Using our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology Teach us About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices

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USING OUR BRAINS: WHAT COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TEACH US ABOUT TEACHING LAW STUDENTS TO MAKE ETHICAL, PROFESSIONALLY RESPONSIBLE, CHOICES

Alan M. Lerner

ABSTRACT

Throughout our lives, below the level of our consciousness, each of us develops values, intuitions, expectations, and needs that powerfully affect both our perceptions and our judgments. Placed in situations in which we feel threatened, or which implicate our values, our brains, relying on those implicitly learned, emotionally weighted, memories, may react automatically, without reflection or the opportunity for reflective interdiction. We can “downshift,” to primitive, self-protective problem solving techniques. Because these processes operate below the radar of our consciousness, automatic, “emotional” reaction, rather than thoughtful, reasoned analysis may drive our responses to stressful questions of ethics and professional responsibility.

1. Practice Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This paper has been several years in the making, and while I take full responsibility for it, I must express profound appreciation for the many people whose support and encouragement were essential to its completion. Professor Mike Rutherford, and Dr. Kathy Hirsh-Pasek to whom I first floated my thesis encouraged me to pursue it, despite my lack of scientific background, and pointed me in the direction to learn the essential background science. When I had completed a draft, Dr. Hirsh-Pasek, Dr. Julio Kuperman, and Dr. Matthew Lattel gave me helpful suggestions for making the scientific portion more precise and understandable. The folks at the UCLA/University of London IALS Fifth International Conference on Clinical Legal Education, encouraged me to present the paper even though I had completed only a preliminary draft, and Dr. Hirsh-Pasek and Michael Pasek convinced me of the appropriateness of presenting it aided by PowerPoint, then taught me how to do it. My clinical colleagues at Penn, and the Mid-Atlantic Clinicians’ Conference, and the participants in the Penn Law School Faculty Summer Colloquium listened patiently, and made very helpful suggestions for making the paper more accessible. I have been privileged to have been aided by an extraordinary group of research assistants over the past several years, including Steven Ebert, Stephanie Vogel, Elisa Behar, Tracey Sorens, Christine Hoyler, and Mariana Kuperman. I am especially indebted to researchers Adam Sundor, Theresa Keeley, and Nicole Isaacs and librarian Merle Slyhoff, without whose thoughtful and tireless work, I certainly would not have completed the paper before retirement. Without the assistance of Sylvia Bloise and Kelly Colgan-Azar, this paper would still be purely a stream of consciousness rambling, totally without form.
Lawyers continually face complex problems of great moment to their clients and the community, problems which may implicate their own professional values. They need to learn to address these problems thoughtfully and effectively while carrying out their professional responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and public citizens, exercising both their analytical skills, and moral judgment. To do so, they need to understand their own emotional processes and the content of their intuitions, and have the skills, and the confidence in their ability, to act appropriately. Unfortunately, traditional legal education focuses on teaching students “legal analysis” of a given set of facts, in which the answer is the formation of a legal rule, the role of the lawyer is to achieve the client’s stated goal, and other values are, at best, minimally relevant.

This paper analyzes recent discoveries in cognitive science and social psychology that explain the brain’s learning and problem solving mechanisms, and applies that scientific knowledge to demonstrate why traditional legal education may actually impair the ability to effectively solve complex problems, particularly those freighted with issues of personal values and professional responsibility. It then describes an alternative pedagogy, problem-based learning, that provides valuable insights to teaching law students to become ethical practitioners.

I. WHAT ARE LAW STUDENTS TAUGHT ABOUT RESPONDING TO ETHICAL PROBLEMS?

A. Examples from Lawyering: The Real World

Case #1

A bright, honest, and hard working fourth year associate, in whom all of the partners saw the potential for partnership, was investigating a discrimination charge brought by a former employee of the firm’s client. She decided that a fellow employee might have some important information. After getting the client’s approval to interview him, she telephoned him to arrange a meeting to discuss the case. The employee asked her whether the call was about some problem with his work. She told him “no,” that everything was fine with him, but that as counsel to the company, she needed to talk to him about a matter relating to another person she was investigating, whom she then identified. The
employee also said that since he still saw the former employee from
time to time, he did not want the former employee to know he said
anything negative about him. The associate assured the employee that
their conversation would be confidential. The employee then agreed to
meet the next day at the law firm’s office.

In fact, the associate did not know whether the work of the
employee to whom she was talking was fine, nor had she been
authorized by the client to tell the employee that. Moreover, while she
was not a “blabber mouth,” she had every intention, in accordance with
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, to report to her client
what she learned from the interview.

Case #2

Associate to Partner: “I’ve met with the client in the XYZ matter,
gone over the interrogatories and document requests we got from the
other side, reviewed our client’s draft answers, and the documents they
have found that respond to the requests. I think I have a pretty good
idea of what we can answer and what we can object to as being unduly
burdensome or not likely to lead to relevant evidence. Do you want me
to draft a set of responses for you to review before they go out to the
client, or to draft a memo to you explaining what I’ve found, and how I
think we should respond?”

Partner to Associate: “As I recall, these are their first discovery
requests to us, so why don’t you object to all of their interrogatories and
document requests? I am sure that you can find some basis to do so.
When they come back to us to negotiate, which they have to do before
they can file any motion to compel, we’ll be in a better position to see
what they really want and to negotiate from there.”

The associate left the partner’s office, presumably to do as he had
been instructed.

In Case #1, the well meaning associate may have violated Rules
4.1(a)\(^3\) and 4.3\(^4\) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. First, she

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2. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.4 [hereinafter “Model Rules”] (stating that “[a] lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information” and “shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation”).


4. See Model Rules R. 4.3.
told the employee that he had done nothing wrong, implying that she knew that to be a fact, when she did not. Then, she represented to the employee that what he told her would be “confidential” in a situation in which he reasonably would have thought that she would tell no one else, although the “confidentiality” of which the lawyer was speaking does not prohibit her from telling her client, the employer. Indeed, she may be bound to disclose what she learns to the employer even if it implicates this employee in wrongdoing. At the same time, she may have violated Rule 1.6, when she disclosed to the prospective interviewee that there was nothing wrong with his performance, a fact that she could have learned only from the client, and made the disclosure without the client’s permission.

In Case #2, the partner may well be counseling the associate to violate Rule 3.1 by asserting an issue—objections to the discovery requests—without a “basis for doing so that is not frivolous.” This would be particularly likely where the partner has not reviewed the discovery requests, and thus had no basis to assume that all of them were legitimately subject to objection. If the case is pending in the federal court or in the court of a state having a rule similar to Rule 11, or 26(g)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the partner may also be counseling the associate to violate those rules.

5. See Model Rules R. 4.1 (a) (stating that “in the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person”).

6. The Model Rules state that:
   In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.

See Model Rules R. 4.3.

7. See Model Rules R. 1.4 (holding that “(a) A lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter; (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions about the representation”).

8. Model Rules R. 1.6 (explaining that “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.”).

9. See Model Rules R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal in existing law.”)

To me, the examples\textsuperscript{11} demonstrate two problems of professional responsibility: (1) an attorney who, in the daily pressure to zealously represent the client, simply does not bring to consciousness a significant question of professional responsibility; (2) an associate who is told by a more senior lawyer to do something that might well raise a significant question of professional responsibility, and fails to question the instruction, because he doesn’t recognize the problem, assumes there might be a problem but that the senior lawyer, being older, wiser, and more experienced, knows better, or considers the ethical problem, but, fears demonstrating disloyalty to the client and/or the senior lawyer.

\textit{Case #3}

An attorney was representing a parent in a custody dispute involving their ten year old child. The parents had been separated since the child was six years old. The opposing party had “primary” custody and the client had “partial” custody (or “visitation”). The client had begun the custody proceeding desiring to obtain primary custody, believing that he/she could be a better parent. The child, however, was thriving in the current living arrangement, physically healthy, doing well in school both academically and socially, demonstrating appropriate behaviors at home, with the client during weekends and extended times there, at school, and with friends in the neighborhood. In addition, the child had recently begun singing in the church’s children’s choir and seemed to enjoy that activity very much.

Shortly before the date of the hearing, the client arrived at the lawyer’s office to prepare. The client informed the lawyer that he/she had some new information that should help considerably. The client had recently learned that the custodial parent had been living with a partner of the same sex in a homosexual relationship. The lawyer responded by asking how the client believed that relationship might affect the child. The client responded that homosexuality was immoral, and that living in a household of such blatant immorality would permanently damage the child, and perhaps lead the child to adopt homosexuality as a way of life. The lawyer sought, but got nothing more from the client in the way of evidence of harm to the child.

\textsuperscript{11} Both of these incidents arose at highly respected law firms. In the course of my exposure to litigation as a law clerk for a federal district court judge and as a lawyer for more than thirty-five years, I experienced, firsthand, and frequently heard of other, numerous incidents of these kinds of, at least arguable, ethical failings.
Under the law of the state in which the matter was pending, a parent’s sexual orientation is entirely irrelevant to custody unless there is evidence that it is causing some harm to the child. The client’s fear that the child was in a sinful environment based upon the homosexual relationship of the other parent is a matter of religious difference between the parents and, absent some palpable harm to the child, that too, was irrelevant.

At the same time, the lawyer knew that the judge before whom the matter was to be heard had a reputation as a homophobe. The lawyer believed that if the situation was brought to the judge’s attention, he would likely decide the matter in his client’s favor, and that if there was an appeal, the judge would write an opinion explaining the decision on grounds totally unrelated to the evidence of the other parent’s homosexuality.

Should the lawyer, in an opening statement, in questioning the opposing party, or in some other way, bring out the issue of the other parent’s living situation in order to influence the judge? I have asked that question on many occasions to law students and lawyers. Almost to a person, the unhesitating response is that the lawyer, in the zealous representation of his client, should find a way to reveal the living arrangements even without any evidence of adverse affect on the child. If opposing counsel fails to object, or if he does object and the objection is overruled, that is not the questioner’s concern in our system. As to what the judge decides, and how he explains his decision in an opinion, that is up to the judge, not the lawyer.

“But what about Rule 3.1?” The answer, invariably, is that as an advocate for my client in our adversary system, I don’t have to make objections to my own questions, that is for my opponent; nor do I make the rulings on evidence, that is for the judge, and Rule 3.1 doesn’t require anything else. Occasionally a lawyer or law student seeks to “fight the hypo” by arguing that if my client thinks that living in the other parent’s household is harmful to the child, perhaps it is, in some way we don’t yet understand. Thus, the question is not improper. Rather than even concede that there is an ethical question, the law students and lawyers present arguments (the zealous advocate in the adversarial system) for their client’s desired position.

The associates in both cases #1 and #2 graduated from excellent law schools, and had been on their respective schools’ Law Reviews.

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Presumably both had passed the school’s course on legal ethics, as well as the MPRE. The lawyer in case #3, a pre-1974 law school graduate, was experienced and well respected among his peers. If you asked the first associate directly whether it is permissible to lie to a witness about some fact relevant to the witness, whether she was free to disclose information about the employee’s employment with a client without the client’s permission, or whether she was free not to tell the witness that her interest as counsel for the client and his interest might be adverse, I have no doubt that she would have quickly answered, “No” to all three questions. If you asked the associate in Case #2 whether he had an obligation to respond to discovery requests in good faith, rather than simply delay and force the requesting party to negotiate without any good faith objection to particular interrogatories or document requests, I suspect that he would have answered in the affirmative. Indeed, I am quite certain, knowing the partner in case #2, as I do, that if the partner was asked a similar question in a general form, not related to a specific matter in which he was involved, he, too, would have immediately answered “yes.” If you had asked lawyer #3 if it is permissible to proffer evidence one knows to be inadmissible, I believe that he would have answered in the negative. So, why had each of these lawyers acted as they did?

_Case # 4_13

There is a scene at the beginning of the movie, “PHILADELPHIA”14 in which Tom Hanks comes into Denzel Washington’s law office seeking representation to sue his former law firm for wrongful termination. Hanks is a young lawyer who has recently been fired because, he believes, the firm’s management discovered that he had AIDS. Washington, an apparently successful, contingent fee, plaintiffs’ lawyer, declines the representation because of Hanks’ illness. What gives the scene particular bite is that Hanks was preceded into Washington’s office by a man who wanted representation to sue the city for negligence. It seems that there was a hole in the middle of the street where the city was having some construction done,  

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13. While this example is from a movie, as opposed to the actual experience, the reality that many of us see every day is that civil legal services organizations seem forever to be narrowing the scope of cases they can take, and closing intake of new cases, while bar association pro bono organizations are always short of volunteers, even for cases that appear to have merit.

the location was in mid-block, rather than in a pedestrian crosswalk, and
the construction site was clearly marked off by yellow warning tape.
Nevertheless, the prospective plaintiff managed to find and fall into the
hole. Even Washington seems surprised, after asking in vain for
evidence of mitigating circumstances, to find that the man still wants to
sue. Despite these extraordinary facts, Washington readily agrees to
represent the injured man, and even refers him for examination by a
doctor that Washington apparently uses in such cases.

B. Learning Does Not Necessarily Lead to Doing.

Learning the Rules of Professional Conduct does not necessarily
lead to ethical practice.

Moral life is not to be confused with tests meant to measure certain kinds of
abstract (moral) thinking, or with tests that give people a chance to offer
hypothetical responses to made-up scenarios. We never quite know what will
happen in this life; nor do we know how an event will connect with
ourselves.\footnote{Robert Coles, Moral Life of Children, 29 (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press
1986).}

The associate in \textit{Case \#1} was assigned to obtain information for
her client’s defense of a claim against it. Her conduct was both logical
and truthful, and her purpose innocuous. While truthfulness and benign
purpose are relevant, they are not sufficient to satisfy the Rules of
Professional Responsibility. She had probably studied Rules 1.6, 4.1,
4.3, and 4.4 in her Professional Responsibility course and in preparation
for the MPRE.\footnote{She might also have had a course in employment law; however, unless she
attended a school that had adopted Deborah Rhode’s “Pervasive Method” of teaching
ethics, Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics By The Pervasive
Method (2d ed., 1995), or something similar, it is unlikely that concern for ethical
questions which might arise in the course of investigation of an employment case would
have been included in such a course.} However, in all likelihood, her study of those rules
was explicit—the class knew in advance that the treatment of those rules
was to be covered in the readings and class. And more likely than not, the
cases and hypos would have focused on sharing information that
might be harmful or embarrassing to the client, sharing information
which the client does not want shared (Rule 1.6),\footnote{See Model Rules R. 1.6.} or speaking or
withholding information in order to take advantage of the third party.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Case \#1}
\item\textit{Case \#2}
\end{itemize}
Here, that was not the case. Hence, whatever memory she retained about the application of the Rules of Professional Conduct from those classes would not necessarily connect with the cues from her experience in “real life.”

The associate in Case #2 may have had a similar non-recognition experience to that of the associate in Case #1. However, let us assume that he actually did consider whether the instruction from the partner was ethically appropriate. At that point, he would have faced a dilemma. Should he, a young and aspiring associate, question a more senior lawyer, especially where that lawyer’s directive seems more likely to serve the client’s goal of the successful outcome of the litigation—a goal which the associate is bound to pursue, under Rule 1.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct? The associate has been taught both in law school, and since entering practice, that he is bound to pursue the client’s lawful goals. Should he deviate from that precept in a matter which would require him to question the partner’s ethics? Answering that question could lead to sweaty palms, or worse.

What does the associate’s brain do when faced with this problem? The associate needs, in Case #1, to secure the witness’s information in order to be successful in representing her client, and thus satisfying her boss. In Case #2 the associate needs to avoid conflict with his boss. As I will argue below, our motivation significantly affects our analysis of problems with which we are faced, even when those goals appear to conflict with the clear meaning of the data. Thus, in both cases, the associates’ needs powerfully affected their judgment as to what behavior was appropriate, despite what they might know about the constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the conflict

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18. See id. at R. 4.1, 4.3. See also MODEL RULES R. 4.4 (providing that “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantiated purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third party, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”).
19. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a).
20. Ziva Kunda noted that:

[M]otivation and affect influence judgment by influencing the cognitive processes we engage in to arrive at a judgment. Both motivation and affect may influence which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to a judgment; we may be especially likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation and affect may also influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick and easy inferential shortcuts or rely on elaborate, systematic reasoning.

between our goals and other values is serious enough to produce severe stress, our brains might well “downshift” into survival mode—fight or flight. In Case #2, fight is not readily available, since there is no one to fight with except the partner, and that doesn’t seem likely to make things better. If he challenges the partner’s ethics, even if he is right, and almost certainly if he is wrong, his job, his income, his future as a lawyer may be in jeopardy. Flight, for the associate in this case, means denial that this is his problem. That is, acceding to the assumed wisdom of the partner. Alternatively, the associate might think that he might be right even if he is only a second year associate. In that case the “flight” response is to return to the “tried and true,” that is, to some problem solving mechanism that he has used successfully in “the law” before.

Inevitably, we look for solutions to problems we face by first scanning our memories for similar situations, and applying the principles and methods that we used in those situations. In the case of lawyers, particularly newer lawyers, our memories for solving legal problems were created in law school.

I suggest that the fundamental problem solving principles that our students are taught in law school are:

1. The answer lies in the formulation of a legal rule;
2. My role as a lawyer, i.e., a “zealous advocate,” is to help my client achieve his goal, regardless of what the law seems to be. Lawyers help their clients achieve their goals principally by building arguments that will lead to the application of the desired legal rule to the client’s situation.
3. Neither my personal values, nor the interests of third parties are to be considered in the pursuit of my client’s goals.

Applying those principles, the associate in case #2 might examine Rule 3.1, the apparently governing legal rule: “A lawyer shall not...defend a proceeding, or...controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”

Perhaps he would argue that Rule 3.1 does not apply because non-responsiveness to discovery requests is not “defend[ing] a proceeding or
controvert[ing] an issue therein...” thereby obviating the fear of violation of the Rules. He can then go back to the individual discovery requests and re-examine them to see if he can so interpret them as to find a basis for asserting that “the information sought [does not] appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” under Rule 26 (b)(1)26 or come up with some other acceptable objection. Since, whether this process satisfied his personal values or unduly burdened the opposing party or its counsel is irrelevant under the “three principles,” his post-hoc rationale, carried out in accordance with his law school learning about how to be a lawyer, would provide him with a basis, morally justifiable to himself, for following the partner’s direction.

Similarly, in Case #3, the lawyer may well resort to the above principles by first making an argument that the introduction of the inadmissible evidence does not raise an ethical issue based upon the argument that the admissibility of the evidence in question is not a “proceeding” or an “issue” in a proceeding, because the latter refers to a substantive issue. Alternatively, it is simply not part of his “role” as a zealous advocate for his client to avoid proffering evidence merely because the other party might object and the judge might sustain the objection. The attorney might also argue that he is, in good faith, arguing for “an extension, modification or reversal” of the otherwise applicable rule as to the admissibility of such evidence, or at least that he needs to preserve his ability to do so on appeal by raising the matter at the trial level.27

C. What’s Wrong With this Picture? And Why?

In each of the examples, the lawyer was faced with a situation which posed a complex problem with significant risks—problems that threatened to lead them away from “zealously,” and perhaps

26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (claiming that “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).

27. The Federal Rules of Evidence explain the concept of offer of proof as:

In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the court makes a definite ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, wither at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.

See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2)
successfully, pursuing their clients’ expressed goals. In Case #1 the problem was how to get important information from an individual who was fearful that disclosure that might harm her. In Case #2, the problem was responding to discovery without giving away information unnecessarily, and when a more senior lawyer has told you to respond in a manner that you think might be unethical. In Case #3, the problem is how to win the case, and appear to be zealously representing your client, while not using evidence that, to the client is clearly both critically relevant and highly persuasive, but to the experienced lawyer is clearly inadmissible. Lawyers face such situations frequently. Indeed, it can be said that the most important work that lawyers do is to solve complex problems, whether of ethics, or otherwise.28 While law schools make some effort to teach students analytical tools for addressing those situations, the curriculum and pedagogy of most law schools effectively teaches them how to solve only a very narrow range of problems, using a very narrow range of their problem solving tools.29

Observing Denzel Washington’s choice not to represent Tom Hanks in PHILADELPHIA, one might argue (as many of my students have) that a lawyer in private practice is free to decline to represent anyone that he/she chooses. Yet, we also know that our legal system assumes that competent representation is essential for anyone who seeks redress in our courts. The Supreme Court has held that representation is

28. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 315 (1995) (promoting the use of cognitive science to help understand how lawyers make decisions and arguing that in order to be more effective problem solvers, students need practice solving problems, a skill not emphasized in most law schools); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY, 101 (Oceana Publications 1951) (arguing that lawyers, through “human ingenuity,” keep the law and the legal system, as well as the legal tools available to commercial enterprises, on pace with our constantly evolving society); Alan M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107, 109-112 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of lawyers exercising critical judgment in solving problems); Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problems Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 5, 6 (1995) (criticizing law schools’ failure to adequately prepare students in skills beyond doctrine and legal analysis and proposing as an alternative courses which integrate “insights” from disciplines such as economics, psychology, and business); Thomas D. Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Introduction, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 267-270 (1998) (stressing the importance of creative problem solving in law).

mandatory in serious criminal cases\textsuperscript{30} though not in civil cases.\textsuperscript{31} However, the Model Rules encourage lawyers to engage in “pro bono publico service,” and cases such as Hanks’s fit precisely within the classes of cases identified in the rule.\textsuperscript{32} The fact that Hanks had been turned down by ten other lawyers, and that Washington was his last hope did not move Washington, even to make the superficial inquiry about the potential legal merits of the claim, as he had with the previous client with a facially questionable claim.

The four examples thus demonstrate, as Robert Coles argued,\textsuperscript{33} that knowledge of the rules and legal analysis that we teach do not necessarily lead to ethical, professionally responsible action.

And while law schools regularly give public kudos to lawyers who perform work in the public interest, in their classes, they provide no exposure to difficult questions concerning how students’ personal values should influence their professional choices of clients, or their professional behavior, what, if any, pro bono work to do, how to balance pro bono work with fee generating work, or how to deal with superiors in one’s law firm whose focus may be on billable hours and litigation outcomes, rather than on the aspirations of Rule 6.1, or some concept of ethical and professional practice. Consequently, students emerge from law school either not steeped in the values of public service and the responsibility of lawyers to assure that individuals have access to legal services, or lacking the tools to navigate both the economic demands of the private practice of law, and the urgings of Rule 6.1, as they reflect genuine need within our communities. And, when confronted with ethical problems, they make arguments to justify doing what will most likely lead to the result sought by the client, or the senior partner, regardless of the spirit of the rules, their own values, or the public interest.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Dean Mark A. Sargent expressed such skepticism about lawyers being positively moved to behave more ethically even in the face of the mandates and potential penalties of the recently promulgated Securities and Exchange Commission’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Model Rules} R. 6.1(a) (1) and (b) (1) and (2) (ABA).
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Coles, supra} note 15, at 29.
concluding, that “[t]he mere existence of the rules may have a deterrent effect on many cautious and conscientious lawyers, but if the kinds of firms that actively or passively contributed to the egregious behavior of corporate clients such as Enron, WorldCom and so many others are dominated by a moral consciousness that encourages endless rationalization and willful blindness, then the deterrent effect is likely to be minimal.”

Thus, the legal academy should be asking whether the prevailing curriculum fails to support, or may actually impede students’ development as both effective, and professionally responsible, ethical lawyers, and whether we can do better.

One reason for our persistence on our current path is, I believe, that we have not incorporated into our teaching scientific discoveries over the past two or three decades about how people learn, what inhibits and enhances their effective use of what we teach, and the effective use of learning to address emerging problems, particularly when those problems are professionally threatening to them.

The legal literature contains a number of examples of experiments with teaching professional responsibility using experiential methods.

36. In 1998, Professor Susan Sturm and I developed a first year elective course designed to teach problem solving to law students in the second semester of the first year, by creating a series of simulations in which they would be placed in role and asked to create a solution to the problem. Lerner, supra note 28, at 109-110 nn.2-3. In the first role play in which the students were assigned to represent one of four parties engaged in a dispute, we asked them to prepare a letter to their respective clients explaining the case and making a recommendation as to what the client should do. Although the problem did not say that litigation had been started, or even was contemplated, by any party, every student assumed that they were already in litigation in court, and addressed only the potential litigation strategies in their letters to their clients. Id. at 123-124.
37. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19 (2001) (sharing the author’s experience teaching professional responsibility to upper-year students through the use of real world dilemmas that evoke student responses on both an intellectual and emotional level, student participation, and occasional role plays); Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and Practice, 47 J. LEGAL ED. 401 (1997) (relating the author’s experience teaching the two semester “Integrated Transactional Practice” course which includes trusts and estates, professional responsibility, interviewing, negotiating, counseling, and drafting); Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 522-528, 532-535 (1995) (discussing the author’s experience of how teaching a professional responsibility course centered on student group interaction and collaboration to solve problems rather than teacher led discussions improved the students’ moral reasoning); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995)
There are also articles which seek to explain why experiential pedagogy can be expected to produce more effective learning in this area than other methods. Conversely, I have, too often, heard from fellow law teachers that, starting with students who have spent the first 22 or more, formative years of their lives developing their character—for better or for worse—our three years of law school cannot possibly be expected to have any impact on the ethics and professional responsibility of the graduates that we send out into the profession and the world. Yet there is also evidence that professional school may be an ideal place to teach ethical decision making.

With that in mind, I propose to (a) examine recent discoveries in cognitive science about how humans learn and what affects their ability to apply what they have learned to new situations, (b) assess how that data relates to how we educate our students, and (c) identify approaches to teaching that I submit will enable us to help our students become more ethical, professionally responsible lawyers. Part II of this paper will discuss applicable scientific principles of learning and problem solving. Part III will compare those principles with the strategy,

(discussing the authors’ incorporation of a legal ethics course with a clinical one in which students met weekly specifically to discuss ethical issues arising in their clinical work); Barton, supra note 28; Symposium, Teaching Ethics, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. (Summer/Autumn 1995) (collecting more than twenty articles discussing experiments in teaching legal ethics at various law school which received grants for that purpose from the Keck Foundation).

38. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 315, 320; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612 (1984) (hypothesizing that in the future, law schools will have realized that concentrating solely on teaching students doctrinal analysis and case interpretation is too narrow and ill-prepares them; rather, schools should focus on teaching students how to learn law from the exercise of practicing); Stephen McG. Bundy, Teaching Legal Ethics: Improving the Required Ethics Course, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 19 (1995) (discussing Boalt Hall’s experiment with teaching the required professional responsibility course in the first year and the school’s ultimate decision to return it to the upper-year curriculum).

39. See Luban & Millemann’s discussion of “The Problem of Excessive Engagement,” supra note 37, at 83-86 (exploring how students often reexamined their positions and changed their viewpoints after participating in clinical work, but if their exposure was limited to classroom learning only, their views were unchanged); Susan P. Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 118, 120 (1995) (promoting the importance of pervasively teaching legal ethics and noting that the failure to do so risks sending the message that there is no problem with behaving unethically); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 239, 240 (1998) (discussing the failure of law schools to teach ethics).

process, and effect of traditional Langdellian / Socratic teaching. In Part IV, I will attempt to demonstrate why experiential, highly contextualized, behaviorally oriented, problem based teaching is likely to be more effective than traditional pedagogy in producing lawyers who are ethical and professionally responsible.

II. THE HUMAN BRAIN IS A PROBLEM SOLVING MACHINE.

To use a modern business metaphor, learning and solving problems are part of the “core business” of the human brain. One cogent example is that of learning language. Virtually every child is born with the capacity to learn language. Without taking a single lesson, they learn to understand and communicate in the language, or languages, that are most prevalent in their environment. Where spoken language is the norm, they learn by hearing, then orally communicating. Where signing is the norm, they learn to understand and then to communicate in sign. Only thereafter do they learn to communicate through reading and writing. Clearly “the brain” comes equipped to solve the problem of communication, and it accomplishes that goal by learning from its environment.

Another example is the use of logic. While there are substantial variances among individuals in their ability to use logic, the human brain seems to find logic compelling, if not irresistible. As Steven Pinker has observed:

All languages have logical terms like not, and, same, equivalent, and opposite. Children use and, not, or, and if appropriately before they turn three, not only in English but in half a dozen other languages that have been studied. Logical

41. For a more detailed discussion see MARC MARSHARK, PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEAF CHILDREN 98, 107 (Oxford University Press 1993) reviewing the literature reporting research as to language acquisition among deaf children, and concluding that “[s]ign language clearly can serve as an effective mode of communication for young deaf children and reveals typical stages of normal acquisition under certain circumstances.” Id. at 98. “[I]conic signs and arbitrary signs are learned with equal facility by children acquiring sign as a first language. [and] unlike early gestures, are not necessarily tied to physical similarities in the world but represent true linguistic symbols at a stage of development prior to spoken words.” Id. at 107. Marschark concludes, “The sequence of emerging semantic relations in deaf children’s language production parallels that observed in hearing children, at least when manual deaf children are evaluated using sign language.” Id. at 126.
inferences are ubiquitous in human thought, particularly when we understand language.42

A. The Brain: A Symphony in Three Movements

The most widely accepted theory of the brain’s evolutionary development of functional specialization, first proposed by Paul D. MacLean, former director of the Laboratory of the Brain and Behavior at the U.S. National Institutes of Health, is that we have developed, over time, three discrete, though interconnected, areas of the brain.43 These areas are frequently referred to as the “R complex” or “reptilian” brain, the limbic system, and the neocortex.44

The reptilian brain is the most primitive part of the brain. Located in the brain stem, it is primarily involved with physical survival and operation of the “system” which is the body. It controls food processing (eating and eliminating), systems operation (heart, lungs, liver, etc.), reproduction, establishing and maintaining home territory (territoriality), various “group” behaviors, and execution of the flight-or-fight response.45 Overall, R-complex behaviors are “automatic, have a ritualistic quality and are highly resistant to change.”46

The limbic system is primarily involved with the emotional system, with evaluating, organizing, and directing incoming data for processing in the brain stem and the cortex, and with our awareness of ourselves, physically and emotionally. It is the focus of the creation of memories developed in the context of active living. Contextual memories are a composite of our inner and outer worlds—our history of emotional and perceptual experiences, and new information constantly arriving through our ongoing perceptions and experiences.47

The limbic system is also involved with certain of our primal activities such as sense of smell, sex, nourishment, and bonding between

42. STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 334 (Penguin Press 1997).
43. Paul D. Mac Lean, A Mind of Three Minds: Educating the Triune Brain, in EDUCATION AND THE BRAIN, 308-342 (Jeanne S. Chall & Allan F. Minsky, eds., 1978) (discussing the three parts of the brain—the “triune” brain—and how although it has expanded in size, the brain has retained the basic features that reflect human’s descendency from reptiles, early mammals, and recent mammals).
44. Id., see also RENATE NUMMELA CAINE & GEOFFREY CAINE, MAKING CONNECTIONS: TEACHING AND THE HUMAN BRAIN, 58 (Pearson Learning 1994).
45. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 59-61.
46. Id. at 59.
47. Id. at 62.
individuals. It is capable of mediating our responses to external data through its ability to “read” and act upon our emotional responses, as well as overriding rational thought. Because the limbic system is involved in all of these activities, emotion is involved with virtually everything that we experience or do. For example, when incoming data indicates a problem, and the limbic system in concert with our rational/emotional brain structures, can discover no appropriate solution or problem solving process, anxiety, even fear, takes over, and the brain activates our fight-or-flight stress response. The limbic system is powerful. “We tend to follow our emotions.”

Finally, the neocortex, the outer portion of the brain, does most of the processing of sensory data, and makes language, logical and formal thinking, and planning for the future possible. It is responsible for the creativity that we call science and art, and is largely responsible for planning, analysis, sequencing, learning from errors, certain inhibitions to inappropriate behaviors, and capacity for abstraction, including empathy. Logical/rational thinking is centered in the neocortex.

All three parts of the brain are in constant interaction. Although one segment may be predominantly “in charge” at a given moment, the others are not entirely out of the picture. This is especially true of the limbic system because it is engaged in activities which are also part of the function of the other two. For example, the limbic system’s receipt, and direction of incoming data, relates to the perception and analysis of external data by the neocortex, and is also essential as a trigger for the response mechanism of the “reptilian” brain.

The challenge for legal educators is to help students learn so that, when faced with problems, whether intellectual, moral or both, they

49. Id. at 45.
51. CAIN & CAINE, supra note 44, at 63.
52. Id. at 67.
53. Id.
avoid resorting solely to the automatic, primitive, flight or fight response, but rather engage their neocortex with all of its power to process sensory data, draw broadly from memory, abstract, identify patterns, analyze rationally, and create new concepts, thus bringing to consciousness a broad range of potentially effective, ethical responses. In the following sections I will argue that the keys to the ability to learn so that learning is usable for effective problem solving and ethical lawyering are (a) the brain’s neural network system for recording implicit experience in memory and later recalling it, (b) the emotional power of the limbic system, and (c) their interaction.

B. Creating Memory: Connectivity and our Neural Network System

1. Encoding the Brain—The Process of Transforming Sensory Perception and Feeling into Memory

In a very real sense, we are our memories because it is from our memories alone that we have a conception of who we are. We can have that conception only as it relates to the environment in which we exist. How our ongoing experience of the environment is recorded, stored, and recalled is what memory is all about. The stimulation of our sense organs and our emotions causes electrical impulses to be transmitted to nerves which connect the sense receptors to the brain, where they are encoded. Memory is the result of the process by which the electrical impulses caused by sense and emotional stimulation are recorded in the brain. The physiological key to those processes are the neurons and their interactions with each other throughout the brain. “[T]he content of brain activity lies in the patterns of connections and activity among the neurons.” Because we are always in some context and the brain is always receiving sensory signals and recording them, the brain is always learning and changing. Our neural networks build on existing patterns. When new data comes into memory, it seeks connections with similar content.

55. Lewis et al., supra note 50, at 103; Sylwester, supra note 48, at 98-100; Caine & Caine, supra note 44, at 30-31; Pinker, supra note 42, at 25-26.
56. Pinker, supra note 42, at 25.
58. Lewis et al., supra note 50, at 128-29; Schacter, supra note 54, at 61.
The more we repeat experiences that create the same or similar patterns of neural connection, the stronger the pattern becomes, and the more likely we are to trigger its recall later. This system of creating memory through the patterns of connections among neurons, and the tendency of repetition to strengthen the pattern and its likely recall, gives rise to several powerful tools, including the ability to correct errors in the perceived data, to conceptualize, and to create meaning from discordant data.

a. Error Correction

When I send an email to my wife at Temple Law School and inadvertently omit the “u” from the last segment of her address, the email invariably returns as undeliverable. If the process were run through my brain, however, it would recognize that I was aiming for “temple.edu”—not “temple.ed”—and make the correction.

b. Conceptualization

As the brain records similar patterns over time, the common elements of those patterns are strengthened, while the uncommon elements become weaker, and less likely to be recalled. The result is the extraction, or creation, of a pattern that represents the core set of connections, the prototype or underlying concept common to the various inputs.

c. Creating Meaning from Apparently Discordant Data

Frequently, there may be two possible interpretations from the same sense data. In such cases the brain is capable of comparing the

59. PINKER, supra note 42, at 108-10 (pointing out that we learn from examples where learning consists of increasing the “weight” of the connections between and among the memories of related inputs, what he calls a “pattern associator.”).

60. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 132-38; Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 162-64 (“We often approach people and events with prior expectancies . . . .Your expectencies may determine the very meaning you ascribe to . . . behaviors as you observe them. Events that are congruent with our expectations may be particularly memorable not only because we pay greater attention to them, but also because they are more strongly related to our existing beliefs.”).

61. See id. at 136-38 for a more detailed discussion of how the brain performs this operation.

62. Id. at 111, 128-32, 135, 136-38; PINKER, supra note 42, at 108-10.
input data to context and searching among similar patterns of neural connections in order to select the best “fit.” Steven Pinker gives the example of hearing someone say what sounds like “I am going to sinned a pin.” The brain could take those sounds and seek their meaning from memory exactly as they were heard. However, in the process of trying to locate a pattern that matched the sound and meaning it would likely find no match. Rather than merely reporting back “does not compute,” as it might if the words heard were in a language that the listener knew she didn’t understand, the brain will try to figure out what does make sense by finding a pattern of neural connections that best satisfies all of the ambiguities at once. If the listener’s memory has recorded that the speaker is one who speaks with a decided southern or southwestern accent and what that means her brain will determine whether that pattern fits both the sound and contextually meaningful interpretation. Even, however, if the listener does not know the speaker’s dialect, she knows that a single speaker uttered both of the “in” vowel sounds. Her memory tells her that at a given time a single speaker usually attaches the same vowel sound to the same vowel. Thus it is more likely than not that both of the sounds represent the same letter. Her brain will then try out the available vowels, a, e, o, and u, and discover that the only vowel that satisfies the constraints of being similarly sounded and making sense in the context is “e.” At that point, the listener’s memory will record that the speaker said, “I am going to send a pen.”

In Pinker’s example, the critical work of the brain was finding patterns in the memory that most closely matched the pattern coming from the sensory perceptions, knowledge of the speaker, and the meaning created by the context of what was said. That required the brain to remember not only the specifics, such as how different vowels sound, but also to store myriad facts about the way the world operates, such as that most people give the same vowel the same sound, native speaking people from the southeastern and southwestern states frequently speak with a particular dialect, and that the “e” and “i” sounds are frequently the same in that dialect. All of this data is in our memory even though we never consciously studied it, and the process operates far below our level of conscious awareness.

And it all happened below our consciousness, and so quickly that we are not aware of the process.

63.  Pinker, supra note 42, at 105.
64.  Id. at 106.
In solving the problem of discordant data, the brain will, as we have seen, be substantially influenced by our expectations and needs.\(^\text{65}\)

2. Explicit and Implicit Memory

a. Explicit Memory

Certain memories, referred to as “explicit,” or “taxon,” memory, result from intentional learning. Because the material was explicitly studied as a unique focus of creating a memory of itself, rather than as part of a broader experiential context, its memory involves only a few of one’s senses and exists with minimal connection to other memories.\(^\text{66}\) Learning the directions from point “A” to point “B” written out for you by a friend, or learning how to take apart and re-assemble your rifle, is done explicitly. Acquiring such memories usually requires repetition, and may also be assisted by observation of experts and continual feedback. Such memories include automatic skill sequences. Memorization of the multiplication tables, the steps to turn on my computer or car, touch typing, taking apart and re-assembling one’s rifle in the dark, and specific athletic skills are types of taxon memory. Memory acquired by explicit learning moves easily between memory and conscious activation. Taxon memories are thus valuable in survival situations because when triggered by the suggestion of danger, the skills and memories laid down in that system of memory can quickly be called into play, and we can expect the learned standard response even without conscious prompting.\(^\text{67}\)

b. Implicit Memory

In contrast, memory that develops from our participation in our environment and comes to us through a wider variety of sensory receptors is referred to as “implicit,” “locale,” or “map” memory.\(^\text{68}\) It is referred to as “locale” or “map,” because it embeds into memory not

\(^{65}\) See Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 162-64 (demonstrating how our emotional states of needs/desire/motivation, and expectation affect the memory we create from the data we perceive); see also, discussion infra, pp. 669-78.

\(^{66}\) Caine & Caine, supra note 44, at 42-44; see Schacter, supra note 54, at 170 for a demonstration of this with amnesic patients.

\(^{67}\) Sylwester, supra note 48, at 95-96.

\(^{68}\) Caine & Caine, supra note 44, at 44-47.
only the specific data to be “learned,” but also the context, or locale, in which we experienced it. It is “implicit” because it arises out of our participation in our environment, without regard to our conscious intention to remember it, and relates to ongoing aspects of our lives.\textsuperscript{69} Since our engagement with our environment is continuous, it is related to, and builds upon, knowledge that already exists in memory.\textsuperscript{70} Implicit memory develops from the ongoing effort of the brain to create patterns and relationships and to create meaning.\textsuperscript{71} It does not require repetition or memorization.

The neural network system for creating memory is constantly recording the context in which we move and experience life. Learning that takes place implicitly is recorded as part of the entire contextual pattern, and thus has multiple sensory inputs and myriad neural connections. Each new pattern of connections contributes to the brain’s memory of the event.\textsuperscript{72} Therefore, the more perceptual and emotional inputs that create the neural pattern for a memory, the more connections are created among the neurons. The more points of connection in a pattern of memory, the more likely that a particular stimulus will bring it to recall.\textsuperscript{73}

3. Social Intuitions

Just as all of us are born with the neural tools to learn language implicitly, we are also born with the neural tools to develop values. During our lives we are immersed in the “beliefs, values, sanctions, rules, motives and satisfactions” of our particular communities.\textsuperscript{74} When we are hungry or uncomfortable as infants, at home, at school and play, the family mealtime, observing our parents interactions with each other,

\textsuperscript{69} Id. at 46; SYLWESTER, supra note 48 at 95-98; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 42-45.

\textsuperscript{70} SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 46; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 44-46.

\textsuperscript{71} CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 46.

\textsuperscript{72} SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 58-59.

\textsuperscript{73} Id. at 42-46; 71; see also CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 48-49.

\textsuperscript{74} HAIDT—THE EMOTIONAL DOG, supra note 50, at 847 (arguing that moral judgment “is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations”), quoting J. W. M. WHITING & IRVIN L. CHILD, CHILD TRAINING AND PERSONALITY: A CROSS CULTURAL STUDY 27 (1953). See also John Dewey, Experience & Education, The Kappa Delta Pi Lecture Series, 48 (1938, Touchstone ed. 1997) (“Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a person learns only the particular he is studying at the time. Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than the spelling, or geography or history lesson that is learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future.”)
and with third parties, indeed on a continuing and ongoing basis from birth on, we learn about relationships and values. Even without explicit lessons in morals and customs, we pay close attention to what we perceive them to be in our families, peer groups, etc., learning them implicitly, because failure to abide by them will have serious adverse consequences to us. Peer socialization contributes heavily to the shaping of these moral intuitions. There is strong evidence that the brain’s “hard wiring” for these moral values, develops during late childhood through adolescence. We learn these values without ever having explicitly studied them, and without consciousness of having learned them. Among the earliest lessons that we learn relate to seeking approval from, and obeying, those in positions of authority, those who hold the key to our survival, comfort, and success or failure, and notions of right and wrong. There are a variety of theories about exactly how these lessons are learned, the relationship between cognitive and emotional responses to environmental stimuli in forming the child’s values in these areas, and their evolution through childhood. Yet no

75. Id. at 828.
76. Id. at 827-28.
77. Haidt’s basic analysis is not new. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg (Stages and Sequence, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, 347, 365-68, in D.A. Goslin, ed., HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY and RESEARCH (Chicago, Rand McNally 1969)), and Carol Gilligan (IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: Psychological Theory of Women’s Development, Ch. 2, at 24-63 (Harvard University press, 1982)), while disagreeing about the nature and extent of the development of values and moral reasoning nevertheless agree that the process begins in childhood with implicit learning from the people closest to us. And Robert Coles demonstrates conclusively that moral development is certainly an active process in children from a very young age. Thus, we arrive at adulthood with implicitly learned, socially constructed “intuitions” concerning most aspects of moral values which form the basis of our adult moral reasoning—the “Social Intuitionist” model of moral reasoning. Even those who take issue with the power of Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral decision making in adulthood, and the ability of learned cognitive behavior to overcome our social intuitions, agree that the process of developing the powerful, deeply imbedded values which form the foundation for our moral reasoning as adults proceeds through implicit childhood and adolescent learning. See, e.g., D.A. Pizarro and P. Bloom, The Intelligence of the Moral Intuitions: A Reply to Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003). Haidt, however, counters by arguing that while the cognitive processes identified by Pizarro and Bloom can be deployed, they very seldom are; leaving our social intuitions to control our moral decision making. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro and Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197 (2003) (Hereinafter Haidt – New Tricks).

78 See, e.g., Marta Lupa, Elliot Turiel, and Philip A. Cowan, Obedience to Authority in Children and Adults, in Melanie Killen and Daniel Hart, eds., MORALITY IN EVERYDAY LIFE, Developmental Perspectives 131 (Cambridge University Press (1999))(reviewing various theories in developmental psychology, concluding that at least
authority suggests that early childhood learning is not relevant to the values and moral behavior of the adult.

4. Some Limitations of Implicit Memory

At the same time, however, implicit memory has its limitations. For example, the automatic error correction makes it very difficult for us to proofread our own writing, because our brains have, over time, developed strong patterns for perceiving and understanding the correct spellings, and, upon seeing a slightly incorrect one are likely to recall what we are actually seeing as the correct version. We bring to every problem a host of intuitions, beliefs, and assumptions. These are concepts that we have built on implicit memory accumulated over the years, and we seldom, if ever, reconsider them without some strong external impetus. When the patterns of memory we draw on to create meaning from discordant data are implicit memory we are not conscious of the analytical work that our brains are doing. Our tendency to establish meanings, to draw conclusions, i.e., to conceptualize, from implicit memory, and thereafter to make judgments based on those concepts leads us to act without the application of critical judgment.

“Implicit memory warps our window on the world.” “While explicit memory serves itself up for conscious reflection, implicit memory does not. That is why it escapes our notice.” “[We] acquire wonderfully complicated knowledge that we cannot describe, explain, or recognize.” “The brain never permits naked reality to intrude into consciousness; all inbound sensory impressions pass through a process that sands the rough edges off an inhospitably complex universe.” “All experience comes to us through similar layers of invisible and occasionally dubious deductions. Our internal realities are mock-ups of unparalleled persuasive power.”

three factors affect children’s likelihood of obeying authority despite the authority’s direction to act contrary to the child’s personal moral standard: (1) the proximity of the actor to the experience of harm to the victim (both physical proximity and likelihood of harm), (2) the legitimacy of the authority in terms of social context and knowledge, (3) the authority’s ability to inflict punishment on the actor.)

79. Lewis et al., supra note 50, at 138-39.
80. Schacter, supra note 54, at 170-71.
81. Lewis et al., supra note 50, at 118.
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 118-119.
85. Lewis et al., supra note 50, at 119.
of consciousness is a shadow of silent strength, spinning dazzlingly complicated life into automatic actions, convictions without intellect, and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at all.” Implicit memory has been shown, for example, to contribute to gender and racial biases that people are unaware that they possess.

5. Emotion: The Foundation on which we Build Memory

We don’t see things as they are. We see things as we are.

a. “[E]motionally important contexts can create powerful memories.”

The brain registers events as pleasurable or painful, exciting or soothing. The story and context relating to our experience necessarily involve emotion. While some particular emotional “highs” or “lows” are explicitly recorded in memory, most emotional learning is implicit. All of our experiences involve our emotions. Thus our emotions are a critical part of the neural patterns that comprise the memory of any event. Indeed, some researchers have argued that there can be no memory without emotional content.

86. Id. at 112. See also, Haidt, supra note 50; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 50.
87. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 189-90. Geoffrey Hazard’s concern that the failure to teach ethics throughout the law school curriculum sends the implicit message lack of focus on ethical practice and professional responsibility is not a problem, HAZARD, supra note 37, and Howard Lesnick’s concern that the selection of subject matter in law school courses teaches a powerful implicit lesson that the matters not included are unimportant. Howard Lesnick, Infinity In A Grain Of Sand: The World Of Lawyering As Portrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In Law School, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990), are but two examples of concern voiced by leading legal academics for the powerful and potentially pernicious effect of implicit learning.
88. I have often seen this quote attributed to Anais Nin, and on occasion to the Talmud, but never with any specific textual location.
89. SYLWESTER, supra note 48; at 96; see also Schacter, supra note 54, at 201, 209 (noting the power of memories concerning personal trauma); Caine and Caine, supra note 44, at 45-47 (discussing how emotions influence map formation in the brain).
90. Pinker, supra note 42, at 139.
91. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 116.
92. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 63-64; See also C. Holden, Paul Mac Lean and the Triune Brain, 204 SCI. 1066, 1069 (observing that “[a]ccording to Mac Lean, subjectively ‘something doesn’t exist unless it’s tied up with emotion’.”).
Emotion drives attention, and to the extent that attention to the experience is an aid in creating memory, emotion is a major contributing factor. That which is meaningful to the rememberer will be more readily remembered than what is not. Our state of mind at the time that we experience events affects what we remember. Expectations and motivation are particularly important factors in determining what we store in memory.

b. Believing is Seeing: Expectations and Motivation Guide Our Perceptions and Memory

I used to teach my clinic and trial advocacy students that “fact” witnesses can only testify about what they actually see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and otherwise perceive with their senses. Now I teach them that fact witnesses can testify only about what they “think their senses perceive.” Our emotions affect not only what events we remember, but also how we remember what our senses have experienced. Expectations and motivation are particularly important factors in determining what we store in memory.

93. SYLWESER, supra note 48, at 72. At the same time, however, as discussed below at pp. 674-75, 78-79, powerful, negative emotion may cause the brain to narrow its focus and thus not give attention to relevant stimuli in the environment.


95. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162 (“Your expectations may determine the very meaning you ascribe to [events as] you observe them, especially if they are ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way... Even when events have clear meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as we observe it, and by determining how new information is linked to existing knowledge”).

96. Id. at 168-70 (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to what we perceive. The way we process an event and its resulting memorability are also affected by the personal significance the event carries for us).

97. Thanks to Ian Weinstein, who introduced me to that felicitous phrase.

98. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162 (“Your expectations may determine the very meaning you ascribe to [events as] you observe them, especially if they are ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way... Even when events have clear meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as we observe it, and by determining how new information is linked to existing knowledge”).

99. Id. at 168-70 (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to what we perceive. “The way we process an event and its resulting memorability are also affected by the personal significance the event carries for us”).
c. Expectations, Perceptions, and Memory.

Expectations can arise from many sources, such as prior experiences, information given by another person, stereotypes, etc. One example of the power of expectations in creating memory is found in a study in which two groups of individuals were shown a video of a husband and wife interacting together. The difference between the two groups was that one group was told that the woman was a librarian, while the other was told that she was a waitress. Some of the activities and attributes of the woman were consistent with stereotypes of waitresses (e.g., drinks beer, affectionate with husband), and some with those of librarians. (E.g., wears glasses, listens to classical music) When the observers were questioned after viewing the video, they recalled the attributes consistent with the stereotype of the person that they expected to see, while not recalling the attributes that were more similar to the other.100

d. Motivation, Perceptions, and Memory.

An example of a study that demonstrates the power of motivation in affecting our perceptions involved second year students at a religious seminary who were told that they had to give a practice sermon on the topic of The Good Samaritan. Immediately before the time scheduled for their assignment they were required to be across the campus from the location at which they were to deliver their sermon. Some of the students were told that they had plenty of time to get across the campus and still be on time, while others were told that they were running late, and needed to hurry in order to get to their assigned location on time. Along the way, each passed by a person slumped in a doorway, looking disheveled. Overwhelmingly, those that thought that they had plenty of time, stopped to see if they could help the person, while those who thought that they were late, did not. Later, when questioned about what they had seen, those that felt that they had adequate time, described the person as appearing to be in distress; while those that thought that they were running late, and did not stop, described the person in terms of appearing to be drunk, or on drugs.101

100. See Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 164.
C. Responding Responsibly as Lawyers: Using the Tools Stored in Memory to Make Behavioral Choices.

The myriad patterns of neural connections that make up our memory, and to which we are constantly adding, thankfully remain dormant until some stimulus or cue calls them to our consciousness. Our challenge is to make the greatest use of our explicit and implicit memories and the creative power of our neo-cortex, to solve the difficult problems that challenge us to act in an ethically and professionally responsible way, while effectively serving our clients.

1. The Power of Emotion in Problem Solving

In *The Person and the Situation*, Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett collected the results of more than a dozen studies extending over more than twenty years by a wide array of researchers, to demonstrate that individuals make critical moral and personal decisions based on their emotional reaction to factors that appear to be inherent in the situation facing them, rather than on the individual’s previously demonstrated moral and analytical qualities. The vast disparity between actual and expected behavior strongly suggests that factors other than expressed moral values and analytical ability are driving the individuals’ decisions.

a. The Power of Implicit Emotional Memory; Herein of Social Intuitions and “Hot Cognition.”

Recent work, by researchers at Princeton University and the University of Pittsburgh and by Jonathan Haidt at the University of Virginia, supports the proposition that emotions may be even more powerful than reasoning in making moral decisions. In addition, psychiatrists Lewis, Amini, and Lannon, have drawn a similar conclusion from their own clinical experiences and a review of much of the research in the area. Cognitive psychologists refer to this process

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102. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 50.
103. Id.
104. Greene, et al., supra note 50.
105. Haidt, supra note 50.
106. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 106-20 (demonstrating how patients with implicit memory brain damage can still learn, but lose incremental acquisition of intuitive knowledge).
as “hot cognition,” which is the exercise of judgment that appears to be the result of our cognitive, analytical, processes, but is, in fact, driven by our emotions. Moreover, there is now a broad consensus that the impact of past experiences, even those of which we are not conscious, or were never conscious, can have great power in directing our present perceptions, judgments, feelings, and behaviors. “We may automatically infer people’s character from their behavior, automatically experience affective reactions to a variety of objects, automatically behave in line with traits cued by recent experiences, and automatically engage in a variety of other mental processes as well.”

Importantly, we are unaware of the operation of this process.

Researchers at Princeton University and the University of Pittsburgh performed functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies on subjects given three different problems to solve: one with no moral dilemmas and two with the moral dilemma of whether it is morally acceptable to affect the death of one person in order to save five. The foundation for the latter two were what are known as the “trolley dilemma”: a trolley is proceeding out of control down a track towards five people who will certainly be killed if the trolley is not stopped or derailed, but to stop or derail the trolley will necessarily cause the death of one person.

In the first of the two trolley situations, the subject is asked if he would throw the switch to shift the trolley to another track which would necessarily lead to the killing of one person who is standing on that track. In the second situation, referred to as the “footbridge dilemma,” there is no switch; however, there is a very large man standing at the edge of the footbridge, under which the runaway trolley will pass before striking and killing the five victims. If the subject pushes the man off the bridge into the path of the oncoming trolley, the man will be killed, but the impact will derail the trolley, saving the lives of the five persons who would have otherwise been killed. The subject is asked whether he would push the man.

107. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 211 (“Both motivation and affect may influence which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to judgment; we may be especially likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation may also influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick and easy inferential shortcuts, or rely on elaborate systematic reasoning.”).
108. Id. at 265-88.
109. Id. at 303.
110. Greene et al., supra note 50, at 2105.
111. See id.
Overwhelmingly, subjects said that they would throw the switch in the first case, but not push the man in the second.\textsuperscript{112} When asked to explain why, they were not able to do so based on any logical reasoning.\textsuperscript{113} Rather, it “felt” or “seemed” different. During the experiment, the fMRI recorded very different brain activity in the two trolley situations. The brain activity during “the switch” was much closer to that when the subject was considering the non-moral problem than it was to the brain acting on the “footbridge” version. The difference was seen as the actor’s emotional connection with the act of actually pushing another to his death, as compared with the more impersonal, and thus less emotional, act of causing his death through the use of an intervening force, the trolley switch.\textsuperscript{114} Clearly, these responses demonstrate the “automatic processes” described by Kunda.\textsuperscript{115}

“Intuitions within culturally supported ethics become sharper and more chronically accessible, whereas intuitions within unsupported ethics become weaker and less accessible.”\textsuperscript{116} Haidt does not deny that moral thinking and reasoning, and reflective judgment, can be taught, nor that once taught, they have no impact on one’s moral judgments and action. Rather, he points to earlier demonstrations that “attempts to directly teach thinking and reasoning in a classroom setting generally show little transfer to activities outside the classroom, and because moral judgment involves [more highly emotionally charged] topics than are usually dealt with in courses that attempt to teach thinking and reasoning, the degree of transfer is likely to be even smaller.”\textsuperscript{117} Haidt’s argument is supported by subsequent work done by Joshua Greene and Haidt which concluded, “Neuroimaging studies of moral judgment in normal adults, as well as studies of individuals exhibiting aberrant behavior, all point to the conclusion, embraced by the social intuitionist model, that emotion is a significant driving force in moral judgment. These results also suggest that much, although not necessarily all, moral judgment makes use of processes [in the brain] specifically dedicated to

\textsuperscript{112} Id.
\textsuperscript{113} Id. at 2106.
\textsuperscript{114} Greene et al., supra note 50, at 2105-08.
\textsuperscript{115} See supra note 107, and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{116} Haidt, supra note 50, at 827.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 829.
social cognition and, more specifically, the representation of others’ mental states.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{b. Cognitive Dissonance}

All of us like to feel good about ourselves and the institutions with which we identify. Thus, it is natural that we perceive our behaviors as being consistent with our values.\textsuperscript{119} Under certain conditions, discrepancies between what actions we take and our attitudes toward those actions can induce a state of tension. According to Leon Festinger, our inclination to reduce this tension, or cognitive dissonance, can sometimes cause us to act irrationally.\textsuperscript{120} We are well-versed in dissonance behavior; anytime we make a tough decision we tend to rationalize it by underscoring the pros of our decision and overstating the cons of the action we chose not to take.\textsuperscript{121}

In a 1959 study by Festinger and J. Merrill Carlsmith, subjects were made to perform an extremely mundane task, as part of an “experiment.” Subjects were then offered compensation, either $1 or $20, to tell the next participant (who was actually a confederate) that the task was enjoyable. Afterward the participants were asked how they felt about the tasks. Those who did not deceive the confederate judged the tasks as boring, as did those who received $20 for the deception. However, those paid only a dollar to mislead the next participant ranked the tasks as somewhat enjoyable. While members of the $20 group were sufficiently justified in their actions, those in the $1 (a very small reward) group were not, and so changed their attitude to reduce dissonance.\textsuperscript{122}

In a similar study, children were threatened with either a mild or severe punishment to keep from playing with an appealing toy. While all subjects desisted, those threatened severely did not change their attitude toward the toy, while those threatened only mildly proceeded to

\textsuperscript{119} Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 218-23 (reviewing the consistent research that supports the conclusion that motivation to believe that one is a good person drives changes in behavior and attitude about one’s behavior).
\textsuperscript{121} Brehm, et al, supra note 120, at 209.
\textsuperscript{122} Id. at 206-08.
disregard the toy later. In fact, the milder the threat, the more one’s attitude tended to change.123

Claude Steele and his colleagues studied the possibility that the characteristic attitude changes associated with cognitive dissonance stem from a motivation to obtain self-affirmation following the challenge to one’s self-image when one engages in counter-attitudinal behavior.124 If the behavior is seen in a more favorable light, the person can reaffirm their sense of self as a respectable and intelligent person, hence the attitude change. One study involved participants who either did or did not care about politics and economics. Though all of the students were opposed to increases in tuition, they were asked to support considerable tuition hikes in an essay. Before they were asked about their attitudes, however, the students were asked to fill out a questionnaire about politics and economics. For those who appreciated politics and economics, the questionnaire provided self-affirmation by reminding them of an esteemed aspect of themselves, eliminating a need for attitude change. On the other hand, for participants not interested in politics and economics the questionnaire provided no self-affirmation, and these participants did, indeed, exhibit a corresponding change in attitude.

Utilization of other means of self-affirmation during situations in which we must engage in counter-attitudinal behavior, helps us to maintain a consistent, rational, and positive view of our actions. Attributing our actions to the need to be a “zealous advocate” for our client, the supposed wisdom and experience of a superior, or simply the belief that “It’s not my decision to make,” might present such opportunities.

123. Id. at 208.
c. Situationism 125

Among the studies on which Ross and Nisbett 126 reported was Stanley Milgram’s renowned series of experiments, in which he demonstrated that given the right set of circumstances, otherwise good people can be influenced to “perform actions that were callous and severe.” 127 Subjects of his experiment agreed to take part in a study measuring learning techniques, and met the professor in charge of the study, as well as a fellow participant (who, in reality, was a confederate of the investigator). The two participants were “randomly” assigned roles, the real subject assigned to play the “teacher,” and the confederate assigned to play the “learner.” The professor would read one word from an associated word pair, and if the learner did not provide the correct word association, the teacher would have to give him a slight electric shock by flipping a switch. However, with every wrong answer, the intensity of the shock would increase by 15 volts; silence would be treated as a wrong answer. There was no real electric shock; however, the “learner” had been prepared to simulate receipt of a shock of the degree that the “teacher” was told he was administering, including screaming in pain, or begging not to go on because he or she suffered from a weak heart, etc. 128

While it was predicted from pre-experiment surveys of comparable subjects, as well as of mental health professionals, that only one out of a hundred people would administer a shock up to 450 volts — where it was marked “DANGER: SEVERE SHOCK,” and by which time the learner (confederate) would have protested, complained of pain, screamed in agony, then become completely silent — 65% of Milgram’s first pool of subjects went all the way to the maximum shock. Milgram also found that the relative authority of the person in

125 For a comprehensive review of the principal research in situationism, and an analysis of its application to a wide variety of historical and current events, see Jon Hanson and David Yosifson, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.PA. L. REV. 129, 149-79, 202-85 (2003) (arguing that much that passes for rational analysis in economics and politics is, in fact, the result of responses to situations that we need to make ourselves feel comfortable with automatic, emotionally based decisions that we have already made subconsciously).
126 Supra note 50.
127 Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57, 74-75 (1965); Stanley Milgram, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
128 Id.
charge of the experiment (such as the professor, in the above case) was directly correlated to the proportion of “teachers” who would dispense the full 450 volts. Also, when one credible person in charge was replaced by two such authorities, the percentage of “teachers” who fully cooperated was obliterated.\footnote{129}

Dr. Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University, creator of the famous 1971 “Stanford Prison Experiment,”\footnote{130} argues that each and every one of us can be made to engage in behavior we would otherwise deem ourselves incapable of—given the right circumstances. Zimbardo details such circumstances, amongst which are a “cover story” under which the objectionable behavior is justified; relatable roles for the subjects to play (such as teacher/learner in Milgram’s experiment; prison guard/prisoner in his own); some sort of obligation to carry out the behavior; responsibility for any negative consequences diverted away from the subject; and a gradual increase in the nature of the situation from reasonable to perverse (including both the level of shock and the authority of the professor in Milgram’s experiment).\footnote{131}

Zimbardo’s groundbreaking 1971 experiment illustrated the extent to which extraordinary behavior can arise from a given situation. In his study, participants with no prior experience or exposure to prisons, were to take on the roles of guards or prisoners in a simulated prison environment, set up in a campus class room building, for a period of two weeks. Prisoners inhabited the setting at all times, while guards worked 8 hour shifts, but neither were taught how to perform their roles. What transpired was beyond anyone’s expectations—normal young men acting as guards began to aggressively torment and humiliate those acting as prisoners, and many of the otherwise healthy students acting as prisoners experienced severe stress and even breakdowns; the study had to be terminated after a mere six days.\footnote{132} Perhaps most telling was Zimbardo’s own transformation into a harsh and uncaring Prison Superintendent, unbeknownst to himself.\footnote{133} The “Good Samaritan”

\footnote{129. Id.}
\footnote{131. Id.}
\footnote{132. Id.}
\footnote{133. Philip G. Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators., in Arthur Miller}
experiment at Princeton Theological Seminary, discussed at p. 670, supra, is yet another example of situationally driven moral reasoning. And, I would argue, the “social contexts” that permeate large corporations and the law firms that represent them, described by Mark A. Sargent, which lead to his pessimistic view of the potential impact of the SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, is an archetypal example of situationism at work.

d. The Danger of “Downshifting”

Making choices and exercising judgment produces stress. Making morally charged choices, or choices in situations where one feels personally threatened, produces a high level of stress. The more stressed we are the less likely we are to engage our cognitive processes, and the more likely we are to rely, unthinkingly, on our expectations, desires, and other emotion laden memories. Stress produces physical and psychological reactions within our body. Among our reactions to stress is the release of several hormones in the brain, including adrenaline, noradrenaline, and cortisol. Increases in adrenaline and noradrenaline in the brain are generally associated with stress perceived as a challenge which we have the ability to meet, rather than as a threat. It can strengthen us to handle the challenge. Such stress is not particularly harmful to the body.

However, under conditions of persistent or unreasonably high stress, the body secretes excessive amounts of cortisol. High levels of cortisol inhibit cognitive functioning, and can lead to the inability to distinguish between important and unimportant elements of an experience, or to feelings of despair. Thus, constant or unreasonably


134. Mark A.Sargent, supra note 35
135. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 167.
136. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 70.
137. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 72.
139. Id. at 70.
140. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 71.
141. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 38 (“Chronic high cortisol levels can lead to the destruction of neurons in the hippocampus associated with learning and memory. Even the short term stress-related elevation of cortisol in the hippocampus can lead to the inability to distinguish between the important and the unimportant elements of a memorable event.”); SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 243-44.
high levels of stress can have very negative effects on learning.\textsuperscript{142} They can impede our capacity to perceive patterns and form memories.\textsuperscript{143} When our brains perceive a situation as threatening and we do not feel able to resolve it satisfactorily, we do what some psychologists have called “downshifting,” to focus on the perceived threat.\textsuperscript{144} When we “downshift” we narrow our focus and limit the incoming stimuli which we consider in order to engage our more primitive self-protective response mechanism.\textsuperscript{145}

In such situations, the brain is also less able to engage in open-ended thinking and connect the perceived experience with the full array of neural connections that might otherwise be available to us to formulate a response. Rather than engage the neocortical brain with its power to abstract, analogize, consider broader and more subtle external and internal cues, and develop new connections and responses necessary for resolving the threatening situation, we get “stuck.” At that point, the brain’s problem solving mechanism may shut down. We feel helpless, fatigued, even a sense of despair, and are unable to distinguish between important and unimportant elements in the environment, or to access our open-ended reasoning power. Our brain resorts to recall primarily from its more primitive, survival oriented reptilian and limbic systems.\textsuperscript{146} Responding through those systems leaves us with limited tools: the “relentless unreasoning force” of implicit emotional memory with which to understand the situation,\textsuperscript{147} “automatic actions, convictions without intellect, and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at all”\textsuperscript{148} and fight-or-flight as our arsenal of responses. We become defensive, even phobic, and tend to act precipitously. “When we downshift, we revert to the tried and true, and follow old beliefs and behaviors regardless of what information the road signs provide.”\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{142} SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 243-44 (“[T]his impairment [problem learning and remembering fear] can be produced by damaging a single structure within the amygdala, known as the lateral nucleus.”).
\textsuperscript{143} C AINE & C AINE, supra note 44, at 71.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 69-70.
\textsuperscript{145} Id.; see also SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 242-44 for a discussion of how a prolonged stressful environment can have deleterious effects on the brain and cause neuron loss.
\textsuperscript{146} SYLWESTER, supra note 48 at 38; C AINE & C AINE, supra note 44, at 73, 76-77; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 242-44.
\textsuperscript{147} LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 118.
\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 112.
\textsuperscript{149} Id. at 70. For a further discussion of emotion, learning, and downshifting, see SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 45 and 73; C AINE & C AINE, supra note 44, at 69-70; and discussion supra pp. 659-60.
e. Avoiding the Dangers of Downshifting

Zimbardo argues that while “‘a few bad apples may spoil the barrel (filled with good fruit/people), a vinegar barrel will always transform sweet cucumbers into sour pickles—regardless of the best intentions, resilience, and genetic nature of those cucumbers.’ So does it make more sense to spend resources to identify, isolate and destroy bad apples or to understand how vinegar works, and teach cucumbers to avoid undesirable vinegar barrels?” Unfortunately, lawyers cannot avoid the pickle barrel. Every form and model of lawyering that I have seen presents a virtual minefield of ethically challenging situations.

The good news, however, is that while situationally induced automatic responses, “hot cognition,” and downshifting are driven by powerful forces, they are not necessarily pre-ordained. For one thing, if we have sufficient time to reflect on the situation, and our emotional response to it, formulate potential solutions, and consider the consequences of various possible courses of action, we may be able to override the effects of automatic reactions. In addition, when our emotions inform us that we care about making the right decision, the emotional force of that motivation can overcome the tendency to act automatically. Another critical factor in determining whether we “downshift,” limiting our intake of data and the range of our responses, or instead open ourselves to expand our data intake and deploy the powerful analytical tools of the neo-cortex, appears to be “whether we see a solution to [the] problem or perceive ourselves as capable of resolving it.”

151. See, e.g., Lewis, et al, supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned, emotional memories, and replace automatic responses with more reflective ones); Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 289, 305.
152. Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 289.
153. Id. at 305.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW SCHOOL

A. Traditional Law School Curriculum and Pedagogy Fail to Prepare Students to Solve Value Laden Ethical Problems.

The environment in which law students are immersed is rich with reading and interpreting statutes and court decisions, analyzing text, considering the phrasing of an appropriate rule of law, and arguing for its adoption against professors and colleagues. Students are constantly engaged in analyzing the same type of material, deciding what the legal rule should be, and zealously advocating in favor of its application.\textsuperscript{155} Socratic dialogue in our classes is emotionally charged, as students are challenged to come up with arguments facing their professors, surrounded by their peers. By implicit learning, i.e., by doing, and being critiqued, rather than by intentionally studying the process, and by repetition, students working in that atmosphere learn principles and processes of analysis of statutes, regulations, and court opinions and how to build an argument in support of the client’s position. Their neural networks form patterns of implicit memory that are repeatedly reinforced, to follow or distinguish precedent whenever they must analyze legal problems. Because they work primarily from appellate opinions, they are “programmed” to look to predetermined sources, e.g., the findings of the court below, the appellate court’s identification of the relevant facts, or the professor’s hypothetical, for all of the relevant facts. In addition, the emotion of both the Socratic dialogue in class and exams have reinforced those implicit memories. They may forget most of the particular legal doctrines learned in various substantive courses; however, forever after, whenever their senses perceive a problem as a legal problem, their brains will call on the patterns of neural connections—the memories—that were created implicitly in law school, about how to respond. Noticeably absent from the explicit teaching, except in the course on ethics, is any consideration of values. When the legal problem is instrumentalist—how to accomplish our client’s goal—the explicit and implicit knowledge garnered in law school about how to solve legal problems stands our students, as lawyers, in good stead, because the answer involves making an effective argument for the

\textsuperscript{155} In each law school course, students analyze appellate opinions using substantially the same tools and methods.
applicability of a legal rule to achieve that goal. The difference between the particular raw material presented by the client in “real life,” and the “hypos” faced in law school, are not terribly problematic, because the concepts and analytical skills that were so effectively encoded in memory en route to the J.D. are readily transferable to most legal domains. Drawing on those memories will, generally, produce valuable information for solving instrumentalist legal problems. However, when the problem is not how to do something, but rather whether to do it, when it involves values or relationships among people—which much of a lawyer’s work does—neither the explicit, nor the implicit knowledge learned in law school is of much help. Among the factors that the rule-based examination of the problem does not consider are the future relationships between and among the parties, the values of the relevant players, including the lawyer, and the potential impact on third parties. Relationships and values, however, implicate emotion as much, or more, than cognitive analysis.

As we have seen, most of our moral choices are initiated automatically, before our cognitive processes can be engaged, by the values, social intuitions, expectations, and needs which we have developed over many years of daily living and implicit, emotionally rich learning. They are in place before students arrive at law school. Moreover, the more stress we experience when confronted by a moral or ethical dilemma, the more likely we are to simply rely on those emotional memories, and the less likely we are to engage our cognitive resources. The lawyers in the problems at the beginning of this paper probably studied the rules of professional responsibility, yet they were unable to overcome the pressures of the situations in which they found themselves, even to the point of considering the ethical issues, and developing an appropriate problem solving strategy. Nevertheless, while our mental-emotional edifice, constructed over many years is powerful, our pre-adult experiences are not necessarily our destiny.156 But it is not easy to change. Simply studying and learning moral reasoning won’t do it.

After childhood, “emotional learning doesn’t stop, but it slows. [O]ften the only emotional learning one sees after childhood is the reinforcement of existing fundamentals.”157 Lewis et al suggest that

156. Id. at 829; LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned emotional memories); ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 289, 305.
157. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 163.
three to five years, sometimes more, of therapy is usually required to make significant change in adults’ emotional responses. Haidt suggests “[y]ears of . . . implicit learning, coupled with explicit discussion, should gradually tune up intuitions . . . about justice, rights, and fairness, leading perhaps to an automatic tendency to look at problems from multiple perspectives . . . .” But he ventures no guess as to how long that might take.

The legal education described by Friedland’s survey results, and familiar to all of us, does not seem likely to serve those goals. Worse yet, it may, as I think the examples at the beginning of this article demonstrate, be antithetical to them.

For most law students, their exposure to matters of professional responsibility is limited to taking one course in the subject, and in preparing for and taking the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). Although the American Bar Association has, since 1974, required as a condition of accreditation that a law school require each of its graduates to complete a course in professional responsibility, there is little incentive for students to really “dig into” the subject, even at the rule-based level.

To the extent that the course is taught in a manner similar to that used in other subject matter courses, the emotional experience of the students is minimal. Certainly, there is always some emotional connection when one is called upon in class, and with final exams. Yet,

158. Id. at 187.
159. Haidt, supra note 50, at 829; see also, Eleanor W. Myers, Simple Truths about Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 835-36 (1996); Myers, supra note 37, at 409-10, 414, 416-17.
161. The career plans of our students do not incentivize them to pay particular attention to issues of ethics and professional responsibility. In the more than ten years that I have been teaching, during all of which time I have served on my law school’s Career Planning and Placement Committee, and indeed in the twenty-five years that I practiced before that, I have heard of only one law firm, during one hiring season, that considered an applicant’s responses to questions of professional responsibility during the hiring process, or paid particular attention to the applicant’s grade in that course.
162. ABA Standard 302(a) (iv), Standards for Approval of Law Schools.
163. Law schools have not rushed to adopt Professor Rhode’s proposed “pervasive method” for educating law students about professional responsibility by including some problem set and important class time for discussion of professional responsibility issues throughout the curriculum. Rhode, supra note 16, at 4-5. Rather, professional responsibility is generally a two credit course offered to second and third year students, frequently after they have taken and passed, with the aid of a bar review course, the MPRE.
164. For a discussion of Friedland’s findings see supra note 29.
in class, and when the exam is comprised of the standard essay and/or multiple choice questions, the student is required to identify and apply the rule of professional conduct implicated in a given fact pattern. The emotional connection is with knowing and applying the correct rule in a situation in which the student knows, in advance, that the fact pattern raises one or more ethical questions. Students’ emotional engagement is not with seeking to discover and understand the full context, identifying and creating options, discerning the ethical choice, and acting on it by exercising judgment to decide what to do, and communicating that judgment to a client and/or supervisor who might prefer a different response, knowing that she may face adverse consequences from her choices. Rather, the only thing at risk is the student’s grade in a course she may see as having little impact on her future.

Legal problems encountered throughout the law school curriculum, outside of Professional Responsibility class, are generally taken from the instrumentalist perspective, and do not consider matters of professional responsibility, i.e., they ask only how to do something. Matters of professional responsibility are, inherently, normative, i.e., asking whether to do something. Thus, to the extent that our students carry memories of issues relevant to ethical decision making, they are primarily explicitly learned, “taxon” memories of specific rules learned in their one class on ethics and professional responsibility.165

165. Of course, there have been numerous creative and potentially effective efforts by talented and dedicated teachers of professional responsibility to design and teach professional responsibility within a pedagogic framework that do exactly what Haidt, Caine & Caine, Schoen, Blasi, and Myers, suggest, including engaging the students in the process of exercising judgment in multiple contexts, and making visible their reasoning process in a safe and supportive environment so that it can be carefully analyzed, and re-examined in the light of thoughtful feedback. See sources cited supra note 50. See also Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719 (1998) (urging that law schools promote the importance of legal ethics by making it a required, three credit, first year, first semester course and an upper level course, as well as incorporate ethics into all other classes); Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & M. L. REV. 357 (1998) (promoting the idea of teaching legal ethics from a “contextual” standpoint rather than as a survey course as being more effective because it emphasizes the importance of context when making decisions and gives students more time to develop skills); Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. L. ETHICS, 33 (1996) (advocating the need to develop the capacity to make well-reasoned, ethical decisions in lawyers and the importance of teaching this to students beyond the Model Code of Professional Responsibility); SYMPOSIUM, supra at note 35. Nevertheless, it seems to me that, within the three years of law school, a single exposure to professional responsibility in a two or three credit mandatory, upper level course, often taught after the students have passed the MPRE, challenges even the very best of
If we return to consider the problems which introduced this paper in light of what cognitive science teaches us about learning and acting we will see that they have several things in common:

1. Each of them was perceived as carrying significant risk to the lawyer.
2. In each case the lawyer had neither practice addressing such challenging problems, nor had they an apparently readily available source of support for analyzing or addressing the problem.
3. Each lawyer “downshifted.” (a) They acted as if there was no ethical issue to consider, despite their knowledge of the rules. Denial and avoidance are clear examples of “flight.” (b) The problem solving behavior they chose to employ is perfectly explainable in terms of the “three principles” that were imbedded in their implicit memory in law school. They acted automatically, reverting to the tried and true.\(^{166}\)

If it is true that our reactions in the face of moral or ethical questions are most significantly automatic, driven by social intuitions, which are primarily governed by elaborately encoded, implied emotional memories,\(^ {167}\) and if the legal academy is concerned about our students’ performance as ethical lawyers, then law schools are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, if students come to us with intuitions that incline them to be reflective and responsible about moral and ethical issues, to look at problems from multiple perspectives, to search, and then to act consistently with the morally correct decision,\(^ {168}\) we want to reinforce them, and also give them the tools to enable them to be both professionally responsible, and zealous and effective advocates for their clients. On the other hand, if they come to the law school with intuitions that do not incline them to consider issues of ethics and professional responsibility, other than perhaps as traps to avoid, rather

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\(^{166}\) See supra pp. 678-80.
\(^{167}\) LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 189-90.
\(^{168}\) Haidt, supra note 50, at 829; LEWIS, ET AL., supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned memories).
than reinforcing those intuitions their legal education should seek to enhance their sensitivity and responsiveness to the important role that those issues play in our profession, while assuring them that to do so is not to surrender their effectiveness as advocates for their clients. Law schools should help them acquire the skills to pursue both goals simultaneously, and the emotional strength to do so. That is, we should strive to create new explicit and implicit emotional memory of being ethically responsible, while exercising the skills necessary to effective problem solving as advocates for their clients.

Motivation is the key to attitude change. Attitude change is driven by the need to affirm oneself as a good person. Self affirmation can be achieved by changing one’s attitude about one’s behavior—either changing the behavior so that it comports with prior values, or changing one’s values as they relate to the extant behaviors.169

As long as law schools teach students to value effective legal arguments without regard to the moral and ethical consequences of their actions, they will not be motivated to value embedding ethical and moral considerations in their professional behavior as lawyers.

B. How Experts Solve Novel and Complex Problems

“Experts” are people who can understand and solve problems that others—non-experts—cannot. Thus, it might be valuable in trying to ascertain how to go about learning to solve complex ethical problems to examine what it is about “expertise” that enables experts, generically, to do so.

As described by Gary L. Blasi170 and Donald A. Schön,171 experts seem to be able to leapfrog over several levels of detailed analysis to identify and engage patterns of apparently related information directly to a given problem, and also to matters that are facially different, yet analogous, and thus useful for the solution. Their memories include a combination of a deep body of subject matter data, and “experience,” the accumulated knowledge from actually using the data in various situations over time (i.e., in context). Accessing these memories permits them to compare and contrast the characteristics of the

169. Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 218-23 (reviewing the consistent research that supports the conclusion that motivation to believe that one is a good person drives changes in behavior and attitude about one’s behavior).
presenting problem with those of the many problems with which they have engaged in the past. Schön describes this as engaging in a “reflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation.” This process enables the experts to construct patterns, or “mental models” that permit them to move forward towards a solution.

Critical to the experts’ approach to a problem are the following: (1) a deep foundation of factual knowledge in the domain; (2) experience, i.e., working with the data in context; and (3) understanding of the conceptual framework that relates to the domain. Given these attributes, experts can see patterns in the data that might not be obvious to others and thus recognize when a “given” problem actually has critical unidentified attributes—perhaps even a different foundational problem—that affect achievement of the desired goal.

How is such expertise developed?

1. Elaborately Encoded, Implicit Memory

Explicit, or taxon, memory created by intentional studying of relevant material is one factor. But, experts’ knowledge cannot be reduced to a fund of explicitly learned data. Rather, it is implicitly learned, contextualized, and organized around core concepts. For the professionals whose work was examined by Schön, all of the problems presented challenges that they had not directly encountered before. However, they were able to engage the problem in context, and find concepts from their experience that contributed to developing a solution. In so doing, they continually re-examined and reflected on their understanding of the problem, as well as the appropriateness of their approach to solving it.

172. Id. at 130 (The expert responds to a situation in action based upon her education, training and experience in using that knowledge in context. That action produces consequences which may include unexpected ones (i.e., the situation “talks back” to the expert), and the expert responds to that “back-talk.” The expert uses this process to build towards a solution.).


174. How People Learn, supra note 173, at 45-47 (The “virtuoso” or expert with adaptive expertise, treats the client’s articulation of the problem with respect, but also as a point of departure for further exploration.).

175. Id. at 13, 36-38, 48.

176. Schön, supra note 171, at 54-56 (examples of major league baseball pitcher, and experienced jazz musician, both of whom must examine their performance as it relates to the performance of others, and evaluate and adjust as they are performing).
neural connections that reinforced the core relationships among the data. Without a vast store of elaborately encoded, implicit knowledge, such an approach would not have been possible. The creation of implicit memory by repeated elaborate encodings from different, yet similar contexts not only enhances the internal bond of the patterns of neural connections, but also highlights the core similarities among related neural patterns, thus strengthening the connections among those representing the concepts central to the memory.  

2. Adaptive Expertise and Metacognition

Some experts simply possess large funds of domain knowledge but are unable to apply it to matters outside of those areas. Chess masters, for example, have been shown to have a keen ability to remember the placement of pieces on the board far better than they can remember similar non-chess related patterns. Other experts, such as those studied by Schön, are able to adapt their knowledge to the demands of new and different external situations. They are said to have “adaptive expertise.”

Experts with adaptive expertise see the presenting problem as the starting point for exploration, an exploration that may lead to a reconfiguration of the problem, itself, as well as the development of a path leading to an effective solution. Key to the difference between experts with and without adaptive expertise is metacognition. Metacognition refers to the ability to understand one’s own thought and 128-36 (reviewing the preceding discussion of that same process by architects and psychotherapists).

177. See discussion “Implicit Memory,” supra pp. 665-66; Schacter, supra note 54 at 56, 60, 63 (recall of explicitly learned memory depends upon the similarity between the encoding process and the recall cue; while elaborately encoded, or implicit, memory, being susceptible to recall by myriad cues, has a much higher likelihood of being recalled) Another example of the critical value of contextualized learning is that actors don’t simply memorize lines, but rather seek to understand the person they are portraying, and the emotional environment and impact on that person of the situation in which they find themselves. Schacter, supra note 54, at 49. Pinker further explains that access to long term memory—“access consciousness”—is a function of the “richness of present-tense [i.e., sensory] awareness” attention and emotion at the time of the experience, and relevance at the time of need for recall. Pinker, supra note 42, at 138-45.

178. Blasi, supra note 28, at 335; Schacter, supra note 54, at 48-49.


180. Id. at 32.
processes,\textsuperscript{181} including the nature, scope, and limitations on one’s knowledge, and the willingness to seek to overcome the limitations by seeking out new sources of relevant expertise.\textsuperscript{182} To avoid such automatic responses as downshifting, but instead employ the best of one’s analytical and problem solving skills, including an objective evaluation of one’s own resources, as well as their limitations, and then seek out other resources necessary to create an effective solution, requires motivation, competence and confidence.

IV. BUILDING BETTER LAWYERS THROUGH CONTEXTUALLY RICH, EMOTIONALLY ENGAGED LEARNING\textsuperscript{183}

A. What Would It Take?

In order to make the best use of their analytical abilities in the face of ethically opaque situations, students need to be motivated to do so, and to understand the historically developed “intuitions” that are pushing or pulling them in particular directions. They need to have the skills and confidence to engage in the type of analysis that encompasses both values and traditional legal analysis, and the courage to make professionally responsible choices in the face of conflicting values. And they should learn how to seek and obtain support when they need to work through problems freighted with ethical issues, as most practitioners do.

To achieve those results, law faculty will need to construct a learning environment specifically designed for that purpose.

\textsuperscript{181} SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 85. See Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 Univ. Detroit Mercy L. Rev. 1, 7-18 (2003).

\textsuperscript{182} HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 12-13.

\textsuperscript{183} See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about Women, the Academy and the Legal Profession, 4 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 119 (1997) (combining the critiques of the model of lawyer as “gladiator” promoted in law school and the profession’s marginalization of women and people of color to argue that the model of lawyer should be recast to that of problem solver, which would better address the needs of lawyers in society and serve to better include all); Lerner, supra note 28; SYMPOSIUM, supra note 35.
B. What Would Emotionally Engaged Learning in Law School Look Like?

1. Let Them In On The Secret.

For more than ten years, I have been teaching in a law school clinical program in which the students represent real clients. I also supervise externs, students whose clinical experience is with a legal organization outside of the law school, where all of their case supervision is by the organization’s lawyers. In our clinic my clinical faculty colleagues and I supervise students representing clients of our law school-based “teaching law office.” In the clinic seminar, we include a class explicitly designed to introduce our students to the idea that they come to their work with a broad array of values, assumptions, judgments, expectations, emotional needs, etc. With our externs we use the requirement that they maintain journals, which we read, and meet with us on a regular basis to introduce them to the importance of their own values and needs in assessing their sensory experiences, analyzing situations, and making judgments. We try to demonstrate that their values and emotional needs are based upon a lifetime of experience, their particular lifetime of experience, but not that of others—even others as similar to themselves as their classmates, let alone as different from themselves as their clients. These issues include, of course, ethnic, gender, religious, and class stereotypes, but also a hierarchy of values covering a myriad of topics. We discuss, explicitly, theories about how these “social intuitions” influence what they see and hear, and how they interact with others, and make judgments. We ask them to consider these issues as they go about the work of representing their clients; and we urge them, too, to be patient with themselves, rather than overly self-critical, as they work to become aware of what forces are influencing their decision making, and gain control of them. Throughout the semester in class and in supervision meetings we try to raise questions to help them see where and why their internal self is influencing their analytical and interpersonal work. Our semester is only fourteen weeks long, but however skeptical and resistant the student may be when we introduce the topic, most are convinced by the end of the semester that they are not the “analytical machine” that they had previously supposed. And, I have had many experiences of students who, by the end of the term, were able to articulate some of the subtle forces operating within themselves as they struggled with their clients’ problems.
By helping our students to understand these principles, and working with them to help them experience those forces in action in the safe environment of our classes and supervised clinical work, we increase their ability to understand and control their impact.


The history of the legal profession’s role in representing unpopular individuals and causes, and its history of ethical conduct, while not without blemish, as well as my own observations as both lawyer and law professor, leads me to think that the problem is not that law school attracts only those who possess only selfish, competitive, or uncaring social intuitions. Research demonstrates that most people have intuitions towards empathy and justice. And, where getting “the right answer” is important we are motivated to pursue that goal. Perhaps the problem is that law students learn only tools for their role as instrumentalist lawyer, and not those that support their pro-social intuitions. Perhaps if, in addition to tools for the traditional role of zealous advocate, law school provided them with skills with which to recognize the emotional pressures created by challenging professional situations, and to design solutions that would support both their need to represent their clients effectively, and their own pro-social intuitions, they would be better able to make choices that would lead them to recognizing and rejecting unethical or unprofessional actions, and insisting on pursuing the “right,” i.e., ethical, professionally responsible choice.


According to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, beyond the mastery of traditional lawyering skills, our students need to learn to pose such questions, as:

185. Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 289.
What are these parties trying to accomplish? [I.e., What are their real goals, needs, interests, and priorities?] What are the likely/possible needs or interests of other parties who may be involved in the case or in important, ongoing or potential, relationships with one or more of the parties? What is really at stake? What are the legal, social, economic, political, psychological, moral, or ethical risks and benefits of litigation? Of non-litigated outcomes? What other considerations might the client be willing to entertain, if they were brought to awareness? Are there ways to satisfy our client’s needs as well as all, or some, of the needs of others? What other arrangements might be better to deal with this problem? Why might they be better or worse?

I submit that they also need to ask themselves:

Are there motivations or expectations that I have that are driving me toward, or away from, recommending, or even considering, particular strategies or tactics? Are there individual values or relationships, including, but not limited to those of my client, that might be impacted differently by our selection of strategy or tactics?

Beyond their mastery of formal analytical and argumentative skills, students should be able to consider the values, or social intuitions that underlie the choices they make, especially with respect to issues of professional responsibility, and consider perspectives other than their own, or that of the instrumentalist view of lawyering. They need to be motivated to seek a morally and ethically appropriate solution, not merely to construct a plausible argument that leads to a pre-determined result. They need to have confidence that they can act in a morally appropriate way, in order to avoid downshifting in the face of morally challenging situations.

To achieve such goals, our students must become comfortable dealing with what Jonathan Haidt, Evan Rosenberg, and Holly Hom have referred to as “moral diversity.” However, as Haidt, Rosenberg, and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 15 (1999).

187. Frenkel, supra note 37, at 41-42.


188. Jonathan Haidt, et. al., Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity is Not Like Other Kinds, 33 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1 (2003) (defining “moral diversity” as “the state of a group when a substantial percentage of its members . . . does not value the most valued moral goods of the community. Moral goods are social, personal, or spiritual obligations (e.g., justice, social harmony, self-actualization, piety, chastity) to which one
and Hom point out, there is a substantial body of social psychological research that indicates that moral diversity in a group makes it difficult for members to work together, because differences based upon “culture and world view” lead to “desires for ostracism and punishment.”

Their own studies of University of Virginia undergraduates confirm that moral diversity reduces desires for interaction more than does demographic diversity.

At the same time, however, “participants [in their study] saw a special value in diversity in educational contexts. . . . [They] seemed to be saying that exposure to [moral] differences in the controlled and safe setting of a class room was desirable.” The fact that students in the Haidt, Rosenberg, and Hom study seemed to appreciate the value, and have less fear, of moral diversity in an academic setting suggests that just such a venue, or perhaps a law school classroom, might well be appropriate for the introduction, open discussion, and reflection upon morally diverse values.

Yet, practice does not necessarily make perfect. Rather, it makes persistent. If we want students to consider with open minds the positive weight of the moral values of others that differ from their own, and to appreciate the implications to others, as well as the effectiveness for their clients, of various behaviors, only feedback, discussion, reflection, and follow-up, led by someone skilled at evaluating their work, and communicating about it with them non-judgmentally, are likely to produce that result. And they need the opportunity to reflect, reconsider, and try again. Feedback and reflection also teaches flexibility, transferability of knowledge, and that learning is built upon

appeals to justify or criticize the practices and behaviors of others, and which are felt to be binding on all people. . . . Moral goods are experienced as affectively laden self-evident truths or intuitions. . . .”); see also id. at 5.

189. Id. at 6.
190. Id. at 30.
192. Cf. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50 at 169-90 (discussing the lengthy and difficult process of psychotherapy in revising the implicitly learned neural code that directs our emotional lives); Haidt, supra note 50, at 829 (“Creating a community in which moral talk was ubiquitous and in which adults model good moral thinking. And by talking about evidence, justifications, and mitigating factors [with discourse partners who are respected for their wisdom and judgment] more nuanced and ultimately more reasonable judgments are likely to be produced.”).
193. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 58-60.
prior learning. Feedback and reflection thus builds metacognition, the ability to understand one’s own cognitive processes.

4. Two Models of Instruction.

a. “Live Client” Clinics

Law school clinics in which students represent real clients offer a unique opportunity to learn how to figure out what really is the problem, to uncover what really is at stake, what unidentified relationships may be critical to one or another of the parties as they work towards a solution of the problem, etc. Student lawyers must examine and understand the problem as presented by the client, theorize as to potential solutions, plan and carry out legal research and factual investigation, remain open to ongoing re-examination of the critical issues, identify limits in their own knowledge and overcome those limits, integrate knowledge from other disciplines or domains, learn, build on their prior learning, exercise judgment, make choices and experience their consequences. Moreover, as Eleanor W. Myers has noted in assessing her simulation-based course, “Experience exerts a powerful influence over the exercise of discretion. Experiential learning is critical to moral development.”

“[I]t is not until students actually experience the reality of practice that they begin to internalize and make their own moral and ethical judgments that are at the core of practice.” Clinics, in which the students represent clients in real matters under the close supervision of experienced lawyers/teachers, thus provide a quintessential locale for emotional engagement of law students in factually complex matters, challenging them to identify and grapple with issues of professional responsibility. They also provide the opportunity for frequent feedback and occasional modeling from experts. In such an atmosphere implicit, emotional learning is likely to take place.

At the same time, because they are “live,” every case is different and quite unpredictable at the outset. Given such unpredictability, it

194. Id. at 68-69.
195. Id. at 67.
196. Myers, Simple Truths, supra note 152, at 835; Myers, supra note 37, at 403-04.
197. Myers, Simple Truths, supra note 152, at 836.
would be difficult to plan a problem solving or professional responsibility curricular thread solely around live client clinics.

b. Problem-Based Learning

Between live client clinics and Langdellian reliance on appellate opinions there should be a pedagogy, or pedagogies, that will enable law students to engage in contextually rich, emotionally engaging, experiential learning. Problem-Based Learning (P-BL)\(^{198}\) is one approach that gives us guidance on how to satisfy those needs.

P-BL is based upon the principle that by engaging students’ interest and having them actively engaged in the learning process, the students will learn how they learn, as well as learning the concepts with which they are working to produce both more effective, usable knowledge and long term “learning capability.”\(^{199}\) Using P-BL, students develop an understanding of the facts and circumstances in which the problem is situated, define, or redefine, the problem(s) or goal(s), consider whatever competing interests may be involved, prioritize, identify the nature and sources of the information needed to achieve the goal, obtain that information, employ critical thinking, exercise judgment, reconsider earlier conclusions or assumptions, make and defend their decisions, reflect on their own learning process and results, and work with the situation as it evolves over time.\(^{200}\) Essential to the process is the participation of a mentor, who can assist the learners to remain on task, collaborate, and encourage reflection on their work as they proceed.\(^{201}\)

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\(^{198}\) See, e.g., \textit{The Challenge of Problem-Based Learning} (David Boud & Graham I. Feletti eds., 2d ed. Kogan Page 1997) (critically examining problem based learning in a variety of learning environments); \textit{The Power of Problem-Based Learning: A Practical “How To” For Teaching Undergraduate Courses in Any Discipline} (Barbara J. Duch et al. eds., Stylus Publishing 2001) (outlining useful strategies for how educators can introduce problem-based learning into their courses).

\(^{199}\) Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 2, 4; Barbara J. Duch et al., \textit{Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate Education}, in \textit{The Power of Problem-Based Learning}, supra note 198, at 6.


to produce more elaborately encoded patterns of neural connections of the approach to problem solving demonstrated by professionals with adaptive expertise, as well as the ability to examine problems from multiple perspectives, which is essential to professionally responsible conduct.

i. Motivating Students

Motivation stimulates attention and learning. Motivation can be externally generated by the expectation of rewards or punishments (i.e., grades). However, learning tends to be more powerful when its motivation is internally generated by the learner’s belief in the usefulness of the learning. A belief that what one is doing has real value to oneself or others is a powerful motivator. Most students come to law school wanting to become lawyers. Thus, the more that students feel that the problems they confront in law school actually relate to the real world of lawyering, the greater their internal motivation to engage with them and the greater their learning from that experience.

ii. Teaching Students to be Adaptive Problem Solvers

Langdellian, case-method, teaching provides the students with all of the information they need from the statement of the problem to the facts and legal authorities available for its solution. But lawyers seldom have such luxury. Frequently, they help to clarify the question, investigate the facts, recognize that over time everything, even the

202. KUNDA, supra note 20, at 211-16; HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 60-61; Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate Education, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 6; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 1-2; Cf. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 72; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 44-45 acknowledging the importance of motivation, but arguing that the encoding-making part of experience—is equally, if not more essential.

203. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 61.

204. Id. at 61. Both SYLWESTER and Caine & Caine point out that external motivation can actually limit a person’s internal motivation. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 75-76; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 76-77. Accord, Dewey, supra note 74, at 67 (“There is, I think, no point in the philosophy of progressive education which is sounder that its emphasis upon the importance of the participation of the learner in the formation of the purposes which direct his activities in the learning process.”).

205. Id.

client’s goals and priorities, may change, find, or create, the legal principles that best support the client, and then marshal the evidence that best supports the application of those principles. P-BL, by providing limited information at the outset of the problem calls on the students to engage in similar activities to those of the lawyer. Students thus learn to exercise judgment to identify and obtain necessary information to consider the implications of change over time, both factually and legally, as well as relationships that might continue beyond the solution of the presenting problem, to understand their own thought processes, recognize the limits of their own knowledge, and to identify and secure resources appropriate to the solution of the problem (metacognition).

iii. Collaboration

P-BL advocates consistently urge that students be required to work in teams for several reasons. First, it brings together the collective skills of the team members, demonstrating the appropriateness and value of collaboration to work and scholarship. Collaboration reduces the individual student’s sense of isolation, which tends to improve performance. Less isolation may produce less fear and thus, less “downshifting.” Students are likely to be motivated to be able to contribute to the team’s goals, thereby increasing their emotional engagement with the problem. Collaboration requires them to make decisions and to communicate effectively to their teammates the evidence and reasons supporting those decisions. It thereby improves both reasoning and communication skills. The process of working in teams also generates appreciation for differences in learning and

207. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see discussion supra pp. 678-80.
211. See “Motivating Students,” supra p. 696; “The Importance of Emotion in Creating Memory,” supra pp. 668-70. Of course, some students may take the opportunity of group work to avoid responsibility and work, expecting that others will do it. But even that has consequences that may, if it is identified, articulated and addressed, provide important learning about ethical judgment.
213. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6.
communication styles, increasing social maturity.\textsuperscript{214} Collaboration can significantly increase one’s exposure to other perspectives, and values.

Although most lawyers work collaboratively in addressing clients’ problems, in most law school course work collaboration is a violation of the honor code. Thus students learn, implicitly, and with powerful emotional stakes, not to ask for support from, or give support to, others in solving legal problems. In my observations, even in my interdisciplinary clinic in which all of the work is done in teams, students demonstrate that they have somehow acquired the belief that asking for support is a sign of weakness or incompetence. Moreover, law schools provide no support for creating, effectively using, or evaluating collaborations. Most law students learn the skills of group process and collaboration only by chance.

Collaboration, however, is an immeasurably valuable tool in addressing ethical problems. When Milgram varied his electric shock experiments in ways that involved a third person being present, even those that were known to be confederates of the “experimenter” the subject almost always refused to proceed to highest level of shock for the “learner.”\textsuperscript{215} The support of colleagues, friends, family, teachers, therapists, spiritual advisors, indeed anyone that we trust, can be of immeasurable help in sorting out our feelings, values, needs, and expectations, as well as clarifying the evidence and issues, and identifying options. We need to inculcate in our students an acceptance that seeking support to discuss one’s feelings about the appropriateness of behaviors that one is being asked to condone, especially when one feels any qualms about the ethics or morality of the action, is an appropriate element of the exercise of professional judgment and not a sign of incompetence or disloyalty.

Carol Buckner, for example, uses small groups (3-5 students) within her large first year civil procedure course to develop not only the ability of the students to work cooperatively, but also better understanding by all students of the core concepts of the course, individual accountability, and self-directed learning—all important qualities for lawyers.\textsuperscript{216} In her course, the instructor selects the groups to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{214} Id.; Barbara J. Duch et al., \textit{Strategies for Using Groups, in The Power of Problem-Based Learning, supra note 198}, at 60.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Marta Laupa, et al, \textit{supra} note 78, at 161-63.
\item \textsuperscript{216} See Carol Buckner, “EXPERT LEARNING AND EQUITY ANDROGENY: Integrating Dynamic Groups into First Year Courses to Develop Self-Regulated Learning,” presentation and materials from “Active Teaching and Learning” Eleventh
\end{enumerate}
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assure both diversity and that students don’t merely choose to work with those with whom they have established relationships. Exercises are developed for all, or most of the classes in which the small groups, which remain constant throughout the course, work together to solve some problem. Frequently there are also out-of-class problems that the groups are assigned. For each group problem, one or more of the groups are required to report on their discussions and conclusions to the class. When group work is assigned during class time, the instructor circulates through the class to monitor that the group is working appropriately.\textsuperscript{217}

My experience teaching an interdisciplinary, live client clinic in which students represent their clients (children in dependency court proceedings) in teams consisting of a law student, a social work graduate student and a medical student or resident has convinced me that the students learn far more from their collaborators, and the process, than they could possibly have learned working alone.\textsuperscript{218}

However, as anyone who has read \textit{Lord of the Flies},\textsuperscript{219} or observed a group of unsupervised children at play, knows group work can get messy and even counterproductive,\textsuperscript{220} not to mention emotionally harmful. To avoid those pitfalls, and keep the group on task and really collaborating—as opposed to competing or engaging in “parallel play”—a group facilitator is required.\textsuperscript{221} In their course, Eleanor W. Myers and Nancy Knauer, used practitioners who, as adjunct faculty, met periodically with the students in small groups.\textsuperscript{222}

Annual Conference of the Institute for Law School Teaching, Gonzaga University School of Law (2004), 4-6, on file with author.
\textsuperscript{217} Id.
\textsuperscript{218} WILLIAM GOLDFING, LORD OF THE FLIES (Perigee Trade 1959).
\textsuperscript{219} See Jonathan Haidt, et. al., \textit{supra} note 118, at 5-7.
\textsuperscript{220} Deborah E. Allen & Harold B. White, III, \textit{Undergraduate Group Facilitators to Meet the Challenges of Multiple Classroom Groups, in The Power of Problem-Based Learning, \textit{supra} note 176, at 80-83.}
\textsuperscript{221} Myers, \textit{supra} note 37, at 407-08.
\textsuperscript{222} Lerner, \textit{supra} note 28.
C. Teaching Our Students to Avoid Downshifting

Downshifting occurs when the situation creates too high a level of stress, for example, when it appears to the individual to pose an insoluble problem, and the risk of error is too great. If law students are placed in realistic, though simulated, situations involving ethical dilemmas comparable to those faced by lawyers, supported in their efforts to solve the problem, given the opportunity to reflect on their work, individually, among their peers, and with supervision, so that they can see what worked, what did not, and why, and what other options might have been considered, actively encouraged to consider multiple perspectives and the ethical dimensions throughout the process, and called on to repeat that process at various points throughout law school, the implicit messages will be (1) that seeking and applying ethically correct answers is important for lawyers; (2) that these problems are soluble; and (3) that they are competent to solve them. They will have felt the intellectual, emotional, and moral challenge of the problem. Likely, they will have experienced trial and error, without dire consequences, but rather the opportunity for reflective consideration of their process and others that they might have pursued. They will be supported to value identifying and working towards an ethical solution to problems, rather than merely making an argument to achieve predetermined outcomes. They will understand the relevant concepts, in the contexts in which they arise, and have a bank of experience to call on in addressing moral and ethical problems when they arise in “real life.” Given such experience and knowledge as law students, they should be less likely to respond automatically, or to downshift, and more likely to engage their sophisticated cognitive powers when such dilemmas arise in practice.
Adapting Problem-Based Learning to Law School

Adapting P-BL to legal education should not be difficult. For example, Professors Eleanor W. Myers and Nancy Knauer teach an “Integrated Transactional Practice Course” (ITP), in which they combine the teaching of Trusts and Estates and Professional Responsibility using “long-term, live simulations.” The course was designed starting with the desired progression of the trusts and estates issues, then building in professional responsibility problems in a sequence that Myers says “developed naturally.” They use six client files, which they have attempted to make realistic. In so doing, they have created the underlying “stories” of “the parties, their lawyers, their decisions and choices, and provide a full description of the factual context in which the matter arose.” The students grapple with the problems in the “first person,” experiencing the challenges, and the emotion of exercising discretion and judgment, and assuming personal responsibility. Throughout the course, the faculty is available as “mentors” to facilitate discussion of substantive, strategic and ethical issues.

For many years, New York University Law School has had a first year course, “The Lawyering Program,” in which small groups of students, frequently sub-divided into smaller teams, address a series of problems typical of problems faced by lawyers in daily practice. Teaching both legal “analysis” and lawyering “skills” are goals of the course. Imbedded in certain of the problems, e.g., counseling and

223. For an example of P-BL in non-US style (i.e., undergraduate) legal education, see Keith Winsor, Applying Problem-Based Learning to Practical Legal Training, in The Challenge of Problem-Based Learning, supra note 198, at 224-32 (discussing the creation and implementation of the Practical Skills Course taught at the College of Law, New South Wales, Australia). For a discussion of the use of P-BL in medical education, see T.J. David and Leena Patel, Adult Learning Theory, Problem Based Learning, And Pediatrics, 73 Archives of Disease in Children, 357 (October, 1997). In addition, Professor Myers has offered to share her “Nuts and Bolts Suggestions for Integrated Education” with anyone who asks. Myers, supra note 37, at 401, n. 1.
224. Myers, supra note 37.
225. Id. at 405.
226. Id. at 406.
227. Id. at 411. In order to create simulations that are realistic and emotionally engaging, law schools can use scripted parts for clients and witnesses played by professional actors or repeat performing amateurs much as medical schools use “standardized patients.” See Lawrence M. Grossberg, Medical Education Again Provides A Model For Law Schools: The Standardized Patient Becomes the Standardized Client, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 212 (2001).
228. Myers, supra note 37, at 408-10.
negotiating, are ethical issues. There is detailed faculty feedback after each exercise.\textsuperscript{229}

A less ambitious example was “Law and Lawyering In The Work Place,”\textsuperscript{230} in which Susan Sturm and I, using employment discrimination law as our subject matter, created a series of problems for each segment of the course. Each problem required the application of the doctrinal principles covered in the current course segment and built upon the work done earlier in the semester. For each, the students were required to act “in role” and to employ different skills that lawyers regularly use in representing their clients. A number of the problems required the students to work collaboratively. After each role play, we provided feedback to the individual students as well as to the class as a whole. Frequently, lawyers, or other experts (e.g., police officials, statisticians, women’s rights advocates, etc.) participated in the problems, and also provided feedback.

The National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) has been teaching trial skills to lawyers and law students for thirty years, using both individual problems (i.e., short, fact statements focused on a particular skill), and entire mock “case files” that call upon the “students” to read the factual material, decide on the legal and factual theories they will pursue, marshal the evidence and legal arguments they need, anticipate their adversaries theories and arguments and prepare to meet them, prepare their witnesses, decide upon and obtain trial exhibits, and then perform the trial under the scrutiny of experts, who provide feedback. From the experience of the NITA model, a number of law schools have developed integrated courses which teach evidence, trial advocacy and professional responsibility.\textsuperscript{231}

\textsuperscript{229} Materials on file with author. For examples of other first year courses in lawyering, which incorporate some or all of the principal elements of P-BL, see, e.g., Franklin M. Schultz, \textit{Teaching “Lawyering” To First Year Students: An Experiment In Constructing Legal Competence}, 52 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 1643 (1995) (describing the first year lawyering course at Washington and Lee Law School); Nancy M. Maurer and Linda Fitts Mischi, \textit{Introduction To Lawyering: Teaching First Year Students To Think Like Professionals}, 44 J. LEGAL ED. 96 (March, 1994) (describing the first year lawyering course at Albany Law School); Dean Braverman, \textit{Law Firm: A First-Year Course On Lawyering}, 39 J. LEGAL ED. 501 (discussing the first year lawyering course at Syracuse University Law School).

\textsuperscript{230} See Lerner, \textit{supra} note 28.

\textsuperscript{231} I am personally familiar with the courses at Temple University’s Beasley School of Law, and Widener University Law School where I have participated as a faculty member, and the one at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where I teach.
Examples of courses which integrate problem solving with professional responsibility are also available. The Center For Professionalism at The University of Pennsylvania Law School produced videos of a number of factually complex “stories” in which professional responsibility issues were imbedded. These videos were widely used to educate law students, lawyers, and judges. Their model was to present a segment of a “story,” stop, have the audience, guided by a trained presenter, discuss the facts, and identify and address whatever ethical issues they spotted, and before moving on to the next segment in which the story continued. Each segment included actual ethical problems and/or conduct that might well lead to such problems if followed.

David Luban and Michael Millman have developed a live client clinical course which consciously incorporates professional responsibility as a for-credit element of the course.

In his Professional Responsibility course, Douglas Frenkel consciously seeks to create an environment in which his students “can experience a situation on both intellectual and emotional planes. [By placing them] in unresolved situations that are complex in terms of variables internal[ly] and external[ly] . . . with current facts unclear, future consequences undefined, and resolution susceptible to several choices.” He uses problems taken from real cases, places students in role, and encourages collaboration among the students. At the conclusion of each problem he leads discussion and reflection among the class members.

232. See articles discussing a variety of efforts to improve the teaching of Professional Responsibility, including efforts to integrate that subject matter with various substantive courses, some with efforts to place the students “in role” such as SYMPOSIUM, supra note 28.
234. Luban & Milman, supra note 37.
235. Frenkel, supra note 37, at 29.
236. Id. at 33, 35, 39-40; see also Carol Bruckner, supra note 241.
237. Id. at 41.
E. When and Where to Engage the Students

1. Start in the First Year

The University of California at Berkeley’s Boalt Hall Law School experimented with a three year program introducing legal ethics in the first year curriculum and then discarded the idea, opting to move the course to the second year, in large measure because of a combination of student and faculty opposition.\textsuperscript{238} Students regarded the two credit course as less important than their other course work, described the study of legal ethics as “patronizing, preachy, irrelevant, or intellectually soft,”\textsuperscript{239} and evaluated the instructors’ performance significantly below that of their other teachers.\textsuperscript{240} For their part, faculty felt that by including the course in the first year, students suffered because they lacked “exposure to relevant advanced courses” and had little, if any, practice experience.\textsuperscript{241} Other schools have also tried, and rejected, the idea. Nevertheless, I submit that there are useful reasons for introducing professional responsibility into the first year curriculum.

First, assuming that we are fighting a battle to overcome, or reinforce in the face of negative learning in law school, students’ social intuitions, the sooner we get started the better. Three years offers more opportunity than two.

Second, students arrive at law school excited to be initiated into the world of law and lawyering. They are emotionally prepared to accept that learning from their first year courses and professors. What we omit, as what we include in the first year curriculum, sends an implicit, but readily learned, message about what we think—no, what we “know”—is important for lawyers to do, and therefore for law students to learn. Consequently, “it is what is imprinted in that initial immersion and not any broader messages of the three years, that shapes the students’ consciousness of what is important and not important to being a lawyer.”\textsuperscript{242} Again, if it is their intuitions, developed over many years,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
  \bibitem{239} Id. at 27.
  \bibitem{240} Id. at 25.
  \bibitem{241} Id. at 28.
  \bibitem{242} Lesnick, \textit{supra} note 87, at 1159; \textit{see also} Russell G. Pearce, \textit{Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Course in Law School}, 29 \textit{LOY. U. CHI. L.J.} 719, 735-36 (1998) (urging that law schools promote the importance of legal ethics
\end{thebibliography}
that we are trying to overcome or reinforce in connection with their roles as lawyers, we can expect them to be more open to that in the first year before they become jaded. My experience with the Law & Lawyering In The Workplace course convinced me that by the end of one semester of law school, we have effectively inculcated in our students the “three principles” of legal problem solving. Thereafter, it is difficult to get them to “unlearn” that process or to supplement it with broader considerations that are necessary for the problem solving necessary in representing clients in the practice of law.

Surely the first year curriculum is important and crowded. Yet, I know of no evidence that teaching first year students to engage in creative problem solving would interfere with their learning traditional legal analysis. I also know of no evidence that a first semester, or first year, of law school which devoted less than 100% of course time to teaching only the traditional approach to legal problem solving would, in any manner or degree, impair law students’ analytical abilities, or other functioning as lawyers. Hence, I must conclude that teaching broad based problem solving techniques in the first year would be a valuable addition to the legal education of our students.

Problems of design for the inclusion of professional responsibility in the first year curriculum can be overcome. Deborah Rhode, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, and others have developed such materials. Moreover, faculty who teach in the first year curriculum are certainly capable of learning to use such materials in order to make their inclusion meaningful, and effective.

2. Teach Pervasively

Deborah Rhode argues that law students can best understand by having ethical issues arise in all of their courses. Her position is supported by the recent research on memory, discussed above in Part II.

by making it a required, three credit, first year, first semester course and an upper level course as well, and also incorporate ethics into all courses).

243. See discussion, supra note 28.
244. See generally Rhode, supra note 16.
245. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 186.
246. Note that in the second and third year iterations of its first year professional responsibility course, Boalt Hall added problems drawn from practice, role plays, small group work, increased faculty feedback and role plays explicitly tied to development of lawyering skills. As a result, students’ reaction to the course, and teacher evaluations dramatically improved. Bundy, supra note 238, at 26-27.
Moreover, as we have seen, understanding, and learning to apply the transferability of learning requires that we teach it in multiple contexts. Professional responsibility problems arise in every type of practice, in every subject matter, and perhaps every day, for lawyers. If we want law students to be prepared to recognize and address ethical issues as part of their every day practice of law those problems should present themselves as part of their “everyday” legal education in order that elaborately encoded implicit memory for those experiences is created. If students encountered ethical issues in five different courses, they would have the opportunity of recognizing them in five different contexts. Engaging with ethical issues under the tutelage of five different professors is also likely to produce a much richer learning experience than doing so with only one.

V. CONCLUSION

“A rational approach to curriculum design would begin with an assessment of the law school’s mission and of the kind of student we wish to train and would then attempt to divine an appropriate blend and sequence law, institutions, skills, perspectives and professional issues.”

For many years, the legal profession has recognized that the kind of lawyers that clients, the profession, and the community needs, are those who can carry out their professional responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and public citizens exercising moral and ethical judgment of the highest order. Unfortunately, most law schools have either not accepted as a significant part of their mission the role of training law students for that practice mode, or otherwise ignored Professor Gorman’s admonition. Consequently, prevalent law school curriculum and pedagogy are not well suited to producing lawyers well equipped for either role. Seeing this, many law professors have experimented with course design and delivery seeking to impart these traits and practices to their students. Recent discoveries in social psychology and neuroscience demonstrate rather clearly that a pedagogy based upon contextually rich, emotionally engaging, role-based, problem solving, coupled with ongoing reflective

250. MODEL RULES, Preamble.
251. Gorman, supra note 249, at 469.
discourse is most likely to significantly enhance law students’ effective engagement with, and mastery of, the role of ethical practitioner. It is now up to us to engage that learning in our teaching.