Professor Heller. Professor Heller focused on the likelihood of underconsumption where owners have high costs in coordinating with one another. But if the anticommons arise within a localized property system, translation costs must be added to the coordination costs as a barrier to efficient use of the property. To return to the infamous Tract 1305 cited by Professor Heller, even if a new and dramatically cheaper system of coordination were developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to permit managing the interests of the 439 owners, the property would still be undervalued because the limitations of transferability mean that any rights recognized by the Bureau and landowners cannot be easily translated into the wider property systems of the United States.

Both in the cases cited by Professor Ostrom and in those by Professor Heller, the translation problem is largely external to the group. It arises from the gap between the property settings of the formal legal systems and the localized property rules adopted by a certain group or community. The adoption of an effective governance mechanism does not remedy the translation

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244 Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 673–75 (cited in note 230).
245 Id at 686–87. See also text accompanying notes 240–41.
problem and cannot remedy it. Our analysis suggests that irrespective of the governance mechanisms that apply to common resources, the mechanisms will often give rise to translation costs.

B. Semicommons

Our translation analysis is also potentially relevant to a branch of the commons literature that focuses on mixtures of features of commons and private property called “semicommons.” The term semicommons is often attributed to Professor Smith, and it refers to situations in which assets are managed with a mixture of commons and private property rights.246 The classic example cited by Professor Smith is the open fields system used in England in the Middle Ages. In the open fields system, peasants each privately owned delineated strips of land in one or more large fields within the village boundaries. However, alongside the peasants’ private rights in the land, there coexisted a commons regime under which the land would have to be opened for grazing during specified times of the year.247

Professor Smith posited that semicommons would arise where, in some places or for some uses, an asset could be most profitably managed by protecting private exclusion rights and leaving one person to be the gatekeeper for the asset, while at different times or for different uses the asset would be optimally managed through a governance regime, without a single gatekeeper.248 The advantage of semicommons over commons regimes could be found in the disciplining effects of partial private property. The strategic offloading of costs onto other users that characterizes commons regimes is less profitable in a well-designed semicommons. At the same time, semicommons may prove cheaper to set up and manage than a full private property regime, and transaction costs among the semicommons owners may prove lower, making semicommons preferable in certain circumstances to full-scale private property.249

A translation analysis adds a dynamic dimension to Professor Smith’s analysis. Following the path of Professor Demsetz,
Professor Smith imagines transitions between and among commons, semicommons, and private property regimes as the values of the asset and various uses of it change, in contrast with the transaction costs involved in managing the property and transitioning among regimes. We posit that one potentially hidden cost in the analysis is the cost of translation of semicommons arrangements beyond the bounds of the community. Semicommons arrangements could certainly encourage efficient use among members of a community using an open field. However, because those rights are partially bound to the ongoing governance arrangements with the community, there will necessarily be translation costs involved in moving to a different area, or in bringing in outsiders. These translation costs can thus exacerbate the standard costs involved in relocation and mobility. In medieval England, translation costs could extract a hidden price from the peasants twice: once by discouraging mobility and a second time by making transitions more costly where localities would have to translate old rights into new ones.

The advantages of semicommons are therefore tightly linked to the pervasiveness of owner mobility and their potential desire to translate their rights to outsiders. The more dynamic the society, the more costly semicommons regimes are, irrespective of the internal costs of managing a semicommons and encouraging optimal management and use.

C. Property Formalities

A third field of scholarly inquiry for which our translation analysis holds relevance is the field of inquiry pioneered by Peruvian economist de Soto. De Soto is best known for his work on informal economies in the third world, and his thesis that an informational framework is the necessary backbone for the full enjoyment of property rights. For instance, de Soto writes that owners of assets in “informal” (that is, not fully legal) economic units like favelas enjoy property rights that cannot reach their full potential because the owners cannot use their rights to obtain credit. Unregistered and unrecognized rights cannot be mortgaged and used to secure loans. Unregistered and unrecognized rights cannot easily be transferred to others. Unregistered

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and unrecognized rights cannot easily be vindicated in courts of law.253

Professor Jeffrey Stake summarized the costs of intransferrability as they were pointed out in the economic literature:

Economic theory would predict that where rights cannot be transferred, productivity will suffer. Omotunde, applying the analysis of Coase, Alchian and Demsetz to land tenure, argues that restrictions on the sale of land reduce investment in land by making it difficult to borrow for improvements and by limiting an owner’s ways of capturing his investment. He concludes that there must be freedom and legal enforcement of sale and rental contracts for a system of land tenure to facilitate wealth increases.254

De Soto argues that formalizing property rights, and creating the informational framework for recognizing and vindicating those rights, is the key to unlocking their potential to create wealth. Once rights are properly registered, information about the property rights is available to a much wider audience, and the potential for realizing gains from the property is correspondingly greater.255

The relevance of de Soto’s work for our analysis of translation costs in localized property systems is obvious. Indeed, as we see it, de Soto’s argument explores one central aspect of the wider phenomenon of localized property systems and their translation costs. As we argue, significant information costs can be created by localized property systems and their differences with other property systems. However, these are not the only translation costs that must be considered. For instance, rights within localized property systems may be partially incompatible with state-recognized property rights. Thus, formalization of rights might come at the cost of losing some of the attractiveness of the structure of localized property rights. This is why, in some cases, “formalization” of rights—or in our parlance, convergence of localized property rights with the wider state property system—may be disadvantageous. In other cases, of course, “formalization” is highly desirable. De Soto’s work is an important

253 Id at 49–51.
contribution to the analysis of localized property systems, but it is incomplete.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have explored the phenomenon of localized property systems and the interactions of such localized property systems with property law. In our exploration, we have looked both at the local systems themselves and at their implications for our broader understanding of the world of property.

We began by showing the ubiquity of localized property systems. Some appear quite exotic, such as the informal property rights in favelas in Brazil, collective property rights in kibbutzim in Israel, or even virtual property rights in computer games. Other localized property systems are quite mundane, such as the quasi-property rights in urban parking spaces or the agreed-upon property arrangements among roommates. In all events, localized property systems serve some need of the localized property users. The localized systems may be due to lower transaction costs thanks to ongoing relationships (roommates), ideological preferences (kibbutzim), flaws in property law or its satellite regulatory systems (favelas), or a variety of other reasons. Whatever the reasons for the localized property systems, they are not costless. All localized property systems entail translation costs with the wider state property systems around them. Translation costs result from incompatibilities, as well as information and enforcement costs. Some of the localized systems are adopted or recognized by state law; others are not. Systems that earn state recognition may benefit from lower translation costs, but they may only suffer from poor incorporation or from ossification. In any event, state recognition of localized systems does not eliminate translation costs.

One way of understanding the phenomenon of localized property systems is through the economic lens of network effects. The value of property arrangements increases as the number of people who abide by them goes up. The greater the number of adherents, the greater the utility of the property regime. These network effects, and the translation costs generated by localized property systems, create pressure for localized property systems to converge with the larger state property systems around them. But pressures for convergence may be resisted. Convergence is itself costly. The costs of transitioning may bar convergence, or the continued utility of the localized property
system may render convergence not cost-effective. Additionally, politics may block efficacious convergences of property systems. Our Article aims to provide the beginnings of an exploration of localized property systems and translation problems rather than a complete survey. We demonstrated that the insights identified in this Article have important and divergent implications for the theoretical work on common property, the semi-commons, and property formalities. Specifically, we showed that the introduction of translation costs into the analysis calls into question the positions endorsed by property theorists on common and semicommon property, as well as the formalization of property rights in various resources. If our analysis is correct, policymakers must pay close heed to the problem of translation as they design future property systems.